COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE,vs.HONORABLE CONRADO M.

VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by
respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents
relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's
Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection
with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a
concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.

The letter reads in pertinent parts:

1 These are the things that I have been observing. During the implementation of E.O. 127 on May 1, 1988, one hundred ninety (190)
personnel were dismissed. Before that implementation, we had a monthly savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus
the implementation of RA 6683 wherein seventy (70) regular employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was saved from the
government monthly. The question is, how do they used or disbursed this savings? The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of
Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents"
(EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has a biggest share on this. Among his activities are:
a) Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He gives big amount especially during the Dec. Failed coup.
b) Payment for thirty five (30) mini UZI's.
c) Payment for the purchased of Maxima '87 for personal used of the Commissioner.
d) Another observation was the agents under the Director of NCR EIIB is the sole operating unit within Metro Manila which was
approved by no less than the Commissioner due to anomalous activities of almost all agents assigned at the central office directly
under the Commissioner. Retired Brig. Gen. Almonte as one of the Anti-Graft board member of the Department of Finance should not
tolerate this. However, the Commissioner did not investigate his own men instead, he placed them under the 15-30 payroll.
e) Many more which are personal.
2. Sir, my question is this. Can your good office investigate EII intelligence funds particularly Personal Services (01) Funds? I wonder
why the Dep't of Budget & Mgmt. cannot compel EIIB to submit an actual filled up position because almost half of it are vacant and still
they are releasing it. Are EIIB plantilla position classified? It is included in the Personal Services Itemization (PSI) and I believe it is not
classified and a ruling from Civil Service Commission that EIIB is not exempted from Civil Service. Another info, when we had salary
differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost
agents of EIA.
3. Another thing that I have observed was the Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber firearms such as a mini UZI, Armalite rifle
and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the Assistant Commissioner wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such
according to memorandum order number 283 signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines effective 9 Jan. 1990.
Another observation was when EIIB agents apprehended a certain civilian who possesses numerous assorted high powered firearms.
Agents plus one personnel from the legal proclaimed only five (5) firearms and the remaining was pilfered by them.
Another observation is almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for
them not to be apprehended.
Another observation is the commissioner allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to the media to sustain their
good image of the bureau.

In his comment 1 on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the separation of personnel,
the EIIB had made some savings. He averred that the only funds released to his agency by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were filled. He also
denied that there were "ghost agents" in the EIIB and claimed that disbursements for "open" (i.e., "overt" personnel)
and "closed" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the agency had been cleared by the Commission on Audit (COA);
that the case of the 30 Uzis had already been investigated by Congress, where it was shown that it was not the EIIB
but an agent who had spent for the firearms and they were only loaned to the EIIB pending appropriation by
Congress; that, contrary to the charge that a Maxima car had been purchased for his use, he was using a
government issued car from the NICA; that it was his prerogative as Commissioner to "ground" agents in the EIIB
main office so that they could be given reorientation and retraining; that the allegation that the EIIB operatives
pilfered smuggled firearms was without factual basis because the firearms were the subject of seizure proceedings
before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been uncompromising toward employees found
involved in anomalous activities; and that intelligence funds had not been used for media propaganda and if media
people went to the EIIB it was because of newsworthy stories. Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and
the case considered closed.

Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied in his comment 2 dated April 3, 1990 that savings had
been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM provided allocations for only the remaining
947 personnel. He said that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for "overt" and "covert" personnel
had been cleared by the COA and that the high-powered firearms had been issued for the protection of EIIB
personnel attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in withdrawing funds from the banks.

The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments unsatisfactory, being
"unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically the points raised by complainant as
constitutive of the alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore, asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena 4 to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to
submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum 5 to the Chief
of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. In his Order dated
June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there
were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled
that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces
tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief
of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents
relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of
the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera were EIIB employees
under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do directly, i.e., compelling
them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence against themselves.

Petitioners' motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman's order dated August 6, 1990. Hence, this petition which
questions the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent Ombudsman.

To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a citizen for
information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the power of the
Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim
of privilege of an agency of the Government. Thus petitioners raise the following issues: 8

I. WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED AND UNVERIFIED LETTER

COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE CASE" WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO
PRODUCE TO HIM "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR
1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR
1988."
II. WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR
1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR
1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE REACH OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
I.
There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the question whether
petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB
employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on
the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will
necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its
being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." 9

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or
materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office.
Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the Government's claim of privilege.

A.

At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance
as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof,
the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. 10

In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right
of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, which it likened to "the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations." Said the Court in United States v. Nixon: 11

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like
the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of the government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. . . .

Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional status and a new name, although not
necessarily a new birth. 12

"The confidentiality of judicial deliberations" mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to the fact that Justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have traditionally treated their working papers and
judicial notes as private property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. Congress that Justices and judges of lower federal
courts "should be encouraged to make such arrangements as will assure the preservation and eventual availability
of their personal papers, especially the deposit of their papers in the same depository they select for [their] Public
Papers" 13 was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulation and
Government Information of the U.S. Senate, referred to "difficult concerns respecting the appropriate separation that
must be maintained between the legislative branch and this Court." 14

There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government's privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. 15

With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:

Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.
Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to
the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the
court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should
not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination
of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. . . . In each case, the showing of necessity
which is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome
the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori,
where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case,
will have to prevail. 16

On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other
national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have
declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to
the enforcement of criminal laws. 17

B.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports
and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may
be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege
resting on other considerations.

Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as
classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention
that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of expenditure which
should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of rewards."
Thus, part V, No. 7 of the Circular reads:

The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under
the category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and payment of
rewards. However, reasonable records should be maintained and kept for inspection of the
Chairman, Commission on Audit or his duly authorized representative. All other expenditures are to
be considered unclassified supported by invoices, receipts and other documents, and, therefore,
subject to reasonable inquiry by the Chairman or his duly authorized representative. 20

It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable records" be kept justifying the confidential or
privileged character of the information relating to informers. There are no such reasonable records in this
case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential.

The other statutes and regulations 21 invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents sought
in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's
functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by
denying that there were savings made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the DBM had released to
the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect
invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined
by the COA and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another
agency of the government which by constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public
office.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other
personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution
"protectors of the people" and as such they are required by it "to act promptly on complaints in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation." 22

His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there
might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now,
seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose
identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert missions to
which they might have been deployed might either have been accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which
continued funding was received by its officials and put to illegal use, remains.

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would only
justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of the
functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of
records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the extent that it will not
reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.

With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting claims of the parties is
achieved. It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security have been inquired into in appropriate in
camera proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v. Garcia 23 this Court held closed door sessions, with only the
immediate parties and their counsel present, to determine claims that because of subversion there was imminent
danger to public safety warranting the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos
v. Manglapus 24 the Court met behind closed doors to receive military briefings on the threat posed to national
security by the return to the country of the former President and his family. In the United States, a similar inquiry into
the danger to national security as a result of the publication of classified documents on the Vietnam war was upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 25 We see no reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of
the Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect public
interests 26 while insuring the confidentiality of classified documents.

C.

Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint in this case is unsigned and unverified,
the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins
the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus,
Art. XI, § 12 provides:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof. (Emphasis added)

Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2):

The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever
form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the
same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing
the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the
respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a
written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it
shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis added)

Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 27 the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and
charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to commence
investigation, because a formal complaint was really not necessary.

Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, § 12 means
any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." 28 The
phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by
Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well
include a requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as exception to the
general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. 29 A reconciliation is thereby made between the
demands of national security and the requirement of accountability enshrined in the Constitution. 30
What has been said above disposes of petitioners' contention that the anonymous letter-complaint against them is
nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the general investigation in the Ombudsman' s office
is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit
resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased public confidence that the privilege is not
being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring.

II.

Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum
and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn
statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence
of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point
out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often
than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. 32

III.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-
incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and
those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the
documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has
already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents
by respondent Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made
personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.

Separate Opinions KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

The well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Mendoza would postulate that the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) documents relating to the Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all documentary evidence,
including salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988 be produced before the Ombudsman over the
objections of the EIIB Commissioner on the ground that the documents contain highly confidential matters, apart
from the fact that the expenditures had been cleared in audit by the Commission on Audit (COA). The reasons relied
upon in the ponencia are a) that the EIIB documents at issue are not classified under COA (Commission on Audit)
Circular No. 88-293, Part V No. 7 which limits such matters exclusively to expenditures relating to the purchase of
information and payment of rewards; and b) the documents relating to disbursement and expenditures of the EIIB
for personal funds had already been previously examined by the Commission on Audit when such outlay had been
passed upon in audit in the said Office, such that there is no confidentiality privilege to protect.

With due respect, I beg to disagree.

Disclosure of the documents as required by the Ombudsman would necessarily defeat the legal mandate of the EIIB
as the intelligence arm of the executive branch of government relating to matters affecting the economy of the
nation. As such, EIIB's functions are related to matters affecting national security. In the performance of its function
in relation with the gathering of intelligence information executive privilege could as well be invoked by the EIIB,
especially in relation to its covert operations.

The determination, by the executive branch, through its appropriate agencies, of a question as affecting the national
security is a policy decision for which this Court has neither the competence nor the mandate to infringe upon. In the
absence of a clear showing a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive, acting through its (national
security) agencies, I am of the opinion that we cannot interfere with a determination, properly made, on a question
affecting economic security lest we are prepared to ride roughshod over certain prerogatives of our political
branches. In an area obviously affecting the national security, disclosure of confidential information on the
promptings of some dissatisfied employees would potentially disturb a number of carefully laid-out operations
dependent on secrecy and I am not prepared to do this. The characterization of the documents as classified
information is not a shield for wrongdoing but a barrier against the burden some requests for information which
necessarily interfere with the proper performance of their duties. To give in, at every turn, to such requests would be
greatly disruptive of governmental functions. More so in this case, since expenditures of the EIIB for personal funds
had already been previously examined and passed upon in audit by the Commission on Audit. There has been no
allegation of any irregularity in the COA's earlier examination, and in the absence of substantiated allegations, the
previous determination ought to be accorded our respect unless we want to encourage unnecessary and tiresome
forays and investigations into government activities which would not only end up nowhere but which would also
disrupt or derail such activities.

The confidentiality privilege invoked by petitioners attaches in the exercise of the functions of the EIIB, as
presidential immunity is bestowed by reason of the political functions of the Chief Executive, as a separate and co-
equal branch of government. By the same parity of reasoning, the disclosure of the EIIB documents required to be
examined by the Ombudsman even in camera proceedings will under the pretext of ascertaining the proper
disbursements of the EIIB funds will unnecessarily impair the performance by the EIIB of its functions especially
those affecting national security.

The constitutional right allowing disclosure of governmental documents, i.e., the right to information on matters of
public concern is not absolute. While access to official records may not be prohibited, it may be
regulated. 1Regulation includes appropriate authority to determine what documents are of public concern, the
manner of access to information contained in such documents and to withhold information under certain
circumstances, particularly, as in this case, those circumstances affecting the national security. 2

Besides, as I emphasized earlier, the determination of the legality of EIIB's disbursements of funds allocated to it are
properly within the competence of the Commission on Audit, which as the ponencia of Justice Mendoza finds, has
been cleared in audit. The Commission on Audit had adopted, as in the past, measures to protect "classified
information" pertaining to examination of expenditures of intelligence agencies. In the present case, disclosure of
information to any other agency would unnecessarily expose the covert operations of EIIB, as a government agency
charged with national security functions.

I, therefore, vote to give due course to the petition.

 SENATE VS. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican
thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a
distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any
greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."1

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence,
the necessity to guard it zealously.

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by
issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.

In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come
from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the
challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the
Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance
of the government that contravenes its mandates.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations 2 dated September 22, 2005 to
the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the
AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo;
Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant
Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a
public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms
that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World";
(3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger";
(4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee
on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the
Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator
Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are
currently attending to other urgent operational matters."

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the
NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation."

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his
request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource
persons were completed [the previous] week."

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or
cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had
been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367,
23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers
covered by this executive order, including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order
(Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege;

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b)
hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the
rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464,
and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
[regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to
[E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which
was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon,
Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President
Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been
granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled
by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani
among all the AFP officials invited attending.

For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings.

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O. 464,
sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit
Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso,
Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas
Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC
Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board
Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and
Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and
prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin
Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of government
employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of
justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance
of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional;
that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress
due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes
them from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a
political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights
and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in
the implementation of laws; Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and
threatened by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and
CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to
transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and
law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource
non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized
sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the
general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null and
void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from
implementing it.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the
same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s
powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate
and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834,
alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented
through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental
issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him and
other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga
replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters
requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will
attend once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on
February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16

In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon
Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani
program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on
October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary
Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director
Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.

In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential
Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local
Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate
clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however,
Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.

On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization
of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their
petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void.

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing,
enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.

In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were
ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the
following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21,
Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or
controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in their
respective memoranda.

After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, paying
particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming
that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the
NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.22

Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those in
G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No.
171246 did not file any memorandum.

Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum27 was
granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in
the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:

Art. VI, Sec. 2130 Art. XI, Sec. 133 Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
Art. VI, Sec. 2231 Art. III, Sec. 734 Art. II, Sec. 2837
Art. VI, Sec. 132 Art. III, Sec. 435

Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum38 on
March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.

The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites
for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.

Standing

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667
make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the
investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of
the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight
functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and
privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention
of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the
implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and that of
the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the
Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties
"injured-in-fact."40

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the
implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.41

With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury
by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of
E.O. 464.44

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in
a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles
the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate,
including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the
proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel
Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are
allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by
the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464
notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.

The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the
House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process
consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute
to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing
of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and
violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of
the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.52

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues
raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded
standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that
it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.54 The first and last determinants
not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have
direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its
petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a
"generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of
judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal
standing.

Actual Case or Controversy

Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate
to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping
controversy.

Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has
actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they claim,
merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the
President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing
on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the President’s consent was
based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will
abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not
sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.

The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance
of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O.
464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition
issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings
of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the
present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain
from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Constitutionality of E.O. 464

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the
information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information
violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as
the power of inquiry, is in order.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests
the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its
committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in
1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to
legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy,
was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an
important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish
Arnault for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same
case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters which
may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows
that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper
exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the
guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold
that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on
executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their
offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It
may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of
legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation
on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The
provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of
procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of
procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even
if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to
obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting
in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In
such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these
abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order,
it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege
is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the
1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in
the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying
kinds.67Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more
accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any
of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the
context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with
Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose
the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that
law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68

Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of
information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that
might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of
government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the
doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure
requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge
of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only
to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary
in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether
that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that
case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court
requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of
privilege was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the
U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s
powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be
balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to
clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional
demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent
assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn
over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the
issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the
same year as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional
subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals
weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure
to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77Almonte
used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
decision which explains the basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy
of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective,
and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not
involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court
recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus
acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for
information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized
limitation on the right to information.

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that
information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations
of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to
information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege
is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Validity of Section 1

Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions,
however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any
official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the
determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not
made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on
what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section
22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of
either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions
of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed
that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or
before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the
Regular Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa –
one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come
and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet
ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22]
does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House
when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez,
that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam
President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to
Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of
department heads discretionary in the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely
in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in
the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the
following exchange during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding
Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner
Davide, to give his reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that
instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section
21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a
Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid
of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.

MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to
or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In
other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it be,
Commissioner Davide?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded from
the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both
Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to
conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions on
these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress.

The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner
Maambong’s committee – the Committee on Style – shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct
functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of
confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and
the operation of the government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a
specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory.
The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are
also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of
government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure
of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in
the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent, the
question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary
system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence
of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of
its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress
has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the
executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as
that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that
makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress
as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between
the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary
system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce
made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to
perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of
oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since
it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of
it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only
of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This
point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon
interpellation of the Chief Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to
pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is
dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will
render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials
of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the
judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section
2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis,
the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage
under executive privilege.

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers
persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege,
the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of saying
that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged
as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the
challenged order.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the
executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned
unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing
more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the
President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is
covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the
legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination.
Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that
the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive
privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon
illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:

In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the
Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of
Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public
Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes".
Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor
does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the
hearing.

Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the invited
officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a
determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official possesses
information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination
has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not
secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition
against their appearance before Congress.

Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through the
President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information required
by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the
President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked
against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may
validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the
separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in
the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of
executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
determine whether it is valid.

While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked
therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that
renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary
quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation
of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege
under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the
executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in
the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order."

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that
the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly
asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:

The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a
private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself
must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining
whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it
should be respected.93 These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted
against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95

A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:

[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible, thereby
preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to override any claims
of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)

And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97

On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating its
objection to claimant’s interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by
claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has
not shown – nor even alleged – that those who evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal policymaking,
generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which
the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to
assume that the evaluation and classification of claimant’s products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an
assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise and certain’
reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."

Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:

A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents
within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is
impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the
affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of
the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim
was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case
because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability.
To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these
documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly
stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102

We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these
questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the
records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas
issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a
statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other
appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy
is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such statement was
"a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot
be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful analogy in
determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v.
U.S.104 declares:

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate
himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his
silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the
witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually
required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted.
It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress
to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of
office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on
the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President
regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation
of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of
the United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from
Congress.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of
prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President
that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege,
as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the
fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption
from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of
executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power
to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he
personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest
official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not
explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,
might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary
invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress
and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President
under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the
Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need
to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Right to Information

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings
conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters
of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is
not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power
of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen
for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The
citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter
before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the
extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense
explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the
need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general,
Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be
covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body
politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this
issuance before it was implemented.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
That is impermissible. For

[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the
divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be
presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the
operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to
take part in government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of
2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under
the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.
G.R. No. 131636 March 5, 2003
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review1 is the Decision2 dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and
P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate complaints
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were consolidated and jointly
tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria
Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and
Celestino Navarro.

Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that
he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of
the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger
brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing
a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.3

Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia
from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather,
Celestino Navarro.4

Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified
that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio
on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small opening in the
destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her
father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left
and proceeded to the field to catch fish.5 He reported what he had witnessed to Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later
that morning.6

Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started
living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they had six
children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways permanently. Later, Gloria and
her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemio’s mother died sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a
small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7 On 30
August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and
asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria
then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to
their daughter Cynthia.8

Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She
found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8
o’clock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private
part.9

Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her mother,
complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She
then executed a written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Canlas.11

The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the
witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified
before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in Barangay
Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were shut. When he went
around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he
could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his children used to sleep. Although it was then about
noontime, it was dark inside.12 Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling
the truth when he declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the
sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.

On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with some destroyed
portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children sometime in December 1995, there was a hole
in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish in a nearby brook.13 When
she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was informed of Cynthia’s pregnancy, she
noticed that the destroyed portions of the hut’s sawali walls were not yet repaired.14
The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of the small
house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia,
were living in that house, the hut’s old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of
Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthia’s complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some
repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions
of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin occupied the house.15

In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however,
acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.

In his Appellant’s Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in

I
x x x BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
x x xNOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS] GUILT x x x BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have
been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.16 Besides, Elven’s
testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the questions asked were mostly
leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.

In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to the following
inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen
Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen them in the same
position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996; (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996,
Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven
and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr.,
Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.

Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was impossible for
Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he likewise urges
us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria. According to him, Celestino had an ax to
grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands,
which was owned by Artemio’s deceased mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because
she was already cohabiting with another man.

In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemio’s conviction and
sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in addition to the awards of
moral and exemplary damages.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry
flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the
forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh,
the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.17 This rule,
however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been
ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the
facts.18We do not find any of these exceptions in the case at bar.

As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a
descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant.20 The rule refers to a privilege not to
testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not
compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against
Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the
truth."21

Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court22 expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like
Elven.

The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such
insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not
have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to
justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive
against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone
to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
credence.23

We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed, i.e., during
the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date
of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of
the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.24 In this case, we believe that the
crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of these
witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to
minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility.25 On the contrary, they may even be
considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is
important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent
whole.26

Artemio’s allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the crime because
the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino
Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not have been
mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the
time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled
out of his sleep by Cynthia’s loud cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father.27

The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved. Nothing in the records
suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the father of her other
children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and
trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the person
responsible for her child’s defilement incarcerated.28 As for Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut stands is
owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by Artemio’s mother.29 At any rate, even without Celestino’s testimony,
Artemio’s conviction would stand.

The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death imposed by the trial court. The
death penalty was imposed because of the trial court’s appreciation of the special qualifying circumstances that
Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at the time the crime was committed.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the governing law in this case,
pertinently reads:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. –

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint
or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction. The
accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as follows:

That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of
his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.

CONTRARY TO LAW.30

Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly established by
evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved.

In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in evidence to
prove Cynthia’s age. The statement in the medical certificate showing Cynthia’s age is not proof thereof, since a
medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Gloria’s
testimony regarding Cynthia’s age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time
of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even
make a categorical finding on Cynthia’s minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding Cynthia’s age could not be taken against him.

It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out,
makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.32 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of
qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact
of rape,33 should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not be less than P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No. 9375 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages;
and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
 ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, vs.Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO
G.R. No. 169895 March 23, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court), assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62479 dated July 8, 2005 and its Resolution2 dated September 29, 2005 in the same
case.

The antecedents of this case are as follows:

On May 26, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) printed an article3 headlined Judge mauled me, says court
employee, carrying the by-line of petitioner Volt Contreras (Contreras). The article reported an alleged mauling
incident that took place between respondent Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Escolastico U. Cruz, Jr.
(Judge Cruz) and Robert Mendoza (Mendoza), an administrative officer assigned at the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Makati RTC.

Reckoning the article to be false and malicious, Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint4 for libel with the City Prosecutor
of Makati. In particular, Judge Cruz protested the following sentence in said article:

According to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme Court by Fiscal
Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati RTC.5

Rebutting the statement, Judge Cruz alleged that there was no suit for sexual harassment pending against him
before this Court, and attached a certification dated July 16, 19966 of the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the
pendency of only two administrative cases against him, namely RTJ-96-1352 (Re: Mauling incident) and OCA IPI
No. 96-185-RTJ (For gross ignorance of the law, Partiality and Rendering an unjust judgment).

For his part, Contreras filed a counter-affidavit7 with the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, explaining the supposed
factual basis for his article. It appeared that Atty. Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia (Paredes-Garcia) had filed with this
Court a Petition for Review to question a contempt order issued against her by Judge Cruz. In connection with said
Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 120654, Paredes-Garcia filed a Reply dated February 5, 1996
asking this Court to look deeply into allegations of one Enrina Talag-Pascual (Talag-Pascual) that Judge Cruz made
sexual advances to her while she was a member of his staff at the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Paredes-Garcia claimed that she suffered similar indignities from Judge Cruz, and prayed that her Petition be
treated as an administrative case against said judge. Paredes-Garcia appended a January 29, 1996 affidavit
executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who became
objects of his fancy. Contreras claimed that the statement in his news article constituted a fair and true report of a
matter of grave public interest as it involved the conduct of a regional trial court judge.

In the meantime, on September 11, 1996, this Court rendered its Decision8 on the Petition of Paredes-Garcia,
granting her prayer to set aside Judge Cruz’s contempt order. The prayer in Paredes-Garcia’s Reply that the
Petition be treated as an administrative case against Judge Cruz was not passed upon by the Court.

Subsequently, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved a Resolution9 finding probable cause against Mendoza and
six PDI officers and employees, namely: Contreras, Isagani Yambot, Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc, Jose Ma. Nolasco,
Artemio Engracia, Jr. and Carlos Hidalgo (the PDI Staff). On February 21, 1997, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information10 for libel against Mendoza and the PDI Staff. Thereafter, the PDI Staff filed a Motion with the trial court
for the deferment of the arraignment to allow them to appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Justice.

On March 3, 2000, then Secretary of Justice Artemio Tuquero (Secretary Tuquero) dismissed the PDI Staff’s
Petition for Review of the Resolution of the City Prosecutor.11 Secretary Tuquero rejected the argument of therein
petitioners that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of lack of supporting affidavits from third persons.
According to Secretary Tuquero, affidavits of third persons are not essential for a libel complaint to prosper, as it is
enough that the person defamed can be identified.12 As regards the factual basis presented by Contreras, Secretary
Tuquero noted it cannot be said that Judge Cruz was indeed facing a sexual harassment suit in this Court.13 The
Motion for Reconsideration14 was denied in a Resolution15 dated October 12, 2000.

The PDI Staff with the exception of Hidalgo (herein petitioners) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals to challenge the aforementioned Resolutions of Secretary Tuquero. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 62479.

On July 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Applying
our ruling in Advincula v. Court of Appeals,16 the appellate court held that since the Information had already been
filed with the trial court, the primary determination of probable cause is now with the latter.17 The Court of Appeals
denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2005.

Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review with this Court, raising the following issues:

(A) WHETHER OR NOT A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE OR DEFICIENT
IF IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVITS OF THIRD PERSONS.
 (B) WHETHER OR NOT A NEWS REPORT ON THE ACTUATIONS OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS
PRIVILEGED IN NATURE AND HENCE, THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IS DESTROYED.

(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVILEGED NATURE OF A PUBLICATION IS A GROUND FOR

DISMISSAL AND THAT THE RESPONDENT NEED NOT WAIT UNTIL TRIAL TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF
PRIVILEGE.

(D) WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLISHER AND EDITORS ARE JOINTLY LIABLE WITH THE AUTHOR OF
THE ALLEGEDLY OFFENDING NEWS REPORT EVEN IF THEY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE
WRITING AND EDITING OF SAID NEWS REPORT.18

In raising the above issues, petitioners essentially questioned the Makati City Prosecutors Office’s finding of
probable cause to charge them with libel, as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. As stated above, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari by applying the procedural doctrine laid down in Advincula.

Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents Amando and Isagani Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice which had earlier
led to the filing of Informations against them in court. The Court of Appeals granted the Petition and set aside the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, we applied the rule that
certiorari, being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when other remedies are available. The Court observed
that respondents had other remedies available to them, such as the filing of a Motion to Quash the Information
under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to proceed where they could either file a demurrer to
evidence or present their evidence to disprove the charges against them.19

At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling in Advincula. However,
Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of certiorari proceedings against the Secretary of
Justice’s determination of probable cause when the criminal information has already been filed in court. Under
exceptional circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an
appeal of the prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an information
with the trial court.

In Ching v. Secretary of Justice,20 petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, otherwise
known as the Trust Receipts Law. Conformably with said Resolution, the City Prosecutor filed 13 Informations
against petitioner. Upon denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. While this Court
ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling denying the Petition for Certiorari, the discussion affirming the resort
to said extraordinary writ is enlightening:

In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), this Court held that the acts of a quasi-judicial officer may
be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice; (c)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused. The
Court also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary investigation (in that case, the Office of the
Ombudsman) acts without or in excess of his authority and resolves to file an Information despite the absence of
probable cause, such act may be nullified by a writ of certiorari.

Indeed, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information shall be prepared by
the Investigating Prosecutor against the respondent only if he or she finds probable cause to hold such respondent
for trial. The Investigating Prosecutor acts without or in excess of his authority under the Rule if the Information is
filed against the respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable cause therefor. If the Secretary of
Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who found no probable cause to hold the respondent
for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the Secretary of
Justice acts contrary to law, without authority and/or in excess of authority. Such resolution may likewise be nullified
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.21

In light of the particular factual context of the present controversy, we find that the need to uphold the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of the press and crystal clear absence of a prima facie case against the PDI staff justify the
resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.22 Consequently, the following elements constitute
libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.23 The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of the
news article subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed by the PDI
staff.
As previously stated, Judge Cruz initiated the complaint for libel, asserting the falsity and maliciousness of the
statement in a news report that "(a)ccording to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case of sexual harassment filed
with the Supreme Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati RTC."24 It can be easily discerned that
the article merely reported the statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual harassment
against Judge Cruz and that said article did not report the existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit as a
confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement.
Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part of the PDI Staff by asserting that they did not
check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong, pointing to a certification from the Deputy Court
Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions
not mentioning sexual harassment.

A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the
choice of words.25 While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate sexual advances in an appeal of a contempt ruling
does not turn such case into one for sexual harassment, we agree with petitioners’ proposition that the subject news
article’s author, not having any legal training, cannot be expected to make the fine distinction between a sexual
harassment suit and a suit where there was an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three other newspapers
reporting the same incident committed the same mistake: the Manila Times article was headlined "Judge in sex
case now in physical injury rap";26 the Philippine Star article described Judge Cruz as "(a) Makati judge who was
previously charged with sexual harassment by a lady prosecutor";27 and the Manila Standard Article referred to him
as "(a) Makati judge who was reportedly charged with sexual harassment by a lady fiscal."28

The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is insufficient to
establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm.29 Malice is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such
remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.30

The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza’s allegation of a sexual harassment suit is
furthermore patent in the tenor of the article: it was a straightforward narration, without any comment from the
reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving Judge Cruz. The subject article was, in fact, replete with other
allegations by Mendoza of purported misconduct on the part of Judge Cruz. Except for the above-quoted statement,
Judge Cruz did not find the other assertions by Mendoza as reported by the PDI article to be libelous:

At around 2 p.m., Mendoza said, an employee at Cruz’s court fetched him to the judge’s chamber.1âwphi1

He was walking along the corridor when Cruz looked out, saw him, and yelled, "Mendoza, halika nga rito (come
here).""He dragged me to his chamber and locked the door. Tatlo kami doon, kasama ang sheriff niya na si Nory
Santos," Mendoza said.

Inside, Mendoza said Cruz began taunting him, asking him, "Matigas ba ang dibdib mo, ha? (Do you have a strong
chest?)" Mendoza said, (h)e was made to sit in a guest’s chair in front of Cruz’s desk. He recalled seeing placed on
top of a side table a .99mm and a .45 caliber pistol which he presumed to belong to the judge.

While standing, Mendoza said the judge began punching him, at the same time subjecting him to verbal abuse. The
first punch was at the left side of his chest, the second at the right. The third was at his left knee, then last was at the
right knee, Mendoza said.

His right knee was still swollen as of yesterday.

"Hinamon pa niya ako, square daw kami," he said. "At hindi daw niya ako titigilan at ipapatanggal pa daw niya
ako(He even dared me to a fight. He threatened me that he would not stop until I am fired from my job)," Mendoza
said.

"Kung anak pa daw niya ang nakalaban ko, babarilin na lang daw niya ako sa sentido at babayaran na lang ako (He
said if it was his son with whom I quarreled, he would have simply put a bullet to my head and paid for my life)."31

In Borjal v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that "[a] newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should
be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of
being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper
respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community." 33 Like fair
commentaries on matters of public interest,34 fair reports on the same should thus be included under the protective
mantle of privileged communications, and should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds
of malice or falsity.35 The concept of privileged communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of
the press,36 which would be threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to
silence the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 62479 dated July 8, 2005 and its Resolution dated Septembe
U.S. Supreme Court McCray v. Illinois Decided March 20, 1967
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 No. 159 386 U.S. 300
(1967) Argued January 10-11, 1967
Syllabus

Following receipt of information from an informer, two Chicago policemen made a warrantless arrest of the petitioner
for possessing narcotics. At the pretrial hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence which was found on
his person, the officers testified that: the informant had told them that petitioner "was selling narcotics and had
narcotics on his person" and the area where petitioner could then be found; they found him in that vicinity; after
pointing petitioner out, the informant departed; they arrested petitioner and searched him in their vehicle and found
the narcotics on his person. The officers also testified that, during the one to two years, respectively, that they had
known the informant, he had frequently furnished accurate information about narcotics activities which had led to
many convictions. Petitioner requested the informant's identity, and the State, relying on the testimonial privilege
under Illinois law against such disclosure, objected. The State's objections were sustained, petitioner's motion to
suppress was denied, and he was thereafter convicted upon the basis of the evidence seized. The judgment of
conviction was affirmed by the State Supreme Court, which held the arrest lawful and not vitiated by the application
of the "informer's privilege."

Held:

1. Upon the basis of the circumstances related by the officers, they had probable cause to make the arrest and the
search incidental thereto. P. 386 U. S. 304.

2. A state court is under no absolute duty under either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or
under the Sixth Amendment as incorporated therein to require disclosure of an informer's identity at a pretrial
hearing held for the purpose of determining only the question of probable cause for an arrest or search where, as
here, there was ample evidence in an open and adversary proceeding that the informer was known to the officers to
be reliable and that they made the arrest in good faith upon the information he supplied. Pp. 386 U. S. 305-314.

33 Ill.2d 66, 210 N.E.2d 161, affirmed.

 AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.
G.R. No. 172835 December 13, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the nullification of the 16 February 2006 Decision1 and the 25 May 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86329, which affirmed the Order3 dated 30 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City,
Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 00-561.

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation
services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing
and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.

On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales Invoices No.
8846,4 9105,5 8962,6 and 8963,7 which correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684, 6634 and 6633,
respectively. Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to ₱449,864.98 with interest at
14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under
said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

In its Answer,9 petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular,
petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four
items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new
line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from respondent.
Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods.
Petitioner specifically identified the items in question, as follows: XXX

According to petitioner, respondent’s products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease, Electric
Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright
about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of. Moreover,
petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and
respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it
previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding
payment of the amount of ₱449,864.94, which later became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for Collection of
a Sum of Money against petitioner.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list of the
ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and Connector Grease;
(b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize
Compound.11 It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry
(PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent’s goods.

On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion. It disposed, thus:

The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines Corporation[,] a
detailed list of the ingredients or chemical components of the following chemical products:XXX

[Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to submit to [petitioner] Air
Philippines Corporation the chemical components of all the above-mentioned products for chemical
comparison/analysis.12

Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the
chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire
upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. Respondent maintained that its
products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its business competitors may easily
imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary rights and to its serious damage and
prejudice.

The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June 2004,
finding that the chemical components are respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in character. A priori, it
rationalized:

The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744,
p. 764, that "the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act) are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure."

Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and privileged
character, ingredients or chemical components of the products ordered by this Court to be disclosed constitute trade
secrets lest [herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted business competition with others who
may imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of [respondent’s] proprietary rights. Being privileged,
the detailed list of ingredients or chemical components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which expressly makes privileged information an exception from its coverage.13

Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004
of the RTC.

The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its lubricants is to
disregard respondent’s rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products and their ingredients are embraced within the meaning of "trade secrets." In disallowing the
disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:

The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade secrets and
confidential, commercial and financial information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is reiterated in Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where the Supreme Court enumerated the
kinds of information and transactions that are recognized as restrictions on or privileges against compulsory
disclosure. There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that:

"The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) re also exempt from
compulsory disclosure."

It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot be compelled to produce, release or disclose documents,
papers, or any object which are considered trade secrets.

In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell produce a detailed
list of ingredients or composition of the latter’s lubricant products so that a chemical comparison and analysis
thereof can be obtained. On this note, We believe and so hold that the ingredients or composition of [respondent]
Pennswell’s lubricants are trade secrets which it cannot be compelled to disclose.

[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or economic right over the ingredients or components of its lubricant
products. The formulation thereof is not known to the general public and is peculiar only to [respondent] Pennswell.
The legitimate and economic interests of business enterprises in protecting their manufacturing and business
secrets are well-recognized in our system.

[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and
other confidential programs and information against the public. Otherwise, such information can be illegally and
unfairly utilized by business competitors who, through their access to [respondent] Pennswell’s business secrets,
may use the same for their own private gain and to the irreparable prejudice of the latter. x x x x

In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the ingredients and
formulation of [respondent] Pennswell’s lubricant products which are unknown to the public and peculiar only to
Pennswell.

All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondent Judge in finding that the detailed list of ingredients or composition of the subject lubricant products
which petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are trade secrets of [respondent] Pennswell;
hence, privileged against compulsory disclosure.14

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before us, on the sole issue of:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE
SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE. 15

Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and ingredients of
respondent’s products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner assails the conclusion reached
by the Court of Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are protected by law and beyond public scrutiny.
Relying on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, petitioner argues that the use of modes of discovery operates
with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the trial court. Furthermore, petitioner posits that its
request is not done in bad faith or in any manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress respondent.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of
his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.16 The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial
value.17 A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in
one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
possess the information.18 Generally, a trade secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the
operation of the business, for example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized
customer list.19 It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or
possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily
an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in
confidence" or through a "confidential relationship."20 American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors21 to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:

1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source. 22
In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 the issue was the legality of an
employee’s termination on the ground of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The Court laid down the rule that
any determination by management as to the confidential nature of technologies, processes, formulae or other so-
called trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis which can pass judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the
employer’s naked contention that its own determination as to what constitutes a trade secret should be binding and
conclusive upon the NLRC. As a caveat, the Court said that to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer to
label almost anything a trade secret, and thereby create a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an
employee on the pretext that the latter somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be none at all to
speak of.24 Hence, in Cocoland, the parameters in the determination of trade secrets were set to be such substantial
factual basis that can withstand judicial scrutiny.

The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade secrets within
the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of general manufacturing and
selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but
not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments
and similar preparations, among others. It is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of
respondent’s products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants,
respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may
not be wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s defense against a collection
for a sum of money. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients
constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to
respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue
disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondent’s lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to
lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of
respondent’s business. Respondent’s proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended
money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a
commercial value to respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive
advantage; we also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information
confidential and not available to the prying public.

We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect documents or
things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its entire provision reads:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. – Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore,
the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the
time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just.

A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of documents or things
as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by any party upon a showing of good
cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The court may order any party: a) to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, which are not privileged;25 which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action; and which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.

Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.26 The documents must not be
privileged against disclosure.27 On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of
books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers
which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be received in evidence.28 Such a condition
is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.

Section 2429 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public
interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be
compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and
(d) bank deposits. 30

We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the
RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the
detailed chemical composition of its products.

That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade
secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government Rehabilitation, effective 15 December
2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and associations pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 902-A,31 as amended; and (2) cases for rehabilitation transferred from the Securities and
Exchange Commission to the RTCs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities
Regulation Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information belonging to the debtor.32 Moreover, the Securities Regulation
Code is explicit that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized to require the revelation
of trade secrets or processes in any application, report or document filed with the Commission.33 This confidentiality
is made paramount as a limitation to the right of any member of the general public, upon request, to have access to
all information filed with the Commission.34

Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following articles:

Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his
principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.

Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any
manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the
industry of
the latter.

Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has a restrictive
provision on trade secrets, penalizing the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or employees, to wit:

SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures an officer or
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding the business, income
or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the discharge of his official duties, and
which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or prints in any manner whatever, not provided
by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing in any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos (₱2,000), or suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five
(5) years, or both.

Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, enacted
to implement the policy of the state to regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, manufacture, processing, sale,
distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that present unreasonable risk and/or injury to
health or the environment, also contains a provision that limits the right of the public to have access to records,
reports or information concerning chemical substances and mixtures including safety data submitted and
data on emission or discharge into the environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge
trade secrets, production or sales figures; or methods, production or processes unique to such
manufacturer, processor or distributor; or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position
of such manufacturer, processor or distributor.35

Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial property rights
cases are not simple property cases.36 Without limiting such industrial property rights to trademarks and trade
names, this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property are intimately connected with
economic development.37 The protection of industrial property encourages investments in new ideas and inventions
and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of human needs. It speeds up transfer of technology and
industrialization, and thereby bring about social and economic progress.38 Verily, the protection of industrial secrets
is inextricably linked to the advancement of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets.1âwphi1 There is a privilege not
to disclose one’s trade secrets.39 Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are
among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution.40 We
said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure.41

Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade secrets of
employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the rationalization that the company has a right
to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors.42 Notably, it was in a labor-related case that this Court made a stark ruling on the
proper determination of trade secrets.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 7743 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all
consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or
active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s
specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength
Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not consumer products. "Consumer products," as
it is defined in Article 4(q),44 refers to goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for
personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs,
cosmetics, and devices. This is not the nature of respondent’s products. Its products are not intended for personal,
family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft
propellers and engines.

Petitioner’s argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the disclosure
of the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground.45 Respondent’s products are outside the scope of the
cited law. They do not come within the purview of a drug46 which, as defined therein, refers to any chemical
compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for use in the treatment, prevention or diagnosis
of disease in man or animals. Again, such are not the characteristics of respondent’s products.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that
these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not reviewable
by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.47 We need not delve into the factual bases of such findings as questions of fact are beyond the
pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.48

We do not find merit or applicability in petitioner’s invocation of Section 1249 of the Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records, reports or information
concerning chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted, and data on emission or discharge
into the environment. To reiterate, Section 1250 of said Act deems as confidential matters, which may not be made
public, those that would divulge trade secrets, including production or sales figures or methods; production or
processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the
competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or distributor. It is true that under the same Act, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources may release information; however, the clear import of the law is
that said authority is limited by the right to confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or distributor, which
information may be released only to a medical research or scientific institution where the information is needed for
the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the chemical substance or mixture. The right
to confidentiality is recognized by said Act as primordial. Petitioner has not made the slightest attempt to show that
these circumstances are availing in the case at bar.

Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing
justice.51 We do not, however, find reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the application of the rule on
privilege. The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case
pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner
received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the
laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor
respondent as the holder of trade secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule
in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery,
because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.52 To
the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of confidentiality
which shields respondent’s trade secrets. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
 EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD vs.COB GROUP MARKETING, INC., JOSE E. BAX, FRANCISCO C. DE
CASTRO
G.R. No. L-68097 January 16, 1986
AQUINO, C.J.:
This case is about the liability of a marketing distributor under its sales agreements with the owner of the products.
The petitioner presented its evidence before Judges Castro Bartolome and Benipayo. Respondents presented their
evidence before Judge Tamayo who decided the case.

A review of the record shows that Judge Tamayo acted under a misapprehension of facts and his findings are
contradicted by the evidence. The Appellate Court adopted the findings of Judge Tamayo. This is a case where this
Court is not bound by the factual findings of the Appellate Court. (See Director of Lands vs. Zartiga, L-46068-69,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 346, 355).

Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Marketing, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its household
products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement dated March 14, 1970 (32-33
RA). Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to COB Group Marketing.

As security for COB Group Marketing's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one Asuncion Manahan
mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group Marketing the faithful performance of all
the terms and conditions of the sales agreement (Exh. D).

In July, 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing's territory was
extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases up to P25,000 of COB Group
Marketing for that area, Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. and his father Tomas, Sr. (now deceased) executed a mortgage on
their land in Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan, the Lorenzos were solidarily liable with COB Group Marketing for its
obligations under the sales agreement (Exh. E).

The credit purchases of COB Group Marketing, which started on October 15, 1969, limited up to January 22, 1971.
On May 8, the board of directors of COB Group Marketing were apprised by Jose E. Bax the firm's president and
general manager, that the firm owed Keller about P179,000. Bax was authorized to negotiate with Keller for the
settlement of his firm's liability (Exh. 1, minutes of the meeting).

On the same day, May 8, Bax and R. Oefeli of Keller signed the conditions for the settlement of COB Group
Marketing's liability, Exhibit J, reproduced as follows:XXX

Twelve days later, or on May 20, COB Group Marketing, through Bax executed two second chattel mortgages over
its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security for its obligation to Keller amounting to
P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971 (Exh. PP and QQ). However, the second mortgages did not become effective
because the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not give its consent. But the second mortgages served the
purpose of being admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.

The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter dated July 24,
1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971 and thereafter every thirtieth day of
the month for three years until COB Group Marketing's mortgage obligation had been fully satisfied. They also
proposed to substitute the Manahan mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City
(Exh. L).

These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group Marketing and to justify the
foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo (Exh. D and E).

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him "as admissions of a party".

The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices, with
delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, Exhibits KK-1 to KK-277-a and N to N-149-a, together with a
tabulation thereof, Exhibit KK, covering the period from October 15, 1969 to January 22, 1971. Victor A. Mayo,
Keller's finance manager, submitted a statement of account showing that COB Group Marketing owed Keller
P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That amount is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.

On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation statements wherein he
showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7 and 8). He claimed overpayment although
in his answer he did not allege at all that there was an overpayment to Keller.

The statement of the Appellate Court that COB Group Marketing alleged in its answer that it overpaid Keller
P100,596.72 is manifestly erroneous first, because COB Group Marketing did not file any answer, having been
declared in default, and second, because Bax and the other stockholders, who filed an answer, did not allege any
overpayment. As already stated, even before they filed their answer, Bax admitted that COB Group Marketing owed
Keller around P179,000 (Exh. 1).
Keller sued on September 16, 1971 COB Group Marketing, its stockholders and the mortgagors, Manahan and
Lorenzo.

COB Group Marketing, Trinidad C. Ordonez and Johnny de la Fuente were declared in default (290 Record on
Appeal).

After trial, the lower court (1) dismissed the complaint; (2) ordered Keller to pay COB Group Marketing the sum of
P100,596.72 with 6% interest a year from August 1, 1971 until the amount is fully paid: (3) ordered Keller to pay
P100,000 as moral damages to be allocated among the stockholders of COB Group Marketing in proportion to their
unpaid capital subscriptions; (4) ordered the petitioner to pay Manahan P20,000 as moral damages; (5) ordered the
petitioner to pay P20,000 as attomey's fees to be divided among the lawyers of all the answering defendants and to
pay the costs of the suit; (6) declared void the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo and the cancellation of
the annotation of said mortgages on the Torrens titles thereof, and (7) dismissed Manahan's cross-claim for lack of
merit.

The petitioner appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed said judgment except the award of P20,000 as moral
damages which it eliminated. The petitioner appealed to this Court.

Bax and the other respondents quoted the six assignments of error made by the petitioner in the Appellate Court,
not the four assignments of error in its brief herein. Manahan did not file any appellee's brief.

We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax as president and
general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving credence to the alleged overpayment computed by Bax .

The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB Group Marketing but they
also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its supposed overpayment in the sum of
P100,596.72 (Exh. 8-A), in spite of the fact that COB Group Marketing was declared in default and did not file any
counterclaim for the supposed overpayment.

The lower courts harped on Keller's alleged failure to thresh out with representatives of COB Group Marketing their
"diverse statements of credits and payments". This contention has no factual basis. In Exhibit J, quoted above, it is
stated by Bax and Keller's Oefeli that "discussion (was) held on May 8, 1971."

That means that there was a conference on the COB Group Marketing's liability. Bax in that discussion did not
present his reconciliation statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8 were an afterthought. He presented
them long after the case was filed. The petitioner regards them as "fabricated" (p. 28, Appellant's Brief).

Bax admitted that Keller sent his company monthly statements of accounts (20-21 tsn, September 2, 1976) but he
could not produce any formal protest against the supposed inaccuracy of the said statements (22). He lamely
explained that he would have to dig up his company's records for the formal protest (23-24). He did not make any
written demand for reconciliation of accounts (27-28).

As to the liability of the stockholders, it is settled that a stockholder is personally liable for the financial obligations of
a corporation to the extent of his unpaid subscription (Vda. de Salvatierra vs. Garlitos 103 Phil. 757, 763; 18 CJs
1311-2).

While the evidence shows that the amount due from COB Group Marketing is P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 or
P186,354.70 as of August 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ), the amount prayed for in Keller's complaint is P182,994.60 as of July
31, 1971 (18-19 Record on Appeal). This latter amount should be the one awarded to Keller because a judgment
entered against a party in default cannot exceed the amount prayed for (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court and the Appellate Court are reversed and set aside.

COB Group marketing, Inc. is ordered to pay Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. the sum of P182,994.60 with 12% interest
per annum from August 1, 1971 up to the date of payment plus P20,000 as attorney's fees.

Asuncion Manahan and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. are ordered to pay solidarity with COB Group Marketing the sums of
P35,000 and P25,000, respectively.

The following respondents are solidarity liable with COB Group Marketing up to the amounts of their unpaid
subscription to be applied to the company's liability herein: Jose E. Bax P36,000; Francisco C. de Castro, P36,000;
Johnny de la Fuente, P12,000; Sergio C. Ordonez, P12,000; Trinidad C. Ordonez, P3,000; Magno C. Ordonez,
P3,000; Adoracion C. Ordonez P3,000; Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., P3,000 and Luz M. Aguilar-Adao, P6,000.

If after ninety (90) days from notice of the finality of the judgment in this case the judgment against COB Group
Marketing has not been satisfied fully, then the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo should be foreclosed
and the proceeds of the sales applied to the obligation of COB Group Marketing. Said mortgage obligations should
bear six percent legal interest per annum after the expiration of the said 90-day period. Costs against the private
respondents.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN",
G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido Paragsa of the
crime of Rape as charged in the Information beyond reasonable doubt and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as the maximum and to indemnify the complaining witness in the amount of
P8,000.00 (People vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and People vs. Chan et al., CA No. 03545-GR,
August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the costs. Being a detention prisoner, he is
entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment from the time of his confinement up to the
date of the promulgation of this judgment.

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 10-19, rollo).

Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the accused, this case is now
before US for review pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948.

The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged rape victim, her aunt-
in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who
examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit A embodying his findings thereon,

Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a little over twelve and
a half (12½) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents' house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan,
Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Her parents were away at the time — her father was in Cadiz,
while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental (p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) while the rest of the family
were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade student of the
Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon instruction of her mother, she did not go to school that
afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their
house cooking hog feed when the accused, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and
closed the door after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck, encircled her
abdomen with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her breast, and
threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter, the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed
nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her panties. The accused then placed his hunting
knife on the bed by Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's
thighs, picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual
organ and then made four push and pull movement until he ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., Ibid). In the
process, Mirasol's dress and panties were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her
dress and pull her panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not holding
the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the house upstairs because he
heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from outside the gate of the house,
asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not answer because she was then in the act of putting on her panties
(p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her panties, she opened the gate and saw her
aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she did not answer because she was afraid as the
accused was still inside the house. She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with
her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita then walked away.

Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt Lita what he did, he
would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon
of the same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did not reveal to any of them what
transpired between her and the accused in Tabagac.

Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also reveal the incident
to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay,
Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was
her aunt Lita who revealed the matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to
reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her about it; because, according to her, she
wanted to take revenge on the accused (p. 15, Dec. 3, 1971). Three days after her return from Sagay, Negros
Occidental — on July 19, 1971 — Mirasol's mother brought her to the Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan,
Cebu, where she was examined by Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:XXX

Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father.
Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her brother-in-law, Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of
July 13, 1971, she went to the house of her brother-in-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the gate
which was made of split bamboos, the accused running away when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act
of putting on her panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol opened the gate after she had put
on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked Mirasol what the accused did to her, but Mirasol did not
answer. So, she hid and from her hiding place she saw the accused emerge from his hiding place and run away,
passing through the gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was
also going there (p. 15, t.s.n., Ibid).

Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not talk to him about what
she saw earlier in Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her husband (p. 17, t.s.n., Ibid).

When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a conversation with her
regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother filed the corresponding complaint against the
accused (p. 18, t.s.n., Ibid).

Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs. Parochel executed an
affidavit which she subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge of Madridejos, Cebu, on July 30, 1971,
wherein she stated, among other things:

1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to the house of Ruperto Magallanes, my neighbor;
2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa ran from the bed where Mirasol Magallanes was sitting on
while putting on her panties;
3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to me about the happening; and that I was only thinking that
something had happened (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been committed by the trial
court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of credibility.

Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did
so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of
the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing
each other; and that the intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse
(pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).

The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for the defense, Mercado
Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972).

A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to
justify a conviction.

Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the conclusion that
the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation
were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She
could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not.
She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was
raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have revealed the same the very moment she was
confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after
the intercourse took place and when the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing
and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when the
copulation was going on, and with it she could have possibly prevented the accused from consummating the sexual
act. But she did not.

Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped. It was only after
her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and confronted her about the
rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the
accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.

Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his
witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous
sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused,
where Mirasol and the accused slept together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and
Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his
presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is
said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
(3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and
calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the
inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in
the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence,
the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion.
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the testimony of Dr.
Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, thus —

Q Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign body might have inserted the internal organ of the offended party?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no laceration?
A There was no laceration (p 5, t.s.n., November 16, 1971; Emphasis supplied).

Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been a virgin when she
was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain as the accused tried to insert his
organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition.
Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the accused made four push and pull movements after which the latter
ejaculated — indicating that he had an easy time doing it.

If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the lacerations even after
the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13, 1971 was in fact her first experience. WE
believe the absence of lacerations in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr.
Gandiongco, supra,eloquently confirms the truth of the accused's assertion that before the incident in question, he
and Mirasol had two prior copulations.

And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining witness and her aunt
Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it is true that on the witness stand these two witnesses practically
corroborated each other on this particular point, the matter of the accused having a hunting knife with him on the
day of the incident was not, however, mentioned by Mrs. Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed on
July 30, 1971 — five months before she testified in court. Besides, at the trial, the prosecution did not bother to
present such "hunting knife".

A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel, whose testimony the trial
court summarized, runs thus:

... The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door.

... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol was very pale,
trembling and in a state of shock, did not answer her inquiries ...(p. 3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis
added).

The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating that —

Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel ... found her niece in a state of shock (p. 4, Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee; p. 49, rec.; Emphasis supplied).

A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows that contrary to the
finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and opened the gate of the house after she had put on
her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971); and that Mirasol only seemed to be afraid, besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n.,
1972); nowhere in the record is any evidence of Mirasol having been in a state of shock.

If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock —

1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house when she heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to bring her to a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment
or assistance;
3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a corner of the ground floor, or she would have gone to the
nearest police authority or barrio captain, who could have easily apprehended the accused:
4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was on about 50 meters away (pp. 7, 20, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did she do? She
abandoned Mirasol "because" she Mirasol had to feed her hogs (p. 24, Idem).

That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt discovered her having
sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt would report the same to her parents.

And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3 o'clock that afternoon of
July 13, 1971, why did she not report the outrage to Mirasol's father — her husband's brother — whom she met
about 4 o'clock that same afternoon, just one hour after the alleged rape?

Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her brother-in-law — vitiates her credibility.

Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, for the same
is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not alleged deceit, although appellant testified that he
promised to marry Mirasol if "something happens to her body." Much less can simple seduction include rape.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY ACQUITTED, WITH
COSTS de oficio AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON
OTHER CHARGES.

Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the acquittal of the accused-appellant in the light of the salient facts and circumstances discussed in the
decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar 1 which justly cast serious doubts on the guilt of the accused and entitle
him to a verdict of acquittal founded on the constitutional presumption of innocence.

The ratio decidendi in the analogous case of People vs. Ramirez 2 (where the 15-year old daughter of the accused's
common-law wife charged him with double rape and his defense was "that there was consent on her part, as indeed
there had been previous instances where he had access to her is fully applicable to the case at bar, thus: "The
pronouncement in People vs. Damayo 3 as to the extent of the protection accorded by the Constitution to a person
indicted for a criminal offense once again possesses relevance. Thus: 'Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to d demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful
scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by
the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It
is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him
must survive the text of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience
must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certain. 4

There as in tills case, we held that the accused could not be convicted of seduction under the rape charge, citing the
case of People vs. Castro 5 because "the rape charge did not place [the accused] in jeopardy of being convicted for
qualified seduction. He is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."

I have written this brief concurrence, principally, because I noted from the decision 6 that this is a case where as
against the prevailing view and practice under section 34 of Republic Act 296, as amended (the Judiciary Act of
1948) and incorporated in Rule 124, section 12 of the Rules of Court (whereby in any criminal case submitted to a
division of the Court of Appeals whenever said court should be of the opinion that the higher penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed than the lesser penalty imposed by the trial court in the decision subject of the
appeal before it, said court "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the
Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal") the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of forthwith certifying by resolution the case
to this Court as falling with this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction under section 17 of the Judiciary Act.

Some members of the Court have asked for re-examination of the prevailing view and practice and to set down as
the proper procedure that followed by the Court of Appeals in the case at bar. But since the Court's verdict is one of
acquittal, there was no need to take up the question in this case. I make this of record so that the present decision
may not be taken as impliedly sanctioning such procedure, or as an indication of approval thereof on the part of any
member of the Court taking part herein. The question will be definitively resolved in several cases pending before
the Court where such reexamination has been squarely raised, e.g. in Case L-40330, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Amado Danie alias "Amado Ato". submitted for decision of August 5, 1975.

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the Solicitor General in this wise:

Mirasol Magallanes, aged twelve-and-a-half, was alone in her parent's house in Sitio Tabagak of Barrio Bunacan, in
Madridejos Cebu in the early afternoon of July 13, 197 1, cooking hog feed. Both of her parents were then away, in
Negros Occidental, and the rest of the family were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia also in Madridejos,
Cebu, Mirasol, although a six-grader in the Bunacan Elementary School, was at home on this date, on instructions
of her mother to look after their pigs, and cook hog feed in the afternoon.

While thus alone on the ground floor of their house in Tabagak innocently cooking food for the family's pigs, the a
accused Bienvenido Paragsa, with a hunting knife in hand, stealthily entered the house, barring the door as he
entered, And approaching Mirasol from behind, he hooked his left arm around the young girl's neck and
simultaneously thrust his knife at Mirasol's tender breast, barking at the same moment for the girl not to shout, under
threat of instant death.

His left arm still hooked around the poor girl's neck, and the knife he held perilously poised upon the girl's vulnerable
breast, the accused pushed the girl to the bamboo bed nearby, and there laid her down. He then removed her
panties, and opened the fly of his own pants. Forcibly, he opened the girl's thighs, and himself in between, he then
penetrated young Mirasol's private part with his erect private part, and hastily consummated his guilt-ridden forcible,
physical intrusion into the young girl's body.

Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel, arriving later, too late to prevent the dastardly abuse of her niece, nevertheless, saw
the accused as he surreptitiously fled the scene and found her niece in a state of shock. Subsequently, report of the
crime was made to the girl's parents, and a complaint lodged against the accused for the crime of rape. (pp. 6-8, tsn
Dec. 3, 1971; pp. 7-18, tsn Jan. 5, 1972; pp 1-3, tsn Nov. 16, 1971; Exh. A).

The accused admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the complaint girl. His defense is that the copulation was
voluntary. The doctor, who examined the complainant, found that she sustained an "abrasion, left thigh, medial side"
in addition to an "abrasion of inguinal region" (Exh. A). He testified that there was laceration of the hymen. The
pertinent portion of his testimony is quoted below:

Q Can you tell us your external findings?
A My external findings is that there was an abrasion
of inguinal region and abrasion, left thigh, medial
side.
Q How about your internal examination?
A I was able to get some of the secretion found at
the anterior fornix of the cervic.
xxx xxx xxx
Q From your findings, Doctor, there was something
foreign which got inside the vaginal tract of the
complainant.
A There might be foreign body which got inside the
vaginal tract not so deep that caused laceration of
the hymen.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals (Justice Lorenzo Relova, ponente) both held that rape was committed. That
conclusion is supported by the following testimony of the complainant:
Q You said that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, you
saw Bienvenido Paragsa entered under your house
where you were cooking the hog feeds, can you tell
this Honorable Court what was he doing when he
entered your premises?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he do?
A When he entered under the house he immediately
held my neck and then embraced my abdomen and
he was carrying a hunting knife.
Q When he grabbed your neck and hugged you, did
he say anything to you?
A Yes, sir, he told me, 'Do not shout, if you will shout,
I will kill you.
Q After hugging you and telling you not to shout, what
did Paragsa do next?
A He pushed me to bed and he let me lie on the bed
and he immediately pulled out my panty,
Q After removing your panty, what next did Paragsa
do.
A He tried to open my thigh but I insisted closing them
because I was ashamed.
Q In effect, was he able to open your thigh
A Yes, sir, because he threatened me with his hunting
knife: You not open. if you will not open, I will stab
you.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After he succeeded in inserting his penis into your
sexual organ, what did he do next?
ATTY. FLORES: I want to make of record that witness
is spontaneous in answering the question,
considering that she is minor and this is her first time.
WITNESS: He made a push and pull movement.
ATTY. SALGADO:
Q After he finished picking you, what was or where
did Paragsa go?
A He ran to one of the room of the house to hide.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you have a conversation with your Tia Lita after
you opened the door?
Q In your study of medicine, when a foreign object is
penetrated but not so deep, will that produce
laceration of the viginal tract or the hymem of the
woman, is that possible?
Q When there is a penetration but not deep, will it
produce laceration of the vaginal tract of a woman?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal: Can you tell us what could have possibly
caused the on your external examination of the
woman Mirasol Magallanes?
xxx xxx xxx
A Maybe the assailant used force. (3tsn).
A Tia Lita asked me what Benben did to me but I did
not answer because I was afraid.
Q That was the only question that was being asked
on you by your Tia Lita?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not make any answer?
A I did not.
Q Did you tell anybody of what had happened to you
as what you had testified?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A I did not tell because I was warned by the accused
that if I would tell he would be coming back to kill me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that while he was holding your neck and
embracing your abdomen you were then sitting near
the place where you were cooking your hog's feeds?
A When he entered under our house when he was
nearing I immediately stood up; I was no longer
sitting.
Q So. you recognized him before he took hold of your
neck?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he took hold of your neck and embraced
your abdomen, what did he do next?
A He told me: 'Do not shout, if you will shout I will kill
you.
Q He was uttering those words when he was holding
your neck and embracing your abdomen?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that he immediately carried you to the
bed inside your house?
A He did not carry me but he pushed me to the bed.
Q How far was the bed to the place where you were
pushed by accused Paragsa?
A One and one-half meters.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q And how long did your Tia Lita went home after the
conversation?
A Tia Lita walked away passing thru our 'banguera ATTY. FLORES:
and Ka Benben appeared and he told me that if I will Q You want to tell the Court that if your mother had
tell Tia Lita he will kill me and I was afraid because he not inquired from you about the incident you have not
was still holding the hunting knife. told Your mother about the incident.
xxx xxx xxx A No, I will not tell.
Q You did not tell your father about the incident that Q How would you reconcile your testimony when a
evening? moment ago you said that you told the incident to
A No, I did not tell because I was afraid, he might your mother because you took revenge of what Ka
punish me and he might kill me. Benben had done to you'?
A Because before she asked one of the incident I had
xxx xxx xxx in mind not to tell her of the incident but after she
Q When your mother arrived home, did she inquire asked me I (told) her of the incident because I want to
from you about the incident? take revenge on Ka Benben. TSN, hearing on
A Yes, she asked me because Tia Lita related to her December 3, 197 1, pp. 6 to 15).
the incident.
The trial court's vivid summary of the prosecution's evidence, which reveals how the rape was committed and why
the complainant did not disclose the outrage right away to her aunt and parents and which mentions the flight of the
accused, and the trial court's reasons for convicting the accused are as follows:

The prosecution thru the testimonies of the complaining witness', and the other State witnesses has
established the following facts: That at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971. the
offended party, Mirasol Magallanes, aged 12 years, 6 months and 4 days as shown in Exhibit "B",
was in the house of her parents at Sitio Tabagak Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos,
Province of Cebu. She was alone and under the house cooking hog feeds. The house, the lower
portion of which, is fenced with bamboo strips, while the surrounding lawn is likewise enclosed with
fence. Her father at the time was in Cadiz, Negros Occidental, where he was employed in one of the
Fishing Outfits. Her mother was in Sagay, Negros Occidental, while all her younger sisters and
brother were in the house of her grandmother at Barrio Codia Madridejos, Cebu, where all of the
children were left for care when their mother left for Sagay on July 10, 1971.

The girl Mirasol Magallanes was a grade six pupil in tile Bunacan Elementary School, and she did
not attend her classes on that day upon instruction of her mother not to attend her classes during the
period of her (mother's) absence. She was instructed to go to Bunacan in order to feed their pig in
the morning, cook its foods and the afternoon and after feeding return to the house of her
grandmother at Codia

While Mirasol was cooking the hog feeds, at about 1:30 in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, the
accused Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, surreptitiously entered the fenced ground
floor of the house, then barred the door after him. The accused approached Mirasol from behind,
hook his left forearm around her neck, at the same time thrust the knife which was held by his right
hand at the breast of Mirasol Magallanes, and told her not to shout for help under the threat of
instant death.

