IN THE APPELLATE COURT, FIRST DISTRICT

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION
APPELLATE CASE NO. 1-17-0864

Alexander Groeper, an individual, and Appeal from 16-CH-13192

Gregory Groeper, an individual Hon. Anna Helen Demacopoulos
Plaintiffs-Appellants, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
vs.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
FITTS MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.,
an Indiana Corporation; ALTISOURCE
SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation;
Defendants-Appellees,
OPENING BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:

Alexander Groeper Pro Se, and;

Gregory Groeper,, Pro Se;
5815 West Dakin Street, Jefferson Township,
Chicago,, Illinois State 60634
phone: 872.230.7135
email: lawman@gmx.us

FOR APPELLEES:
For FITTS MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. For ALTISOURCE SOLUTIONS, INC.
Brittany B. Kimble, Atty. Kimberly A. Jansen, Atty.
Kimble Law Offices Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP
846 South 17th Ave. 151 North Franklin, Suite 2500
Maywood, Illinois 60153 Chicago, Illinois 60606
phone: 773.609.4529 phone: 312.704.3000
email: info@brittanykimbleesq.com email: kjansen@hinshawlaw.com

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 1 of 42

 I. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Description Page

I. Points and Authorities 1

II. Nature of Case 5

III. Questions presented for Review 5

IV. Jurisdiction 7

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) 7

V. Relevant Laws, Statutes, and Constitutional Provisions being 7

challenged

VI. Statement of Facts 7

a. Underlying Wrongful Foreclosure Case no. 09 CH 49823 7

735 ILCS 15/1101 Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act 13

b. Present Cause of Action Case No. 16 CH 13192 14

805 ILCS 5/13.05 15

c. Related subtenant Eviction US Bank v. Kroeker 15 M1 724453 20

735 ILCS 5/15-1701 20

VII Standard of Review 22

Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 22

1009, 1015 (1996)

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 129, 22
835 N.E. 2d 801, 821 (2005)

Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council v. Town of 22

Cicero, 301 Ill. App. 3d 323, 335, 703 N.E.2d 559, 567 (1st Dist.
1998)

VIII. Legal Analysis 23

Issue No. 1- Necessary Parties were never served in the 23

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 2 of 42

 Wrongful Foreclosure case

West Suburban Bank v. ADVANTAGE FINANCIAL, 23 NE 3d 370 – 23

Ill: Appellate Court, 2nd Dist. 2-13-1146 (2014)

Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 109, 267 24

Ill.Dec. 58, 776 N.E.2d 195 (2002)

C.T.A.S.S. & U. Federal Credit Union v. Johnson, 383 Ill.App.3d 24

909, 912, 322 Ill.Dec. 543, 891 N.E.2d 558 (2008)

State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (1986) 24, 27

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877) 24

In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill.2d 33, 332 Ill.Dec. 555, 932 24

N.E.2d 1016 (2010)

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) 24

Kole v. Brubaker, 325 Ill. App. 3d 944, 954 (2001) 24

In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill.2d 542, 547, 129 Ill.Dec. 53, 535 25, 26
N.E.2d 818 (1989)

Illinois Constitution of (1974) 25

Issue No. 2- The doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral 26

Estoppel do not apply where there is no service on defendants

Bank Champaign v. Wells Fargo Bank 2012 IL App (4th) 26

110588

Issue No. 3 Whether the trial court erred when it ruled in favor of 28
Defendants’ 2-619 motions to dismiss

735 ILCS 5/2-615 28

735 ILCS 5/2-619 28

735 ILCS 5-2-1005 28

Issue No. 4 Whether the trial court erred when it refused to allow 29
Plaintiff to amend its Original Complaint

Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ill. 2006) 30

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 3 of 42

 Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 26, 965 30
N.E.2d 1092, 1099

Johnson v. Matrix Fin. Servs. Corp., 820 N.E.2d 1094, 1105 (Ill. 30
App. Ct. 2004)

Zeh v. Wheeler, 489 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. 1986) 30

186 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 38] 30

735 ILCS 5/2-612 31

Issue No. 5 Whether the trial court erred in granting a dismissal 31

and allowing unregistered foreign corporations to file numerous
pleadings.

805 ILCS 5/13.75 Illinois BCA 32

Royal Insurance Co. v. All States Theatres, 6 So. 2d 494 (Ala. 32

1942)

805 ILCS 5/124 Illinois BCA 33

Henderson- Smith & Assocs, Inc. vs. Nahamani Family Serv. 33

Cntr., Ill. App. 3d 15, 26, 752 N.E.2d 33, 42 (1st Dist. 2001)

Issue No. 6 Whether the trial court erred when it refused to 34

issue a TRO to protect the personal property and home of
Plaintiffs

735 ILCS 5/11-101 34

Kable Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union Local 34

65-B (1976), 63 Ill.2d 514, 521, 349 N.E.2d 36

Diamond Sav. & Loan Co. v. Royal Glen Condominium Ass'n, 34

526 N.E.2d 372, 173 Ill.App.3d 431, 122 Ill.Dec. 113 (Ill. App., 1988)

Abdulhafedh v. Secretary of State (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 413, 417, 34

112 Ill.Dec. 900, 514 N.E.2d 563

Stocker Hinge Manufacturing Co. v. Darnel Industries, Inc. 35

(1983), 94 Ill.2d 535, 541, 69 Ill.Dec. 71, 447 N.E.2d 288

Peoples Gas Light [173 Ill.App.3d 435] & Coke Co., 117 Ill.App.3d 35
at 355-56, 72 Ill.Dec. 865, 453 N.E.2d 740

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 4 of 42

 Jurco v. Stuart (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 405, 408, 66 Ill.Dec. 207, 442 35
N.E.2d 633

Bojangles, Inc. v. City of Elmhurst (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 19, 349 35

N.E.2d 478

Cross Wood Products, Inc. v. Suter (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 282, 286, 35

52 Ill.Dec. 744, 422 N.E.2d 953.

IX. Conclusion 36

NATURE OF THE CASE

The present case involves an action for wrongful eviction wherein Plaintiffs sued

for damages to person and property and violation of their civil rights. There was no

jurisdiction in the underlying foreclosure case because Greg Groeper, Beneficiary of

a Land Trust was never served, nor was the Legal Owner of the Land Trust, Chicago

Title Land Trust Company (“CTLTC”). Instead a mistake was made and the wrong

company was named and served (JP Morgan Chase Bank) as Trustee.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW TO THE APPELLATE COURT

a. Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to seriously consider

and grant plaintiffs a hearing on plaintiffs’ contention that the underlying

foreclosure case was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because: 1)

plaintiff Gregory, a named defendant in that case, was not personally

served and 2) the affidavit stating that Gregory’s teenage son Ben Groeper

was given substitute service was false, and 3) the legal owner of the

property, Trustee Chicago Title Land Trust Company (CTLTC), the trustee

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 5 of 42

 of record within the Cook County Recorder of Deeds files since 2005, was

never named or served.

b. Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred by invoking doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel for the foreclosure case and it did not follow the law

that void judgments may be attacked in any court at any time.

c. Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting 615/619 motions for the

Defendants when in fact there was no valid service on Greg Groeper, his

son Alex, or the correct Land Trust Company CTLTC.

d. Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to allow Plaintiffs

Groeper to amend their Original Complaint to state valid causes of action

for wrongful eviction, assault, trespass upon chattels, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, etc., as shown in Exhibit B hereto and it summarily

dismissed the Plaintiffs’ case with prejudice.

e. Issue 5. Whether the trial court erred when it granted the relief of a

dismissal judgment for Defendants when in fact they were wholly

unregistered foreign corporations and had not paid any fees, fines or

penalties for doing business in Illinois since at least the date of the

wrongful eviction on 07/28/16.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 6 of 42

 f. Issue 6. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to issue a TRO against

Defendants when they had broken into the Subject property, stolen,

vandalized, damaged and threatened further damage to irreplaceable family

heirlooms and unique tools of the trade necessary for Greg Groeper to

conduct his business.

