Deutschland WM 2018

2018 WORLD CUP
TEAM ANALYSIS:
GERMANY
Ionuț APAHIDEANU
June 14, 2018
CONTENT
1. Squad, context, system
AA GENERAL
Germany –REMARKS
General Remarks 2. Tactics
3. Methodology
B ATTACK
C DEFENSIVE (NEGATIVE) TRANSITION
D DEFENCE
E OFFENSIVE (POSITIVE) TRANSITION
F VARIA (fitness, psychological, etc.)
G One-page summary
A.1 GENERAL DATA: SQUAD, FIRST TEAM, CONTEXT, AND SYSTEM (1/2)
Squad Holder of 4 World and 3 European titles, current World and Confederations Cup holders and a top-four favourite to win the World Cup at the moment of
writing, Germany proposes a squad in which, remarkably and unparalleled at this WC by any other team, the average player, although only 26.7 years old, has 41
caps and 3031 minutes played for the national team. Comprising multiple national and Champions League winners, employing many polyvalent players, mixing
certified experience with young promises, affording to leave back home the likes of Sané, Götze, or Wagner, and grouping various types of playing styles, the squad
is, at least on paper and in terms if its potential, indeed one of the best present at this World Cup.
Context Prompting some (mostly journalistic) voices to suggest the idea of

a crisis, Germany, have managed to win only one of their last six matches,
despite generally dominating in terms of both possession and chances
created. Of their last ten, switching among three playing systems, they have
won five and lost two, with three ties, in a sample of opponents that has
included Spain, France, England, and Brazil.
(as of June 14, 2018; source: transfermarkt.de)
3 © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
A.1 GENERAL DATA: SQUAD, FIRST TEAM, CONTEXT, AND SYSTEM (2/2)
System and personnel stability

With a head coach (Joachim Löw, 58, manager since 2006) not afraid to experiment, albeit in a relatively cautious manner, Germany have fielded no less
than 46 players throughout their last 25 matches since Euro 2016*, and employed arguably five different playing systems.
At a closer look, however, one indicating remarkable stability, homogeneity, and experience, one should notice the nucleus of 5-7 players, occupying the
skeleton of the playing formation, who have been regular starters at both the 2014 World Cup and at Euro 2016, with four of them also teammates at club
level: Hummels, Boateng, Müller, Kimmich from Bayern, Kroos as a former colleague of them, plus Özil and Khedira, both former teammates of Kroos at
Real Madrid. These players, occupying in the given order, the left DC, right DC, AMR, DR, left DMC, AMC, and right DMC, are also quasi-certain starters at
this World Cup. They should be accompanied by Hector as a left-back, whereas regarding the remaining three positions:
✓ the problem of the goalkeeper remains theoretically an open one: Germany’s cpt. Manuel Neuer has returned against Austria after a 259-days injury-
caused break, and by all appearances, performed pretty well, his alternative being Barcelona goalkeeper ter Stegen, with Trapp only third choice;
✓ the starting striker will most likely be youngster Timo Werner, who, although not very experienced at this level, is preferred by the manager, the latter
having dropped Wagner from the squad and kept experienced Gomez as a sub;
✓ the AML role will most likely be played alternatively by the so far usual occupant Draxler, considering Reus, though visibly talented and offering an
effervescent style of play, has been fielded for only a few minutes against Austria and Saudi Arabia after a two-years long break caused by injury.
Squad depth and system issues

There are two positions, respectively one player, which, for different reasons, seem to raise some problems:
❑ the AMR position: over a single year, Löw has tried no less than nine players, throughout the matches or for certain periods within them – Müller,
Özil, Brandt, Stindl, Reus, Werner, Goretzka, and even Gündogan and Emre Can. Arguably none of them produced satisfying results, so that the
manager will most likely opt for Müller for the sake of continuity and established playing automatisms, with Brandt (or Reus) as a sub;
❑ Kimmich’s sub as right-back is, at least on paper, Matthias Ginter, who, however is by all employable criteria, a centre-back, and has also been tested
on this position with Germany for only a few minutes. Third-choices would be DC Rüdiger and DMC Rudy;
❑ Kroos, exactly because of his unique individual qualities, extensively addressed in the underlying analysis, simply has no comparable sub in terms of
involvement in and influence over a game, although, logically, the squad has another three players capable to fill in the formal DMC position:
Gündogan, Rudy, an Goretzka.
*1. Boateng, 2. Bellarabi, 3. Brandt, 4. Can, 5. Demirbay, 6. Demme, 7. Draxler, 8. Gerhardt, 9. Ginter, 10. Gnabry, 11. Götze, 12. Gomez, 13. Goretzka, 14. Gündogan, 15. Halstenberg, 16. Hector, 17. Henrichs, 18. Höwedes,
19. Hummels, 20. Khedira, 21. Kimmich, 22. Kroos, 23. Leno, 24. Meyer, 25. Müller, 26. Mustafi, 27. Neuer, 28. Özil, 29. Petersen, 30. Plattenhardt, 31. Podolski, 32. Rudy, 33. Rüdiger, 34. Sané, 35. Schürrle, 36. Schweinsteiger,
37. Stindl, 38. Süle, 39. Tah, 40. ter Stegen, 41. Trapp, 42. Volland, 43. Wagner, 44. Weigl, 45. Werner, 46. Younes.
A.2 GENERAL REMARKS ON TACTICS
Dominant playing style: Playing system:
➢ athletic (making use of the players’ speed, strength ➢ nominally, 4-2-3-1 (a system perfectly suited for their intense
and height) and direct (meaning without an pressing and counter-pressing);
elaborated build-up), playing predominantly on the ➢ practically and functionally, as explained and exemplified further
flanks. As such, despite actually enjoying a below in this analysis, a hybrid formation:
possession rate higher than most of its opponents, • a 3-3-1-3 / 3-2-2-3 shape on the attack, which turns into a
and also having technically-gifted players capable of fluid 2-2-3-3 during build-up, respectively
sophisticated build-up (e.g. Kroos, Özil, Draxler), • a 4-4-1-1 / 4-5-1 on the defense, as the more common
Germany is essentially rather a counterattacking retreating shape of the 4-2-3-1 module.
than a meticulously passing team;
➢ largely positional (Positionsspiel / juego de posicion) Context: For some reason, Joachim Löw seems captivated by the idea of 3-central-defender
at least intentionally and in terms of principles (e.g. formations. Throughout 2017, in official games against weaker opponents (e.g. SMR, CZE, AZE), in
no more than two players on the same vertical friendlies (e.g. ENG (November), DEN), and in the Confederations Cup as well, he flirted with 3 DCs
space, no more than three on the same horizontal systems - 3-4-2-1 / 3-3-1-3 / 3-5-1-1. The results of such experiments remained rather
one), with especially the three advanced midfielders unsatisfactory: although employed against weaker opponents, these systems proved rather
and the striker often swapping positions, each of unstable, leading to Germany actually scoring overall less and conceding more than when using its
them playing in direct accordance with the area he common formation. Subsequently, in matches against stronger opponents (e.g. FRA, BRA, ESP), Löw
finds himself in. reverted to a 4-2-3-1, which will also most certainly be the system used at the World Cup, but with a
peculiarity: left DMC Kroos often falls back as a third, usually left, central defender, acting as a deep
playmaker during the initiation of positional attacks.
Tactical philosophy / identity:

➢ regaining the ball as quickly as possible => intense counter-pressing and high-pressing;
➢ playing to own strengths => ruthless counterattacking; set-pieces, aerial crosses;
➢ effectiveness = maximizing the number of chances created per time unit => directness of play, shots from both within and outside of the box.
A.3 A FEW METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Data sources: all primary data indicated in the document, except for the a.) ones referring to general squad elements, and b.) Champions League specifically
related, comparative, data, are extracted directly by the author from dozens of hours of monitoring Germany’s matches.
Secondary data sources instrumented: fifa.com, db.de, uefa.com, transfermarkt.de, squawka.com, foxsports.com.
All graphs, processed screen captures, and derived indexes or coefficients, as well as tactical diagrams, if not otherwise mentioned, are the product of the
author’s own creative work, using no specialized football-analysis software, only the ordinary Microsoft Office package, youtube.com, and footbie.com.
No copyright infringement is intented by any use of video captures.
Timeframe covered: mainly the last 12 months, sometimes extended over the last two years, starting with right after Euro 2016 (i.e. 25 games covered at the
moment of writing – June 15, 2018). The analysis has been finalised on June 14, 2018.
Other elements:
Jersey numbers: because they have constantly changed over the period covered,
The structure of the analysis follows the throughout the captures and graphs of this analysis they have been retroactively changed
(phenomeno-) logical unfolding of a football game corresponding to the ones currently worn at the World Cup.
and starts, as a convention, with a positional attack: For instance, Rudy was No. 23 against France, No. 15 against Brazil, etc. In all the images throughout this
document, his currently used No. 19 has been retroactively superimposed on his former ones.
Jersey numbers vs. role-abbreviations: whenever the analysis focuses on system-

positional issues, it indicates positions; whenever it follows individual features, it specifies
jersey numbers.
Colour-coding: there is a distinct colour-coding for Germany’s system positions (see
above, the first table, and below, passim in the document), given their playing style’s
emphasis on positional play.
Aside from positions, red is used in the most common manner as meant to draw
attention, yellow usually signifies a pass, while, usually, continuous arrows indicate
grounded (drilled) passes, interrupted lines aerial (floated) ones, dotted arrows a solo
run, etc.
6 X = player not selected into this WC’s squad

© Ionuț APAHIDEANU
CONTENT
A General Remarks
1. Build-up
2. Shortcuts to finalisation
B ATTACK
3. Set-pieces
4. General assessment
C DEFENSIVE TRANSITION
D DEFENCE
E OFFENSIVE TRANSITION
F Varia
B.1 BUILD-UP: phases & patterns
B.1.1 Initiation
B.1.1 Initiation
General pattern Example
Standard initiation when building from the back:

- left central defender (Hummels (5) or his sub Rüdiger (16)) remains the deepest German player, similar to a sweeper, the right one (Boateng (17) or his sub
Süle (15)) advances diagonally and is accompanied symmetrically by left defensive midfielder and key-player Kroos (No.8), who falls back in the position of a
third (usually left, rarely middle) DC and initiates the proper build-up; construction almost invariably starts with him;
- on the flanks, the lateral advanced midfielders cut inside, making way for the full-backs, who move to higher positions, usually at half line.
Transition to development phase:
- the three-men base gradually moves higher up the pitch, with the DCs stopping somewhere at the half-line;
- from there, depending on situation, Kroos may either remain in line with the DCs, or step farther, next to the second DMC, in a 2-2-x shape of the team;
- the full-backs also advance farther, in most cases, as a transition step, in line with the wingers;
- the wingers may stay in line with the central striker or drop a bit deeper and inside;
- the second DMC (Khedira - 6, respectively Gündogan – 21, in the captures below) remains centrally, as both a link between compartments and a first line of
defence in case of a counterattack.
B.1.2 Development and finalisation
Depending on the movements of Kroos, the full-backs and the wingers, Germany’s structure during build-up may take three shapes:
Both full-backs advance up the pitch, wider

and past the wingers, who cut inside-
3-3-3-1 / 3-3-1-3 backwards like “interiores” in order to
collect the ball and look for a creative pass.
Striker and AMC play positionally.
Germany’s AMC drags an opponent out of

the midfield block and a breach emerges. A
quick pass to the right flank, where
3-4-2-1 / 3-2-2-3 Germany has a 5 vs 3-4 numerical
superiority. AMC and AMR play positionally.
Kroos advances in line with the other