With his left forearm still around the neck of Mirasol and the knife's point at her breast, the accused
pushed the victim to a nearby bamboo bed and laid her. He then placed the knife beside Mirasol,
removed her panty, and opened his pants. He forced the victim to open or spread her legs by
placing his hands on the inside portion of both thighs according to the testimony of Mirasol and
corroborated by Medical Certificate, Exhibit "A", indicating confusion.

Placing himself between the legs, directly in front of the sexual organ of Mirasol, the accused
inserted his erected penis into her vagina and hurriedly proceeded with the act of copulation by up
and down movement. After completing the act, the accused was about to leave when, unexpectedly,
Lita Parochel, aunt of Mirasol (wife of the younger brother of victim's father), arrived outside the
barred door. She called for Mirasol, who was already sitting at the edge of the bamboo bed, putting
on her panty, to open the door, On hearing the call, the accused ran away and hid himself in a closet
located at the corner of the ground floor.

The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door. Lita Parochel,
suspecting that something unusual had happened to her niece, walked away from the door, making
it appear t at she was going out and hid herself behind an outside projection of the ground floor
where she could see and observe the door. No sooner had she hidden herself when she saw the
accused came out of the door, holding a hunting knife in his right hand, and ran towards the general
direction of the seashore.

She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol was very pale,
trembling and in a state of shock did not answer her inquiries. Without pressing further, the aunt
instructed her niece to return immediately to her grandmother's home at Barrio Codia after feeding
the pig, then she (Lita) returned to her house which is about 50 fathoms away.
 At about 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon, before Mirasol Magallanes could return to her
grandmother's house, her father arrived from Cadiz, Negros Occidental. Lita Parochel, having only
her suspicion as she did not actually see the accused abuse her niece, did not report the incident to
her brother-in-law. But she reported the incident to her husband at 7:00 o'clock that evening on his
return home.

On July 15, 1971, upon the return of Mirasol's mother from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Lita Parochel
personally reported the matter to the mother. Acting upon the report, the mother immediately
investigated her daughter who, having been given the assurance that she would not be subjected to
physical punishment, and who had already recovered from her fears and shock, readily told her
mother that she was raped by Bienvenido Paragsa. She was brought to the Bantayan Emergency
Hospital and subjected to an internal examination by Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, M.D. Medico- Legal-
Incharge, who found her positive of having sexual intercourse.

A complaint for rape was filed against Bienvenido Paragsa by the Chief of Police of Madridejos,
Cebu, at the instance of Bernardina R. Magallanes, mother of the victim, who at the time she was
raped was a little more than 12 years old as stated above (Exhibit "B"). In the meantime the accused
had left Madridejos, Cebu and was finally arrested at Danao City on the strength of a Warrant of
Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge of Madridejos, Cebu, before whom the Complain, for rape was
filed.

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful consideration of the evidence of the parties in its totality, the Court is of the view that
the prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the
crime of RAPE as charged in the Information. It is true that the offended party did not exert strong
and effective efforts to thwart the attack of the accused in disgracing or dishonoring her womanhood
but considering that the accused was carrying with him a knife which he used in threatening her to
death, it is not unusual that the young and innocent girl of over 12 years of age would just meekly
submit for fear of her life.

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, the accused admitted having sexual intercourse with the complaining minor of a
little over 12 years of age and his testimony regarding their being sweetheart and especially as to
the first intercourse he allegedly had with the victim in their house in the first week of July 1971 and
the second in the first week of June 1971 is so unnatural, unbelievable and contrary to common
sense that this Court is of the opinion and so holds that his story is fabricated and self-serving and
untrustworthyfor it if it were true that the victim was his own sweetheart and he was her boyfriend
then there could have been no reason for this young innocent girl of a little above 12 years to tell her
mother about the criminal attack by the accused upon her womanhood and virginity. Her story
regarding her being threatened to death by the accused who carried with him a hunting knife is being
corroborated by witness Lita Parochel who had no motive whatsoever to declare falsely against the
accused.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court had observed that Mirasol Magallanes is an intelligent, honest and reliable witness
notwithstanding the fact that she was of a very tender age and the Court cannot accept the theory of
the defense that the intercourse that took place on July 13, 1971 was voluntary on her part. It would
be very hard to believe that the complainant would easily submit to such an intercourse if her will to
resist had not been overpowered or overcome by threat, intimidation and force on the part of the
accused who was armed with a knife.

The accused was twenty-one (21) years old while the victim was twelve years and six months old. The fact of the
accused in taking advantage of the victim's immaturity is a form of unpardonable sexual perversion which is worse
than the offense committed by Roman Polanski the Hollywood director who was convicted of cohabiting with
thirteen-year old girl.

To acquit the accused would be a miscarriage of justice. The lower court's judgment of conviction should be
affirmed and the accused should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

ANTONIO, J.:

This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII,
Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio
Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them
as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario
Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4)
aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of
them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing
the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina
Sajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.

With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law.

During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16,
1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on
August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus
Medalla.

This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her
bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26,
1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death
was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were
open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the
commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on
the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in
connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning
a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the
stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his
extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-
2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of
Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa,
Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, "
another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters,
Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was
sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in
detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario."
According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret
Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as
Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of
Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against
Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan,
Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe."

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered
a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual
commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and
mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of
the crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore,
presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando
Carillo.

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio
Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the
commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."

Q. In what particular place in the Police Department A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.
did you have to confront the accused Melecio Cudillan
with the other suspects'?
Q. When you said there was a confrontation between A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario
the accused Melecio Cudillan and other suspects Comayas.
whom do you refer to as other suspects?
A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons
and Mario. There was another person Eduardo what did these three persons do?
Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but
Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp.
companion. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).
Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by
Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of Pasay
City as his companions?
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not
merely kept their silence."

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him
that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:

ATTY. DEPASUCAT: Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?
Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre? A. That while the killing was being perpetrated
A. Yes, sir. upstairs he was told to by the door.
Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point Q. How about the other accused Melencio Cudillan,
him out? do you know him?
INTERPRETER: A. Yes, sir.
Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?
from the left who, upon being asked, gave his name INTERPRETER:
as Ramiro Alegre. Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name
ATTY. DEPASUCAT: as Melecio Cudillan.
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Alegre? Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?
A. Yes, sir. A. Because he is with me in one cell.
Q. Where? Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?
A. In the city jail because our cells are also near A. Most of the time because we used to talk about
each other. our case.
Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about? Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan,
A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has more or less?
also anticipated in the commission of the killing of A. Three days after my confinement and
Adelina Sajo. subsequently thereafter up to about the first week of
Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, June, 1967.
more or less? Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell
A. About the middle of June. you about this case?
Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any? ATTY. RAMIREZ:
A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Objection, Your Honor, leading.
Adelina Sajo. COURT:
Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the Witness may answer, there is already a basis.
accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take place, A. That they were the ones who planned and killed
more or less? Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July 21,
A. About that month also of June, about the middle of 1967).
June.
Q. What year?
A. 1967.
Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are
near each other. Q. If he is inside the courtroom, will
you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name
as Mario Comayas.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the
accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that, more or less?
A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of
June.
Q. And what did you talk about?
A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he
admitted to me that he was one of those who
planned and killed Adelina Sajo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as
the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by
the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at
the time of the incident in question. they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote.
According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded
directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and
Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.

Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano
Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the
Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966,
and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he
knew this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre
(Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas
Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the
number of hours he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.

Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now
deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when
allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt;
and in giving undue weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants
admitted to him their participation in the crime.

The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"), on the basis
of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be
used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the
principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a
general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at
bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the
crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by
Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

II

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face
of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be
considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.

The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not
be taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It has also been
held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right
to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of
silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona7 held that the prosecution may not use at trial the
fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation
made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a
statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission
of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional
right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. 8 Other
courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible,
and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer,
where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses. 9
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by
another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the
crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear
incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.

The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a
personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-
incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his
most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by
inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of
each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10

In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11

... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is
fundamental to our scheme of justice ...

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of
his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts
usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission
of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.

It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of
an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian
and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an
offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force,
violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's detention, and the
safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12 The
1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the
Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such
silence. 13

This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now
Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had
occasion to declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used
as a presumption of his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through
Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.'

Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual explained that the
privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
to surrender to its detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in
the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly
admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio
Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently
improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous
crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly
denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario
Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are
charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for
some other lawful cause.
 PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., , vs.ANTIGUA BOTICA RAMIREZ, DANIEL BOQUER, and J. J. DUNBAR
G.R. No. L-34686 February 24, 1932
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the above-entitled three cases which
have been tried together and decided by the court below as one case.

In case G.R. No. 34686, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants-appellees, Antigua Botica Ramirez,
Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, the amount of P7,531.28 which represents the balance of an overdraft account of
the Antigua Botica Ramirez with the plaintiff as of December 17, 1928. J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer were
guarantors for the overdraft.

In case G.R. No. 34687, plaintiff-appellant sees to collect from defendants, Daniel Boque, Antigua Botica Ramirez,
J. J. Dunabar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, the amount of P5,837.07, balance as of March 24, 1930, of a
promissory note for P6,000 executed by the defendants on June 7, 1927, in favor of the plaintiff, whereby the
defendant promised, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff 90 days after its execution.

In case G.R. No. 34688, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer, Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide, and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, the sum of P17,702.52, balance of December 10, 1927, of a
promissory note for P30,000 executed by Dunbar Boquer, and Gutierrez Rupide, P10,000 of which was guaranteed
by Manuela Reyes y Almeida with a mortgage of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila in favor of the
plaintiff.

For some time before the complaints were filed the Antigua Botica Ramirez was under the control and management
of the plaintiff, and a few months after plaintiff's complaints were filed, and upon plaintiff's petition a receiver of the
properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez was appointed.

After trial, the court below rendered judgment, dismissing the three complaints, ordering the cancellation of the
mortgage of Manuela Reyes' land, discharging the receiver and ordering him to turn over the properties of the
defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez to plaintiff. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the
following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in permitting the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide testify, over the objection and exception of counsel for the
plaintiff, that he signed the promissory notes marked Exhibits J and M in cases Nos. 34687-88, as a mere surety, and for no consideration.
2. The trial court erred in not striking from the record defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide's testimony that his codefendant Daniel Boquer told
him that the plaintiff gave him several extentions for the payment of the promissory notes marked Exhibits J and M in cases Nos. 34687-88,
and in finding that such extensions were in fact given by plaintiff.
3. The trial court erred in permitting the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer and J. J. Dunbar and the witness Rosario
Boquer testify, over the objection and exception of counsel for the plaintiff, that the shares which they owned of the stock of the defendant
corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez were assigned by them to plaintiff in payment of their obligations and in finding that such assignment, as
claimed by the defendant, was in fact made.
4. The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff administered the business of the defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez, without any
intervention on the latter's part, and in not permitting plaintiff's witness J. M. Araullo testify as to the condition of the corporation in the month of
April, 1929.
5. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff sold certain furniture and other properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez at very
reduced prices.
6. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the documents marked defendant's Exhibit CC, DD and EE, and in not permitting plaintiff's
witnesses E.B. Ford and E.B. Velasquez testify on them.
7. The trial court erred in finding that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
8. The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the defendants, and not in favor of the plaintiff, as prayed for in its complaints.
9. The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motions for a new trial.
Under the first assignment of error, counsel for the plaintiff contend that the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide
should not have been permitted by the lower court to testify that he signed the promissory notes marked plaintiff's
Exhibits J and M as a mere surety, and for no consideration.

We think that this point is well taken. It is admitted by the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide that he signed the
promissory notes as a surety, and it was immaterial, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, whether or not the said
Gutierrez Repide received anything in payment for the use of his signature. (Clark vs. Sellner, 42 Phil., 384.)

The second assignment of error has reference to the action of the lower court in not striking from the record the
testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide that he was told by the defendant Daniel Boquer that the
plaintiff bank gave him (Boquer) several extensions for the payment of the promissory notes Exhibits J and M, and
in finding that plaintiff gave such extensions.
We have not found anything in the record to justify defendant's contention. The only witness for the defendants who
testified on the alleged extensions given by plaintiff was the defendant Gutierrez Repide himself, and his testimony
consisted only of hearsay evidence and general statements against the direct and positive evidence introduced by
plaintiff that no extension was ever given for the payment of the promissory notes. But what convinces the court that
plaintiff did not extend the time for the payment of the promissory notes in question, is the fact that the testimony of
the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, was not corroborated by either the defendant Daniel Boquer, who
imparted the information to Gutierrez, Repide, or by the defendant J. J. Dunbar. The latter, in fact, admitted that no
extension was given him for the payment of the promissory notes. Dunbar testified as follows:

Q. Mr. Dunbar, have you ever obtained an extension for the payment of the indebtedness or obligations of
the Antigua Botica Ramirez to the Philippine Trust Company and Fidelity & Surety Company covered by
some of the documents here presented in evidence? — A. No, sir.

Plaintiff might not have been prompt in proceeding against the principal debtor, but mere delay is no defense at all
for the surety.

We rule that the lower court erred in not striking from the record the testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez
Repide on the alleged extensions given by plaintiff to the defendant Daniel Boquer for the payment of the
promissory notes marked plaintiff's Exhibits J and M, and in finding that such extensions were given by plaintiff.

The third assignment of error is directed toward the action of the lower court in permitting the defendants Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, and the witness Rosario Boquer to testify that the shares which
they owned of the stock of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez were assigned by them to plaintiff that such
assignment was, in fact, made.

The defendants claim that they assigned to plaintiff the shares which they owned of the stock of the corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez in payment of their obligations. Plaintiff denies that such assignment was ever made, and
claims that the shares in question were assigned for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to reorganize the corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez and sell its business at a fair and reasonable price.

We have carefully examined the evidence, and are of the opinion that plaintiff's contention should be sustained. The
defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Daniel Boquer testified, in direct examination, that a deed of assignment
to plaintiff of the shares in question in payment of the obligations of the defendants was to be executed, and the
record shows that no such document was ever executed.

It is claimed by the defendants that the assignment of their shares of the stock of the corporation Antigua Botica
Ramirez to the plaintiff bank was made in payment of their obligations. Examining, however, the notice for the
special stockholders' meeting on April 26, 1929, which notice was prepared by the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez
Repide himself, no mention is made therein of any assignment of the shares in question in payment of the
obligations of the defendants to plaintiff. The notice simply says that the meeting was being called "for the purpose
of electing the new members of the Board of Directors and determining the manner of liquidating with the Philippine
Trust Company and Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands the obligations of the corporation (Antiga
Botica Ramirez) pending payment, and at the same time resolve the indorsement of all the shares of the
corporations to the creditor corporations in order that the latter might reorganize the Antigua Botica Ramirez (antes
Zobel), Inc. in the manner most convenient to their interest." Had such an assignment as claimed by the defendants
been made, it is but natural to except that the defendant Gutierrez Repide would have made some mention thereof
in the notice for the meeting prepared by him.

The fourth and fifth assignments of error relate to the action of the lower court in holding that plaintiff administered
the business of the defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez without any intervention on the latter's part; in not
permitting the witness J. M. Araullo to testify as to the condition of the corporation in the month of April, 1929; and in
finding that plaintiff sold certain properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez at very reduced prices.

We think these points are well taken.

The defendants contend that plaintiff should not have sold for P5,000 a credit of P18,539.25 which the defendant
corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez had against the Palma Rosa Manufacturing Company. The record, however,
shows that the debtor, the said Palma Rosa Manufacturing Company, was insolvent and that before the new board
of directors of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez made the sale, the defendants Daniel Boquer and Jose V.
Ramirez were asked by plaintiff to make their comments and recommendations and that no attention was paid to
plaintiff's request. The defendants should not be heard now to complain.

The defendant Daniel Boquer testified, in direct examination, that he delivered to plaintiff's witness J. M. Araullo all
the assets of the defendant coporation Antigua Botica Ramirez. On rebuttal, Araullo was not permitted to controvert
Boquer's testimony.

The defendant Daniel Boquer was the manager of the business of the Antigua Botica Ramirez before the plaintiff
took possession thereof, and the defendants claimed that the business was properly managed by Boquer. On
rebuttal, Araullo was not permitted to testify as to the condition of the business at the time plaintiff took it over for the
purpose of reorganization.

The rulings of the lower court were erroneous. The witness Araullo should have been permitted to testify, on
rebuttal, on the points covered by the defendant Boquer in direct examination.

With reference to the sale of a motorcycle and certain shelves of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez, we have
examined the record and found nothing therein to show that they were not sold for a reasonable price. It appears
that the party who once offered P500 for the motorcycle and later on P150, had no money and claimed that the
motorcycle was in bad condition, and there is total lack of evidence as to the condition in which the shelves were at
the time of the sale.

The sixth and seventh assignments of error are concerned with certain evidence offered by the defendant and
admitted by the lower court over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff, and with certain evidence offered by the
plaintiff and rejected by the lower court.

In view of the decision to be rendered by the court, we shall only discuss the assignment of error in connection with
the document marked Exhibit EE offered by plaintiff in evidence and rejected by the lower court.

Plaintiff's Exhibit EE is a copy of the minutes of a special meeting of the stockholders of the corporation Antigua
Botica Ramirez held on April 26, 1929, wherein a transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the stockholders'
meeting of the same corporation held on April 19, 1929, was incorporated. At the said meeting of April 19, 1929, the
defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer admitted their obligations to the plaintiff bank
and such admissions were inserted, without any objection on the part of the said defendants, in the minutes of the
special stockholders' meeting of April 26, 1929.

Counsel for the defendants objected to the introduction of said Exhibit EE on the ground that it contained certain
statements made by the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer; that the latter
were not given an opportunity to explain their statements before plaintiff offered the document in evidence; and that
this contention is without merit. Had plaintiff intended to impeach statements made by the defendants Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer on another occasion, plaintiff, as claimed by counsel for the
defendant, should have laid a foundation for the introduction in evidence of said Exhibit EE by calling the attention of
the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer to their former statements, but
apparently plaintiff had no such purpose. Plaintiff's purpose in introducing the said Exhibit EE was probably to show
certain admissions against interest made by the defendants, and said EE might then be admissible without the
necessity of plaintiff's first making the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer explain
their statements.

. . . In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the
defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to
the action of their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have been admissible without the
laying of a foundation and without the witness having testified in the case at bar. . . . (Juan Ysmael & Co. vs.
Hashim and Gorayeb, 50 Phil., 132, 138.)

For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and judgment is hereby
rendered —
In case No. 34686, in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendants Antigua Botica
Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, jointly, for the sum of seven thousand five hundred thirty-one pesos and
twenty-eight centavos(P7,531.28), with interest at the rate of nine per cent (9%) per annum from December 17,
1928, until paid.

In case No. 34687, in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendants Antigua Botica
Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, J. J. Dunbar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, jointly and severally, for the sum of five
thousand eight hundred thirty-seven pesos and seven centavos (P5,837.07), with interest at the rate of ten per cent
(10%) per annum, from March 24, 1930, until paid; and additional sum of five hundred eighty-three pesos and
seventy centavos (P583.70) for and as attorney's fee and costs of collection.

In case No. 34688 in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendant J. J. Dunbar, Daniel
Boquer, Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, jointly and severally, for the sum of seventeen
thousand seven hundred and two pesos and fifty-two centavos (P17,702.52), with interest at the rate of ten per cent
(10%) per annum from December 10, 1927, until paid, the liability of the defendant Manuela Reyes y Almeida being
limited, however, to the sum of ten thousand pesos (10,000), which is the amount of the obligation secured by her
mortgage of February 13, 1926.

The defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide are further sentenced to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the additional sum of one centavos (P1,702.25) for and as attorneys' fees and costs of
collection.

The defendant Manuela Reyes y Almeida is further sentenced to pay plaintiff the additional sum of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) for and as attorney's fees and costs of collection.

The costs will be limited to the attorney's fees and costs of collection as hereinbefore stated. So ordered.
 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.ANIANO DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the
President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities
are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While
the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he
would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1

The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He
accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November
1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to
the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then
headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down
from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice"
of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent
Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.

The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic
Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator
Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel
Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
(21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13

The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The
battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then
House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio
Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and
Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund
Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high
and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She
testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on
documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on
January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who
served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW
Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day
of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and
speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice
Davide granted the motion.20

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people
holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers
walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the
EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando
Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General
Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish
to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies
for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26There
was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and
orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo
Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the
petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of
Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor
injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer
the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following
press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While
along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation
as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: 31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise
the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was
transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties
of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-
SC, to wit:

"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.1âwphi1.nêt

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition
of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d'
honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a
hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave
the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36

On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It
also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into
office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals
under the Constitution."39

On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also
signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41

On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next
day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona,
Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing
as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme
Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also
approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice
President two (2) days later.46

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and
has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure
of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that
the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48

Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16%
on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from
February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement
of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also
60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D
or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft
and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees,
etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by
Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and
1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered
the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or
before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."

On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice
Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel,
former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised
themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves.
Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to
submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag
Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
 "(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for
contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.

The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:

I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I

Whether or not the cases

At bar involve a political question

Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail
the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the
powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these
realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.

We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on
political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century,
the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56 viz:

"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
 justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions', not of 'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of
the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the
1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.
In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x
x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."

Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve
the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral
reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one.
No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered
contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the
EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and
defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency
under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the
reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the
recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus
non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of
Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing,
through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and
which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or
collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the
Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley,
it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was
carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1966.66

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights
are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."

The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The
reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in
which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society."70In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was
echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which
emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk
rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v.
Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that
when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it
is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section
875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call
for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been
laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ."
Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.

II

Whether or not the petitioner

Resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it
involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to
judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.

The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x."

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20,
2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession
of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more
detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against
him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher
chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than
1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent
Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade
and Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached
a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope.
It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was
swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The
window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara
serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19,
petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an
ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his
small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this
is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap
presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president
in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the
resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and
their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president.
According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified
exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the
petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified
exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds
to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a
graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to
Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is
proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already
concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly
transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that
at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the
petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20,
that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to
open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of
petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary
shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

"x x x

I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his
name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x
x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.

The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:

"Opposition's deal

7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.

Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:

'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.

2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.

4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.

Our deal

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
 '1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).

'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.

'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.

Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
"Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during
this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was
further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel
to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was
aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90

"xxx

11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.

Agreement.

The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.

xxx

The rest of the agreement follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority – Vice President.

'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.

'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.

11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.

'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.

Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'

I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'

And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.

But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been
signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.

I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The President is too stunned for words:

Final meal

12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.

12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.

By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
 1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacañang.

The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!"'

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part
tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

"Sir.

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar
did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the
petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the
letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there
was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the
Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as
a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court
cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this
Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a
matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019
originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not
contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator
Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a
provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the
following provision was inserted as section 15:

"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act
for an offense committed during his incumbency."93

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the
provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above
became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the
immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any
debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and
administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act
of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a
pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service
for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to
retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that
when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case
Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that
as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as
pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA
3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.
But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against
the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect,
no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.

III

Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and
duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the
January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he
is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance
with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:

"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE

ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
 THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S
GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition
to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to
the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nation's goals under the Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF

SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
– qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:

"RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served
the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land -
which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:

"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officioand has been terminated.

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.

Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate president.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate
and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of
government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police,
the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial
power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx
branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided
by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

IV

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman
should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second,
he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening.
The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the
Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:

" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded
and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act
unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that
the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as
 possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This
remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property
rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do
is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining
whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that
position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such
men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as
a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in
wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office
he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government
itself."105

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the
tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In
1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.

In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men:
The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP
College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on
the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:

"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome)."

The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in
the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto
Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a
public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no
wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power
revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity
provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second
sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But
would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President
shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an
immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigation's almost daily?

Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.

I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot
be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment
trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it
will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110

"xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost
the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.114

Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US
v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates
were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the
Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign.
President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena
on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was
rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case
of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages
covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of
Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as
a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office
of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner

Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of
the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained
publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the
presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the
right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga
vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:

"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile
and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds
of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state
of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially.
xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se
fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even
by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its
companion cases, viz:

"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

xxx

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair
trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was

xxx

a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
 England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value
of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v.
United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing
people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United
States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of
trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily
closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment
was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their
presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be
eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against
the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports,
and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been
quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is
postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of
the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be
compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the
petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension
and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant
justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred
duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an
accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135To
be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint
against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by
the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of
number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law.
If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the
key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's
prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED
 RUFINA PATIS FACTORY, and JESUS LUCAS, SR vs.JUAN ALUSITAIN
G.R. No. 146202 July 14, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the June 23, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 affirming that of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarding retirement benefits in the amount of P88,595.00 to respondent Juan
Alusitain (Alusitain), petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Jesus Lucas, Sr. (Lucas) come to this Court on a petition
for review on certiorari.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and operated by petitioner Lucas. After close to forty three years or
on February 19, 1991, Alusitain admittedly tendered his letter of resignation which is quoted verbatim:
February 19, 1991
TO: MR. JESUS LUCAS, JR.
ASSISTANT MANAGER
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY
Gentlemen:
I would like to tender my separation letter as a laborer, from your good company effective this 20th of February 1991. May I take this opportunity to
extent my heartfelt thanks to you for having given me the chance to commit myself to work in your factory from which I owe varied experiences that has
made a part of me and be what I am today. Anticipating your outmost consideration on this matter. I remain.
VERY TRULY YOURS,
(Signed)
JUAN A. ALUSITAIN
RECEIVED THE ABOVE SEPARATION LETTER ON THIS DAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1991.
(Signed)
BY: JESUS R. LUCAS, JR.
Assistant Manager2

On May 22, 1991, Alusitain executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from employment and submitted the
same on even date to the Pensions Department of the Social Security System (SSS). The affidavit reads:
Republic of the Philippines )SSS
Quezon City )
AFFIDAVIT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT
I, JUAN ASERAS ALUSITAIN of legal age, 63, Filipino and residing at Int. 18 Flores St., Mal. Mla, after having [been] sworn to in accordance
with law hereby depose and state;
1. That I am [a] bonafide member of the Social Security System with SSS Number 03-0107252-0
2. That I was separated from my last employer RUFINA PATIS FACTORY with address at 290 C. Arellano St., Malabon, Metro
Manila on 2-20-91 and thereafter, I was never again re-employed.
3. That I cannot secure a certification of separation from my last employer because I have not reached the company applicable age
of retirement.
4. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to support my retirement paper.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
(Signed)
Affiant3

On January 7, 1993, Republic Act No. 7641 (R.A. 7641),4 "AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY
PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY RETIRMENT PLAN IN THE ESTABLISHMENT," took effect5 providing, among other things, thusly:

Art. 287. Retirement. — Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

xxx

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty five (65)
years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one half (1/2)
month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole
year.
 Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15)
days plus one twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of
service incentive leaves.

xxx

Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288
of this Code.6

Sometime in 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company on January 31, 1995, having reached the
age of 657 and due to poor health, verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas for the payment of his retirement
benefits. By his computation, he claimed that he was entitled to P86,710.008 broken down as follows: XXX

Petitioner Lucas, however, refused to pay the retirement benefits of Alusitain, prompting the latter to make a written
demand on September 20, 1995. Lucas, however, remained adamant in his refusal to give in to Alusitain's
demands.

Having failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Alusitain filed on November 17, 1995 a complaint before the NLRC
against petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Lucas for non-payment of retirement benefits. The complaint was
docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-11-07474-95.

Petitioners maintained that Alusitain had resigned from the company on February 19, 1991 per his letter of
resignation and the Affidavit of Separation dated May 22, 1991.10

On the other hand, while respondent admitted having tendered his letter of resignation on February 19, 1991 and
executed the Affidavit of Separation on May 22, 1991,11 he nevertheless maintained that he continued working for
petitioners until January 1995, the date of actual retirement, due to illness and old age, and that he merely
accomplished the foregoing documents in compliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to avail of his
retirement benefits.12

By Decision13 of February 6, 1997, Executive Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Guanio upheld Alusitain's position in this
wise:

After carefully considering the respective submissions of the parties and the evidence they adduced in
support of their opposing claims, this Office rules in favor of the complainant.

To substantiate his allegation that he had continued working for the respondents even after his supposed
resignation on February 19, 1991, the complainant submitted in evidence his sworn statement and that of
his eldest daughter, Gloria Alusitain. In his affidavit, the complainant swore that: "Bagamat ako ay
pensionado ng SSS, ako ay patuloy na naglilingkod/nagtratrabaho sa kompanya ng Rufina Patis Factory
hanggang noong buwan ng Enero 1995." By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated
under oath that since elementary school (sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the
Rufina Patis Factory; and that the last time she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of
January 1995.

While the foregoing statements may appear to be self-serving, still they have the ring of truth. From
experience, it is quite common that the eldest daughter would be tasked with the duty of taking lunch to her
father at work. Besides, the respondents failed to controvert these sworn declarations by submitting their
counter-affidavits. If it is true that the complainant had in fact stopped working on February 1991, the
respondents could have produced a number of witnesses who could have attested to this. Hence, their
failure to submit even a single affidavit does not speak well of their credibility in this regard.

Thus, this Office finds that the complainant had executed the letter of resignation and affidavit of separation
from employment in 1991 only for the purpose of securing a pension from the SSS, but that despite this he
remained in the employ of the respondents until his actual retirement on January 31, 1995, two years after
the effectivity of Republic Act 7641 on January 7, 1993. At the time of his retirement, the complainant was
already sixty-five (65) years of age and had served the respondent company for forty-seven (47) years and
 therefore, he is legally entitled to the retirement benefits granted by R.A. 7641 which is one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service which as computed will amount to a total of P88,595.00 (P1,885.00 x 47
years).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents "Rufina
Patis Factory" and Jesus Lucas, Sr., jointly and severally to pay complainant Juan Alusitain his retirement
benefits in the amount of P88,595.00.

SO ORDERED.14

On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution15 of May 17, 1999, affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision.

Aggrieved by the NLRC resolution, petitioners brought the case on certiorari16 to the Court of Appeals which, by the
assailed decision, dismissed it, holding that the NLRC committed no error much less any grave abuse of
discretion17as Alusitain was able to sufficiently establish that his letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation were
executed only for the purpose of securing a pension from the SSS and that he remained in the employ of
petitioners.18

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution19 of December 6, 2000,
petitioners lodged the present petition.20

Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it did not give weight and probative value to Alusitain's letter of
resignation and Affidavit of Separation, choosing instead to give credence to his self-serving sworn statement and
that of his daughter that he remained in the employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.

Petitioners assert that the Affidavit of Separation, being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face, and proof is required to assail and controvert the same, citing Cacho v. Court of Appeals21 and Arrieta v.
Llosa.22

Petitioners further assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A. 7641 as said law does not
expressly provide for such retroactive application and to do so would defeat the clear intent of Congress.
Furthermore, petitioners insist that the case of Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC23 is inapplicable and submit that what
is controlling is the case of J.V. Angeles Construction Corp. v. NLRC24 where this Court held that before R.A. 7641
could be given retroactive effect, the claimant should still be an employee of the employer at the time the said law
took effect,.

The petition is impressed with merit.

This Court held in Oro25 that R.A. 7641 should be given retroactive effect, viz:

R.A. 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure and
as a curative statute that – absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant
from, an employer – can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight
years soon following their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to
labor contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not
only from the date of the law's enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have
started. . .26(Underscoring supplied)

The doctrine enunciated in Oro has been clarified in several cases. In CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC,27 this Court,
speaking through Justice Florentino Feliciano, held that R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect where (1) the
claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the
claimant had complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits.28 These
twin requirements for the retroactive application of R.A. 7641 have been reiterated in Philippine Scout Veterans
Security and Investigation Agency v. NLRC,29 Cabcaban v. NLRC,30 J.V. Angeles Construction Corporation v.
NLRC,31 and Manuel L. Quezon University v. NLRC.32
It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner Rufina Patis Factory, he has to
prove that he was its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect.

As a general rule, the factual findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are, on appeal,
accorded great weight and even finality, unless petitioners are able to show that the NLRC arbitrarily disregarded
the evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly
appreciated.33

In affirming the decision of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, the Court of Appeals disregarded Alusitain's letter of
resignation and Affidavit of Separation and gave weight to his and his daughter's sworn statements that he
remained in the employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.

It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the
allegations34 – ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat.35 If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his
claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent.

In the case at bar, it was incumbent on Alusitain to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and not on February
20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. As the following discussion will show, he utterly failed to discharge
the onus.

Respondent's letter of resignation and May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation which he admittedly voluntarily executed
constitute admissions against his own interest.36 The said documents belie his claim that he retired on January 31,
1995. Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute.37 The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration was true.38 Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with
the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.39

While these two documents may have facilitated the release of Alusitain's retirement benefits from the SSS, hence,
beneficial to him at that time, they may still be considered admissions against interest since the disserving quality of
the admission is judged as of the time it is used or offered in evidence and not when such admission is
made.40Thus, it matters not that the admission is self-serving when it was made, so long as it is against
respondent's present claim.41

No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant.42 It bears stressing, however, that Alusitain's
Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document,43 hence, prima facie evidence44 of the facts
expressed therein.45

Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, to contradict the facts stated therein,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.46

Alusitain explains through his subsequent sworn statement that he only executed these two documents in order to
obtain his retirement benefits from the SSS. His daughter, also by sworn statement, corroborates his explanation.
His position does not persuade.

In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to merely
execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in a notarial
document is clear and convincing evidence. The subsequent notarial documents executed by respondent and his
daughter fall short of this standard.

The case of Reyes v. Zaballero47 is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December 1, 1944 a notarial
document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor had already paid his debt. On even
date, the creditor subsequently executed an affidavit without the debtor's knowledge stating that he had accepted
the payment under protest and "obligado por las circunstancias actuales." This Court held that the creditor's
statement in his affidavit that he received the money "obligado por las circunstancias actuales" is self-serving
evidence.48
A contrary rule would undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial documents. In Dequito v.
Llamas,49 this Court held:

After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made admissions and declarations against his own
interest under the solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He
cannot, even "with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live."50

Neither is the sworn statement of Alusitain's daughter sufficient to prove that he indeed retired on January 31, 1995.
The February 6, 1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter Guanio relates the material portion of the sworn statement of
Alusitain's daughter as follows:

. . . By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that since elementary school
(sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the Rufina Patis Factory; and that the last
time she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of January 1995.51 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Alusitain's daughter did not state, however, that her father worked for petitioner Rufina Patis Factory until his alleged
retirement on January 31, 1995. All she said was that the last time she brought him food at the factory was in
January 1995. To conclude that Alusitain was still employed on January 1995 from the mere fact that his daughter
brought him food at the Rufina Patis Factory is non sequitur.

Lastly, while it is evident that Alusitain's subsequent sworn statement is in the nature of a retraction of his May 22,
1991 Affidavit of Separation, such retraction does not necessarily negate the affidavit. For retractions are generally
unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts as they can easily be fabricated. Thus, before
accepting a retraction, it is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding it and possible motives for
reversing the previous declaration, as these motives may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To
automatically adopt them hook, line and sinker would allow unscrupulous individuals to throw wide open the doors to
fraud.

In the case at bar, Alusitain's retraction is highly suspect. Other than his bare and self-serving allegations and the
sworn statement of his daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any scintilla of
evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. He did not
produce any documentary evidence such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification card, or any other
independent evidence to substantiate his claim.

While the NLRC and its Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the
adjudication of cases,52 this should not be construed as a license to disregard fundamental rules on evidence in
proving one's allegations.53

In fine, Alusitain having failed to prove that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect, his
claim for retirement benefits thereunder must be disallowed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals June 23, 2000 Decision and December 6, 2000
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS S. YUJUICO vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168661 October 26, 2007
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land with
an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Province
of Rizal (now Parañaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 22. The application was
docketed LRC Case No. N-8239. The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on
behalf of the Director of Lands, and by Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Both oppositions were stricken from the
records since the opposition of Dizon was filed after the expiration of the period given by the court, and the
opposition of the Director of Lands was filed after the entry of the order of general default. After considering the
evidence, the trial court rendered its April 26, 1974 Decision. The dispositive portion reads:

____________________________
* As per September 3, 2007 raffle.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicant, Fermina Castro, of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident
of 1515 F. Agoncillo St., Corner J. Escoda St., Ermita, Manila, the true and absolute owner of the land applied for
situated in the Municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 17,343 square meters and covered by
plan (LRC) Psu-964 and orders the registration of said parcel of land in her name with her aforementioned personal
circumstances.

Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the corresponding order for the issuance of the decree be
issued.

SO ORDERED.1

The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus,
the order for the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and Decree No. N-150912 was issued by the
Land Registration Commission (LRC).2 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10215 was issued in the name of
Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on May 29, 1974.3

The land was then sold to Jesus S. Yujuico, and OCT No. 10215 was cancelled. On May 31, 1974,4 Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 445863 was issued in Yujuico’s name, who subdivided the land into two lots. TCT No.
4463865 over Lot 1 was issued in his name, while TCT No. S-293616 over Lot 2 was issued in the name of petitioner
Augusto Y. Carpio.

Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another, mortgaged the lot to the
Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank, N.A. Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio
reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) to secure various loans.

Sometime in 1977, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 entitled Conveying the Land Reclaimed in the Foreshore and
Offshore of the Manila Bay (The Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project) as Property of the Public Estates Authority as
well as Rights and Interests with Assumptions of Obligations in the Reclamation Contract Covering Areas of the
Manila Bay between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (1977) was issued. Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the
properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands
or the acquisition of reclaimed lands. On January 13, 1989, OCT No. SP 02 was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA
also acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the Manila Bay coast, some of which were subsequently sold
to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC), which in turn leased portions to Uniwide Holdings, Inc.7
The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio
discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their property, and
that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC.

On July 24, 1996, Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Parañaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for
the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0317 against the PEA.
On May 15, 1998 the parties entered into a compromise agreement approved by the trial court in a Resolution dated
May 18, 1998. On June 17, 1998, the parties executed a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the
compromise agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Jesus
Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343 hectares.

On July 31, 1998, the incumbent PEA General Manager, Carlos P. Doble, informed the OSG that the new PEA
board and management had reviewed the compromise agreement and had decided to defer its implementation and
hold it in abeyance following the view of the former PEA General Manager, Atty. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., that the
compromise agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA Board, requiring the approval of the Office of
the President. The new PEA management then filed a petition for relief from the resolution approving the
compromise agreement on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence.

The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed out of time and that the allegation of
mistake and excusable negligence lacked basis.

The PEA fared no better in the Court of Appeals (CA), as the petition was dismissed for failure to pay the required
docket fees and for lack of merit.

The matter was raised to the Supreme Court in Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico8 but PEA’s petition was denied,
upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for relief for having been filed out of time. The allegation of fraud
in the titling of the subject property in the name of Fermina Castro was not taken up by the Court.

On June 8, 2001, in a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its Derivative Titles,
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Fermina Castro, Jesus S. Yujuico, August Y. Carpio and the Registry of Deeds
of Parañaque City docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0222, filed with the Parañaque City RTC, respondent Republic of
the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when the land registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto
on August 3, 1972 and subsequently approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was still a portion of Manila
Bay as evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243, Surveys to 1980; 1st Ed/. January 9/61: Revised 80-11-
2; that Roman Mataverde, the then OIC of the Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands, informed the OIC of the Legal
Division that "[w]hen projected on Cadastral Maps CM 14 deg. 13’ N-120 deg, 59’E, Sec.2-A of Parañaque Cadastre
(Cad. 299), (LRC) Psu-964 falls inside Manila Bay, outside Cad. 299"; that then Acting Regional Lands Director
Narciso V. Villapando issued a Report dated November 15, 1973 stating that plan (LRC) Psu-964 is a portion of
Manila Bay; that then Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Director of Lands, Ernesto C. Mendiola, submitted his Comment
and Recommendation re: Application for Registration of Title of FERMINA CASTRO, LRC Case No. N-8239, dated
Dec. 1, 1977, praying that the instant registration case be dismissed; and that Fermina Castro had no registrable
rights over the property.

More significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be
registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void. And third,
the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void.9

On September 13, 2001, Yujuico and Carpio filed a Motion to Dismiss (With Cancellation of Notice of Lis
Pendens),10 on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action was barred by prior judgment; (2) the claim had been
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (3) a condition precedent for the filing of the complaint was not
complied with; and (4) the complaint was not verified and the certification against forum shopping was not duly
executed by the plaintiff or principal party.

On November 27, 2001, respondent Republic filed an Opposition11 to the motion to dismiss to which defendants
filed a Reply12 on January 14, 2002, reiterating the grounds for the motion to dismiss.
In the August 7, 2002 Order of the RTC,13 Civil Case No. 01-0222 was dismissed. The trial court stated that the
matter had already been decided in LRC Case No. N-8239, and that after 28 years without being contested, the
case had already become final and executory.1âwphi1 The trial court also found that the OSG had participated in
the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. Civil Case No. 01-0222 was thus
found barred by prior judgment.

On appeal to the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76212, respondent Republic alleged that the trial court erred in
disregarding that appellant had evidence to prove that the subject parcel of land used to be foreshore land of the
Manila Bay and that the trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 01-0222 on the ground of res judicata.14

The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not
registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership
or confer title upon the registrant.

Further, according to the appellate court res judicata does not apply to lands of public domain, nor does possession
of the land automatically divest the land of its public character.

The appellate court explained that rulings of the Supreme Court have made exceptions in cases where the findings
of the Director of Lands and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were conflicting as to
the true nature of the land in as much as reversion efforts pertaining foreshore lands are embued with public
interest.

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Order dated August 7,
2002 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 01-0222 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to said court for further proceedings and a full-blown trial on the merits with utmost dispatch.15

Hence, this petition.

The Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues before this Court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS NECESSITATING THE HONORABLE COURT’S EXERCISE OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE REVERSAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE TRIAL COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE
INSTANT CASE IS BASED ON ITS ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN, ALLEGEDLY PART OF
MANILA BAY.
A. IN THE FIRESTONE CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA NOTWITHSTANDING
ALLEGATIONS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, FORECLOSING ANY FURTHER ATTEMPT BY
RESPONDENT THEREIN, AS IN THE INSTANT CASE, TO RESURRECT A LONG-SETTLED JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
REGISTRABILITY OF A PARCEL OF LAND BASED ON THE SHEER ALLEGATION THAT THE SAME IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
B. THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT LAND WAS PART OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN.
C. RESPONDENT’S REVERSION CASE SEEKS TO RETRY THE VERY SAME FACTUAL ISSUES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN
JUDICIALLY DETERMINED OVER THIRTY (30) YEARS AGO.
D. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION ARE MISPLACED,
CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE ALL PREDICATED ON THE ERRONEOUS PREMISE THAT IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE SUBJECT
LAND IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II. RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY JURISDICTIONAL ESTOPPEL AND LACHES FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT.
III. RELIANCE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE ISOLATED PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE IS
UNWARRANTED AND MISLEADING CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT’S DECISION IN 1974 WAS NOT IN ISSUE IN SAID CASE.
A. THE INSTANT REVERSION CASE IS NOT THE PROPER RECOURSE.
B. THE VALIDITY OF THE COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT 15 MAY 1998 HAS ALREADY BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN THE PEA CASE.
IV. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS MANDATE THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON ORDINARY ESTOPPEL AND LACHES IN THE INSTANT
CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT.
V. RESPONDENT CANNOT BE GIVEN SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AND EXCUSED FOR TRANSGRESSING RULES OF PROCEDURE. 16
Essentially, the issues boil down to three: (1) Is a reversion suit proper in this case? (2) Is the present petition
estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata?
An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain.17 This remedy is provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141
(Public Land Act) which became effective on December 1, 1936. Said law recognized the power of the state to
recover lands of public domain. Section 124 of CA No. 141 reads:

SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any
of the provisions of Sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to
the State. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act, reversion suits are proper in the following instances, to wit:

1. Alienations of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions in violation of Section 118, CA No. 141;
2. Conveyances made by non-Christians in violation of Section 120, CA No. 141; and
3. Alienations of lands acquired under CA No. 141 in favor of persons not qualified under Sections 121, 122, and 123 of CA No. 141.
From the foregoing, an action for reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead patents or free patents based on
transfers and conveyances in violation of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the
Administrative Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that reversion suits were originally utilized to annul titles or
patents administratively issued by the Director of the Land Management Bureau or the Secretary of the DENR.

While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land registration court can be subject of
a reversion suit, the government availed of such remedy by filing actions with the RTC to cancel titles and decrees
granted in land registration applications.

The situation changed on August 14, 1981 upon effectivity of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 which gave the
Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs.

When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of
judgments or final orders and resolutions of the RTCs. The two grounds for annulment under Sec. 2, Rule 47 are
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from
its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel as provided by Section 3,
Rule 47. Thus, effective July 1, 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by the Government was
already covered by Rule 47.

The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative titles
was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Parañaque City RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously
instituted in the Parañaque RTC and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The proper court is the CA
which is the body mandated by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle annulment of judgments of RTCs.

In Collado v. Court of Appeals,18 the government, represented by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 9(2) of
BP Blg. 129, filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Similarly in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,19 the Solicitor General correctly filed the annulment of judgment with the said appellate court.

This was not done in this case. The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Parañaque RTC. It should have
been filed with the CA as required by Rule 47. Evidently, the Parañaque RTC had no jurisdiction over the instant
reversion case.

Assuming that the Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion case, still the lapse of almost three decades in
filing the instant case, the inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would cause constrain us to
rule for petitioners. While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the state or its agents,20 deviations
have been allowed. In Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, we said:

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual
circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy
adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special
cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against
private individuals.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to
innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable
length of time.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the clean
certificates of the title was sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we ruled
that "[i]t is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to
avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value (emphasis supplied)."22 We explained:

Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of
title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the
certificate. Such cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been
regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily,
all persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore,
and the law or the courts do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true
condition of the property. They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the property that are
noted on the certificate.23

xxxx

But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest
damage to third persons. First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land to put a stop forever to
any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the
registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars
petitioner from questioning private respondents’ titles to the subdivision lots. Third, it was never proven that Private
Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that led to the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision.
Finally, because petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been committed by its
agents who had surveyed the property, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions must be
respected. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by filing this
case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly performed their duties.24

Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic v. Umali,25 where, in a reversion case, we held
that even if the original grantee of a patent and title has obtained the same through fraud, reversion will no longer
prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot affect the titles of innocent
purchasers for value.

Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed
before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches.

While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred
by laches or estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and
above the interests of the government. Section 32 provides:

SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor
by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser
for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrances for value. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this petition, the LRC (now LRA), on May 30, 1974, issued Decree No. N-150912 in favor of Fermina Castro and
OCT No. 10215 was issued by the Rizal Registrar of Deeds on May 29, 1974. OCT No. 10215 does not show any
annotation, lien, or encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean title, Yujuico bought the same in good faith and
for value from her. He was issued TCT No. 445863 on May 31, 1974. There is no allegation that Yujuico was a
buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that
every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the x x x encumbrances which
may be subsisting.26 The same legal shield redounds to his successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos and Carpio, more
particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from Jesus Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith.

Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees for value, the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB,
and DBP. Even if the mortgagor’s title was proved fraudulent and the title declared null and void, such declaration
cannot nullify the mortgage rights of a mortgagee in good faith.27

All told, a reversion suit will no longer be allowed at this stage.

More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned or declined to assert it.28

When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed from the time the late
Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the original owner Castro. After the issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro,
no further action was taken by the government to question the issuance of the title to Castro until the case of Public
Estates Authority, brought up in the oral argument before this Court on September 6, 2000.29 We then held that
allegation of fraud in the issuance of the title was not proper for consideration and determination at that stage of the
case.

From the undisputed facts of the case, it is easily revealed that respondent Republic took its sweet time to nullify
Castro’s title, notwithstanding the easy access to ample remedies which were readily available after OCT No. 10215
was registered in the name of Castro. First, it could have appealed to the CA when the Pasig-Rizal CFI rendered a
decision ordering the registration of title in the name of applicant Castro on April 26, 1974. Had it done so, it could
have elevated the matter to this Court if the appellate court affirms the decision of the land registration court.
Second, when the entry of Decree No. N-150912 was made on May 29, 1974 by the Rizal Register of Deeds, the
Republic had one (1) year from said date or up to May 28, 1975 to file a petition for the reopening and review of
Decree No. N-150912 with the Rizal CFI (now RTC) on the ground of actual fraud under section 32 of PD 1592.
Again, respondent Republic did not avail of such remedy. Third, when Jesus Yujuico filed a complaint for Removal
of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages against PEA before the Parañaque RTC in Civil Case No. 96-0317,
respondent could have persevered to question and nullify Castro’s title. Instead, PEA undertook a compromise
agreement on which the May 18, 1998 Resolution30 was issued. PEA in effect admitted that the disputed land was
owned by the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners and their title legal and valid; and impliedly waived its right to
contest the validity of said title; respondent Republic even filed the petition for relief from judgment beyond the time
frames allowed by the rules, a fact even acknowledged by this Court in Public Estates Authority. Lastly, respondent
only filed the reversion suit on June 8, 2001 after the passage of 27 years from the date the decree of registration
was issued to Fermina Castro.

Such a Rip Van Winkle, coupled with the signing of the settlement with PEA, understandably misled petitioners to
believe that the government no longer had any right or interest in the disputed lot to the extent that the two lots were
even mortgaged to several banks including a government financing institution. Any nullification of title at this stage
would unsettle and prejudice the rights and obligations of innocent parties. All told, we are constrained to conclude
that laches had set in.

Even granting arguendo that respondent Republic is not precluded by laches from challenging the title of petitioners
in the case at bar, still we find that the instant action for reversion is already barred by res judicata.
Petitioners relying on Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals31 as a precedent to the case at bar contend that
the instant reversion suit is now barred by res judicata.

We agree with petitioners.

The doctrine on precedents is expressed in the latin maxim—Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.32 In order however that a case can be considered as a
precedent to another case which is pending consideration, the facts of the first case should be similar or analogous
to the second case.

A perusal of the facts of the Firestone case and those of the case at bar reveals that the facts in the two (2) cases
are parallel. First, in Firestone and in this case, the claimants filed land registration applications with the CFI; both
claimants obtained decrees for registration of lots applied for and were issued OCTs. Second, in Firestone, the
Republic filed a reversion case alleging that the land covered by the OCT was still inalienable forest land at the time
of the application and hence the Land Registration Court did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property to the
claimant. In the instant case, respondent Republic contend that the land applied for by Yujuico was within Manila
Bay at the time of application and therefore the CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint. Third, in Firestone, the validity of the title of the claimant was favorably ruled upon by this Court in G.R.
No. 109490entitled Patrocinio E. Margolles v. CA. In the case at bar, the validity of the compromise agreement
involving the disputed lot was in effect upheld when this Court in Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico dismissed the
petition of PEA seeking to reinstate the petition for relief from the May 18, 1998 Resolution approving said
compromise agreement. With the dismissal of the petition, the May 18, 1998 Resolution became final and executory
and herein respondent Republic through PEA was deemed to have recognized Castro’s title over the disputed land
as legal and valid. In Romero v. Tan,33 we ruled that "a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata." We also
made clear that a judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits, wherein the parties
have validly entered into stipulations and the evidence was duly considered by the trial court that approved the
agreement. In the instant case, the May 18, 1998 Resolution approving the compromise agreement confirmed the
favorable decision directing the registration of the lot to Castro’s name in LRC Case No. N-8239. Similarly,
in Firestone, the Margolles case confirmed the decision rendered in favor of Gana in Land Registration Case No.
672 ordering the issuance of the decree to said applicant. Fourth, in Firestone, the Supreme Court relied on the
letter of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez that the evidence of the Bureau of Lands and the LRC was not
sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216. In the instant case, both the Solicitor General and
the Government Corporate Counsel opined that the Yujuico land was not under water and that "there appears to be
no sufficient basis for the Government to institute the action for annulment." Fifth, in Firestone, we ruled that "the
Margolles case had long become final, thus the validity of OCT No. 4216 should no longer be disturbed and should
be applied in the instant case (reversion suit) based on the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment."34

Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The Public Estates Authority had become final and thus the
validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro could no longer be questioned.

While we said in Public Estates Authority that the court does not foreclose the right of the Republic from pursuing
the proper recourse in a separate proceedings as it may deem warranted, the statement was obiter dictum since the
inquiry on whether or not the disputed land was still under water at the time of its registration was a non-issue in the
said case.

Even granting for the sake of argument that Firestone is not squarely applicable, still we find the reversion suit
already barred by res judicata.

For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the two cases, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.35

There is no question as to the first, third and last requisites. The threshold question pertains to the second requisite,
whether or not the then Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch 22 had jurisdiction over the subject matter in LRC Case No. N-
8239. In Civil Case No. 01-0222, the Parañaque City RTC, Branch 257 held that the CFI had jurisdiction. The CA
reversed the decision of the Parañaque City RTC based on the assertion of respondent Republic that the Pasig-
Rizal CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that there was a need to determine the character of the
land in question.

The Parañaque City RTC Order dismissing the case for res judicata must be upheld.

The CA, in rejecting the dismissal of the reversion case by the Parañaque RTC, relied on two cases, namely:
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta36 and Republic v. Vda. De Castillo.37

In Municipality of Antipolo, we held that the land registration court had no jurisdiction to entertain any land
registration application if the land was public property, thus:

Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of
ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is null and void. It never
attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its
annulment by reason of res judicata.

"[x x x] the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject matter renders the judgment void and a mere nullity, and
considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights
can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing
out of are void, and considering, further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in
contemplation of law, and hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot
constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata."

xxxx

"It follows that ‘if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot
be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of
the land illegally included’ (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
769)."

[x x x x]

"Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra),
and the cancellation maybe pursued through an ordinary action therefore. This action cannot be barred by the prior
judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there
was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. [x x x] Certainly, one of the essential
requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter, is absent in this case." (Italics supplied).38

The plain import of Municipality of Antipolo is that a land registration court, the RTC at present, has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the application which respondent Republic claims is public land. This ruling needs
elucidation.

Firmly entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.39 Consequently, the
proper CFI (now the RTC) under Section 14 of PD 152940 (Property Registration Decree) has jurisdiction over
applications for registration of title to land.

Section 14 of PD 1592 provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conformably, the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the land registration case
filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the initiatory pleading¾the application.41 Settled is the rule that "the authority to decide a case
and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. When there is jurisdiction, the decision of all
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of jurisdiction."42

In our view, it was imprecise to state in Municipality of Antipolo that the "Land Registration Court [has] no jurisdiction
to entertain the application for registration of public property x x x" for such court precisely has the jurisdiction to
entertain land registration applications since that is conferred by PD 1529. The applicant in a land registration case
usually claims the land subject matter of the application as his/her private property, as in the case of the application
of Castro. Thus, the conclusion of the CA that the Pasig-Rizal CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
application of Castro has no legal mooring. The land registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied
for at the time of the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, can determine
whether the title to the land applied for is registrable and can be confirmed. In the event that the subject matter of
the application turns out to be inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the registration of the land
and perforce must dismiss the application.

Based on our ruling in Antipolo, the threshold question is whether the land covered by the titles of petitioners is
under water and forms part of Manila Bay at the time of the land registration application in 1974. If the land was
within Manila Bay, then res judicata does not apply. Otherwise, the decision of the land registration court is a bar to
the instant reversion suit.

After a scrutiny of the case records and pleadings of the parties in LRC Case No. N-8239 and in the instant petition,
we rule that the land of Fermina Castro is registrable and not part of Manila Bay at the time of the filing of the land
registration application.

The trial court’s Decision in 1974 easily reveals the basis for its conclusion that the subject matter was a dry land,
thus:

On February 1, 1974, the applicant presented her evidence before the Deputy Clerk of this Court and among the
evidence presented by her were certain documents which were marked as Exhibits D to J, inclusive. The applicant
testified in her behalf and substantially declared that: she was 62 years old, single, housekeeper and residing at
1550 J. Escoda, Ermita, Manila; that she was born on June 3, 1911; that she first came to know of the land applied
for which is situated in the Municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, with an area of 17,343 square meters and
covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 while she was still ten (10) years old or sometime in 1921; that when she first came
to know of the land applied for, the person who was in possession and owner of said land was her father, Catalino
Castro; that during that time her father used to plant on said land various crops like pechay, mustard, eggplant, etc.;
that during that time, her father built a house on said land which was used by her father and the other members of
the family, including the applicant, as their residential house; that the land applied for was inherited by her father
from her grandfather Sergio Castro; that Catalino Castro continuously possessed and owned the land in question
from 1921 up to the time of his death in 1952; and that during that period of time nobody ever disturbed the
possession and ownership of her father over the said parcel of land; that after the death of her father in 1952 she left
the place and transferred her place of residence but she had also occasions to visit said land twice or thrice a week
and sometimes once a week; that after she left the land in question in 1952, she still continued possessing said
land, through her caretaker Eliseo Salonga; that her possession over the land in question from the time she
inherited it up to the time of the filing of the application has been continuous, public, adverse against the whole world
and in the concept of an owner; that it was never encumbered, mortgaged, or disposed of by her father during his
lifetime and neither did she ever encumber or sell the same; that it was declared for taxation purposes by her father
when he was still alive and her father also paid the real estate taxes due to the government although the receipt
evidencing the payment of said real estate taxes for the property applied for have been lost and could no longer be
found inspite of diligent effort exerted to locate the same.

The other witness presented by the applicant was Emiliano de Leon, who declared that he was 70 years old,
married, farmer and residing at San Jose, Baliwag, Bulacan; that he knew Catalino Castro, the father of the
applicant because said Catalino Castro was his neighbor in Tambo, Parañaque, Rizal, he had a house erected on
the land of Catalino Castro; that he was born in 1903 and he first came to know of the land in question when in 1918
when he was about 18 years old; that the area of the land owned and possessed by Catalino Castro where he
constructed a residential house has an area of more than one and one-half (1 ½) hectares; that the possession of
Catalino Castro over the land in question was peaceful, continuous, notorious, adverse against the whole world and
in the concept of an owner; that during the time that Catalino Castro was in possession of the land applied for he
planted on said parcel of land mango, coconut and banana, etc.; that Catalino Castro continuously possessed and
owned said parcel of land up to the year 1952 when he died; that during the time that Catalino Castro was in
possession of said land, nobody ever laid claim over the said property; that said land is not within any military or
naval reservation; that upon the death of Catalino Castro, the applicant took possession of the land applied for and
that up to the present the applicant is in possession of said land; that he resided in the land in question from 1918
up to the time he transferred his place of residence in Baliwag, Bulacan in the year 1958.

On February 11, 1974, the Court, pursuant to the provision of Presidential Decree No. 230 issued by his Excellency,
Ferdinand E. Marcos dated July 9, 1973 held in abeyance the rendition of a decision in this case and directed the
applicant to submit a white print copy of plan (LRC) Psu-964 to the Director of lands who was directed by the Court
to submit his comment and recommendation thereon.

The property in question is declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 51842 (Exhibit G) and real
estate taxes due thereon have been paid up to the year 1973 (Exhibit H).

In compliance with the Order of this Court February 11, 1974, the Director of Lands, thru Special Attorney Saturnino
A. Pacubas, submitted a report to this Court dated April 25, 1974, stating among other things, that upon ocular
inspection conducted by Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe and the subsequent joint ocular inspection conducted
by Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania, it was established that
the parcel of land covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 no longer forms part of the Manila Bay but is definitely solid and
dry land.

In this connection, it should be noted that Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Geodetic Engineer
Manuel A. Cervantes, in their report dated March 22, 1974 have also stated that the land applied for cannot be
reached by water even in the highest tide and that the said land is occupied by squatter families who have erected
makeshift shanties and a basketball court which only prove that the same is dry and solid land away from the shores
of Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Land Inspector Adelino G. Gorospe in his letter-report dated November 28, 1973 has also stated that
there is a house of pre-war vintage owned by the applicant on the land in question which in effect corroborates the
testimony of the applicant and her witness that they have lived on the land in question even prior to the outbreak of
the second world war and that the applicant has been in possession of the land in question long time ago.43

To counter the evidence of applicant Castro, and bolster its claim that she has no valid title, respondent Republic
relies on the July 18, 1973 Office Memorandum44 of Roman Mataverde, OIC, Surveys Division, to the OIC, Legal
Division, of the Bureau of Lands, stating that "when projected on cadastral maps CM 14º 13’N - 120º 59’ E., Sec. 3-
D and CM 14º 30’N - 120º 59’E., Sec. 2-A of Paranaque [sic] Cadastre (Cad-299), (LRC) Psu-964 falls inside Manila
Bay, outside Cad-299."45

The same conclusion was adopted in a November 15, 1973 letter of Narciso Villapando, Acting Regional Lands
Director to the Chief, Legal Division, Bureau of Lands and in the Comment and Recommendation of Ernesto C.
Mendiola, Assistant Director, also of the Bureau of Lands.

Respondent likewise cites Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 Revised 80-11-2 to support its position that Castro’s
lot is a portion of Manila Bay.

The burden of proving these averments falls to the shoulders of respondent Republic. The difficulty is locating the
witnesses of the government. Roman Mataverde, then OIC of the Surveys Division retired from the government
service in 1982. He should by this time be in his 90s. Moreover, Asst. Regional Director Narciso Villapando and
Asst. Director Ernesto C. Mendiola are no longer connected with the Bureau of Lands since 1986.

Assuming that OIC Roman Mataverde, Asst. Regional Director Narciso Villapando and Assistant Director Ernesto C.
Mendiola are still available as witnesses, the projections made on the cadastral maps of the then Bureau of Lands
cannot prevail over the results of the two ocular inspections by several Bureau of Lands officials that the disputed lot
is definitely "dry and solid land" and not part of Manila Bay. Special Attorney Saturnino A. Pacubas, Land Inspector
Adelino G. Gorospe, Geodetic Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative Asst. Lazaro A. Berana, all
officials of the Bureau of Lands, were positive that the disputed land is solid and dry land and no longer forms part of
Manila Bay. Evidence gathered from the ocular inspection is considered direct and firsthand information entitled to
great weight and credit while the Mataverde and Villapando reports are evidence weak in probative value, being
merely based on theoretical projections "in the cadastral map or table surveys."46 Said projections must be
confirmed by the actual inspection and verification survey by the land inspectors and geodetic engineers of the
Bureau of Lands. Unfortunately for respondent Republic, the bureau land inspectors attested and affirmed that the
disputed land is already dry land and not within Manila Bay.

On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion of Manila Bay was
Castro’s lot located in 1974. Moreover, a hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the nature and location
of the lot subject of a land registration application. It is derived from a hydrographic survey which is mainly used for
navigation purposes, thus:

Surveys whose principal purpose is the determination of data relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic survey may
consist of the determination of one or several of the following classes of data: depth water; configuration and nature
of the bottom; directions and force of currents; heights and times of tides and water stages; and location of fixed
objects for survey and navigation purposes.47

Juxtaposed with finding of the ocular inspection by Bureau of Lands Special Attorney Pacubas and others that
Castro’s lot is dry land in 1974, Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 is therefore inferior evidence and lacking in
probative force.