JURISDICTION

This case is appealable to the First District Court of Appeals pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) when the Circuit Court fully and finally disposed of

Plaintiffs’ case by ruling on behalf of the Defendants on all of their claims on 3-3-17

(C.160) . (Cite, Exhibit A, A.05). Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider on 4-3-17 (C.

168) which was denied on 6-14-17 (C.176) (A.10) Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of

appeal on 4-3-17 in the Circuit Court (Cite, Exhibit A, A.01-02) (C.166)

RELEVANT STATUTES, LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS BEING

CHALLENGED
No Constitutional provisions, laws or statutes are being challenged.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNDERLYING CASE 09-CH-49823 (“Wrongful

Foreclosure” case)

In December of 1999, the Groepers (Husband and Wife Gregory & Amy, wife

now deceased), purchased the property from a speculator/contractor Gary Poter

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 7 of 42

 who had just purchased the tax exempt property at auction from the Nebo Lutheran

Church (aka United in Faith Lutheran Church) with a combination of their joint

marital assets from the sale of their previous home and a financing agreement with

PINNFUND. (C.14)

On February 2, 2000, prior to the 90 day seasoning of the PinnFund loan, as a

continuation of that same purchase under the direction of their real estate attorney

Carlo Palladinetti, Gregory sold his legal and equitable interest in the property into

Land Trust 601393-00, administered by American National Bank & Trust Company

of Chicago (ANBTC) as Trustee. (C.14) For some reason unknown to Gregory, his

wife Amy was not asked to divest her financial or homestead interest by any

document, recorded or otherwise. (C.15)

In October 2004, in the midst of the now infamous nationwide push to get

homeowners to refinance under teaser rate Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs),

Gregory was invited by several brokers including Modern Mortgage to file an

application to refinance. (C.15)

Modern Mortgage did not inquire as to the ownership of the property and

apparently either did not do, or wholly ignored, the results of a title search which

would have shown that the property was held in trust 601393-00 at the time by

trustee LaSalle. Appendix, Exhibit C.

Modern Mortgage created documents by way of inflated property appraisals and

other declarations to show that Gregory’s income (because he was self employed

and there were month to month variances) was at the level they wanted to express

to achieve their target loan amount.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 8 of 42

 Gregory, being a simple homeowner at the time without the knowledge and skills

to identify any irregularities in what Modern Mortgage “was pitching” proceeded

under what he perceived as the broker’s ‘expert’ direction.

This resulted in a meeting with Title Services, Inc. (TSI) at their offices in

downtown Chicago as a closing agent for New Century Mortgage Corp. of California

(New Century), the purported originator and purported lender for the transaction, for

the purpose of concluding the terms of the proposed refinance agreement.

Gregory had never seen any of these documents before this meeting.

None of the documents prepared by TSI or New Century named or expressed

the fact that the legal and equitable title holder to the property was the trustee at the

time, LaSalle.

None of the documents named Trustee LaSalle as the mortgagor.

None of the documents included an Assignment of Beneficial Interest from

Gregory to any party.

At no time was the trustee LaSalle served with RESPA/TILA disclosure

documents.

Gregory did not understand what the absence of references to the Land Trust or

Trustee meant.

Neither New Century nor TSI ever inquired as to the legal ownership of the

property at the time of closing.

Gregory asked the TSI closing agent if his wife Amy needed to sign anything to

which the answer was no.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 9 of 42

 Gregory asked if there was anything else that was needed to conclude the

transaction to which the answer was no.

Gregory asked why the amount of the loan was so high, instead of just the

amount to refinance his existing balance at a lower rate. TSI’s agent told Gregory

that they had to increase the amount to include a $75,000 escrow account to pay for

property taxes; since the property was previously tax exempt under the church and

the intermediary purchaser/seller Poter never established the property as tax liable.

TSI also said they would not do anything with respect to changing the status of the

tax status with the County Assessor, but would hold those escrow funds indefinitely

until the tax status was changed and any taxes due were paid.

Gregory then indorsed the document labeled note and the document labeled

mortgage.

After signing, the TSI agent then hand wrote the phrase “a single man” near

Gregory’s name throughout the documents. Gregory asked why and was told they

were instructed to do so. Gregory asked how that applied since he was married. He

was told that it was a legal thing.

Gregory then embarked upon a long journey of trying to get the property onto the

tax rolls with the County Assessor which finally culminated in a compromise, as the

property definitions were split across multiple PIN numbers.

Once the process of placing the property on the tax roles with the Assessor was

accomplished, the County Assessor assessed three years of taxes (apx. $15,000)

(their stated legal limit) and TSI paid this amount from the escrow account.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 10 of 42

 To date, Gregory still does not know what happened to his remaining balance

and neither TSI nor OCWEN responds to inquiries.

Gregory spent the intervening period inquiring with OCWEN as to the escrow

account as well as the status of his purported lender New Century who by 2007 was

in bankruptcy.

OCWEN told Gregory to sign a loan modification which “would fix everything”.

Gregory submitted the illegible document via fax but it was never returned

countersigned nor did he receive any confirmation from OCWEN of it being in effect.

Gregory hired independent CPA Michael Graf and his associates to perform a

forensic analysis of the transaction. Graf et al. reported that there was fraud in the

transaction and that Gregory should demand, given New Century’s bankruptcy, who

OCWEN claimed the actual creditor was. Gregory also appointed Graf as Trustee

with Power of Attorney over his “name” and personal property beneficial interest for

purposes of filing, IRS issues and other personal matters.

Gregory called and emailed OCWEN repeatedly for several years but could not

get a straight answer. Gregory finally informed OCWEN that he was suspending all

further payments until OCWEN could prove to him that his money was going to the

proper party, not being diverted and the underlying failures were resolved.