2-2-3-3 A/B DMC, the full-backs embrace the
touchline, trying to stretch the
opposition’s defence, AMR cuts inside.
Transition to finalisation:
Especially against compact, deep-sitting opponents, but also as a consequence of its own playing shortcomings (see below), in most of the cases, after an initial
sluggish and prolonged series of lateral, short-distance, swaps of the ball between the DCS and Kroos somewhere in the vicinity of the half-line, the attack will then
unfold rapidly and directly on a flank, where the forward-moving full-back and the frequently laterally-drifting AMs will try to generate an overload in search for a
delivery into the box:
Example: both AML and AMC drop a little deeper within the same half-space, Example: Kroos advances in the half-space, able to pass to the left-back, who
creating space in the opponent’s midfield line. A quick through pass of Kroos has entered the opposition half, while AML, AMC, and AMR all move in a
leads to a potential 3-2 / 4-3 / 5-4 numerical advantage. France’s right back is coordinated manner within the half-space in order to create a 4 vs 3 / 3 vs 1
left alone to handle two German players, Werner sprints in behind him to numerical superiority on the flank:
collect a possible assist:
Weaknesses:
If in theory the team’s attacks should always fall within one of the three fluid situational types indicated above, in practice, however, Germany’s positional attacking dynamics
is often flawed by a considerable weakness. Thus, as captured in the images below, (although) the full-backs advance (too) high, often none of AML/AMC/AMR drop back, as
necessary, to collect the ball and further elaborate the attack. Instead, they remain isolated, alongside the striker and the full-backs, in between the opponent’s lines, leaving
Kroos or the central defenders no useful passing option and effectively turning Germany’s dynamic structure into a dysfunctional, sluggish, and predictable 3-1-5-1 / 3-1-6:
Weakness => compensation: accelerating the transition to finalisation

Example
black: lateral & backward initial passing (14 passes, 43’’)
Subsequent to this red: acceleration on the flank + cross (4 passes, 7’’)
surprisingly often manifested
flaw caused by immobility,
and somehow meant to
compensate it, the vast
majority of Germany’s attacks
will unfold in a standard two-
phases pattern:
1) a prolonged series of
short-to-medium lateral
and meaningless passes
between the team’s DCs
and DMCs, followed by
2) a sudden, abrupt
acceleration consisting of
a pass onto one of the
flanks (short, medium or
long), simultaneous with
an overload of three-four
German players in the
targeted area, in search
of a cross into the box:
Weakness => compensation: accelerating the transition to finalisation, examples;
Acceleration Finalisation
Example
Germany
vs
Spain
DMC Khedira changes direction, with FB Kimmich having enough space and time to sprint and cross into the area of the box where both S and AMR have moved into
Example
Germany
vs
Brazil
Kroos’ quick change of flanks de-structures BRA’s midfield. Inside cut by DR, Marcelo dragged out of position, AMR attacks the space behind, collects ball, and crosses
B.2. SKIPPING CONSTRUCTION: shortcuts to finalisation
Given not only a) the above-exemplified shortcomings in their own development of the play, but also b) the fact that many of their (usually underdog-positioned)
opponents prefer a positional defensive approach and c) their own playing philosophy of maximizing the creation of chances per time unit and of playing to their
own strengths (e.g. speed, counterattacking skills, height), Germany may, and often does, skip proper construction altogether. This tendency, manifested arguably
at least as often as their attempts to execute an elaborate development of the attack, can materialize in a number of ways:
➢ Starting and then continuing the attack directly on the flanks, via the full-backs – especially if the opponent has brought five or more men into Germany’s
half and/or is high pressing, which means an opportunity to counter, starting with the expectedly free spaces on the flanks:
It is especially Neuer among Germany’s goalkeepers,
the so-called “sweeper-keeper”, that feels extremely
comfortable on the ball and doesn’t kick it into the
stands when pressured (unlike Trapp, for instance),
but instead masterfully launches the full-backs on
the counter (see yellow circled areas below)
➢ Long aerial diagonals on their high-positioned full-backs, from where an assist or at least a creative follows swiftly (main provider: Kroos, seconded by Hummels)
Shortcut Finalisation
➢ Long balls lifted directly into the penalty area (providers - the DMCs and the DCs):
➢ Penetrating, through, grounded balls (very rare form of verticalization, usually involving Kroos in one capacity or another):
B.3 OFFENSIVE SET-PIECES
With a mixture of not only technically-gifted players, capable of both crossing accurately and shooting with precision (e.g. Kroos, Özil, Draxler), but also tall
players excelling in aerial duels (e.g. Hummels, Boateng, Rüdiger, Süle, Khedira), Germany attributes a great practical importance to set-pieces. Indicatively
of this relevance, over the last ten games, 18.2% of their goals (4/22) and over a quarter (24.7%) of all their attempts have originated from set-pieces.
Free kicks
➢ shot (usually from less than 28m, centre and medial half of the half-spaces): those from DEU’s left attacking direction and centre are taken almost
invariably by Kroos, those on the right by Özil;
➢ crossed:
- Kroos the usual taker; behind, cover is provided by both full-backs plus another player (10 / 7 / 21);
- main target: Hummels (5); secondary targets: the other DC, Khedira, Gomez (if playing). The rest of the players (2-3) in the box are rather
decoys, with the sole purpose of dragging opposition players out of their defensive block.
B.3 Offensive SET-PIECES
Corner kicks or assimilable
Type A (most often): cross into the box Type B (less often): hybrid
• 4-5 men outside of the box: Fused mini-chain next to the penalty area plus containment belt in front of it.
- Kroos takes corner kick, crossing into targeted area (red), Usually 6 men outside of the box, 4 inside.
- Özil (if absent, Kimmich) free situational offensive + defensive role, Short pass to Özil (sometimes Draxler). Then:
- containment belt composed by Kimmich, Hector (both accustomed - pass back to Kroos, who crosses, or
at club level with the DMC position) and AML – close space, - inside pass to Draxler (or another teammate in the area of the box-
preventing counters; Hector shoots on second ball (!); corner), who enters the penalty area and can shoot or assist.
• 5-6 men inside the box: Depending on Draxler’s movement, a third player joins Hector (or
- main target: Hummels (mobile, but entering the same target-area); Plattenhardt) and Kimmich as the defensive block preventing counters.
- secondary targets: the other DC + DMC + Gomez/Goretzka; Target - area and - players: the same as in the previous type.
- Werner & Müller act rather as decoys, creating space for targets.
Corner kicks or similar: examples Throw-ins
Over 4/5 are taken by the full-backs. Main preoccupation is to maintain