Moreover, the reliability and veracity of the July 18, 1973 report of Roman Mataverde based on the alleged
projection on cadastral maps and the Villapando report dated November 15, 1973 are put to serious doubt in the
face of the opinion dated October 13, 1997 of the Government Corporate Counsel, the lawyer of the PEA, which
upheld the validity of the titles of petitioners, thus:

We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as
based on the two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands Administrative Assistant Lazaro G.
Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding ‘… the same no longer forms part of Manila Bay but is
definitely solid land which cannot be reached by water even in the highest of tides’. This Berania-Cervantes report
based on ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and recommendations of Land Director Narciso V.
Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and the
fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on projections in the cadastral map or table surveys.

xxxx

A. The Legal prognosis of the case is not promising in favor of PEA.

4.1 LRC Case No. N-8239 has already become final and executory and OCT No. 10215 was already issued
in favor of Fermina Castro. Any and all attempts to question its validity can only be entertained in a quo
warranto proceedings (sic), assuming that there are legal grounds (not factual grounds) to support its
nullification. Subjecting it to a collateral attack is not allowed under the Torrens Title System. In Calalang vs.
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215, the Supreme Court held that the present petition is not
the proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles since the judicial action required is a
direct and not a collateral attack (refer also to: Toyota Motor Philippine Corporation vs. CA, 216 SCRA 236).

4.2 OCT No. 10215 in favor of Fermina Castro was issued pursuant to a cadastral proceeding, hence is
a rem proceedings which is translated as a constructive notice to the whole world, as held in Adez Realty
Incorporated vs. CA, 212 SCRA 623.

4.3 From the cursory and intent reading of the decision of Judge Sison in LRC Case No. N-8239, we cannot
find any iota of fraud having been committed by the court and the parties. In fact, due process was observed
when the Office of the Solicitor General represented ably the Bureau of Lands. In Balangcad vs. Justices of
the Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 169, the Supreme Court held that title to registered property becomes
indefeasible after one-year from date of registration except where there is actual fraud in which case it may
be challenged in a direct proceeding within that period. This is also the ruling in Bishop vs. CA, 208 SCRA
636, that to sustain an action for annulment of a torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown
 that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and there was actual fraud in securing
the title.

4.4 As to priority of torrens title, PEA has no defense, assuming that both PEA and Yujuico titles are valid,
as held in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. CA, 215 SCRA 783, where two (2)
certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails.

4.5 The documents so far submitted by the parties to the court indicate that the mother title of the Yujuico
land when registered in 1974 was not underwater. This was shown in the two (2) ocular inspections
conducted by the officials of the Land Bureau.

4.6 The provision of P.D. 239 that no decree of registration may be issued by the court unless upon approval
and recommendation of the Bureau of Lands was substantially complied with in the Report of Lands Special
Attorney Saturnino Pacubas, submitted to the court.48

Even the counsel of respondent Republic, the OSG, arrived at the conclusion that there is no sufficient legal basis
for said respondent to institute action to annul the titles of petitioners, thus:

It may be stated at the outset that a petition for annulment of certificate of title or reconveyance of land may be
based on fraud which attended the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title.

Based on the decision in the LRC Case No. N-8239 involving the petition for registration and confirmation of title
filed by Fermina Castro, there is no showing that fraud attended the issuance of OCT No. 10215. it appears that the
evidence presented by Fermina Castro was sufficient for the trial court to grant her petition.

The testimony of Fermina Castro, which was corroborated by Emiliano de Leon, that she and her predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years sufficiently established her vested right
over the property initially covered by OCT No. 10215. The report dated April 25, 1974 which was submitted to the
trial court by the Director of Lands through Special Attorney Saturnino Pacubas showed that the parcel of land was
solid and dry land when Fermina Castro’s application for registration of title was filed. It was based on the ocular
inspection conducted by Land Inspector Adelino Gorospe and the joint circular inspection conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Manuel A. Cervantes and Administrative Assistant Lazaro Berania on November 28, 1973 and March 22,
1974 respectively.

The aforesaid report must be requested unless there is a concrete proof that there was an irregularity in the
issuance thereof. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ocular inspection of the parcel of land, which was
made the basis of said report, is presumed to be in order.

Based on the available records, there appears to be no sufficient basis for the Government to institute an action for
the annulment of OCT No. 10215 and its derivative titles. It is opined that a petition for cancellation/annulment of
Decree No. N-150912 and OCT No. 10215 and all its derivative titles will not prosper unless there is convincing
evidence to negate the report of the then Land Management Bureau through Special Attorney Pacubas. Should the
Government pursue the filing of such an action, the possibility of winning the case is remote.49

More so, respondent Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina Castro in 1973 was
solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said land is underwater. The only conclusion that can be
derived from the admissions of the Solicitor General and Government Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of
the titles of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of the state.

Notably, the land in question has been the subject of a compromise agreement upheld by this Court in Public
Estates Authority.50 In that compromise agreement, among other provisions, it was held that the property covered by
TCT Nos. 446386 and S-29361, the land subject of the instant case, would be exchanged for PEA property. The fact
that PEA signed the May 15, 1998 Compromise Agreement is already a clear admission that it recognized
petitioners as true and legal owners of the land subject of this controversy.

Moreover, PEA has waived its right to contest the legality and validity of Castro’s title. Such waiver is clearly within
the powers of PEA since it was created by PD 1084 as a body corporate "which shall have the attribute of perpetual
succession and possessed of the powers of the corporations, to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of
this Charter [PD 1084]."51 It has the power "to enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every class and
description, including loan agreements, mortgages and other types of security arrangements, necessary or
incidental to the realization of its purposes with any person, firm or corporation, private or public, and with any
foreign government or entity."52 It also has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name.53 Thus, the
Compromise Agreement and the Deed of Exchange of Real Property signed by PEA with the petitioners are legal,
valid and binding on PEA. In the Compromise Agreement, it is provided that it "settles in full all the
claims/counterclaims of the parties against each other."54 The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners’ title
is fortified by the manifestation by PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on Compromise Agreement that

4. The parties herein hereto waive and abandon any and all other claims and counterclaims which they may have
against each other arising from this case or related thereto.55

Thus, there was a valid waiver of the right of respondent Republic through PEA to challenge petitioners’ titles.

The recognition of petitioners’ legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal
acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated that: "Your ownership thereof was
acknowledged by PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an owner of a
piece of land in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member thereof."56 Section 26, Rule 130 provides that "the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." The admissions of
PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding
on respondent Republic. Respondent’s claim that the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the
admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of
registrability of petitioners’ lot.

In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Parañaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches.
Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining therein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76212 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the August 7, 2002 Order of the Parañaque City RTC, Branch
257 in Civil Case No. 01-0222 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Fermina Castro, et al. dismissing the complaint
is AFFIRMED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter
fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent
justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in
the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996,
Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of
Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly
covered by respondent’s titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air
Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as
represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as
counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an
alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or
continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative
investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos.
135604, 135605 and 135606.

During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft
to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no
one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare
respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person
who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively
an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a mere scrap of paper and
produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republic’s motion. 4 It found respondent’s
answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer
stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 seeking to set aside
the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in
default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the
legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also
scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer 6 and concluded that he assented to the signing of the
answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the
appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default against
respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but
it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared respondent in default for its failure to
file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. 7 Where it appears that a party
clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is
admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat
the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. 9 By adoptive admission, a
third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may
occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; 10

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 12

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she
has heard the other make 13 or

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 14

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it
ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos’ testimony
as well as its implications, as follows:

1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading
could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither
known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer
bore a signature.

2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a
counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did.
The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by
another. This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person could
act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as
counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
ratified the signing of the answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s February
19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment 15 and
memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive admission
constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
one that is unsigned to one that is signed.

Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. 16Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer 17 but cannot do so

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, 18 something the law
strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken
pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’
subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the
signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-
serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial
court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own
valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness
and injustice. 19

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application
of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it
should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the
legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED
G.R. No. 21911 September 15, 1924

EL VARADERO DE MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

Ernesto Zaragoza for appellant.

Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the lighter Tatlo, the property of the Insular Lumber
Company. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit understanding that the
price would be as low as, or lower than, could be secured from any other company.

The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented by El Varadero de Manila was grossly
exorbitant and a proposed compromise having failed of realization, the matter was taken to court with the result that
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured judgment against the Insular
Lumber Company, the defendant, in the amount of P5,310.70, with legal interest from the presentation of the
complaint, and costs. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed to this court and here as asked us to increase the
amount of the judgment to P12,412.62.

To arrive at as correct a judgment as is possible, it will first be necessary to set down a number of figures and
thereafter to seize upon a few salient facts as having influence.

The itemized bill presented by the plaintiff, the amount which it still claims, totals P12,412.62. At one time during the
course of the negotiations, the plaintiff was willing to accept P10,241.37. (Exhibit I.) The witnesses for the plaintiff
naturally took the view that the bill was correct. But the trial judge was of the opinion that it was excessive.

The defendant, on the other hand, says that a reasonable figure for the work would be P5,310.70. Witnesses were
offered to substantiate this contention. Their testimony so impressed the trial judge that he adopted their statements
as his own. During the course of the abortive negotiations, however, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay
the plaintiff P8,070.12. (Exhibit G.)

Now to emphasize three points which will materially assist us in rendering judgment. The first point relates to the
offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be excluded, except that as the
amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate
of value, they are relevant. (City of Springfield vs. Schmook [1878], 68 Mo., 394; Daniels vs. Town of Woonsocket
[1874], 11 R. I., 4; Teasley vs. Bradley [1900], 110 Ga., 497.) Here, there was no denial of liability and the only
question discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be more than P8,070.12. The
second point of interest relates to the testimony of Mariano Yengko, inspector of vessels, admittedly a disinterested
witness, who in one synopsis of a fair value of the repairs, arrived at P5,134.20, but which, on cross-examination, he
raised to between seven and eight thousand pesos. And the third point is that the tacit understanding between the
parties was that the cost of the repairs should be approximately the same as what other companies would charge.
The defendant admits that El Varadero de Navotas would have done the work for about P8,000.

Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the reasonable value of
the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by the Insular Lumber Company, was
something less than P8,000. We fix the sum definitely at P7,700.
Judgment is modified, and in lieu of the judgment rendered in the lower court, another shall issue in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the recovery of P7,700, with legal interest to begin to run from the date when
this judgment shall become final and to continue until payment, without express finding as to costs in either
instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-8931 March 14, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN MAQUI, defendant-appellant.

Alejo Mabanag for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and sentenced
to imprisonment for the period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay his
share of the costs of the proceedings.

Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa,
the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have
been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money; and in
declining to accept as true the testimony of the accused in his own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record,
however, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge as to the degree of the credit which
should be accorded the various witnesses called at the trial.

Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused should have
been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof n the record that they were made
voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as they can be construed as admission or
confession of guilt. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in the
court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence
as to the circumstances under which these incriminating statements were made be accepted as true it clearly rebuts
the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of reward. The record
clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and that they
were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope that it
accepted he would escape prosecution.

The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been discussed in the
courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think, however, that the
weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits
the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to
compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.

Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if made merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. (U.
S. vs.Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)

In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is
inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)

On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible on behalf of
the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case
could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could be
settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a
solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)

In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of a civil
action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)

An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are
admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)

An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an admission of
guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in the
indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)

It may be shown that the prisoner sent a massage to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping and to be let go.
(State vs. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)

We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in imposing the
penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of
"instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is or not an uncivilized Igorot,
although there are indications in the record which tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if he
is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the
Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher that are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of
article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly applicable to
offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the
fact that their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in
"instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of
those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.

It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are not entitled to the
benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142, this on the theory
that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the ground upon which the courts were authorized in
their direction to mitigate the penalties prescribed by the code was "the circumstance of the offender being a native,
mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes of this nature we declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a native of the
Philippine Islands, a mestizo or a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as theft or
robbery he should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no sounds presumption
arising from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less or to resist the temptation to commit them than
are they.

Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts are authorized to
mitigate the prescribed penalties is not racial affiliation of the convict, but "the degree of instruction and education of
the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be sufficient to justify the mitigation of
the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may and will arise
wherein under all the "circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion
will justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which should be accorded
one who has the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would justify the court in believing that
he was capable of fully and properly understanding and appreciating the criminal character of the offense committed
by him.

We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 111 as amended by Act No. 2142, the courts may and
should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration where it appears that under all the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility prescribed in the
code for the ordinary offender.

The larceny of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650 pesetas, a penalty one
degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree should have
been imposed; in other words, presidio correccional in its medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree.
Giving the convict the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be
imposed in its minimum degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of presidio correccional in
its medium degree.

Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was convicted in
the minimum degree — that is to say, by, imposing upon the accused the penalty of two years four months and one
day of presidio correccional, in lieu of that of five years' imprisonment imposed by the court below — the judgment
convicting and sentencing him should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

[G.R. No. 10566. August 20, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINO TORRES AND PABLO PADILLA, Defendants-
Appellants.

Ledesma, Clarin, Gabaldon & Recto for appellant Torres.

P. E. del Rosario for appellant Padilla.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. OPIUM; PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF DRUG. — Where a person entertains an offer to sell his opium,
goes to the house of the vendor, examines the drug and leaves the house with three tins of it, and where the person
is not authorized to have the drug in his possession, it is presumed that he was the owner thereof by purchase.

2. POSSESSION DEFINED. — Civil possession is the holding of a thing with the intention of acquiring ownership.
(Civil Code, art. 430.)

3. OFFER TO COMPROMISE. — An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in
evidence.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

The reason in this case has come before us on appeal by both defendants from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu whereby they were convicted of a violation of Act No. 1761. Regino Torres was sentenced to
imprisonment for three years, Pablo Padilla to one year and one month, and each to pay one-half of the costs. The
three tins of opium, the corpus delicti, were ordered confiscated.

On examination of the record it appears:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That the testimony of George W. Walker and Juan Samson, secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse who
arrested the defendants, and the seizure of the corpus delicti (Exhibits A, B, and C) were held by the trial court to be
conclusive evidence against defendants.

That Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of January 20, 1914, Regino Torres would go
to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that evening they stationed themselves in
Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short while afterwards saw the two defendants come out of the
door of the garage on the premises; that Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in
pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to
halt, and, as the latter continued to run, witness fired a shot into the air, whereupon Padilla stopped, after he had
thrown one tin over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with lights to
search for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the other two tins, about a meter
from the place where Samson had been holding Torres.

That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when questioned by the
defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say
that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was also asked by the defense
whether Walker had proposed to the defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to which he
replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who made this offer.

That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was a large amount of opium, and they
agreed that at 6 o’clock in the evening they would go to the house above mentioned; that Padilla went to Torres’
house at 6 o’clock in the evening and hurried him up, saying: "Eat in a hurry, for the owner of the opium needs
money" ; that when they arrived at the house of Franco’s widow, Padilla entered the door of the place where the
automobiles were kept, and five minutes afterwards called witness to enter the garage and there Padilla showed
Torres a tin of opium, at the same time saying that it was first class and cost P60 without haggling; that witness
replied that he would first show it to some trustworthy friends to determine its class; that Padilla agreed and they
both left for this purpose, but that when they had gone about ten brazas from the door, he was seized by Samson
and saw that Padilla had run away and was being pursued by Walker. The court asked Torres whether he had
wished to investigate first and buy afterwards, to which he replied that he did, and that if he had been convinced of
the quality of the opium he would have bought about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?" inquired the
judge. The defendant replied: "Yes, sir."cralaw virtua1aw library

That, upon arraignment, Pablo Padilla pleaded guilty. "The defendant’s counsel," says the trial court in his decision,
"requested that his client be permitted to state the circumstances that surrounded the case and which induced this
defendant to commit the crime under prosecution." The court further says therein: "It is preferable that counsel
himself state the circumstances that, in his opinion, attended the crime and which may be considered as
extenuating."cralaw virtua1aw library

Pantaleon del Rosario, Padilla’s counsel, stated that according to the information given by his client, the latter is a
poor man who accompanied the other defendant Regino Torres principally in order that, in case they were caught by
the authorities, Torres might transfer the material possession of the opium to counsel’s client and the latter would
assume liability for such possession and suffer the legal consequences.

That the trial court took that statement into consideration in extenuation of the penalty he imposed upon Padilla,
concluding by saying that this defendant appeared to be a poor man who, impelled by poverty, had accompanied
Torres for the purpose, as every probability indicated, of obtaining a relatively small share in the business in which
Torres was engaged; while, with respect to Torres, the court said that he played the most important role, for he
confessed to have sufficient means to purchase opium to the amount of twenty tins at P60 a tin.

From the judgment of conviction Regino Torres bases his appeal on four assignments of error: (1) In that the trial
court concluded that two tins were taken from the appellant’s possession; (2) in holding that the appellant had
incurred the penalties provided in section 31 of Act No. 1761; (3) in holding been engaged in the business of buying
and selling opium, and in grounding the judgment of conviction on the said confession; (4) in accepting, as evidence
for the prosecution, the compromise that it is asserted he proposed to the agent George Walker; and (5), in that the
penalty imposed upon the appellant was excessive.

Pablo Padilla bases his appeal only on this last assignment.

Errors 1, 2, and 3 will not lie. Where a person entertains an offer to sell, goes to the house where the sale is to be
effected, making haste because the vendor needs money and because he was urged to do so by the agent who
made him the offer, enters the house, examines the article, leaves the house with three tins which contained the
thing offered for sale and which is a prohibited article by a reason of its being opium, and if the purchaser is not a
person authorized to have it in his possession, it can not be held that the purchaser took the three tins with him to
sample their contents; such a purpose must be proven and unless it is there can be no other inference than that he
carried away with him the thing purchased and that its acquisition was a consummated fact, for the presumption is
that the acts took place in the ordinary course of things and the general routine of dealings between men, and it
cannot be doubted that the person who had the control over the opium at the moment it was seized, whoever it was
that carried it, could be no other than the owner of the money which the vendor so urgently desired to acquire on
that day in exchange for the opium. Civil possession is the holding of a thing by a person with the intention of
acquiring ownership thereof (Civ. Code, art. 430). It was Torres who had the intention of having the opium as
belonging to him, and as he intended, so he had it, and it was afterwards taken from him, as being a thing that he
could not hold, possess nor lawfully have as his own. Padilla was not the owner of the money which the person who
sold the opium needed. Padilla was but an agent who made the offer to Torres. Padilla had no intention of holding,
possessing and having as his own the opium which, on the part of another, he had offered to Torres. The
possession or material holding in this case gives way to the civil possession which, according to Torres’ confession,
was the reason that took him to the house of Franco’s widow, thus putting into effect the intention to possess which
he had a priori entertained as the cause of his presence in the place of the sale. After all, the seizure of the two tins
at a place one meter away from the spot where Torres was arrested by Samson, and the seizure of one tin in the
possession of Padilla, who had thrown it into an inclosure, are facts held by the trial court to have been proven, and
this finding, which does not violate any law and which we do not find to be erroneous, should not be changed in this
review of the evidence. We confirm the finding and hold that it is in accord with the merits of the case.

With regard to the fourth cause of action, the facts are as follows: The witness, Walker, testified, among other
things, that Regino Torres endeavored to compromise the case and that he (Walker) was willing to accept the
compromise through the payment of P1,500, but subject to the approval of his superiors. The defense asked that
this testimony be stricken out, alleging that, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the compromise in such
cases must be made in writing. "When made in civil cases, it is proper; but in criminal causes, it is not," the court
said, and accordingly overruled the objection. The defense excepted.

We have already seen above what Samson’s testimony was concerning this point and how thereby he corroborated
that given by Walker.

An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 346).
In a criminal cause for theft (U. S. v. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court said that the weight both of authority and
reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the accused
to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom.

It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance and private interests are concerned, no
compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action, however it may be with respect to the civil
liability. But section 25 of Act No. 1761, under which this cause was prosecuted, expressly authorizes the Collector
of Internal Revenue to compromise a case after action has been begun, "instead of commencing or prosecuting suit
thereon." The words in quotation marks are textual. A compromise necessarily implies two elements, one of which is
the offer and the other the acceptance, in order that the penal action may be extinguished and there remain only the
civil liability to deal with. Of course ordinarily it is the defendant who makes the offer, — a lawful act sanctioned by
law in this class of prosecutions, — and because it is made, no presumption of guilt must be raised against the
maker, as occurs in other criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not lawful because it is a thing
prohibited by law. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the annoyance of a prosecution, as
sometimes happens in a civil case where a person involved in the litigation is perhaps entirely in the right but prefers
to lose a sum of money rather than commence and prosecute an action. This case is, therefore, on all fours with that
of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above cited. At all events, for the conviction of the defendants it is not
necessary to consider and weigh this evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative, and it was not taken into
account by the trial court.

With regard to the 5th assignment of error which alleges that the penalty was excessive, it must be remembered that
the trial court exercised his discretion in fixing the penalty within the limits established by law and that, in principle,
what is authorized by law cannot be held to be arbitrary. But the penalty imposed by the trial court in his discretion
will not necessarily have to stand for that reason. If such a principle governed, appeals would be useless. This
Supreme Court also exercises its discretion, and, in a higher degree, by its right of review in criminal causes brought
up on appeal or consultation and of high inspection over the administration of justice, it has the power to modify
within the limits of the penalty provided by law, in order to maintain uniformity in its application. If judicial decisions
vary in the different provinces of the Archipelago, even in identical or at least analogous cases, it is principally due to
the fact that the judges, acquainted with the extent of crime in their respective jurisdictions, are justified, in order to
suppress crime, in applying the law more strictly and severely in some provinces than in others in accordance with
the greater or lesser propensity to disobey the laws and the peculiar circumstances that prevail in each locality. But
within the same province such variation would not be justifiable, as it would transgress the law which fits the penalty
to the crime. In the Province of Cebu the court sentenced Lao Lock Hing, for the possession of 70 tins of opium, to
five years’ imprisonment and a fine of P10,000, or, in case of insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment; but this
Supreme Court reduced the penalty to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of P3,000 (14 Phil. Rep., 86 1). In the
same Province of Cebu, Miguel Villano was charged with having bought and sold 190 tins of opium — although one
of the charges was for 100 tins only, valued at P3,000, because the 190 tins were received on different dates — and
was sentenced on the charge for the 100 tins, to one year and two months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P2,500, a judgment which was affirmed by this Supreme Court (18 Phil. Rep., 359 2). In another cause also tried in
Cebu against one Look Chaw for the sale of 30 tins of opium, the penalty imposed was one year’s imprisonment
and a fine of P2,000; this also was affirmed by this Supreme Court (19 Phil. Rep., 343 3).

The foregoing sentences are in notable contrast to the case at bar in which Regino Torres is sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment for the possession of two tins of opium, valued at scarcely P120, and Pablo Padilla to one year
and one month for the possession of one tin of the same drug, worth probably P60.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the understanding that the imprisonment to be imposed upon Regino
Torres shall be that of nine months, and that upon Pablo Padilla, six months, each of them to pay the costs of this
instance in equal shares. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal protection
accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to minimally reduce, if not
altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the
accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by
the grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of death are
automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the
condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention.

Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively
punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:

That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center,
Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and
by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice.1

In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, a private individual, and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of
17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty
against her will and consent and without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia
Taha.2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was
terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.3

According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School (PNS),
Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the
kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door,
somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She
was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by
the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics
teacher at PNS.

When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the
other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her
will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a
word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor
plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not
to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.

Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked
with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not
see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her
landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident.

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point.
She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around
3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if
complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her
parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.

Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant,
towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the
conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the
vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.

At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three days. During the
entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always
kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or
unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife
with him.

In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision
where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded
by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that
complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain
Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to
settle the case with appellant.

Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined
by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:

GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.

BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.

 EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal
opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis,
approximately 1/2 cm. length.

INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2
fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.

CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of
laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can
admit an average size penis in erection with laceration.4

Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration,
which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration which
was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches
or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or
injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.

During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she
never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to her; and that she did not notice
if there were people near the boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her
panty, she was already lying down, and that even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was
afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent from the time
she was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.

When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there was no threat
made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission from them in her behalf
and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she
could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife
at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She
likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.

Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom
which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding lock inside the
room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if
appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his
eyes.

Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of January
22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her daughter if there
was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she
knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her
husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of
appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did
not come home.

Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's
Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio
station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When
she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He
further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen
Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.

In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She
testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter
threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the
hospital where the latter was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape
and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case.
On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00.
Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping
pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha
testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from
the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what
happened.

The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.

According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS).
Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a
joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December
20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot
Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00
P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to
spend the night there with him.

Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS,
was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard voices
apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na
mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door
and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were doing there at
such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly
closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with
appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it
when the latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.

Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the present case, but
the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed and submitted by the parents
of complainant. In her sworn statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on
January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a
married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.

Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with
the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for
him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they
talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which
complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant headed for home some fifteen
meters away.

It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS
and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was doing there at
such a late hour. Complainant merely replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store
and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena
Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed that they were quite intimate because
they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told
appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go
home.

Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further
testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She also
warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial,
she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that
she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that
when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did not see Mia
crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.

In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house
and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant
told him to ask permission from her mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before
they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained
her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they
solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.

Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available transportation, so
she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because they
already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should
he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged
their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening,
however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the
latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not bring
complainant along because she had refused to go home.

The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and informed them
that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he went
back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to
go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's
friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the
room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.

Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered that what she
was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed to know about it for,
otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the
matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions.
Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple
looked very happy.

Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22
to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that
what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit
suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to
the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.

Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in
procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already looking for them and so
they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a
co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.

Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against appellant and after
finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was
able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested
that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but appellant refused because he was already married. It was
eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with
Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house.

The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills,
the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision
where they stayed for two days. They just walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's
Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio,
as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to
each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would
buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio
once asked her why she chose to go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she
really loved appellant. She never told him, and Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was
supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within
their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that
fact to them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked
because the lock had been destroyed.

On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was
Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his
house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him
to the municipal hall.

Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him
that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or on
January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch
Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant
permitted complainant to go but he told her that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the
municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.

After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police
Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but
when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any
one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at
the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.

During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from
complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with
and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know,
through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims
that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid
P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to
complainants in order to settle the case.

Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994.
However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on January 24, 1994.
While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant
visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused to testify against him, although by the time she testified
in court, her father had already died.

Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of her cousin,
Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a relationship with her
because he wanted to change her and that was what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time
when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On
the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily
gave her permission to go.

He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but
which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes
was brought to him at the provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.

Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant
for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because according
to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an
affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with
these cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when the
latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested by Mia
Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.

Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at
the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on
that date and time. She likewise negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about
her alleged relationship with appellant contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she
disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently
disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there never was a time that
they became sweethearts.

She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told
appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna
Baradero confronted her about her relationship with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset
Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani
Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the only other person who went there was the
room boy who served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and
that she was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.

Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex
with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I
love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since
she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being
guarded by appellant.

However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and
admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then,
contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to
her.

On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in
these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around
4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit
appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the
visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter
which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify.

Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994,
he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant
and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the
poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the Sunset Garden.

On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in
both cases.6 By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic
review.

The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape7 and kidnapping with serious illegal detention8 filed
by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a resolution9 on
February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses
Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention.10 However, pursuant to a joint resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R.
Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious
illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following assignment of
errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence
adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People
vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).

III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated the crime of rape
against private complainant.

IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the
defense.

V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the
accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise.

VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed.

IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes charged on the
accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659.12

A. The Rape Case

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the accuser to
humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of
the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its
occurrence. 14This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the
nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element,
and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof
of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.15

The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the
presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough
to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se,
strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be
convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is
clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a
prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and
impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder
to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.19

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that
there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.

I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under
paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force or intimidation.

1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress
with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually
assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand,
denied such a serious imputation and contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant
outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of
record.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside
apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on
that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's
intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching
the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never
established nor even intimated by the prosecution.

Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards
the setting of the supposed sexual assault.20 It will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was committed
is not an ordinary residence but a boarding house where several persons live and where people are expected to
come and go. The prosecution did not even bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the
boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was
expected to arrive at any given time.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of
complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However,
they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench
outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness
Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant
seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was already
late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building.
On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.21

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant
openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is
inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had
raped,22and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end
further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as
far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a
crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other
things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest
suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime
are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to
identify the appellant.23 Consequently, it is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be
seen with the complainant immediately after he had allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the
notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering
its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street,25 and the PNS
schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away.26

Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding house where
she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate the story of complainant,
despite the fact that the former was the very first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly
left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they
supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on complainant's physical appearance and to
attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair,
bloody skirt and all.

We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the
boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is even consonant
with her testimony that appellant fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same
school affair.

In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she
asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin.
Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially
stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin.
Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she reached the boarding house it
was dark and there was nobody inside.

The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign the same with
her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single episode, thus:

Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, do you
remember where you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there?

A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.

COURT:

Q Conversing with whom?

A With my cousin, Your Honor.

Q Your cousin's name?

A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
 Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please relate to this
Honorable Court how that rape happened?

A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

COURT:

Q Of what date?

A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q Then what happened?

A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed

(through) the kitchen and then when I opened the door somebody grabbed me
suddenly.

xxx xxx xxx

Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding house where you
said Danny Godoy raped you?

A None, Sir.

COURT:

Q So, the house was empty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?

A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor.27 (Corrections and emphasis
supplied.)

2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a
knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by
the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal
findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor
confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January
21, 1994.

The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the
conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the date which she alleged, do not
establish the supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's
admission that coitus took place with the consent of complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994.28 Further,
rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission of rape, the
finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's
claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical
force.29In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated
by physical evidence showing use of force.30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal
expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further questioning, he gave
a straightforward answer that force was not applied.31 He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he
did not see any sign of bruises.32 The absence of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an
indication of complainant's consent to the act.33 While the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of
physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of rape,34 the instant case is clearly an
exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.

Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated complainant's assertion
that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held
that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element
of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the
crime.35

Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of appellant.
Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly believe that her
supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did not use the manifest resistance
expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity.36 She failed to make any outcry when appellant allegedly
grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle
when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his
organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her
to any force of whatever nature or form.

Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing
to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever
she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of
resistance expected of a woman defending her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being
raped renders doubtful her charge of rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of
her asseverations.

There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as
they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline to the view, however, that this general rule holds
true only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is
inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except
for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of
the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.

II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as
tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense of
rape should even be sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond
doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was such as
might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
case. 40

Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked
permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire
testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with
him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the
supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on
that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming that he
had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from
her parents for her to accompany him.

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so
strangely normal as to be abnormal.41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the person who had allegedly
raped her only the day before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and
disgust.42Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of
neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From
her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of
complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be
expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood.43

III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy
for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist.
However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law.44

The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the lower court's
findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts.46

The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994
incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that
appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had
sexual intercourse with her. The question then that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's
testimony is credible.47 The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that
testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire
testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated.48

In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious
effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching
in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate
credulity.49 In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly,
there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her
testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or
unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its being
accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other, the defects might not
suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and
fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of said judgment.50 Thus:

1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three
times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations. If this were true, it is
inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal
implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of
complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as may be
inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it was
similarly befuddled.

2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened with the
same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. We
are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial
expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never noticed if
appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by side with appellant,
complainant admitted that everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her.51

4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not be opened
from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:

Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?

A No, Sir, it was locked.

Q Can you describe the lock of that room?

A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.

ATTY. EBOL:

Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked
and opened from the inside.

COURT:

Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open
that door from the inside.

CLERK OF COURT:

Witness holding the doorknob.

COURT:

The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can
open it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?

A There was, Your Honor.

Q What is that?

A The one that slides, Your Honor.

Q And that is used when you are already inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)

5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token
or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her
plight.53 In her own declaration, complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the
cashier at the information counter where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that
appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and
brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible
opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to
present these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated
complainant's story.

6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house together and
walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is
highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond
comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in complainant that she could not dare take
advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as possible despite all the
chances therefor.

7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped
from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and commiserate with the ill-fated
victim of rape, it would appear that the school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and
considered her an outcast. That would be adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia
and her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make
one think and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic action taken by the
school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.

On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with sweeping
statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's testimony, declared them to be
preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect
rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of
that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be
made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution.54

IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart
theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and
the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is
illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is
uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action
in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of
indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.

Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several
witnesses for the defense, viz.:

1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a
bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple were talking intimately. She
had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.

2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he
asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she really
loves him.55 He heard her call appellant "Papa".56 The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.57

3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked Mia if she
knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she again
answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if
appellant left her, she would commit suicide.58 He could see that the couple were happy together.59

4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was located within
the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he was advising appellant that
what he was doing is wrong because he is married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no
matter what happened she would not leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her.60 He also
observed that they were happy.61

5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of
the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo
ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."62 She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with
appellant.63

The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant, which were
substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of
complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed
assertions of appellant.64 Mere denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight
greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.65

Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with details which
could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereto.66 His assertions are more
logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant should be
accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored his account, even on the assumption that he could be
trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity.
More to the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality.67

Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and
incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive rule
of law and is not an inflexible one.68 It does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the
testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although
not completely.69

Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the
most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he was
detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:

27 Feb. 94

Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.

Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako
gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang
mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi
ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.

Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako.
kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit
noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko
makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na
gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay
dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor
Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay
dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay
Lorna.

alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.

Please sir . . .

(Sgd.) Mia Taha70

3/1/94

Dane,
 I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo
nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang
kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si
nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si
Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong
lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila
na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot
samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko
nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa
sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang
kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang
hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis
na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang
magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa.
tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito
ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain
maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.

Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo.
hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam
mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa
situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng
bahay sa tulong niya.

Love
you

(Sgd.)
Mia
Taha71

There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's
handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the
handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were
admittedly the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder
committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any
probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert
was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.

Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting
experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting.72 This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.73

The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination papers
submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the
handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and,
contrary to the observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were
written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the
handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.

It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this
conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:
ATTY. EBOL:

Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were
your teachers?

A Yes, sir.

Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of
January 21, 1994, am I not correct?

A That is true, sir.

Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers
you took examinations in their classes in their particular subject(s)?

A Yes, sir.

Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I
correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your
test paper and with your signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears
to be that of Mia Taha, please examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is
your test paper?

A Yes, sir.

Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this
Honorable Court if you are familiar with that.

A What subject is that?

Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.

A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.

Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature?

A That is min(e), sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with
that signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, sir.
 Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?

A That is my handwriting, sir.

Q Also Exhibit "2"?

A Yes, sir.74

While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant to herein
appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the
provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie.
Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the witness
himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that
Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.

V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt.
This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible
as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right
to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may
be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience
of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise
was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.75

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of
the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually
suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could
be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to
appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not
until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own
mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's
mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings.76

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made,
such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.77 In another case, this Court ruled that no
implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did
not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal
customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between
the parties.78

VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create
serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of
criminal charges.79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of
desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to
the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga
magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to
her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed
that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her
and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by
her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required
to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted.
Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be
that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an
effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she
had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.

Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is
not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of false
charges of rape.81 While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial
courts in rape charges, especially where the offended parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives
to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed
judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that
the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission.82 This is a case in
point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting
test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of
complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted as
adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting
her.83Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains
in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do
not rule out such other legal options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.

VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a
person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional
presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions
conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is
necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each
presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the
other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy
the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack
of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.84

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:

In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on
the theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to
speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably
sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that
she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be
the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating
every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most
 frequently, the defense will argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual
act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the
outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost,
albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet,
suppressing her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason
why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . .85

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere
form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the
defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the
scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all
the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution,
the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.87 This is in
consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon
a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.88

On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in
favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the constitutional presumption on the
innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular indictment.

B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case

It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty.89 In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been
established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge
which they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's
evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:

To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the day after the
alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit her to help him solicit
contributions for her candidacy. When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents
and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal
and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in
vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by
complainant.

Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag
which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as
hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a
ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely
leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who
passively looked on without comment.

Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied, whether at Sunset
Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the inside. We must, however,
recall that when she was asked on cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the
doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked
complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in
the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably
undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that
the room which was occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock
thereof was broken.

When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in broad daylight.
Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other people and free herself from
appellant if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter.90 In fact, several opportunities to
do so had presented themselves from the time they left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the
hotel and in the lodging house.

According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset Garden to
inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned by Helen Taha, her
husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police
about her missing daughter was not supported by any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was
the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified or presented in court.

We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the commission
of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint
of a motive for the crime.91 It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and,
not being an element of a crime, it does not have to be proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without
any motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and,
hence, an acquittal is in order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her mother can any ill motive
of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst, immoral
though it may be.

As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to
complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced supposition that the clothes
could have easily been bought from a department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise
or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or
clarification from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently
whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were thus
cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by
said court.

We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court against the
practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:

It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered where trivial
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence
on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be
avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over
which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of
proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step
which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of
first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result
in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal,
this court then has all the materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment.94

At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and substantial evidence
which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to repeat this age-
old observation and experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is
justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.

Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death penalty on
certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its publication in the December
16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal,95 and not on January
1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny
Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49.
It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.

G.R. No. 117217 December 2, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

On 1 April 1992, complainant Gilda Ambray filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, a
complaint 1 charging accused Gener de Guzman y Sico with the crime of rape allegedly committed at 9:00 p.m. of
31 March 1992 in Meadow Wood, Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite. On even date, Gener de
Guzman was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Bacoor, Cavite, but was released on 14 April 1992 upon
the filing and approval of his bail bond. 2

Gener de Guzman did not submit any counter-affidavit as required in the subpoena 3 issued by the MTC on 14 April
1992. Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded
the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary information with the
appropriate court. 4

On 14 July 1992, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19, an information 5 charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime of rape, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of March 1992 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Meadow Wood
Subd., Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Gilda B. Ambray against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of said Gilda B. Ambray.

Contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. B-92-216.

Upon arraignment on 10 August 1992, accused Gener de Guzman entered a plea of not guilty. 6 Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued and the prosecution moved for the cancellation of the bail bond.

On 9 December 1992, after complainant Gilda Ambray, Police Officer Efren Bautista, and Dr. Valentin Bernales of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), completed their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court
cancelled the bail bond of Gener de Guzman on the ground that the evidence of his guilt was strong. 7 He was re-
arrested, and on 22 January 1993, his motion for reconsideration 8 of the order cancelling his bail bond was denied
by the trial court for lack of merit as he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
evidence of his guilt was strong. 9

Two other witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, a kumadre of the
accused, and Aquilino Flores Ambray, the husband of the complainant.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:
Homeward bound on 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant
Gilda Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino mores Ambray and a mother of two children, was at the gate of
Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about 8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her
residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the
guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The
complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-
lit. 10

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she
agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. She got scared but
managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good
condition. 11 When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped
and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda
then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her
mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her
to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill
her if she made noise. She fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to
raise her T-shirt while holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she
obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted "Saklolo! Tulungan
ninyo ako!," but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could hardly breathe. He held her
hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She
struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so
because she struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried
to stand, he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She
pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two children. He warned her: "Huwag kang
sisigaw,papatayin kita!" The accused again tried to insert his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so.
The accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against
the accused's sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled
out his penis and "fingered" her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody,
otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family. 12 He told her that she was his third victim but the two did
not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home,
without looking back. 13

When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by the
accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's mother. 14

At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony Antonio, the
President of the Homeowners' Association and President of the National Press Club. Antonio radioed the
Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator. PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt. Saguisame responded to the
alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3 Bautista saw Gilda with her mother.
Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was raped and described to him her assailant as a
tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in army cut.15 Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a vivid description
of the accused's tricycle, viz., blue in color with the name "Dimple" at the back. 16 The policemen left and
went to the house of the accused. PO3 Bautista invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor
wanted to talk to him. The accused, together with PO3 Bautista, went to the residence of Antonio. When the
accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the accused as her
rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail. 17

Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and issued a medical certificate. 18 She then
proceeded to the NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI,
conducted the examination on Gilda. His findings, contained in his medico-legal report, 19 were as follows:

I. Physical Injuries:

Abrasion, brownish; lips, upper, left side, mucosal, 2.0 x 1.5 cm.;
elbow, right, postero-lateral aspect, 2.0 x 1.5 cm. and postero-medial
aspect, multi-linear, with brown scab formation, 3.0 x 1.0 cm.
 Contusion, reddish; back, right, scapular area, 7.0 x 5.0 cm. and left,
15.0 x 8.0 cm.

Contused abrasion, reddish black, scapular area, left, medial aspect,

3.0 x 2.0 cm.

II. Genital Examination:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia

minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibulae, pinkish, smooth.
Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a
tube, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal wall, lax. Rugosities, obliterated.

III. Conclusions:

1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body

of the subject at the time of the examination.

2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual

intercourse with man on or about the alleged date of
examination.

IV. Remarks:

Laboratory Report S-92-94 20 shows positive result for the presence

of human spermatozoa.

Dr. Bernales opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force applied to her," 21 while
the presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda's genitals indicated recent sexual intercourse. 22

On 3 April 1992, "Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion Talub
Quiocho, the accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the accused's sake. The following day,
Resurreccion accompanied the accused's parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. 23 Gilda met
them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that should not be tolerated." 24

Gilda further testified that she suffered moral damages, had to resign from her job due to shame, and had spent
P28,500.00 for attorney's fees. 25

Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi and presented Alfredo Fenandez and Teotimo Camagong as his
witnesses.

According to Gener de Guzman, on 31 March 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., he was about to go home and was at the
corner of Meadow Wood Subdivision coming from Justineville Subdivision. On his way home on his tricycle, he saw
Gilda Ambray, who flagged him down and hoarded his tricycle. After traveling about half a kilometer, his tricycle
malfunctioned. He told her that she better walk home because her house was already near. He pushed his tricycle
home, and on his way, one Alfredo Fenandez approached him and inquired what was wrong with his tricycle.
Alfredo helped him push the tricycle towards his (accused's) home, and upon arrival thereat, he told Alfredo not to
leave at once. At around 9:10 p.m., they started to drink liquor until 11:00 p.m., and after their drinking spree, he
cleaned their mess and slept. Then at around 12:50 a.m. of 1 April 1992, PO3 Efren Bautista fetched and apprised
him that he was accused of rape by a certain Gilda Ambray. Thereafter, an investigation was conducted and he was
brought to the Bacoor Police Station.

Alfredo L. Fernandez, 37 years old, jobless, and a resident of Justineville Subdivision, corroborated Gener's story
about the malfunctioning tricycle and the drinking session. 26

Teotimo Camagong testified that he was present when the accused was investigated at the residence of Tony
Antonio and that the complainant did not pinpoint and identify the accused as her alleged molester. 27
In its Decision 28 dated 30 June 1994 and promulgated on 25 July 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused GENER SICO DE GUZMAN is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. He should suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and indemnify herein private
complainant Gilda Ambray the following: actual damages representing her lost monthly salary when
she resigned from her office due to shame for being a rape victim, in the sum of P30,000.00, moral
damages in the sum of P30,000.00, exemplary damages of P10,000.00, litigation expenses of
P5,000.00, and attorney's fee[s] including appearance fees for the private prosecutor in the sum of
P28,500.00.

It gave full gave weight to the testimony of Gilda Ambray because "[w]ithout doubt, the complainant had endured the
rigors of recalling her harrowing ordeal and had vividly, credibly and candidly portrayed in detail how she was raped
by the accused." 29

As to whether sexual intercourse was consummated against the will or consent of the offended party, the trial court
said:

No less than NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Valentin Bernales had corroborated the stance of herein
private complainant that she was raped by the accused. The victim had sustained contusions and
abrasions at her body that indicated that she struggled against the sexual advances of the accused.
As a result of the doctor's examination on the victim, he confirmed the occurrence of a recent sexual
intercourse and presence in her private part of human spermatozoa as denoted in his Medico Legal
Report (Exh. F) and Laboratory Report (Exh. D). 30

Likewise it ruled that since the accused was drunk, he was more aggressive and sexually capable. 31 Finally,
it considered as evidence of the accused's guilt the plea of his parents, wife and relatives for forgiveness
and compromise. 32

The accused seasonably appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction, and in urging us to acquit him,
interposes the following assignment of errors in his Appellant's Brief:

1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED HAS INDUBITABLY EMPLOYED FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION IN THE RAPE OF THE VICTIM.

2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE
VICTIM.

3. THE COURT ERRED IN STRESSING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DRUNK AT THE TIME OF
THE COMMISSION OF RAPE.

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the accused and prays that we
affirm in toto the appealed decision.

The first and second assigned errors may be taken up together. The upshot of the accused's stance in these alleged
errors is that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor intimidation was proven. As to the latter he
cites these facts: (a) Gilda's assailant had three acts of sexual intercourse with her; (b) the physical examination
showed that she suffered injuries on the dorsal portion only, and none was found on her neck; (c) her personal
belongings — bra, pants, T-shirt and underwear — were completely intact; and (d) no signs of physical violence
were discernible on both the persons of the accused and Gilda Ambray.

Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places
away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and
conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's single witness of the actual occurrence. 33
In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can
be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its on merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.34

The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the accused depend
primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the accused witnessed the incident
when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the accused's conviction inevitable.

A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she
narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her
ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without
looking back, and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately
thereafter, she reported it to Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association and President of the
National Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonio's residence in
response to the latter's call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them the description of the assailant.
When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the
person who raped her. Gilda voluntarily submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Piñas Hospital and
then to an examination of her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an
investigations 35 by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape against the accused
with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.

All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within twenty-four hours after the commission of the crime. The quickness
and spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous woman who had just undergone
sexual molestation against herself, 36 and evinced nothing more than her instant resolve to denounce the beast who
criminally abused and ravished her, and to protect her honor. Moreover, she rejected the plea for forgiveness sought
by the accused's parents, wife, and children, then suffered the travails of a public trial which necessarily exposed
her to humiliation and embarrassment by unraveling the details of the rape and enduring a cross-examination which
sought to discredit her.

What Gilda endured could only come from one whose obsession was to bring to justice the person who had abused
her and vindicate her honor, even if such vindication would never erase from her memory that excruciatingly painful
chapter in her life which left her psychologically and emotionally scarred forever. This Court has repeatedly held that
no complainant would admit that she has been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private
parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if
she had not in fact been raped. 3 7

We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda.

Another established rule in rape cases is that the force need not be irresistible; all that is necessary is that the force
used by the accused is sufficient to consummate his evil purpose, or that it was successfully used. It need not be so
great or of such character that it could not be repelled. 38 Intimidation, on the other hand, must be viewed in light of
the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it
is enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
something would happen to her at that moment, or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.39

In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she
struggled to free herself, she sustained her injuries. Dr. Bernales confirmed the use of force, and according to him,
the abrasions and contusions on Gilda's body were due to force applied on her. Moreover, the accused also
threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation.

The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since the assailant
committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant consideration. In the first place,
Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the
time which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the
incident to Tony Antonio. 40 The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the
party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-
examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an opportunity which is
ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the
answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation
of testimony. 41 In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to
thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but
succeeded on the third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified
that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three times, no inconsistency at
all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of the three separate
acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law,
among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be
asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. Law in the sense here used
embraces whatever conclusions belonging properly to the court. 42

What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one consummated rape, committed in
light of the testimony of Gilda. The information, however, charged the accused with only one act of rape; hence,
consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, 43 he cannot be held liable for more than what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for
rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows three separate acts of sexual
intercourse. 44

Neither are we persuaded by the claim that Gilda was not able to positively identify the accused. He was familiar to
Gilda one or two weeks before the incident because she saw him driving a tricycle and had, in fact, been once a
passenger of his. She saw him clearly at the guardhouse before the incident because the guardhouse was well-lit;
she was his passenger that evening until he stopped his tricycle near the unfinished house; and she had ample
opportunity to see and recognize him during the assault. Then, Gilda did not hesitate to point to and identify the
accused as her rapist when the latter was brought by the policemen to the house of Tony Antonio.

The accused's defense of alibi, which is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and fabricate, cannot
prevail over his positive identification by Gilda.45

Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the
overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not
disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose
not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was
"strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask
her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error
and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to
seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and
ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 46 No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some
wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong
committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon
(an offender). 4 7 In People vs. Calimquim, 48 we stated:

The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's father is an indication
of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo,
L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193).

The accused may be correct in the third assigned error because no testimony of a witness established that the
accused was in a state of drunkenness when he sexually assaulted Gilda. The trial court may have formed its
conclusion that the accused was drunk from his testimony that he and Alfredo Fernandez were drinking liquor in his
house from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992. In any event, that erroneous conclusion is innocuous.
We do not then hesitate to conclude that the accused, having had carnal knowledge of complainant Gilda Ambray
through the use of force and intimidation, committed the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty being reclusion perpetua.

The damages awarded by the trial court stand modification. No damage for loss of income due to Gilda's resignation
from her employment should have been awarded, the resignation being unnecessary. Conformably however with
the current jurisprudence, she is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00. For her shame, as well as mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to
the offended party,49 she is entitled to recover moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Article 2217 of the
Civil Code. However, since no aggravating circumstance had been proved, exemplary damages may not be
awarded. In Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of 30 June 1994 of Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. B-92-216 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification on
the civil liabilities, and as so modified, the awards of P30,000.00 as actual damages for loss of monthly salary and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages are deleted, and accused-appellant Gener de Guzman y Sico is further ordered
to pay the complainant Gilda Ambray the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity. The awards for moral damages, litigation
expenses and attorney's fees stand.

[G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as
follows:
"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA,
against her will."[1]
The prosecution established that AAA was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00 in the
evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, AAA was cooking porridge for the spouses' two
children, one aged four years old and the other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found
the two children asleep. He approached AAA and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her
skin disease. AAA was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of
the children. AAA opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, AAA
took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was
dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting
knife at her neck. He ordered AAA not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top
of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. AAA cried out in pain but
appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched AAA in the
stomach. She lost consciousness.
A few minutes later, AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and changed her
clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her parents. Appellant
then left the house.[2]
AAA did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before
leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA in a state of shock. She could
not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, AAA became
helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the
Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to
talk. She conducted a physical examination and also found that:
"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."[3]
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation
and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant.[4]
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape he was
selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked straight until
8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.[5]
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to
indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, thus:
"WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin Yparraguirre guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED."[6]
In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:
I
"THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE;
II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE
MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF THE
CASE."[7]
The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which rests mainly
on the testimony of AAA, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. AAA testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and
candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony
are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.[8]
The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not important. The
undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her tablets for treatment of the
disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is
speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened AAA and
prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.[9] The delay in filing the complaint does not in
any way affect AAA's credibility.[10] She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three
months after AAA told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for
rape.
AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the
family.[11] It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place
her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. [12] AAA
suffered psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for
two months[13] and the spouses actually found her to be a good worker.[14] When AAA returned to her family,
however, she lost her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric
treatment. Indeed, AAA's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.
 Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after AAA revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's
wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, BBB, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her
from filing the complaint.[15] When BBB refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00). Still BBB refused to accept it.[16] As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at
the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's
wife. Mary Ann herself testified that BBB told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first
offered the money.[17] An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer
can be received in evidence against the offeror.[18] What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused
or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi.[19] It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public market was merely a ten-
minute walk from their rented room[20] and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to
his children.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo, Davao is
affirmed. Costs against appellant.

G.R. Nos. 133066-67 October 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ROMEO H. LAMBID, appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Cases Nos.
CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each count.1

In her two separate Complaints dated November 4, 1997 and November 5, 1997, complainant Lyzel S. Lambid,
accuses Romeo H. Lambid of raping her, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:

The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby
accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force
and intimidation upon undersigned complainant to wit, by forcibly placing himself on top of the victim, and at the
same time threat her with death if she would shout, then removed her panty, did then and there have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:

The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby
accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation upon undersigned
complainant to wit, by forcibly placing himself on top of the victim, and at the same time threat her with death if she
would shout, then removed her panty, did then and there have carnal knowledge of the undersigned against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Lyzel Lambid, the complainant; Mary Ann Lambid, a sister of Lyzel; and
Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi, the physician who conducted a physical examination on the complainant.

The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

On October 31, 1997, 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house located at Inayawan, Cebu City together with
her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the morning, she woke up and noticed her father lying
beside her. Then, her father started removing her panty at the same time warning her not to tell her mother what he
was doing. After her father succeeded in removing her panty, he went on top of her and started inserting his penis
into her vagina. She initially tried to resist the sexual advances of her father by kicking him and by moving her body
from left to right and vice versa. She stopped resisting when her father stared hard at her and threatened to kill her
(Lyzel). Her father succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. The following day, November 1, 1997, she was
again roused from her sleep and noticed her father lying beside her. Repeating what he did the previous day, her
father removed her panty. Thereafter, he successfully inserted his penis into her vagina. Lyzel did nothing out of
fear. She did not tell anybody about these two incidents.4

However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened around 5:00 in the morning
of October 31, 1997 when she heard their father say to her sister Lyzel: "Don’t tell this to your mother or else I will
kill you." Their father was then lying beside Lyzel. Afterwards, she saw him stand up and go to urinate. About 5:00 in
the morning of the succeeding day, November 1, 1997, she was sleeping beside her sister Lyzel. She was
awakened while their father was pulling her blanket. Suspicious of their father’s actuation, she kicked him. After
kicking him, she laid near the foot of her sister Lyzel. Their father then covered her with a blanket but she peeped
through the blanket. She saw their father who was only wearing an underwear place himself on top of Lyzel. Her
father covered himself and Lyzel with a blanket, after which Mary Ann saw their father’s whole body shake and
heard him breathing hard. She again heard their father warn Lyzel not to relate the incident to their mother,
otherwise he will kill her (Lyzel).

On November 2, 1997, Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents she witnessed. Their
neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for assistance and on that same day their father was
arrested.5

Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel on November 3, 1997 and found that Lyzel’s
vagina had "new hymenal lacerations with raw edges at 5 o’clock position." The doctor asserted that Lyzel might
have sustained the lacerations within six days prior to her examination. The test for the presence of spermatozoa
yielded negative results.6

The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. On the witness stand, when asked about the truth of her
daughter’s complaint, appellant simply stated that if he had committed the crimes of rape against his daughter, he
asks for forgiveness because during that time he was drunk. He asked the court to impose upon him a lesser
penalty considering that his children are still under his care.7

The trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No.
7659 known as the Death Penalty Law and sentences him to suffer two supreme penalties of Death for the two (2)
crimes of rape committed against her own daughter Lyzel Lambid, with inherent accessory penalties provided by
law; to indemnify the victim the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Hence, the present automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE THE AGE AND RELATIONSHIP OF
THE VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.9

At the outset, it is noted that since the crimes were committed on October 31, 1997 and November 1, 1997, the
applicable law is R.A. 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997"10 which took effect on October 22,
1997.11 Under this law, rape has been reclassified from a private crime or crime against chastity into a crime against
persons. Consequently, the prosecution for the crime of rape was removed from the ambit of Chapter Five, Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which required
that in crimes against chastity, the complaint must be filed by the offended party, or her parents, godparents or
guardian, as the case may be under the law. Thus, effective October 22, 1997, R.A. No. 8353, it is required that
prosecution for the crime of rape, as in any other public crimes, is commenced in court by the filing of an information
by the public prosecutor and no longer by a mere complaint filed by the offended party, parents, godparents or
guardian.

In the present cases, the indictments charging appellant with the crimes of rape were each captioned as a
"Complaint" signed by Lyzel herself; but, there is a Certification on the second page of each of the complaints by the
investigating prosecutor treating the complaint as an information, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and not
having executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. I further certify that this information is
being filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.

Cebu City, Philippines, November 4, 1997.

(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City12
(Emphasis supplied)

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the accused having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and having
executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. I further certify that this information is being filed
with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.

Cebu City, Philippines, November 5, 1997.

(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City13

The apparent defect in the form of indictment, that is by way of a complaint by the offended party, is merely one of
form which does not invalidate the proceedings had in the trial court. The certification converted the complaints into
informations filed by the prosecutor.

Moreover, under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,14 the governing law at the time of the
filing of the indictments, for his failure to move to quash the same prior to his arraignment, appellant was deemed to
have waived his right to question the complaints filed by Lyzel on the ground that it is defective in form per Section
3(d), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.15

Coming to the merits of the case, appellant, in support of the first assigned error, attacks the credibility of the
complainant. He harps upon the fact that although Lyzel was sure of the dates when appellant raped her, she failed
to recall the days of the week upon which these dates fell. Appellant also points out the apparent inconsistency as to
the date Lyzel’s mother arrived from Leyte and the date she accompanied Lyzel to report the incident to the police
authorities.

We agree with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the failure of complainant to correctly
pinpoint the day of the week when she was raped and to recall the exact date of her mother’s arrival from Leyte are
inconsequential matters. It is a settled rule that discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime, such as the exact time of the commission of the crime, are not grounds for acquittal.16 To be material,
discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which are determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.17 In the present case, the mental lapse on the part of Lyzel in failing to accurately recall
the exact days of the week when she was raped and the date of her mother’s arrival from Leyte does not detract
from her credibility. It only indicates that her account is spontaneous, neither rehearsed nor contrived.18 What is
important is that she was able to clearly recall how she was raped and testify on this matter in a categorical and
straightforward manner.

Moreover, Lyzel’s testimony is strongly corroborated by her sister Mary Ann19 and buttressed by physical evidence.
The physician’s findings on her physical examination conducted on November 3, 1997 indicated the presence of
fresh lacerations on her hymen. Laceration of the hymen, whether fresh or healed, is the best physical evidence of
defloration.20 In the present case, the doctor estimated that the lacerations could have been sustained by Lyzel
within six days prior to the date of her examination.21 This estimate is consistent with Lyzel’s claim that she was
raped on October 31, 1997 and November 1, 1997.

Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, rape is committed
by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through fear, threat or intimidation.

Appellant would have us to believe that if he had carnal knowledge with her daughter Lyzel, it was done without
force and intimidation, citing her testimony that she did nothing while she was supposedly being sexually abused by
him.

We are not convinced in the light of Lyzel’s testimony, pertinent portions of which we quote verbatim, as follows:

Q At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of October 31, 1997 can you recall of any unusual incident that
transpired inside the house where you were residing?

A Yes there was sir.

Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what was the unusual indicent?

A While I was still asleep I was awaken when my father sleep beside me.

Q If your father was laying beside you did he do anything?

A There was sir.

Q What did your father do to you?

A He remove my panty.

Q And after your father remove your panty what did he do?

A He lift out his penis and let it enter into my vagina.

Q And did your father succeeded in inserting his penis into your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do when your father was still removing your panty and before he placed himself on top of
you and inserted his penis into your vagina?

A He told me not to reveal to my mother what he did

...

COURT:

Q What did you do when your father was doing all these things that you have told to us?

A Nothing.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Why?

A I was entertaining fear considering that he stared his eyes towards me.

Q Aside from staring at you what else if any did your father do to in staring on you?

A He said as follows: "Don’t tell anybody, if you still somebody I would kill you".

COURT:

Q Did you not move your body away from him so that he would not succeed in doing such thing to you?

A I moved my body but he kept on holding me.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q On the following day Lyzel November 1, 1997 where did you sleep?

A At our house sir.

Q The same house where you sleep the day before?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:
Q Why did you still sleep in that house after that experienced you had with your father the preceding night.
Why did you not run away from that house.

A Because he will be looking for me, Your Honor.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q And again Lyzel who were your companions if any on November 1, 1997 at your house when you were
sleeping?

A My two younger sister sir.

Q Who else if any?

A My father.

Q At about the same time on November 1, 1997 at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning was there anything
unusual that happened inside your house?

A There was.

Q Now. Please tell this Honorable Court what unusual incident happened on that particular date and time.

A While I was still asleep there was somebody lying beside me I thought it was my sister but when I was
awaken it was my father.

Q And while your father was lying beside you did he do anything?

A Yes.

Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what did your father do to you?

A He removed my panty sir.

Q And after your father removed your panty what did he do next?

A He lift out his penis and inserted into my vagina.

...

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Did your father succeed in inserting his penis into your vagina?

A Yes.

Q Now what did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?

A Nothing.

Q Why?

A Because I was entertaining fear.

COURT:
Q Why were you afraid of your father?

A Because his eyes were starring at me.

Q Was his bolo was still there?

A Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Did you tell somebody Lyzel on what your father did to you on October 31, 1997 as well as on November
1, 1997?

A No, sir.

Q Why did you not tell anybody about what your father did to you?

A Because I was entertaining fear all the time.22 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, Lyzel further testified:

ATTY. GUBALANE:

Q How long did it take by your father in removing your panty on October 31, 1997?

A About one minute sir.

Q Do your remember what were your wearing on October 31, 1997?

A Yes I remember sir.

Q What were you wearing then?

A Short pants sir.

Q When you noticed your father on October 31, 1997 sleep beside you and before he remove your panty
why did you not shour for help?

A Because I was entertaining fear sir.

COURT:

Q Fear of what?

A Entertaining fear to my father, Your Honor.

ATTY. GUBALANE:

Q Is it not true then that Mary Ann is sleeping beside you at your foot?

A That’s correct sir.

Q Did you not kick you father?

A I kicked him sir.

 Q How many times did you kick your father?

A Two times.

Q But you did not shout?

A No, sir.

Q Because of fear?

A That’s right sir.

Q Inspite your fear you managed to kick your father two times?

A That’s right sir.

COURT:

Q You kick for two times, did you do this on the first rape or on the second rape?

A The first rape, Your Honor.

Q Why did you not kick him any more in the second time?

A Because he stared his eyes towards me (gisigahan ko sa iyang mata).23 (Emphasis supplied)

Lyzel very clearly testified that in the first incident, she tried to resist the sexual advances of appellant by kicking him
and by trying to move her body but when appellant threatened to kill her, she, who was only fourteen years old, was
easily cowed into submitting herself to appellant’s carnal desire. When appellant raped her the following day, her
fear of her father and of the previous threat that he would kill her still pervaded causing her to do nothing the second
time. Her harrowing experience the day before in the hands of her father coupled with a threat on her life was
sufficient to envelop her with fear and paralyze her into submission even if appellant merely stared at her when he
raped her again the following morning. Lyzel’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance during the second
incident does not demolish her claim that she was raped. As we have held in People vs. Rodriguez:

The defense argument that the accused has not employed force upon his daughter in order to have sex with him
does not at all persuade. The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term that depends not only on the
age, size, and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each other. In a rape committed by a
father against his own daughter, the former’s parental authority and moral ascendancy over the latter substitutes for
violence or intimidation who, expectedly, would just cower in fear and resign to the father’s wicked deeds. It would
be plain fallacy to say that the failure to shout or to offer tenacious resistance makes voluntary the victim’s
submission to the criminal act of the offender.24

and in People vs. Flores, to wit:

Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not
by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear – fear that if she did not yield to the bestial
demands of her revisher, some evil could happen to her at that moment or even thereafter.

The fact that complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person is of no moment. The
absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being
an essential element of the crime. What is important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made
to submit to the will of appellant. As stated in People vs. Maglente, the test is whether the treat or intimidation
produces fear in the mind of a reasonable person – that if one resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused,
the threat would be carried out.25
Besides, no less than Lyzel’s younger sister Mary Ann positively testified that she heard her father threaten Lyzel’s
life on both occasions. Appellant’s threat on the life of his 14-year old child and the fear it instilled in her clearly
repudiate his claim that there was no force or intimidation employed against her in both occasions.

Appellant further questions the credibility of Lyzel in enabling him to rape her in two successive days. He contends
that after Lyzel was raped for the first time on October 31, 1997, her logical reaction should have been to
immediately seek the help of other people; that despite her opportunity to do so, she did not. We are not persuaded.
It is a settled rule that the workings of the human mind under emotional stress are unpredictable and there is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.26 Verily, under emotional stress, the
human mind is not expected to follow a predictable path.27 Indeed, Lyzel must have been shocked and utterly
confused by the fact that her own father, committed such an act of bestiality against her. More importantly, it is
established by competent evidence that appellant threatened to kill Lyzel if she told anybody about the rape. That
alone is sufficient explanation why she did not make known to other people the first time that she was raped by her
father.

Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that he never disowned the acts imputed against
him.28Appellant merely claimed that he was drunk and he asked for forgiveness from Lyzel, if he had really raped
her and for compassion from the trial court. In People vs. Alvero, we held that a plea for forgiveness may be
considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise and an offer of compromise by the accused may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.29 Thus, by asking for forgiveness, appellant has admitted his guilt.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG agrees with appellant. We sustain the arguments of both appellant and
the OSG. The trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.

Articles 266-A and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provide:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above are present.

...

Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

...

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim;

...
 3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity; (Emphasis supplied)

...

In both cases, the prosecution has established by competent evidence that Lyzel was fourteen years old and
appellant is her father. In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673, it is likewise established that appellant raped his daughter
Lyzel in full view of his other minor daughter Mary Ann, thus:

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q The following day November 1, 1997 at about the same time 5:00 a.m., can you recall where were you?

A Yes, I can.

Q Where were you on that particular date and time?

A At our house.

Q Again, can you tell the Court if there was any unusual incident that transpired?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that unusual incident?

A While I was sleeping beside my sister my father pulled that blanket and then I kicked him. That is why I
transferred lying at the foot sir of my sister.

Q You said that when your father pulled the blanket you kicked him why did you kick you father?

A Because I was suspicious on his actuations sir considering that because I noticed what he said to my
sister by saying don’t tell to your mother. If you tell your mother I would kill you.

Q What was that something which your father don’t want to let your sister do, if you know?

A When he abused my sister.

Q Now, after you kicked your father and transferred sleeping at the foot of your sister what happened next?

A While I was lying at that time and when he covered me with a blanket I saw my father rose placed himself
on top of my sister.

Q While your father was already on top of your sister what did you do?

A He made a sexual intercourse with my sister.

COURT:

Q Were you not dreaming?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Are your sure you were wide awake at that time?

A Yes, I am sure.
COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q According to you Mary Ann you covered yourself you covered yourself with a blanket how were you able
to witness, to see what all your father did to your sister when you were inside the blanket?

A Because I peeped sir.

Q Why did you peep when there was no partition or room inside that house?

A The breathing of my father. As a matter of fact, he kicked me.

Q You said you saw what your father did to your sister because you peeped from where did your peep?

A I peeped through the blanket.

Q Whose blanket?

A My blanket.

COURT:

Q Are you made to understand you have covered yourself with a blanket and removed a part so you can
peeped?

A That is right Your Honor.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Now, after your father, according to you, sexually abused your sister Lyzel did your father say anything to
your sister?

A Yes, there was. He threatened my sister.

Q What was this threat?

A He told my sister as follows: don’t tell your mother and if you tell your mother I will kill you.

Q And after that what happened?

A He keep on sexually abusing my sister.

Q For how long?

A For quite a time.

Q Did you notice, if your sister, ever resisted to the sexual intercourse done by your father to her?
 A My sister moaned.

Q How about you Mary Ann considering that you actually saw your father abusing your sister what did you
do?

A I cried.

Q Did you not try to stop your father from abusing your sister?

A No, sir because he placed a bolo beside him when he sleep.

Q On October 31, 1997 did your father place a bolo beside him when he sleep?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about on November 1, 1997 did he also place the bolo beside him when your father sleep?

A Yes, he place the bolo beside him every night.30

However, the complaints/informations in those two cases fail to allege Lyzel’s minority or appellant’s relationship to
her. Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in the complaint or information. Existing jurisprudence instructs that the death penalty
may be imposed only if the complaint or information has alleged and the evidence has proven both the minority of
the victim and her relationship to the offender by the quantum of proof required for conviction.31 In the present case,
not only were the minority of the complainant and her relationship with appellant not alleged in the two
complaints/informations filed against appellant, but, also, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the second
rape was committed in full view of appellant’s daughter. Consequently, appellant may be convicted only of simple
rape; hence, the trial court erred in imposing death penalty in both cases. The appropriate penalty which could be
imposed on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in each count.

Let us now consider the civil aspect of the criminal cases.

It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether or not it is made
the subject of assignment of errors.32

While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, it failed to award civil indemnity.

Civil indemnity is distinct from moral damages as it is based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court
in the exercise of its sound discretion.33 The award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of fact of
rape.34Based on existing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the victim in simple rape shall not be less than
₱50,000.00.35

It is settled that the presence of an aggravating circumstance justifies an award for exemplary damages under
Article 223036 of the Civil Code even in the absence of an allegation of the aggravating circumstance in the
Information.37 The award of exemplary damages should serve to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies and
aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon and sexually abusing their daughters.38 Thus, exemplary damages in
the amount of ₱25,000.00 for each count of rape should be awarded to the victim in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of relationship and dwelling.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated December 22, 1997 in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding appellant Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to the effect that in each case, he is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay complainant Lyzel S. Lambid the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary
damages in addition to the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) awarded by the trial court as moral
damages or a total of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱250,000.00).
G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.

SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:p

The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused
Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value of the stolen revolver. 1 The Raquel brothers
now plead for their absolution in this appellate review.

In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with
homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16, 2 allegedly committed on July 4,
1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan.

Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and
before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. 3

The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page
references to the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellee's
brief:

At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the
backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a
hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man
took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)

She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other
men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)

George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The
police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters
from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-
9, TSN, March 21, 1988)

Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel
were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the
police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-
14, ibid.)

Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991) 4

Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in
their brief in this wise:
 Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left
Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the
house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and
Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police
authorities accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan,
Cotabato. He already heard the name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land
in Paatan.

On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same
Barangay. Before July 4, he entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2,
1991, pp. 2-20).

Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano
Raquel told him that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the)
same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a
soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came
over to his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even
accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26).

T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was
assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas
Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-
20). 5

On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. 6

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were
appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of
the case to the Court of Appeals. 8 In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded
the same to us. 9

Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting
accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively
implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.

We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence
convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her
testimony on direct examination in court she declared as follows:

Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you
see any when you pip (sic) at the window?

A; Yes, sir.

Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?

A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2)
persons who were running away, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and
two (2) persons running away?

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?

A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police
arrived. 10(emphasis ours.)

On cross-examination she further testified:

Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?

A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.

Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and
got the gun of your husband because he was mask(ed), is that not right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?

FISCAL DIZON:

Already answered.

She was not able to identify, your Honor.

Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is
that right?

A: Yes, sir. 11

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help
and you saw two (2) person(s) running, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?

A: I saw them running sir going around.

Q: These two (2) persons were running going around?

A: They were running towards the road.

ATTY. DIVINO:

Going to the road.

Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?

A: No, sir. 12 (Emphases supplied.)

Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito
Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police
Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that:

19Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from
where you were then drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed
any?

A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a
maong jacket. The other one wore a hat locally known as "kipis" meaning a hat made
of cloth with leaves protruding above the forehead and seemed to be holding
something which I failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant with a
somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his
head and a part of his face as he was head-down during that time.

20Q: Did you recognized any of these men?

A: No. Because they walked fast. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as
the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as
his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify
in court and he has been at large since then.

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter,
unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-
accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
accused. 14 That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which
implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant,
while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. 15

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience,
a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 16

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, 17 those exceptions do not
however apply to the present case.

Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence
whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that
appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name
Dante Clemente, 18was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no person by the name
of Danny Clemente. 19

Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation
of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the
same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police
station:
 Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the
process of investigation?

A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him . . . And after
that I checked the information that he gave.

Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?

A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to

investigate as to against (sic) him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but
if the purpose is to interrogate him to acquire information which will lead to the
identity of the other accused we do not need to inform him.

Q: Don't you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit; the accused should be
(re)presented by counsel that is the ruling of the Supreme Court?

A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.

Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?

A: No sir.

Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.

A: No counsel, Sir. 20

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be
waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. 21 These rights, both constitutional and
statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.

A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. 22 Without the
positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. 23 While admittedly the alibi of appellants
may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred in
part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the
strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is
weak. 24

It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be
resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty
of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor
fulfilled.

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas
Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

[G.R. Nos. 98494-98692. July 17, 2003]

ROGELIO ALVIZO, FLORITO MONTECILLO, POMPEYO ALMAGRO and CATALINO MAGNO,

JR., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 [G.R. Nos. 99006-20. July 17, 2003]

JOSELITO J. GENSON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99059-99259. July 17, 2003]

EFREN COYOCA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99309-18. July 17, 2003]

OSCAR BELCINA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99412-16 & 99436-99636. July 17, 2003]

HARVEY RUIZ, EDGAR OSMEA, GUILBERTO HERMOSA and ANICETO ARRIOLA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R.Nos. 99417-21 & 99637-99837. July 17, 2003]

SANTOS CABUSAS and SOFRONIO MAG-UYON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99887-100084. July 17, 2003]

RAFAEL RABAYA, JR. and NESTOR RABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
accused Rogelio Alvizo, Florito Montecillo, Pompeyo Almagro, Catalino Magno, Jr., Efren Coyoca, Oscar Belcina,
Harvey Ruiz, Edgar Osmea, Guilberto Hermosa, Aniceto Arriola, Santos Cabusas, Sofronio Mag-uyon, Rafael
Rabaya, Jr., Nestor Rabaya andJoselito Genson which seek to annul the Decision dated October 24, 1990 of the
Sandiganbayan[1] in Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1341 finding them guilty on different counts of violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the
Resolution[2] dated April 15, 1991 denying their respective motions for reconsideration.
The factual background of the consolidated petitions are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, a team from the Commission on Audit (COA) was organized by Sofronio Flores, Jr., the
COA Region VII Director, to verify the alleged issuances of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) and Sub-
Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCs) during the period of 1976-1978 in various Highway Engineering
Districts (HEDs) of Region VII.The special audit team was composed of auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth
Paredes. Then President Marcos also created a Special Cabinet Committee composed of the heads of the COA,
Ministry of Justice, Office of the Budget and Management, Bureau of Treasury and the National Bureau of
Investigation to investigate the fund anomalies in Region VII. This Special Cabinet Committee created a Special
Task Force made up of various teams, among others, Team II, headed by Supervising Agent Amado de Coco to
cover the Cebu 2nd HED. The task force worked with the Audit team and retrieved documents and records from the
Regional Office and the Cebu 2nd HED. The Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued in the
year 1977 leading to irregular disbursements of public funds for the payment of ghost projects.
The investigations resulted in the filing of 397 criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan charging certain officials
and employees of the government as well as private contractors with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In the 198 cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 5585-5782, the accused were officials and employees of
Central Office of the then Ministry of Public Highways, Manila (MPH for brevity), now Department of Public Works
and Highways. They were all acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[3]
In the 199 cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1341, subject-matter of herein petitions, the following
officials and employees of the Cebu 2nd HED were charged: Manuel de Veyra (Regional Director), Rolando
Mangubat (Regional Accountant), Delia Preagido (Regional Accountant III), Santos Cabusas (District Property
Custodian), Sofronio Mag-uyon (District Accountant), Adventor Fernandez (Highway District Engineer), Jose
Genson (Highway District Engineer), Domingo Rayos (Highway District Engineer), Rafael Rabaya, Jr. (Assistant
Highway District Engineer), Godofredo Lagura (Assistant Highway District Engineer), Nestor Rabaya (Material
Testing Engineer), Oscar Belcina, Sr. (Civil Engineer), Rogelio Alvizo, (Civil Engineer), Florito Montecillo
(Supervising Civil Engineer I), Catalino Magno, Jr. (Supervising Civil Engineer), Perseverando Licen (Civil
Engineer), Pompeo Almagro, (Civil Engineer), Efren Coyoca (Auditor), Harvey Ruiz (Auditor), Edgar Osmea
(Auditor), Fe delos Reyes (Auditing Examiner), Guilberto Hermosa, Aniceto Arriola and Graciano Navales, Jr. (COA
Auditing Aides); together with private contractors/suppliers Rufino Nuez, Antolin Jariol, Erasmo Gabison, Feliciano
Echavez, Joselito Genson and Pablo Guinocor.
The 199 Informations are identically worded, except as to names of the persons charged, dates of the
commission, amounts defrauded, and supplies/materials involved. We adopt the same format used by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision by reproducing only the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1143, leaving blank
and unfilled the proper spaces corresponding to the above-mentioned particulars, thus:

That in, about and during the period from [period specified] in the City and Province of Cebu, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN, the accused [name][4] all public officers and employees in the Ministry of Public
Highways and Commission on Audit, Republic of the Philippines, conspiring, confederating, conniving and
cooperating with each other, and conspiracy, confederation, connivance and cooperation with [name][5] a private
contractor for the supply of materials, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or inexcusable negligence in the
discharge and performance of their official and administrative functions, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously cause undue injury, loss and prejudice to the Government of the Philippines by causing, allowing,
approving and receiving the illegal and unauthorized disbursement and expenditure of public funds, out of the
National Treasury, in the amount of x x x x x Philippine Currency, thru General Voucher No. x x x x x and charged
against spurious and fake Letter of Advice of Allotment (LAA) and fake Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
(ACDC); supported by simulated and falsified public bidding proposals, abstract of sealed quotations, Requisitions,
Purchase Order, Delivery Receipts, Inspection of Reports and Tally Sheets thus making it appear (1) that said
expenditures and disbursements were legally funded out of authorized budgetary appropriations of the Ministry of
Public Highways; (2) that the accounting and auditing rules and requirements on public biddings in relation to
government purchases of equipment supplies and materials were complied with; (3) that a valid purchase order was
prepared and approved; and (4) that worth were needed, ordered, delivered, receipted, inspected and consequently,
paid for - when in truth and in fact, as all the aforementioned accused very well knew, that such were all false and
falsified as same were prepared to merely give semblances of regularity of the transactions and as designed means
to pursue and cover-up the fraud; and finally, upon receipt of the aforesaid amount the accused misappropriated,
converted and misapplied the same for their own personal benefit, uses and gain thus, causing injury to the
government in the aforesaid amount of

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

The following tabulation specifies the data corresponding to the particulars alleged in each of the Information
under which the petitioners are charged:

Crim. Case Date of Amount GV[7]. Treasury Material

No. commission No. Check No.

1143 Dec. 1976- 25,220.00 288 2400749 Aggregate

Feb. 23, base
1977 course
1144 Dec.-Feb. 38,446.92 145 959604 -do-
28, 1977

1145 -do- 47,530.00 261 240072 -do-

1146 -do- 27,645.00 139 959598 -do-

1147 Nov. 1976 - 25,220.00 134 959592 -do-

Feb. 1977

1148 Dec. 1976- 40,123.08 138 959597 -do-

Feb. 28, 1977

1149 Nov. 1976- 47,530.00 133 959591 -do-

Feb. 1977

1150 Nov. - Feb. 38,446.92 105 959563 -do-

28, 1977

1151 Nov. 1976 40,123.00 77 959535 -do-

- Jan. 1977

1152 Nov. 1976 27,645.00 76 959534 -do-

-Feb. 1977

1153 Feb. 28, 1977 37,927.81 71 959529 -do-

1154 Dec. Jan. 43,527.00 38 959495 -do-

1977

1155 Nov. - Feb. 26,645.00 35 959492 -do-

28, 1977

1156 Nov. - Feb. 37,870.74 30 959487 -do-

10, 1977

1157 Nov. - Jan. 26,675.00 18 959475 -do-

30, 1977
 1158 Nov. - Feb. 46,075.00 15 959472 -do-
28, 1977

1159 Nov. - Feb. 40,699.26 08 959465 -do-

1977

1160 Sept. 1977- 40,740.00 1773 4217072 Bituminous

Jan. 1978 concrete
Surface
Course

1161 Oct. 1976 38,800.00 1769 4217068 Bituminous

- Jan. 1977 concrete
surface
course

1162 Sept. Nov. 38,800.00 1682 4216981 -do-

30, 1977

1163 Aug. - Nov. 38,800.00 1556 4216480 -do-

1977

1164 Aug.-Nov. 38,800.00 1497 4216421 -do-

15, 1977

1165 Aug.-Oct. 38,800.00 1397 2887321 -do-

30, 1977

1166 July-Oct. 38,800.00 1384 2887278 -do-

15, 1977

1167 July - Sept. 38,800.00 1286 2887208 -do-

30, 1977

1168 July - Sept. 38,800.00 1266 2887188 -do-

30, 1977

1169 Aug. - Nov. 33,465.00 1481 4216405 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1170 July - Oct. 30,555.00 1362 2887286 -do-

1977

1171 July - Sept. 29,100.00 1241 2887163 -do-

30, 1977

1172 Aug. Nov. 48,015.00 1462 4216386 -do-

1977

1173 Aug.- Oct. 39,900.37 1402 2887326 Bituminous

30, 1977 concrete
surface
course

1174 Aug.Nov. 48,132.18 1401 2887325 -do-

1977
 1175 Aug.-Oct. 48,158.56 1400 2887324 -do-
30, 1977

1176 -do- 48,301.34 1399 2887323 -do-

1177 Aug-Sept. 48,253.23 1398 2887322 -do-

1977

1178 July - Oct. 47,118.19 1380 2887304 -do-

1977

1179 -do- 48,364.59 1361 2887285 -do-

1180 JulyOct. 43,650.00 1360 2887284 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1181 -do- 32,010.00 1358 2887282 -do-

1182 Sept.-Nov. 29,100.00 1357 2887281 -do-

15, 1977

1183 July-Oct. 48,283.40 1355 2887279 Bituminous

1977 concrete
surface
course

1184 JulyOct. 43,650.00 1353 2887277 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1185 -do- 48,384.13 1343 2887267 Bituminous

concrete
surface
course

1186 -do- 48,409.69 1342 2887266 -do-

1187 -do- 13,849.66 1288 2887210 Aggregate

base
course

1188 June - Nov. 43,768.34 1287 2887209 -do-

30, 1977

1189 July - Sept. 32,010.00 1242 2887164 -do-

1977

1190 -do- 48,257.50 1237 2887159 -do-

1191 Aug. - Sept. 24,492.50 1236 2887158 -do-

1977

1192 June Aug. 29,100.00 1233 2887155 -do-

15, 1977
 1193 June - Sept. 180.00 1110 2886407 -do-
30, 1977

1194 May - Aug. 29,100.00 1070 2886267 -do-

15, 1977

1195 -do- 29,100.00 997 2886294 -do-

1196 April June 29,100.00 756 2886051 -do-

1977

1197 Jan.-April 29,100.00 462 2400925 -do-

1977

1198 -do- 27,465.43 398 2400860 -do-

1199 -do- 24,390.77 386 2400847 -do-

1200 -do- 29,100.00 345 2400806 -do-

1201 Jan.-Mar. 28,247.97 309 2400770 -do-

1977

1202 Sept.-Dec. 47,294.29 1607 4216906 -do-

30, 1977

1203 Aug.-Nov. 48,257.50 1461 4216385 -do-

30, 1977

1204 July-Oct. 30,433.75 1379 2887303 -do-

30, 1977

1205 -do- 42,316.25 1352 2887276 -do-

1206 -do- 39,285.00 1268 2887190 -do-

1207 -do- 48,015.00 1239 2887161 -do-

1208 Oct. 1977- 44,232.00 1756 4217055 -do-

Jan. 1978

1209 Oct. 1977- 43,068.00 1761 4217060 -do-

Jan. 1978

1210 Sept.-Dec. 48,290.29 1618 4216917 Bituminous

15, 1977 concrete
surface
course

1211 Oct.-Dec. 33,465.00 1617 4216916 Aggregate

15, 1977 base
course

1212 Sept. - Nov. 30,355.00 1615 4216914 -do-

30, 1977
1213 -do- 47,025.60 1613 4216912 -do-

1214 Sept.-Dec. 46,094.40 1605 4216904 -do-

1977

1215 Sept.-Nov. 6,945.59 1562 4216486 Bituminous

30, 1977 concrete
surface
course

1216 Aug.-Nov. 47,840.79 1560 4216484 -do-

1977

1217 -do- 48,343.73 1559 4216483 -do-

1218 -do- 48,340.43 1557 4216481 -do-

1219 Aug.-Oct. 47,863.87 1524 4216448 -do-

1977

1220 -do- 48,015.58 1520 4216444 -do-

1221 Aug.-Nov. 39,285.00 1494 4216418 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1222 -do- 29,100.00 1488 4216412 -do-

1223 -do- 8,962.80 1473 4216397 -do-

1224 -do- 30,555.00 1472 4216396 -do-

1225 -do- 43,999.20 1470 4216394 -do-

1226 Sept.-Dec. 48,229.47 1625 4216924 Bituminous

15, 1977 concrete
surface
course

1227 Sept.-Nov. 46,696.19 1624 4216923 -do-

30, 1977

1228 -do- 48,133.44 1622 4216921 -do-

1229 -do- 29,100.00 1619 4216918 Aggregate

base

course

1230 Aug.-Nov. 24,492.00 1469 4216393 -do-

1977

1231 Sept.-Nov. 48,015.00 1606 4216905 -do-

1977
 1232 Oct. 1977 - 32,010.00 1760 4217059 -do-
Jan. 1978

1233 -do- 33,465.00 1759 4217058 -do-

1234 June-Sept. 38,800.00 1203 2886500 Bituminous

1977 concrete
surface
course

1235 JuneSept. 38,800.00 1202 2886499 Bituminous

1977 concrete
surface
course

1236 -do- 38,800.00 1112 2886409 -do-

1237 -do- 240.00 1111 2886408 Hollow

blocks

1238 April - Aug. 38,800.00 1079 2886376 Bituminous

28, 1977 concrete
surface
course

1239 May-Aug. 38,800.00 1048 2886345 -do-

1977

1240 April-July 38,800.00 996 2886293 -do-

15, 1977

1241 April-June 36,860.00 773 2886069 -do-

30, 1977

1242 Jan.-April 41,111.12 327 2400788 -do-

1977

1243 Dec.-Mar. 44,693.62 282 2400742 -do-

30, 1977

1244 Jan.-Mar. 46,616.65 259 2400719 -do-

1977

1245 Dec. 1976- 44,118.61 215 999675 -do-

Mar. 30, 1977

1246 Nov. 1976- 34,920.00 146 959605 -do-

Feb. 28, 1977

1247 -do- 34, 920.00 131 959589 -do-

1248 -do- 33,950.00 37 959494 -do-

1249 -do- 33,950.00 05 959462 -do-

1250 JuneAug. 43,650.00 1081 2880378 Aggregate

 30, 1977 base
course

1251 May-Aug. 43,650.00 1065 2886362 -do-

1977

1252 May-Aug. 39,721.50 961 2886258 -do-

15, 1977

1253 Oct. 1977- 41,147.40 1762 4717061 -do-

Jan. 1978

1254 May-Aug 47,578.50 959 2886256 -do-

15, 1977

1255 Mar.-June 43,795.50 753 2886048 -do-

30, 1977

1256 Mar.-June 43,504.50 751 2886046 -do-

15, 1977

1257 Oct. 1976- 40,332.60 1757 4217056 Aggregate

Jan. 15, 1977 base
Course

1258 Sept.-Nov. 48,015.00 1672 4216911 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1259 Sept.-Dec. 18,180.71 1614 4216913 -do-

1977

1260 Oct. 1977- 29,100.00 1768 4217067 -do-

Jan. 15, 1978

1261 Dec.-Mar. 23,608.23 298 2400759 -do-

31, 1977

1262 Nov. 1976 - 6,790.00 227 2400687 -do-

Mar. 1977

1263 Nov. 1976- 29,100.00 142 959601 -do-

Feb. 28, 1977

1264 Nov. 1976- 47,142.00 132 959590 -do-

Feb. 28, 1977

1265 -do- 29,100.00 69 959527 -do-

1266 Nov. 1976- 29,100.00 31 959488 -do-

Feb. 1977

1267 May-Aug. 33,465.00 1067 2886364 -do-

1977

1268 May-Aug. 33,465.00 998 2886295 -do-

15, 1977

1269 April-June 29,100.00 766 2886062 -do-

3, 1977

1270 Jan.-April 33,465.00 466 2400929 -do-

1977

1271 -do- 26,190.00 464 2400927 -do-

1272 -do- 32,010.00 402 2400864 -do-

1273 Jan.-Mar. 26,190.00 355 2400816 -do-

1977

1274 -do- 33,465.00 350 2400811 -do-

1275 Dec. 1976- 26,190.00 252 2400712 -do-

Mar. 1977

1276 Dec. 1976- 26,190.00 143 959602 - do-

Feb. 28, 1977

1277 -do- 33,465.00 140 959599 -do-

1278 Nov. 1976- 33,465.00 90 959548 -do-

Feb. 1977

1279 -do- 26,190.00 70 959528 -do-

1280 -do- 33,465.00 36 959493 -do-

1281 Nov. 1976- 26,190.00 33 959490 Aggregate

Jan. 30, 1977 base
Course

1282 May-Aug. 29,100.00 1066 2886363 Aggregate

30, 1977 base
course

1283 May-July 30, 29,100.00 993 2886290 -do-

1977

1284 April-July 32,010.00 767 2886063 -do-

1977

1285 Jan.-Mar. 30, 32,010.00 465 2400928 -do-

1977

1286 Jan.-Mar. 32,010.00 351 2400812 -do-

9, 1977

1287 Nov. 1976- 32,010.00 141 959600 -do-

Jan. 3, 1977

1288 Nov. 1976- 32,010.00 89 959547 -do-

Jan. 30, 1977

1289 Nov. 1976- 32,010.00 32 959489

Jan. 1977

1290 Jan.-April 42,427.80 337 2400798 -do-

1977

1291 Dec.1976- 48,476.53 299 2400760 Bituminous

Mar. 31, 1977 concrete
Surface
Course

1292 Nov. 1976- 48,392.33 296 2400757 -do-

Mar. 1977

1293 Dec.-Mar. 34,744.16 295 2400756 Aggregate

31, 1977 base
course

1294 -do- 46,735.84 294 2400755 -do-

1295 -do- 48,422.21 291 2400752 Bituminous

concrete
surface
course

1296 Jan.-April 41,104.33 352 2400813 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1297 -do- 39,285.00 348 2400809 -do-

1298 -do- 27,645.00 347 2400808 -do-

1299 -do- 46,195.67 346 2400807 -do-

1300 -do- 36,142.00 344 2400805 -do-

1301 -do- 44,083.40 326 2400787 Bituminous

concrete
surface
course

1302 -do- 35,036.40 401 2400863 Aggregate

base
course

1303 -do- 10,289.76 400 2400862 -do-

1304 -do- 48,443.60 399 2400861 -do-

1305 Dec. 1976- 46,280.64 387 2400848 -do-

Apr. 30, 1977

1306 Jan - Mar. 33,465.00 354 2400815 Aggregate

 30, 1977 base
course

1307 Apr.-June 33,683.25 754 2886049 -do-

1977

1308 Mar.-June 39,066.75 752 2886047 -do-

1977

1309 Feb.-May 20,802.13 504 2400968 Bituminous

1977 concrete
surface
course

1310 -do- 31,187.73 503 2400967 -do-

1311 Jan.-Apr. 41,132.70 497 2400961 -do-

1977

1312 -do- 48,361.10 484 2400947 -do-

1313 -do- 48,370.94 483 2400946 -do-

1314 -do- 48,188.10 482 2400945 -do-

1315 -do- 47,160.33 468 2400931 -do-

1316 -do- 27,645.00 463 2400926 Aggregate

base
course

1317 -do- 46,711.17 461 2400924 Bituminous

concrete
surface
course

1318 -do- 48,352.79 460 2400932 -do-

1319 Apr.-June 33,465.00 757 2886052 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1320 Oct. 1976- 29,100.00 1770 4217069 -do-

Jan. 30, 1977

1321 Sept.-Dec. 29,100.00 1621 4216920 -do-

1977

1322 Aug.-Nov. 29,100.00 1487 4216411 -do-

30, 1977

1323 July-Oct. 29,100.00 1359 2887283 -do-

1977

1324 July-Sept. 29,100.00 1238 2887160 -do-

30, 1977
 1325 Oct. 1977- 30,555.00 1758 4217057 -do-
Jan. 1978

1326 Sept.-Dec. 32,010.00 1616 4216915 -do-

1977

1327 Aug.-Nov. 32,010.00 1471 4216395 -do-

1977

1328 July-Oct. 33,465.00 1356 2887280 -do-

1977

1329 July-Sept. 33,465.00 1240 2887162 -do-

30, 1977

1330 May-Aug. 46,349.80 1151 2886448 Bituminous

30, 1977 concrete
surface
course

1331 June-Aug. 46,792.85 1150 2886447 -do-

1977

1332 June-Sept. 47, 496.10 1149 2886446 -do-

30, 1977

1333 June-Aug. 29,318.25 1082 2886379 Aggregate

1977 base
course

1334 May-Aug. 29,100.00 1069 2886366 -do-

1977

1335 -do- 32,010.00 1068 2886365 -do-

1336 -do- 43, 431.75 1064 2886361 -do-

1337 -do- 29,100.00 1008 2886305 -do-

1338 -do- 32,010.00 994 2886291 -do-

1339 April-July 35,211.00 962 2886259 -do-

31, 1977

1340 April-June 29,100.00 771 2886067 -do-

30, 1977

1341 April-July 37,539.00 960 2886257 -do-

31, 1977

Accused Domingo Rayos, Graciano Navales, Jr., Basilisa Galvan, Edgardo Cruz and Agripino Pagdanganan
are at large.[8]
After the judgment was rendered in these cases, accused Pablo Guinocor surrendered and was charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1267-1281, 1325-1329. He pleaded guilty and was convicted by the Sandiganbayan in a
decision dated April 20, 1994.[9]
 Accused Rufino Nuez, Adventor Fernandez and Heracleo Faelnar are already deceased.[10]
Accused Fe delos Reyes (District Auditing Examiner) and Delia Preagido (Region VII Accountant III) were
discharged and utilized as state witnesses.
Upon being duly arraigned under each of the separate Informations wherein they were charged, all the rest of
the accused pleaded not guilty.[11]
All these cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties except as to accused private contractor Joselito
Genson who, upon his motion, was granted a separate trial when it was his turn to present evidence.[12]
During the trial, accused Rolando Mangubat (Region VII Accountant) who signed all the fake LAAs and
SACDCs,[13] and co-accused contractors/ suppliers Erasmo Gabison and Feliciano Echavez who delivered the
materials and prosecuted the ghost projects, changed their previous pleas of not guilty to guilty to the crimes
charged against them.[14]
The evidence of the prosecution, through the testimony of the then Supervising COA Auditor Ruth Paredes,
established the standard operating procedure in the releases of allotments to fund the highway projects or the
maintenance and repair of the existing ones in the different regions of the MPH, as follows:
Based on the appropriation law and upon the request made by the head of the MPH, the Ministry of Budget
releases funds to the MPH by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA) which is the authority to obligate funds, and the
Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC) which is the authority to disburse the funds so obligated. In turn, the MPH issues
a Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the corresponding Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) addressed to
the Regional Director concerned which are duly recorded in the appropriate book of account of the Central Office of
the MPH. These SAAs and ACDCs serve as the authority for the Regional Offices to obligate and disburse funds
which become the sources of funds of the various Engineering Districts apportioned throughout each region. The
Engineering District then submits a Program of Work to the Regional Director for the release of these funds. Upon
approval of said request by the Regional Director, the Regional Finance Officer issues a Letter of Advice of
Allotment (LAA) and the corresponding Sub-Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC), as authority to incur
obligation and to disburse the funds so obligated, to the District Engineer. The LAA and the SACDC are then duly
recorded in the logbook of the Regional Office and are sent to the district engineers office.
The testimony of Auditor Paredes as to the implementation of the project in the district level is summarized by
the Sandiganbayan as follows:

Implementation of the districts programs of work now go into the requisition stage, wherein the proper Requisition
for Supplies and Equipment (RSE), needed for the prosecution of its projects and embodied in the approved
program of work, is prepared by the requisitioning officer, certified as to the availability of funds by the District
Accountant, and approved by the District Engineer. The Project Engineer also prepares a Request for Obligation of
Allotment (ROA) which the Accountant certifies as to availability of funds. The RSE, together with a copy of the
program of work, is then transmitted to the Regional Office for the approval of the Regional Director and thereafter
returned to the district concerned for prosecution of the project after compliance with bidding and award procedures.

Based on the approved RSE, the districts Property Custodian or Purchasing/Supply Officer, with the approval of the
District Engineer, sends out Request for Sealed Quotations to various contractors or suppliers requesting them to
submit, on or before a date fixed therein, their quotations for the materials or supplies. Notices thereof are likewise
publicized through either newspaper publications or postings in public places. Within the reglementary period, the
sealed bid forms are opened by the Committee on Bidding and Award in the presence of representatives of the
District Engineer and the District/City Auditor. The lowest price quotation or bid is determined and the corresponding
Abstract of Bids is prepared and signed by the members of the committee, as well as the auditors and district
engineers representatives, after which the corresponding award is made to the said lowest bidder, duly approved by
the District Engineer. A Purchase Order (PO) is thereafter prepared by the Property Custodian, addressed to the
winning bidder, certified as to availability of funds by the Accountant and approved by the District Engineer.

Delivery is then effected by the winning bidder, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the PO, which may
include the time required to start and terminate said deliveries and the places of delivery.Inspection of deliveries are
made at the delivery or project sites by a representative of the Auditors office upon receipt of a verbal or written
request for such inspection prepared by the Property Custodian to the Auditor. The Auditors representative inspects
the deliveries, signs the Delivery Receipts (DRs) and, finally, the Report of Inspection (ROI), duly concurred in by
the Property Custodian. During said deliveries, samples of the materials are also tested for their conformity with
specifications and the results of such tests are submitted to the District Engineer to be attached to the payment
vouchers, together with all other supporting documents.

After completion of deliveries, the corresponding General Voucher (GV) for the payment of the supplies or materials
delivered is prepared, usually by someone at the district office. Said GV contains on the face thereof five (5)
certifications to be signed by the proper officials, namely, the Property Custodian, the Project Engineer, the District
or City Engineer, the Accountant and the District or City Auditor attesting and certifying to the correctness, legality
and propriety of the transactions covered by said GV. Attached to said GV and required to be examined and verified
by the proper district officials and their subordinates are the requisite supporting documents, such as, the RSE,
ROA, Program of Work, Detailed Estimates, Request for Sealed Quotations, Abstract of Bids, PO, DRs, Request for
Inspection, Test Reports and Tax Clearance Certificate of the supplier-contractor. After the GV is processed, pre-
audited and approved, the papers are brought to the Cashier for the preparation of the check or treasury warrant or
TCAA check, which is also pre-audited. The check is then released to the supplier-contractor or his duly authorized
representative who issues the corresponding official receipt.

At the end of each calendar month, the District Accountant prepares several reports, including the Report of
Obligations Incurred (ROI) and the Report of Checks Issued (RCI), which are submitted to the Regional Office. At
the Regional Budget and Finance Division, these reports, together with those coming from other districts, are
entered in the proper journals and, in the course of ordinary accounting procedures, are entered in the General
Ledger. In turn, the entries in the General Ledger become the basis for monthly Trial Balances (TBs) which are
prepared cumulatively by the Regional Accountant, recommended for approval by the Regional Finance officer and
approved by the Regional Director, which TBs are also submitted every month to the Central Office of the MPH. At
the end of the fiscal calendar year, the final Trial Balance is prepared by the Regional Office and likewise submitted
to the MPH.[15]

Paredes further testified: Her team prepared a working paper containing the summary of Sub-Advice of
Allotments (SAAs) received by Region VII from the MPH, Central Office in 1977.[16] The summary was based on the
(1) certifications from the Regional officials[17] (2) the copies of the SAAs themselves and (3) the logbook of the
Regional Offices.[18] They prepared another working paper to match the SAAs and the Letters of Advice of
Allotments (LAAs) released by the Region to Cebu 2nd HED for 1977.[19] While they found some LAAs[20] that
matched with the SAAs and these LAAs were entered in the logbook of the Regional Office, they also found another
set of LAAs[21] which were fake or irregular as they were (1) not stamped released by the accounting section of the
region at the topmost portion of the sheet, (2) undated and not numbered consecutively, (3) not recorded in the
Regional Office logbook, (4) not covered by any appropriation law and (5) not supported by SAA number coming
from the MPH which must be reflected in the LAA.[22] It was possible to release several LAAs but not exceeding the
amount of the SAA and she found no fake SAAs released by the MPH, Central Office. They found out that the
Regional Office manipulated the amount in such a way that they deleted certain amounts which they charged
against the fake allotments and thus the trial balance sent to the Central Office did not reflect the true and correct
expenditures of the district.[23] They also prepared a summary of the Advice of Cash Disbursements Ceilings
(ACDCs) released by the Central Office to the Regional Office in 1977 and they had found some Sub-Advice of
Cash Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCs)[24] released by the Region to the district which could not be traced from
these ACDCs.[25] They identified the general vouchers charged against the fake allotments based on the general
vouchers themselves, cost ledger sheets maintained by Cebu 2nd HED and the Report of Checks Issued by the
Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO).[26] All the general vouchers charged against the fake LAAs were all for
amounts below P50,000.00 in order to avoid review of said vouchers in the COA Regional Office since under
existing auditing rules and regulations, all disbursements exceeding P50,000.00 would have to be countersigned by
the officials in the COA Regional Office.[27]
Prosecution witness Felicitas Ona, then Auditor V, was assigned as a member of the team formed by the
Performance Audit Office to investigate the extent of the anomaly in the MPH Central and the Regional Offices. Her
testimony is as follows: She assisted in the interpretation and analysis of the regions trial balance, journal of checks
issued and books of accounts submitted to the Central Office.[28] Her team analyzed the trial balance per month
based on the journal where all the checks issued for the month were recorded. They discovered discrepancies
because the trial balance did not match the amounts recorded in the journal. The region made adjusting entry in the
journal voucher so as to take out the checks issued from the fake LAAs, enclosed them in parenthesis and
transferred them to another account so as not to show that the actual disbursements made were much higher than
the accounts payable.[29] Negative entries were made so that the regional trial balance will no longer show such
manipulation when forwarded to MPH Central Office for consolidation.[30]
 Prosecution witness Manuel Dionisio, a Senior Agent of the NBI and member of the Special Task Force of the
Cabinet Committee, testified that he concentrated on the angle of splitting of the general vouchers into amounts less
than P50,000.00 and that most of these vouchers were supported by the same RIVs.[31]
Accused-turned-state witness, Delia Preagido testified as follows:[32] She was employed in the MPH, Region
VII, holding the position of Accountant III. Her duties consisted in the handling of books of accounts like journal of
collections and disbursements, general journals, preparation of the trial balance for the entire region and other
related works.[33] Sometime in the last week of January 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat,[34] Chief Accountant of
Region VII, asked her to stay after office hours and they proceeded to the Town and Country Restaurant
Club. While they were there, Mangubat told her that they could get a big money out of the simulated LAAs by selling
them to the Contractors, District Accountant, District Engineer and the Assistant District Engineer.[35] Mangubat told
her that some officers and employees in the Region and the Central Office would be part of the
arrangement.[36] They also discussed the percentages to be given to the participants, i.e., 26 percent to the Regional
Office, 20 percent to the Central Office, 6 percent to the signatories of the fake LAA, while the balance will go to the
contractors and District Engineers.[37] She agreed to be a part of the fraudulent scheme after she was assured that
the conspiracy was not only in the Regional Office but included the Central Office.[38] After a while, accused Jose
Sayson[39] (Budget Examiner II) and Edgardo Cruz[40] (Accountant I) of Region VII, arrived and joined them in their
discussion. Sayson and Cruz also typed the fake LAAs and were in charge in the negotiation and selling of the fake
LAAs.[41] After they had typed the simulated LAAs and SACDCs and released them to the district concerned, she
received her share from the fake LAAs.[42] For around one year, Mangubat gave her amounts varying from P500.00
to P700.00 every week totaling to around P70,000.00.[43] She also distributed money to the other Regional officials
and employees based on the handwritten lists prepared by Mangubat and she together with Mangubat brought the
amounts intended for the Central Office people.[44] The amounts covered by the fake LAAs were all reflected in the
journals of checks issued, general journals and lists of checks issued and cancelled but the amounts were no longer
reflected in the trial balance submitted to the Central Office because of the manipulation of the journal voucher
through negation of entries.[45] She identified Exhibits K, K-1 to K-18 as fake LAAs and Exhibits Q, Q-1 to Q-18 as
fake SACDCs issued to Cebu 2nd HED in 1977.[46]
Fe delos Reyes, then Auditing Examiner II at the Cebu 2nd HED, likewise an accused-turned-state witness,
testified as follows: Among her duties was to conduct the inspection of the deliveries of supplies and materials made
by the contractors/suppliers in the job sites.[47] Sometime in the first quarter of 1977, she was instructed by petitioner
Auditor Efren Coyoca to inspect the delivery of supplies and materials at the project site of the Argao Dalaguete
project but she found no deliveries therein. She then reported the non-delivery to petitioner Coyoca who told her that
he had to confer the matter with petitioner Engr. Rafael Rabaya, Jr..[48] After a day later, she was called by petitioner
Coyoca to his office and told her, in the presence of petitioner Rabaya, to just sign all the prepared tally sheets and
inspection reports as Coyoca would assume the responsibility if anything went wrong. Upon such assurance, she
signed the tally sheets and inspection reports.[49] Thereafter, she just signed tally sheets and reports without actually
going to the jobsites to inspect the deliveries of supplies and materials because she knew that there would be no
deliveries to be made.[50] The contractors who participated in the alleged deliveries of materials were accused
Rufino Nuez,[51] Antolin Jariol,[52] Pablo Guinocor,[53] Feliciano Echavez[54] and Erasmo Gabison[55] and herein
petitioner Joselito Genson. The practice of signing the tally sheets and inspection reports without actual inspections
of deliveries of materials at the job sites was done during the time of petitioner Auditor Efren Coyoca and was
continued even after he was replaced by petitioner Auditor Harvey Ruiz and the latter by petitioner Edgar
Osmea.[56] On separate occasions, she called the attention of all the petitioners Auditors on the non-deliveries of
materials but after these Auditors conferred with petitioner Engr. Rabaya, Jr., she was just told to continue with the
practice. The signed tally sheets and inspection reports were used by the contractors to claim for the payments of
the alleged deliveries of materials. She saw Marcia Maruda, an employee in the Engineering District Office,
distributing several mailing envelopes containing money to petitioners Aniceto Arriola, Guilberto Hermosa, Sofronio
Mag-uyon, Santos Cabusas, Florito Montecillo, Rogelio Alvizo, Oscar Belcina, Pompeyo Almagro, Sr., Nestor
Rabaya and accused Graciano Navales, Perseverando Licen and Patalinghog.[57] She also received envelopes with
money inside from Maruda who told her that they were given by petitioner Engr. Rabaya, Jr. for her signature in the
tally sheets and inspection reports.[58]
Eduardo Selma, operations manager of the Selma Mananga Rocks, owned by his deceased father, Moises
Selma, testified: Sometime in 1979, he and his late father were summoned by the NBI for investigation as to
whether they had participated in any government projects. He and his father had issued separate
certifications[59] stating that they had never participated in any bidding conducted by the Cebu 2nd HED.[60] They
were not shown any abstract of bids prior to the signing of the certifications. The signatures on the
quotations[61] were not his signatures and neither had he authorized anybody to sign for him. It was possible that
said abstracts of bids were prepared for the company without his knowledge but they are not licensed contractors
and never participated in any government contract.[62]
On the other hand, all the accused from the District Office denied that they had anything to do with the
preparation and simulation of the LAAs and SACDCs which originated from the Regional Office. The project
engineers maintained that the projects were implemented in accordance with the programs of work. The auditing
examiners declared that they inspected the materials delivered in the project sites. The auditors, accountant and
property custodian asserted that the documents submitted in support of the general vouchers were complete. All the
district officials asserted that there were no splitting of payments but only partial payments which was allowed. The
private contractors declared that they delivered the materials to the project sites as shown by the delivery receipts
and the tally sheets.
After a long tedious trial, a joint decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan on October 24, 1990. It made the
following findings:
(1) Region VII had released the regular maintenance allocation of Cebu 2nd HED for the year 1977 through 33
regular LAAs and 19 SACDCs which amounted to P5,735,197.97 and P6,529,063.29, respectively. There was no
basis for the additional disbursements of P7,005,477.22 made by the district through the 199 general vouchers
covered by 18 LAAs and 8 SACDCs to co-accused contractors/suppliers for the supposed deliveries of aggregate
base course, bituminous concrete surface course, hollow blocks and cover coat materials from January to
December 1977. Although the defense claim that the regular allocations for 1977 were insufficient, they failed to
prove that proper written requests had been made by the district officials to the Regional and Central Offices for
approval and implementation;
(2) The issuances of 18 LAAs and 8 SACDCs from which the 199 general vouchers were based were clearly
established to be fake or spurious. Badges of fraud were patently shown on the faces of the LAAs, to wit:

(a) six LAAs were undated while one was only dated October 1977;

(b) five LAAs were improperly charged to alleged prior years obligations (1973-76);

(c) fake LAAs have a letter A after the number 8;

(d) the improper charging of the illegal disbursements to savings on equipment rentals and for salaries
when there were no programs of work;

(e) fake LAAs were not numbered in sequence;

(f) no references were made to the mother SAA numbers which were always cited in the regular LAAs;

(g) fake LAAs could not be traced in the logbook maintained by the Regional Office;

(h) the rubber stamps for the certification of availability of funds in the fake LAAs were all signed by
convicted accused Rolando Mangubat as Chief Accountant I, while in the regular LAAs, it was his
assistant Delia Preagido who signed such certifications;

(3) The SACDCs were found to be fake since they could not be matched up against the ACDCs released by the
MPH Central Office to the Regional office; they could not be found in the subsidiary ledger maintained by the
Regional office;
(4) There were splitting of Requisitions for Supplies and Equipments (RSEs), Purchase Orders (POs) and
General Vouchers (GVs) so that the checks in payment of the items purportedly delivered were split into amounts
less than P50,000.00 in order that the general vouchers would only be pre-audited by the Cebu Second HED
Resident Auditor and would not be subject to action, review and approval by the COA Regional Auditor as required
in COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30, 1976 in relation to COA Circular No. 16-16-A dated March 23, 1976
clarifying COA Circular No. 76-A dated February 10, 1976;
(5) There were illegal charging to fund 81-400 (prior year obligation);
(6) No programs of works were attached to the general vouchers;
 (7) There were no deliveries made by the accused contractors/ suppliers, thus:

(a) the execution and preparation of the supposed delivery receipts(DRs), summaries of deliveries (tally
sheets), reports of inspections and the reports of analysis of the materials, were all manufactured
en-masse and ante-dated to give some semblance of justification for the questioned transactions,

(b) the projects undertaken in 1977 involving the 199 GVs were in connection with the regular maintenance
projects and not part of the rehabilitation or improvement as claimed by the defense,

(c) the seven accused contractors/suppliers could not have made the deliveries on the limited period
appearing in the delivery receipts and tally sheets,

(d) there were inordinate haste in the alleged inspections and payments,

(e) two of the seven contractors/suppliers had admitted non-delivery of materials when they pleaded guilty
of the charges against them;

(8) No foremen or maintenance engineers of Cebu 2nd HED supervised and inspected the alleged
projects. There were no laborers who did the spreading and steam rolling of the materials. No record of the proper
travel orders and cash advances or reimbursable expense receipts (RERs) in the travels of personnel from the
district office to the project sites and no daily time records (DTRs) were presented to show that the employees who
performed the works in the project sites were absent from the district office on the dates reflected in the supporting
documents. There was no payroll for the payment of laborers who worked on the project. There were no proper
travel orders or lease documents from the Engineering depot concerned which showed that heavy equipments were
utilized in these projects;
(9) The GVs and their supporting documents were produced en masse and processed hastily by the Cebu
2nd HED officials and contractors since all the 199 transactions were paid within 3-4 weeks from dates of requisition;
(10) The case of the prosecution was strengthened by the pleas of guilty of accused Rolando Mangubat and
co-accused contractors Erasmo Gabison and Feliciano Echavez thus constituting judicial admissions which clearly
and positively confirmed not only the issuances of fake or simulated LAAs and SACDCs as well as the irregular,
illegal preparation, execution and processing of the GVs and their supporting documents as a consequence of the
receipt by the Cebu 2nd HED but also the non-delivery of materials and the non-prosecution of the ghost projects;
(11) The amount of P7,005,477.22 was received by the contractors/ suppliers as follows: Rufino Nuez -
P3,470,428.58; Antolin Jariol - P935,320.40; Joselito Genson - P731,685.09; Pablo Guinocor - P889,963.75;
Feliciano Echavez - P540,124.40; Erasmo Gabison - P94,575.00 and Jose Abatayo - P343,380.00;[63]
(12) There was conspiracy among the accused as shown by the following:

Accused Sofronio Mag-uyons liability, as District Accountant, emanates from his signing GVs, ROAs, RIVs, and
Abstract of Proposals for Furnishing Supplies, Materials and Equipments which were all irregular and which cover
ghost projects. He also cannot feign ignorance of the fake and/or fictitious nature of the LAAs and SACDCs which
were received by him as chief financial officer of the district and on the basis of which he certified as to the
availability of unauthorized funds or allotments in said GV, ROAs and RSEs.

Accused Santos Cabusas liability, as Property Custodian, in all the 199 cases wherein he stands charged can
readily be seen, as he signed all the GVs and many RIVs, POs, Reports of Inspection and Abstract of Proposals for
Furnishing Supplies, Materials and Equipments which were all irregular and covered ghost projects. As Property
Custodian, he is not supposed to sign Reports of Inspection and Abstracts.

Accused Rafael Rabaya, Jr., Godofredo Lagura, Catalino Magno, Jr. Pompeyo Almagro, Florito Montecillo, Rogelio
Alvizo, Oscar Belcia, Perseverando Licen, and Nestor Rabaya; their liabilities as Asst. Highway District Engrs.,
Supervising Civil Engr. I, Sr. Civil Engr., Supervising Civil Engr. I, Senior Civil Engrs., Civil Engr., and Material
Testing Engr., arise and/or emanate from their individual and collective preparation, execution and approval of
irregularly-processed and simulated public documents which purported to be in pursuance of regular and authorized
allotments for actual projects within the district but which were really based on fake, irregular and unauthorized
LAAs and SACDCs and the projects were fictitious and non-existent, thus enabling their co-accused contractors to
receive public funds to which they are not entitled.

Accused Efren Coyoca, Edgar Osmea, Harvey Ruiz, Aniceto Arriola, and Guilberto Hermosa; their liabilities as
District Auditor, District Auditor, District Auditor, Auditing Aide and Auditing Aide, respectively, arise and/or emanate
from their individual and collective execution, processing and approval of GVs, ROIs, Delivery Receipts and Daily
Tally Sheets which were irregular and/or fictitious and covered ghost projects and, because of the deliberate and/or
grossly negligent performance of their auditing duties and functions, their co-accused contractors were able to
collect payments of public funds to which they are not entitled.

Contractors Joselito Genson and Antolin Jariol, Jr. liabilities arise and/or emanate from their individual and collective
participation in the preparation of fake or simulated bid quotations, POs, ROIs, Delivery Receipts, Daily Tally
Sheets, ORs and GVs for fictitious or non-existent deliveries of aggregate base course and asphalt on ghost
projects and for which they illegally collected public funds to the damage and prejudice of the Government.[64]

Based on the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused under Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Under paragraph (e), the requisite elements to constitute corrupt practices are (1) the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) said public officers commit the prohibited acts during
the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public position; (3) they caused undue injury to any party,
whether the Government or a private party; (4) such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and (5) the public officers have acted with manifest partiality,[65] evident bad faith[66] or
gross inexcusable negligence.[67]
As aptly found by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are present, thus:

In the cases at bar, all the above-cited requisites elements are present. When accused Fernandez, Faelnar and
Mangubat, as Asst. Regional Directors and Regional Accountant, respectively, issued the fake LAAs and
corresponding SACDCs to the Cebu 2nd HED knowing fully well that the allotments and/or allocation thereunder
were not properly authorized by the Ministries of the Budget and the Public Highways and neither have they been
programmed for release in accordance with standard operating procedure, they thus acted with evident bad
faith. Accused District Engineer Jose Genson, Assistant District Engineers Rafael Rabaya, Jr. and Godofredo
Lagura and District Accountant Sofronio Mag-uyon likewise acted with evident bad faith, gross inexcusable
negligence and manifest partiality in receiving and implementing the fake LAAs and SACDCs since they should
have known and noticed that all the allotments released thereunder were not for regular maintenance, especially so
when the district had been receiving its regular maintenance allocations for 1977; that they had not requested
formally for such extra allocations; that the LAAs and SACDCs were fake or spurious on their faces and signed by
unauthorized officials, and that they had not prepared any program of work to justify such extra allocations.

All the other accused officials from the Cebu 2nd HED, namely, Santos Cabusas, Nestor Rabaya, Almagro,
Montecillo, Alvizo, Magno, Jr., Belcia and Licen who are all engineers, together with those involved in auditing
functions, namely, District Auditors Harvey Ruiz, Edgar Osmea and Efren Coyoca, and Auditing Aides Aniceto
Arriola and Guilberto Hermosa, likewise acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in participating in the
preparation, processing and approval of the GVs and supporting documents, such as RSEs, Requests for Obligation
of Allotment (ROAs), Abstracts of Bids, POs, Delivery Receipts (DRs), Summary of Deliveries, Reports of Inspection
(ROIs) and Checks in payment of ghost projects to fake or spurious contractors-suppliers, among whom are Jariol
and Joselito Genson. They not only connived and confederated in the hasty and mass production of such ante-
dated documents, excluding programs of work, but also allowed their names, positions and signatures to be used in
completing the cycle which would lend a semblance of legality or regularity to the questioned transactions and illegal
disbursements and which caused undue injury to the Government in the total amount of P7,005,477.22. Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that their claims and pretensions as to their lack of expertise or means to
determine the validity or nullity of the LAAs and SACDCs in questions have any bases, however, they are still liable
for having acted with gross inexcusable negligence in the performance of their respective duties.[68]

Except for Manuel de Veyra, who was acquitted, all the other accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1341,
which include herein petitioners, were convicted in all the criminal cases they were respectively charged. They were
sentenced in each of the 199 cases to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) Years and One (1) Day as the
minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day as the maximum and to indemnify the Government of the amounts
defrauded in each case.[69]
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were all denied by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution dated April 15, 1991.
Hence, the herein consolidated petitions for review.
Auditor Harvey Ruiz is one of the petitioners together with Edgar Osmea, Guilberto Hermosa and Aniceto
Arriola in G.R. Nos. 99412-99416 and 99436-99636. However, Ruiz had filed a separate petition, entitled Harvey
Ruiz vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. Nos. 98715-98913 which we dismissed in
a Resolution dated June 20, 1991 pursuant to paragraph 3 of Circular 1-88 which took effect on January 1,
1989.[70] Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated August 6, 1991. The
corresponding entry of judgment was made on September 9, 1991. Considering that the decision of the
Sandiganbayan is already final and executory as to Ruiz, his inclusion as one of the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 99412-
99416 and 99436-99636 could no longer be entertained and his name should be deleted from the petitions.
Also, in our Resolution[71] dated September 29, 1994, we dismissed the petition filed by Oscar Belcina in G.R.
Nos. 99309-99318 pursuant to paragraph 3 of Circular No. 1-88.[72] No motion for reconsideration having been filed,
the decision appealed from had already attained finality.
In a Resolution,[73] dated November 16, 1999, the cases against Florito Montecillo (a co-petitioner of Rogelio
Alvizo, Pompeyo Almagro and Catalino Magno, Jr.) in G.R. Nos. 9849498692 were dismissed by reason of his
death on April 17, 1998. The corresponding partial entry of judgment was made insofar as Florito Montecillo is
concerned on March 27, 2000.[74]
The following are the respective contentions of herein petitioners:
In G.R. Nos. 98494-98692

(Criminal Cases Nos. 1153-1159, 1161-1163, 1165, 1170-1171, 1173-1177, 1182, 1187-1188, 1192, 1194-1197,
1200, 1201, 1203-1205, 1215-1218, 1222, 1227, 1230, 1231-1233, 1236, 1238,
1241-1246, 1249, 1253, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1261, 1263-1266, 1272, 1280, 1281,
1284, 1288, 1291-1295, 1301-1302, 1304, 1307, 1319-1324, 1330-1332, 1334 and
1337)

Engineers Rogelio Alvizo, Pompeyo Almagro and Catalino Magno, Jr. assail the decision of the
Sandiganbayan, as follows:

THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE

PETITIONERS TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND, INSTEAD, REVERSED THE PRESUMPTION AND
CONVICTED THE PETITIONERS OF VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW IN SPITE OF THE CONCEDED
FACT THAT PETITIONER-ENGINEERS ACTUALLY PROSECUTED THE ENGINEERING PROJECTS ASSIGNED
TO THEM, THE CONVICTION RESTING NOT ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE BUT
ON RATIOCINATION THRU LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE THAT, WITHOUT THE SUSPICION THAT
OBVIOUSLY SWAYED THE JUDGMENT, SHOULD HAVE INEVITABLY, AS SHOWN BY UNDEBATABLE
PREMISES, RESULTED IN A FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CO-AUTHORS OF
THE CRIMES IMPUTED TO THEM BUT THEY WERE MADE THE UNWITTING TOOLS OF THE CRIMINAL
MINDS THAT PLANNED AND EXECUTED THE DEFRAUDATION OF THE GOVERNMENT. [75]

In G.R. Nos. 99006-99020

(Criminal Cases Nos. 1202-1207, 1230, 1231, 1250-1259)

Joselito Genson, private contractor/supplier of materials, raises the following errors:

I THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING
EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED JOSELITO GENSON.
II THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE CONVICTED ACCUSED DESPITE FAILURE OF
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UTTERLY
FAILING TO ANALYZE AND EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH DO NOT
CONTAIN ANY INCULPATORY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER AGAINST PETITIONER.
IV THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVER-LOOKING
RELEVANT AND UNREBUTTED FACTS TESTIFIED TO BY ACCUSED/PETITIONER WHICH
JUSTIFIES HIS ACQUITTAL.
V THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER BASED UPON THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT AND
OVERCOME PETITIONERS PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE (SEC. 14, SUB-PAR. [2], ART. III, BILL
OF RIGHTS, 1987 CONSTITUTION).
VI THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN ORDER
TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF PETITIONER (SEC. 2, RULE 133, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT)[76]
In G.R. Nos. 99059-99259

(Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1153, 1155-1159, 1197-1201, 1242-1249, 1261-1266, 1270-1281, 1285-1288, 1290-
1306 and 1309-1318)

District Auditor Efren Coyoca alleges the following errors:

I

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN ENTERTAINING THE CASES.

II

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER TO HAVE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-
ACCUSED.

III

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FUND RELEASES, EXPENDITURES AND
DISBURSEMENTS WERE WITHOUT BUDGETARY ALLOCATION.

IV

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FAULTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE EXCLUSIVE ACT OF THE
REGIONAL ACCOUNTANT IN CHARGING OF EXPENDITURES AND DISBURSEMENTS TO PRIOR YEAR
OBLIGATION WITH ACCOUNT SYMBOL 81-400.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF SPLITTING OF VOUCHERS, ETC., IN THESE
CASES AND IN CONSIDERING THE SAME TO BE ILLEGAL.
 VI

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[77]

In G.R. Nos. 99412-99416 and 99436-99636

(Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1163, 1165-1167, 1169-1177, 1180-1181, 1184, 1190-1191, 1193-1194, 1196, 1198-
1200, 1208-1214, 1217, 1221-1224, 1226-1229, 1233, 1236-1237, 1239-1240, 1245,
1253, 1255-1260, 1262-1263, 1265-1272, 1277, 1281-1285, 1288-1289, 1291-1299,
1301, 1306, 1311, 1315, 1317-1323, 1325-1336, 1338, 1339-1341)

District Auditor Edgar Osmea, and Auditing Aides Guilberto Hermosa and Aniceto Arriola raise the following
issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THESE CASES WERE VALIDLY FILED.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE PARTIES TO THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS ARE
CONCERNED WAS SUPPORTED BY ESTABLISHED FACTS AND LAW OF THE CASES.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

RENDERING ITS SUBJECT DECISION.[78]

In G.R. Nos. 99417-99421

(Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1341)
Property Custodian Santos Cabusas and District Accountant Sofronio Mag-uyon anchor their petition on the
following grounds:

1. THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS MAY HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED.

2. THE DECISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN CONVICTING HEREIN PETITIONERS IS NOT

SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL. THUS, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[79]

In G.R. Nos. 99887-100084

(Criminal Cases Nos. 1143-1341 except 1289)
Assistant District Engineer Rafael B. Rabaya, Jr., and Material Testing Supervisor Nestor Rabaya assign the
following errors:

I. THE CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN IN DENYING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE

OF THE PETITIONERS IS A FINDING GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR
CONJECTURES AND THE INFERENCES MADE BY IT ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR
IMPOSSIBLE.
II. THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN IN
GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EXPLANATION BY THE PETITIONERS THAT THERE WERE IN FACT DELIVERIES OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS AND THE PROJECTS PAID FOR AS REFLECTED IN THE GENERAL VOUCHERS IN EACH OF
THE 199 CASES WERE IN TRUTH AND IN FACT UNDERTAKEN AND WERE IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME AN
OCULAR INSPECTION WAS MADE BY MEMBERS OF THE NBI INVESTIGATING TEAM AND THAT THE LAAs
FUNDING THEM WERE VALID.

III. THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE SANDIGAN-BAYAN IS BASED ON

GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.

