CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T.

GARCIA (Second District of Bataan) versus

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF
COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY
REGULATORY BOARD
G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992
En Banc, Feliciano, J.

Facts: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order

No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty
of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all
imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same
year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a
representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for
they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides that, “All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.”mHe contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to
enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-
generating measures.
Issue: WON EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Held: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not
follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming
they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress
of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides, “The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.” There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as
[Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other
duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
 MANUEL BASTIDA versus THE ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-24011 October 24, 1970
En Banc, Castro, J.

Facts: Benigno Layug, a customs examiner at the Manila International Airport,

found two cardboard boxes in a package each containing a Minifons and he
thereupon found concealed various checks, money orders, and traveler's
checks — all payable in US dollars — amounting to a total of $13,780. In the
other box, he found, concealed in the same manner, two money orders in the
total amount of $3,149.50 and several US dollar bills of different denominations
in the total amount of P630. The Customs authorities seized the two cardboard
boxes and all the contents thereof, alleging violation of Section 1363(f) and (m)
sub-paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Revised Administrative Code, as well as Central
Bank Circular 20 as implemented by Circular 42 (in relation to Section 1363 [f]
of the same Code) because although an Export Control Committee permit and
Central Bank export license covered the exportation of the Minifons the various
checks, money orders and dollar bills were not covered by any Central Bank
license. After the hearing, the Collector of Customs decreed the forfeiture of
the two Minifons as well as the checks, money orders and dollar bills in favor of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The petitioner appealed to
the Commissioner of Customs and it affirmed the decision of the Collector of
Customs. In his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner contended,
inter alia, that the bulk of the property seized consists of checks which are not
subject to forfeiture because they are not "merchandise" as contemplated by
Sections 1363 and 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the
Court of Tax Appeals, affirmed the decision of the Acting Commissioner of
Customs. Hence, the present petition for review of the Tax Court's decision.

Issue: WON the checks and money orders payable in US dollars and the US
dollar bills in question "merchandise" within the purview of Section 1363 of the
Revised Administrative Code

Held: Yes. It is to be noted that Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative

Code, under which the checks, money orders and dollar bills were ordered
forfeited, specifically makes reference to "merchandise." Section 1419 of the
same Code defines "merchandise" thus: " "Merchandise," when used with
reference to importations or exportations, includes goods, wares, and in
general anything that may be made the subject of importation or exportation."
In Commissioner of Customs vs. Capistrano, we held that US dollars, having
ceased to be legal tender in the Philippines, fall within the meaning of the term
"merchandise" as used in the Revised Administrative Code. The dollar bills in
the case at bar are therefore subject to forfeiture.In addition, that part of the
definition of "merchandise" which states, "in general anything that may be
made the subject of importation or exportation," is sufficiently clear and
comprehensive to include checks and money orders.Based on the foregoing,
the Court holds that the checks, money orders and dollar bills in question
properly fall within the concept of "merchandise" as this term is used in Section
1419 of the Revised Administrative Code.
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE
 ENRILE, as Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of
the Manila Police Department versus REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION
U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance
of Manila
G.R. No. L-27360 , February 28, 1968
En Banc, Zaldivar, J.

Facts: Having received information of misdeclared and undervalued personal effects

would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao and
aduly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of two
trucks allegedly carrying thegoods. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they
carried were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation
those claiming ownership showed the policemen a “Statement of Receipts
of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501” issued by the Bureau of
Customs in the name of one Bienvenido Naguit. M a g o fi l e d w i t h t h e C F I .
She complained that the goods were seized without a warrant, and that they
were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code
even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had bought them
without knowing they had been imported illegally. An assailed Order issued by
Jarencio, authorized release under bond of goods seized and held by petitioners in
connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. Papa filed a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs to hold the goods pending
termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court’s action on the
MR, Papa filed the present action.