structure and not lose possession, so full-backs play them safe,
transmitting the ball backwards in most of the cases, to the DC / DMC
on their side. Alternatively, the winger drops back to collect the ball.
Penalty kicks
The lack of adequate data allows only some partial conclusions, other than the cliché that states that Germany have won all their last six penalty shoot-outs,
having actually not lost one since 1976:
➢ expected takers: Kroos / Özil / Reus / Kimmich / Hummels / Werner (?) / Draxler among the starters, Gündogan / Goretzka among the subs;
➢ as a general rule discernible from data extended over more than two years:
- Kroos, Boateng, and Gomez tend to shoot to the right of the goalkeeper, at half-height or above;
- Werner to the right, usually grounded;
- Reus to the right, at half-height or a bit lower (that’s where he shot in all his three misses (1 friendly incl.) in the 3.5 years);
- Özil and Hummels to the top-left;
- Draxler to the left, grounded or at half-height.
➢ Aside from Müller, who in 2016 announced his decision to stop taking penalties, Werner, Gomez, and Goretzka in particular seem to have some problems
in converting penalties.
X X13
23
X
23
9
8
11 23
8 9
23 X
11 21
X
11 X
7
9
11 7
9 X
9
9 13 9
Some penalty kicks taken by DEU players at both national & club level (friendlies not included)
over the last 23 months Source: transfermarkt.de
(circle = converted; X = missed)
B.4 GENERAL ASSESSMENT: key-features, strengths & weaknesses
Insofar as such a distinction is possible in case of Germany’s current national squad (the problem, as detailed below, has to do mainly with Kroos, Germany’s key-
player), the underlying evaluation differentiates between two types of analytical elements: a.) general characteristics of the dynamics of play (style-and-system of
play) and b.) individual features of the players in their mutual conditioning with the playing dynamics.
GENERAL DYNAMICS OF PLAY (1/5)

Three different methodological instruments employed in the analysis (one time-based, the second ball-based, the third pass-based), all converge towards the
same conclusion already prefaced above, in part, within the discussion of the build-up phases and patterns: Germany’s (properly considered) attacking
dynamics is • sluggish, • significantly skewed towards their left direction of attack, • uncreative, and • excessively dependent on Kroos.
Main directions of attack Mathematical modelling. Players’ involvement in the attack: on-the-ball involvement index
(time-based; 10 games analyzed) (=[sqrt ( passes received + attempted) * total ball touches per 93’] / 10) (ball-based; last 10 games analyzed: OBI avg. = 12.4; st.dev = 4.5)
As captured above, Germany develops its attack primarily along its left third (to the direct detriment of the centre, while their right third appears statistically normal),
which is directly corroborated by Kroos displaying the highest involvement on the ball throughout Germany’s entire squad. Moreover, the sluggishness of the initial
attacking phase that has been so far captured purely visual, with DCs passing the ball repeatedly between them and to and from Kroos has now been statistically
confirmed by the finding that, within Germany’s squad, 6 of the 7 players with the highest OBI index values are central defenders and defensive midfielders. This is
further substantiated from a different direction, when operating a mathematical modelling of Germany’s average passing map per 93 minutes of game:
➢ Seven of the top ten passing lanes occur among the