IV. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GAVE WEIGHT TO THE PLEAS
OF GUILTY OF SOME OF THE CO-ACCUSED IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CASES AND CONSIDERED SAID
PLEAS OF GUILTY AS COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE ABOVE-NAMED PETITIONERS.[80]

The common issues raised by petitioners may be summarized as follows:

(a) Whether the evidence of the prosecution has sufficiently proven that the offense charged was committed.
(b) Whether the prosecution has duly established conspiracy among the petitioners in the commission of the
crimes charged.
Before delving into the merits of these cases, we shall first discuss the preliminary matters put in issue.
Petitioners Cabusas and Mag-uyon argue that their right to due process had been impaired due to the
following: (a) adverse publicity about the Central Visayas highway anomalies in the tri-media; (b) they were not able
to fully exercise their basic right to confront witnesses against them by reason of poverty because attendance in
hearing which were held in Manila entailed a lot of expenses for transportation and lodging and they were not
represented by counsel of their choice; (c) the respondent court had probably made a pre-judgment of their cases
since it also previously heard the other criminal cases filed against officials and employees of the other districts.
Said arguments deserve scant consideration.
These cases were filed in 1978 while the hearing started only in June 1984. Hence any alleged adverse
publicity in 1978 had already waned or ceased by 1984. Petitioners Mag-uyon and Cabusas have no basis in
claiming that they have been denied due process since the records show that they were given ample opportunity to
present their cases and to cross-examine the witnesses.
The Sandiganbayan has, in fact, decided these cases on the basis of the documentary and the testimonial
evidence presented by the prosecution in these cases. Aware of the possible concern of the accused, respondent
court declared:

Considering that there are other similar cases pending trial before the First and Third Divisions of this Court,
resolution of the instant charges shall be confined only to such evidence which have been presented in the cases at
bar, despite the similarity of the legal and factual issues involved in all of these cases.[81]

Petitioners Auditors, Efren Coyoca and Edgar Osmena; and Auditing Aides, Aniceto Arriola and Guilberto
Hermosa, complain that the Informations against them were filed without the preliminary investigations conducted by
the Tanodbayan as mandated by PD 1630; and that the Informations were filed by Atty. Meliton R. Reyes who had
no authority because he was not from the Tanodbayan but the Chief of the Administrative Services of the Bureau of
Treasury.
Said claim is without merit.
Under Section 17 of PD 1630, while it is the Office of the Tanodbayan which has the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigations of all cases and to file the corresponding Informations, cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, the Tanodbayan, with the approval of the President, may utilize, designate or deputize any lawyer
in the government to act as special prosecutor to assist him in the investigation of said cases. As stated by
petitioners in their respective petitions, the conduct of the investigation was made by the composite team whose
finding and resolution to file Information was approved by the Tanodbayan. Hence, the designation of Atty. Meliton
Reyes as Investigating Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan was valid.
 Moreover, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or
render it defective.[82] The question of whether or not a preliminary investigation has been properly conducted should
be raised prior to arraignment.[83] It can not be invoked for the first time at the appellate level.[84] Besides, the posting
of bail made by petitioners expressly waived any irregularity in the preliminary investigation.[85] The Sandiganbayan
had rendered, after trial on the merits, a judgment of conviction. It is too late in the day for petitioners to make an
issue of their right to a preliminary investigation.
We now proceed to resolve the issue whether the evidence of the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime charged was committed by petitioners.
The petitioners question the conclusions of the Sandiganbayan insofar as its appreciation of the facts is
concerned.
Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are binding upon the Court. However, this general rule is
subject to some exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based and 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganayan are premised on the
absence of evidence on record.[86]
Petitioners claim that these cases are exceptions to the general rule because the findings of Sandiganbayan
are contrary to the established facts and based on speculations, surmises or conjectures and the inferences made
by it are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible.
We are not persuaded.
The scheme to defraud the government started with the issuance of 18 fake LAAs and 8 SACDCs to Cebu
2nd HED which were admittedly signed by Regional Accountant Rolando Mangubat.
The evidence for the prosecution had clearly established the existence of these fake LAAs and SACDCs which
became the bases of the subject 199 general vouchers and checks issued to contractors/suppliers in payment for
the alleged deliveries of materials in the different project sites. Prosecution witnesses Ruth Paredes and Felicitas
Ona, both COA Auditors who were tasked to investigate the issuances of these fake LAAs and SACDCs, had clearly
identified the badges of fraud in the issuances of these fake LAAs which were released to Cebu 2nd HED. It was
established among others that while the regular LAAs were recorded in the logbook maintained by the Regional
Office, the fake LAAs and SACDCs following their issuances were not entered in the logbook. The entry in the
logbook is an important safeguard against fraud; thus, the failure to enter the LAAs and SACDCs in the logbook
necessarily indicates irregularity and fraud.
The COA findings were corroborated by no less than prosecution witness Delia Preagido, an accused-turned-
state witness, who had a first hand knowledge of how such falsification was done, testifying as follows:
Q - What were the other occasions wherein Mr. Rolando Mangubat requested you to remain after office
hours?
A - In the first week of February 1977, he told me to remain after office hours and to discuss important
matters.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Where were you?
WITNESS
A - In the office.
Q - What time was it?
A - About 4:30.
Q - And did you comply with the request of Mr. Rolando Mangubat?
A - Yes sir.
Q - Now, what happened when you remained after office hours?
A - He told me to pack up my things and that we will go to the Town and Country Restaurant.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - And did you go to the Town and Country Restaurant?
WITNESS
A - Yes sir.
Q - Now, what time did you go to the Town and Country Restaurant?
A - After office hours.
Q - Could you recall the exact time?
A - After 5:00 oclock.
Q - Now, at the Town and Country Restaurant, will you kindly tell us what happened?
A - He discussed about the letter of advice of allotment and he told me that we can get big money out of
simulated letter of advice of allotment.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
(To the witness)
Q - How many were you then?
WITNESS
A - Only two, Your Honor.
Q - You and Mangubat only?
A - Yes, Your Honor.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Aside from your being superior officer, is there any other relationship that you have with Rolando
Mangubat at that time?
A - I am next in rank, and we are close friends.
Q - In what way are you close friends with each other?
A - He tells me his personal and office problems; his No. 2, he told me.
Q - Now, what was your reaction to the things that were told to you by Rolando Mangubat regarding these
allotments?
A - I told him, how can we get money out of fake letters of advice of allotments?
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - And what did Rolando Mangubat tell you?
WITNESS
A - Mr. Mangubat told me that by selling the fake LAAs we can get big money.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - And to whom will these fake LAAs be sold?
WITNESS
A - To the different contractors, the District Accountant, the District Engineer and the Assistant District
Engineer.
Q - Now, on these occasions, did Mangubat tell you how the fake LAAs would be affected (sic)?
ATTY. DE SANTOS
Objection. Asking for hearsay evidence.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May answer.
WITNESS
A - Yes sir.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - How.
WITNESS
A - If we will sell the LAAs to the contractors or to the district engineers, we can get big amount of money
and we can receive the proceeds of the fake LAAs.
ATTY. DE SANTOS
I move to strike out the answer for being hearsay and hypothetical.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May remain.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Now, were you informed on that occasion who will be the persons involved in this scheme that was
mentioned to you by Rolando Mangubat?
WITNESS
A - In the regional office, I told him that there is difficulty to sell fake LAAs because it can be easily
discovered by Mrs. Angelina Escao. But he told me that Mrs. Angelina Escao is a part of the
arrangement.
ATTY. DE SANTOS
I move to strike out the answer for being hearsay.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May remain.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - What else?
WITNESS
A - And the big boos(sic) already knows about it.
Q - Now, who is this big boss that you mentioned?
ATTY. DE SANTOS
Asking for strictly hearsay evidence.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May answer.
WITNESS
A - He told me the regional director, the assistant regional director and other high ranking officers in the
central office.[87]
...
Q - Now, what else was discussed inside the Town and Country Restaurant between you and Rolando
Mangubat?
WITNESS
A - Mr. Rolando Mangubat and I discussed about the percentage of the selling of the LAAs.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Percentage of whom?
WITNESS
A - From the contractors and from the district engineers.
We discussed about the LAAs and I told him that even if the arrangement is between the regional office
only it is easily discovered by the central office people because of our report of checks issued and
cancelled, and he told me not to worry because the officers or the people in the central office are part
of the conspiracy.
ATTY. JIMENEZ
Central office? Hearsay.
ATTY. DE SANTOS
We joined the objection of counsel.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
Part of her testimony.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - What did you discuss about?
WITNESS
A - About the percentage of the LAAs 26 per cent of the fake LAA.
Q - What is this 26 per cent?
A - The contractors or the district engineers concerned will give us 26 percent like for example P5,000.00,
26% of the P5,000.00 is our percentage, and 20% goes to the central office and 6% to the signatories
of the fake LAA; the 20% we divide, of the 20% goes to the regional office and goes to the central
office people.
Q - Now, Mrs. Preagido, will you kindly tell us why your superior officer, Rolando Mangubat, discussed to
you these things that you have mentioned about the fake LAAs and the selling of these fake LAAs to
contractors?
ATTY. DE SANTOS
We object to her previous answer for being hearsay.
ATTY. BAUTISTA
Objection to the question. Calling for opinion.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May answer.
WITNESS
A - Being an intimate friend of Mr. Rolando Mangubat and I am the one who makes the trial balance for the
entire region and for the posting of the journal entries to the journal voucher.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - And what would be the significance of this duty that you mentioned to the fake LAAs and the selling
thereof?
ATTY. DE SANTOS
Asking for an opinion.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May answer.
WITNESS -
A - For the journal voucher, there is a regulation in the journal to be posted in the general journal and from
the general journal to the general ledger, then the preparation of the trial balance.
PROS. GUERRERO -
Q - The discussion that you had with Rolando Mangubat at the Town and Country Restaurant, was that the
first time that Rolando Mangubat ever discussed out this fake LAA and the selling of the same to the
contractors?
WITNESS -
A - Yes sir.
JUSTICE BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO
(To the witness)
Q - Were the people in the central office allegedly involved, were the names mentioned to you?
WITNESS
A - Mr. Rolando Mangubat mentioned their names during our conversation, Your Honor.
Q - And who are they?
A - Mrs. Leonila del Rosario; Mrs. Engracia Escobar, our chief accountant; and Mr. Abelardo Cardona, our
assistant chief accountant; Mr. Leonardo Tordecilla, our supervising accountant; and Mr.
Pagdanganan, our budget officer.
Q - All of the central office?
A - Yes sir. Yes, Your Honor.
PROS. GUERRERO -
Q - What did you tell Mr. Rolando Mangubat when you were told about this scheme of faking LAAs and
selling these to the contractors?
WITNESS
A - I said, how can that be possible when there are some officers who can easily discover.
Q - And what was his reply?
A - He answered not to worry because they are part of the conspiracy.
Q - Why did you tell Rolando Mangubat the possibility that these fake LAAs will be detected?
A - Because of our reports. It can be easily detected in our reports especially in the list of checks issued
and cancelled. All checks issued in the district will be signed, all checks issued and cancelled.
Q - Now, on that occasion, did Rolando Mangubat tell you to join them in the fraudulent scheme?
ATTY. DE SANTOS -
Leading.
PRESIDING JUSTICE -
May answer.
WITNESS -
A - Yes sir.
PROS. GUERRERO -
Q - And what did you tell Rolando Mangubat when you were invited to join them?
ATTY. DE SANTOS -
Objection. Asking for hearsay evidence.
PRESIDING JUSTICE
May answer.
WITNESS -
A - I told Mr. Rolando Mangubat, if the conspiracy is not only for the regional office by including the central
office, I will consent to be part of the conspiracy.
...
PROS. GUERRERO -
Q - Now, you mentioned also of Jose Sayson, an employee of Region 7, as being involved in this
conspiracy that you discussed with Rolando Mangubat. Now, my question is, on that occasion when
Rolando Mangubat discussed with you these fake LAAs and the selling thereof to contractors, do you
recall having met Jose Sayson?
WITNESS
A - Yes sir.
Q - Where did you meet him, Jose Sayson?
A - In the Town and Country Restaurant.
Q - How many days after that meeting with Rolando Mangubat?
A - After a few minutes on that day.
Q - How did you meet him?
A - Mr. Rolando Mangubat called by phone. After two minutes, he joined our table with Edgardo Cruz,
Accountant I of Region 7.
Q - With your office?
A - Yes sir.
Q - In the accounting division?
A - Yes sir.
Q - What is the position of Jose Sayson?
A - Budget Examiner II, Ministry of Public Highways, under Angelina Escao.
Q - What happened when these Jose Sayson and Edgardo Cruz joined your table inside the Town and
Country Restaurant?
ATTY. DE SANTOS -
Objection. Nothing was said by this witness regarding Edgardo Cruz.
PROS. GUERRERO -
Q - Who arrived after making that phone call?
WITNESS -
A - Mr. Edgardo Cruz and Mr. Jose Sayson.
Q - What happened?
A - They joined our table.
Q - And what was discussed?
A - At that time, I knew that Mr. Edgardo Cruz and Mr. Jose Sayson will be ones to do the selling of fake
LAAs.
Q - Who brought up the proposition when the two arrived?
A - Mr. Rolando Mangubat.
Q - What did he say?
A - He told to us, Mr. Jose Sayson and Mr. Edgardo Cruz will be the ones to take charge of negotiating and
selling the fake LAAs.
Q - What was the reply of Cruz?
A - They answered, yes.
Q - I am only asking you about Cruz.
A - Mr. Cruz answered yes.
Q - How about Sayson?
A - He said also, yes.
Q - And then?
A - Mr. Mangubat told us that Mr. Sayson and Mr. Cruz are the ones who typed the fake LAAs, or
sometimes by me.
Q - You said, are the ones. Why, was there anything typewritten already?
A - The amount of fake LAAs because we have only the forms.
Q - Now, what else what discussed in that meeting? What was the reply of how about you, what was your
reply?
A - I told Mr. Mangubat that if I have no work, I will type.
Q - How about Jose Sayson?
A - He said, yes.
Q - How about Edgardo Cruz?
A - Yes.
Q - What happened after you agreed?
A - We started to make the LAAs.
Q - About that meeting, nothing more?
A - Nothing more.
Q - You separated already?
A - But Edgardo Cruz, Jose Sayson and Mr. Mangubat stayed in the Town and Country Restaurant and I
went home.
Q - After that meeting, what happened?
A - We started typing the fake LAAs.
Q - You said, we. Who were your companions?
A - Mr. Jose Sayson and Edgardo Cruz.
 Q - Now, how many documents did you prepare in connection with these allotments that were discussed
between you and Mr. Rolando Mangubat?
ATTY. DE SANTOS -
Objection. Leading.
PRESIDING JUSTICE -
May answer.
WITNESS -
A - I cannot remember because we typed in bunch, not individually.[88]
...
Q - But aside from you, just to be clear, aside from you, Edgardo Cruz and Jose Sayson, nobody else
typed the fake LAAs.
A - Nobody else, Your Honor.
Q - How can you be sure about that?
A - Our agreement with Mr. Mangubat was that we will be the ones who will type the fake LAAs, the three
of us, Your Honor.
Q - You do not know if Mangubat also made arrangements with others?
A - He told me that only three of us, Your Honor.[89]
...
JUSTICE B. GUERRERO -
(To the witness)
Q - What happened to these fake LAAs and fake CDCs after Mangubat signed them?
WITNESS -
A - The Regional Director, or the Assistant Regional Director, or the District Highways Engineer
countersigned them for approval.
Q - Who were these people that you mentioned? What are their names?
A - Mr. Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez and Jose Bagasao, Your Honor.
Q - Why do you know that they signed these documents?
A - I am familiar with their signatures. Besides, I saw Mr. Bagasao signed (sic) in his office.
PROS. GUERRERO -
Q - Now, you mentioned that these fake LAAs and fake CDCs were released to the district. After they were
duly signed, what happened to the fake LAAs and fake SACDCs?
WITNESS -
A - Mr. Edgardo Cruz and Mr. Jose Sayson started selling them to the different contractors.[90]
The plea of guilty[91] entered by accused Regional Accountant Rolando Mangubat as the author of such fraud
and the signatory of all the fake LAAs and SACDCs, in effect, confirms the testimony of Delia Preagido on the falsity
of the LAAs.
We find it significant to mention that we have already affirmed the conviction of Mangubat by the
Sandiganbayan in the other ghost project anomalies involving the same scheme as in this case, which was
committed in the other engineering districts of the MPH-Region VII in 1977 and 1978, to wit: the Danao City
Highway Engineering District[92] and the Tagbilaran City Engineering Office.[93]
 Pursuant to the 18 LAAs and 8 SACDCs addressed to Cebu 2 nd HED, purportedly issued by Region VII, it
appears that the Cebu 2nd HED had prepared the necessary papers for the procurements of supplies and
materials. Evidence shows that initially, the Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIVs) and the Requests for Allotments
(ROAs) were both prepared by petitioner Property Custodian Santos Cabusas upon instructions of the project
engineer.[94] These RIVs[95] and ROAs[96] show that they were signed by the requisitioning officer, herein petitioner
Assistant District Engineer Rafael Rabaya Jr., or by any one of his co-petitioners Project Engineers, namely: Rogelio
Alvizo, Pompeyo Almagro, Catalino Magno, Jr., and co-accused Florito Montecillo. After having been certified as to
the availability of funds by petitioner District Accountant Sofronio Mag-uyon,[97] the RIVs and the ROAs were
approved by the District Engineer Jose Genson or Domingo Rayos.[98]
Evidence clearly show that during approximately the same period of time, separate RIVs[99] and ROAs[100] were
prepared for the same project involving the same materials and requested by the same requistioner. Thus, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, there was indeed a splitting of requisition which is not allowed under COA
Circular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976.
Based on the abstracts of proposals,[101] various contractors/suppliers whose names appeared therein
purportedly submitted their bids which were opened on the specified date by the Committee on Bidding, witnessed
and signed by petitioner Aniceto Arriola or petitioner Guilberto Hermosa or co-accused Graciano Navales or co-
accused-turned-state witness Fe delos Reyes as COA representative and by petitioner Property Custodian
Cabusas. In the same abstract, the award was given to the lowest bidder signed by three members of the
Committee on Award, composed of Administrative Officer Vicente C. Licen, petitioner Assistant District Engineer
Rafael Rabaya, Jr. and petitioner District Engineer Jose Genson or District Engineer Domingo Rayos.[102]
Purchase orders for the materials needed addressed to the winning contractor/supplier were either signed by
the requisitioning officer, petitioner Assistant District Engineer Rafael Rabaya, Jr. or the other petitioners Project
Engineers, Property Custodian Cabusas and the District Engineer.[103] The tally sheets based on the delivery
receipts of materials were signed by a Property Inspector from COA, herein petitioners Arriola, Hermosa, Navales or
delos Reyes or one of the Project Engineers, petitioners Alvizo, Magno, Jr. or Almagro.[104] The reports of inspection
were signed by a COA inspector, petitioners Arriola, Hermosa, Navales or delos Reyes, with the concurrence of
petitioner Property Custodian Cabusas and approved by the Auditor concerned, petitioners Efren Coyoca or Edgar
Osmea.[105] The worksheets for mechanical analysis that samples of materials delivered were tested for conformity
with the specifications were signed by the Material Testing Supervisor petitioner Nestor Rabaya or Rogelio
Alvizo.[106]
It is established by prosecution witness COA Examiner Fe delos Reyes, an accused-turned-state witness, who
was one of the inspectors assigned to inspect deliveries on the project sites, that no actual deliveries were made
when she made the inspections on the specified date. She testified that on the two separate days that she went to
the job sites where the deliveries were to have been made, she found none; that she called the attention of the
Auditor, petitioner Efren Coyoca regarding the non-delivery but he told her to sign the tally sheets and inspection
reports even without actual deliveries and assured her that he will be responsible if something went wrong. She did
not go to the jobsite after her first and second inspections because petitioner Auditor Coyoca told her to just sign the
tally sheets and there was no need to go to the site since there would be no delivery at all. Petitioner Auditor Coyoca
was replaced by petitioner Auditor Edgar Osmea and later by petitioner Auditor Harvey Ruiz. Delos Reyes brought
the matter of non-delivery to the attention of these replacement Auditors who just told her to continue with what had
been the practice.
The Sandiganbayan found no actual deliveries of materials and aptly made the following disquisition:

With respect to the issue as to whether there was actual compliance and deliveries made by the accused-
contractors herein, the Court must necessarily adjudge that there was no such compliance or deliveries and that the
execution and preparation of the supposed DRs, Summaries of Deliveries (Tally Sheets), and Reports of Inspection,
together with the Reports of Analysis of the materials, were all manufactured en masse and ante-dated to give some
semblance of justification for the questioned transactions. Even if it will be admitted, for the sake of argument, that
there were projects during 1977 within the Cebu 2ndHED involving re-gravelling and asphalting and that there were
deliveries made on such projects, the Court concludes that these were in connection with the regular maintenance
projects and not, as claimed by the defense, part of routine, periodic, or progressive maintenance or for
rehabilitation, betterment or improvement. Considering the allotments released to the Cebu 2nd HED for regular
maintenance in 1977, and there being no showing at all that dire calamities, such as typhoons and earthquakes, had
occurred over Cebu province during said year which would have necessitated or required additional allotments, then
the defense theory to that effect must be rejected. Such a theory appears to be a desperate and last minute
concoction by the accused which they seek to impose on the Court in the total absence of any meritorious or valid
defense.

This Courts credulity and powers of imagination would have to be stretched ten-fold to conceive that the seven (7)
accused-contractors could make the deliveries alleged by them within the limited periods appearing in the
supporting papers to the GVs in question, notably, the DRs and the Tally Sheets. The convergence of the dates
when some of these deliveries were alleged to have been made and the monumental, if not stupendous, efforts
required to perform such tasks, together with the inordinate haste with which the alleged inspections were made,
resulting in similarly hasty payments, all these circumstances indicate that no such deliveries were actually made. In
fact, the defense theories put up by the accused who are officials of the Cebu 2nd HED suffer from an intrinsic flaw
or defect, which is, that two of the seven (7) contractors suppliers had admitted non deliveries by pleading guilty in
the cases wherein they were charged. As reflected in the record, accused Gabison and Echavez had withdrawn
their previous pleas of not guilty in all of cases wherein they were charged and, upon re-arraignment, pleaded guilty,
thus, admitting that they had participated in the conspiracy by submitting simulated bids, making fictitious deliveries
and receiving payments for them. Accused Pablo Guinocor, on the other hand, has remained at- large up to this
date while Rufino Nunez had died after having been convicted by final judgment in the Danao 78 and Lapu Lapu 78
cases wherein he was also similarly charged.[107]

Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that actual projects were being prosecuted by the Cebu 2nd HED during the
period from January to December, 1977 and that there were actual deliveries of Items 200 and asphalt made on
such projects, the Court logically assumes that these were in connection with regular maintenance and not for
periodic maintenance, or for rehabilitation, betterment or improvement (RBI) as claimed by the defense. Considering
that, as previously stated, the Cebu 2nd HED had already been issued regular LAAs and SACDCs in the amounts of
P5,737,197.97 and P6,529,063.39 respectively, for the entire year 1977, and there is no showing whatsoever, that,
firstly, such allocations were insufficient; secondly, that extreme emergencies, calamities or force majeure had
actually occurred during said year to justify additional allocations and, thirdly, that the proper request or requests
had been made to the Central Office, MPH, through the Regional Office, then the inevitable conclusions which arise
are that the alleged periodic maintenance or RBI were not actually done but had been prosecuted as part and parcel
of regular maintenance and that such theory had been concocted by the defense to justify the illegal disbursements
made through the 199 GVs. For it defies logic and reason to accept the defense posture that illegally-disbursed and
misappropriated public funds would be actually spent for any project at all. Instead, the co-conspirators would
naturally divide the spoils among themselves rather than look for ways and means to disburse them pursuant to the
generally-accepted accounting and auditing procedures. Such a situation we find to be completely in accord with the
facts and circumstances appearing on the record.

Moreover, attempts by the defense to discredit the testimony of discharged state witness Fe delos Reyes to the
effect that, as Auditing Aide or Examiner, she signed Daily Tally Sheets and Reports of Inspections for supplies and
materials supposedly delivered at the project sites by accused-contractors when there were actually no deliveries or
inspection, do not gain our acceptance or approval. Aside from the fact that delos Reyes testimony appears to be
convincing and credible, the facts testified to by her have been substantiated and/or corroborated by the pleas of
guilty of accused-contractors Gabison and Echavez. If such modus operandi was resorted to with respect to these
two contractors, then there is no reason for its non-application or non-compliance as regards accused-contractors
Joselito Genson and Jariol, Jr. and also Nunez, Guinocor and Abatayo. Again, logic and common sense dictates
that the disbursement of public funds emanating from the fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs and the utilization of
simulated RSEs, POs, Tests Reports, DRs, DTSs, ROIs and GVs would not include or cover the actual deliveries of
supplies and materials since the co-conspirators would not be able to profit therefrom.[108]

Thus, if We are to believe and accept the accused-contractors theories, more particularly those of accused Jariol
and Joselito Genson, with respect to their alleged prosecution of projects in 1977 within the Cebu 2nd HED,
involving P7,005,477.22, We can just imagine the monstrous traffic jams and problems which would have occurred
within the district throughout the year, considering that, at the same time and during the same months, projects
involving regular maintenance worth P5,735,197.97 were on-going. Considering further, that during the same year,
contractors Rufino Nunez, Juliana delos Angeles, Antolin Jariol and Erasmo Gabison were involved in allegedly
similar projects in the Cebu 1st HED, Mandaue City HED, Davao City HED and Lapu-Lapu City HED, then it could
be logically and reasonably concluded that they would have run short of supplies and equipment, such as trucks,
payloaders, bulldozers and rollers, as well as manpower. Furthermore, no attempt whatsoever had been made by
the accused district officials and the accused-contractors to show or prove that there was no overlapping or regular
maintenance projects with the projects in question, there being no showing that the districts records for 1977 are not
available or complete.[109]

The general vouchers were prepared for payment to the contractors/ suppliers concerned, one of whom was
petitioner Joselito Genson. The documents submitted by the contractor to ask for payment and to support the
general vouchers were the RIV, ROA, abstract of bids, PO, delivery receipts, tally sheets, inspection report and the
test report which were all signed by herein petitioners. The general vouchers contain on the face thereof five
certifications signed by the proper officials, to wit: (1) a certification of receipt of supplies accomplished by the
Property Custodian; (2) a certification of correctness, that is, that the expenses are necessary and lawful and that
the prices are just and reasonable and not in excess of current rates in the locality accomplished by the Project
Engineeer; (3) approval by the District Engineer; (4) a certification accomplished by the Accountant, that the GV had
been properly approved, its account codes proper, and that it is supported by the proper documents; (5) a
certification that the GV has undergone pre-audit accomplished by the Auditor.
The general vouchers and the supporting documents attached thereto were processed, pre-audited and
approved for payment by the District Auditor, petitioners Efren Coyoca or Edgar Osmea.[110]
The Sandiganbayan found that there were patent splitting of payments in the general vouchers as shown by the
supporting documents which was in violation of COA Circular No.76-41. One glaring fact which cannot be
overlooked is that all the 199 general vouchers were for amounts less than P50,000.00 even if most of these
vouchers were supported by the same set of documents worth much higher than the said amount. Under COA
Circular No. 76-41, the District Auditor can approve vouchers in amounts not exceeding P50,000.00. All the general
vouchers more than P50,000.00 must have to be pre-audited and approved for payment by the Regional Auditor
instead of the herein petitioner District Auditors. In fact, COA Examiner Ruth Paredes testified that during their
investigation, they found out that the Regional Auditor who routinely receives copy of the LAAs and SACDCs from
the Regional Office, was not furnished copies of the fake LAAs. Paredes explained that this was due to the fact that
the Regional Auditor who received copies of the SAA released by the Central Office to the Regional Office would
disapprove the voucher since he could easily see that the fake LAAs were beyond the SAA issued.
With the approval of the general vouchers, checks were prepared by the Cashier and released to the
supplier/contractor or his representative who then issued the corresponding official receipts. Petitioner contractor
Joselito Genson issued company receipts[111] acknowledging that he had received the checks pursuant to the
subject general vouchers from the Cebu 2nd district.
Fe delos Reyes testified that she had received envelopes containing money for her signatures in the tally
sheets and reports of inspection certifying that deliveries were made but in reality there were none. The first
envelope she received was personally given to her by Engr. Rafael Rabaya, Jr. while the subsequent envelopes
were given by Marcia Maruda, a Clerk from the Cebu 2nd HED. The tally sheets and reports of inspections which
she signed were some of the documents which supported the general vouchers based on the fake LAAs.
It is positively demonstrated by the prosecution evidence that the amounts covered by the subject 199 general
vouchers and checks based on the fake LAAs were not reflected in the trial balances submitted by Region VII to the
Central Office since they were negated through the journal vouchers to cover up the fraud. [112]
As established in Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan,[113] the ghost projects anomalies that beset the different
engineering districts of the MPH-Region VII in 1977 and 1978 was masterminded by a core group of officers and
employees of the Regional Office headed by the Chief Accountant, Rolando Mangubat. The scheme made use of
fake LAAs, SACDCs and supporting documents such as RSEs or RIVs, ROAs, abstracts of bids, purchase orders,
delivery receipts, tally sheets, reports of inspections which had to be accomplished before a check could be issued
and released to the supplier or contractor in payment of the materials purportedly purchased from and delivered by
him.[114]
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners, who were officers and employees of the Cebu 2 nd HED and the COA, to
have perpetuated the crime by signing the general vouchers and the supporting documents. Their convictions were
based upon a finding of conspiracy. The evidence on record shows that such conspiracy existed considering the
issuances of fake LAAs, followed by the irregular preparation, processing and approval of the 199 GVs supported by
simulated supporting documents and the payment to the contractors for ghost projects.
All the foregoing documents were prepared and processed by petitioners Regional and District officials in
connection with the performance of their official functions without which collusion the anomalies charged could not
have been committed.
 Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.The existence of the assent of minds which
is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from
proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole.[115] If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.[116] Thus, the proof of
conspiracy, which is essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others than those directly concerned, is
perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.[117]
All the herein petitioners contend that they had nothing to do with the preparations and issuances of the LAAs
and SACDCs, which turned out to be fake or irregular. While it is true that the fake LAAs and SACDCs originated
from the regional office, the falsity of such allotments would be useless if the district officials and employees did not
consent to its implementation by making it appear that there were valid requisitions, deliveries, inspections,
processing, pre-auditing and approval of the general vouchers and the checks paid to the contractor/supplier.The
individual acts of the petitioners including petitioner contractor Genson pointed to a single criminal intent, one
performing one part of the transaction and the others another part of the same transaction, so as to complete it with
a view to attaining the object which they were pursuing, i.e., to defraud the government.
We will now discuss the respective liabilities of the petitioners.
Petitioners Assistant District Engineer Rafael Rabaya, Jr., Engineer Nestor Rabaya, Material Testing
Supervisor, Project Engineers Rogelio Alvizo, Pompeyo Almagro and Catalino Magno, Jr. were convicted for
signing the RIVs, worksheet for mechanical analysis and tally sheets. The documents they signed were used as the
supporting papers of the general vouchers and the corresponding checks issued for payment to the
contractors/suppliers. The general vouchers were traced to the fake LAAs. Petitioners made it appear that there
were valid requisitions and deliveries of materials, that projects were indeed undertaken. However, the
Sandiganbayan found that although there were deliveries in 1977 in Cebu 2nd HED, these deliveries were in
connection with the regular maintenance projects covered by the regular LAAs and SACDCs and not part of the
routine, periodic or progressive maintenance as claimed by the petitioners which were based on the fake LAAs and
SACDCs; and that no deliveries were made under the fake LAAs and SACDCs since payments to the vouchers
went to the pockets of the co-conspirators.
Liability of Asst. District Engineer Rafael Rabaya, Jr.:
Rafael was the then Assistant District Engineer of the Cebu 2nd HED. He was second in command in the over-
all supervision of the district office which includes the proper implementation of the maintenance, construction and
improvement of the districts national roads and bridges.[118] It was established and unrebutted that the district had
received 33 regular LAAs in 1977 for the regular maintenance of the districts national roads and bridges. It was also
shown that when the district would ask for supplementary allocations outside of the regular allocations given, a
written communication must be made by the District Engineer to the Regional Director who would refer the request
and the copy of the program of work attached thereto to the Central Office for approval. Petitioner Rafael, in his
petition, insists that requests for additional allotments which covered the alleged ghost projects were indeed made
but these requests and the programs of work were all taken by the NBI agents when the latter retrieved documents
from the district office. If these documents really existed, petitioner Rafael could have easily secured a certification
from the Regional Office where the requests were made or from the Central Office where the alleged written
requests and programs of work were supposed to have been forwarded to prove his claim. It is an essential part of
standard operating procedure that these documents have copies for each office where they customarily pass
through. Without such written request accompanied by a program of work, the district had no basis for additional
releases of funds.
Petitioner Rafael had signed so many RIVs as the requisitioning officer and a painstaking review of these RIVs
showed that even if the projects undertaken refer to the same road for the same materials and for almost the same
period of time, there were splitting of RIVs which resulted in separate biddings for each RIV and separate purchase
orders. We find no compelling reason to disregard the finding of the Sandiganbayan that such splitting had been
deliberately resorted to in order to avoid said transactions to be sent to the higher authorities for approval.
Petitioner Rafael was also held liable for affixing his signature in the general vouchers certifying that the
expenses are necessary, lawful and incurred for. His signature signified that the expenses are necessary in the
prosecution of the project and in accordance with the program of work. As admitted in his petition, there is one RIV
for every program of work; but despite the fact that so many RIVs[119] had been issued, petitioner failed to present a
single program of work which would have justified the additional allotments. Moreover, his defense of denial does
not relieve him from the fact that had he exercised due diligence, he would have known the badges of fraud
enumerated by the Sandiganbayan in its decision and refused to be a part of the conspiracy.
We therefore sustain the conviction of petitioner Rafael Rabaya, Jr. in 184 counts.[120]
Rafael was not charged in Criminal Case No. 1232 but the Sandiganbayan convicted him in said case. Thus,
his conviction in said case must be set aside. Further, Rafael was charged and tried in Criminal Cases Nos. 1180
1283 and 1289 but he was neither convicted nor acquitted in the assailed decision of Sandiganbayan. Records of
said cases should be remanded for proper disposition by the Sandiganbayan.
Liability of petitioner Project Engineer Nestor Rabaya:
Petitioner Nestor affixed his signature as material testing supervisor in the laboratory test reports certifying that
he had checked the samples taken from the alleged materials delivered and they passed the required tests. Notably,
the laboratory test reports indicated that samples were taken by a certain Soledad F. Pansacala and Honorio A.
Capa, laboratory technicians, but they were not presented to corroborate his claim that samples were presented to
him and he had checked them. The evidence of the prosecution clearly show that no deliveries were actually made,
thus, Nestor is guilty of affixing his signature in the worksheets for mechanical analysis when in fact there were no
deliveries and no analysis were made by him. He allowed his name and position to complete the process of
defrauding the Government.
Nestor as well as Rafael tried to cast doubt on the testimony of prosecution witness Ruth Paredes, COA
Supervising Auditor, regarding her findings that the subject LAAs and SACDCs were fake or irregular as they could
not be traced from the mother SAA. Petitioners Rabayas argue that why should Paredes insist on tracing the subject
LAAs to the mother SAA when they could be traced to the obligation numbers reflected in the ROA which, they
claim, were taken by the NBI.
We are not convinced.
COA Auditor Ruth Paredes had satisfactorily explained the irregularity of indicating the obligation number in the
fake LAAs, thus:
Q. In these LAAs that you have examined, the obligation number is indicated in the LAAs, these alleged
LAAs.
A. In the LAAs marked Exhs. K-1 to K-18 there are obligation numbers, the obligation numbers are
indicated.
CHAIRMAN ESCAREAL:
Q. Were they correct obligation numbers?
A. No, sir, obligation number should not be indicated because the LAA is the authority to incur
obligationthat means funds are still available for obligation, not that part that it has already been
obligated.
Q. What is wrong in putting the obligation number in these?
A. Because it would appear that funds were already obligated in the past.
Q. So there is no necessity for an LAA?
A. But the CDC if the obligations have been already obligated in the past. [121]
We find no basis for petitioners Rabayas insistence on the regularity of the LAAs. The prosecution had
sufficiently established the falsity of the same. All the LAAs which were regularly issued by the Regional Office were
recorded in their logbook. The fact that the fake LAAs were not recorded conclusively established their falsity.
Petitioners Rabayas further contend that although the total amount released to Cebu 2 nd HED for 1977 through
the 33 LAAs was P5,735,197.97, only the amount of P1,919,385.71 was actually released for the regular
maintenance of the national roads and bridges which amount was inadequate to meet the
total effective maintenance kilometrage (EMK) of 294.54 a year.
We find the argument devoid of merit.
 The 33 regular LAAs issued to Cebu 2nd HED provided also for calamity funds for the repair of the national and
barangay roads hit by typhoons. There were also funds released for the construction, rehabilitation, betterment and
improvement of the other national and barangay roads. These funds were released together with the amount
of P1,919,385.71 for the regular maintenance of the national roads and bridges; thus, the claim of petitioners
Rabayas is misleading. Assuming arguendo that the funds released were inadequate to maintain the national roads,
such deficiency, in the absence of a written request for additional allotment did not give authority to petitioners to
obtain the release of these funds in violation of the standard operating procedure. To reiterate, the LAAs are issued
by the Regional Office based on the SAA from the MPH. The fake LAAs did not have the SAA No. from which the
allotment was based and were not recorded in the logbook of the Regional Office.
The contention of petitioners Rabayas that the court erred in giving evidentiary value to the pleas of guilty of
accused Mangubat, Gabison and Echavez as it violated the hearsay and res inter alios acta rule, is devoid of merit.
The Solicitor General, in the Brief for respondent State, aptly refuted the argument of petitioners, as follows:

In their fourth and last argument, petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving evidentiary value to the
pleas of guilty of Mangubat, Gabison and Echavez, petitioners co-accused. According to petitioners, the admission
or confession of a party may be presented as evidence only against himself pursuant to Sec. 33 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court and under Sec. 26 of the same Rule; that, therefore, admission of the pleas of guilty of Mangubat,
Gabison and Echavez against petitioners violated the hearsay and res inter alios acta rules.

Sections 26 and 33 of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, cited by petitioners, provide as follows:

Section 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.

Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused [expressly] acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
OR OF ANY OFFENSE NECESSARILY INCLUDED THEREIN, may be given in evidence against him.

On the other hand, the rule of res inter alios acta, mentioned by petitioners, is embodied in Section 28 of Rule 130,
Rules of Court states:

Section 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another and proceedings against one cannot affect another, except as hereinafter provided.

However, this aforecited rule allow exceptions one of these being Section 30 on admissions by a co-conspirator, to
wit:

Section 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.

Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan violated the rule of res inter alios acta when said Court made reference
to the pleas of guilty of Mangubat, Gabison and Echavez. It is submitted that this contention is untenable.

Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez were charged together with petitioners for having acted in conspiracy with one
another to commit the offenses. The pleas of guilty of some of the accused are admissions of the truth of the
accusations that they committed acts of falsifications done during the existence of the conspiracy.

The Sandiganbayan merely declared that the pleas of guilty confirmed the issuance and release of fake or simulated
LAAs and SACDCs, the irregular, improper and illegal preparation, execution and processing of the general
vouchers and their supporting documents, and the non-delivery of materials and non-prosecution of ghost
projects. In short, the pleas of guilty were merely confirmatory: they confirmed the facts already established by other
evidence of the prosecution. Said pleas were not used by the Sandiganbayan to convict petitioners for, as
already mentioned, even if the pleas were completely disregarded, the prosecution had already succeeded
in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It could be conceded, as petitioners assert, that the confession, i.e., the pleas of guilty, were not made during the
existence of the conspiracy (Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 30). However, it is submitted that said pleas are
nonetheless admissible against petitioners as co-conspirators because the pleas were made in open court. In other
words, they are judicial confessions. The rule embodied in Sec. 30 that the declaration of a conspirator made
after the termination of the conspiracy is inadmissible against his co-conspirator applies only to an extra-
judicial confession, and not to a plea of guilty, which is a judicial confession. In this very specific instance,
the rule of res inter alios acta does not apply because the confessions embodied in the pleas of guilty are
judicial confessions, not extra-judicial ones.

...

The hearsay rule being put up by petitioners apply only if Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez admission of guilt was
testified to by another person or by means of affidavit. In this case the three co-accused personally confessed their
guilt during arraignment where petitioners were likewise present. If petitioners wanted to dispute the circumstances
surrounding the confession of guilt of Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez, petitioners had the right to present the three
as hostile witnesses during the trial or petitioners could even have presented the three as their own witnesses. And
this fault should not be translated in terms of absence of opportunity to cross-examine the three.

Petitioners invoke the rule on res inter alios acta alleging that the pleas of guilty of the three should have not been
given weight because they were made after the conspiracy had terminated (Petition, p. 29).This is erroneous
because the Sandiganbayan did not convict petitioners on the basis of the pleas of guilty. The Sandiganbayan
merely said that the prosecutions case had been amply supported and strengthened by the pleas of guilty entered
by the three. The pleas of guilty are in themselves evidence that the pleaders committed the acts mentioned in the
Informations. The pleas certainly have corroborative effect on the evidence-in-chief of the prosecution. There is no
rule violated by the Sandiganbayan when it considered the pleas of guilty.

The motive of the three in pleading not guilty is both speculative and insignificant. Petitioners could imagine the
motives of the three for pleading guilty, but the fact remains that the consequence of their pleas is that they admitted
the commission of the crimes charged. Petitioners cannot escape the effects of this admission.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the portion of the Decision referring to the pleas of guilty of
Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez is not the basis for the conviction of petitioners. Even if said portion is
disregarded, the decision is still supported by evidence which proved petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In other words, even if there were no pleas of guilty by Mangubat, Gabison and Echavez, the
prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Assuming that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to consider and refer to the pleas of guilty, this is not reversible
error because after disregarding the pleas of guilty there remains sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, and the substantial rights of petitioners were not, therefore, prejudice by its
admission (See U.S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil. 613, 616 [1908].[122](Emphasis supplied).

We uphold the conviction of petitioner Nestor Rabaya in 184 counts.[123]

Liabilities of Project Engineers Rogelio Alvizo, Catalino Magno, Jr. and Pompeyo Almagro:
Project Engineers Alvizo, Almagro and Magno, Jr. claim that they received the materials delivered in their
respective projects; that they signed the tally sheets certifying receipt of materials after they had checked and
verified the deliveries; that all projects assigned to them were prosecuted in accordance with the program of
work. However, the Sandiganbayan rejected such claim of completion of projects, which we uphold, thus:

And since it goes without saying that the projects in question involved re-gravelling and asphalting wherein the
presence of the maintenance engineers or foremen would be required, as well as laborers to do the spreading and
steam rolling, accused district officials should have presented evidence that the officials and employees concerned
were issued the proper travel orders and either cash advances or reimbursable expense receipts (RERs) in traveling
from the district office to the project sites and in supervising and inspecting the project sites on the dates concerned;
that their Daily Time Records would show their absence from the district office on the dates reflected in the GVs
supporting documents and that the proper payrolls had been prepared for payment of the laborers who worked on
the project. If heavy equipments were utilized in these projects, then the proper travel orders or lease documents
from the Engineering depot concerned would show that such equipment had, indeed, been used in the prosecution
of said projects. None of these have been submitted by the accused concerned.[124]

Petitioner Alvizo testified during his cross-examination that road graders and rollers of the government were
used to spread the base course materials and to compact the same; that the laborers required were the operator of
the road graders, the assistant of the road grade operator and an assistant laborer; and that reports were made for
the use of such equipments but he could no longer recall where the operators submitted their reports.[125] Taking
note of his testimony, Justice Escareal asked petitioner Alvizo, thus:
Q. Mr. Alvizo in 1977 do you still remember how many road rollers and graders were being used by Cebu
Second Engineering District?
A. The project, on road grader and road roller.
Q. In your district, do you remember?
A. We have wide area. I could not count how many were there.
Q. But there will be more than two?
A. I am not very sure.
Q. But at least two are assigned to you.
A. In my project, one.
Q. So there are more than two?
A. Maybe sir.
Q. If there are other projects they will also be entitled to two?
A. If there are
Q. And since you were assigned to several projects then in those projects at least two or more road rollers
and graders were assigned in those projects where you are the project engineer?
A. Sometimes the equipment will be utilized first in the first project and transfer (sic) to the second project.
Q. In other words the road rollers will be used by other project engineers and after you can use them in
your project?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. Following your testimony that Cebu Second Engineering District is quite wide you are referring to the
area south of Cebu City from Talisay up to the tip, Southern tip of Cebu?
A. Yes, that is the area.
Q. On both course of Cebu Island and inland going south?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. If there is a project down south in Cebu down south of Cebu City such as Alcoy, the road roller and
grader will have to travel? In connection with the grader, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then the operator will have to get trip ticket because they could not travel without the trip ticket, is it not.
A. Yes your honor.
Q. You all project engineers should know that? Not only that but the operator has to file daily time record?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. If it exceeds the number of hours, it requires over time?
A. We are not allowed overtime, your honor.
Q. If you work only during the regular hours?
 A. Sometimes we go home late at night but we do not claim overtime.
Q. But the workers stay there until completed? If you make projects in Argao the road rollers, the graders
will not be able to come back in the afternoon?
A. They will stay in the project site.
Q. So there will be a record of the Engineering office of the length of time a road roller and road grader is
stationed in a project.
A. I could no longer recall, your honor.
Q. We are talking about procedure. If a road roller is assigned in Argao will there be a record of the
Engineering Office at the time it left and was issued a trip ticket, the amount of gasoline used in going
there in completing the project and in coming back to Cebu City?
A. Yes your honor.
Q. So unless assigned and the same thing will follow the number of hours it is used in completing the
project, correct?
A. Yes your honor
Q. So if this project was really projected (sic) these cases which are now being tried were really
prosecuted, you just look into the record of the Cebu Engineering District and it supports there the
completing of the project. Is it not?
A. Yes, Your honor.[126]
Yet, Alvizo did not present any record of machine utilization reports nor evidence of workers who performed the
work of spreading the materials to corroborate that work had actually been done. If indeed there were reports, they
should have been readily available. Bare allegations which are not supported by any other evidence, document or
otherwise, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed.
Likewise, petitioner Magno asserted during his cross-examination that the use of the road graders and rollers
for a certain project and a certain date was reflected in the record of the district and that even their office had a
record of the trip tickets of these machines.[127] However, like Alvizo, he also failed to present the records and the
trip tickets to corroborate his defense. Aside from his bare allegation, no competent evidence was adduced to
substantiate his claim. The failure to request for the record gives rise to a presumption that the evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.[128]
Petitioner Almagro testified on cross-examination that he was the requisitioning officer in all the projects he
prosecuted which, however, was belied by the RIVs which were all signed by Assistant District Engineer Rafael
Rabaya, Jr.. If he were not part of the conspiracy he should have easily noticed that something was unusual with the
RIVs considering that they were split[129] even if the projects undertaken refer to the same road and for the same
kind of materials and called the attention of Rabaya. Such conspiracy was shown when he affixed his signatures in
the tally sheets as project engineer certifying receipt of non-existent materials and projects. There would have been
no need to resort to splitting of requisitions and the use of fake LAAs and SACDCs if materials were really delivered
and projects were prosecuted.
The claim of petitioners Engineers Alvizo, Magno, Jr. and Almagro that the supporting documents on which
their signatures appeared were only re-used to validate or give semblance of validity to the fake LAAs and SACDCs
deserves scant consideration. The records disclose that petitioners raised this issue for the first time on appeal. It is
settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court
below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.[130]
We uphold the conviction of petitioner Alvizo only in 25 counts[131] instead of 31 counts; of petitioner Magno, Jr.
in 22 counts[132] instead of 28 counts; and of petitioner Almagro in 24 counts[133] instead of 26 counts. The conviction
of petitioners Alvizo in Criminal Cases Nos. 1203, 1204, 1205, 1230, 1281 and 1288; Magno, Jr. in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1162, 1163, 1215,1217, 1236 and 1238; Almagro in Criminal Case No. 1227, cannot be sustained for the
reason that their signatures do not appear in the general vouchers and its supporting documents.[134]
Moreover, records disclose the following:
 In Criminal Case No. 1241, petitioner Magno, Jr. was neither convicted nor acquitted by the Sandiganbayan in
its assailed decision although he was charged in the Information and duly tried therefor. Records of said case
should be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition thereof insofar as petitioner Magno, Jr. is
concerned.
In Criminal Case No. 1232, petitioner Almagro was convicted by the respondent court although Almagro was
not charged in the Information. Thus, the conviction of Almagro in said case should be set aside.

Liability of petitioner District Accountant Sofronio Mag-uyon:

Petitioner Mag-uyon was held liable by the respondent Sandiganbayan in this wise:

Accused Sofronio Mag-uyons liability, as District Accountant, emanates from his signing GVs, ROAs, RIVs, and
Abstract of Proposals for Furnishing of Supplies, Materials and Equipments which were all irregular and which cover
ghost projects. He also cannot feign ignorance of the fake and/or fictitious nature of the LAAs and SACDCs which
were received by him as chief financial officer of the district and on the basis of which he certified as to availability of
unauthorized funds of allotments in said GVs, ROAs and RSEs.[135]

He was the District Accountant of Cebu 2nd HED since 1973 up to 1981[136] and he had received copies of the
LAAs for the quarterly allotments of the district which made him familiar with the LAAs.
In the regular LAAs for 1977 which petitioner Mag-uyon received, the SAA number from which the LAA was
taken and the date it was issued are indicated in typewritten words. To show where they were derived from, the SAA
number is specified in the regular LAAs. On the other hand, the fake LAAs, although signed by Regional Accountant
Rolando Mangubat who was also authorized to sign the LAAs and SACDCs in the absence of the finance officer,
have no SAA Number. Instead, the fake LAAs were charged to account 81-400 (prior years obligations) which was
not a normal procedure and should have put Mag-uyon on guard. These fake LAAs were supposed to be issued for
current allotments so that they should not refer to prior obligation numbers. Supervising COA Auditor Felicitas Ona,
a member of the Performance Audit team, who investigated the anomaly, testified, during her cross-examination, on
such anomalous practice:
Q - Now, lets go to Exhibit K-3. This is a letter of advice of allotment for a total sum of P350,000.00[137]
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - Again, will you please enlighten this Honorable Court what these entries mean, this 101-7?
A - 101 is the fund, 7 is the month, 292 is the number of ROA issued for the year 1975.
Q - Again, these were requested for obligation of funds made in 75 but as per letter of advice of allotment,
they were being done for the year 1977 as per Exhibit K-3, is it not?
Q - I am driving at this. These were the funds that were appropriated in 75 but these funds were obligated
and actually spent for 1977?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - Is that allowable?
A - No, Sir.
Q - Why?
A - In fact, this is really questionable because, Sir, an allotment is an authority to obligate. So much so now
that if the region had already obligated this in 1975, they dont need an allotment to be issued to the
district because all that they need is the CDC to pay this obligation. Because, they are an authority to
obligate.
Q - Now, if an LAA such as K-3 which was received by the district and which you claim cannot be done or
should not be done
A - Not regularly done.
 Q - Because it is irregular, what should the district do upon receipt of such LAA?
A - I will question If I am the district, I will question the region why are you giving me this fund when it is
obligated, how will I spend the money. You have already obligated, so I cannot spend it. [138]
All the regular LAAs bore the rubber stamps of the Accounting Division of Region VII indicating the date when
they were released and the signature of the person who released the same which the fake LAAs did not have. The
appropriation law which authorized such expenditure was indicated in the regular LAAs but it was not so indicated in
the fake LAAs.
All regular LAAs were dated while five fake LAAs were undated. COA Auditor Paredes explained during her
cross-examination that the LAA must be dated because under budgetary regulations, the funds intended for a
particular quarter becomes self-executory only at the beginning of that quarter; and that the LAA has to be dated to
indicate when it is supposed to take effect because obligation which may not be incurred in the particular quarter is
chargeable against the allotments of subsequent quarters.[139] Thus, in the absence of the date in the fake LAA,
Mag-uyon would not know when it is to take effect and to what period of obligation it should be applied.
These were patent irregularities on the faces of the LAAs which Mag-uyon could not have failed to see but still,
he affixed his signature on the RIV and ROA certifying to the availability of funds.
Notably, petitioner Mag-uyon had approved 199 general vouchers which were all for amounts less
than P50,000.00. Looking at the RIVs where Mag-uyons signatures appeared certifying Ok as to funds, and the POs
supporting the general vouchers, he should have easily noticed that the items requisitioned were actually worth
more than P50,000.00, thus unmistakably signifying that Mag-uyon had knowingly and deliberately participated in
the splitting of the accounts.
The splitting of accounts is very glaring to be ignored. The number of transactions in which petitioner is involved
prevent a reasonable mind from accepting the proposition that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the
performance of his functions.[140] His signatures on the general vouchers, as the District Accountant, certifying to the
availability of funds, were an indispensable link to the accomplishment of the fraud. We entertain no doubt that Mag-
uyons participation in the conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the fact that several of these vouchers were made in payment for the same kind of materials to be
delivered to the same project and payable to the same suppliers could not have escaped his attention and alerted
him of the anomalies in said transactions.
Mag-uyon contends that he could not be considered a conspirator because he entered all the funds received by
the district from the Regional Office as well as all the disbursements of the district in the cost ledger sheet which he
submitted to the Region. We are not convinced. It has been established that there was conspiracy among the district
and regional officials and employees thus, Mag-uyon had to record all the transactions done in the district to enable
his co-conspirators in the region, who received the cost ledger sheet, to manipulate the books of accounts. Such
manipulation was done by taking out the transactions covered by the fake LAAs through negation of entries in the
journal voucher, thus, the checks issued and paid, based on the fake LAAs would no longer be reflected in the trial
balance submitted by the Regional Office to the Central Office.

Liability of petitioner Property Custodian Santos Cabusas:

Property Custodian Cabusas was held liable for affixing his signatures in the 199 GVs and in the Reports of
Inspection certifying receipt of materials requisitioned and in the Abstracts of Proposals for furnishing supplies,
materials and equipments which were all irregular and covered ghost projects. He was the one who prepared all the
RIVs and the purchase orders to the winning suppliers of the materials needed for the alleged projects.
Prosecution evidence showed that there were many RIVs issued for the same project with the same materials
and for almost the same period of time and made by the same requisitioner. It boggles our mind why as property
custodian, Cabusas had not been suspicious of the fact that he was asked by Assistant District Engineer Rabaya,
Jr. or by the project engineers to prepare separate RIVs and separate notices of public biddings and purchase
orders for the same projects and materials. He was also the one who prepared the general vouchers, where a
number of these general vouchers were supported by the same RIV, PO and other documents. In fact, the
Sandiganbayan took notice of the circumstances and propounded questions to Cabusas as follows:
JUSTICE DEL ROSARIO:
 Q - You said that before you signed vouchers you scrutinize the delivery receipts and tally sheets and
other documents that are necessary and since you find out that there is nothing wrong you approve
and sign the voucher?
A - Yes, your honor
Q - What bothers the Court, if there were only one or a few vouchers it will be all right but did it not ever
arouse your suspicion that there might be something wrong due to the unusual volume of materials
purchased and number of vouchers being prepared a number, the similar identities of suppliers and
contractors, did it never occur to you to suggest that instead of so many vouchers and purchase
orders you prepare why not lump sum them all in one voucher?
A - No sir.
Q - Why?
A - Because I am only the Property Custodian. I only do what I am told to do.
JUSTICE DEL ROSARIO:
Q - But you are the one in charge of preparing purchase order?
A - Yes sir.
Q - And since that involved a lot of repeated work for you for the purchase of materials for the same project
involving the same suppliers, it is unusual that you would not even think of suggesting to put only all in
one voucher or one specific purchase order?
A - Mine is not to question them because I only perform my duty.
Q - All right, you said you merely depend on delivery receipts and tally sheet. Since you are the property
custodian would you ever try to verify on your own in these delivery receipts or tally sheets were being
correct or accurate say by making an inspection on you own?
A - I make inspections but very seldom because of the very nature of my duty as property custodian
requires that I stay more in office because I have also to take the needs of the project, project
engineers. I have to take care of the issuance of gasoline and equipments so I am tied mostly.
Q - Did it not occur to you that just to make sure that these vouchers that what you are signing is regular
and proper to go out on your own and find out? It did not even occur to you?
A - I go out but not often. Very seldom so that I have to rely on them because I do not have reason to
doubt the honesty and integrity of the project engineers and the COA representatives.
JUSTICE DEL ROSARIO:
Q - Despite the numerous vouchers and orders?
A - They certify to the inspection and receipts.
Q - In going over the delivery receipts did you ever notice that problem the same trucks made several trips
a day which may not have been physically possible?
A - My checking is the mathematical computation. I am not concerned with the quantity, the total number of
cubic meter that is being delivered and recommended for payments.
Q - So you did not go deep enough?
A - No, I did not, Your Honor.[141]
Petitioner Cabusas could not simply say that he signed the documents as mandated by the nature of his
functions pursuant to the standard operating procedure. His signature in the 199 general vouchers certifying that he
received the supplies and materials served as a vital link to perpetuate such anomaly. As Property Custodian, he
discharges a very sensitive function in the work of the Ministry of Public Highways, even in such areas that may be
said to be routine. It is of no defense therefore to say that since there were engineers to inspect and supervise the
projects as well as the materials requisitioned therefore, he need not have intervened therein. Otherwise, he would
have allowed unbridled fraud in the office itself, an eventuality against which he, as property custodian, had been
precisely designated to install safeguards.[142] As such Property Custodian, the petitioner is the first person to
determine whether or not supplies (not only for specific programs but for perfunctory projects as well) are properly
delivered based on the specifications. The fact that the orders therefore had previously passed through the higher-
ups and had merited their sanction does not deprive him of the right, nay his bounden duty, to ascertain the
correctness of such orders, that is to say, whether or not they conform to the said specifications. Indeed, had he
performed this duty he would have discovered the anomaly then going on and prevented it had he desired.[143]

Liabilities of petitioners Guilberto Hermosa and Aniceto Arriola:

Petitioners Hermosa and Arriola, both COA Auditing Aides of the same district, were convicted of 26 [144] and
[145]
100 counts, respectively, for signing abstract of proposal, reports of inspections and tally sheets of materials
delivered, covered by fake LAAs and SACDCs.
Both were convicted for signing the abstracts of proposals, tally sheets and reports of inspections, certifying to
the receipts of certain deliveries in the jobsites which deliveries, however, were found to be non-existent. As
Auditing Aides, they were charged with the duty to make sure that materials conformed to the specifications in the
purchase order. However, they allowed the irregularities to be committed by making it appear in the inspection
reports they prepared and signed that materials had been delivered in the project sites. The tally sheets and the
inspection reports were attached as supporting documents to the general vouchers, which allowed the co-accused
contractors and suppliers to collect payments for ghost projects. Their signatures facilitated the consummation of the
crime.
Petitioner Hermosa was not charged in Criminal Case No. 1163 but he was convicted and therefore the
decision of the Sandiganbayan must be set aside against him insofar as said case is concerned. Petitioner Arriola
was charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 1163 and 1232 but the Sandiganbayan neither convicted nor acquitted him and
therefore the records of said cases must be remanded for proper disposition by the Sandiganbayan.

Liabilities of petitioners District Auditors Efren Coyoca and Edgar Osmea:

Petitioner Coyoca was convicted of 78 counts.[146] Petitioner Osmea was convicted of 24 counts.[147]
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners Coyoca and Osmea for pre-auditing and approving the general
vouchers, and the reports of inspections which were irregular and/or fictitious covering ghost projects. They were
found to have conspired with the other petitioners to defraud the government when they allowed splitting of RIVs,
POs and GVs into amounts less than P50,000.00 so that their approval of the vouchers would suffice. A higher
amount of the vouchers would have required the vouchers to be forwarded to the Regional Auditor for action and
review. The Sandiganbayan described the details of splitting, thus:

V. Another significant circumstance patent on the record which supports the perpetration of irregularities in the
preparation and processing of the GVs and supporting papers and the corollary aspect of conspiracy between and
among the accused coming from the Regional Office and the Cebu 2nd HED is the splitting of the RSEs (RIVs), POs
and the GVs into amounts less than P50,000.00. Noteworthy is the fact that sixteen (16) of the eighteen (18) fake
LAAs were for amounts over P350,000.00,[148] while the eight (8) fake SACDCs were for amounts
over P500,000.00.[149] Therefrom, 199 GVs were prepared for the payments of separate transactions
below P50,000.00.

Under the COA Circular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976, in relation to COA Circular No. 16-16A, dated March 23,
1976, clarifying COA Circular No. 76-4, dated February 10, 1976, of which the Court can take judicial notice,[150] it is
provided that Resident Auditors of bureaus, offices and agencies of the National Government in Metropolitan
Manila, as well as other Auditors for District/City Highway, Public Work/School, State Colleges and Universities,
Military Areas and Zones outside Metropolitan Manila, are authorized to countersign checks and warrants
in amounts not exceeding P50,000.00 in each case(Underlining supplied). Consequently, all GVs in amounts
exceeding P50,000.00 must have to be processed, pre-audited and approved for payment by the Regional Auditor
of the COA, instead of the Cebu 2nd HED resident auditors, accused Harvey Ruiz, Edgar Osmea and Efren Coyoca.