In 2008, four years after the attempted New Century transaction, a mysterious

and clearly fabricated Satisfaction of Mortgage regarding the original PINNFUND

purchase loan appeared in the records of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. This

alerted Gregory to the likelihood that the original purchase loan was not paid leaving

two loans on his property records.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 11 of 42

 Then, without further response, in October of 2009, USBANK NA via Fisher &

Shapiro apparently filed foreclosure action 09-CH-49823 claiming to be a trustee to

some claimed RMBS/REMIC trust. Neither Gregory nor the Successor Trustee at

the time, Chicago Title Land Trust Company, were ever served.

Gregory issued a TILA rescission and challenged the authenticity of New

Century/ USBANK’s claims via certified mail by Graf et al. in 2010. Gregory

surmised that if the New Century transaction had been held in limbo for four years,

there had been no consummation in 2004, in addition to the fact that there was no

valid mortgage issued by the Trustee of the Land Trust at the time, LaSalle, and the

Trustee had never been served RESPA/TILA closing documents.

Gregory was eventually made aware of the case by way of hearsay unsolicited

advertisements from attorneys offering their service, not by service of process.

Gregory looked into the matter at the County Court Clerk’s website to find that the

case was already in default for a foreclosure judgment and was up for approval of

sale.

From phone calls later placed by Gregory with USBANK NA’s Trust department

they had no knowledge of said trust or foreclosure suit.

On September 26, 2013, Gregory’s wife Amy died intestate while retaining her

homestead and investment rights. No probate action was ever initiated in Illinois

prior to the alleged sale of the family property.

Gregory showed up at the trial court to object for failure of service and was told it

was too late by the trial court judge to object to the proceedings and judgments

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 12 of 42

 against him. He was told all he could object to was the sale, not the default. A

hearing was then scheduled. R.17

Gregory submitted an offer to settle plaintiffs’ claims even though he said he

objected to the plaintiffs’ claims as unfounded.

Gregory returned for the hearing and again objected to the default for lack of

service, was warned by the court that his offer to settle was ex parte and to not

make further ex parte communications, and the sale was approved over his

objections.

Gregory filed a Notice of Appeal and was given copies of the case by the clerk of

court, documents he had never seen before. Unfortunately, Gregory could not find

an attorney to assist in the appeal and it lapsed. C.14

There apparently was another subsequent case involving a sub-tenant on a

lease between Graf and the tenant to which Gregory was not a party or ever served.

Gregory does not believe that it applies to him and his wife or children and he was

not mentioned as a party or litigant to the case, 15 M1 724453 (“Subtenant Eviction”)

However, since the subtenant was his sister, this appears to be an end run around

the 120 day eviction rule under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law Act (“IMFLA”)

735 ILCS 15/1101 et. seq. See section C, below.

On July 28, 2016, three representatives of ALTISOURCE and FITTS appeared

with some five men and one woman appearing to be Cook County Sheriff Deputies.

As stated in the initial complaint (C.9), they broke down the door and assaulted

Gregory, his son and fellow appellant Alexander and Gregory’s younger son

Benjamin with open firearms drawn featuring laser pointers aimed at the family. For

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 13 of 42

 brevity, further details of the eviction are found within the initial complaint and are

incorporated as if fully set forth herein (Id.)

These persons refused to allow the Groepers to move within the house, use their

cell phones to call attorneys or anyone, speak to each other, and refused to present

any documentation when demanded by Gregory to provide justification for their

forced entry.

Once the Groepers were forcibly removed from the property ALTISOURCE and

FITTS proceeded to change locks, board up the house and refused to allow the

Groepers to retrieve vital resources, clothing, computers, etc.

B. AS TO THE INSTANT CASE 16-CH-13192 (“Wrongful Eviction”)

The instant case under appeal 16-CH-13192 (“Wrongful Eviction”) was filed and

initiated by Groeper Plaintiffs on October 6, 2016 in the Circuit Court of Illinois County

Department, Chancery Division in response to specific acts by the named and served

foreign interstate defendants and other of their privies taken against plaintiffs and their

family members and sub-tenants and their property interests and personalty beginning

on July 28, 2016 and ongoing.

Included in the initial filing of the case was a motion for an emergency temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) to stop defendants from seizing plaintiffs’ personalty until

such time that a hearing on the matter could be held and a motion for defendants to

show cause. C.36-41

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 14 of 42

 Under oral objections by plaintiffs, the trial court judge denied plaintiffs’ motion for

the emergency temporary injunction and motion to show cause and instead set a

date for case management for February 3, 2017. C.59.

The instant lawsuit 16-CH-13192 was filed on 10-6-16 (C.9) and this subsequent

case on appeal 1-17-0864 was filed by plaintiffs in this matter on October 6, 2016 in

the Circuit Court of Illinois County Department, Chancery Division (C.166) in

response to specific acts by defendants against plaintiffs, their property and their

personalty beginning on July 28, 2016 and ongoing threats against Plaintiffs to

convert, vandalize or damage their personal property and home. (Id.).

On July 28, 2016, acting under a void court judgment and order, defendants and

each of them by way of their agents, representatives, subcontractors or employees

1) breached the close of Illinois and the plaintiffs’ subject property and personality,

and 2) began “doing business” without authority under the statutory requirements of

the Illinois BCA (805 ILCS 5/13.05 Business Corporation Act of 1983) and without

license under Chicago Municipal Codes 4-6-16 for Debt Collectors and 4-6-190 for

Board up companies, 3) with the aid of several Cook County Sheriff Deputies 4)

acting under forged documents (see Appendix Exhibit C Sheriff FOIA Admissions),

and 5) under strong hand and at the point of guns brandished and pointed at

plaintiffs et. al., did forcibly break down the door, arrest, eject and physically

remove/dispossess plaintiffs and others of their property and personalty, and

threaten ongoing damages to their personal property and home. (C.17-18)

Along with the initial complaint (C.9), Plaintiffs filed for an emergency preliminary

injunction to protect their property and personalty from defendants pending a court

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 15 of 42

 hearing on the matter. (C.36, 37, 38, 41) Plaintiffs were summarily denied the pled

preliminary injunction by court order on October 12, 2016 (C.59), without any

findings of fact or conclusions of law. This Order from is nothing but “check the

boxes” and appears to be designed for filings by pro se litigants. The same order

also denied Plaintiffs’ motion for an Order to Show Cause; and instead the court set

a date for case management for February 3, 2017. Id.

Defendants, and each of them, have ongoingly performed the taking of

personalty and destruction of the subject property and personalty through neglect and

arrogance against plaintiffs and said Illinois statutes and Municipal codes. Defendants,

and each of them, each a corporation foreign to Illinois, have held that they have some

presumed inherited right from some previous plaintiff in case 09-CH-49823 (Wrongful

Foreclosure case) which exempts them from being required to establish themselves

under the Illinois BCA statute, and to act thusly and “do business” in Illinois without

obeying the statute. However, at the same time, they clearly operate under separate

corporate names, namely Altisource and Fitts Management. They have never informed

anyone they are a part of, or a division of US Bank.

Plaintiffs can find no citations creating such a presumption or precedent in law,

fact, statute or court cases validating this holding, anywhere.