Issue: WON the judge acted with jurisdiction in issuing the Order releasing
the goods in question

Held: No. The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others,
to (1) assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all
other dues, fees, charges, fines andpenalties, accruing under the tariff and customs
laws (2) prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to
enforce tariff and customs laws. As long as the importation has not been
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles,or secured to
be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted.
The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.The record
shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid
"Statementand Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated that the
estimated duties, taxes and other chargeson the goods subject of this case
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the
Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in
full. The Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods.
Sec. 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty
to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other
charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same
according to law.
 R.V. MARZAN FREIGHT, INC. versus COURT OF APPEALS and SHIELA’S
MANUFACTURING, INC.,
G.R. No. 128064, March 4, 2004
Second Division, Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts: Petitioner RV Marzan Freight, Inc., owned and operated a customs-

bonded warehouse, which, along with the goods stored therein, was covered by
a Philfire insurance policy. On April 12, 1989, raw materials consigned to
private respondent Shiela’s Manufacturing, Inc., arrived in the Philippines from
Keelung, Taiwan. The Bureau of Customs treated the raw materials as subject
to ordinary import taxes and were not immediately released to Shiela’s
Manufacturing. Later, the District Collector of Customs initiated abandonment
proceedings over the cargo and notice was posted. No separate notice was
however sent to Shiela’s Manufacturing because its address was unknown.
After the aforestated proceedings achieved finality but before inventory and
sale at public auction, part of the warehouse containing the shipment was
burned. Philfire paid to Marzan the amount of P12,000,000, for which the latter
was issued a receipt. Shiela’s Manufacturing is now demanding payment of the
value of the goods from Marzan, who, however, rejected the demand. Thus, on
Dec. 26, 1991, or after the lapse of more than 2 years from the arrival of the
cargo in the Philippines, Shiela’s Manufacturing filed a complaint for damages
with the RTC of Pasig City against Marzan. The lower court ruled in favor of
Shiela’s Manufacturing.

Issue: WON the trial court had jurisdiction to review and declare ineffective the
declaration of the District Collector of Customs in the abandonment
proceedings that the subject shipment was abandoned cargo and that,
henceforth, the government ipso facto became the owner thereof.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the contention of Marzan. The RTC had
jurisdiction over the nature of the private respondent’s action, which was one
for the collection of the value of the cargo gutted by fire, while under the
custody and control of the petitioner preparatory to its sale at public auction by
the BOC. However, the Supreme Court also held that the trial court was
incompetent to pass upon and nullify (1) the seizure of the cargo in the
abandonment proceedings, and (2) the declaration made by the District
Collector of Customs that the cargo was abandoned and ipso facto owned by
the government. It, likewise, had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether
or not the private respondent was the owner of the cargo before it was gutted
by fire. The trial court should have rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint, without prejudice to the right of the private respondent to ventilate
the issue before the Commissioner of Customs and/or the CTA. The District
Collector of Customs did not lose jurisdiction over the abandonment
proceedings. The loss of the cargo did not extinguish his incipient jurisdiction in
the said proceedings, nor render functus officio her declaration that the subject
shipment had been abandoned.

FELIClDAD VIERNEZA versus THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

 G.R. No. L-24348, July 30, 1968
En Banc, Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Facts: M/V "Legaspi", a coastwise vessel coming from Jolo was searched upon
a confidential telegraphic report from an informer that it was carrying a
substantial quantity of smuggled foreign cigarettes. The Customs authorities
found 8 cases containing 650 cartons of Chesterfield cigarettes and 110
cartons of Camel cigarettes without the required Internal Revenue strip stamps.
Upon investigation it was also discovered that the subject merchandise was
covered by Bill of Lading No. 24-A (Exhibit B) with "personal belongings" as its
declaration and correspondingly entered into the manifest of the vessel
likewise with "personal belongings" as the noted description, and with Sultan
Pula of Jolo as the consignor and a certain Carlos Valdez as the consignee in
Manila. Upon further investigation, however, it was found that a woman
passenger was accompanying the subject merchandise appearing later to be
Mrs. Felicidad Vierneza, the present claimant, who all the while holds the bill of
lading. It should be noted that when Mrs. Vierneza was questioned during the
course of the search she disclaimed under oath (Exhibit H) ownership of the
merchandise. The Collector of Customs of Cebu seized the merchandise and
instituted the forfeiture proceedings for violation of Section 2530 (f), (g) and
(m-4) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Section 174 of the
Internal Revenue Code. After due hearing, the subject merchandise was
forfeited in favor of the Government. Vierneza appealed to the Commissioner of
Customs who affirmed the decision of the Collector, with the modification that
the forfeiture was sustained, among others, under paragraph (m-1) of Section
2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code instead of under paragraph (m-4) of the
same section. Elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the decision of respondent
Commissioner of Customs was affirmed.

Issue: WON the Collector of Customs for the port of Cebu acted with
jurisdiction in instituting seizure proceedings against the merchandise herein
involved.