Thus, in the very wording of COA Circular No. 76-41, to avoid action, review or approval by higher authorities, the
district officials herein resorted to the splitting of the RSEs, POs, and the GVs involved in the fake LAAs with 199
GVs evolving into separate transactions involving the amounts of less then P50,000.00. Otherwise, if such
transactions were to be reviewed and pre-audited by the Regional COA Auditor, who might be adverse to joining the
conspiracy then the GVs and supporting papers may be found to be the result of (1) inexistent or ante-dated
programs of work, (2) illegal funding, (3) irregular bidding, (4) fictitious or simulated deliveries and inspection, and
other anomalies. Consequently, the Court considers such splitting as an integral and/or essential element or link in
the conspiracy to defraud the Government inasmuch as such practice was consciously and deliberately resorted to
in order to hide the massive misappropriation being undertaken by some of the accused herein.[151]

The participation of petitioners Coyoca and Osmea in the conspiracy were established by the testimony of
prosecution witness Fe delos Reyes who positively identified them, to wit:
Q - Now in the early part of 1977 would you recall if the Cebu 2nd Highway Engineering District have ever
undertaken projects concerning the maintenance or repair of the highway under its jurisdiction?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, why do you know this fact?
A - Because, I was assigned as one of the property inspectors during that time.
Q - As property inspector, what do you usually perform with respect to these projects being undertaken or
prosecuted by the district?
A - I usually perform the inspection.
Q - Inspection of?
A - Of deliveries of supplies and materials.
Q - And where do you usually make the inspection of these materials that would be delivered?
A - At the job site.
Q - When you said at the job site, to what place are you particularly referring to?
A - It depends upon my office memorandum issued by the auditor.
Q - Now, usually who assigns you to inspect deliveries of materials for projects being undertaken by the
district?
A - It is the auditor.
Q - And how are you assigned verbally or in writing?
A - I am covered by an office memorandum.
Q - Issued by whom?
A - Issued by the auditor.
Q - Now, in the early part of 1977 would you recall if you received any instructions from your immediate
superior, Auditor Coyoca, concerning the inspection of materials?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, would you recall the specific month of 1977 when you were directed to perform inspection?
A - As I recall, it was sometime in the first quarter.
Q - Of 1977
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Can you not recall the month?
A - I cannot.
Q - Now, were you able to comply with that directive of your auditor, Efren Coyoca?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And what did you do when you went to inspect the materials?
A - When I went to inspect the first time at the job site, I found out that there was no delivery made.
Q - So, what did you do when you discovered that there were no deliveries of materials made by the
contractor?
A - I told that matter immediately to Auditor Coyoca.
Q - And what did Auditor Coyoca say?
A - He told me I will just confer that matter first to Engineer Rafael Rabaya, Jr.
Q - Now, this Rafael Rabaya, Jr., what is his position at the district in the early part of 1977?
A - He was the Assistant District Engineer.
Q - And would you know if Auditor Coyoca has some conversation with Engineer Rabaya concerning your
report?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Why? Why do you know that he was able to talk with Engineer Rabaya?
A - Because after the day later, Coyoca called me up in his office.
Q - And were you able to talk with Auditor Coyoca?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, when you talked with Auditor Coyoca were there other persons present?
A - There was.
Q - Who?
A - It was Engineer Rafael Rabaya, Jr.
Q - What did Engineer . . . Auditor Coyoca tell you, if any?
A - That you just sign all those prepared tally sheets and inspection reports.
CHAIRMAN
Q - Who said that?
A - That inspection reports and that if anything goes wrong, I will assume the full responsibility being your
chief. (sic)
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Now, when Auditor Coyoca told you that, what did you do?
A - Then, because of that assurance, I was compelled to sign all those prepared tally sheets and reports of
Inspection.
Q - Now, lets go back to that inspection which you made on the job site. Would you recall who was the
contractor involved in that project wherein you were required to make an inspection of deliveries?
A - I think it was Rufino Nuez.
Q - Now, in connection with that inspection that you made on Rufino Nuez, would you recall if you ever
signed inspection reports and tally sheets concerning deliveries of materials?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, you said from this first inspection that you conducted were you also assigned to conduct other
inspections in the succeeding quarters of 1977?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And what would be the procedure that you would adopt in connection with this inspection that you
would conduct?
A - It was just the same procedure.
Q - In this inspection that you subsequently conducted what were your findings? Were there deliveries of
materials or not?
A - The second order that they gave me, I did not go to the job site anymore because I know that there
were no deliveries.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - For how long did Auditor Coyoca act as your immediate superior in the year 1977?
A - That was the first quarter, sir.
Q - Up to the first quarter?
A - Up to the first quarter.
Q - During Auditor Coyocas incumbency would you recall how many inspections or yes, inspections were
you required to conduct in the district?
A - I cannot recall it anymore, sir.
Q - But would you recall the contractors involved, in this alleged delivery of materials that you are
supposed to inspect?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And aside from Rufino Nuez who are the other contractors?
A - Antolin Jariol, Pablo Guinocor, Feliciano Echavez, Gabison. I think that is all.
Q - After Auditor Coyoca ceased to be your immediate superior who replaced him?
A - He was replaced by Atty. Harvey Ruiz.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Now, would you recall the specific date when Atty. Harvey Ruiz assumed the position of resident
auditor of the engineering district?
A - It was sometime in April, 1977.
Q - And upon the assumption of Auditor Ruiz what happened to your practice of inspecting?
A - Upon assumption, the first day he assumed office I told him of the anomalies regarding the delivery of
materials and supplies in the contract.
Q - And what did Auditor Ruiz do or say to your report?
A - He also told me to, we will just refer it to Engineer Rabaya.
Q - Did Auditor Ruiz confer with Engineer Rabaya?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - When did Auditor Ruiz confer with Engineer Rabaya?
A - After I told him about the anomalies.
Q - Why do you know that Auditor Ruiz was able to talk with Engineer Rabaya concerning your report to
him?
A - Because Engineer Rabaya came also to the office of Auditor Harvey Ruiz.
PROS. GUERRERO
Q - Why? Were you able to talk with Engineer Rabaya when he came to you?
A - The first time he came he talked with Auditor Ruiz and Auditor Ruiz called me up in the office and in the
presence also of Engineer Rabaya.
Q - And what did he tell you during that occasion?
A - To just continue what has been done during the time of Coyoca.
Q - Now, during the time of Auditor Ruiz how many inspection reports were signed by you in your capacity
as Auditing Examiner II of the district?
A - I cannot recall it anymore, sir.
Q - Would you recall the contractors involved in this inspection report that you signed?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Who are these contractors involved?
A - They are Jariol, Nuez, Gabison, Echavez, Guinocor.
Q - Mrs. delos Reyes, do you know a person by the name of Joselito Genson.
A - Yes, sir.
Q - In the year 1977 when you were made to sign inspection reports and tally sheets did you have the
occasion of meeting this Joselito Genson?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Under what circumstance did you come to know Joselito Genson?
A - Because, as I recall now, he is one also of the contractors.
Q - Contractors of what district?
A - Of Cebu 2nd.
Q - In what year did he contract with Cebu 2nd Highway Engineering District?
A - In 1977.
Q - Of course you know the accused, Jose Genson?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Would you know if there is a relation between Jose Genson and Joselito Genson?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What is the relationship between the two?
A - Contractor Joselito Genson is the son of the district engineer, Genson.
Q - Now, in the year 1977 would you know if Jose Genson was ever employed with the Cebu
2nd Engineering District?
A - No, he is not.
Q - For how long did Auditor Ruiz act as the resident auditor of Cebu 2nd Highway Engineering District?
A - It was from April up to October.
Q - Why, what happened to him in October, 1977?
A - He was then replaced by Auditor Edgar Osmea.
Q - Now, when Auditor Edgar Osmea took over what was the practice that you adopted in connection with
the deliveries of materials to be inspected by you?
A - It was just the same practice.
Q - When Auditor Osmea assumed his office did you have occasion to talk to him?
 A - Yes, sir.
Q - And what did you tell him?
A - I told him about the practice that there is no delivery of supplies and materials and that if possible I
would like to be assigned to another (sic) activities other than inspection of materials and supplies.[152]
The positive declaration of prosecution witness Fe de Los Reyes was corroborated by the voluminous
documentary evidence consisting of the 199 general vouchers and checks as well as the supporting documents
attached thereto which were submitted by the prosecution establishing the complicity of petitioners in the illegality of
the subject transactions.
A careful review of the 199 general vouchers and the supporting documents revealed that there were splitting of
requisitions, purchase orders and general vouchers which were all in violation of COA Circular No. 76-41, dated 30
July 1976. As defined by the Circular, splitting in its literal sense, means dividing or breaking up into separate parts
or portions, or an act resulting in a fissure, rupture, breach. Within the sphere of government procurement, splitting
is associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries and payments.
Splitting may be in the form of (1) Splitting of Requisitions which consists in the non-consolidation of
requisitions for one or more items needed at or about the same time by the requisitioner; (2) Splitting of Purchase
Orders which consists in the issuance of two or more purchase orders based on two or more requisitions for the
same or at about the same time by the different requisitioners; and (3) Splitting of payments which consists in
making two or more payments for one or more items involving one purchase order. These forms of splitting are
resorted to in order to avoid (a) inspection of deliveries, (b) action, review of approval by higher authorities; (or)
public bidding.[153] We find that all these forms of splitting were used in all the transactions brought to the attention of
the auditors. Thus, even if the projects undertaken refer to the same road and for the same materials and for almost
the same period of time, separate requisitions were prepared and separate purchase orders were made
corresponding to each requisition. Also, payments were split into amounts less than P50,000.00 although the
general vouchers were supported by the same RIVs and POs. All, to avoid action or review by the higher authorities.
The petitioners District Auditors were tasked to safeguard expenditures and uses of government funds hence
they had to be on the look-out for cases of splitting in varied forms. The job of an auditor is to pre-audit the general
voucher and review the documents attached thereto before a check is to be issued. Petitioners auditors could not
have failed to notice that the 199 general vouchers were all for amounts less than P50,000.00 despite the fact that
most of these vouchers were supported by the same set of documents, i.e., RIVs and POs, which were worth higher
than such amount. To reiterate, several of the general vouchers were made in payment for the same kind of
materials to be delivered to the same project for almost the same period of time and payable to the same
contractor.[154] Notably, some of the checks issued pursuant to these general vouchers bore the same date[155] or
were dated very close to each other.[156]
All the herein petitioners insist that there were no splitting of payments but only partial payments in accordance
with the progress of work. They claim that partial payments are allowed under existing rules of the MPH particularly
Art. 9.06 of the Standard Specification for Highways and Bridges which reads:

Art. 9.06. PARTIAL PAYMENTS. Once each month, or oftener if warranted, as the work progresses, the Engineer
and the representative of the Contractor will make an estimate of the value of the work performed and materials
complete in place in accordance with the contract. Materials on hand but not complete in place shall not be included
for payment.

Each consecutive estimate shall be filed by the Contractor as a claim against the government and certified to by the
Engineer. Ten per cent of each estimate shall be deducted and retained until final acceptance of the entire contract
as guarantee for good performance. The monthly payments shall be considered as approximate only and shall not
be evidence of acceptance of unsatisfactory work or material. The retention of ten per cent on every partial payment
shall be made regardless of whether or not claims for labor and materials have been paid, and shall not be released
or authorized to be paid to the contractor until after sixty calendar days have elapsed, counting from the date the
final payment on the contract is made.

We are not convinced. Petitioners reliance on Art. 9.06 is misplaced for the following reasons: Firstly, the RIVs
pertained to the procurement of supplies and materials and the purchase orders covering these procurements did
not indicate therein any partial payment that may be allowed to the contractor. Hence, the suppliers were obligated
to deliver the materials within the period agreed upon and to be paid only after completion of the delivery. Secondly,
based on the delivery receipts and checks paid to the suppliers, the alleged deliveries of materials were completed
within 10-15 days from the start of the deliveries and paid within 3-4 weeks from the issuance of the RIVs. A reading
of Art. 9.06 would show that the allowed partial payments refer to long term project which is precisely why the
frequency of the said payments is generally on a monthly basis. Thirdly, the almost one hundred checks issued to
the suppliers which were based on the general vouchers supported by the same RIVs and purchase orders were
dated on the same date or were dated very close to each other; therefore, partial payments did not serve its alleged
purpose of helping the suppliers to defray their expenses. It bears stressing that when these contractors/ suppliers
participated and were awarded the whole quantity of what they bidded, they were expected that they had their own
resources to comply in order to attain uniformity of the materials delivered. Finally, it is incredibly astonishing that all
the alleged partial payments were uniformly pegged at amounts below P50,000.00 when this circumstance only
shows that the scheme was deliberately employed by petitioners to make sure that said payments would no longer
be made subject to the approval of the Regional Auditor.
Thus, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the prosecution has amply established the guilt of petitioners
Auditors Coyoca and Osmea, as well as the Auditing Aides Hermosa and Arriola.
Records disclose that although petitioner Osmea was convicted in Criminal Case No. 1163, he was not charged
in said case; and in Criminal Case No. 1232, he was neither convicted nor acquitted by the Sandiganbayan although
he had been duly charged and tried in said case. The assailed decision must be set aside insofar as Osmea is
concerned in Criminal Case No. 1163 and the records should be remanded to Sandiganbayan for proper disposition
of Criminal Case No. 1232.
Petitioner Coyoca was charged in Criminal Case No. 1289 and tried but was neither convicted nor acquitted by
the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, records of said case must be remanded to respondent court for proper
disposition.
While there are cases where heads of offices, whose actions involved the very function he had to discharge,
cannot be swept into a conspiracy conviction,[157] we find the same to be inapplicable in the present cases before
the Court. Herein petitioners, Engineer Rafael Rabaya, Jr., District Accountant Mag-uyon, Property Custodian
Cabusas and the District Auditors who were heads of their respective divisions in the Cebu 2 nd HED were knowing
participants in the conspiracy considering that despite the patent irregularities in the documents presented to them,
they still affixed their signatures thereto. In fine, all the individual acts of petitioners were so synchronized and
concerted leaving no room for any doubt that there was conspiracy and connivance among them.

Liability of petitioner contractor Joselito Genson:

Petitioner Genson was one of the private contractors who was convicted of 19 counts[158] of violation of section
3(e), RA 3019 for having conspired, cooperated and confederated with the other petitioners in a fraudulent scheme
that defrauded the government.
Genson was not charged in Criminal Case No. 1232 but he was convicted. The Solicitor General, in his
Comment, points out that Genson was not charged in Criminal Case No. 1251 as the name of contractor Rufino
Nuez appeared in the body of the Information. A reading of the Information would show that Gensons name
appeared in the title as well as in the first paragraph of the Information but not in the body of the
Information. However, Genson never raised any objection thereto when he entered his plea of not guilty to the
Information nor did he raise the same before, during, after trial, in his memorandum or in his petition. In fact, he
included Criminal Case No. 1251 as one of the appealed cases. Thus, unlike the other petitioners heretofore
mentioned, Genson is considered as having been validly charged and tried in Criminal Case No. 1251.
Petitioner Genson basically raises the issue of sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction
on the basis of conspiracy. He claims that Sandiganbayans statement that a meticulous examination and analysis of
the mass of testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution tends to show the existence of a
conspiracy was not the kind of proof required to establish conspiracy.
We are not persuaded.
Although the findings of the Sandiganbayan started with such a statement, the entirety of the decision
discussed how the crime was committed by means of conspiracy between petitioner Genson and his co-
accused. The Sandiganbayan had discussed lengthily how such conspiracy was carried out by the individual
collective actions of the regional and district employees which began with the issuances of the fake LAAs and
SACDCs, followed by the irregular processing of the supporting documents and the approval of the general
vouchers which ended with the payment of the checks to the accused supplier or contractor.
We agree with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that petitioner Joselito Genson conspired with the other
petitioners to commit the crime. Such agreement was manifested in the general vouchers and the checks paid to
petitioner Joselito Genson, to wit:

CC RIV GV No. Date of Amount Project

No. Check

1255[159] 345 B-751 5-31-77 P 43,795.50 Pinamun-

gahan
Aloguin-
san Rd.
1256[160] - do - 753 - do - 43,504.50 - do
1250[161] 451 1081 7-28-77 43,650.00 - do
1251[162] - do - 1065 8-1-77 43,650.00 - do
1252[163] 421 961 7-13-77 39,721.50 - do
1254[164] - do - 959 - do - 47,578.50 - do
1207[165] - do - 1239 9-1-77 48,015.00 - do
1204[166] 607 1379 9-20-77 30,433.75 Cebu-
Toledo
Rd
1205[167] - do - 1352 9-29-77 42,316.25 - do
1203[168] 632 1461 10-17-77 48,257.50 - do
1230[169] - do - 1469 - do - 24,492.00 - do
1253[170] 755 1762 12-21-77 41,147.40 - do
1257[171] - do - 1757 - do - 40,332.60 - do
1231[172] 685 1606 11-9-77 48,015.00 Manta-
longon-
Dalaguite
Rd.
1258[173] - do - 1612 11-30-77 - do - - do
1202[174] 691 1607 11-9-77 47,294.29 Argao
1259[175] - do - 1614 11-14-77 18,180.71 - do -

Notably, there were two general vouchers corresponding to each RIV, thus a clear case of splitting of payments
by the issuances of two checks below P50,000.00 each for only one RIV. Such fact supports the findings of
respondent court that there was splitting of payments to avoid review by the Regional COA Auditor. Petitioner
Genson admits the receipt of said payments[176] but claims that he had asked for partial payments to answer for the
fuel and oil used and as a down payment for the rented dump trucks and other equipments. However, the summary
shows that some checks supported by the same RIV bore the same date or were dated very close to each
other. How could such partial payments serve their purported purpose when the checks were received by petitioner
supposedly after the alleged deliveries were completed as shown by the tally sheets attached to the general
vouchers.
Petitioner Genson further contends that his conviction was merely based on the pleas of guilty of the two co-
accused contractors/suppliers, namely, Erasmo Gabison and Feliciano Echavez;[177] that said pleas are not
admissible against him considering that he was granted a separate trial by the court.
We are not convinced.
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing
guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him.[178]
We have carefully studied the decision of the Sandiganbayan and we find that petitioner Genson, like the
petitioners Engineers, was not convicted on the basis solely of the pleas of guilty of his co-accused private
contractors/suppliers. The evidence of the prosecution had fully established the conspiracy among the accused and
the pleas of guilty of the two contractors were merely considered as confirmatory. Thus, even without such pleas,
petitioner Gensons participation in the scheme to defraud the government was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 Petitioner Genson claims that the respondent court did not consider the testimonies of his witnesses proving
that he prosecuted the questioned projects. We have gone over the testimonies of Gensons witnesses and we find
no error committed by the respondent court in not giving them probative value.
Defense witness Mariano Castro testified that petitioner Genson requested him to utilize his house as resting
place for his men while hauling gravel and sand; that their place was not a boarding house nor was he engaged in
the business of accepting transients; that he did not know Genson personally;[179] that Gensons men stayed in his
house for 2-3 weeks which began on the 9th of November;[180] that he did not accept any rental fees from Genson
since the road construction was just in front of his house thus, will be beneficial to him; [181] Based on the
prosecutions evidence, however, the alleged deliveries of the materials in the Argao section were supposed to have
started on November 5 up to 10, 1977,[182] or a total of 6 days only contrary to Castros testimony that Gensons men
stayed in his house for 14 to 21 days.[183] Moreover, it is quite unusual that witness Castro would allow the workers
of Genson to stay in his house and for free at that when Castro admitted that he did not even know Genson
personally, much more the workers.
Defense witness Perpetua Mercado, barangay captain of Ubo and owner of the quarry where petitioner
allegedly hauled limestone, testified that she met Genson for the first time when he asked her permission to allow
his men to stay in her sister-in laws house; that she agreed on condition that Genson will fill up the barangay road
with grinded materials. There was nothing, however, in Perpetuas testimony explaining why it was her permission
that was sought and not of her sister-in-law who lives in the house where Gensons men were supposed to stay. The
name of Perpetuas sister-in law was not even made known nor was she presented in court to confirm that Gensons
men indeed stayed in her place.
Perpetua further stated that it took petitioner a month or more to deliver the piles of limestone used in leveling
the 12 kms. Montalongon road,[184] however, the delivery receipts show that it purportedly took petitioner only 5
days, i.e., November 7 to 12, 1977, to deliver the materials to the project site.[185]
Moreover, Perpetuas testimony on cross-examination that she was not requested by Genson to testify for him
is quite unbelievable. She testified that the last time she saw Genson was in 1977 when the project was still
undergoing; that since then she had no communication with him until twelve years later, she received a note at 7:00
a.m. of April 11, 1989 signed by Genson telling her to meet him on the same day at the Capitol building without
specifying the subject matter of the meeting;[186] that she had traveled ninety kilometers from Barangay Ubo,
Dalaguete to Cebu City in order to meet Genson and on the same day was presented as Gensons witness; [187] that
she only came to know that there were cases filed against Genson involving non-deliveries of materials when she
was already being questioned in court; that she was not able to talk to Genson or his lawyer before she was
presented as a witness. The behavior shown by Perpetua is contrary to ordinary human experience since a note
from somebody whom she was not in close association with and without even a slightest hint on what the meeting
would be about, would not prompt her to act on it specially when it was made on such a short notice and such
meeting would not only entail expenses on her part but also the inconvenience of traveling a ninety kilometer road
just to reach the meeting place.
Felicidad Obejero testified that she met Genson when he came to haul materials at the river bank of Mananga,
Campo 2, in Talisay, Cebu; that after hauling the materials, she collected P1 for every truck that passed by their
private road; that she did not know where those gravel and sand taken from the river were unloaded.[188] Obviously,
this testimony has no probative value as it is too general and does not specifically refer to the projects in question.
We find that the testimonies of petitioner Gensons witnesses do not outweigh the evidence presented by the
prosecution that no deliveries were actually made in 1977 in the Cebu 2 ndHED and that the Sandiganbayan did not
commit any error in convicting him.
WHEREFORE, the convictions of petitioners Rogelio Alvizo

G.R. No. 146111 February 23, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee

vs.
ROLENDO GAUDIA @ "LENDOY" or "DODO", appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
There can be no greater violation of a person’s right to feel safe and secure than the crime of rape. When one
commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that person’s body; more importantly, he defiles that
person’s mind. When the victim is a little child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond the
comprehension of normal human beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the
most salacious ruffian.

Before us is the Decision1 dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia2 guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the penalty of death, and ordering
him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral
damages, thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.

The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:

That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.

The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that on 24
March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)3and Kimberly (1 year old)4 at their house in Clib,
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs’ food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South
Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch
water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any
information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyn’s name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard
Remelyn calling out to her, "Ma, I am here," from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.5 Amalia rushed toward the place, but was
met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their house.6 She found Remelyn crying,
naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves
clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her.
Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyn’s private organ.7

The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for
treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the appellant.8 The quack
doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyn’s vagina, and told Amalia, "Hoy! Amalia, your
daughter was being (sic) raped."9 At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he
had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.10 At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia,
"Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of ₱15,000.00, for the
crime that my son committed."11 Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials
(kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalia’s statement was taken.12

On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio Hernane,
the municipal health officer,13 conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and made the following findings:

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried blood are
(sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 o’clock (sic) are noted with fresh
vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not extending to the perineum. No lacerations were noted
at the anal opening.

Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)

CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.14

The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as the
penis of a man.15
On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.16 Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had told her
"Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos."17 (Meaning "crazy lendoy he forced me" in the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in
her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, "Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to
the ipil-ipil trees."18

The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyn’s neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified
that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering at the
COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in
his arms.19 He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were
on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.20

The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had been raped. He
proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for examination. Amalia confirmed to
Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay
Official Rodrigo Malud21 and the other tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant. They
passed to the police the information that appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took
appellant for investigation. 22

The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about
4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections. With him was
Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of
Catalina Cabano, appellant’s aunt, to ask for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in
vinegar). They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying,
hence, they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented
coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen.23 They reached Catalina’s place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they
went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and appellant’s parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong
and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997),
appellant and Dodo Malon went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt,
Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated.24 He claimed that it was
Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.

As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex "Totong" Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March 1997, at
about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they went home to appellant’s house,
but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalina’s house, they found her
drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.25 Catalina’s daughter directed them
to the place where she was gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It
was then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them – appellant, Totong, Catalina and
Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalina’s house for the vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellant’s
house where they spent the night.26 Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day, and left appellant’s house.
Totong came to know of appellant’s arrest the following day.27

Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellant’s story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was gathering tuba, at
a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her
house.28 At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina
to finish gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the former’s house, had a drinking spree, and
then parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the premises near
the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at the house of Catalina’s younger
sister, which is located across the river, about 4 kilometers away.29

After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of
rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was sentenced to
death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty
thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

In his Brief30 to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial court:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA DESPITE
THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE
INFORMATION.

We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.

Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence
provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.31

The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00
p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters
from her house.32 As a neighbor and relative of Remelyn’s stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child
Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.

The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalia’s testimony that Remelyn emerged naked from
the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs
spread far apart. Remelyn’s private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance.33

The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyn’s statement to her mother that it was appellant who
had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove34 and forced her to do something against her will.35

There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal
Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal lacerations.

From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned
circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.

The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant contends, first, that
Tulon Mik’s testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the husband of Amalia.36 He also questions the
credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik
inform Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom
he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that
he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that
the offer of compromise by his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him,37 while the
offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalia’s husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be
excluded as evidence for being hearsay.38 Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola
and Cabano should not be counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the strength of
the prosecution’s evidence.

We reject appellant’s arguments.

First, appellant’s attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by affinity of
Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of
any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the witness.39 In the case at bar,
appellant cannot impute any ill motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik for failing
to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the inadvertence. He said his own child was
down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying home.40 For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he
saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyn’s fate. But thereafter, he
lost no time in reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.41 As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in the
pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.42 These subsequent actions strengthen Mik’s credibility.

The trial court accorded more credence to Mik’s narration of the events over the testimonies of Cabano and Loyola.
It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness and its factual
findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been
ignored or misunderstood which could alter the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no
irregularity in the assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Mik’s testimony. Given
the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his
demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not.43 The trial court found Mik’s testimony more worthy of
credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have no reason to reverse its findings.

Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he sexually molested her.
This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, "Crazy Lendoy forced me."44 Remelyn was 3 1/2 years
old at the time. At such an infantile age, she could not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape.
Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make the "perfect victims". They naturally follow the
authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The child’s age and
developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her.
If the child is too young to understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no
comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events
because they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which
to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited
vocabulary.45 The fact that Remelyn called appellant "Buang" or crazy shows that he did something which she knew
was not right or proper. By saying "iya kong lugos," Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something
bad. With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually
abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word "rape" in Visayan
parlance.

Appellant’s charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to his guilt.
There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither will it affect the penalty or the award of
damages rendered against him.

Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia,
and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if
sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia
Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged
offer,46 and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A
witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.47 The offer of
compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony48 of
Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,49 the actions of his parents
cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy
to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence
against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.

Appellant’s defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim that it was at
around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at the place where she
was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward
the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia
Loyola, appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there,
all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to his house, and together
with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have
done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the
witnesses’ narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of
arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial details
which could be forgotten by witnesses because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the appellant’s
testimony was, at times, contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellant’s
statement that Totong had already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and Catalina’s own
averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellant’s house. These contradictory testimonies only made more
incredulous appellant’s tale.

We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information states that
appellant, "by means of force and intimidation…willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (had) carnal knowledge with
Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice."50 (emphasis ours) The Information did not
allege that Remelyn was below seven years old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with
simple rape, under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death
Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant circumstances, which when
present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by death. We again stress that these new attendant
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he
must be tried.51 The main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.52

We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that when there is a finding
that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory.53 If the death penalty has been
imposed, the indemnity should be ₱75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled to ₱50,000.00 for each count of
rape.54 Thus, the appellant is ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.55

We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without need of further proof
other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to
such an award.56

We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant as proper because
complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against her was committed with the
aggravating circumstance57 of age. However, the amount awarded must be reduced to ₱25,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.58

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del Sur in
Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of simple rape, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-17011 August 30, 1963

EMMA S. ACENAS and ALBERTO E. ACENAS, spouses, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ANGELA SISON and TEOFILO SISON, spouses, defendants-appellants.

Gil R. Carlos & Associates for plaintiffs-appellees.

Sevilla and Aquino for defendants-appellants.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal from the order dated March 7, 1960 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
holding husband and wife solidarily liable on a note made by the wife.
But although this appeal was brought on behalf of husband and wife, the decision of the trial court is being
questioned only insofar as it holds the husband liable on the note of his wife. The wife's liability is admitted.

The records show that in September, 1956, Angela Sison executed a promissory note, promising to pay Emma S.
Acenas the sum of P8,160 in 26 installments, the first falling due on November 30, 1956 and the last on November
30, 1960. The note provided that failure to pay two consecutive installments would make the balance due and
demandable.

Mrs. Sison was able to pay up to August 31, 1957 only. Upon her failure to pay the balance of the note, alleged to
be in the sum of P8,391.60, she was sued. Her husband, Teofilo Sison, was joined as a defendant pursuant to
Article 113 of the Civil Code.

In their answer, Mr. Sison denied liability on the ground that he had not signed the promissory note.

The case was set for hearing on March 7, 1960. What happened on that day is set forth in the following decision of
the court of First Instance, dated March 7, 1960.

When this case was called for hearing today, counsel for the defendants moved for the postponement of the
hearing hereof in view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time within which to confer with them
for the purpose of amicably settling this case. To this motion for postponement, however, counsel for the
plaintiffs objected on the ground that the defendants have been given sufficient time within which to settle
this case but failed to do so. On the other hand, when the court indicated to the defendant's counsel that
there seems to be no defense on the part of the defendants in this case, and that it would be for the best
interest of the latter if the case is terminated by way of judgment on the pleadings or confession of
judgment, counsel for defendants offered no objection and asked that confession of judgment by the
defendants may be entered in this case provided that the corresponding writ of execution thereof should not
be issued until June 30, 1960, to which counsel for the plaintiffs agreed.

In view thereof, and upon motion of counsel for defendants with the conformity of counsel for the plaintiffs,
the motion for confession of judgment under the terms and conditions set forth above are hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, by ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P8,391.60, with interest at the rate of 1%
per month from November 1, 1959 until fully paid for: by ordering the same defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay to plaintiffs the additional sum of P500.00 by way of attorney's fees; and for the defendants to pay the
costs. This decision, however, is subject to the condition that the corresponding writ of execution should not
be issued until June 30, 1960, as agreed upon by the parties herein. (Emphasis supplied).

Their motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, defendants appealed directly to this Court.
Appellant Teofilo Sison contends that his lawyer agreed to a judgment on the pleadings but not to a confession of
judgment; that he never authorized his lawyer to confess judgment for him and that at any rate he was not liable on
the note of his wife.

For purposes of this appeal, We take it as a fact, as the trial court found, that Atty. Nicanor S. Sison, counsel for
Teofilo and Angela Sison, agreed to a judgment on confession against his clients, provided no writ of execution was
issued until June 30, 1960. But, the records do not show that Atty. Sison had authority to confess judgment. On the
contrary, the decision of March 7, 1960 states that Atty. Sison "moved for the postponement of the hearing hereof in
view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time within which to confer with them for the purpose of
amicably settling this case." This indicates that Atty. Sison lacked authority to confess judgment, otherwise, there
would have been no need for him to confer with his clients. This circumstance should have put the trial court on an
inquiry as to counsel's authority.

In Natividad v. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613, and Anduiza v. Quirona, G.R. No. L-5073, May 20, 1953, We held that the
compromise of causes and confession of judgments appear to stand upon the same footing and that since the
compromise may not be effected by counsel without special authority,1 so may not an agreement to permit judgment
to be entered against his client be authorized except with the knowledge and at the instance of the client. Such
judgment may be set aside or reopened.
Appellees cite decisions of the courts of Georgia which hold that where a settlement of a suit is made by an attorney
accepting less than the full amount of the claim in cash, the agreement binds the client if the settlement is carried
out by a consent verdict and judgment and the settlement was made without fraud on the part of the attorney or any
instruction of the client to the contrary. (Coweta Fertilizer Co. v. Johnson, 26 Ga. App. 528, 106 S.E. 610; Brannan
v. Mobley, 169 Ga. 243, 150 S.E. 76).1äwphï1.ñët

As this Court noted in the Natividad case, these cases do not apply here because the Georgia statute is different
from our law. Thus, in the Coweta Fertilizer case, supra, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held:

We do not think that section 4956 of the Civil Code of 1910 is applicable to the facts of the present case.
That section provides as follows:

"Without special authority, attorneys cannot receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash."

In the present case the attorney of the defendant was not endeavoring to collect or enforce his client's claim, but
was resisting a suit or claim against his client and consented to the credit in favor of his client. . . .

In contrast, Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly requires that attorneys have special authority not only to receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash but also to compromise their client's litigation.

Appellees also rely on Holker and others v. Parker, 7 Cranch 436, 6 Law Ed. 433. But that case does not support
appellees' position, for it was held there that —

Although an attorney at law, merely as such has strictly speaking no right to make a compromise, yet a court
would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be exclaimed against by all,
and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been imposed on, or not fairly exercised in
the case. But where the sacrifice is such as to leave it scarcely possible that, with a full knowledge of every
circumstance, such a compromise could be fairly made, there can be no hesitation in saying that the
compromise, being unauthorized and being therefore itself void, ought not to bind the injured party. Though
it may assume the form of an award or of a judgment at law, the injured party, if his own conduct has been
perfectly blameless, ought to be relieved against it. . . .

We hold therefore that it was error for the trial court to accept the confession made by counsel without ascertaining
his authority to do so, at least with respect to Teofilo Sison. With respect to Angela Sison, however, the judgment
will be maintained, there being no claim in this appeal that the confession of judgment made in her behalf was
unauthorized. In fact her liability is admitted here.

This brings us to the next point. Does Article 113 of the Civil Code, which requires the joinder of the husband in
actions against the wife, make the husband solidarily liable? Appellees maintain that it does, since the order is not
assailed as far as Mrs. Sison is concerned "otherwise, his (the husband's) joinder would be an empty formality."

We do not share this view. The law requires the joinder of the husband not because he is thereby bound with his
wife but because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership which might be held liable in the action. To
make the husband solidarily liable with his wife simply because his joinder is required would be to subvert the basic
rule that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. (Art. 172, Civil Code.) The
only exceptions are when the husband consents; when the wife spends for the usual daily needs of the family (Art.
115); or when she is given the management of the partnership (Arts. 157, 168, 178 and 196). There is no allegation
in the complaint that Mrs. Sison incurred her obligation to Mrs. Acenas under any of these exceptions so as to bind
the conjugal partnership.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 7, 1960 of the lower court is modified in the sense that defendant Teofilo
Sison is not liable and that defendant Angela Sison alone is liable to the plaintiffs for the amount adjudged in the
decision. No costs.

G.R. No. L-37398 June 28, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendant-
appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor
Pio C. Guerrero for plaintiff-appellee.

Jesus E. Mendoza & Raul M. Aviso for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of conviction of Robbery-Hold-up with Homicide of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III, in its Criminal Case No. O423-V, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado
Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime as charged in the
information and hereby sentence each of them to life imprisonment; to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; and also jointly and severally to pay the
amount of P8,000.00, the cost of the jeep stolen; and the further amount of P30,000.00 representing
actual, moral and exemplary damages; to suffer all the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to
pay the costs.

Accused shall be entitled to full credit for the preventive imprisonment they have already undergone
in accordance with Rep. Act 6127.

SO ORDERED.

Accused Rosario Cabrera did not appeal. Only defendant Conrado Villanueva's appeal is before Us.

Accused Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva were charged in an information reading:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado
Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc of the crime of robbery holdup with homicide, penalized under the
provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1972, in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rosario
Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc, with John Doe alias
Ben and Peter Doe alias Abay, who are still at large, armed with knives or ice picks, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, holdup, take, rob
and carry away with them a jeep with plate number 84-26 S'71, Bulacan, being driven by Luis dela
Cruz y de Jesus and owned by one Reynaldo Santos, Jr., with a value of P8,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount of P8,000.00; that during the commission of this
crime, and on the occasion thereof, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie and stab several times with the said knives or ice picks
the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and thereafter was abandoned, thereby inflicting upon the said
Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus stabbed wounds which caused his death after a few days of confinement
in the hospital.

Contrary to law.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are briefly stated in the brief of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza assisted by
Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero as follows:
 At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed
immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who
was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds (pp. 12-13, tsn., May 11, 1972).

This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz (pp. 6-7, tsn., May 11, 1972).
He gave an ante mortem statement (Exhibit A; p. 11, tsn., May 11, 1972). In the ante-mortem
statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep
(Exhibit A) but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and
jeep (pp. 11-72, tsn., May 11, 1972; Exhibit A).

In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police (p. 18,
tsn., May 18, 1972). On January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession (Exhibit B, to B-
3, inclusive). In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to appellant Conrado Villanueva as the
mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery
and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified companions (Ibid).

Lt. Carlos Palomares of the Valenzuela Police Department who took the extra-judicial confession of
defendant Rosario Cabrera testified to identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial
confession (pp. 3-37, tsn., May 18, 1972). Dr. Ernesto G, Brion of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) testified regarding the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the
deceased (pp. 310, tsn., September 7, 1972). Reynaldo Santos Jr. testified on the ownership and
value of the jeep stolen (pp. 4-14, tsn., June 9, 1972). Alejandro de la Cruz testified on the expenses
and damages suffered by the family of the deceased (pp. 15-27, tsn., June 9, 1972) on account of
the deceased's untimely death. Dante Marcelo testified that in the early evening before the robbery
took place he saw defendant Rosario Cabrera riding on the jeep of the deceased (pp. 29-41, tsn.,
June 9, 1972) but did not notice whether there were other passengers (p. 33, tsn., June 9, 1972).

Defendant Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva did not take the witness stand.
Neither did they present any evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
together with their respective cross-examination and objections to some of the exhibits, particularly
appellants objection to the admission of Exhibits B to B-3 (defendant Cabrera's extra-judicial
confession) insofar as he was concerned, the case was considered submitted for decision." (Pp. 2-4,
Brief for the Appellee)

xxx xxx xxx

The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the
extra-judicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the
continuing objection of appellant's counsel (p. 10, tsn., May 18, 1972). Appellant reiterated his
objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence (p. 12, tsn.,
September 7, 1972)." (Id.)

In their prayer, counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the reversal of appellant's conviction and
his acquittal.

After carefully going over the record and minutely reviewing the evidence, We are fully convinced that the prayer for
acquittal is in order.

The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator, together
with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of
the jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection
thereto.

There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation conducted by
the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question. For this reason alone,
that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant,
but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities,
Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:

Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment appealed from
and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for the People.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, appellant Conrado Villanueva is acquitted,
and his immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless he is lawfully held for another case, with costs de
oficio.

G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN
CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman, City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and
Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino Navarro for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso
Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the
murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the
case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the
progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier
of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly
made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore
incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence
objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior
proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the
transcript, the following remarks were made:

FISCAL LUSTRE:

May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as
against the accused Consunji himself?

COURT:

That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession
unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required
by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was
denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review
and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the
ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused,
freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to
the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against
his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan,
64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123,
providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case,
long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14
Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as
evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet
even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions),
much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the
respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the
objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu
proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused
Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put
up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and
Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc.
and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object
is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made,
the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella
vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions
of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the
confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered
in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given
in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to
prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be
able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be
excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance
Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the
early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a
judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the
other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality,
or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed
to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material
from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of
evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled
and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs
against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-19590 April 25, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA, VICTORIO ALVAREZ, DIONISIO CARASIG, and JOHN
DOES, accused,
CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA and VICTOR ALVAREZ, appellants.

Jose L. Uy and Associates and Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

ANGELES, J.:

At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo, then an officer of the
Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers, was found in his Borgward
sedan car at Lias Road, Marilao, Bulacan.

Upon the advice of the NBI medico-legal officer, the cadaver was brought to Funeraria Quiogue, Manila, for autopsy.
Examination of the corpse revealed that the deceased suffered three gunshot wounds on the head: One, at the right
temple, at a point above the external auditory meatus right, the entrance wound directed from right to left; another,
at the pre-auricular region left, above the external auditory meatus left, directed from left to right; and the last, at the
temporal region, scalp, left, at a point on the above left external auditory meatus, directed from left to right. The
cause of death was shock, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot wounds on the head.

In the course of the investigation to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime, Capt. Dionisio Carasig, also a member
of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee working with the deceased, intimated to the PC authorities that the
recent car deal of Crisostomo with Victorio Alvarez may possibly have some connection with the killing. With that
clue, an intensive investigation was pursued by the police agencies, the Bulacan PC, the Marilao police, and the NBI
agents joining hands together. Fingerprint experts and photographers of the NBI examined the car where the body
of the victim was found, but no clear fingerprints could be detected. Upon an inspection of the car, some specimen
evidence were found, such as, one (1) cartridge case caliber .25; one (1) unfired bullet, caliber .25; one (1) slug,
caliber .25; two (2) metal jacketed bullets retrieved from the head of the victim, caliber .25; and a bag.

Upon an examination of the bag, the investigators found a Philippine Trust Co.'s check in the amount of P1,000.00,
drawn by Victoria Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by the deceased acknowledging
payment by Alvarez in the amount stated in the check, with a further statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500.00.

Suspecting that Alvarez may have something to do with the killing, the authorities picked him up for questioning.
Alvarez was taken to the Criminal Investigation Section of the PC for fingerprinting and paraffin test for gun powder
residue. The result of the test, as contained in the report of Crispin Garcia, chief chemistry section of the PC,
showed the presence of gun powder residue on both hands of Alvarez.

On August 4, 1959, a complaint for murder was filed by Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio Alvarez and two John Does. The victim named in the complaint
was Hector Crisostomo.

Victoria Alvarez was arrested on August 19, 1959. Immediately after his arrest, Alvarez was investigated. He made
a tape-recorded statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the CIS at Camp Crame, admitting that he
alone shot and killed Crisostomo near Manga Avenue, Manila. (Vide question 68, Exhibit L, statement of Alvarez,
August 21, 1959.)

On August 20, 1959, Alvarez executed a handwritten statement in narrative form before the CIS in the office of the
PC Alabang headquarters (Exhibit G). In this statement, he affirmed that a certain Johnny was the one who shot and
killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. On the same day, Alvarez made another statement in the form of questions
and answers repeating substantially the facts contained in his handwritten statement. (Exhibit F.)

Still on the next day, August 21, 1959, Alvarez executed another statement before Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the
PC (Exhibit L), wherein Alvarez again admitted that he was the only one who shot and killed Crisostomo at barrio
Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. In this statement, Alvarez gave a detailed narration of the participation of George Chua in
the commission of the crime, as follows: "At around 8:00 o'clock P.M. (July 14), the Borgward sedan car driven by
Capt. Crisostomo was approaching our car within a distance enough to call his attention. Johnny extended his arm
and called Capt. Crisostomo. Capt. Crisostomo's attention was attracted and he cut in and parked his car in front of
the Olds mobile where we were riding. When his car was properly parked, Capt. Carasig and George Chua
approached Capt. Crisostomo, and finally they got in; Capt. Carasig first then followed by George Chua. After a few
minutes conversation, the car driven by Capt. Crisostomo with Capt. Carasig and George in it, left and we followed.
They passed Taft Avenue towards Isaac Peral to Otis, turned left towards Nagtahan bridge, turned right to Santa
Mesa Boulevard, turned left to Santol, turned left to Pararle St., turned left to Benito St." . . . and then we proceeded
"towards Bulacan."

Q. — Were you constantly following the car of Capt. Crisostomo?

A. — Yes, sir,. . . .

Q. — Where in Bulacan did you go?

A. — Approximately one hundred meters before the road junction leading to Marilao poblacion where we
stopped.

Q. — What happened then?

A. — Upon arrival there at approximately 10:00 p.m., the Oldsmobile stopped at the back of the white sedan.
Then we all alighted from the Oldsmobile and transferred to the white sedan. Our position inside the white
sedan is that beside Capt. Crisostomo who was on the wheel was George Chua. Behind George Chua,
Capt. Carasig, behind the seat at the back extreme right, next to the left at center is me and to my left is
Johnny.
 Q. — What did you talked about?

A. — George Chua started the talking by telling Capt. Crisostomo to please turn over the documents to them
(documents consisting of names of persons connected with the dollar syndicate, the modus operandi and
activities) and then followed discussion, Chua telling Crisostomo to turn over to us the papers and forget
everything, then Capt. Crisostomo replied, I told you that I do not have time to discuss that matter, and then
Capt. Carasig said, Capt. we are business partners, and I am engaged in this business too, for my sake,
turn over the paper to them or to me, that will save the government from exposing the whole activities, then
Capt. Crisostomo replied it is too late already, I have no time to discuss the matter; then George Chua drew
his revolver. When we saw George Chua drew his revolver, we did the same thing. . . .

Q. — What happened next?

A. — When Capt. Crisostomo saw us drew our guns, he showed a sign of fighting back. George Chua gave
a signal and I fired a shot at Capt. Crisostomo on his right temple, then Capt. Crisostomo showed a sign of
fighting back so Johnny held the left shoulder of Capt. Crisostomo while Capt. Carasig held his right
shoulder, then I fired again, hitting him at the back of the head, George Chua after the first shot, opened the
door and went out and then I fired the third shot on his left temple and Capt. Crisostomo snapped dead. . . .

Alvarez further declared that he was trusted by George Chua and was chosen to be the trigger-man; that Chua
promised to pay him P35,000.00 plus P400.00 a month for killing Crisostomo; that Chua was engaged in the
business of dollar smuggling.

On September 1, 1959, the complaint was amended by including Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and Lim Bun
Ping @ Johnny Yao, together with Victorio Alvarez and two John Does.

On the basis of Alvarez' confessions, and with him as guide, the CIS agents proceeded to Chua's residence at 1834
M.H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila. Upon arrival at the house, they were received by Chua's wife. Inquiring for Chua, the
CIS agents were told by the wife that her husband was not at home.

In the evening of August 24, 1959, George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer, Jose Uy, surrendered to General
Isagani Campo of the PC at the D & E restaurant in Quezon City, in the presence of newspaper reporters and
photographers. Immediately thereafter, George Chua was taken to Camp Crame and was investigated by Capt.
Yapdiangco and other CIS agents for three hours, after which he was allowed to sleep. The next day, August 25,
1959, Chua was again investigated by the CIS agents. The investigation was reduced to writing. Believing that Chua
was not telling the truth, because he would not admit participation in the crime, the investigator destroyed the
statements. To quote from Capt. Yapdiangco's testimony:

Q. — Will you please tell the court from what time George Chua was interrogated on August 24, 1959?

A. — Well, as far as I remember, from that time when General Campo turned over to us Mr. Chua, he was
interviewed by us for about three hours. After that, we allowed him to sleep. We also slept. But the following
morning the 25th, naturally, we had to interview him again.

Q. — During those interviews that you have made as well as your companions on August 24 and 25, did you
attempt to make it in writing?

A. — Well, there was an attempt to put it in writing, but it was destroyed.

Q. — Will you tell us the reason why you have to discontinue the written interrogation?

A. — Because what he was telling us we believe it was not true. (tsn pp. 34-35, Vol. 22).

In spite of knowledge on the part of Capt. Yapdiangco that a complaint against George Chua had already been filed
in court, nevertheless, in view of the insistent denial by Chua of any participation in the crime, at about midnight on
August 26, 1959, Capt. Yapdiangco brought him to the PC headquarters in Alabang, Rizal, where he was
investigated in the presence of several CIS agents. Chua made a written statement (Exhibit R). In his confession,
Chua stated the following: That he ordered the killing of Capt. Crisostomo; that the plot to kill Crisostomo was
hatched up in his house at 1834 M. H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila, on July 13, 1959, in the presence of Lim Bon Pin @
Johnny Yao and Victorio Alvarez; that he (Chua) and Johnny hired Alvarez to kill Crisostomo for P35,000.00
because his partners in Hongkong, Yao Chiong and Tay Seng got angry at him, because the $132,000.00 entrusted
to a lady who was leaving for Hongkong, was confiscated by the local authorities at the airport between June 15 and
25, 1959; that his partner, Yao Chung who was in Hongkong called him through overseas telephone on June 29,
1959, at eleven o'clock in the morning, and told him to do something for him and to finish Capt. Crisostomo; that
Capt. Crisostomo was killed on July 14, 1959, at about ten o'clock at Marilao, Bulacan, and that Victorio Alvarez
killed him with a .25 caliber pistol by shooting him on the head two times; that when Capt. Crisostomo was driving
his car, Alvarez was seated at the rear, and a Filipino whose name he does not know, was seated on the front seat
beside Crisostomo when Alvarez shot Crisostomo; that after Capt. Crisostomo was shot by Alvarez, the latter drove
the small car to barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan, turning right, while he (Chua) in another car, drove the Filipino further
away and dropped him at a bridge, and he (Chua) returned to pick up Alvarez, and both of them returned to Manila
in the Oldsmobile car; that upon reaching Manila, Alvarez was dropped at the Quezon Bridge where Alvarez threw
his pistol, caliber .25, and he (Chua) returned to his house; that he (Chua) actually gave the amount of P35,000.00
to Johnny in his house, but does not know whether Johnny gave the money to Alvarez.

On August 28, 1959, while George Chua was detained in the provincial jail of Bulacan, he asked the warden to
summon the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, because he wanted to give a statement. The assistant provincial fiscal,
Pascual K. Kiliathko, interviewed George Chua in the provincial jail on August 29, 1959. The interview was reduced
to writing in the form of questions and answers (Exhibit VVV) the pertinent portions of which are the following:

Q. — I understand from you that you sent for me?

A. — Yes, sir.

Q. — Are you ready to give the statement voluntarily and willingly?

A. — Yes, sir.

Q. — Now, Mr. George Chua, will you please state your name and other personal circumstances?

A. — (Witness does so, and said) because I am accused of murder.

Q. — What is this murder charge that you have just stated?

A. — I was implicated by Alvarez to be one of those responsible for the killing of Crisostomo.

Q. — Now Mr. Chua, what is it that you would like to state, you stated that you sent for me to give a
statement, what is that statement you would like to give?

A. — Because I want to report to you that I was maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign a
statement.

Q. — You stated that you were maltreated before, how were you maltreated?

A. — First I was taken to the 5th PC Co. at 12:00 o'clock midnight at Alabang, Rizal, on August 25, 1959,
and there I was handcuffed, but before I was handcuffed, I was ordered to take off my clothes and then I
was handcuffed again and blindfolded me by wrapping a towel all around my face and my head and some of
the agents turned my head seven or eight times.

Q. — Now, is there something more that you still like to disclose before I ask you to sign this statement?

A. — Yes, sir, I want to inform you that they also applied electric shock to my body and while doing so, they
forced me to answer the way they designed, two hours later they forced me to lie down on the ground, then
a stout agent sat on my stomach and another agent sat on my legs, and then I almost lost consciousness.
On March 24, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for murder against Victorio Alvarez, Dionisio
Carasig, Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and two John Does, alleging that said accused, acting in conspiracy,
with the attendant qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength, use of motor vehicle, nocturnity and by a band, killed Hector Crisostomo.

Upon arraignment, Victorio Alvarez, Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and Dionisio Carasig entered a plea of not
guilty.

After a trial, Dionisio Carasig was acquity on reasonable doubt; Victorio Alvarez and Chaw Yaw Shun @ George
Chua were found guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs
of Hector Crisostomo in the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay the proportionate costs. Both appealed from the decision.

On September 6, 1962, Alvarez filed a motion to withdraw his appeal which he reiterated in another motion on
October 1, 1962. On October 24, 1962, Alvarez' motion was granted.

The case before Us concerns the appeal of George Chua.

The evidence relied upon by the Solicitor General in sustaining the conviction of the appellant, as cited in the brief
are:

The several confessions of Alvarez, which are self-contradicting and the confession of the appellant; testimonial
evidence that Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents went to the house of Chua, and not finding him there, they
told the wife of Chua that they were looking for her husband; that on the next day, Capt. Yapdiangco secured a
warrant to search the house of Chua, and they found "a calling card of Victorio Alvarez and a sort of a telephone
directory index marked exhibits H and H-1"; that Alvarez made a re-enactment of the crime; that George Chua,
accompanied by his lawyer, surrendered to General Isagani Campo; that during the investigation of Chua, "Capt.
Calderon asked Chua why he was implicated by Victorio Alvarez. At first he denied any participation in the killing of
Capt. Crisostomo. But when Alvarez was brought before him, the former told him, 'George I have already confessed
the truth. Do not tell a lie. Please tell the truth, George.' At this instance, Chua countered: 'I did not kill him. You
killed him.' Alvarez told him again: 'Now, tell the truth.' Chua, however, kept silent." (The foregoing incident testified
to by CIS agents, does not appear in any signed statement of Chua, although it is claimed that the confrontation had
taken place during Chua's interrogation by the CIS agents, and neither does it appear in any of the several
statements of Alvarez); that "early in the morning on August 26, 1959, Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco brought George
Chua to Alabang PC headquarters for the purpose of taking down his statement. The reason of Capt. Yapdiangco in
investigating Chua in Alabang instead of at Camp Crame was explained by him thus:

. . . Your Honor, the reason why the investigation of George Chua whose true name is Chaw Yaw Shun was
made at Alabang is that there were so many newspapermen in the CIS building and it seems to confuse us
in our manner of investigation, even now and then, they interfere, thus obstructing our investigation, so we
made it a point to bring Mr. Chua to Alabang so that more or less, we will be in a position to investigate him
thoroughly.;

that "After their arrival at Alabang, Capt. Yapdiangco in the presence of Agent Ricardo Chavez and some other
agents, personally investigated George Chua. According to Capt. Yapdiangco, Chua voluntarily submitted himself to
the investigation and agreed that his confession be made in writing." (Then follows the quoted confession of Chua.)

There is no evidence, oral or documentary, adduced by the prosecution, other than the several confessions of
Alvarez, the confession of Chua, and the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, that would tend to prove any overt act of
Chua indicating some connection between him and the other accused establishing a common criminal design to
commit the crime.

With regard to Arturo Cayetano, this witness declared that between 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock in the evening of July 14,
1959, he saw an Oldsmobile car parked at the corner of Isaac Peral and Florida streets, Manila, while he was at the
opposite side of the street under a waiting shed; that after a while, he was attracted by one of the occupants of the
Oldsmobile car who was waving his hand in the act of stopping another car coming from behind; that the latter car
stopped and parked in front of the former car; that later on, he saw two persons, whom he identified in court as
Dionisio Carasig and George Chua, approach the car that had just stopped, board it, and then the car left and
moved away towards Taft Avenue, Manila.
The weakness of the testimony is apparent from the failure of the witness to identify the driver or occupant of the car
into which Carasig and Chua entered. In the brief of the appellee, no reference whatsoever is made to the testimony
of Cayetano, for the obvious reason that it is irrelevant and immaterial, as it would not in any way connect the
appellant with the commission of the crime committed in Marilao, Bulacan, about which fact there is not a scintilla of
evidence showing that the appellant was ever seen thereat on the night of July 14, 1959.

At the trial, George Chua repudiated his confession and denied any participation in the commission of the crime.
With reference to his confession, he declared thus: "When he was investigated by the CIS agents at Alabang PC
headquarters on August 26, 1959, his eyes were 'tied' (blindfolded) with a wet towel for about six (6) hours and the
bandage was removed only at around 6:30 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of said date, but he cannot remember who
tied his eyes; that some agents used electric shock on his body for two (2) hours simultaneously on his left upper
back, left ear and knees; that the wire connected to his body is cranked; that he was forced to lie down after which
an agent sat on his stomach and another sat on his leg; that he was ordered to undress, and remove his shoes and
socks, then they applied the electric shock; that he signed his confession under threat, the agents telling him that if
he did not sign the statement, he will be killed and his body will be thrown away; that nobody read to him the written
statement; that he was not allowed to read his confession, and to save his life, he just signed it.

Corroborating appellant's claim of maltreatment, Dr. Jose Eustaquio, a private physician, declared that when he
examined Chua on August 26, 1959, at the instance of the latter's lawyer, he noticed some contusion on his left
upper back, at the nape of the neck, and in the middle term called linear abrasions also in the left upper back. His
finding, however, was not put in writing. Dr. Eustaquio examined Chua for the second time on August 27, 1959, and
this time he put his findings in writing (Exh. 19-Chua, Vol. 1). Being asked about the meaning of "multiple scratches
likeline" mentioned in his medical certificate, he said, it means linear abrasions, the cause of which he could not
determine. When he was pressed to explain the contents of his certificate, he said these scratches could have been
cause by wires, rough stones, pointed objects or similar instruments applied by other persons; that the "reddish
discoloration of the nape of the neck" which is a "contusion" may have been caused by so called trauma or in
common parlance, a blow that may cause injury either by fist or objects; that the "reddish discoloration at the left
upper back which is medial of shoulder blade" is the same as the injury on the neck which may have been caused
by any kind of object, such as fist or hand blow; that the "pinhead spot on the left leg and multiple scratches likeline",
could have been caused by a pointed object applied to the skin, but he does not know whether electrical shocking
apparatus introduced in the body could have produced the same. (tsn, pp. 149-195, Vol. 1)

In this appeal, the appellant assails the admission of his confession, contending that it is not admissible, because it
was obtained thru force, threat and intimidation.

In passing upon the weight and admissibility of a confession, the court may take into consideration the
circumstances and conditions under which it was obtained (People vs. Lauas, 58 Phil. 742), and may consider
claims that a statement was taken in circumstances which violate the standard of voluntariness — a standard
grounded in the policies of privileged self-incrimination. (Davis vs. State of North Carolina, 16 L. ed. 86.)

As narrated hereinabove, immediately upon Chua's surrender on August 24, 1959, Capt. Yapdiangco and several
CIS agents interrogated him for three hours. The next morning, August 25, 1959, Chua was again interrogated. The
interrogation were reduced to writing. But, because Chua would not admit his guilt, the investigators considered him
a liar, and so they destroyed his written statement. Persisting in their attempt to obtain a confession, at midnight on
August 26, 1959, Chua was brought to Alabang, Rizal, within the jurisdiction of the 3rd PC zone, for investigation,
instead of taking him to the 1st PC zone in Bulacan where the crime was committed. According to Capt.
Yapdiangco, George Chua voluntarily submitted himself to an investigation and agreed that his confession be made
in writing. To quote from appellee's brief, p. 17:

After their arrival at Alabang, Capt. Yapdiangco, in the presence of agents Ricardo Chavez and other
agents, . . . Chua voluntarily submitted himself to the investigation and agreed that his confession be made
in writing.

In the light of the foregoing testimony of Capt. Yapdiangco, it is food for thought to ask: What made Chua become a
"dove", when during all the time he was being investigated at Camp Crame, he had demonstrated an attitude of
belligerency by refusing to admit participation in the crime? Was the sudden transformation the result of some
spiritual persuasion that moved the conscience of the suspect to admit his guilt, or was it due to an overbearing
pressure which finally subdued his will power? The observation made by his Honor, the late Manuel M. Mejia, the
first trial judge in the case, would seem to have an answered the riddle. Thus:

. . . Notwithstanding the fact that he surrendered or was surrendered to General Campo at the D & E
Restaurant in the evening of 25 August 1959, and was supposed to be confined at the CIS building Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and notwithstanding the prosecution's claim that defendant Chua executed his alleged
confession, Exhibit M, voluntarily, the CIS agents had to take him to Alabang, Rizal, approximately 20
kilometers away from Quezon City. Now, it may be asked, if defendant Chua were really willing to execute a
confession, why should the CIS agents have to take him to Alabang? Could not such a confession be taken
right in the CIS building in Quezon City, where they have all the facilities? And if the confession, Exhibit N,
had really been voluntarily given by defendant Chua, as claimed by the prosecution, why would it take the
CIS several hours in an isolated place in Alabang, Rizal, to extract from him a 3-page confession?. . .
.1äwphï1.ñët

Of course, Captain Yapdiangco explained that the reason why appellant was investigated in Alabang, Rizal, was
because of the presence of newspapermen in the CIS building at Camp Crame, Quezon City, who interfered in their
manner of investigation. His Honor, Judge Manuel M. Mejia, did not accord credence to the explanation. Indeed, it is
clear that it was only a pretext, considering that, as admitted by the witness, the newspapermen are not always
present in their office at Camp Crame. (tsn, p. 62, Vol. 1)

The appellant claimed that he was maltreated and intimidated by the investigators at Alabang, hitting his head,
boxing him, applying electric shock to his body, sitting on his stomach and legs, and required him to sign the
confession under threat of death.

The claim merits serious consideration.

It appears that after Chua's investigation on August 26, 1959, he was examined by Dr. Eustaquio Bautista, a private
medical practitioner, and by doctors Arsenio Anastacio and Miguel Zarraga of the PC.

Dr. Eustaquio in his examination of Chua on August 27, 1959, as stated in his report, found "multiple scratch likeline
on the left upper back; reddish discoloration at nape of neck; reddish discoloration at left upper back just medial of
the shoulder blade; multiple pinhead reddish spots on left leg and multiple scratches like line; 3 scratches likeline on
right leg" which according to the doctor could not have been self-inflicted because of the location of the injuries.

On the other hand, upon an examination of Chua on August 27, 1959, by Dr. Anastacio, he found "7 linear reddish
marks varying in length — 1/4 x 3/4 inch, 7 in number pinhead in size skin eruptions reddish with some healed are
noted on the outer half of the left shoulder, upper part of the left arm and upper part of the left back. Similar
eruptions appear on the upper part of the right back, both legs and thighs. Linear reddish mark about 1 inch is noted
on the antero-lateral aspect of the left thighs. Three small reddish marks are noted on the junction of the upper and
middle thirds lateral aspect of the right leg. The above-mentioned linear reddish marks represent scratch marks."
(Exh. 3-Chua p. 135, Vol. 1.)

Upon examination conducted by Dr. Miguel Zarraga, at about 10:00 a.m. on August 27, 1959, he found that "over
the left shoulder area, upper back, and upper arm are seen a number of superficial abrasions of various sizes from
0.6 to 1.5 cm. long in various stage of healing, some reddish, some covered with brownish scab; there are observed
similar superficial marks over the right upper back, and both legs and thighs. An abrasion measuring 2.2 cm. is seen
on the antero-lateral portion of the left thigh. On the right leg at about the junction of the upper and middle thirds are
three small abrasions lateral to another one which subject claims had already been there for sometime now, the
exact number of days he does not remember." (Exh. 4-Chua, Vol. 1.)

These findings of the three doctors, yielded one significant indication, the existence of "reddish marks and scratch
abrasions on appellant's body. True, that Dr. Arsenio Anastacio made a remark in his medical certificate (Exh. 3-
Chua) that there is "no sign of physical injury externally which can be appreciated at the time of his examination,"
and Major Miguel Zarraga declared that "the abdomen revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is there
any area of tenderness in the whole body" of the appellant, these remarks, however, do not detract from the fact,
physically and scientifically recognized, that some forms of torture do not usually manifest external injury on the
body of the person maltreated. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the use of electric shock, which incidentally
are among appellant's complaints, do not necessarily produce external physical injury. Dr. Anastacio
said:1äwphï1.ñët

Q. — You have long experience in medical practice, as a general rule, if blows are given in the abdomen, do
they leave external sign?

A. — Not all (tsn, p. 405 Exh. KKK, pp. 390-415, Vol. 1).

On the same point, Dr. Zarraga said:

Q. — In your experience, did you Doctor have come across a person given blows in the abdomen without
leaving any external mark?

A. — I have many cases, some of them leave signs and some of them do not leave any external injury.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. — Have You come across a person who died in traffic accident where the wheel passed over the
abdomen without leaving any mark of external injury?

A. — I remember very well a man in Camp Murphy whereby a young child was ran over by wheel and she
sustained serious internal injuries without any external injuries. (tsn, pp. 424-425, Exh. LLL, Vol. 1, JP
Marilao.)

And as regards the use of electric shock, Dr. Zarraga's findings that "there are no external manifestation to indicate
the application of electric current of such duration to almost cause death as alleged," does not negate the
application of this form of torture for according to him, the use of electricity with wire on the body of a person does
not always leave any mark thereon. On cross-examination, he said:

Q. — You also admit Doctor that electricity from 6 volts battery applied with wire will not leave any mark?

A. — I admit that. (tsn, p. 525, Exh. LLL, Vol. I, JP Marilao.)

Testifying further on this point, and confronted with a quotation from a medical book, Dr. Zarraga said:

Q. — I will just read to you a certain portion of this book on page 201, and I quote:

the autopsy of a person . . . dead and lying near an electric machine or wire may reveal a severe cardiac, which
could account for said death even without contact with the current. It may be very difficult to define in such a case if
the death was due to the disease or electric current if no electric current marks are present.

You agree with that, Doctor?

A. — I agree with the condition that those who died of cardiac as a result of small shock may really die
without indication externally. (tsn. pp. 426-427, Vol. I, JP Marilao.) .

Q. — And the abrasion you mentioned in Exh. R could that have been produced by minor or sharp object?

A. — Yes, sir, in fact I mentioned that in my statement.

From the foregoing facts and circumstances set forth, it is clear that the mere absence of external injury in
appellant's body does not destroy or rule out appellant's claim of maltreatment by the use of other scientific modes
or forms of torture. Appellant's injuries, certified by a private physician and constabulary doctors, were telltales
corroboration of the charge of torture and maltreatment.
It is now settled that a confession which is induced or extorted by torturing the accused or by personal violence or
abuse directed against the accused for the purpose of obtaining a confession, is an involuntary one and is not
admissible in evidence against him, unless found to be true. (People vs. Tipay, 70 Phil. 615.)

Appellee argues, however, conceding that the confession was involuntary, that it is nevertheless admissible
because the facts stated in the confession have been corroborated by other evidence.

A review of the evidence, however, showed that other than the confession, there is no other evidence which proves
the truth of the facts stated in the confession. On the contrary, analyzing the confession of Chua, it will be noticed
that it is replete with improbabilities and falsities in its material and substantial parts.

1. — While in Chua's confession there appears a statement that the order to kill was given to him by his
partners in Hongkong, Yao Chung and Tay Seng, thru the overseas telephone on June 29, 1959, at 11:00
a.m., the records of the Bureau of Telecommunications which in July, 1959 was the only agency operating
an overseas telephone system between Hongkong and Manila, failed to disclose any such telephone
conversation between Yao Chung and appellant Chua. (Exhibit 17-Chua, and testimony of radio technician,
pp. 471-481, bail hearing before Judge Mejia.).

2. — In Chua's confession, it is said that the plot to kill Crisostomo was hatched up in Chua's residence at
1834 M. H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila, on the night of July 13, 1959, with Alvarez and Lim Bon Ping @ Johnny
Yao, but the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that said Lim Bong Ping had re-entered Manila in
November, 1958 and had left by Philippine Air Lines plane for Hongkong on December 7, 1958 (Exhs. 13,
14 and 15). And there is no showing that he had re-entered the Philippines after his departure for abroad on
December 7, 1958. That Lim Bong Ping was not in Manila in July, 1959, is further shown by the sworn
declarations of members of the staff Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California on 30 April 1958, and returned thereto on 24
December 1958, where he had been living constantly ever since. (Exhs. 5, 5-a and 6, 6-a.) And this fact was
corroborated by the sworn statements of Mrs. Pilar R. Guerrero, Philippine Consulate employee in San
Francisco, and Enrique Herbosa, a Filipino student in California. (Exhs. 7 and 7-a.)

3. — In Chua's confession, it is said that Alvarez killed Crisostomo in consideration of P35,000.00. This is
illogical and unbelievable. As his Honor, the late Judge Manuel M. Mejia, the first trial judge in the case, said
in his order granting bail to appellant, "If Alvarez had really killed Crisostomo in consideration of a reward
promised to him by Chua, it would seem to be unnatural and illogical for Chua, to have gone along with
Alvarez in the actual killing of Crisostomo on the night of July 14, 1959. On the other hand, it is said by
Alvarez in his tape-recorded statement that his motive in killing the deceased Crisostomo was to retrieve a
rubber check which he had issued to Crisostomo in connection with his purchase from the latter of a Ford
Fairlane car for P20,500.00 (Exh. LL, pp. 13, 28, tsn, Oct. 31, 1959)." Indeed, the foregoing facts would
show that it was Alvarez who had a motive to kill Crisostomo. In fact, he withdrew his appeal.

4. — It is also said in the confession that Crisostomo was shot on the head while driving the car. This is
incredible, because in that situation, the car would have gone out of control or would have been involved in
an accident which did not happen.

5. — And as a result of the incident discussed in the preceding number, if it were true, evidently the
authorities would have found bloodstains in the car which is not present.

6. — The statement in the confession that Chua was with the group that killed Crisostomo at Lias road,
Marilao, is impeached by the testimony of Paulino Antonio, a witness for the prosecution, who declared that
it was only Alvarez whom he saw at the vicinity of the crime on the night of July 14, 1959.