After several procedural hearings, the circuit court judge, by her own claimed

discretion on the record, reinterpreted and morphed plaintiffs’ initial case filed by

plaintiffs referring to unlawful acts by unregistered foreign trespassers/intervenors;

into one which was a collateral attack on an underlying case regarding a (wrongful)

foreclosure under 09-CH-49823 and, yet the trial court judge refused to hear this

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 16 of 42

 argument. Transcripts R.67, (after a foreclosure, all people on the property are

tenants and can be evicted [in a separate eviction proceeding]; R.72--court finds the

present lawsuit to be an attack on the foreclosure case and it is res judicata and

collateral estoppel. R.73 - Dismissal is with prejudice because court does not

believe that any claim can be made out against Defendants Fitts Management and

Altisource.

After several procedural hearings, the circuit court repeatedly denied plaintiffs’

motions to file a First Amended Complaint consistent with the judge’s alteration and

re-interpretation of the nature of the case beyond the scope of plaintiffs’ initial

complaint, thus morphing it into a different case as to how she construed it; yet in

spite of her demand that plaintiffs’ re-file under her new interpretation of the case as

a collateral attack on the underlying 09-CH-49823 (Wrongful Foreclosure case)

case,they were continuously denied leave to file a First Amended Complaint. (Id.)

After several procedural hearings and denials to grant plaintiffs motions to file a

First Amended Complaint, on 3-3-17 the circuit court granted motions to dismiss in

favor of defendants, who remain without the attendant legal capacity or standing

available by way of registration under the Illinois BCA. (C.160)

Here we are, some two years after the initial action, and upon continued prodding

by plaintiffs to defendants that they simply take advantage of remediation provisions

granted by Illinois’ statutes to “fix” their failed standing requirements and to operate

and do business in Illinois under Illinois law; yet they have refused/failed to do so

within their power.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 17 of 42

 Further, with respect to the rights of CTLTC as Successor Trustee of Land Trust

601393-00, a court judgment or order against a wrong party or non-party

(JPMORGAN CHASE) in a case is the same as a failure to rule against the proper

party in a case, leaving the proper party free of any judgment in the case [the

passed bullet].

In the end, the trial court ruled on June 14, 2017 with a final appealable order to

dismiss against plaintiffs complaint and motion to reconsider to grant leave for a First

Amended Complaint, and granted defendants’ motions to dismiss under Section

619.1 combined motion to dismiss. (C.177)

Plaintiffs then timely initiated this appeal. Notice of Appeal dated 4-3-17 (R.166)

The trial court judge in case 16-CH-13192 (Wrongful Eviction) specifically and on

the record stated that her interpretation of the case was that this was actually a

collateral attack on the underlying foreclosure case 09-CH-49823 by Groeper

plaintiffs and not simply a case of challenging the lawfulness of named defendants’

actions against them and that plaintiffs had not stated such attack in their complaint

(C.72-73).

The trial court judge stated on the record that she was going to “force” [foreign]

defendants to come into court to file motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. (citation

to record) R. 25

The trial court judge in case 16-CH-13192 (Wrongful Eviction) then also stated

on the record that she would not allow such a collateral attack of a purported void

judgment from another courtroom/judge in her court and demanded that such a

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 18 of 42

 collateral attack ‘must’ be performed in the original courtroom under the original

judge. R.23

Against her own judicial interpretation as stated on the record to plaintiffs, the

trial court judge then denied the Groeper plaintiffs several motions for leave to

correct their complaint by way of a first amended complaint in her court stating

[words to the effect] ‘I cannot imagine’ how you would correct this in an amended

complaint. R.75.

Because the trial court judge in the instant case chose to bring up the matter of

the previous foreclosure case as being essential to the instant case, certain

elements of that case need to be presented to this appellate court for consideration.

Appellants do not attempt to provide a full review of that case here, but at the

election and discretion of this appellant panel, they may review the former case

docket and certified record on appeal here: google drive link to be provided in Reply

brief or upon request.

OCWEN, apparently paying for and controlling the attorneys (SHAPIRO and later

CODILIS) in the name of USBANK, NA et al. as plaintiff in unlawful and void

foreclosure case 09-CH-49823, THEN...

Hired/subcontracted their subsidiary company ALTISOURCE who then...

Hired/subcontracted FIELD CONNECTIONS who then...

Hired/subcontracted FITTS who then...

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 19 of 42

 Conducted the eviction with Cook County Sheriff Deputies, under color of law

and falsified documents, and performed the violent taking of Groeper plaintiffs’

property and personalty, assaulting unarmed Groeper plaintiffs and family with

deadly force and threat of escalated violence and incarceration if they did not yield to

their demands.

There is no record that FITTS employees or contractors who appeared on site at

the time of the eviction had any legal authority to stand as representatives of plaintiff

USBANK, NA, or sign for USBANK, NA with Sheriff Deputies’ paperwork, to cause

or maintain a forcible eviction of Groeper plaintiffs et al. C.18

There is no record that the corporations ALTISOURCE or FITTS foreign to Illinois

had or have any legal authority under Illinois statutes or county or city municipal

licensing ordinances to perform the business acts which they performed and

continue to perform upon the Groeper plaintiffs or the property or their personalty.

C.18.

C. US Bank Files an Eviction Action against “subtenants” when they fail to

evict “Greg Groeper” within 120 days from the Order of Possession

In the Foreclosure Action, that trial court entered an Order for Possession on 6-

17-14 (C.135). However, no eviction occurred until 10-4-16, well beyond the 120

day time period permitted under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act. (735 ILCS

5/15-1701). Instead of extending the date of the foreclosure action Order for

Possession for “good cause” as the IMFL permits, Foreclosure Plaintiff US Bank

filed an action against one of the persons living at the Subject Property, Therese

Kroeker, sister to Plaintiff Gregory, and the eviction occurred under that cause of

action/ See link to Gdrive for Kroeker Order for Possession.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 20 of 42

 Interestingly enough, while the Trial court and Defendants complaint that Plaintiff

Gregory is attacking the judgment in the Foreclosure action wrongfully and in

derogation of the doctrines of Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata, they apparently

have no qualms about ignoring Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata when it suits

them. The Foreclosure Action gave a date for Order of Possession for 6-17-14. US

Bank never evicted in 120 days, nor sought an extension of time “for good cause.” It

would appear then, that they are subject to the doctrine of res judicata and collateral

estoppel, barring them from evicting Plaintiff Gregory or any one residing on his

property.

While the court said it could not ignore the underlying foreclosure case, Gregory

pointed out the order for eviction in that case expired as it was 173 days old and no

extension was ever sought or granted. R.19. Instead, the court switched subjects

and asked if Greg had gone to “housing court” for relief. R.19. It is not known how

“housing court” could have helped when the Kroeker case had been sealed by the

Defendant long ago, no information was available on the case and Plaintiff Gregory

could obtain no records from the case. (15 M1 724453)

In addition, Plaintiff Gregory complained to the trial court on 1/27/17 that he

found forged and altered documents with the Sheriff’s offices regarding the eviction

proceedings. (C.143). This would constitute Fraud on the Court and entitle Plaintiff

Greg to amend his complaint. However, the Trial Court wholly ignored the forged

and fraudulent documents (many documents in the Sheriff’s office files were also

now missing from the file). The Trial Court should have given Plaintiff Gregory

additional time to investigate the matter, file additional pleadings and a Cause of

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 21 of 42

 Action for Fraud on the Court. Instead the Trial Court Judge clung to her belief that

there was “no possible way” Plaintiff Greg could ever plead a valid Cause of Action.