Held: Yes. The Tariff and Customs Code clearly empowers the Bureau of
Customs to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the
Customs [Sec. 602 (b)] over all seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines
and over all coasts, ports, airports, harbors, bays, rivers and inland waters
navigable from the sea and, in case of "hot pursuit", even beyond the maritime
zone (Sec. 603). For the due enforcement of this function, a Collector, among
others, is authorized to search and seize (Sec. 2203), at any place within the
jurisdiction of the said Bureau (Sec. 2204, sec. par.), any vessel, aircraft, cargo,
article, animal or other movable property when the same is subject to forfeiture
or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws (Sec. 2205). It is of
no moment where the introduction of the property subject to forfeiture took
place. For, to our mind, "(i)t is the right of an officer of the customs to seize
goods which are suspected to have been introduced into the country in
violation of the revenue laws not only in his own district, but also in any other
district than his own".

SABINO RIGOR, RODOLFO AQUINO and SIMEON ANTICAMARA,

 Collector of Customs, Legal Officer and Chief of the Port and Water
Patrol Division, Respectively, Bureau of Customs, Port of Davao,
Davao City versus
SPOUSES EDUARDO ROSALES AND FLORA ROSALES and HONORABLE
ALFREDO I. GONZALES
G.R. No. L-33756, October 23, 1982
First Division, Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts: Collector Sabino Rigor issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention

against the vessel LCT-759 and its cargo, consisting of 103 pieces of logs for
failure to present a manifest for the said logs within the period prescribed. The
parties who were duly notified and represented, voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the respondent Collector. After hearing, the Collector rendered a
decision ordering the seized logs forfeited in favor of the government to be
disposed of according to law. Instead of appealing the Collector’s decision to
the Commissioner of Customs, the private respondents filed an original petition
for certiorari with the Davao CFI. Respondent alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
CFI.

Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the
Collector of Customs

Held: NO. The Supreme Court held in the negative. Articles subject to seizure
do not have to be goods imported from a foreign country. The provisions of the
Code refer to unmanifested articles found on vessels or aircraft engaged in the
coastwise trade. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the
satisfaction of a court of first instance that the articles on board a vessel were
imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may
exercise the power to effect customs’ searches, seizure, or arrests provided by
law and to continue with the administrative hearings on whether or not the law
may have been violated. Regarding the nature of the port of origin and the port
of destination, it is enough if one of the ports is a port of entry. The respondent
court’s finding that “port of entry” must be limited to the wharves of Sta. Ana
and Sasa where the customs house is located and not extended to “every inch
of the City of Davao” would unduly hamper if not cripple the effective
enforcement of customs and tariff laws. Customs officials cannot stand by
helplessly for want of jurisdiction simply because a restrictive interpretation of
“port of entry” would enable coastwise vessels to load or unload unmanifested
goods with impunity outside of the specific area where the wharves and the
customs house are located. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that the
customs’ officials have authority under the law to make the initial
determination on the limits of their administrative jurisdiction, to act speedily
and to make decisions on the basis of that determination, and to have such act
or decision reviewable only in the manner provided by the Customs and Tariff
Code. The Collector’s decisions are appealable to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decisions, in cases involving seizure, detention or release of
property, may in turn be reviewed only by the CTA.

PEDRO PACIS, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila

 versus
MANUEL R. PAMARAN, as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, and RICARDO
SANTOS
G.R. No. L-23996, March 15, 1974
Second Division, Fernando, J.

Facts: Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile,

model 1957, brought into the country without payment of customs duty and
taxes because its original owner, Donald James Hatch, was tax-exempt. Santos
later on paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. On July 22, 1964, Acting
Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed by the General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National Defense that the automobile was
a “hot car.” By virtue thereof, Pacis, through his subordinates, looked into the
records of his office and found that although the amount of P311.00 was
already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on the said car should be
P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, he instituted seizure
proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. The automobile
was also taken by the Department of National Defense agents and brought to
the General Affairs Administration for compound. In answer, Santos filed a
criminal complaint against Pacis for usurpation of judicial functions with the
City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel Pamaran, alleging that Pacis did not have authority
to issue such warrant of seizure and detention.

Issue: WON petitioner, in the discharge of his official function, lay himself open
to a criminal prosecution for usurpation of judicial functions

Held: Yes. It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for

the Port of Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contested
warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned by respondent
Ricardo Santos. What was done by him certainly could not be the basis of a
prosecution for the usurpation of judicial functions. The remedy of prohibition
lies. The Taffif and Customs Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying
any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling house may
be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace … .”. In this case the subject car was seized in a parking lot, not a
dwelling house.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus LO HO WING alias PETER LO,
LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991
First Division, Gancayco, J.