The finding of the court that there was conspiracy among the accused, notwithstanding the fact that on the same
evidence, the court found one defendant not guilty, but sufficient to convict the two others, on the court's finding and
conclusion "As regards the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, the court is inclined to give a margin of error in his
identifying Carasig on the night in question . . .," is indeed, somewhat illogical —

Since in the instant case, the widow appears also to be a star witness of the prosecution whose testimony
was given much weight in pinning liability on appellants, we wonder whether this could be consistent and
 would be true to logic and fairness if it would hold that on the strength of the same testimony which was
discredited by the court, insofar as one of the appellants' co-accused in the same case is concerned, would
reach a verdict of conviction against said appellants. (People vs. Aquino, et al., L-13789, June 30, 1960, 67
Off. Gaz. No. 51, 9180.)

Aside from the foregoing consideration, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the
confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to
statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in
furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought
to an end. (People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil. 985; People vs. Yatco, et al., 51 Off. Gaz. No. 12, 6187). Conspiracy must be
real and not presumptive. (U.S. vs. Figueras, 2 Phil. 491). It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from
the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not
binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial.
There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an
overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.

The appellant maintains that the trial court erred in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The evidence shows that the appellant, even from the very beginning of his interrogation by the CIS agents upon his
surrender on August 24, 1959, has consistently claimed that on the night of July 14, 1959, when Crisostomo was
killed at Marilao, Bulacan, he was at No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City, playing mahjong. Capt. Yapdiangco corroborated
this fact. Thus —

Q. — What were the things which you fear he was not answering your interrogation which you consider is
not true?

A. — I remember he was declaring to us that on that day, on the evening of 14th of July 1959, he was in the
mahjong game.

While Chua was being interrogated at the CIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City, on August 24, 1959, other agents of the
CIS particularly Agent Mariano Belen and Lt. Bautista, on the same date, were busy checking up on Chua's
movements or whereabouts on July 14, 1959, and they were informed that on the night of July 14, 1959, Chua was
indeed playing mahjong at No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City. To this effect is the testimony of agent Belen:

Q. — Do you remember having gone with Lt. Bautista to a certain club house in Pasay on August 24, 1959?

A. — I remember, sir.

Q. — Do you remember where that club house is?

A. — No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City.

Q. — What was the purpose in going with Lt. Bautista to that club house at Salud St., Pasay City?

A. — To verify the allegation of Mr. Peter Lim that at said club house, George Chua was playing mahjong on
the night of July 14, 1959.

Q. — Because of that information imparted to you by Peter Lim, you went direct to Salud St.?

A. — Yes, sir, in the afternoon of the same date.

Q. — Whom did you interrogate upon your arrival in the clubhouse?

A. — We interrogated Ong Kong Pay.

xxx xxx xxx

 Q. — What was the answer of Ong Kong Pay?

A. — That Mr. George Chua was there and practically playing mahjong one week from July 8 to 14, 1959.

The foregoing facts were also corroborated by the testimonies of Ng Yu (tsn, p. 1024); Ong Kong Pay (tsn, p. 1245)
and Peter Lim (tsn, p. 1295).

As further proof of the fact that Chua was playing mahjong at Salud St., on the night of July 14, 1959, the record
shows that agent Belen of the CIS was given a notebook by Ong Kong Pay in-charge of the clubhouse, on August
24, 1959, wherein accused George Chua was listed as one of the players thereat on the date in question. However,
it appears that the prosecution had lost the notebook. Whether it was really lost by the CIS or deliberately
suppressed, the presumption of its truth has basis in law.1äwphï1.ñët

All the foregoing indubitably show that the defense of alibi of the appellant could not have been merely a concoction,
as the testimonies of the witnesses clearly showed that Chua was really playing mahjong at Salud St., Pasay City,
on the date in question.

UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant Chaw Yaw Shun @
George Chua has not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby acquitted of the offense
charged with costs de oficio. The bail bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.

G.R. No. L-7973 April 27, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants.
DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON, defendants-appellants.

First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for appellee.

Santos, Valencia and Cenzon for appellants.

PADILLA, J.:

Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga finding them and their co-defendants, who did not appeal, guilty of murder for the death of Pablo Navarro
and sentencing them to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity and the proportionate share in the costs
(Criminal Case No. 1262).

In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano aliasPiping,
Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes then gathered at the sala of the house of
the first in the barrio of Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, that Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people
to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to
them his desire and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the town of
Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. After disclosing to them his plan, Eulogio
Serrano told them to go to sleep at the post of the civilian guards near his house. In pursuance of the plan, the next
day (17 October), Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio
Reyes waited for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to
hang around. Navarro did not show up that day. The following day (18 October), the group waited for him at the
same places. This time Navarro showed up at the gambling casino and Cenon Serrano aliasPiping promptly invited
him to a drink but Navarro declined saying that he was going somewhere. On 19 October, the group again waited
for their quarry at the same places but failed to make contact with him as he did not show up. At about 10:00 o'clock
in the morning of 20 October, the group waited for Navarro in the same places. Navarro arrived at the gambling
casino between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Cenon Serrano alias Piping asked him for some drinks.
Navarro ordered some drinks and all in the group except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank. After drinking the
contents of six bottles of Black Dog gin, Orange Wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine, Navarro asked Cenon
Serrano alias Piping whether what they had drunk was enough, and the latter answered "No, look for some more."
Navarro left the gambling casino, went to the market place about 20 meters away and came back accompanied by
Simplicio Manguerra bringing four bottles of Orange wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine. Simplicio Manguerra joined the
party and all except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank the four bottles of wine. While the spree was going on, Cenon
Serrano alias Piping suggested to Pablo Navarro that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which
suggestion Navarro agreed. Cenon Serrano alias Piping sent out Domingo Cadiang to look for a jeep, and Cading
returned with an auto calesa jeep driven by Marcelino Sicate. After drinking the four bottles of wine, Cenon
Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon, Pablo Navarro, Simplicio Manguerra
and Anastacio Reyes boarded the jeep, the first and the last sitting at the front with the driver and the rest inside.
From the gambling casino the party repaired to Don Q gasoline station to refuel and proceeded to San Fernando.
But before reaching San Fernando, Cenon Serrano alias Piping remarked that "there is no use having a good time"
in San Fernando and suggested that they should proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which suggestion Navarro
approved. On the way to Angeles Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered the driver to stop at Tony's Place in San
Fernando to buy some more wine. After buying another jar of San Miguel gin, part of which Navarro who was
already drunk was made to drink, the party resumed their trip; but upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse
of barrio San Isidro, Cenon Serrano alias Piping told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, where they
arrived at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. There Cenon Serrano alias Piping dismissed the driver of the jeep. At
barrio Dolores, the group passed by the house of Simeon Dizon, the barrio lieutenant, told him to come down and
ordered him to call for some temporary policemen. Upon seeing Benjamin Tolentino at the house of Dizon, Cenon
Serrano alias Piping beckoned and ordered Tolentino to tie Navarro's hands with rope. Upon Cenon Serrano's order
Felipe Garcia, a civilian guard who came with Simeon Dizon, pointed a gun at Navarro. The latter asked Cenon
Serrano alias Piping why he was being tied and Cenon Serrano alias Piping answered "You deserve to be tied up
because you are against us." Navarro was brought to the stockade of the civilian guards where he was questioned
and accused Cenon Serrano alias Piping of bringing witnesses to the house of Senator Pablo Angeles David to
testify on the Maliwalu massacre. As Navarro denied the charge, Cenon Serrano aliasPiping hit Navarro with his fist,
struck him with the butt of his .45 caliber pistol and ordered Domingo Cadiang to beat up Navarro. Cadiang did as
he was ordered by beating up Navarro with a piece of bamboo about 4 inches in diameter and less than a meter
long. As a result of the beating Navarro fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping kicked him and ordered him to rise,
and as Navarro was rising Cadiang hit him on the back, so Navarro again fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping
then told Filemon Cenzon to beat up Navarro and Cenzon with the same piece of bamboo struck Navarro on his
back about the waistline as he made an effort to stand up. Cenon Serrano aliasPiping returned to where the jeep
was parked and ordered Felipe Garcia to tie the hands of Simplicio Manguerra. Upon hearing the order of Cenon
Serrano alias Piping, Simplicio Manguerra asked whether he was to be killed. Cenon Serrano answered "I will also
have you killed, you son of a whole." Manguerra clung to Anastacio Reyes begging for mercy but the latter
disengaged himself from him. Cenon Serrano alias Piping pushed Manguerra and ordered Santiago Yumul to beat
him up. Santiago Yumul hit Manguerra with a pestle on the back. Manguerra fell to the ground. Then Cenon
Serrano alias Piping ordered Domingo Cadian and Felipe Garcia to bring Manguerra to the post behind the
stockade. At this juncture Basilio de Guzman arrived and was ordered by Cenon Serrano aliasPiping to kill
Manguerra. De Guzman and Garcia brought Manguerra to a field in Dolores where De Guzman dug a pit while
Garcia stood guard; and after digging the pit De Guzman shot Manguerra twice and shoved Manguerra's body in the
pit and covered it with earth. Afterwards, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon
Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes repaired to the house of Eulogio Serrano in barrio Potrero to report to him that the two
victims were already in barrio Dolores, arriving at barrio Potrero at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As Eulogio
Serrano was not in his house when Cenon Serrano alias Piping arrived, the latter boarded the jeep of the late
Maximino Serrano and drove on it to the town of Bacolor together with Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon
Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes. Upon reaching the second bridge at barrio San Antonio on the way to Bacolor,
Santiago Yumul alighted. The rest resumed driving to town and met Eulogio Serrano that the two men were already
in barrio Dolores. Eulogio told Cenon that he would go to Dolores. Domingo Cadiang was left in the barrio of San
Antonio while Filemon Cenzon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes proceeded to the town of Bacolor.

In the afternoon of 20 October 1950, while Emiliano Manalo known also as Isaias, a civilian guard, was in his house
at barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga, Benjamin Tolentino came and asked him to help him dig a pit at Sitio
Castilang Malati, barrio Dolores, to bury a dead horse of Atilano Gopez. He acceded to his request and helped
Tolentino did it. After digging the pit he went home and then proceeded to his post in Sitio Pigulut Mauli, barrio
Dolores. Upon reaching his post he was called by Eulogio Serrano who was outside the stockade together with
Atilano Gopez, Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino talking with another person inside the stockade who he
later on learned was Pablo Navarro. He heard Eulogio Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people
from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro answered that he was not the one. Eulogio Serrano then told Atilano Gopez to
take Pablo Navarro out of the stockade and to bring him along with them (Eulogio Serrano, Atilano Gopez, Benjamin
Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra and Emiliano Manalo) to barrio Potrero. When they reached sitio Castilang Malati
Eulogio Serrano ordered Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino to shoot Pablo Navarro from behind. Melchor
Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino fired one shot each simultaneously. Navarro fell down dead. Eulogio Serrano
ordered them to bring the dead body of Pablo Navarro to the pit that Benjamin Tolentino and Emiliano Manalo had
dug and to cover it with earth. Afterwards, they walked back to barrio Dolores. Sometime after the elections in
November 1951, Atilano Gopez ordered Emiliano Manalo and Benjamin Tolentino to exhume the bones of the late
Pablo Navarro, put them in a sack and threw them into a creek. On 6 December 1951 the chief of police of Bacolor,
Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Eulogio Serrano and Emiliano Manalo, accompanied by Constabulary
soldiers, exhumed the bones of the late Pablo Navarro.

On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang,
Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were charged with illegal detention with murder for the
death of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On 12 February 1952, upon
motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the information to
testify as witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano was charged with the same crime in criminal case No. 1819
but has not yet been apprehended. Cenon Serrano alias Piping charged with the same crime was also at large but
later on arrested and brought to trial with his co-defendants in both criminal cases for the death of Pablo Navarro
(case No. 1262) and for the death of Simplicio Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard
against his co-defendants before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses.

After a joint trial with criminal case No. 1263 for the death of Simplicio Manguerra, the Court found. —

. . . Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul
and Filemon Cenzon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1262 (for
the death of Pablo Navarro) and, appreciating No aggravating or mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences
each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also sentenced to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Pablo Navarro in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.

Only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon have appealed.

The appellants deny having been in the house of Eulogio Serrano at barrio Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, in the
evening of 16 October 1950, when Eulogio Serrano told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him
there. Domingo Cadiang claims that on 16 October 1950 he was at the farm of Paquito Liongson in the barrio of San
Antonio helping his in-laws thresh palay that they had promised and agreed to do; and that on 17, 18 and 19
October he was in the yard of his house cutting kapok trees for fuel. Filemon Cenzon claims that on 16 October
1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he was on the market place of Bacolor; that on 17 October up
to the early morning of 18 October, he was at Bagac Bay hauling lumber; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning
of 18 October he was already in Bacolor where he refilled the tank of his truck with petrol and thereafter he together
with Juanito Bognot proceeded to Dagupan to deliver lumber for his employer, Manuel Joseph, to the Liberty
Lumber; and that he returned to Bacolor at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day, 19 October, and
brought his truck to the garage of the company and went home. Santiago Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October
1950 he was working as laborer for Martin Tuason and Martin Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October 1950 he
was working as laborer for Martin Tuason to remove a railroad track of the Pampanga Sugar Development
Company leading to Magalang, Pampanga; and from that reason he could not have been with Eulogio Serrano,
Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang and Filemon Cenzon in the evening of 16 October at the house of
Eulogio Serrano, and from 17 to 19 October in the town of Bacolor waiting for Pablo Navarro to carry out the plan of
luring him to barrio Dolores and there kill him. And although they admit to have been in the company of Cenon
Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes, who they claim brought Pablo Navarro and Simplicio Manguerra to
barrio Dolores in the jeep driven by Marcelino Sicat on 20 October 1950, yet they disclaim any knowledge of the plot
to kill them, and that if they ever took a hand in maltreating the victims it was out of fear to Anastacio Reyes and
Cenon Serrano alias Piping, the latter ordering them to inflict injury upon the victims at the point of a gun.

The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity in the murder of Pablo Navarro cannot
overcome the clear and positive testimony of Anastacio Reyes that they were at the house of Eulogio Serrano in the
evening of 16 October 1950 when the latter told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and there kill him; and
that they were together on 17, 18 and 19 October waiting for Pablo Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to
barrio Dolores, and on 20 October when they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him.
It is difficult to believe that a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring along with him other persons
who know nothing about the plan just to witness the commission of the crime. If they were not in the know, as they
contend, they also would have been done away with right then and there, in the same way Simplicio Manguerra,
who was not to be killed, had been done away with, to prevent him from reporting to the authorities or from testifying
against them in Court; or they also would have been sent away upon arriving at barrio Dolores, in the same way that
Marcelino Sicat, the driver of the jeep on which they rode in going to the said barrio, was sent away. The way the
appellants were seated in the jeep in going to barrio Dolores-Anastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping at
the front seat with the driver and the three appellants on the two parallel seats inside the jeep-belies the assertion
that they were prevented by Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes from running away upon learning that
criminal act was to be committed. The assertion that Cenon Serrano alias Piping pointed his gun at them at the
gasoline station, where they stopped to refuel, to prevent them from deserting, is unbelievable, because the
gasoline station is located in the heart of the town of Bacolor, in a busy street where the slightest commotion or any
sign of distress would easily draw the attention of the nearby traffic officer directing the traffic.

The fact that in the evening of 16 October 1950, the three appellants and their co-defendants were gathered at the
house of Eulogio Serrano, over-all commander of the civilian guard and temporary police organizations, who
ordered them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him there, because he had been including and
prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David to inform him about and to testify on the Maliwalu
massacre; that pursuant to the plan laid out by Eulogio Serrano, from 17 to 20 October 1950 the appellants joined
Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes in waiting for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese
stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to frequent; that they were actually with Cenon Serrano alias Piping
and Anastacio Reyes when Pablo Navarro was lured to go to Dolores on the pretext of going to San Fernando and
then to Angeles for a "good time" after a drinking spree in bacolor; that they took turns in manhandling the victim as
he was hogtied and rendered helpless; and the fact that the appellants went into hiding after the incident together
with Cenon Serrano alias Piping in the barrio of Escribania, show that they were in league with Eulogio Serrano and
Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Pablo Navarro. Each of them is, therefore, guilty as co-principal.

The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence
against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the
conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy.
And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial
court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone
testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,"1 applies
only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial,2 where the defendant
has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in
crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with
great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.3

The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the death
penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants.

G.R. No. L-48185 August 18, 1941

FELICIANO B. GARDINER, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, ET AL., respondents.

Feliciano B. Gardiner in his own behalf.

Jose Alejandrino for respondent Eugenio Villegas.
Francisco M. Ramos for respondent Maximo Manlapid.

OZAETA, J.:

This is an original petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit the testimony of Catalino
Fernandez, one of the accused in criminal case No. 6598, to prove the alleged conspiracy between him and his five
coaccused, respondents herein.
It appears that on October 30, 1940, the herein petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, filed an
information against the said Catalino Fernandez and the herein respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas,
Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired together to kill, and that
they did kill, one Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premiditation.

Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the trial of the latter, the
former was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of counsel for
the defense, the respondent judge did no permit the witness Catalino Fernandez to testify against his coaccused, on
the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators until the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of
Court. A written motion for reconsideration, supported with lenthy argument, was filed by the fiscal to no avail.
Hence the present petition for mandamus.

The only question raised here is the interpretation of section 12 of rule 123, which reads as follows:

SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, which provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy may be given in evidence. This rule has a well-settled meaning in jurisprudence, but apparently the
respondents completely missed it. It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial
declaration of a conspirator — not to his testimony by way of direct evidence. For illustration, let us suppose that
after the formation but before the consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and his five
coaccused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he and his coaccused were going to kill
Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of Fernandez's friend to the effect that Fernandez borrowed his bolo and
told him that he (Fernandez) and his coaccused were going to kill Gaudencion Viviar would be admissible against
Fernandez, but not against his coaccused unless the conspiracy between them be proven first. It is admissible
against Fernandez because the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him (section 7, rule 123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not admissible against Fernandez's
coaccused because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter alios as to his coaccused and, therefore,
cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the act of one
conspirator is the act of all the coconspirators.

To further explain the rule in the language of the jurisprudence on the subject, we add:

... The evidence adduced in court by the coconspirators as witnesses are not declarations of conspirators,
but directly testimony to the facts to which they testify. Aside from the discredit which attaches to them as
accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to establish the facts to which they testify. The rule for
which counsel contends is applicable only when it sought to introduce extrajudicial declarations and
statements of coconspirators (People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 P. 78, 84.)

There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish a conspiracy in order to permit a witness to testify
what one or all of several accused persons did; and evidence adduced by coconspirators as witnesses,
which is direct evidence of the facts to which they testify, is not within the rule requiring a conspiracy to be
shown as a prerequisite to its admissibility. ... (22 C. J. S. 1293; see also 2 Whartoon's Criminal Evidence,
1189; cox and others v. State, 8 Tex Cr. App. 254, 303, 34 Am. Rep. 746; White v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R.
559, 132, S. W. [2d] 518; Bannister v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 158, 15 S. W. [2d] 629; Bland v. State, 89 S. W.
[2d] 996, 998.)

Let the writ of mandate be issued as prayed for by the petitioner, with costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 112262. April 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and WILFREDO
TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED. - The rights invoked by
appellants are premised upon Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution then in force. The aforequoted
provision was interpreted and expounded upon in the case of Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, et al., (121 SCRA 538)
wherein this Court laid down the procedure to be followed in custodial investigations, thus: x x x . At the time a
person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means - by
telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the duty of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS AVAILABLE WHERE INVESTIGATION BEGAN TO FOCUS ON A PARTICULAR
SUSPECT. - As interpreted in the jurisdiction of their origin, these rights begin to be available where the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, and the police carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.
3. ID.; ID,; ID.; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED OBTAINED WITHOUT BEING INFORMED OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INADMISSIBLE. - A reading of the challenged decision shows that the court
below relied upon appellants confessions to disaffirm their credibility and to impugn their denial of complicity in
the commission of the felony. This the lower court cannot do because, absent any showing that appellants were
duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of Rights, their confessions made before Patrolman
Cario are inadmissible against them and cannot be used in support of their conviction.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR PERFORMANCE OFFICIAL
ACTS DOES NOT APPLY TO IN CUSTODY INVESTIGATION. - As we have heretofore held, it is now
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior to questioning, the confessant was warned
of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of regularity of official acts does not apply
during in-custody investigation. Trial courts should further keep in mind that even if the confession of the
accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
5. ID.; ID.; EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION; BINDING ONLY UPON THE CONFESSANT; REASON. As to the
implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be placed on the imputation
therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not fall under the exceptions thereto,
especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession is
hearsay.
6. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CONVINCING AND TRUSTWORTHY TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE
WITNESS IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. - It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found
convincing and trustworthy by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(People vs. Catubig, 195 SCRA 505) We also see no reason to deviate from the trial courts observation that
Penalvers testimony bore the attributes of truth, having been delivered in a candid and straightforward manner.
We have scrupulously examined the testimony of Penalver and we find the same to be categorical and candid,
untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It creditably chronicles the material details in the
commission of the crimes in question, and should accordingly be given full credence.
7. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. - It
bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses deserve great respect
since it had the opportunity to hear and observe their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand and,
therefore, it was in a better position to discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not based on their
deportment while testifying.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITHOUT EVIL MOTIVE AGAINST ACCUSED, ENTITLED TO FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT. - There was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of Penalver that might
have led him to give fabricated testimony against appellants. He, and even appellant Camat, declared in open
court that they did not know each other before the gruesome incident happened on September 1, 1985. Having
no motive to testify falsely, his positive testimony is sufficient for conviction. When there is no evidence
indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that
he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION;
AVAILABLE TO ACCUSED DURING TRIAL AND NOT DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. - The right
of confrontation is one of the rights of an accused enumerated in Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
In a case decided in 1979, the above provision was invoked by an accused in claiming that his extrajudicial
confessions made prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were illegally obtained because his
constitutional right to counsel was disregarded. The Court, citing People vs. Jose, et al., clarified that the
phrase criminal prosecutions in the said constitutional provision shall be interpreted to mean proceedings
before the trial court, which in its most expanded concepts is from arraignment up to the rendition of the
decision. It will also be observed that under both the 1964 Rules of Court, and the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the right of confrontation is specified as a right of the accused at the trial. We accordingly reiterate
that an accuseds constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face is limited to proceedings before the trial
court. Accordingly, appellants reliance upon this constitutional right is evidently misplaced as the same is
available to him at the trial and not during a custodial investigation.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF EACH PARTY TO CHOOSE ITS
OWN WITNESSES. - Appellants apprehension that the unidentified witness may be someone who is harboring
ill motives against appellant Camat will not subvert the case of the prosecution. It is the prerogative of each
party to choose its own witness in accordance with its own assessment of the evidence it needs to prove its
case. If appellants felt that the vendor might have a grudge against Camat, there was nothing to prevent them
from determining that fact on the witness stand by calling said vendor via compulsory process available to them
both under the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
11. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; REQUISITE FOR DEFENSE TO PROSPER; CASE AT BAR. - We
agree with the lower court in discarding the stories of appellants which were designed to provide them their
respective alibis coetaneous with the commission of the offense. Time and again, we have held that alibi is one
of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable but also because it is easy of fabrication without much opportunity for checking or rebutting it. For a
defense of alibi to prosper, we have repeatedly stressed, it must not only be shown that the accused was not at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission but also that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at that time. Appellants, from their own testimony in court, were present not only
in the same municipality but in the same district where the crime was committed. We take judicial notice of the
fact that Bagong Silang and Sanchez Streets are just a few meters away from Quirino Avenue and, therefore, it
was not impossible for them to be present at the scene of the crime at the time it was perpetrated.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BECOMES LESS PLAUSIBLE WHEN MAINLY ESTABLISHED BY ACCUSED HIMSELF
AND HIS RELATIVES. - Alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is mainly established by the
accused himself and his immediate relatives who, in the present case, are respectively appellants mother and
mother-in-law, because they would naturally be expected to make statements in his favor. Furthermore, the
positive identification of the malefactors made by witness Penalver negates appellants submissions on their
respective alibis.
13. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; HOMICIDE, UNDERSTOOD IN ITS
GENERIC NAME; ABSORBS ALL OTHER ACTS WHICH DO NOT RESULT TO DEATH. - Regarding the
designation of the offense for which appellants were convicted based on the criminal charge in the information,
the present jurisprudential rule is that appellants should have been indicted only for the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no crime of robbery with
homicide and frustrated homicide. The term homicide in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is
to be understood in its generic sense, absorbing not only the act which results in death but also all other acts
producing anything short of death, assuming that death occurs by reason or on the occasion of the robbery,
and is designated as such regardless of the number of homicides and physical injuries committed. Hence, the
frustrated homicide aspect of the present charge is deemed merged in the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide defined and penalized under the law.
14. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INDEMNITY FOR DEATH RAISED TO P50,000.00. - The civil indemnity for the death
Nelson Sinoy is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with the present jurisprudential policy.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellants.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellants Armando Rodriguez Camat, alias Amboy Camat, and Wilfredo Tanyag del Rosario, alias
Willie, were charged in Criminal Case No. 19841 of the Regional Trial Court of the then Municipality of Makati,
Branch 147, with the so-called special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide committed in
Paranaque, Metro Manila.
The information therefor, filed on October 21, 1985 with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, alleges:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1985, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and without the consent and
against the will of Gonzalo Penalver and Nelson Sinoy, and by means of force, threats, violence and intimidation
employed upon the persons of said Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously divest the said Gonzalo Penalver of his one (1) Black leather clutch bag containing plier(s), test valve,
longnose and one (1) Sanwa Electric tester, valued at P150.00, with the total amount of P150.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Gonzalo Penalver, in the aforementioned amount of P150.00; that on the occasion of the
said Robbery (Hold-Up) immediately thereafter, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab said Nelson Sinoy, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal stab
wounds, which directly caused his death; that as a further consequence, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab said Gonzalo Penalver, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious and mortal stab wounds, which ordinarily would cause the death of said Gonzalo Penalver, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or accident independent of the will of the said accused, that is
due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Gonzalo Penalver, which prevented his death.1
At their arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After due hearing, the lower court
rendered judgment2 on June 19, 1987 finding both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide, sentencing them to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering them to indemnify the heirs of Nelson Sinoy in the amount of P30,000 and Gonzalo Penalver in the sum of
P10,000.00.
Hence, this appeal, with appellants assigning in their joint brief a single error submitting that the trial court
gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated
omicide.3
The factual findings of the court a quo are sustained by the evidence on record, and we reproduce the same:
About 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 1, 1985, Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver, both members of
the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, were walking along Quirino Avenue,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. They had just come from Camp Claudio where they attended a birthday party. They were
in civilian clothes.
While walking along Quirino Avenue, they noticed two persons trailing them closely, about ten meters away.
The place was well-lighted. Gonzalo Penalver was carrying a clutch bag, containing a Sanwa electric tester (Exhibit
1). They crossed the street ostensibly to avoid the two men following them.
On(e) of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy and kicked the latter. Armando Camat followed del
Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat who in turn stabbed the
former, hitting him at the right rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became outbalanced. Wilfredo del Rosario then
grabbed the clutch bag from him (Penalver).
Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid of somebody who identified
himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
 Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital despite the efforts of Dr. Vittorio Pantig to save him. Dr.
Pantig conducted an exploratory lapar(o)tomy on the abdomen of Nelson Sinoy and found massive bleeding in the
abdominal cavity, and partial damage to the kidney, pancreas and the diaphragm. He tried to control the bleeding
but despite blood transfusion, the blood pressure of the patient went down to zero.
Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2, 1985 after his wound was
already sutured at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. At the AFP Medical Center, Dr. Benedicto Mina took care of the
patient. He gave blood transfusion to the patient. The patient was discharged from the hospital only on March 15,
1986.4
In traversing the criminal charge, appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied any participation in the
commission of the felony.
Appellant Armando R. Camat claimed that at around 7:00 to 8:30 in the evening of September 1, 1985, he was
already in his house located at Bagong Silang Street, Baclaran, Paranaque resting and preparing to sleep for the
night. He testified that he was at the saklaan working as a card dealer from 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. of that day.5
This testimony of appellant Camat. was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Filomena Macabangon, who stated
that she is certain Camat was at their house at around 7:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. on September 1, 1985 as the said
appellant and his family lived with her and her other children at Bagong Silang Street.6
For his part, appellant Wilfredo T. del Rosario contended that from 5:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M. of September
1,1989, he and his wife were are their stall selling vegetables along a sidewalk of Quirino Avenue in Baclaran. He
went home at 7:00 oclock in the evening and never left their house located at Sanchez St., Baclaran, Paranaque
because he was very tired that day.7
Magdalena del Rosario, mother of appellant Del Rosario supported the story of the latter by testifying that she
saw her son vending vegetables up to 7:00 P.M. and that he have never left the house after 7:00 oclock in the
evening of September 1, 1989.8
Both appellants claim that they did not know each other prior to the date of the commission of the crime and
that they met each other only after they were arrested and brought to the police precinct.9
Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985, stated on the
witness stand that appellant Camat orally admitted to him his (Camat s) participation in the killing of the soldier
during interrogation at the police precinct.10 In addition, Camat also allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del
Rosario and one Roland as his co-conspirators in the crime charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as the
one who actually stabbed Sinoy.11
With this information, Patrolman Cario and another policeman traced the whereabouts of Del Rosario and,
when they found him, they invited him for questioning. In the police station, appellant Del Rosario allegedly
confessed to Patrolman Cario his involvement in the crime and informed the latter that the electric tester could be
recovered from his relatives.12
The investigation of the case centered upon Camat only after the latter was pointed to by a vendor who
allegedly saw what happened during the night of September 1, 1985;As fate would have it, Camat was arrested by
Paraaque policemen on October 11, 1985 for acts of lasciviousness, upon the complaint of his sister-in-law. Since
Camat fitted the description given earlier by the eyewitness to the investigating policemen, Patrolman Cario fetched
the vendor to verify the identity of Camat. At the police station, said witness recognized and identified Camat as the
one who killed Sinoy. On the witness stand, Patrolman Cario refused to give the identity of the anonymous vendor-
witness who was allegedly afraid of the accused, but the policeman promised that he would present said witness if
ordered to do so by the court.13
In support of their lone assignment of error, appellants insist that the trial court cannot rely on the extrajudicial
confession of appellant Camat as a basis for their conviction because such confession was obtained during
custodial investigation in violation of their constitutional rights. Correlatively, appellants aver that the lower court also
erred in making an inference of guilt from the extrajudicial confession of appellant Del Rosario wherein the latter
supposedly gave to the investigating policeman the name of his relative in possession of the electric tester.14
The rights invoked by appellants are premised upon Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution 15 then in
force, and which provided:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The aforequoted provision was interpreted and expounded upon in the case of Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, et
al.,16 wherein this Court laid down the procedure to be followed in custodial investigations, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means - by
telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the duty of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in the jurisdiction of their origin, these rights begin to be available where the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, and the police carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements.17

A reading of the challenged decision shows that the court below relied upon appellants confessions to disaffirm
their credibility and to impugn their denial of complicity in the commission of the felony. This the lower court cannot
do because, absent any showing that appellants were duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of
Rights, their confessions made before Patrolman Cario are inadmissible against them and cannot be used in
support of their conviction.
As we have heretofore held, it is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior to
questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of
regularity of official acts does not apply during in-custody investigation.18 Trial courts should further keep in mind
that even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.19
As to the implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be placed on the
imputation therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not fall under the exceptions
thereto,20 especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession
is hearsay.21
However, even disregarding the extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the judgment of conviction rendered by
the lower court stands and can be sustained. Worthy of consideration is the trial courts conclusion that (a)lthough
there is only one (1) eyewitness presented by the prosecution in the person of Gonzalo Penalver, the Court is of the
opinion and so holds that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable
doubt.22
It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the trial court,
is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23 We also see no reason to deviate from the trial
courts observation that Penalver s testimony bore the attributes of truth, having been delivered in a candid and
straightforward manner.
We have scrupulously examined the testimony of Penalver and we find the same to be categorical and candid,
untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It creditably chronicles the material details in the
commission of the crimes in question, and should accordingly be given full credence.
It bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses deserve great respect
since it had the opportunity to hear and observe their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand and,
therefore, it was in a better position to discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not based on their
deportment while testifying.24
Additionally, there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of Penalver that might have led him
to give fabricated testimony against appellants. He, and even appellant Camat, declared in open court that they did
not know each other before the gruesome incident happened on September 1, 1985.25 Having no motive to testify
falsely, his positive testimony is sufficient for conviction. When there is no evidence indicating that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.26
We also take note of the fact that prosecution witness Penalver positively identified appellants as the persons
who robbed him and killed Sinoy. He could not have been mistaken in identifying appellants as the scene of the
crime was sufficiently illuminated and he even remembers that appellant Del Rosario was wearing faded
camouflage clothing at the time of the robbery.27 Thus, appellants claim that witness Penalver failed to identify
them28 is without merit. His narration of the incident and his identification of the malefactors are direct and definite.
Appellants also contend that the failure of the prosecution to present in court the police informer who allegedly
pointed to appellant Camat in the police precinct deprived them of their constitutional right of confrontation.29
The right of confrontation is one of the rights of an accused enumerated in Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution30 which provided that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. x x x
In a case decided in 1979,31 the above provision was invoked by an accused in claiming that his extrajudicial
confessions made prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution32 were illegally obtained because his constitutional
right to counsel was disregarded. The Court, citing People vs. Jose, et al.,33 clarified that the phrase criminal
prosecutions in the said constitutional provision shall be interpreted to mean proceedings before the trial court,
which in its most expanded concepts is from arraignment up to the rendition of the decision. It will also be observed
that under both the 1964 Rules of Court, and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the right of confrontation is
specified as a right of the accused at the trial.34 We accordingly reiterate that an accuseds constitutional right to
meet the witnesses face to face is limited to proceedings before the trial court. Accordingly, appellants reliance upon
this constitutional right is evidently misplaced as the same is available to him at the trial and not during a custodial
investigation.
Appellants apprehension that the unidentified witness may be someone who is harboring ill motives against
appellant Camat will not subvert the case of the prosecution. It is the prerogative of each party to choose its own
witnesses in accordance with its own assessment of the evidence it needs to prove its case. 35 If appellants felt that
the vendor might have a grudge against Camat, there was nothing to prevent them from determining that fact on the
witness stand by calling said vendor via compulsory process available to them both under the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
We agree with the lower court in discarding the stories of appellants which were designed to provide them their
respective alibis coetaneous with the commission of the offense. Time and again, we have held that alibi is one of
the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable
but also because it is easy of fabrication without much opportunity for checking or rebutting it. 36 For a defense of
alibi to prosper, we have repeatedly stressed, it must not only be shown that the accused was not at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at that time.37
Appellants, from their own testimony in court, were present not only in the same municipality but in the same
district where the crime was committed. We take judicial notice of the fact that Bagong Silang and Sanchez Streets
are just a few meters away from Quirino Avenue and, therefore, it was not impossible for them to be present at the
scene of the crime at the time it was perpetrated.
Also, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is mainly established by the accused himself and his
immediate relatives who, in the present case, are respectively appellants mother and mother-in-law, because they
would naturally be expected to make statements in his favor.38 Furthermore, the positive identification of the
malefactors made by witness Penalver negates appellants submissions on their respective alibis.39
 Regarding the designation of the offense for which appellants were convicted based on the criminal charge in
the information, the present jurisprudential rule is that appellants should have been indicted only for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no crime of robbery
with homicide and frustrated homicide. The term homicide in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is
to be understood in its generic sense, absorbing not only the act which results in death but also all other acts
producing anything short of death, assuming that death occurs by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, and is
designated as such regardless of the number of homicides and physical injuries committed.40 Hence, the frustrated
homicide aspect of the present charge is deemed merged in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
defined and penalized under the law.*
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS that appellants
are declared guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and the civil indemnity for the death of Nelson Sinoy is
hereby increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with the present jurisprudential policy.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123545 October 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ "MADELO," JIM MERCENE y BUSAR @ "EMI," CARLITO DECENA y
PARDELA, and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, and JOHN DOES, accused,
RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ "MADELO" and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, accused-appellants.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 8768-SP,
promulgated on August 25, 1995, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide, and
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:

At around two o’clock in the morning of August 27, 1993, Rodelo Palijon,1 Carlos Decena,2 and Jim Mercene entered
the yard of the residence in San Pablo City of the spouses Gonzalo and Mellorequina Reyes. Both were elderly
returnees (balikbayans), recently arrived from the United States.

Decena entered the house by climbing a post and removing some glass panes from the jalousy windows. Once
inside, Decena and Mercene positioned themselves near the couple’s bedroom door and waited for someone to
open it so they could take cash and jewelry from the bedroom. Palijon remained outside the house, as look-out.

Around four o’clock A.M., Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. She did not notice the intruders.
Decena then followed her to the toilet where he kicked and boxed her. Mrs. Reyes managed to shout for help before
she fainted. Mr. Reyes rushed to assist his wife. Decena met him, with a steel-edged stool and struck him hard
several times. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on the floor. The robbers ransacked the house then escaped.

Prosecution witness Merly Reyes Alvero, a daughter of the Reyes couple, who lived some distance away, was
roused from her sleep by a phone call from her cousin, Edith Bicomong. A hysterical Bicomong told Alvero that the
latter’s parents were hospitalized and in critical condition. Alvero dashed off to the hospital and was able to talk to
her mother. Alvero then proceeded to the house of her parents. An inspection of the bedroom of the spouses Reyes
revealed that cash amounting to P17,000.00 and various pieces of jewelry belonging to her mother, worth
P100,000.00 were missing.

At 10:55 A.M., Mr. Gonzales died from his injuries. The immediate cause of death was "cardio-respiratory failure"
caused by "severe contusion hematoma of head (right side, liver, and chest wall due to severe beatings, with
suspicious multiple fractures, ribs, 5th and 7th, right.")3
In an Information dated October 14, 1993, the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City charged Rodelo
Palijon, Jim Mercene, Carlos Decena, Myra Pria, and several John Does, with robbery and homicide, allegedly
committed as follows:

"That on or about August 27, 1993, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain, did then and there wilfully unlawfully and feloniously enter the house belonging to septuagenarian
spouses GONZALO REYES and MELLOREQUINA BAGSIC REYES by means of forcibly detaching a glass
window, and once inside said house, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away P17,000.00 cash, one Sanyo Casette, one transformer-converter, and several pieces of
jewelry belonging to said spouses, and on occasion of such robbery, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault the said spouses, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries that
subsequently caused the death of said Gonzalo Reyes.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."4

On November 9, 1993, the accused were arraigned before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch 30,5 and pleaded
"Not Guilty" to the offense in the charge sheet. Both parties waived pre-trial. Trial on the merits then ensued.

On December 15, 1993, counsel for accused Decena and Mercene moved that the two be allowed to withdraw their
earlier plea of "Not Guilty" and be re-arraigned to allow them to enter a plea of "Guilty" to the lesser offense of
homicide. The prosecution raised no opposition and the motion was granted. Decena and Mercene were then re-
indicted for homicide and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded "Guilty" to the charge. Both were then sentenced as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt by their spontaneous plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of Homicide, the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs
of the offended party the sum of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."6

Trial then proceeded against the remaining co-accused Rodelo Palijon and Myra Pria. The prosecution’s case was
propelled in the main by the testimony of Mercene, who gave evidence against said co-accused. The trial court
synthesized the testimony of Mercene as follows:

"…Jim Mercene points to the herein accused Palijon and Pria as co-conspirators in the commission of the crime, not
to mention Decena who like him (Mercene) already pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. The accused
Mercene and Decena participated in the commission and consummation of the offense with Myra Pria as having
initiated the plan, knowing as she does that the victims are balikbayans and moneyed. The plan was completely
hatched in the house of Palijon which is near the house of the victims. In the evening of August 26, [1993], the live-
in partners Decena and Pria and the latter’s child slept in the house of Palijon. At 2:00 o’clock in the morning of
August 27, 1993, Decena, Palijon and Mercene executed the act, with Palijon climbing the concrete fence and
Decena climbing a post to open a jalousy window. After Decena had opened the jalousy window Mercene was able
to enter the house and he (Mercene) entered through the door with Decena opening the same. Palijon meanwhile
stayed outside the house near the door. Pria stayed in the house of Palijon. He and Decena executed the acts with
Decena hitting Mrs. Reyes causing her physical injuries, as well as Mr. Reyes, the latter having died due to the
injuries sustained by him. Shouts were heard from outside saying "Ate, Ate, what happened (?)" which caused
Mercene to run away going towards the direction of his cousin’s house and proceeded to the BLTB Station. He did
not return to the house of Palijon. Before the commission of the crime, Mercene knew already that Decena and Pria
are live-in partners. Mercene had been Decena’s co-inmate at the City Jail of Lucena (City). Later, Mercene saw
Palijon in the CIS-Headquarters, Camp Nakar, Lucena City. They were not able to carry away the articles mentioned
in the Information. It was Palijon who pointed to Mercene which led to the latter’s investigation by the CIS-
Investigator leading to his arrest and detention. The investigation on Mercene was not in writing. Mercene also saw
Decena and Pria in the City Jail of San Pablo but was not able to talk to them.

"Mercene went to Brgy. Sta. Monica for three times with Decena and they went to the house of Pria on August 24,
1993. At that time Decena was staying in the house of Palijon and Decena could not stay in the house of Myra
because the latter’s parents were very angry with Decena. It was Myra who mentioned to Mercene that the victims
are already in the Philippines from the United States and upon knowing this matter, the four of them, namely,
Palijon, Decena, Pria and Mercene planned the robbery. Decena was arrested in Carmona, Cavite at the instance of
Pria. From August 24 to 26, 1993, Mercene stayed in the house of Palijon, with Decena and Pria. Palijon was the
one who pointed to Mercene and Decena."7

Palijon raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He said he was in Pila, Laguna from August 23-28, 1993, helping to
construct an extension to the house of Arcadio Pangilinan, whom he presented as a witness. He claimed that he
was tortured by the police investigators and interrogated without the assistance of counsel.

Pria also denied any involvement in the incident. She testified that on August 26, 1993, her father drove her out of
their house for being the paramour of Decena, a married man. Decena and she then sought shelter in the house of
Palijon where they stayed the night. On August 27, 1993, they were wakened by a commotion. Outside, she found
that the Reyes couple had been robbed and assaulted in their home. Mrs. Reyes was a first-degree cousin of her
mother, so she proceeded to the Reyes house. There, she found Edith Bicomong who asked her to get a tricycle so
the injured spouses could be brought to a hospital. Before she did, she saw her second cousin, Merly Reyes Alvero,
arrive in her car. It was only in October 1993 that Decena told her of his involvement in the incident. She informed
Mrs. Reyes and Alvero, who asked her to help in the arrest of Decena. On October 7, 1993, the police investigators
brought her to Carmona, Cavite where Decena was arrested. The law enforcers brought her to the Philippine
National Police-Criminal Investigation Service (PNP-CIS) headquarters in Lucena City where she was investigated
and asked to sign a waiver, without the assistance of a counsel. She claims she was not given copies of the
statements of witnesses for the prosecution named in the Information, nor was there a preliminary investigation
conducted by the City Prosecutor. She avers that the only reason she was implicated, was because she was the
live-in partner of Decena.8

Decena testified for Pria. He said Pria did not know about the plan to rob the Reyes couple. She was asleep when
he robbed the Reyeses. He decided to rob the Reyeses because they disapproved of his live-in relationship with
Pria and he hated the angry looks they gave him. He even said he had tried robbing the house twice before. He told
her of the robbery and assault only after they transferred to Carmona, Cavite. He initially kept silent on Pria’s non-
participation since he was angry at her for causing his arrest.

The court a quo found the prosecution’s evidence convincing and disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
Rodelo Palijon y Urhina and Myra Pria y Bagsic each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of:

"1. Reclusion perpetua for the death of Gonzalo Reyes;

"2, Four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional for the infliction of
serious physical injuries to (sic) Mellorequina Reyes;

"3. To pay the heirs of said deceased the sum of P100,000.00 at P50,000.00 each of the said accused;

"4. For lack of evidence to prove the civil liability of both accused of the medical expenses of Mellorequina
Reyes no award could be made;

"5. Both accused are entitled to the full credit of their preventive imprisonment; and

"6. To pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."9

On September 6, 1995, Palijon filed his notice of appeal to this Court, while Pria moved for reconsideration of the
trial court’s decision.

On October 11, 1995, the court denied Pria’s motion for reconsideration.
On October 18, 1995, Pria filed her notice of appeal.

In his brief, Palijon assigns the sole error that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RODELO PALIJON OF THE

CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant Pria assigned in her brief the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MYRA PRIA IS A CO-CONSPIRATOR WITH THE
OTHER ACCUSED JIM MERCENE, RODELO PALIJON AND CARLITO DECENA.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROBBERY HAS BEEN CONSUMMATED WHEN
THERE WAS NO SHOWING OR PROOF ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ASPORTATION
HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT MYRA PRIA WITH ROBBERY
HOMICIDE WHEN ROBBERY ITSELF HAS BEEN PROVED AS CONCLUSIVELY AS ANY OTHER
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT
TO WARRANT CONVICTION.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS.

We find pertinent the following issues:

(1) Was there a violation of due process in the case of appellant Myra Pria?

(2) Did the trial court correctly convict appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide instead of the lesser
offense of homicide?

(3) Was the guilt of appellants established beyond reasonable doubt?

On the first issue, Pria claims her arrest was illegal;10 that PNP-CIS operatives had no warrant of arrest when they
took her; that there was no preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor; that she was not properly
informed she was one of the accused in this case, thus her right to due process was violated.11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in turn, argues that appellant Pria had already waived the rights she
invokes. The OSG points that Pria did not question the legality of her arrest immediately after detention; that she
entered a plea on arraignment, thus waiving her rights to question any illegality in the conduct of her arrest.

Nowhere in the records can we find any objection by appellant Pria to the irregularity of her arrest before her
arraignment. Any irregularity attendant to her arrest was deemed cured when she voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court with her entry of plea during her arraignment and by actively participating in the
trial.12She pleaded on arraignment to the Information filed against her and her co-accused.13 These acts clearly
constitute a waiver against any unlawful restraint of liberty to which she may have been subjected.14

Pria avers that since no preliminary investigation was conducted on her case, her right to due process was violated.
The records also show that Pria signed a waiver of her detention dated October 7, 1993, with the assistance of
counsel at the office of the inquest prosecutor.15 In said waiver, she asked for a preliminary investigation. Other than
the prosecutor’s certification that a preliminary investigation was conducted,16 there are no records showing that a
preliminary investigation was indeed conducted. When arraigned, appellant Pria pleaded to the charge sheet and
did not protest that no preliminary investigation had been conducted as far as she was concerned. The right to a
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea on
arraignment.17 By her failure to invoke her right to a preliminary investigation, Pria forfeited her right to one and she
can no longer invoke it for the first time on appeal.18

On the second issue. It is Pria’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove the vital element of asportation in
robbery. Pria argues that from the testimony of Mercene there was no unlawful taking of any property of the Reyes
spouses.19 Hence, assuming without admitting, that Pria was indeed one of the conspirators, she could only be
convicted of the lesser offense of homicide, and not robbery with homicide.

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against persons,
the homicide being a mere incident of the robbery.20 To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, it is essential
that the robbery itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt.21 The onus probandi is, thus, upon the prosecution to
prove the following: (1) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or by using force
upon things; (2) that the property taken belongs to another; (3) that the taking was characterized by animus lucrandi;
and (4) that on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed.22

The prosecution presented both object and testimonial evidence that personal property of the victims were taken.
Alvero testified that she was familiar with her mother’s jewelry having borrowed some of the items on past
occasions. After she inspected her parents’ house she discovered cash and valuable pieces of jewelry
missing.23Alvero also identified, in open court, the broken jewelry box, some pieces of fancy jewelry and other items
of her mother recovered at the crime scene.24 Under cross-examination, Alvero was categorical in her account that
the more expensive pieces of jewelry of her mother were missing.25 The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
Alvero is entitled to great respect. It is binding on this court in the absence of any showing that the trial court’s
finding was not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.26 We
also note that the physical evidence of the prosecution corroborated Alvero’s account that her parents had been
robbed. Physical evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates highly in the hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.27

On the third issue. It is appellant Pria’s contention that the prosecution’s evidence implicating her is weak and
shaky. She points out that when her co-accused planned the robbery in appellant Palijon’s house, she was some
distance from them and could not have heard their scheme. She also avers that she was sleeping at the time of the
incident, and did not participate in the robbery.

In the instant case, both prosecution witness Mercene and defense witness Decena admitted the existence of a
conspiracy to rob the victims.28 However, their versions as to the participation of appellant Pria differ. Mercene
testified that he and his co-accused agreed to enter and rob the house of the Reyes couple during the wee hours of
the morning of August 27, 1993. According to Mercene it was appellant Pria who: (1) informed them of the arrival of
the Reyes spouses from abroad; (2) told them that the balikbayans had a lot of money being; and (3) told them how
to enter the house.29 Decena, admits that Pria was present when they plotted the robbery,30 but vehemently insists
that she had no participation in its planning. Decena claims that Pria was there only to attend to their child,31 and she
was sleeping when he and Mercene broke into the house of the victims.32 To buttress Decena’s testimony, the
defense presented three of his letters to Pria, written in prison, clearing her of any knowledge or participation in the
crime.33

After reviewing the transcripts and circumstances extant to the case, we find that the trial court did not err in giving
credence to the testimony of Mercene. The latter testified that Pria was only 1-1/2 meters away from them when
they were plotting the robbery.34 The house of Palijon where they hatched their plan is a small, one-room house with
an area of approximately twenty (20) meters only.35 Both facts clearly show that Pria could easily participate in the
discussion of the conspirators. Mercene’s declarations are positive testimonial evidence. They outweigh Decena’s
unsubstantiated denial of Pria’s participation in the criminal conspiracy. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony
of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.36

In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime scene, Pria, as a conspirator, is as liable for robbery
with homicide just as if she had participated in the actual robbing and killing. At the instant that the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and pursue it, each and every member of the conspiracy is criminally
liable for the felony committed by anyone of them.37

Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of
the testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could not be taken against him under the principle of
res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet as formulated in Sections 2838 and 30,39 Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.

Palijon and Pria submit that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of a conspiracy and, did not overcome
the presumption of innocence in their favor.

There is conspiracy to commit a crime, where at the time the malefactors of the crime, their actions impliedly
showed a unity of purpose to attain their illicit ends.40 One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts in effect the
criminal design of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.41

In seeking an acquittal, appellant Palijon further contends that the trial court erred when it convicted him on the
basis of the confession of his co-accused. Palijon argues that in determining the weight and sufficiency of the
admissions of a self-confessed co-conspirator, the trial court should have exercised the greatest caution and held
that such confession should have been corroborated by other evidence to establish his participation in the
conspiracy or in the commission of the crime. Human experience teaches that a malefactor who admits the
commission of a crime is likely to put the blame as much as possible on others other than himself alone.42

In ruling upon Palijon’s arguments, we must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-
accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court43 applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.44 Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was
given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused
are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.45

Nor can we give credence to Palijon’s defense of alibi. Mercene’s identification of Palijon as one of the conspirators
and participants in the crime was positive and categorical. His alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
made by the prosecution’s eyewitness.46

With respect to the penalties imposed by the court a quo, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends that, while
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the robbery with homicide be affirmed, nonetheless, the penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional for the serious physical injuries inflicted
upon Mrs. Reyes should not be imposed on appellants. To support its recommendation, the Solicitor General points
to our ruling in People v. Pamintuan, 222 SCRA 716 (1993), where we held that the physical injuries committed
during or on occasion of robo con homicidio, are absorbed therein, irrespective of the number of homicides or
physical injuries committed.

We agree with the Solicitor General’s recommendation. Both the killing and the physical injuries in the instant case
were perpetrated during the robbery with the objective of removing both opposition and witnesses to the robbery.
The physical injuries inflicted upon Mrs. Reyes and the killing of Mr. Reyes should thus be merged in the composite,
integrated whole of robbery with homicide as penalized.47 The term "homicide" under the Article 294 (1), of the
Revised Penal Code is used in its generic sense, and embraces not only any act which results in death but also all
other acts producing anything short of death.48 Since the lighter offense of physical injuries cannot stand separately
from the more serious crime of robbery with homicide, it follows that no separate penalty can be imposed for the
physical injuries suffered by Mrs. Reyes. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua may thus be correctly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case
No. 8768-SP, dated August 25, 1995, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellants RODELO PALIJON Y
URHINA and MYRA PRIA Y BAGSIC are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide, and they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the
sum of P100,000.00 as indemnity to the widow Mellorequina Reyes and other heirs of the deceased Gonzalo
Reyes, as well as to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 123070 April 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CASIANO BUNTAG alias "CIANO" and DIEGO BONGO, appellants.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No.
7729, convicting the appellants Casiano Buntag alias "Ciano" and Diego Bongo of murder, sentencing each of them
to reclusion perpetua, and directing them to jointly indemnify the heirs of the victim Berno Georg Otte the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages.

The Indictment

The appellants were charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of February, 1992, in the municipality of Panglao, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill
and without any justifiable cause, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery
by the suddenness and unexpectedness of the acts, the victim who was unarmed being then unaware
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the use of a
bladed instrument one Berno Georg Otte (a German national), hitting and injuring the latter on his chest,
thereby causing his immediate death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount to
be proved during the trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 248 in relation to Art. 14 all of the Revised Penal Code as
amended.2

The Case for the Prosecution

Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,3 a German national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona Ville Beach
Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal Bonga,4 assigned Otte to Room No. 95 and
gave the latter his room key.

On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resort’s restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the disco which
was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo Chapel.6

At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of the tables.7 She noticed
that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize.8
Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno "Ninoy" Guigue were also at the disco. At around 2:00 a.m.
of February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a night and walked home, with their respective bicycles
at their sides.9 At the crossing to the Alona Beach, they saw a man lying on the road but did not recognize him. They
walked past the prostrate man. When they were about twenty-five meters10 away from the body by the road, they
met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates.11 11 Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and
simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of
Guigue’s uncle, Aquilino Bongo.12 12 In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino Bongo then
accompanied Mihangos and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos and Guigue retrieved their bicycles,
but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there.

At around 5:30 a.m. of February 9, 1992, the police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call about a
man, believed to be dead, lying at the side of the crossroad near the Alona Beach.13 13 PO1 Yolando E.
Hormachuelos, together with PO1 Mauro Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie Ragusta,14 14 proceeded to the crime scene.
They were accompanied by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed that the man died due to
a stab wound.15 15 The policemen found a hunting knife about one meter away from the body.16 16 Constancio
Geoivencal took pictures of the cadaver. Hormachuelos took custody of the knife.17 17

In the course of their investigation, the policemen learned that Mihangos and Guigue had seen the dead body by the
road. Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their houses and brought them to the road where the body
of Otte was found. Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the body at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well as
their encounter with Bongo and Buntag.

At about 1:00 p.m. that day, Hormachuelos took appellant Bongo to the police station and investigated him without
the assistance of counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Otte’s key to Room No. 9 and hid it near their house. He
then drew a sketch showing the place where he hid the key, at the back of their house. Bongo also admitted that he
was with appellant Casiano Buntag. The policemen went to Bongo’s house and recovered the key to Otte’s room as
indicated by Bongo in his sketch.

At 2:00 p.m., Guigue arrived at the police station and gave his statement to Hormachuelos.18 18 At 3:00 p.m.,
Mihangos gave his statement to SPO1 Proculo Bonao.19 19 Hormachuelos then took custody of Casiano Buntag
and brought him to the police station where he was asked about his involvement in the killing of Otte without the
assistance of counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep silent. When apprised that Diego Bongo had implicated him,
Buntag, this time with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, gave a statement on February 13, 1992
to a police investigator. He stated that at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was walking back home from the disco
place where he caught up with Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife at
Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box Otte but he refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then
boxed Otte three times on the face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also
stated that he then ran back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal the incident to anybody
or else he would be implicated.20 Buntag subscribed and swore to the truth of his statement on February 21, 1992
before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

In the meantime, Municipal Health Officer Dr. Julita Lood-Cogo performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Otte and
submitted her Post-Mortem Report which contained the following findings:

Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib, approx. 2 cms. x 1 cm. in size, with a depth of
approx. 12 cms., directed upwards and medially, with a complete fracture of the 4th rib, right, involving a
portion of the right lung and base of the heart.

Cause of death:

CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO STAB WOUND,

ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT.21

On March 7, 1992, a criminal complaint for murder was filed against appellants Bongo and Buntag with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Attached to the records was Buntag’s sworn statement dated February 21, 1992. Only
appellant Bongo submitted his counter-affidavit on February 27, 1992, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Antonio Sarce,22 where he confirmed (a) Buntag’s account in his sworn statement before Judge Sarce that they
were with Otte at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992 at the crossing towards Alona Beach Resort, and (b) that he was
armed with a hunting knife. He further stated therein that while at the crossing, Buntag and Otte, who were both
drunk, had an altercation and that he tried to pacify them but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongo’s) hunting
knife from his waist and stabbed Otte with it.23

After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a resolution finding probable cause against the
appellants for murder and issued warrants for their arrest. The court found Buntag’s sworn statement and Bongo’s
counter-affidavit self-serving.

On June 4, 1992, the day of the appellant’s arraignment in the Regional Trial Court, appellant Buntag, through
counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, filed a "Motion to Discharge (him) to be a Witness for the Prosecution,"
alleging inter alia:

1) That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused whose discharge is requested;

2) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused, as can be shown by the affidavit of said accused in relation to the
affidavits or sworn statements of Ponciano Horcerada, Isidro Mihangos, Benigno Guigue, Alfredo Guioguio,
and PO1 Yolando [E.] Hormachuelos;

3) That the testimony of herein accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

4) That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

5) That the said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude;

6) That herein accused-movant hereby expresses his consent to be a witness for the government.24

However, the prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that both accused were equally guilty. On June 8,
1992, the court issued an Order denying the motion, and the appellants, assisted by their respective counsels,
entered pleas of not guilty.25

During the trial, the prosecution presented Judge Antonio G. Sarce who testified that he conducted the preliminary
examination of the case and identified both Buntag’s sworn statement and Bongo’s counter-affidavit as subscribed
and sworn to before him (Judge Sarce) in his chambers.

After presenting all its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence the hunting knife,26 the key to room no. 9 of the
beach resort,27 the sworn statement of Buntag,28 and Bongo’s counter-affidavit29 to prove that both appellants
conspired to kill the victim and that they in fact killed the victim, and as part of the testimony of Judge Sarce. Both
appellants objected to the admission of the said sworn statements and counter-affidavit solely on the ground that the
statements executed by one accused was hearsay as to the other accused.30 By way of rejoinder, the prosecution
alleged as follows:

1. That exhibits A, B, C, D, E and all its submarkings are all relevant, pertinent and material evidence
against the accused in the above-entitled case, therefore, admissible in evidence;

2. That exhibits F and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter alios acta rule
because they are principally offered against accused Casiano Buntag, the affiant. The sworn statement of
Casiano Buntag is offered mainly as admission of said accused Casiano Buntag;

3. That exhibits G and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter alios acta rule
because they are principally offered against accused Diego Bongo, the affiant. The counter-affidavit of Diego
Bongo is offered mainly as admission of said accused Diego Bongo.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to admit in evidence all the
prosecution’s exhibits formally offered, for the purpose for which they are being offered.31
The court admitted the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution. The appellants opted not to adduce
any evidence on their behalf. Instead, they filed, without leave of court, a "Motion to Acquit." On June 7, 1993, the
court issued an Order denying the motion.

On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment finding both the appellants guilty of the crime charged. The
decretal portion of the decision of the trial court reads:

FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Court renders judgment finding the two (2) accused Casiano
Buntag, alias Ciano, and Diego Bongo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, an act
committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248, in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and does hereby sentences each one of them to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the
accusatory penalties imposed by law.

There being no evidence disclosed as to the civil liability, this Court, therefore, limits in providing that the
accused shall pay jointly the heirs of the deceased Berno Georg Otte the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), by way of moral damages, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The trial court relied, inter alia, on the sworn statement of Buntag dated February 21, 199233 and the counter-
affidavit of Bongo34 in convicting them of the crime charged. Both the appellants appealed the decision.

Although the appellants enumerated separate issues in their briefs, the same may be synthesized into three issues,
namely: (a) whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the victim
Otte and that they, in fact, killed him; (b) whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not
the appellants are liable for moral damages to the heirs of the victim. Appellant Bongo’s contention that he was
deprived of his right to due process on his claim that the transcripts of the respective testimonies of Dr. Julita Cogo,
SPO1 Bonao and resort manager Bonga were not transmitted to this Court is belied by the records. In a Resolution
dated September 11, 2000, the Court declared that, based on the records, the transcripts of stenographic notes in
this case were already complete.35

The appellants contend that the prosecution failed to adduce direct or circumstantial evidence to prove that they
conspired to kill the victim, and that they, in fact, killed him. They argue that although the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence consisting of the extrajudicial sworn statement of appellant Buntag and the counter-affidavit
of appellant Bongo, such evidence is utterly insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, according to the appellants, the admissions made by appellant Buntag in his sworn statement are
binding on him only. Being prejudicial to appellant Bongo, such admissions are not inadmissible against the latter
unless repeated in open court by appellant Buntag, thus, affording appellant Bongo the right to cross-examination.
Likewise, the admissions of appellant Bongo in his sworn statement are inadmissible against appellant Buntag,
unless the former repeated his admissions during the trial, affording the latter an opportunity to cross-examine the
said appellant. The appellants further aver that since they opted not to testify on their respective statements, there
was no opportunity for cross-examination. Consequently, the admissions made by one appellant in his sworn
statement are hearsay evidence against the other appellant, and vice versa. In fine, the appellants contend that the
trial court should have acquitted them of the crime charged.

We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that they conspired to kill Otte
and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, we find and so hold, after an incisive review of the
records, that the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a
crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.36 Conspiracy can be presumed
from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests.37 It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and
killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of
their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.38

The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive
evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites
are established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.39

In People v. Delim,40 we held, thus:

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of
circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without
exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the
prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the
prosecution.41

In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial court relied not only on the counter-affidavit of appellant
Bongo42 and appellant Buntag’s sworn statement,43 but also on the other evidence on record, namely, the knife used
in killing the victim,44 the key to Otte’s room,45 and the collective testimonies of the other witnesses of the
prosecution.

The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against the said
accused but is inadmissible against the other accused.46 The same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession is
made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in court his
extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the
admitter, such confession or admission is admissible against both accused.47 The erstwhile extrajudicial confession
or admission when repeated during the trial is transposed into judicial admissions.

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts by the accused,
direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged.48 It is an acknowledgment of
some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to
establish the ultimate facts of guilt.49 A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of
his guilt of the crime charged.50

In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his sworn statement, and not a
confession. So did appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit. Such admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the
Municipal Trial Court in the course of its preliminary investigation, are high quality evidence.51 MCTC Judge Antonio
Sarce testified on the said sworn statement and counter-affidavit and was cross-examined.52 Moreover, some of the
extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant are identical with some of the extrajudicial inculpatory
admissions of the other, and vice versa. This corroborates and confirms their veracity. Such admissions, made
without collusion, are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are admissible as circumstantial evidence
against the other appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his participation in the commission of the
crime and as corroborative evidence against him.53 The Court rejects the appellants’ contention that they were
deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on the latter’s admissions against the other. Through their common
counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective statements by the prosecution. They
opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity to cross-examine Judge Sarce before whom they
swore to the truthfulness of their statements.54

In this case, the prosecution adduced the following circumstantial evidence which constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants, indeed, conspired to kill and did kill the victim:
1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement,55 that, at about 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was in the
company of appellant Bongo and the victim Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach, and that appellant Bongo was
armed with a hunting knife. Appellant Buntag identified the victim through the latter’s picture, as well as the hunting
knife used in the killing.56 Appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, confirmed the truth of appellant Buntag’s
admissions and also admitted that on the said date, time and place, he was with appellant Buntag and the victim,
and that he was armed with a hunting knife which was tucked on his waist.