R.75. Clearly Plaintiff Gregory had found a claim against the Sheriff’s department,

and other unknown persons (law firm staff? US Bank staff?) for a claim of Fraud on

the Court. This was wholly ignored by the trial court judge who just wanted to throw

out Plaintiff Gregory’s case for some unknown reason.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, reviewing courts examine questions of law de novo. Woods v. Cole,

181 IIl. 2d 512, 516, 693 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1998). Under the de novo standard,

reviewing courts determine the correctness of the circuit court’s rulings

independently. Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009,

1015 (1996). With regards to contracts, “the construction, interpretation, or legal

effect of a contract is a matter to be determined by the court as a question of law,”

and thus contract interpretation is reviewed de novo. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 129, 835 N.E. 2d 801, 821 (2005); see also Illinois Fraternal

Order of Police Labor Council v. Town of Cicero, 301 Ill. App. 3d 323, 335, 703

N.E.2d 559, 567 (1st Dist. 1998). The application of law to undisputed facts is also

reviewed under a de novo standard. Advincula, 176 III. at 12; In re Estate of Lum,

298 Ill. App.3d 791,793, 699 N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (1st Dist. 1998).

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 22 of 42

 LEGAL ANALYSIS

g. Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to seriously consider

and grant plaintiffs a hearing on plaintiffs’ contention that the underlying

foreclosure case was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because: 1)

plaintiff Gregory, a named defendant in that case, was not personally

served and 2) the affidavit stating that Gregory’s teenage son Ben Groeper

was given substitute service was false, and 3) the legal owner of the

property, Trustee Chicago Title Land Trust Company (CTLTC), the trustee

of record within the Cook County Recorder of Deeds files since 2005, was

never named or served.

US federal and Illinois state courts have held since time immemorial that a

challenge to personal or subject matter jurisdiction of any court or its judgments may

be heard in any [other] court, at any time, without any bar of statutory time limits or

choice of venue, because when prima facie evidence appears on the record of any

case to show the failure of a court to achieve personal or subject matter jurisdiction

over the essential parties to a case, it renders that subject court and its judgments

void , not voidable, by way of an unconstitutional usurpation of due process rights of

the citizen/person/defendant or their property.

In West Suburban Bank v. ADVANTAGE FINANCIAL, 23 NE 3d 370 – Ill: Appellate

Court, 2nd Dist. 2-13-1146 (2014)., at ¶ 20 WSB argues that MPSI’s expired certification is

a technical defect that should not result in a lack of personal jurisdiction.

However, the weight of Illinois law is clearly to the contrary: defects in the
service of process are neither “technical” nor insubstantial.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 23 of 42

 ***
Further, strict compliance with the statutes governing the service of process is
required before a court will acquire personal jurisdiction over the person
served. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 109, 267 Ill.Dec.
58, 776 N.E.2d 195 (2002); C.T.A.S.S. & U. Federal Credit Union v. Johnson, 383
Ill.App.3d 909, 912, 322 Ill.Dec. 543, 891 N.E.2d 558 (2008).

***
¶ 24 WSB contends that the defect in service of process merely rendered the
judgments voidable, not void, […].

***

As we have said, the proposition is well established that invalid service results
in a judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Sarkissian, 201 Ill.2d
at 109, 267 Ill.Dec. 58, 776 N.E.2d 195;State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.
2d 294, 308 (1986), ; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732, 24 L.Ed. 565
(1877) (“if the court has no jurisdiction over the person * * * and, consequently, no
authority to pass [judgment] upon his personal rights and obligations[,] * * * the
whole proceeding * * * is coram non judice and void“).

There is no similar support for the idea that lack of personal jurisdiction merely
renders a judgment voidable.

Where lack of jurisdiction is invoked, it must be done on a de novo basis.. In re

Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill.2d 33, 332 Ill.Dec. 555, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (2010).

In this case, the issue of service and jurisdiction was pointed out to the trial court at

numerous junctures, and the trial court judge steadfastly refused to consider the issue.

Committee Comments (June 5, 2007) “Because public policy favors the

determination of controversies according to the substantive rights of the parties, Rule
103(b) should not be used by the trial courts to simply clear a crowded docket, nor
should they delay ruling on a defendant’s dismissal motion until after the statute of
limitations has run. See Kole v. Brubaker, 325 Ill. App. 3d 944, 954 (2001)”.

In the instant case, Plaintiff argued that the court in case 09-CH-49823 did not serve

him, the affidavit of service for his son was false because his son was in high school at the

time, and the true Trustee, CTLTC was never named or served. The trial court consistently

told Plaintiff Gregory this was a collateral attack which cannot be considered in her

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 24 of 42

courtroom, when in fact Plaintiff Gregory was bringing up Due Process which is a 5th

Amendment right that was mandatory to consider de novo at the time it was raised in her

court.

To enter a valid judgment, a Court must have both: jurisdiction over the subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties. (In re Marriage of Verdung, 126
Ill.2d 542, 547, 129 Ill.Dec. 53, 535 N.E.2d 818 (1989)).

By allowing Groeper plaintiffs leave to file the attached proposed first amended

complaint, significant justiciable controversy will be established to require an

examination of the facts and law at the trial court level and initially contradict the

presumptive claims of defendants Fitts & Altisource as to the bona fide and

underlying basis (res judicata collateral estoppel and stare decisis) of their combined

Section 2-619 and 2-615 Motions to Dismiss

While the revised Illinois Constitution of (1974) redefined subject matter

jurisdiction to by any justiciable controversy, in the underlying foreclosure case no

justiciable controversy exists because a foreclosure proceeding under the IMFL

requires that there be a bona fide’ actionable security instrument attached to a note

representing a debt of the mortgagor. In the case of 09-CH-49823 (Wrongful

Foreclosure case) , the attached security instrument (alleged mortgage) is ineffective

and not actionable because of lack of naming the Land Trust Trustee as the

mortgagor and lack of indorsements from the Land Trust Trustee or in the

alternative, the lack of an Assignment of Beneficial Interest from the beneficiary with

the power to direct the Trustee. Therefore, a foreclosure proceeding under IMFL is

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 25 of 42

 without statutory substance and the wrong action to settle any question between the

parties.

The Trustee was a necessary party to the action and had to have been served,

because it held legal and equitable title to the Subject Property. In addition, the

Mortgage and Note was not valid without the signature and consent of the Trustee.

Bank Champaign v. Wells Fargo Bank 2012 IL App (4th) 110588.

h. Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred by invoking doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel for the foreclosure case and it did

not follow the law that void judgments may be attacked in any court

at any time.