Facts: Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat, were
convicted for the violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of the aforementioned statute
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the RTC. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia
was discharged as a state witness. In rendering a judgment of conviction, the
trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the government anti-
narcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial
court, namely:

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted was illegal.

Held: NO. The search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not
an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions
thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are
search incidental to an arrest, search of a moving vehicle, and seizure of
evidence in plain view. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the
search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid
warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-
accused. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground
that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought." In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings
of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such
knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.

ANGEL NASIAD and ERNESTO LOZADA versus THE COURT OF TAX

 APPEALS
G.R. No. L-29318, November 29, 1974
Second Division, Fernando, J.

Facts: Petitioners purchased 1,408 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee in

Kiamba, Lumatin and Lumasal, all in the province of Cotabato, from a certain
Osmena Juanday. The said goods were later subjected to seizure and forfeiture.
According to petitioners, inasmuch as the said goods were not imported and of
foreign origin, they are not subject to seizure and forfeiture. They likewise
contend that the forfeiture made was invalid because it was based on
documents and papers which were illegally seized by agents of the
Government through violence and intimidation.

Issue: WON seizure and forfeiture was proper

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the answer by the Solicitor General in that
the petitioners had no personality to contest the searches and seizures
complained of, since at the time the searches and seizures were allegedly
conducted, the vessel belonged to Jose G. Lopez and was chartered by Tomas
Velasco, and the hotel room was occupied by said Velasco and his wife. And so,
petitioners not being parties-in-interest over the so-called Indonesian
documents and effects, they may not invoke the Constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure.

The Supreme Court also held that the findings of facts by the Commissioner of
Customs is entitled to respect. It has been the constantly holding of this Court
that in the absence of a showing of an abuse or improvident exercise of the
authority of respondent Court, the facts as determined by it must be accorded
deference. They are well-nigh conclusive.

JOSE T. VIDUYA, as collector of Customs of the Port of Manila versus

EDUARDO BERDIAGO alias EDUARDO BERTIAGO; and HON. ANDRES
REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal
G.R. No. L-29218 October 29, 1976
Second Division, Fernando, J.

Facts: Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966,
which arrived in the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner,
Jose Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, obtained reliable intelligence
that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release of
the car from the Bureau of Customs, making it appear therein that the car was
a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much
lower customs duty. There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment
of the sum to cover the deficiency, respondent manifesting his willingness to
do so but failing to live up to his promise. As the car was kept in a dwelling
house at the Yabut Compound, two officials of the Customs Police Service as
duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied to respondent Judge for a warrant
to search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein.
Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court based
on lack of probable cause to issue the warrant. Collector Viduya opposed,
alleging that Berdiago could not rely on the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure because it was not shown that he owned the
dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent Judge in the
challenged order quashed such search warrant. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in

quashing the warrant

Held: Yes. The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect
search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws. There is justification then for the insistence on the part of private
respondent that probable cause be shown. So respondent Judge found in
issuing the search warrant. Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he
noted that the warrant for seizure and detention came later than its issuance.
In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently overlooked that long before the
search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April 15, 1968, the
misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and that thereafter on
April 24, 1968, private respondent himself agreed to make good the further
amount due but not in the sum demanded. As the car was kept in a dwelling
house, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service
applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such
move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law
assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have been
performed. While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and
detention came later than the search warrant, there were indubitable facts in
existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly there was probable
cause. There was evidently need for the issuance of a search warrant. It ought
not to have been thereafter quashed.
AUYONG HIAN (HONG WHUA HANG) versus COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
CONSOLIDATED TOBACCO INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(CTIP) & LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION
 G.R. No. L-28782 November 27, 1981
Second Division, Barredo, J.

Facts: On December 30, 1961, 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco arrived
in the Port of Manila. As the Import Control Law was already expired, the
Collector of Customs in Manila refused to release the shipment of the subject
goods. The shipment was then, declared illegal upon the ground that the
importation was made long after the expiration of the effectivity of the Import
Control Law and that the importation contravened the government policy as
declared in Republic Acts 698 and 1194. The goods were declared forfeited to
the government and its sale was ordered for public auction which the CTIP took
advantage of. The petitioner prayed for several errors by the CTA. One of them
is the petitioner’s contention that the sale to the CTIP was invalid on ground
that the amount paid by the CTIP was insufficient in respect with the
petitioner’s claim that the goods’ value was Php 7,000,000 and what CTIP paid
was only Php 1,500,000.