2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements that on the said occasion, Otte died from a stab wound
caused by a hunting knife.

3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that he took the key to the victim’s room and hid it near their
house where the policemen found it.

4. While both appellants were within the periphery of the situs criminis, Mihangos and Guigue sauntered by with
their bicycles at their sides. Suddenly, the appellants jointly and simultaneously lunged at them, causing Mihangos
and Guigue to believe that their lives were in peril, impelling them to run for their lives and seek sanctuary in the
house of Guigue’s uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By the time Mihangos and Guigue returned to the situs criminis to retrieve
their bicycles, the appellants had already left.

5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that after the victim was stabbed, he and appellant Bongo fled
from the situs criminis. This was corroborated by the testimony of Mihangos. The presence of both appellants at
the situs criminis and their flight from the scene are strong indicia of their participation in the commission of the
crime and their complicity therein.57 Appellant Bongo opted not to testify or adduce evidence to controvert the
testimony of Mihangos and the admissions of the appellant prejudicial to him.

6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used to kill the victim was left at the scene of the crime where the
policemen recovered it shortly thereafter.

7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn statements that the victim was stabbed once with a hunting
knife. These admissions were corroborated by Dr. Julita Cogo’s finding that the victim was stabbed once on the
anterior chest area.58 The doctor testified that the stab wound could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon.59

8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the hospital for immediate medical attendance and operation.

9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the assailant in their respective statements, neither of them
reported the stabbing to the police authorities and claimed that the other killed the victim.

10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to deny any involvement in the killing of the victim. The evidence
of the prosecution, thus, stands unrebutted.

The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of their respective statements as basis for their acquittal of
the crime charged. In the case of appellant Buntag, he avers in his sworn statement that he was ordered by
appellant Bongo to box the victim and when he refused, appellant Bongo himself boxed and stabbed the victim with
the hunting knife. When appellant Buntag fled from the scene and went back home, appellant Bongo followed and
warned him not to divulge the incident so that he would not be implicated. For his part, appellant Bongo turned the
tables on appellant Buntag and claimed in his counter-affidavit that the latter snatched the hunting knife from his
waist and stabbed the victim in the heat of their altercation. The stabbing was so sudden, he insists, that he was
unable to stop appellant Buntag from stabbing the victim.

We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for the following reasons:

First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that appellant Bongo boxed the victim, the necropsy report of Dr.
Cogo failed to show that the victim’s body sustained hematoma, bruises or contusions. The findings of the doctor
must prevail as against the bare statements of the appellants.

Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn statement that before he and appellant Bongo could leave the situs
criminis after the victim was stabbed, Mihangos and Guigue arrived. The appellants lunged jointly and
simultaneously at the two teenagers which so terrified the latter that they fled for their lives. If, as appellant Buntag
claims, he had nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim, he should have sought the help of the teenagers,
brought the victim to the hospital and reported to the police authorities that it was appellant Bongo who stabbed the
victim. Appellant Buntag failed to do so. Neither did appellant Bongo seek the help of the two teenagers and report
the stabbing to the police authorities. Both appellants’ unexplained omission is another indication of their conspiracy
and complicity in the crime charged.

Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the victim and hid it near their house where the policemen
found it. The appellant has not explained why he had the key to the victim’s room and hid it near their house. He
owned the hunting knife used in stabbing the victim. He knew or should have known that sooner or later, the
policemen would trace the knife to him; and yet, appellant Bongo failed to report the incident to the police authorities
and surrender the knife to them.

Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing and pointed to appellant Buntag as the assailant only after
the latter had executed his own sworn statement pointing to appellant Bongo as the victim’s assailant. We are
convinced that appellant Bongo’s denial of any involvement in the killing is but a belated afterthought to escape
criminal liability for the victim’s death.

The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua. We note, however, that the trial court, in its amended decision, made
no finding on any attendant circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder. It bears stressing that under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, any qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of a crime must be alleged in
the Information and proved by the prosecution, conformably to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed
of the nature of the charges against him.

In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. The prosecution
was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but also the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia.60 Treachery cannot be based on speculations and surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that
(a) the malefactor employed means, method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate and, (b) the means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender. In this case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.

On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn statement, claimed that before the victim was stabbed, appellant
Bongo and the victim had an altercation; appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, stated that it was appellant
Buntag and the victim who had an altercation before the victim was killed. There is no evidence that the appellants
deliberately or consciously adopted a method or means of execution to insure the death of the victim.

In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide, punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion temporal in its full range, which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being
no modifying circumstance attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be in its
medium period.

The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the victim, although the prosecution failed to present any heir
of the victim as witness. The trial court, likewise, failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim.
The decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified accordingly.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case No. 7729 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Casiano Buntag alias "Ciano" and
Diego Bongo are found guilty, as principals, of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being
no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, each of the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty from ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The award of moral damages is deleted. The said
appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Berno Georg Otte, P50,000 as civil
indemnity, conformably to current jurisprudence.61 Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-12794 October 14, 1918

ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA, provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants.

Jose Martinez de San Agustin for appellants.

Gullas & Briones for appellee.

STREET, J.:

The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this case formerly
belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled under, the plaintiff as party in
possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant as purchaser at a public sale under an
execution directed against Llenos. the plaintiff, Eladio Alpuerto, asks the court to make a declaration against the
defendant, Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion. He
also prays that the sale of the property effected by the sheriff, Manuel Roa, to said defendant be declared null.

The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the transaction by which
the plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected
for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Juan Llenos. This defendant therefore in turn prays the
court to declare that he himself is the true owner of the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the
plaintiff to surrender possession to him. From a judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of
the plaintiff , the defendants have appealed. It appears that, pending the proceedings, the defendant Pastor has
died and an administrator, Eustaquio Lopez, has been substituted in his stead. Throughout the opinion, however,
Pastor, the name of the original party defendant, will be used in referring to the interest now represented by the
administrator.

The plaintiff claims by virtue of the document (Exhibit A), which purports to be a contract of sale with the privilege of
repurchase. It recites a consideration of P2,500 the payment of which is acknowledged; and the stipulated period
within which is acknowledge; and the stipulated period within which the vendor may repurchase the property is fixed
at two years. This documents is signed by the two contracting parties (Juan Llenos and Eladio Alpuerto) and is
attested by two subscribing witnesses. It purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; just it was not
acknowledged before a notary until December 3, 1914. The property in question is assessed for the purposes of
taxation at P5,000 or P6,000; and is worth more than twice the amount which the plaintiff claims to have paid for it.

At the time of the supposed sale to Eladio Alpuerto there had been pending for nearly two years, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, an action in which Jose Perez Pastor was plaintiff and Juan Llenos was defendant. In this action
the plaintiff sought to recover from Juan Llenos a considerable sum of money; and Eladio Alpuerto, as son-in-law of
Juan Llenos, was aware of this litigation from the beginning. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the
alleged sale of the property in question to Eladio Alpuerto judgment was rendered in said action in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of P3,789.13, with interest and costs. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal to the Supreme
Court on November 20, 1914. 1 An execution was thereafter issued on April 12, 1915, from the Court of First
Instance upon said judgment was levied upon the property in question as the property of Juan Llenos. Before the
sale was effected the plaintiff herein, Eladio Alpuerto, notified the sheriff that he claimed the property as his own.
Nevertheless, the sheriff proceeded under indemnification and sold the property at public sale to Jose Perez Pastor
for the sum of P1,100.

The case stated in the cross-complaint as a ground of relief to the defendant has its basis in the rule stated in
subsection 3 of article 1291 of the Civil Code, which declares generally that a contract executed in fraud of creditors
is subject of rescission; and upon this issue the burden of proof is of course upon Pastor, as the party assailing the
transaction, to show that the transfer was fraudulent; though it should here be remembered that proof on this point
may be accomplished by the aid of presumptions, as in other cases.

The argument against the validity of the conveyance from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto is based on two
propositions, namely: (1) that said conveyance must, under the second paragraph of article 1297, in connection with
article 1227, of the Civil Code, be presumed to be fraudulent; and (2) that furthermore is shown by the evidence to
have been fraudulent in fact.

The second paragraph of article 1297 of the Civil Code says that a transfer of property made by one against whom a
condemnatory judgment has been pronounced in either instance is to be presumed fraudulent. The cardinal
question on this branch of the case is therefore this. Was the transfer in question made after a judgment had been
entered against Juan Llenos in either instance? This in turn depends upon the question whether the contract of sale
shall be considered effective as from the date upon which it purports to have been executed (July 3, 1912) or from
the date when it was acknowledge before a notary public (December 3, 1914) for in the interval between these two
dates final judgment had been rendered against Juan Llenos both in the Court of First Instance and in the Supreme
Court.

The solution of the problem thus presented requires us to consider the combined effect of articles 1225 and 1227 of
the Civil Code. Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who
sign it and their privies (causahabientes), the same force as a public instrument.

The expression "legally recognized" (reconocido legamente), as here used, must be taken to mean recognized, or
acknowledged by the person or persons, executing or emitting the document-in this case the vendor, Juan Llenos,
and the vendee-Eladio Alpuerto. The act of legal recognition occurred, we assume, when the document was signed
by parties and delivered in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who were called upon to bear witness to the
transaction.

Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following passage is found in
the Commentary of Manresa:

The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but
also that of succession by singular title, derived form acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an
assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short, he, who by succession is placed
in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and
appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations, is a privy. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp.
492 and 492.)

Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose Perez Pastor, the
purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos, must be considered a privy or
successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by the instrument which conveyed
the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a private document-
unless this result is prohibited by article 1227 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on
which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may have been
delivered to a public official by virtue of his office.

In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the probative value of the
document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to lay down any rule concerning the efficacy
of the act or acts evidenced by the document. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.) The importance of the rule
here declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation where the document itself contains the only
competent evidence before the court bearing upon the date upon which the instrument in question was executed as
a private document.

This can be most conveniently exhibited by means of illustrations based on the language of the text itself. For
instance, let it be supposed that a document is produced bearing the signatures of the parties who participated in it
and purporting to have been executed upon a certain date, prior to the date upon which the document was filed or
inscribed in a public register. In such case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the
date when it was so filed or inscribed in a public register. It is, however, proved that one of the signatory parties has
died upon a certain date subsequent to that upon which case the instrument can take effect, as against third
persons, only from the date of the death of the deceased signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is
produced in court bearing the signatures of the parties and purporting to have been executed upon a certain date.
The instrument has at no time been elevated into a public document and it is not shown that either of the signatory
parties is dead. In this case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the date of the death
of the deceased signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is produced in court bearing the signatures of
the parties has died upon a certain dated subsequent to that upon which the instrument purports to have been
executed. In this case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the death of the deceased
signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is produced in court bearing the signatures of the parties and
purporting to have been executed upon a certain date. The instrument has at no time been elevated into a public
document and it is not shown that either of the signatory parties is dead. In this case the instrument can take effect,
as against third persons, only from the date when the document was filed in court, this being considered to be
delivery to a public official by virtue of his office.

All of these illustrations have reference to the situation where the document itself contains only evidence before the
court bearing upon the date of its original execution; and the execution of the instrument is supposed to be proved
by force of the act of notarial acknowledgment or by proof that the names of the parties signed to the document are
genuine. It must be borne in mind in this connection that article 1227 is not primarily or exclusively concerned with
instruments which after being executed originally as private documents are at a later date elevated to the status of
public documents. On the contrary, it deals primarily with private documents, and the instrument in question may at
all times remain a private document is not converted into a public document either by the death of one of the
signatory parties or by the fact that it is delivered to a public official by virtue of his office. The due execution of such
instruments must therefore be proved when they are introduced in court, if not made self-proving by notarial
acknowledgment, which operate to raise them to the status of public documents.

The commentator Manresa, discussing article 1227, observes with discernment that there may be other facts than
those mentioned in said article which be received as determinative of the date from which the instrument should be
considered to be effective against third person. Thus, if it should appear that, subsequent to the date upon which the
document purports to have been executed, one of the signatory parties had lost his penhand by amputation, this
should be accepted as being fully conclusive that the instrument was in fact executed before such occurrence.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8 p. 503.) In the same connection Manresa says that if a third person is affected with
notice of the existence of a private document or by any act of his own recognizes its existence, it will have effect, as
against him, from the date of such notice or recognition. (Opus citat., id.) These observations all go to show that
article 1227 states a presumption which may be rebutted.

The question then arises. Is there anything in article 1227, or elsewhere, which prohibits the introduction of the
testimony of attesting witnesses, or other persons who may be present when a private document is executed, to
prove that the act was accomplished upon the date stated therein to be date of its execution? We are of the opinion
that such testimony is admissible, even as against third parties.

This conclusion is fully supported by the opinion of the supreme court of Spain in the case of Alvarez vs. Yañez.
(177 Juris, Civil, 663, decided April 16, 1910). The facts in that case were that by private documents dated
respectively August 2 and August 3, 1908, Alvarez purchased four tracts of land. On August 17, of the same year
Carlos Vega sold, by public instrument, to Yañez several tracts were adjacent to part of the land purchased by
Alvarez who, upon learning of the sale, brought his action, under article 1523 of Civil Code, to be subrogated to the
buyer, exercising his right of retracto legal. The defendant answered that on August 17, 1908, plaintiff was not the
owner of any land adjacent to that acquired on that date by defendant the contention being that the private
documents upon which the complaint was based, in addition to the fact that they are not proof of ownership, were
not presented for the payment of the tax on real estate, which was fourteen days after defendant purchased the
properties in contest . . . .

The trial court permitted plaintiff to produce witnesses for the purpose of proving that the private documents relied
upon by him were in fact executed and delivered upon the dates therein recited and that plaintiff went into
possession under them, and upon that evidence made finding in accordance with plaintiff's contentions, and held
that the right to take over the purchase retracto existed. The defendant appealed to the supreme court of Spain, and
argued that by its ruling the Audiencia had disregarded article 1227 of the Civil Code, the specific contention being
that as against persons who are not parties to them private documents must be treated as though their existence
commenced only from the date upon which they are made of public record. This contention was overruled, the Court
saying:

It cannot be denied that the appellant Constantino Vega is to be regarded as a third person, because he was
not a party to the two contracts of sale by virtue of which Vicente Alvarez acquired from Ildefonso Alvarez
 the ownership of the three tracts of country real estate from which he derives his right to be subrogated as
purchaser of our other tracts adjacent thereto sold, with others, by Carlos Vega to the defendant by public
instrument dated August 17, 1908. Nevertheless, it is not to be inferred from this fact as appellant contends,
that the legal dates of the two first contracts, evidenced by private documents, are not those which are
recited therein, but that as regards third persons, in accordance with Art. 1227 of the Civil Code, they must
be regarded as dated on the day . . . on which they were noted in the tax office. That article established a
legal presumption which must yield to contrary evidence, and the trial court, basing its conclusion on the
testimony of the witnesses, has established the finding, which we cannot disturb, that the dates recited in
these documents are the true dates upon which the contracts were made.

Clearly articles 1225 and 1227 should be construed in such manner as to harmonize with each other and to give
effect, so far as possible, to the legislative intent expressed in each; and the only interpretation of article 1227 which
can be adopted consistently with the meaning of article 1225 is that the rule announced in article 1227 has
reference exclusively to the situation where there is no accredited evidence before the court, independent of the
recitals of the document itself, showing the date upon which it was in fact executed.

It has been settled in many decisions that a document which originates as private document and never arises above
that status will, under article 1225, be given full effect as such. (Samson vs. Salvilla and Sierra, 12 Phil. Rep., 497,
505; Tanguinot vs. Municipality of Tanay, 9 Phil. Rep., 369, 401; Guillermo vs. Mantiezo, 8 Phil. Rep., 368, 372;
Irureta, Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. Rep., 490, 493.) It follows that article 1227 does not, as against the
signatory parties and their successors in interest, postpone the operation of an instrument, proved as private
document, if it is shown by competent evidence that it was in fact executed upon the date recited therein as the date
of its execution. If this were not true, the result would be that a person having rights under an instrument, probable
as a private document, might lose those rights by reason of the happening of some one of the occurrences
mentioned in article 1227. The contrary conclusion is evidently the proper one, that is, that if a party has rights under
an instrument, provable as a private document, and it is so proved, it will prevail from the true and proven date of its
execution with all the effect attributable to it under article 1225.

The expression "third parties" (terceros) as used in article 1227, evidently means persons who have not intervened
in the execution of the document. It has been so interpreted by the supreme court of Spain and by this court. (Lao
Simbieng vs. Palencia, 18 Phil. Rep., 325, 328; Easton vs. E. Diaz & Co. and Sheriff of Albay, 32 Phil. Rep., 181;
decision of the supreme court of Spain of April 16, 1910, already cited.) Manresa is therefore in error in supposing
that it has the more limited meaning of persons who have not intervened in the execution of the document and are
neither heirs nor successors in interest of those who signed the same. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.)

In the case now before us the two witnesses examined with reference to the execution of the document in question
testify that it was originally executed and delivered on July 13, 1912, the date stated upon its face. For the purpose
of disposing of this branch of the case without further discussion, we provisionally accept this statement as true and
deduce the conclusion that he presumption stated in paragraph 2 of article 1297 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

This brings us to the question whether the transaction evidenced by Exhibit A should be pronounced fraudulent in
fact. Upon turning to the evidence for the purpose of determining this question, the following circumstances are
revealed, namely; (1) the grantee is the son-in-law of the grantor; (2) at the time conveyance is made an action is
pending against the grantor to recover several thousand pesos of money; and of the pendency of this action the
grantee has full knowledge; (3) the debtor has no other satisfied (4) the consideration for the transfer is less than
half of the value of the property in question. These circumstances are familiar badges of fraud, and their combined
effect is such, we think, as to raise a presumption of fraud, even apart from the legal presumption expressed in
article 1297, and to impose upon the vendee the burden of proving the bona fides of the transaction by a
preponderance of evidence and to the satisfaction of the court.1awph!l.net

We are of the opinion that the proof adduced not only fails to remove the imputation of fraud thus cast upon the
transaction but strongly tends to engender the suspicion that the transaction was wholly fictitious. It is true that both
the plaintiff himself and Simon Batuigas, one of the subscribing witnesses, declared in the clearest terms that the
transaction took place on July 3, 1912, as claimed; that two thousand pesos of the money charged hands in the act;
and that the balance of the consideration consisted in the satisfaction and released of the debt for five hundred
pesos owing from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto. It should not escape notice that neither Juan Llenos nor the other
attesting witness, Geronimo Godinez, were examined as to the circumstances attending the transaction; and no
explanation is given as to why these witnesses were not produced.
Where the law imposes the burden of proof upon the party to established the bona fides of such a transaction as
this, against the presumption of the fraud, it is his duty, if the experts to be believed, to lay before the court, so far as
is within his power, a complete and true revelation of all circumstances surrounding the affair; and where he
supresses evidence or negligently falls to call a witness supposed to know the facts, it may be presumed that the
testimony of the witness, if adduced, would be unfavorable.

The plaintiff did not try to show where or how he acquired the two thousand pesos of ready money with which the
purchased was made, and it does not appear that his resource are sufficient to enable him readily to command that
sum. The proof of the existence of the debt of five hundred pesos which Juan Llenos is supposed to have owed to
the plaintiff and which constituted the balance of the purchase price over and above the amount which was paid in
cash rests almost exclusively in the statement of the plaintiff himself. Upon these important points the testimony of
Juan Llenos, if adduced, might possibly have shed something about what become of the money. the effect of these
observations cannot be evaded by saying that the defendant might himself have summoned Juan Llenos and
examined him in court. The burden of the proof was on the plaintiff; and the defendant could not be expected to call
of the principles in the transaction which was impeached.

It is the course somewhat perplexing to a court to weight the uncontradicted testimony of a witness against mere
presumption of fraud stands as a witness, thought mute, pointing the finger of denunciation at the questioned
transaction, and the imputation thus cast upon it can only be removed by a full and honest revelation sufficient to
convince the court that the fraudulent intent did not exist.

It is not to be denied that the secretary of a transaction like that now under consideration, arising from the fact that
the conveyance was affected by a private document, is a circumstance tending to cast suspicion upon it. strong
consideration of public policy require that in such case the parties should held to strict proof of good faith; and this
court cannot give it approval to a doctrine which would permit the property of a failing and impleaded debtor to be
put beyond the reach of this creditors by a trick such as we believe was attempted in this case. When a legal
proceeding is ended and the sheriff goes to take property of the debtor in execution, he is not infrequently met with
the statutory that the property now belongs to some other persons; and a document is produced to prove it which
nobody, except the immediate parties, ever heard of before. The courts must be executed if they refused to listen
with childish credulity to mentions of this character.

We do not overlook the circumstances that the supposed sale in this case was effected by a contract with pacto de
retro; and where such a sale is made, as frequently occurs, to secure money intended as a mere loan, the
consideration is naturally less than the true value of the property. In such case, if the bona fides of the original
contract is not under suspicion, the fact that the consideration for the sale is less than the value of the property is not
indicative of fraud. But where the original sale is presumptively tained with fraud. But where the original sale is
presumptively tained with fraud, the entire transaction from the time of the making of the contract until the
consolidation of the title in the purchaser should be considered as a whole, and absolutely transferred at once.
otherwise the contract of sale with pacto de retro could be as an instrument to shield parties in their efforts to
defraud creditors. this cannot be permitted.

In the connection reliance is placed by the appellee upon the case of Chiong Veloso vs. Ro and Levering (37 Phil.
Rep., 63); and it is urged that this decision affords support for the view that the transaction in question, having been
accomplished by means of contract of sale with facto de retro, cannot be considered fraudulent. It must be
remember, however, that the original sale to contract of pacto de retro was made in the case last cited to a
purchaser for value and in good faith; and the question was not so much whether the original transaction was
fraudulent as whether the failure of the debtor to redeem was fraudulent as whether, it being the theory of the
defendant that the plaintiff had colluded with the debtor (who as a sister) and had redeemed the property with her
money or for her benefit. Moreover, it was found in that case that at the time of the original conveyance the debtor
had other property more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment that might be recovered in the pending action.

The conclusion to which we come is that the questioned transaction, if actually any simulated, was made in fraud of
creditors and must be annulled. The judgment entered in this cause in the court below must accordingly be
reversed; and judgment will be here entered dismissing the complaint of Eladio Alpuerto and requiring in the
complaint to Eustaquio Lopez, as administrator to be a declared that the documents (Exhibit A), purporting to be a
contract of sale conveying the property in question from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto, acknowledged before a
notary public upon December 3, 1914, was executed in fraud of creditors and the same is hereby annulled. No
special adjudication as to costs will be made. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Carson and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FISHER, J., dissenting:

While we concur fully with the views expressed in the majority opinion concerning the interpretation of articles 1225
and 1227 of the Civil Code, we are unable to agree with the conclusion that the transaction here in dispute is
fraudulent in fact. Assuming for the sake of the argument that the circumstances surrounding the transaction, if
unexplained, would warrant the presumption of fraud, we consider that the presumption has been overcome in this
case by the positive and uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff of Batuigas that the money was in fact paid as
recited in the deed. The record shows that plaintiff was possessed of sufficient means to permit him to make such
purchase; and while it is true that the consideration named was less than the full value of the property, the different
is not greater is usual in sale under pacto de retro such as this purports to have been. This difference in value,
rather than tending to show a fraudulent intent, tends to negative it. During the period within which the right to
repurchase is reversed, which in this case was two years, any judgment creditors of the vendor may exercise the
right to redeem. Consequently, in case of the simulation of a sale of this kind, it is rather to be expected that the
value will be inflated than understand.

As regards the failure to call the other subscribing witnesses, this court, following the general presumption trend of
judicial opinion, has held that no unfavorable presumption arises in such a case when that no unfavorable
presumption arises in such a case when it appears that the witnesses were equally available to both parties. The
fact that a party refrains from cumbering the record with merely corroborative evidence should not be considered to
his prejudice.

[G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905. ]

THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.

Francisco Rodriguez, for Appellant.

Modesto Reyes, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ACTION; DISMISSAL; ERROR. — The defendant is entitled to have the case dismissed where the plaintiff fails to
establish the allegations in the complaint; and an order overruling such motion is erroneous.

2. REALTY; POSSESSION; EVIDENCE. — Where one derives title to real estate from another, the declaration act,
or omission of the latter to the property is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the
title. (Sec. 278, Code of Civil Procedure.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION; PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP. — A possessory information recorded in the
property register is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person who instituted the proceedings holds the property
as owner; and the presumption, under article 448 of the Civil Code, is that his title is good unless the contrary is
shown.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant.

The court below entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for possession and damages in
the sum of $2,500, United States currency, and costs.

At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. This motion was overruled by the court, to which
ruling the defendant duly excepted. The question thus raised puts in issue the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff
was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question. We accordingly hold that this point is impliedly
involved in the third and fourth assignments of error.

Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony of John R. Lorenzo
del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that he did not know of his own
knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city (p. 11 of the bill of exceptions). The next witness testified that
the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central
Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and 13 of the bill of
exceptions)). It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona,
and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of
either. According to the complaint, they are building lots.

The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and
that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of the
precediing witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega’s testimony was merely
hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His
testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered
the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334,
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in
the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The
testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.

Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality and
the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles
Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property abuts (bill of exceptions, pp.
15 and 16).

The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her brother
Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the property abutting on Calle Clavel. It
appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del
Rosario, the defendant in this case. Notwithstanding this, and assuming that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco
is admissible, we do not see how it can be inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the
property.

The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the land. They simply
testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff.

Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the "mayor of the
city of manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written by him on the 9th of October, 1901, to the
Municipal Board of Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario in his testimony, admitted the authenticity of both documents which
contain an offer to the municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo del Rosario admitted
also that he signed the first document under the misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had
been subsequently informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to the municipality, but to
Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second document because the President of the Municipal
Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was
not contradicted. We accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence.

Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership
of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant
Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the
complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in
the documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. This map is not before us. It is sufficient to say,
in order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The only
witness examined with regard to it was the city attorney. He was unable to say who made it or who caused it to be
made, or when it was made. He said only that he believed the map had been drawn in the month of July, 1880, or
prior to May, 1893. Neither this nor his statement that the map was found among the archives of the city of Manila is
of itself sufficient to show that the map is authentic. No one appears to certify as to its correctness.

The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the
location of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in establishing the right of possession claimed by the
plaintiff.

On the other hand, the two public instruments executed on March 7, 1900, between the defendant and Telesfora
Apostol y Perea, also introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, show that the defendant was in possession of the land
under a good title and with the status of owner of the land. In the first instrument if is stated so many words that the
defendant is the owner in fee simple of the land, he having repurchased it from Liberio de Aurteneche y
Menchacatorre, whose title had been recorded in the property register.

From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its claim of title to the land
in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the plaintiff nor the documentary evidence
introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in
the complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been
executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore,
the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was
recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the
defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be
presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his
motion to dismiss.

The order of the trial court overruling the motion of the defendant to dismiss and the judgment appealed from are
hereby reversed. Let the case be remanded to the court of its origin for action in accordance herewith. The plaintiff
shall pay the costs of the Court of First Instance. No special order is made as to the costs on appeal. After the
expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in conformity herewith. So ordered.

G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial confession which he
claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to evidence instead of presenting evidence
in his behalf. The trial court however denied his demurrer, admitted his extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty
of robbery with homicide. Now before us, he maintains that his extrajudicial confession was extracted without the
assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed.

As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures located
along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel
and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the
second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids
of the owners into the bathroom.

Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood Furniture, along
Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their bedroom. Sensing however that
something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door to peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around
her neck while another poked a balisong at her nape. She was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open
the drawers where she kept money. A third man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back,
stuffed her mouth with a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.00.

Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the bathroom, heard
Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two (2) men guarding them had
already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho, dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to the
bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her
mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of
furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.

In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the
Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso
inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and
Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police
investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to report for work the day after the
incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his
sister's child.

Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went
to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records of the
parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of his
sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar
Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning to leave.

After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused Marlo Compil
who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned
pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated,
Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of
the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was
further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before
midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers
who his companions were and his participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside
the furniture shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside.
Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in
Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared
the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and agreed that from there they
would all go home to their respective provinces.

From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit
who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including Compil, went to his house past
midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked up from
their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer until past four o'clock the next morning.

On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio
Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala,
executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a
lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos,
Rogelio Pakit, a certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jose
Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work
for MJ Furnitures where he was the foreman.
Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila, Parañaque and
Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.

On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a
counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused
represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.

On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49,1 denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of
robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitutional rights (to
remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police officers started interrogating him from the time of
his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he)
was made to confess and declare statements that can be used against him in any proceeding."2 And, the belated
arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not cure the
constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from him the day
before, which extracted statements formed part of his alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the
admission of (his) oral . . . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of other witnesses"3 which are
replete with "serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions."4

In People v. Rous,5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be admitted in evidence
even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provided that it was read and fully explained to confessant by
counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our view in Gamboa v. Cruz 6 where the Court En Banc ruled that
"[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or
coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the
offense." We maintained this rule in the fairly recent cases of People v. Macam 7 and People v. Bandula 8 where we
further reiterated the procedure —

. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be in admissible in evidence.

In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his
arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he
was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating
information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation
therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled
confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from
accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by
the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the
signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we said that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing
and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to the accused who
did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional rights
and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.

While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which could not
have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we
cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, we find other sufficient
factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and Jenelyn Valle. We
believe that Linda Hermoso saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ Furnitures just before the commission
of the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted herself on some minor incidents, she was straightforward on
this specific instance —

FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):

Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini) together with Jessie when
you were inside the jeep, is it not?

WITNESS HERMOSO:

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was this before you went to sleep?

A. Yes, sir. 10

Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the credibility of witnesses, more so with
witness Hermoso who only reached Grade Two and who as the trial court noted had difficulty understanding the
questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the absence of evidence to show any reason why prosecution
witnesses should falsely testify, it is fair to conclude that no improper motive exists and that their testimony is worthy
of full faith and credit.

We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and,
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there
can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 12

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the following circumstances:
First, accused Marlo Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz,
Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the shop. Second, on the night of the incident, they were seen in front
of MJ Furnitures. Third, they were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly entered MJ
Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth, some two (2) hours after the commission of the
crime, at around two o'clock the following morning, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing between
themselves and their five (5) other companions the money and jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all
failed to show up for work the following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and speechless
when apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime committed in Manila. Certainly these circumstances as gleaned
from the factual findings of the trial court form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime.13 Hence even disregarding accused-appellant's oral
and written confessions, as we do, still the prosecution was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery
with homicide.

While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a warrant, accused-
appellant is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the information
before the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 14
The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted the arresting police officers of arbitrary
detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced. Suffice it to say that the law enforcers who
arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the case at bench.

Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting that he had participated in the
commission of the crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice. Disregarding his extrajudicial confession
and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his behalf, the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider
only the evidence of the prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy 15 which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and after the
commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. 16 Thus
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of
all, and each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the others. 18

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds accused-
appellant MARLO COMPIL y LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. Consequently, he
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.

Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Jay in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus P35,000.00 as actual damages. He is further directed to return to Mary Jay the jewelry worth P30,000.00, and if
he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its value.

G.R. Nos. 112801-11 April 12, 1996

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WONG CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG,
YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG, CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK SUN, accused.

PADILLA, J.:p

Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appeal from a decision * of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109 of Pasay
City, finding them, as well as their co-accused, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, both British (Hongkong) nationals, together with Tan Soi Tee,
Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yang, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and
Lim Nyuk Sun, all Malaysian nationals, were charged with unlawfully transporting into the country Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or "shabu". Eleven (11) separate criminal informations were filed against all of the accused
individually, setting forth similar allegations:

That on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon in Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport without lawful authority [3.40 kilograms in
Criminal Case No. 91-1524 filed against Wong Chuen Ming; 3.45 kilograms in Criminal Case No. 91-
1525 to 91-1534 filed against all other accused individually], more or less of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, as (sic) regulated drug commonly known as "SHABU."

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

At their respective arraignments, all accused with the assistance of their counsels, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The counsel of accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung earlier filed a petition for reinvestigation and deferment of his
arraignment but the same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung was
arraigned on 20 September 1991 and with the assistance of counsel, he likewise entered a plea of not guilty.
The trial court conducted a joint and/or consolidated trial of all the cases upon motion by the prosecution considering
that the State had common testimonial and documentary evidence against all accused. The prosecution presented
four (4) witnesses, namely, (1) Danilo Gomez, a customs examiner assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Customs Office; (2) Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio, Chief of the Collection Division and Acting Duty
Collector of the Customs Office at the NAIA; (3) Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, and (4) Capt. Rustico Francisco, Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Philippine National Police
Narcotics Command Detachment at the NAIA. The case for the prosecution, as culled from the testimonies of its
witnesses, may be summarized as follows:

On 7 September 1991, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR No. 301 from
Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila. Among the many
passengers who arrived on board said flight were the eleven (11) accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing
Cheung, Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah,
Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun. Their respective passports showed that Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their
passports also revealed that all the accused Malaysians (except Lim Chan Fatt) originally came from Malaysia,
travelled to Singapore and Hongkong before proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au
Wing Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong to Manila. All accused arrived in Manila as a
tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung, an employee of
Select Tours International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide.

After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the
baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and
proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at that time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing
Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports.

Gomez testified that he instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the examiner's table for inspection.
They were directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their turn to be examined. Chin Kong
Song's baggage was first to be examined by Gomez. Gomez put his hand inside the baggage and in the course of
the inspection, he found three (3) brown colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk boxes underneath the
clothes. The boxes were marked Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong with them, Gomez returned them
inside the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song to go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next examined the
baggage of Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out two (2) boxes of Alpen Cereals from said
baggage and like in the previous inspection, he found nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong Chuen Ming to
go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to Lim Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another three (3) boxes
of Alpen Cereals from said baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter.
Inside the box was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately called the
attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his discovery.2

Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline substance, she immediately
ordered the tour group to get their baggages and proceed to the district collector's office. Chin Kong Song and
Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by Gomez, were also brought inside together with the rest of the
group. Inside the collector's office, Gomez continued to examine the baggages of the other members of the tour
group. He allegedly found that each baggage contained one (1), two (2) or three (3) boxes similar to those
previously found in the baggages of Chin Kong Song, Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of thirty (30)
boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the
eleven (11) accused. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by
putting masking tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes,
Bonifacio called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the
masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also present at this time
were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs and several news reporters. A few
minutes later, District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI Deputy Director
Mariano Mison.3

Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, he conducted a field test on a
sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed "shabu." Capt. Francisco
immediately informed the eleven (11) accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the
Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame.4
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified them, they
were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their
signatures. The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered from accused was
"shabu."5The total weight of "shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms.6

For their part, the defense interposed by all accused was basically anchored on the testimony of their co-accused
Lim Chan Fatt, a technician and self-confessed "call boy", who admitted being responsible for bringing the boxes of
Alpea Cereals into the country although he denied any knowledge that they contained "shabu." Lim Chan Fatt
testified that except for Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, all other accused were unknown or complete strangers
to him until their trip to the Philippines on 7 September 1991. With respect to Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun,
Lim Chan Fatt allegedly met them at his boarding house in Hongkong where the two (2) temporarily lived a few days
before said trip. According to Lim Chan Fatt, prior to their departure date, a certain Ah Hong, a co-boarder and a
Hongkong businessman, approached him and asked him if he could kindly bring with him boxes of cereals to the
Philippines. Ah Hong promised Lim Chan Fatt that a certain Ah Sing will get these boxes from him at the Philippine
airport and for this trouble, Ah Sing will see to it that Lim Chan Fatt will have a good time in the Philippines. Ah Hong
allegedly even opened one (1) box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim Chan Fatt acceded to Ah Hong's
request as he allegedly found nothing wrong with it. Consequently, Ah Hong delivered to Lim Chan Fatt thirty (30)
boxes of Alpen Cereals. Since his baggage could not accommodate all thirty (30) boxes, Lim Chan Fatt requested
Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun to accommodate some of the boxes in their baggages. Lim Chan Fatt claimed
that he entrusted five (5) boxes to Chin Kong Song and another five (5) to Lim Nyuk Sun. He allegedly placed four
(4) boxes inside a hand carried plastic bag while the rest were put inside his baggage.7

On the basis of this testimony, the defense endeavored to show that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song and Lim
Nyuk Sun were responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country and even then they cannot be held
liable for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, as they allegedly had no knowledge that
these boxes contained "shabu."

The defense also presented as witnesses accused Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun and accused-appellants Au
Wing Cheung and Wong Chuen Ming. Accused-appellants denied that boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered from
their baggages. They claimed that they affixed their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by
police authorities who were present during the examination inside the collector's office. Accused-appellant Au Wing
Cheung maintained that he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. and that he had no
prior knowledge that the tour group he was supposed to accompany to the Philippines brought boxes containing
"shabu."8 For his part, accused-appellant Wong Chuen Ming tried to dissociate himself from the other accused by
testifying that he was not a part of their group. He claimed that he was originally booked with another travel agency,
Wing Ann Travel Co., for a five-day Cebu tour. This Cebu tour was allegedly cancelled due to insufficient number of
clients and accused-appellant was subsequently transferred to and accommodated by Select Tours.9 The other
accused who did not take the witness stand opted to adopt as their own all testimonial and documentary evidence
presented in court for the defense.

On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

In view of all the foregoing evidences, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven the guilt of all
the accused in all the criminal cases filed against them for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, RA 6425
as amended and hereby sentences them as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 91-1524 entitled People of the Philippines vs. WONG CHUEN MING, the Court
sentences Wong Cheun Ming to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15 Art. III of RA 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1525 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KIN YONG, the Court
hereby sentences Chin Kin Yong to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation 15 (sic), Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.
 In Criminal Case No. 91-1526 entitled People of the Philippines vs. AU WING CHEUNG, the Court
hereby sentences Au Wing Cheung to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1527 entitled People of the Philippines vs. YAP BOON AH, the Court
hereby sentences Yap Boon Ah to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1528 entitled People of the Philippines vs. TAN SOI TEE, the Court hereby
sentences Tan Soi Tee to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1529 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KONG SONG, the Court
hereby sentences Chin Kong Song to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1530 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KOK WEE, the Court
hereby sentences Chin Kok Wee, to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No: 91-1531 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN KIN FAH, the Court
sentences Chin Kin Fah to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1532 entitled People of the Philippines vs. LIM CHAN FATT, the Court
hereby sentences Lim Chan Fatt to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1533 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHAI MIN HUWA, the Court
hereby sentences Chai Min Huwa to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1534 entitled People of the Philippines vs. LIM NYUK SUN, the Court
hereby sentences Lim Nyuk Sun, to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15, R.A. 6425 as amended.

Likewise, the thirty (30) alpen cereal boxes found to contain a total of 34.450 kilograms of
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride or shabu is hereby forfeited and the same is hereby ordered burned
and/or destroyed in the presence of this Court, representative of the Department of Justice, National
Bureau of Investigation, Dangerous Drugs Board, Bureau of Customs and the Narcotics Command
(Narcom) at the San Lazaro crematorium before the same falls in the hands of future victims and
further compound the already epidemic proportions of the drug menace in the country.

SO ORDERED.10

Thereafter, all accused through counsel filed with the trial court their joint notice of appeal.11 However, on 7 April
1992, accused Chin Kong Song, Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok Wee and Chai Min Huwa withdrew their notice of
appeal.12 This Court then directed those accused who did not withdraw their appeal to file their respective
appellant's brief. Only accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung filed their joint appeal brief,
hence, the Court was constrained to dismiss the appeal pertaining to accused Lim Chan Fatt, Ching Kin Yong, Tan
Soi Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.13 Consequently, the Court is now only concerned with the appeal of
accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung as the decision of the trial court has already become
final and executory with respect to accused Chin Kong Song, Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok Wee, Chai Min Huwa, Lim
Chan Fatt, Chi Kin Yong, Tan Soi Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.

In their appeal brief, accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung make the following assignment of
errors:
 I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE JOINT
REPRESENTATION BY PREVIOUS COUNSEL OF APPELLANTS WITH THE GROUP OF NINE
MALAYSIAN ACCUSED NOT ONLY PREJUDICED THE FORMER BUT ALSO AMOUNTED TO
THE DEPRIVATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND DUE
PROCESS.

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE APPREHENDING CUSTOMS
OFFICERS VIOLATED APPELLANTS' MIRANDA RIGHTS.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' MIRANDA RIGHTS.

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN

THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, DESPITE THE PAUCITY AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY
OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR ABSENCE OF ANIMUS
POSSIDENDI ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANTS.14

Accused-appellants' contention that they were deprived of their right to counsel and due process when their
previous counsels also represented the other accused despite "conflicting interests" is not well-taken. After going
over the lengthy transcripts taken during the trial, the Court is satisfied that said counsels tried to present all the
defenses available to each of the accused and that they did not, in any way, put in jeopardy accused-appellants'
constitutional right to counsel. It does not appear from the records that the effectiveness of accused-appellants'
previous counsels was diminished by the fact that they also jointly represented the other accused.

The Court, however, finds merit in the other contentions raised by accused-appellants in their appeal brief. These
contentions shall be discussed jointly considering that the issues they raise are interrelated and deal with the
question of whether or not the guilt of accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

At the outset, the Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing
"shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveals that accused were never informed of
their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not
informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they
might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen
Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at
Camp Crame.

Prosecution witness Danilo Gomez admitted this fatal lapse during cross-examination:

Atty. Tomas:

What did you tell these passengers before you made them sign this bunch of
cartons?
 A It was Collector Bonifacio who call (sic) their names and as soon as their luggage
are examined and pulled, the three boxes, I wrap it in a masking tape and requested
them to sign their names.

Q You just told them to sign this matter?

A Yes.

Q No preliminaries?

A No.

Q At that time that each one of the passengers were made to sign, was there any
lawyer representing them?

A None.

Q You did not even inform them of their constitutional rights?

A No.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Capt. Rustico Francisco also admitted that he did not inform the accused of their rights when he placed them under
arrest:

Atty. Zoleta:

So, after the result of that sample examined which yielded positive result, you
immediately placed the accused under arrest, is that correct?

A I informed that that they are under arrest for bringing transporting to the country
suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How did you announce your authority to the accused?

A I told Mr. Paul Au to tell his companions that we are placing them under arrest for
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride into the country.

Q And it is at this very moment that you informed them of their right, is that correct?

A I did not inform them of their right.16 (Emphasis supplied)

It is also not shown from the testimony of Elizabeth Ayonon that accused were informed of their rights when they
were again made to affix their signatures on the plastic bags:

Atty. Tomas:

You said all the signatures were already there when brought to your laboratory for
examination. With that answer, do you mean to tell even the signature inside the
cereal box and transparent plastic bag were already there when you examined said
specimen?

A Only the brown box labelled Alpen.

Q Who made the signature inside the cereal box and on the transparent plastic bag?
 A Me, sir, because I asked them to identify. The interpreter asked them to identify
their signature. So, in return I have to tell them please affix your signature for proper
identification since they are reflected on the box.

Q What did you tell the accused when you required them to make their signatures?

A The interpreter told them to affix their signature for proper identification on the
transparent plastic bag since their signature appeared on the carton box.17

By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit
admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of accused
are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12
[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the
accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.18 The fact that all accused are foreign
nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in
the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.19

Without the signatures of accused on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the transparent plastic bags, the
prosecution is left with the testimonies of its witnesses to establish that all the eleven (11) accused transported
"shabu" into the country. Among the prosecution witnesses, only customs examiner Danilo Gomez testified that all
the seized baggages, including those owned by accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung,
contained a box or boxes of "shabu." His testimony was given credence by the trial court since he was presumed to
have performed his duties in a regular manner. However, Gomez' testimony inculpating accused-appellants as not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

Customs collector Zenaida Bonifacio stated during cross-examination that she cannot recall if each and everyone of
accused were found in possession of any box or boxes of Alpen Cereals.20 More significantly, the testimony of
NARCOM officer Capt. Rustico Francisco casts doubt on the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of "shabu"
from the baggages of accused-appellants:

COURT:

Clarificatory questions from the Court, you said that you were at the arrival area
immediately after the arrival of all these accused when your attention was called by
the customs examiner, is that correct?

A Yes. Your Honor.

Court:

So that you can truly say that you could note or witness the actual examinations of
the baggages of all the accused persons here?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

You realize, of course, the seriousness of the charges against these persons?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

As a matter of fact, they could stay in jail for life?

A Yes, Your Honor.

 Court :

Now in all candor and sincerity, did you actually see with your own two eyes any box
being recovered from the bag of Au Wing Cheung? If you are not sure, don't answer.

A I am not sure.

Court:

How about from the bag of Wong Chuen Ming, the other tourist from Hongkong. In all
candor and sincerity did you actually see with your own two eyes a box being
recovered from his bag?

A I am not sure.

Court:

There are nine other accused in these cases. In all fairness and sincerity, other than
the two, did you actually see with your own two eyes boxes of cereals being
recovered from the bags of the other Malaysians accused in these cases?

A For the nine others, I am very sure, I am very sure that cereal boxes containing
shabu, I am very sure.

Court:

Without any exception?

A Yes, Your Honor, for the nine.21 (Emphasis supplied)

While Capt. Francisco was categorical in stating that boxes of "shabu" were recovered from the baggages belonging
to the other nine (9) accused Malaysians, he admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez actually recovered
boxes of "shabu" from accused-appellants' baggages. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties accorded to Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellants to be
presumed innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution witnesses.22

There are other circumstances that militate against the conviction of accused-appellants. First, accused-appellants
are British (Hongkong) nationals while all the other accused are Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine how accused-
appellants could have conspired with the other accused, who are total strangers, when they do not even speak the
same language. Second, overwhelming evidence consisting of testimonies of accused-appellant Piu Wing Cheung's
superiors was presented to show that he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Third,
evidence showed that accused-appellant Wong Chuen Ming was not originally part of the tour group arranged by
Select Tours but he was only accommodated by the latter at the last minute when his package tour to Cebu was
cancelled by Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by Capt. Francisco, both accused-appellants adamantly
refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags containing "shabu":

Court:

You made mention about two persons two of the accused who refused to sign the
plastic bags containing the suspected shabu. Did you say that?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court:
 Did you not go out of your way to inquire the reasons of the two for not wanting to
sign knowing of course that your duty as a law officer is not only to see to it that the
guilty are prosecuted but to spare the innocent? Did you inquire why they refused to
sign?

A I inquired.

Court:

What was the reason of the two?

A They told me their baggages did not contain any prohibited drugs.

Court:

Now again, think very carefully and try to recall vividly the time when these two
refused to sign and go over the faces of the eleven accused and tell the Court if you
can remember or recall the looks of the two accused who refused to sign. Before you
do that look very carefully at their faces.

A Wong Chuen Ming, the one with the tattoo.

Q Now, you mentioned two persons look at the faces of the 10 others. Aside from the
one with a tattoo and look for the other one.

A The other one is the tour leader.23

All the foregoing circumstances taken together with the findings of the Court persuade us to hold that accused-
appellants' participation in the illegal transportation of "shabu" into the country has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. To paraphrase an admonition expressed by the Court in a recent case, "[m]uch as We share the
abhorrence of he disenchanted public in regard to the proliferation of drug pushers (or drug smugglers, as in this
case), the Court cannot permit the incarceration of individuals based on insufficient factual nexus of their
participation in the commission of an offense."24

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one entered ACQUITTING Wong
Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung of the crime charged, based on reasonable doubt. Their immediate release is
hereby ORDERED unless they are detained for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @
PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife,
Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the metropolis of Manila or its
environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they thought they were in a
veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and trouble when in the early morning of 27 August 91,
in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the
occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims·former houseboy, as
one of the perpetrators of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for
robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries1 filed on 19 November 1991 with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.

Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the prosecution
filed a motion to amend the information2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the
evaluation Of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the
motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information
because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him.3

The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were
issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for
bail.4He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the
accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality of Tuba,
Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the, above-
named accused, Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes,
and with intent of gain and against the will and consent of the owners thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE
BARKER and with violence against and intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and
take and carry away the following articles, to ,it:

[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]

all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita and William Horace Barker; that
on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of
their body, leading to the death of William Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on
the former which required medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have
likewise incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same period of time.

Contrary to Law.

Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a plea of not
guilty on 22 April 1992.6

In its decision7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William
Horace Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs."

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta
Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean
Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda
Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented
SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.

The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as
follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker
repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main doors of their house to see if they
had been locked and bolted.

At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a
room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the
lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched. on the
light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the
former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had
acquainted her on her chores.

Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a
fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as
Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante
chased her and pulled her back inside the house.

Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her
room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two
meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and
immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held
on to it and shouted for help.

The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room, leaving behind
her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the dining room. She saw
Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly the two rushed towards her and beat
her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up
until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.

Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the·back of her right hand. She fell to the concrete
floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, ,he went near
the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they
rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced
themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of
Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped,
Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.

At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside
the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba·, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw
two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller
of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was
carrying a black bag on his right shoulder

Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would lead to
Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and
owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the
taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on
to the bar of the jeepney as he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a
picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.

At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where they had earlier
barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the dining room, they
saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet
Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it
for fear of what they had seen earlier. They just stayed near the road.

Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City Police
Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City Health
Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only because it found out that the scene of the
crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that
time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch
(Exhibit "JJ") showing its location.' They went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a
black T-shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe (Exhibit
"BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with
descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security
guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK").

Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on
the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall,
and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through and created a trail amidst the
grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was
sent to the Barker house to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.

At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the·Barker house to conduct their
investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house.

The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio City Police
were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the
court.

The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where
it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal·Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. H, found in it twenty-
seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic
shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and "R").

The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she was
treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around
11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple
lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the
muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined
that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had
been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.

On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs.
Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She
pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the
members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had
not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired,
and she had double vision.

On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the hospital
and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get
back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V").
Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry
(Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an
affidavit on these missing items (Exhibit "X.).

Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she sustained a
damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt
Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatment
at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").

On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go to
Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the, whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante.
In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw
Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to find out whether
Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the two had not,
Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan,

On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none other than
accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the
Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station
turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.

Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the 235th PNP
Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed
SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his
rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated
his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991.

On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated
therein that "he is willing and volunteering·to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is
the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such
statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the
Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion
for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").

In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the
latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that
Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to
the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his
zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it;
when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her
with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead
pipe provided·him by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who
had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and
a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry.

Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road
where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they
were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted
somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station
where they boarded a bus for Manila.8

Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the trial court in
this wise:

Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that O" August 27,
1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas
Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was employed as a caretaker Since July
5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig,
who found him the job as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the
factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-
employees all Sleep inside the factory.

On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He slept
inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how to
make the seasoning for the polvoron.

On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was his
vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day in
1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He
knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary
 school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each
other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante)
house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed to
go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag,
Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him
/Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda
knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able to
sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went to visit accused
Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante again. After his
Christmas vacation, he went back to work a the polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his
co-workers Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she
was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to Guinyangan,
Quezon. He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as he
was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home.
He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba,
Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not
stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante,
he would be freed and he could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the
fact that he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.

On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he
has remained under detention up to the present.9

The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and SP03
Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, ·testified that she started
her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991.
SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and
that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10

Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a
conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated
thus:

Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing accused
Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession and the proof of
corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?

In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the following
requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance; 2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19,
1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of
the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).

The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused are:

1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any objection shows
that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well and easily grip a lead pipe and
strike a cement post with such force that it produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then
to conclude that accused Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.

2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the company of
accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution witness who noticed the
defective hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog
dialect shows that they were strangers to the place
 3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they from the same
town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that he Salvamante are close friends
to the point that they went out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even
accompanied Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder.

4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing and volunteering
to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in appearing that he is the least guilty
along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession trade to the police at Although he claims
that he did not his signature would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this is a
flimsy excuse which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily
asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on
the motion.

5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that fateful morning
and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what he actually did can be
considered as another circumstance to already bloster the increasing circumstances against the
accused.

6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defense
and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712).
For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at
some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247).
This defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime
scene.

The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the needed proof
beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11

The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda taken by SP02
Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.

Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him because the
trial court committed this lone error:

. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED. 12

Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored on his alibi that
at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of
the star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital,
Pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two
housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.

We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.

The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps
identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza
Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Magueda,
The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on
circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his attention and arguments on these.

From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession — the Sinumpaang
Salaysay — and an extrajudicial admission — the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa.
A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an
extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and
33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows:
 Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as
follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent
to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt. 14

And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the
assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already benefited in court against
him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not,
therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as
follows:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation." It
heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial
investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went on to state:

At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the
right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have
any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a
case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. 17

The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the
aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since
voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence,
the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.

As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their
testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because
such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:

In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of
the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No.
83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we
cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent End
to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is
deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view
would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights
under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution,

The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III
of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are
available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and
primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which
reads:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .

The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second paragraph of Section
20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the united
States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other
settings." It went on to state its ruling:

Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated, it is
this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards
to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that
he may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney
and thereafter consents to a questioned. 20

It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20, the
word custudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view thereof,
in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it
inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the
phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda
doctrine.

Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by making it
applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in custody. 22 Accordingly, as so
formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the
accused only begin upon arraignment, Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule
in Morales vs, Enrile: 24

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the
arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case had been
filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to counsel and to
be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at any time before
arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into
Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be
competent and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel,
he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus, Section 12(2),
Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically declared:

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be-held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail
if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if
he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to
custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has
already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of
the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting
confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned
because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain
silent and to counsel.

Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant
of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the
warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be
improper for any public officer Or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of
the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.

The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable
violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda
was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the
absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3,
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a
different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and
freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea
to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of
the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant,
that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28 or restriction on the
power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that
keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited.29 They are the fundamental
safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the
relationships between individuals. 31

Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the
former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, 32 this Court held that the declaration
of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any
person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.

To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly .stated that "he
is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
among the accused in this case."

In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness,
Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His
defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to
Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by
circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case:

(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime
in question was committed there;

(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara,
and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;

(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;

(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place
sometime in September 1991;

(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and

(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and

(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if
the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of
Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case.

This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly
rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place
must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed,
he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. 34 Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his
brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not
then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was
committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron
factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and
continuously until 27 August 1991.

WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. Nos. 97437-39 February 5, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSUE MOLAS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Antonio S. Ramos-Uypitching for accused-appellant.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Appellant Josue Molas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murders of two women and an eight-year
old boy in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812 and 5813 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Dumaguete City, and
was sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The three (3) separate Informations dated June 3, 1983 filed against the appellant alleged:

Criminal Case No. 5811

The undersigned Fiscal accuses JOSUE MOLAS of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, at sitio Inas, Dobdob, Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, then armed with a sharp bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab and hack Dulcesima Resonable, thereby inflicting the following wounds:

1. Deep incised wound on the anterior neck, cutting the muscles, blood vessels,
esophagus, trachea, extending from the left side of the neck to the right side of the
neck;

2. Deep stab wound on the epigastric region penetrating the abdominal muscles
intestines 4 1/2 inches deep 1 inch wide;

3. Stab wound at the back, below the right scapular bone 1/2 inch deep 1 1/4 inches
wide;

which wounds directly caused the death of said Dulcesima Resonable immediately thereafter. (p. 28-
29, Rollo.)

Criminal Case No. 5812

The undersigned Fiscal accuses JOSUE MOLAS of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, at sitio Inas, Dobdob, Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, then armed with a sharp bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab Abelardo Resonable, an 8 year old boy, thereby inflicting the following wounds:

1. Multiple stab wounds, right Lumbar transverse colon;

2. Partial spinal cord transection;

3. General peritonitis;

which wounds directly caused the death of said Abelardo Resonable thereafter. (p. 29, Rollo.)

Criminal Case No. 5813

The undersigned Fiscal accuses JOSUE MOLAS of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:

That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, at sitio Inas, Dobdob, Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, then armed with a sharp bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and hack Soledad Resonable, thereby inflicting the following wounds:

1. Stab wound, on the mid-chest 2-1/2 inches deep, 1/2 inch wide;

2. Multiple puncture wounds on the anterior neck 1/2 inch deep;

3. Stab wound on the right arm, anterior proximal side 1-1/2 inches deep 1-1/2
inches wide;

4. Stab wound on the anterior axillary region 1-1/2 inches deep 2-1/2 inches wide;
 5. Deep stab wound on the left breast 1/2 inch wide, 2 inches deep;

6. Stab wound on the right infrascapular region 1 inch deep, 1/2 inch wide;

7. Stab wound on the left lumbar region 1 inch deep, 1/2 inch wide;

which wounds directly caused the death of said Soledad Resonable immediately thereafter. (p.
30, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, Molas entered a plea of "not guilty" in all the three (3) cases which were jointly tried as they
arose on the same occasion and involve the same accused and the same evidence for both the prosecution and the
defense.

The evidence for the prosecution established that Molas and Dulcesima Resonable, the victim in Criminal Case No.
5811, were sweethearts. They were engaged to be married in May, 1983. Dulcesima was the daughter of Bernardo
Resonable and Soledad Resonable, the victim in Criminal Case No. 5813. The couple had two (2) sons namely
Nicolas and Abelardo, the victim in Criminal Case No. 5812.

At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, Bernardo Resonable arrived at his house in Inas, Dobdob,
Valencia, Negros Oriental, tired from work on his farm. He was surprised to find his eight-year-old son, Abelardo, at
the doorway of his house, bathed in his own blood. He carried his son into the house and placed him on top of a
table. Abelardo asked for hot water, which his father quickly fetched, after which Abelardo informed his father that
appellant, Josue Molas, was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also stabbed his sister Dulcesima and
his mother Soledad (TSN of August 7, 1984 of Bernardo Resonable, pp. 7-15). Having been informed of the
stabbing, Bernardo looked for his daughter and wife. He found the lifeless body of his daughter Dulce in a dried
carabao mud pool some three (3) arms-lengths from his house. He carried her into the house and looked for his wife
whose corpse he found near the bench by the door of the house. He ran to report the matter to the barangay captain
(Labe) and sought help from the authorities in the municipal building of Valencia. Meanwhile, Abelardo was brought
to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in a house on higher ground. Abelardo
expired the next day.

At dawn of February 3, 1983, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman Geronimo Vallega
in the municipal hall of Pamplona, Negros Oriental. He also surrendered "the hunting knife I used in killing the
mother, the daughter and the boy" (p. 14 TSN, June 18, 1985; p. 160, Records in G.R. Nos. 97437-39). The guard
forthwith lodged him in jail. Afterwards, he was transferred to the Valencia Police Station, which had jurisdiction over
the crime that was committed in Sitio Inas, Dobdob, Valencia, Negros Oriental.

The next morning, after he was informed of his Constitutional rights, Molas refused to give any statement to the
police. However, on March 10, 1983, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the station investigator at the Valencia Police
Station, took down the sworn statement which Molas freely and voluntarily gave with the assistance or presence of
counsel. When he was asked to "relate the whole story" (pp. 36-38, TSN, October 16, 1984), he answered as
follows:

A — In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad
Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako
ug patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my
own daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter and grabbed her hair and boxed
her to the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped Solidad by holding
her hands to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting my
head and arms. Due to blocks I made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima and again
boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because I was hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-to-
be and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to grab the weapon on my waist and stabbed
Solidad hitting her first on the breast, then on the back after which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's
younger brother at my back holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him on the breast and followed
again at the back causing him to fall down on the ground, leaving therein the weapon I used causing
incised wound on my right little finger and ran away but Dulcisima stopped me by holding my left
hand and said, "puslang nabuhat sa akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag onong ta
sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together]. Hearing
 such words, I responded, "papatay ka diay kanako," [You'll kill me after all?] I went back where
Abelardo was and pulled the penetrated weapon and stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was
following me hitting her breast and caused her life to end. When I saw Solidad her mother walking
towards the seat of their store and sat down, I followed her and slashed her neck and stabbed her
stomach and immediately ran home.

Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P. Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of Valencia after the latter
and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents of his affidavit into the Cebuano dialect. Molas did not object to
any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document willingly, after which the judge affixed his
own signature thereon.

During the trial, Molas, testifying as the lone witness in his own behalf, spun a different tale. He declared:

On February 2, 1983 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was walking towards the store of
Soledad Resonable when he saw the lifeless body of his fiancee, Dulcesima, beside the dried mud
pool at a distance of about three (3) "fathoms" away from the store. He approached and hugged
Dulcesima and "thinking that she was alive, asked "Day, what is this?" but he received no reply." He
looked toward the store and saw Soledad leaning on the wall. He ran to her and asked: "Tia, what is
this ?" but heard no answer. He discovered that Soledad was wounded in the neck and bathed with
blood. Then he heard someone moaning. He got a lamp and saw his future brother-in-law, Abelardo,
under a table, still alive, with a hunting knife stuck in his back. He pulled out the knife, held it, and
shouted to Nicolas Resonable for help, but nobody responded. Suddenly, he heard a voice coming
from behind the store saying: "Don't shout, Bay, if you don't want to die!" When he looked, he saw
three (3) unidentified persons chasing him. During his flight, he stumbled and injured his middle and
small fingers with the hunting knife in his hand. Upon reaching his house, some five (5) kilometers
away in Cabangogan, Calinawan, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, he informed his mother about what
happened to his fiancee and his prospective mother-in-law. Still wearing his blood-stained clothes,
he proceeded to the police station at Pamplona, Negros Oriental, arriving there at 2:00 o'clock in the
morning of February 3, 1983. While Patrolman Renzal was investigating him, Patrolman Geronimo
Vallaga arrived and informed Renzal that Abelardo Resonable tagged Molas as the killer of his
mother and his sister so that he was put in the Pamplona Municipal jail. At 8:00 o'clock the following
morning, he was taken to the Valencia Police Station where he was detained for two months and
twenty days.

Although he alleged that he was manhandled by a certain Patrolman Quitoy, he could not substantiate the allegation
with a medical certificate. He admitted having signed an affidavit on March 10, 1983 but he denied knowing its
contents because it was written in English and allegedly was not translated to him.

The trial court viewed with disbelief Molas' testimony, because it was riddled with inconsistencies. He could not
explain, during cross-examination, why he did not shout for help when he was chased by "unidentified persons," and
why he "forgot" to tell his mother that Abelardo Resonable, his future brother-in-law, was also wounded.

On August 10, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Molas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of murder. It imposed on him three penalties of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of
his victims P30,000.00 as death indemnity in each case, plus the costs.

He has appealed the decision, alleging that the trial court erred:

1. in admitting as evidence against him his extra-judicial confession which was executed without the
assistance of counsel, as required by the Constitution;

2. in giving full faith and credit to the dying declaration of Abelardo Resonable; and

3. in finding that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal has no merit.

Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was
given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord,
as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying declaration.

To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he
was a competent witness; and (d) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder
or parricide in which the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA
427). All of these circumstances were present when Abelardo made his dying declaration.

While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and assistance of counsel,
hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the
testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167
SCRA 462; People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249).

The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16,
1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on the witness stand,
found him credible.

Rage appeared to have triggered Molas' killing rampage, rage on seeing Soledad maul his sweetheart, Dulcesima,
rage when Dulcesima chided him instead of appreciating his effort to stop her mother's attack against her, and rage
at Abelardo for attacking him also. But even if that motive may seem insufficient to persons not as easily provoked
to violence, the absence of motive only assumes determinative significance when the perpetrator of the crimes had
not been positively identified (People vs. Ballinas, 202 SCRA 516). In this case, however, both the crimes and
Molas' participation therein were definitely established.

At any rate, the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if that confession
were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the
police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after
the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona
and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it
was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable.

The trial court correctly found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the three victims was
raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. There was abuse of
superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and
stronger, was armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present
when he hacked eight-year old Abelardo and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was
unarmed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment convicting Josue Molas for the murders of Dulcesima Resonable, Soledad
Resonable and Abelardo Resonable and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of said
murders is AFFIRMED, with modification of the death indemnity which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 for each
case.