In Illinois courts, it has long been established that the court must review the issue

of service upon all defendants and be diligent that all defendants were properly

served both in the case before it, and in any prior case where jurisdiction in that

case is also an issue.

A judgment entered by a Court without personal jurisdiction over the parties is void
and may be challenged at any time, either directly or collaterally. Verdung, 126 Ill.2d
at 547,129 Ill.Dec. 53, 535 N.E.2d 818.

In this case, the judge was told there was no service upon Plaintiff Gregory in the

wrongful foreclosure case, the service upon the son was false because the son was in high

school at the time, and the Trustee was never served, CTLTC. Through some sort of error

US Bank served JP Morgan Chase Bank, a third party stranger to the Wrongful Foreclosure

action.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 26 of 42

 Personal jurisdiction [only] may be established either by service of process in
accordance with statutory requirements or by a party’s voluntary submission to the
Court’s jurisdiction. Verdung, 126 Ill.2d at 547, 129 Ill.Dec. 53, 535 N.E.2d 818 ;

In the present case, Plaintiff Gregory filed a special appearance in the Wrongful

Foreclosure and at the first hearing he told the Foreclosure court he had never been

served, to which was the response from the judge “you are too late.” The judge

should not have told Plaintiff Gregory that, he should have told him to get an attorney

and/or file a written motion. Instead, he blatantly lied to a member of the public.

A judgment is not valid unless the trial Court has both jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the litigation and jurisdiction over the parties. State Bank of Lake Zurich v.
Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (1986).

The Wrongful Eviction judge should have asked Plaintiff Gregory if he needed

special assistance for him and his disabled son under the ADA or Americans with

Disabilities Act. Cook County Courts should have a registry online for attorneys and

others who want to help indigent and low income people with their pleadings and in

court. This honorable appellate court should set up such a system not only at

Dorothy Brown’s online website to link up indigent/low income people with attorneys

and others willing to help out, but the same assistance should be offered at all of the

Illinois Appellate court websites. Writing an appellate brief is a daunting task even for

the most intelligent and sophisticated person. It is even more difficult for those who

are indigent and those who are suffering of old age and disabilities. Plaintiff Gregory

and disabled son Alex should have been treated a whole lot better by both the

Wrongful Foreclosure Court and the Wrongful Eviction Court.

Plaintiff Gregory had a Wrongful Foreclosure claim due to lack of service, he

also had a Wrongful Eviction claim due to lack of service. It is unknown at this time

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 27 of 42

 why the trial court judge completely and wholly ignored those claims. However, it is

noted that she questioned Plaintiff Gregory on why he dropped his appeal in the

Foreclosure case and Plaintiff Gregory replied he could not find an attorney to help

him. R.12 to R.14. Why this judge did not try to help him is unknown. Certainly

there is no level playing field between an indigent elderly man with a disabled autistic

son and a top ten bank, US Bank and their expensive lawyers.

And US Bank is not without fault either. When they failed to evict Gregory

within 120 days, they concocted a pretext case against Sister Therese Kroeker to

evict the entire family. 15 M1 724453. Why did not collateral estoppel and res

judicata apply to that case? Why could not Plaintiff Gregory get the case file he

needed to stop that eviction from proceeding?

i. Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting 615/619 motions for the

Defendants when in fact there was no valid service in the underlying

foreclosure case on Greg Groeper, his son Alexander, or the correct Land

Trust Company CTLTC.

A section 2- 615 motion (735 ILCS 5/2-615) is used to test the complaint’s

legal sufficiency, a section 2-619 motion (735 ILCS 5/2-619) is used where

something outside of the litigation prevents the claim, and a section 2-1005

motion (735 ILCS 5/2-1005) is used where the facts do not support the

complaint. These motions assist to define and narrow the scope of the litigation

by determining if what the plaintiff seeks has a basis in law, whether there is a

meritorious dispute (i.e., the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations), and

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 28 of 42

 whether there are any facts that would support plaintiff’s recovery. They are a

series of nets working together to block non-meritorious claims.

In this case, as explained below, Plaintiff Gregory clearly told a story in his

complaint (C.9) of how he had been wrongfully evicted because he had not been

served, the Trust company for the Subject Property had not been served, and

how he and his adult children, one of whom was adult child Alexander Groeper, a

disabled adult with autism, had been falsely arrested by Cook County Sheriffs,

were told to call no one on their phones, were told they could not leave the

premises and were shockingly brandished with laser pointer guns at close range.

Those serious allegations are not difficult to understand. What is difficult

to understand is how the trial court completely missed the concept of jurisdiction

in its decision on 3-3-17 (R.160) and claimed that res judicata and collateral

estoppel applied to the case. Nothing could be further from the truth.

j. Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to allow Plaintiffs

Groeper to amend their Original Complaint to state valid causes of action

for wrongful eviction, assault, tresspass upon chattels, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, etc., as shown in Exhibit B hereto and it summarily

dismissed the Plaintiffs’ case with prejudice.

A pleading is defined as “[a] formal document in which a party to a legal

proceeding (esp. a civil lawsuit) sets forth or responds to allegations, claims,

denials, or defenses.” In Illinois, the first pleading by a plaintiff is designated a

complaint. The first pleading by a defendant is designated an answer. The Illinois

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 29 of 42

 Code of Civil Procedure (Code-735 ILCS 5 et seq.) requires pleadings to “contain

a plain and concise statement of the pleader’s cause of action, counterclaim,

defense, or reply.” In other words, the pleading must contain a plain statement

identifying what the pleader is alleging or denying. For example, “this is a

negligence action” or “defendant denies he negligently caused plaintiff injury.”

Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction. Under this standard, the pleader is required

to set forth and allege facts that support his or her cause of action, i.e., those

facts necessary for recovery pursuant to a legally recognized cause of action. A

complaint is not required to set out the evidentiary facts tending to prove ultimate

facts; however, it is required to allege the ultimate facts to be proved. Factual

and legal conclusions are not required and are technically improper.13 For

example, the plaintiff must plead the ultimate fact that the defendant struck her

with his vehicle. She is not required to plead all the facts tending to show he

struck her with his vehicle, such as the fact that the defendant has a red vehicle

and red paint was transferred to her vehicle. Obviously, it is better to plead more

facts than not enough. Illinois civil procedure reflects a modern approach to

pleading by avoiding elevating questions of form over questions of substance

and instead resolving the litigation on the merits.14 Section 2-603(c) of the Code

states, “Pleadings shall be liberally construed with a view to doing substantial

justice”. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ill. 2006);

Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 26, 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1099;

Johnson v. Matrix Fin. Servs. Corp., 820 N.E.2d 1094, 1105 (Ill. App. Ct.

2004). Zeh v. Wheeler, 489 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. 1986). 186 Southern Illinois

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 30 of 42

 University Law Journal [Vol. 38] “pleadings should ensure substantial justice

between the parties.”