four defenders and the two defensive midfielders;
suggestively for the sluggishness, over a fifth of all
Germany’s passes are exchanged within the base
diamond comprising the DCs and DMCs;
➢ The passing pattern visually suggests two concentric
arches of ball circulation at a set and safe distance
from the opposition’s goal:
- one superimposed on 4-defenders curved line;
- the other composed by the DMCs and the full-backs.
➢ There are no statistically significant attempts of
verticalization (through the centre, that is) whatsoever,
except for Kroos’ passes to Draxler and Özil, who,
recognizable throughout Germany’s games, tend to
enter exactly the (left) half-space where Kroos usually
operates, in search of his passes, which in turn:
- aggravates the skewness of the team’s attack
towards the left. - further augments the entire
system’s already too high dependence on Kroos, who
is directly involved (on any of the two ends
- sending or receiving) in no less than 29.95% of the
teams total passes (192/641 in an average
mathematically modelled match
Mathematical modelling: RMA’s passing map per avg. 93 minutes of match
(pass-based on last 10 games (attempted passes); filter: 2+ passes / 93’; usual starters;
23 GK = mathematically composite figure of Neuer, ter Stegen, and Trapp)
© Ionuț APAHIDEANU
❑ Germany’s excessive dependence on Kroos becomes even more striking when measuring and identifying, over a series of ten games, each player’s most
frequent three passes. Thus, an isolation of the most common pass of each of Germany’s regular starters, shows that Kroos represents the preferred passing
destination of no less than 5 of the other 9 field players!
❑ Additionally, the images indicate:
• (especially the first one) what could be termed as a “fracture” of the passing pattern in two left-right halves, with neither a communication lane between
them, nor a centrally-occurring verticalization of the play, and
• a backwards orientation of the general passing, on the left towards Kroos, and on the other side from Werner to Müller, then to Kimmich, and then all
the way back to Boateng. The bottom-left graph is particularly shocking in highlighting Germany’s dependence on Kroos.
As such, Germany’s build-up pattern, to the extent that it should still be termed “build-up”, is considerably un-creative, sluggish, uni-
dimensional, overly dependent on Kroos, and therefore predictable and relatively easy to neutralize by the opposition.
Most frequent pass of each player Most frequent two passes Most frequent three passes
!
Mathematical modelling: top 3 preferred passes for each of Germany’s starters
24 (data: last ten of Germany’s games analyzed, avg. number of attempted passes per 93 minutes) © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
However, it needs to be stressed, the “Kroos factor” (i.e. his qualities that are recognized and sought by his teammates, thus contributing to a disbalancing of the
play dynamics) and more generally the individual features of the starters represent only a part of the problem, the rest having clearly to do with a certain game-
plan followed or, more generally, with a certain system-and-style idea of play. Two arguments can and need to be made in this regard.
1. Firstly, not only did those games in which Kroos has been absent (see for instance the recent Furthermore, as captured in the image on the right, when inventorying for the entire squad the
friendly against Austria) exhibit any remarkable altering of Germany’s game*, but, when using the passing lanes of the last ten games, one discovers that among the top 25 of them, only three of
same data computed from the team’s last ten games and applying the same mathematical them represent (at least theoretically) verticalizations through the centre (Kroos and Gündogan to
modelling as above, the results in the image left-below show that even if 7 of the 10 fields Özil, respectively Kroos to Draxler). The rest is made up by the same prolonged bulk of short,
players are replaced (Kroos included), the pattern remains essentially the same: the top-passing lateral and backward, passes in the back DC-DMC area, those meaningless passes followed at a
crescent comprising the four defenders, a comparable concentration of the ball-circulation in the certain moment by a swift and simple opening of the game on one of the flanks and then a cross
back area of the DCs-DMCs, and only one new attempt of vertical pass appearing on the team’s into the box.
right, one that, however, simply replaces one lost on the left once Kroos has been removed.
Passing lanes of a Germany team with 7 subs Top 25 passing lanes among players of the entire German squad
(methodology: same as in the previous case) (methodology: same as in the previous case)
* Quite the contrary, it might be argued: not a few times, Gündogan, who replaced Kroos as the left DMC, looked as if he tried to closely replicate the number 8’s role – dropping as the third DC during initiation, seeking
25 launches on the left-back, patrolling the same left half-space, etc. © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
2. Secondly, an identical analysis, over this entire season’s Champions League, of Real Madrid, Kroos’ club team, allows two clear observations:
a.) even though Kroos remains the player with the highest on-the-ball involvement in the game’s build-up, the club’s dependence on him is smaller, and recognizable as such by multiple
indicators (his OBI index value, his share of the team’s total passes, his participation in the top ten passing lanes, marked with red in the images below, his share of creative passes, etc.);
b.) Kroos’ presence in and influence over the game does not automatically attract a slowing down of the attack, with Real Madrid’s passing maps displaying a clearly more vertical direction of
construction than the German national team, in both their two main playing systems used in the Champions League – 4-3-1-2, respectively 4-4-2. Significantly though, at the club serving the
comparison here, there are visibly less short lateral and backwards passes in the back area of the team than in the case of Germany*.
Germany national team RMA in a 4-3-1-2 shape RMA in a 4-4-2 shape:
A comparison of mathematically modelled passing maps: Germany in their last ten games vs. Real Madrid in this season’s UCL
(methodology: same as previously)
Thus, arguments combined, it can be stated that the main flaws identified in Germany’s attack within this analysis are the consequence rather of a certain
game-plan and general idea of play than of the influence, no matter how remarkable, of their key-player.
* This also being the reason why almost all of Germany’s defensive players register higher passing accuracy rates at the national level than at the club, where the play is more direct (among Bayern’s DCs,
for instance: Süle – 95.5 vs 93; Hummels – 94 vs 87, Boateng – 92 vs. 87, etc. The only exception is DR Kimmich who, conversely, interprets at the national team a more offensive role than at the club).
INDIVIDUAL PLAYERS’ FEATURES IN RELATION TO GAME DYNAMICS (1/3)
Sometimes when analysing Germany’s current national squad and qualification campaign, the frontier between game dynamics and system on the one hand and individual
features of the players is difficult, but still possible. Take the AMR position for instance: implicitly admitting that there’s a problem with this particular position, over the course
of a single year, German coach Joachim Löw has tested no less than 9 players: Müller (2nd S / false 10), Özil (AMC), Goretzka (MC/DMC), Gündogan (DMC/MC), Brandt (AML),
Can (DMC), and, for short periods within the games, Reus (AML), Stindl (AMC), and Werner (S). Considering that, except maybe, and rather potentially, for Brandt, all the
other variants on this position (coincidentally within the area opposite to the half-space Kroos operates in) shared one statistical commonality, that is an extremely low
involvement (time/ball/passes) in the team’s attack, this must logically be a problem of the playing system, and not an individual-related one.
In other cases however, the frontier gets severely blurred. Take for instance the frequent agglomeration, when attacking, of the left half-space on Germany’s attacking
direction, right in front of the box: one the one hand, as a clear tactical indication, no matter who plays/played in the AML, respectively AMC position (e.g. Draxler, Reus, Sané,
respectively Özil, Draxler, Müller), the two frequently swap positions during games, so that, logically speaking, in multiple moments they will meet half-way in the respective
half-space; on the other hand though, one must take into account that both Reus and Draxler, when used as AML, are right-footed, while Özil as AMC is left-footed, meaning
that all of them drifting into the same half-space is a only natural tendency related to their individual features, in this case their preferred foot. Then again, not only Germany
sometimes obviously aim, as part of a plan, to create overloads in the lateral thirds of the pitch, but the left half-space referred to here is is exactly the one hosting Kroos, in
the same context in which, only naturally seeking a close enough distance to his main providers, central striker Werner, although right-footed, often drifts leftwards.
Example. Open-play German deliveries into the opponent’s penalty area vs Spain (23.03.2018) and France (14.11.2017):
vs Spain (DEU possession: 45%) vs France (DEU possession: 61%)
Given this methodological conundrum of positional & system automatisms vs individual characteristics, the underlying approach tries to isolate, insofar as
possible, obviously, on how some individual features of the players influence the game dynamics, and not the other way around.
Key-man No.1: Kroos