Issue: WON the sale of the tobacco from the public auction to STIP was
invalid?

Held: NO. The sale of the tobacco from the public auction to CTIP was valid.
Even if the consideration paid for the forfeited tobacco was inadequate, such
inadequate consideration is not a ground for the invalidity of a contract. Article
1355 of the Civil Code provides the law for this matter. It was not shown that
the instant sale is a case exempted by law from the operation of the
aforementioned Article; neither has the petitioner shown that there was fraud,
mistake or undue influence in the sale. Therefore, the SC can only conclude
with the CTA that “In these circumstances, we find no reason to invalidate the
sale of said tobacco to CTIP.”

ROLANDO E. GEOTINA, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

versus
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS and UNITRADE, INC.
G.R. No. L-33500 August 30, 1971
 En Banc, Teehankee, J.

Facts: The vessel M/V "Mindanao Sea" arrived at the Port of Manila carrying
37,042 cartons fresh apples consigned to Unitrade Inc., a domestic corporation.
After payment of the taxes and duties on the portion of the shipment consisting
of 10,000 cartons of fresh apples, the necessary transfer permits were issued
by the Collector of Customs of Manila. While this portion of the importation was
being unloaded from the carrying vessel and transported to the designated
cold storage house, the Collector of Customs, issued warrants of seizure and
detention ordering the seizure of a portion of the goods already unloaded and
their detention for allegedly having been imported in violation of Central Bank
Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295, in relation to Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and
Customs Code "pending termination of the seizure proceedings thereof and/or
until further orders." Unitrade, through its broker, requested the discharge of
said articles from the carrying vessel and their delivery to it under bond. The
Collector denied the request on the ground that the importation of said goods
is prohibited under Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 of the Central Bank and
are, therefore, articles of prohibited importation under Section 102(k) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Respondent Commissioner of Customs, on appeal
fsustained the decision. Hence, this appeal. The tax court, per its resolution,
correctly denied respondent's motion. On another urgent motion of respondent
alleging malfunctioning of the reefer machinery of the carrying vessel,
however, the tax court per its order oallowed the immediate discharge of the
fruits and their deposit in a customs bonded warehouse "under conditions as to
prevent or arrest spoilage or deterioration pending final determination of the
case on the merits."
Issue: WON the tax court act within its authority and in accordance with the
applicable law and jurisprudence in ordering the release under bond of the
questioned shipment of fresh apples — admittedly imported on a "no dollar"
basis — notwithstanding the lack of the required Central Bank release
certificate?
Held: The issue reduces itself quite simply and essentially to whether or not
the fresh apples in question are "articles of prohibited importation." If so, as the
Court holds, then the tax court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in overturning
the customs authorities' proper exercise of their jurisdiction under section 1207
of the Customs Code, in preventing importation and refusing to allow the
discharge of the shipment of apples, which admittedly is not covered by the
required Central Bank permit or release certificate. By the same token, since
the importation of said apples is banned under the cited Central Bank circulars
which have the force and effect of law, the tax court acted without authority of
law in ordering the commissioner to release the apples to the importer under
bond, for under the very section 2301 of the customs code invoked by it,
"articles the importation of which is prohibited by law shall not be released
under bond." The judgment of the CTA was set aside and annulled. The
decision of petitioner commissioner of customs appealed from by private
respondent is instead affirmed and the petition of said respondent in the lower
court is dismissed, with costs in both instances against said respondent.
UTE PATEROK versus BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and HON. SALVADOR N.
MISON
G.R. Nos. 90660-61, January 21, 1991
En Banc, Sarmiento, J.
Facts: In March 1986, petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two
containers, one with used household goods and the other two used
automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz). The first container and
the Bourgetti car were released by the BOC, but not the Mercedes Benz, which
remained in custody of the Bureau. Petitioner then received a notice of hearing,
informing him that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the said
Mercedes Benz. While this case was pending, petitioner received a letter from
the District Collector of Customs, informing her that a decision ordering the
forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered. Petitioner did not know
that the same Mercedes Benz was subject to two different forfeiture
proceedings. He only found out later that the Notice of Hearing for the
forfeiture proceedings before the District Collector was posted on the bulletin
board of the BOC, at Port Area, Manila.