Section 2-612 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-612) specifies that a pleading is

not substantively defective if it “contains such information [that] reasonably

informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she

is called upon to meet.” In determining whether the complaint informs the

opposite party of the nature of the claim, the complaint’s use of legal conclusions

and allegations of evidence are considered formal defects and not substantive

defects. In furtherance of the modern approach to pleading, Illinois courts tend to

allow liberally for amended pleadings.

Plaintiff Gregory’s original complaint was clear, and the court understood it

in its Decision on 3-3-16 (C.138), and the Defendants understood it clearly in the

pleadings they filed in response. (Altisource, 123-16 (C.112) 2-10-17 to C.151,

and C.170 on 5-23-17). Plaintiff Gregory repeatedly asked the court to amend his

complaint during court calls and he was repeatedly told no by the trial court

judge.

Issue 5. Whether the trial court erred when it granted the relief of a

dismissal judgment for Defendants when in fact they were wholly

unregistered foreign corporations and had not paid any fees, fines or

penalties for doing business in Illinois since at least the date of the

wrongful eviction in 10-4-16.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 31 of 42

 The Illinois Business Corporation Act (BCA) makes it clear that

unregistered foreign corporations are not permitted to do business in Illinois.

Obviously, Illinois citizens have a right to know which corporations are present in

their state and what they are doing there, and if they commit any wrongful or

tortious actions, they should be amenable to suit within Illinois. The foreign

corporation should have a place with a registered agent for service of process.

While the BCA lists in Sec. 13.75, “activities that do not constitute transacting

business”, (805 ILCS 5/13.75) the Defendants did clearly more than this. They

were involved in boarding up, packing, cleaning and other activities in the

personal residences of persons whose homes are about to be or have been

foreclosed upon, as explained in detail in Plaintiff’s complaint C.9, C.18. The

actions of these Defendants are better described in the Proposed First Amended

Complaint, Exhibit B, hereto.

Illinois law states in its pertinent part:

The general rule concerning what constitutes doing business so as to

require a foreign corporation to qualify has been stated as follows:

“It is established by well considered general authorities that a

foreign corporation is doing, transacting, carrying on, or engaging in
business within a state when it transacts some substantial part of its
ordinary business therein.” Royal Insurance Co. v. All States Theatres,
6 So. 2d 494 (Ala. 1942).

There is no doubt that when Fitts Management and Altisource are

packing up, managing and engaging in the logistics of transporting and

storing the property of persons foreclosed upon, they are indeed “doing

business” in Illinois.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 32 of 42

 In addition, Sec. 124 of the Illinois BCA states that:

“ No foreign corporation transacting business in this State without a

certificate of authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, suit
or proceeding in any court of this State, until such corporation shall
have obtained a certificate of authority.” Id.

Now the trial court believed that this meant that the offending foreign

corporation had to be a Plaintiff or counter Plaintiff, but the statute does not say

that. It says an unregistered foreign corporation cannot “maintain any action”

which is much broader language than requiring the entity to “be a plaintiff.”

Clearly, if the unregistered corporation is obtaining any benefit from litigation, it

should be registered and pay its fines, fees and penalties before it obtains any

benefit from the court system in Illinois.

The Illinois BCA specifically prohibits a corporation from actively

maintaining any civil action until all taxes, fees, penalties and interest are paid in

full. 805 ILCS § 5/15.85.

Although Defendants may believe they are entitled to appear in court and

present defenses and counterclaims—all the while not paying substantial fees to

the State of Illinois, even nearly a year after it was informed it needed to do so—it

is believed that sanctioning Defendants is necessary because sanctions can be

“appropriate in the interest of deterrence [when a corporation wilfully fails to pay

its corporate state fees].” Henderson- Smith & Assocs, Inc. vs. Nahamani

Family Serv. Cntr., Ill. App. 3d 15, 26, 752 N.E.2d 33, 42 (1st Dist. 2001).

The trial court should not have allowed Defendants Fitts and Altisource to

file any pleadings until they registered and paid their corporate fees to the State

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 33 of 42

 of Illinois. By appearing in court numerous times and filing Motions and

Responses and Replies, the trial court judge only gave refuge to corporations

which wholly flaunt the laws of the State of Illinois. She should have sanctioned

them instead.

k. Issue 6. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to issue a TRO against

Defendants when they had broken into the Subject property, stolen,

vandalized, damaged and threatened further damage to irreplaceable family

heirlooms and unique tools of the trade necessary for Greg Groeper to

conduct his business.

On 10-6-16 (C.36-41), Plaintiffs filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

based upon the fact that Defendants had participated in a scheme to remove,

destroy, vandalize and otherwise dispose of, personal property in the Subject

Property located on Dakin Street in Chicago. On 10-12-16 (C.59), the trial court

denied the motion without any findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Section 11-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par.
11-101) sets out the process for obtaining a temporary restraining order. If a
temporary restraining order is granted without notice to the adverse party, it expires
after 10 days and may be extended for an additional 10 days for good cause.
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 11-101.) If a temporary restraining order is granted
after notice has been given to the adverse party, there is no [173 Ill.App.3d 434] time
limit on the order. Kable Printing Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinders Union Local
65-B (1976), 63 Ill.2d 514, 521, 349 N.E.2d 36. Diamond Sav. & Loan Co. v.
Royal Glen Condominium Ass'n, 526 N.E.2d 372, 173 Ill.App.3d 431, 122 Ill.Dec.
113 (Ill. App., 1988)

A temporary restraining order is an emergency remedy which should be issued in

exceptional circumstances. (Abdulhafedh v. Secretary of State (1987), 161

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 34 of 42

 Ill.App.3d 413, 417, 112 Ill.Dec. 900, 514 N.E.2d 563.) The purpose of a temporary

restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a hearing on a preliminary

injunction. (Stocker Hinge Manufacturing Co. v. Darnel Industries, Inc. (1983),

94 Ill.2d 535, 541, 69 Ill.Dec. 71, 447 N.E.2d 288.) The grant of a temporary

restraining order is within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent

an abuse of that discretion. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,117 Ill.App.3d at 357,

72 Ill.Dec. 865, 453 N.E.2d 740.

Temporary restraining orders may be entered upon a summary showing

that the order is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm.

(Peoples Gas Light [173 Ill.App.3d 435] & Coke Co., 117 Ill.App.3d at 355-56, 72

Ill.Dec. 865, 453 N.E.2d 740; Jurco v. Stuart (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 405, 408, 66

Ill.Dec. 207, 442 N.E.2d 633.) In addition, the court must find that there is no

adequate remedy at law which would deprive the equity court of jurisdiction. See

Bojangles, Inc. v. City of Elmhurst (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 19, 349 N.E.2d 478.

An irreparable injury is one which "cannot be adequately compensated therefor in

damages or * * * cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard." (Cross

Wood Products, Inc. v. Suter (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 282, 286, 52 Ill.Dec. 744, 422

N.E.2d 953.)