Initiates construction, dropping in line with the DCs and acting as a very deep playmaker, then patrols
back and forth within Germany’s left half-space. Most on-the-ball involved player of the German
squad, participates directly in 5 of Germany’s top 10 passing combos. Involved directly in almost every
third pass of the team. Plays significantly deeper than at club level, which explains why he is also less
involved in creating chances or assisting. Technically gifted, with unique vision of the game and
impressive passing accuracy (95.3%). Main executer of corner & free kicks. Calm and composed, able
to play on-touch passes. Prefers to play it short and safe, but can anytime catch the opponent off-
guard, accelerating with a 30-40m long through ball or long diagonals on the full backs. Kroos’ medium+ passes to FBs vs. NOR
vs NOR (Sept. 2017) vs ESP (March 2018)
Kroos: total touches and passes in two of Germany’s last ten games Kroos’ box deliveries in his last 6 matches
INDIVIDUAL PLAYERS’ FEATURES IN RELATION TO GAME DYNAMICS
Key-roles (and their corresponding men): the full-backs
Similitudes (positional):
o Tremendous effort capacity, being not only the main suppliers of deliveries into the
vs Norway box (e.g. 2.4x more than the wingers), but also required to rush back into the base
(Sept. 2017)
4-men line on Germany’s positional defence;
o both Kimmich on the right and Hector or Plattenhardt on the left advance wider
and higher up the pitch than the wingers (who cut inside into the half-spaces,
creating space for them), trying to either cross directly, or stretch out the
opposition defence;
o adopt the same offensive style, ploughing their own flank, regardless of the
German direction of attack Kimmich Hector opponent (e.g. compare the two captures – against Spain (Germany: 45%
possession) and against Norway (Germany: 74% possession);
o both Kimmich and Hector have good positional awareness and are also accustomed
at club level with the (D)MC position - as such, on offensive corners they are part of
the 3-men belt meant to close down any opposition counterattack.
Differences (personal):
vs Spain • Kimmich drops back more often to collect the ball during initiation, but also
(March. 2018) • engages in more lateral exchanges of the ball with his side’s DC & DMC;
• is the Germany’s main provider for Werner, with 9.1 attempts per 93’ (compared to
only 4.8 Hector), even though more than 50% of them fail;
• over 80% of his box deliveries are floated (tends to sprint until reaching the box
line, from where he instantly lifts the ball), whereas
• on average, both Hector and Plattenhardt stay a bit higher on the pitch (Kroos
covers) and make more grounded deliveries and also solo runs into the box;
Kimmich & Hector’s ball touches against NOR & ESP
Other players
Key-man: Özil
Werner
Not very technical, nor good aerially, but strong, tireless (11.6 km/93’) and
Technique, creativity, movement. very fast, with spectacular 50m+ runs into the box on counterattacks.
Free role, allowed to roam Shoots from within the box. Drops deep more often than Gomez, entering
around in the opposition’s half passing combinations (whereas the latter is less mobile, but very good
when attacking. In practice, aerially, being the biggest recipient of floated crosses). Within the starting
drifts laterally, especially the left eleven, tends to drift a bit leftwards.
half-space of Germany’s attack,
where he spends 2.8 times more Müller
time than on the right one and One of the least on-the-ball involved players and with the lowest PAcc
3.6 times more than in the among the starters. Not very technical, but with great effort capacity,
central fifth). Engages in permanently trying to create spaces in the opposition’s defence. When on
position swaps with AML & AMR the ball, almost half of his passes go either diagonally on the flank to
With Kroos positioned deeper, is Kimmich, or vertically to Werner, being the latter’s favourite passing
the main provider of creative partner. Shoots frequently and very well from outside of the box.
passes (and also of assists per
time unit played). Draxler
Occupies predominantly two More involved on the ball than Müller on the opposite side, dropping
key-areas during open-play, as deeper and running 12.8 km/93’!. High PAcc for his position (93.3%), but
exemplified in the recent friendly mainly because he tends to play it short and safe, 2/3 of all his passes
against Austria: remaining in the Kroos – Hector - Özil area (over 1/4 of them being short
backwards passes to Kroos, in whose area he often drops back). Germany’s
second shooter from right outside of the penalty area.
Others Hummels and Rüdiger more often, respectively Khedira and Gündogan Reus
less often, try long lifted ball verticalizations into the box and also not rarely A complete attacking player, extremely mobile on the pitch, creating
exploit central spaces created by Germany’s wingers – full-backs stretching out of overloads in the targeted areas. Good passing skills, decent shooter, creates
opposition defences (see next slide). and assists. Fitness question mark following his prolonged absence.
System-and-style of play vs individual features: contributions & scoring (1/3)
Germany’s manner of creating chances and their finalisation is the fluctuant resultant of the general dynamics’ and individual features’ mutual conditioning, in a
manner that the three elements analysed below try to both explain and evaluate.
Firstly, a result of both a clear playing idea
(simple and fast approach of the attack, trying
to max. the number of chances created / time
unit, the wingers and the AMC entering the
half-spaces, the full-backs advancing wider
and higher up the pitch, DMCs pinning the
central third, etc.) and certain individual
qualities necessary (the tremendous effort and
desired tactical discipline of the full-backs, the
mobility of the wingers and the striker, etc.),
which also explains why they so often chose to
skip construction altogether and instead adopt
various shortcuts to finalisation, Germany’s
playing style is dominantly characterized by an
abundance of deliveries into the opposition’s
box. Thus, on an average of 7 matches (just
from open-play, and including ESP, FRA, and
BRA as opponents!), Germany’s players brought
the ball inside the box 41.4 times per match.
Add to this direct shots from outside of the box
and set-pieces are added, and the conclusion
states that Germany manages to make a
delivery into the opposition’s box more than
once every two minutes.
Seven-matches-superimposed map of sources of German deliveries into the opposition’s box
(matches against NOR (61 deliveries), NIR (31x), FRA (34x) (2017); ESP (43x), BRA (39x), AUT (29x), and KSA (53x) (2018))
Secondly, as another combined result of playing philosophy and individual players’ features, Germany tends to deliver quite a lot of shots per match.
vs NOR (Sept. 2017; 6-0) vs SPA (March 2018; 1-1)
As two noteworthy specific strengths,