Issue: WON seizure and forfeiture was proper in the instant case

Held: The seizure and forfeiture proceedings was based on a violation of B.P.
73, specifically a law that promotes energy conservation and prohibits the
importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor
cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters. The Mercedes
Benz subject of this case has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic
centimeters, which clearly falls within the prohibited importation and as such,
is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents.

RAMON RAMOS, JR. versus HON. MANUEL R. PAMARAN, Presiding

Judge, Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and JOSE GAMBOA
G.R. No. L-38271 October 28, 1974
Second Division, Aquino, J.
Facts: Ramos was charged with fraudulently importing to the country
Ammonium Sulphate or fertilizer which were found to have no import entry as
required by customs laws and which were to be released without having been
properly declared, and that the duties and taxes have not been paid to the
proper authorities. Ramos avers that the Tariff and Customs Code (Code)does
not provide any prescriptive period for the violation of its provisions, the
applicable statute of limitations is article 1149 of the Civil Code which provides
that all other actions whose periods are not fixed in the Civil Code must be
brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. Hence, he
concludes that the offense of fraudulent importation, which was allegedly
committed in 1966, had already prescribed when the information was filed on
1972.

Issue: WON Ramos' contention has merit.

Held: NO. Section 3601 of the Code should be applied as unlawfully imported
merchandise, as in this case, is valued at more than P150,000. When, upon
trial for a violation of Section 3601, Ramos is shown to have had possession of
the article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction, unless he shall explain the possession to the satisfaction
of the court. Provided, however, that payment of the tax due after
apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this
section. The Code is a special law which does not provide when the offenses
committed thereunder would prescribe. That deficiency is supplied by Act No.
3326, as amended by Act No. 3763. Article 1149 of the Civil Code has no
application to this case. The prescription of actions in the Civil Code
contemplates civil actions and not criminal actions.

TRANQUILINO ROVERO versus RAFAEL AMPARO as Judge of the Court

of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-5482, May 5, 1952
En Banc, Montemayor, J.
Facts: Tranquilino Rovero arrived at the Makati Air Port on board a PAL plane
which came from Bangkok, Siam, with a Chinese vase which he declared and
valued at P15. Upon examination of it by Customs officials, they discovered 259
pieces of jewelry with precious stones, which the Customs officials appraised at
P23,736. Rovero never mentioned to said Customs officials the presence of said
pieces of jewelry in the Chinese vase. The jewelry was, therefore, seized as
property subject to forfeiture under section 1363 (m-2) in relation to section
1292 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rovero was found guilty of violating
section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rovero appealedto the CFI
which later affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Rovero
again appealed to the SC and it was affirmed. Thereafter, Rovero wrote to the
Commissioner of Customs a letter petitioning for a reappraisal of said jewelry.
Acting upon said petition the Collector of Customs in a memorandum order, by
order of the Commissioner of Customs created a Committee on
Reappraisement. They filed their report and it said that the 259 pieces of
jewelry were reappraised at P9,880. Then, the Secretary of Finance granted
authority "for the setting aside of the original appraisement and for the
collection of the fine imposed by the Supreme Court and of the customs duties
and charges based on the reappraisement value of P9,800." The Solicitor-
General moved for execution of the decision of the CFI which have been
affirmed by the SC. Rovero asked for the denial of the motion for execution of
the ground that the judgment had already been satisfied claiming that the fine
in lieu for forfeiture plus surcharge and other legal charges had already been
paid, including sales tax. Incidentally, it should be here stated that Rovero
received from the Collector of Customs the 259 pieces of jewelry after he had
paid the corresponding duty and all charges and the fine of trebel the
reappraised value of P9,880. justify the reappraisal made by the Customs
officials after the decision of this Court had become final, the provisions of
section 1368 is invoked.

Issue: WON the appraisement is material

Held: Yes. The imposed on Rovero for the fraudulent importation of jewelry was
based on this same appraisal. Even if he won the case, said original appraisal
was still material because he would have to pay the ordinary customs duties on
said jewelry just the same based on the original appraisement. He cannot
ignore the fact that every merchandise, even if regularly and lawfully imported
has to be appraised, the duty payable thereon being based and dependent
upon the appraisal. So, the claim is not correct that the original appraisal was
not material. In conclusion, when the Commissioner of Customs or his
subordinate orders the seizure of goods fraudulently brought in or imported,
have them appraised and then in lieu of forfeiture imposes on the importer a
fine based on said appraisal, and the importer appeals to the CFI, the amount
of appraisal is necessarily involved and is in issue in the appeal.