In this case, the trial court was told that the Defendants had destroyed, and

where threatening to destroy in the near future, irreplaceable items belonging to the

Plaintiffs--items of a highly personal nature (photographs, musical instruments,

unique tools of the trade for Gregory’s business), and Plaintiffs were clearly entitled

to a TRO. C.20 The Defendants knew or should have known that the Trial Court

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 35 of 42

 had rendered judgments for foreclosure and possession without proper service upon

Plaintiff Gregory and the true and correct Trustee, CTLTC. They either knew or

should have known their actions were highly illegal. The trial court should have

issued an injunction to stop any and all damages to the Subject Property and its

contents unless and until a proper hearing was held on the TRO.

The decision from the Trial Court to fail to protect the property of Plaintiff Gregory

was improper and the case should be remanded with instructions to issue a TRO

and Preliminary Injunction to protect the personal property of Plaintiff Gregory and

his family until a trial on the merits occurs.

CONCLUSION

The trial court wrongfully denied the Plaintiff’s the right to file their Proposed

Amended complaint, Exhibit B, hereto. In addition, the trial court held no hearing,

made no serious investigation of Plaintiffs’ complaint that the Foreclosure action

was wrongful because Gregory Groeper had not been served, the correct trust

company had not been served, Chicago Title Land Trust Co. (not JP Morgan

Chase Bank, a 3rd party stranger to the Foreclosure and ownership of the

Subject Property). In addition, under the Illinois Business Corporations Act, the

the trial court should not have granted any relief for the Defendants Fitts and

Altisource, including dismissal of the instant action or the filing of any pleadings--

motions, responses or replies. It should have issued sanctions against them. In

doing so, the trial court encourages other foreign corporations to act illegally in

Illinois. The State of Illinois needs the revenue, for it is broke.

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 36 of 42

 For all the foregoing reasons, this case should be Reversed and

Remanded to the Trial Court with instructions on each of the foregoing issues.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

_/s/Gregory Groeper/__________
Gregory Groeper, Pro Se, Plaintiff/Appellant

_/s/Alexander Groeper/__________
Alexander Groeper, Pro Se, Plaintiff/Appellant

5815 West Dakin Street

Chicago, Illinois 60634
fon: 872-230-7135
email: lawman@gmx.us

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 37 of 42

 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE – Rule 341 (c)

I hereby certify that this brief conforms to the requirements of Rules 341(a)

and (b). The length of this brief, excluding the pages containing the Rule 341(d)

cover, the Rule 341(h)(1) statement of points and authorities, the Rules 341(c)

certificate of compliance, the certificate of service and those matters to be

appended to the brief under Rule 342(a), is 33 pages.

BY ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS,

_/s/Gregory Groeper/__________
Gregory Groeper, Pro Se, Appellant
5815 West Dakin Street
Chicago, Illinois 60634
fon: 872-230-7135
email: lawman@gmx.us

NOTICE OF FILING

I herewith certify that this Opening Brief was filed on June 13, 2018 with the
electronic filing system for the Illinois Appellate court.

BY ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS,

_/s/Gregory Groeper/__________
Gregory Groeper, Pro Se, Appellant
5815 West Dakin Street
Chicago, Illinois 60634
fon: 872-230-7135
email: lawman@gmx.us

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 38 of 42

 PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned herewith certifies that the foregoing Pleading/Brief entitled

Opening Brief of Appellants was filed timely in accord with 5 ILCS 70/1.11 or 10
ILCS 5/1-6 with:
A) One (1) copy via electronic court service or email and as directed by the
Court of Appeals for paper copies on opposing counsel on or before June
13, 2018:

For FITTS MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.

Brittany B. Kimble, Atty.
Kimble Law Offices
846 South 17th Ave.
Maywood, Illinois 60153
fon: 773.609.4529
email: info@brittanykimbleesq.com

AND

For ALTISOURCE SOLUTIONS, INC.

Kimberly A. Jansen, Atty.
Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP
151 North Franklin, Suite 2500
Chicago, Illinois 60606
fon: 312.704.3000
email: kjansen@hinshawlaw.com
https://www.hinshawlaw.com/attorneys-Kimberly-Jansen.html

BY ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS,

_/s/Gregory Groeper/__________
Gregory Groeper, Pro Se, Appellant
5815 West Dakin Street
Chicago, Illinois 60634
fon: 872-230-7135
email: lawman@gmx.us

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 39 of 42

 APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Exh Description Page

A Notice of Appeal and Orders Appealed From A.01

B Proposed First Amended Complaint A.019

C Dakin St. Title search 6-28-10 A.078

D Illinois Secretary of State Cyberdrive Records showing A.087

no corporate records for Fitts or Altisource

E Foia return from Sheriff A.091

TABLE OF CONTENTS RECORD ON APPEAL

Date Filer Description Page

Docket sheet 1

10-6-16 GG Complaint 9

“ GG Motion for TRO 36

“ GG Em TRO 37

“ GG Motion for TRO 38

“ GG App. for Injunctive Relief 41

“ AG Affidavit for TRO 44

“ Screenshot SOS Fitts no corp registration 47

“ Screenshot SOS Altisource no corp registration 49

“ GG Pltffs Memo of Law for TRO 51

10-12-16 CO Em. Mot 4 TRO denied 59

11-2-16 FM Appearance by Kimble for FM 61

11-2-16 FM Mot 2 Dismiss under 619 62

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 40 of 42

11-7-16 ALT Appearance by Adam Saper/Hinshaw 65

11-1-16 ALT Mot 4 EOT to Answer Compl 69

11-8-16 FM Mot 2 Dismiss 615/619 72

11-15-16 CO Deft. ALT to Answer by 12-15-16 77

11-16-16 CO Briefing Schedule MTD 78

12-14-16 GG Mot 2 Strike FM MTD 79

12-14-16 AG Affidavit 99

12-14-16 ALT 2nd Mot 4 EOTto Answer 102

12-14-16 GG Answer and Affidavits 109

12-22-16 CO Briefing Schedule MTD 111

12-23-16 ALT Combined 619 MTD 112

2-28-13 CO Foreclosure Sale and Judgment 125

2-28-13 CO Default Judgment on Complaint (Farther present in 133

court)

6-17-14 CO Order approving Sale and Order for Possession 135

3-3-16 CO 453 tenant case Order for possession 138

4-14-16 CO 453 tenant case Order to correct name Therese Kroeker 139

1-27-17 GG Response, Objections and MTS 140

2-10-17 ALT Reply to Mot 2 Dismiss 151

3-3-17 CO Dismissal w/prejudice 160

4-3-17 GG Notice of Appeal 166

“ GG Motion 2 Reconsider 168

5-23-17 ALT Defts Resp to MTR 170

6-6-17 CO Pltff to present MTR on 6-14-17 175

6-14-17 CO Pltff MTR denied, sanctions denied FM 176

“ CO Decision on MTR 177

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 41 of 42

8-16-17 GG Request to prepare ROA 179

RECORD ON APPEAL - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

Date Page

10-12-16 1

11-16-16 29

12-22-16 36

3-3-17 50

6-14-17 78

Groeper Appellants’ Opening Brief Page 42 of 42