a) shooting is uniformly distributed, both among all
of the team’s front six positions- striker, AMs and
DMCs (being not the monopoly of a certain player
and regardless who occupies those positions) and
spatially across the attacking thirds;
b) the players do not hesitate to shoot from outside
vs NIR (Oct. 2017; 3-1) vs BRA (March 2018; 0-1) the box (see especially Müller and Draxler), a
feature all so rare in many of today’s top teams.
Moreover, 4 of their last 21 proper goals (i.e. KSA’s
X own goal excluded), so almost a fifth of them,
have been scored from outside of the box
A few observations:
- Werner rarely shoots from outside of the box,
vs FRA (Nov. 2017; 2-2) vs KSA (June 2018; 2-1) preferring to enter the box running and/or shoot
from not farther than 11-13m; usually drifts a bit to
DEU’s left, as opposed to Gomez.
- The latter, taller and less mobile, receives
significantly more aerial crosses;
- Aside from the top shooter Müller, Kroos, Khedira,
and especially Hector shoot extremely well on
second balls.
Germany’s open-play attempts in six of their last ten matches
(circle: attempt; square: goal)
Finally, analysing the specific manner in which Germany have scored over their last ten games sheds further explanatory light on the here followed mutual
conditioning of system-and-style of play on the one hand, and individual, particular, features of the players on the other hand.
Thus, bearing witness to Germany’s multiple build-up

flaws and also explaining in part why they often choose to
skip construction altogether and adopt various shortcuts
to finalization, only 50% of their last ten matches’ goals
have been scored from open-play (compare this to this
season’s UCL finalists – Real Madrid – 66%, Liverpool FC –
74%).
Instead, due to not only a certain playing philosophy (i.e.
maximizing the number of chances created per time unit,
but also to certain players’ qualities (e.g. the speed of
Werner, the technique and vision of Özil, the diagonals of
Kroos, the aerial dominance of Hummels, the effort
capacity of Kimmich, etc.), Germany relies much more on
counterattacks and set-pieces.
! Strengths:
- there is no sign of an over-dependence on a certain
player, neither regarding creation, nor scoring;
- creations, assists, and scoring as well are
(satisfactorily) uniformly spread spatially
Goals scored by Germany in their last ten games (Sept. 2017 – June 2018)
Obs. Since the whole point of the game is to score, and not to pass and build-up just for the sake of it, whether or not Germany’s style of attacking is effective actually remains
debatable, given the contradicting nature of some key-indicators. Thus, in terms of chance-creation, the team does manage to generate a considerable 15.5 attempts per game.
However, in terms of accuracy, only 32.9% of them are on target, which is low and easy explainable considering the heavy emphasis placed on crosses. Then again, in terms of
efficacy, for an average of 5.1 attempts on target per game, no less than 2.2 of them (that is 43%) are converted into goals. Judging by their disbalanced scoring-structure, the key-
question is probably for how long Germany will still manage to surprise its opponents on counters and also continue to exploit offensive set-pieces as efficiently as it currently does.
CONTENT
A General Remarks
B ATTACK
1. Gegenpressing
2. High-pressing
D DEFENCE
F Varia
C. NEGATIVE (DEFENSIVE) TRANSITION: Gegenpressing & high-pressing
C.1 Gegenpressing (1/2)
Once possession is lost, Germany doesn’t fall back in a defensive shape, but immediately and invariably launches a very intense and extremely effective form of
Gegenpressing, meant to regain the ball in a matter of seconds. A tactical tool perfectly suited for both their playing style (attacking with many men high up the
pitch with the opposition pushed back deep) and their traditionally good physical condition (as regain the ball implies a good deal of running), Germany’s counter-
pressing is probably the best in the world, at least at national level*.
Key-characteristics:
➢ Objectives:
o max: regain ball and resume attack;
o min: force opponent to either move to the flank, or pass backwards to own
goalkeeper;
➢ Fluid, highly effective, structure of the pressing unit:
a) a group of ball-chasers, attacking the ball-holder usually one more than the
opponent’s immediate passing options
b) a containment belt behind them, intercepting or preventing any attempt of a
forward pass (e.g. DL – DMC – AMC – DR in the image top-left, with image to
the left, with DR and Khedira stepping out of the chain and joining the ball-
chasers unit)
➢ Ensuring numerical superiority in the targeted area, by bringing at least one man
more than the opposition: full-backs cut inside or come forward on the flank,
DMCs advance from behind, S and AMC / the closest winger storm towards the
opponent with the ball (e.g. a fluid 2/1 – 4/3 – 7/6 in the top image at the top, 4/2
in the bottom image).
* In their friendly against Spain for instance, out of eight attempts, Germany recovered the ball in six (minutes 9:09, 32:00, 32:40, 34:17, 73:09, and 89:20), once they had to commit a foul (2:03), and only once did their counter-
35 pressing fail, leaving them exposed to Spain’s counterattack. © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
C.1 Gegenpressing (2/2)
Example
Ball lost in the vicinity of the box’s corner. DL, S, and AML
pounce on the current holder of the ball. AMR closes in,
while AMR, DMC and DR aim at preventing a forward
through pass by, depending on each player, blocking either
zonally the passing lanes or man-marking opponents.
Example
Interception by France, whose ball-holder is immediately
surrounded by three German players, thus having
reasonably only two backwards passing options. Flexible
ball-chase / containment-belt structure depending on ball
movement.
C.2 HIGH-PRESSING – first step (1/2)
Applied especially against opponents building from the back, equally relentless and efficient, and almost identical in both its dynamic structure and underlying
philosophy, Germany’s high-pressing represents, qualitatively and quantitatively as well, much more than a simply forwards-moved form of positional defending.
If, for instance, Gegenpressing (semi-) fails, meaning only that the ball hasn’t been won back, Germany does not fall back in a stable defensive module via a classic
negative transition, but remains extremely high up the pitch, with usually 6+ players in the opposition’s half.
Identically to counter-pressing, Germany’s maximally defined objective in high-pressing is to regain the ball and resume the offensive. If, however, this objective is
not reached, then, as a specific difference regarding both the objective and the methods applied, Germany’s high-pressing implies two steps:
1. first step: force opponent to pass backwards, ultimately to the goalkeeper, either directly, or after pushing him out of the centre onto the flank
Example:
In a 3 vs 3 situation on the lateral side, well isolated in the corner area of the pitch, French Seconds later, on the other side, confronted with DEU’s fast translation movement, FRA’s ball-
defender is forced to pass to his GK, with Werner close to making an interception holder, having received it from the GK, has no option but either send it back to him, or try a risky
pass to his teammate
C.2 HIGH-PRESSING – first step (2/2)
Dynamics: as in the case of Gegenpressing, the key-features of Germany’s highly efficient high-pressing are, aside from the mobility of its players:
a) bringing at least one man more than the opposition in the targeted area, thus deliberately sacrificing the back (for the explanation, see below - second step):
aside from the regular “pressers” (striker + advanced midfielders), when the flank is targeted, the full-back advances very high, accompanied from the centre
by one or both DMCs, while the other full-back also cuts inside;
b) a situationally-dependent highly fluid structure composed by ball-chasers (2 or even 3 vs 1) and a containment belt behind them blocking any potential
forward-passing lanes
Example: flank; 2-3vs2 on the ball, 4-5vs 4 zonal Example: flank, 3 vs 1 on the ball, 5vs4 zonal
38 Example: flank; 3vs1 on the ball, 4vs3 / 7vs6 zonal Example: flank, 3vs1 on the ball, 4vs2 / 5vs4 zonal © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
C.2 HIGH-PRESSING – second step
2. second step: force opponent to either make a mistake or kick a long aerial ball into Germany’s half
Once the first step is accomplished, Germany’s players do not fall back positionally, but remain in the adversary’s own third, usually in numerical superiority, their
minimal objective being to prevent the opposition from building from the back and instead their goalkeeper to kick a long aerial ball:
At a maximum, the objective of the entire high-pressing mechanism remains, obviously, regaining the ball and resuming the offensive.
Example:
Germany’s goal against Austria (June 2018)

1. In the first step of its high-pressing, Germany contains Austria on the flank in a
2vs1 / 3vs2 / 6vs5 situation. AUT’s defender is forced to pass to his goalkeeper.
2. In the second step, the goalkeeper doesn’t chose to kick a long ball, but instead
tries to pass it short, in between Germany’s most advanced pressers. Behind
them, well positioned, Özil intercepts, enters the penalty area, shoots, scores.
Whereas for most teams a long ball behind the advanced pressing unit into their own half, in a situation of numerical inferiority, would represent an high risk, for Germany it’s actually a
favored situation addressing directly one of their main strengths: although they might be outnumbered at the back, most of their defensive players, especially the DCs, are not only
excellent positionally, but very tall and overwhelming in aerial duels. And it is exactly this type of long balls that explains the biggest chunk of their otherwise staggering average
numbers of interceptions + clearances made per 93 minutes of game: Hummels - 1.91m, (14.7+4.2), Süle - 1.95m (8.8+6.6), Boateng - 1.92m (10.1+3.3), Rüdiger - 1.91m (9.2+3.4),
39 Khedira - 1.88m (8.8+2.6), Hector - 1.85m (7.3+1.5).
CONTENT
A General Remarks
B ATTACK
1. General assessment
2. Positional defending
D DEFENCE
3. Set-pieces
4. Vulnerabilities
F Varia
D.1 DEFENCE: GENERAL REMARKS
For a team as attack-minded as Germany, one that practices a simplified, direct, form of attack, that employs what some observers might deem as extreme, if not
reckless, forms of counter-pressing and high-pressing, and that tries with any occasion to pin down and suffocate their opposition as deep on the pitch as
possible, it should maybe not come as a surprise that, at least in general statistical terms, Germany’s main weakness appears to be exactly its defence.
Specifically, over their last ten games, they have conceded exactly one goal per match
(two clean sheets), this having nothing to do with the quality of their opponents in
friendlies or other potential, contextual, factors, considering that they conceded
- against teams such as the Czech Republic, Northern Ireland, Azerbaijan, Saudi
Arabia (each once), or Austria (twice);
- from all possible situations, except own goals (open-play – 5 goals; set pieces – 3;
penalty kick – 1; counterattack – 1).
Things seem indeed to have worsened over the last
12 months, both offensively and defensively, as the
table to the right indicates, which is all the more
intriguing, if not uniquely paradoxical, considering
two facts:
a) over the last season, Germany’s current squad members, each at his own club,
have registered on average defensive indicators’ values (interceptions / blocks /
tackles) 1.3-1.4 times higher than, for instance, the players of Real Madrid,
winner of four of the last five UCL trophies!;
b) not only that, but at the national level, if measured over the last ten games and
Goals conceded by Germany in their last ten games (Sept. 2017 – June 2018)
employing the same statistical instruments, the average defensive performance
of Germany’s squad players has reached levels 4.5 times higher than at the clubs!
Part of the explanation of this paradox has already been offered at the end of the previous chapter: a considerable share of the spectacular figures pertaining to
interceptions, ball recoveries, clearances, etc., recorded at the national level, has to do with the specific and highly-effective manner in which Germany, using an
extreme high-pressing, manage to force their opponents to kick long balls, only for their own defensive players to overwhelmingly win the ball back, most of
them being not only tall, but also aerially dominant, as well as positionally very competent. The rest of the explanation, a substantial one, shall be constructed in
the following, together with a separate assessment of the teams defensive vulnerabilities.
D.2 POSITIONAL DEFENDING
Intermediary / middle-pressing (1/2)
In the vast majority of positional defending situations, Germany exerts a form of intense middle-pressing characterized by:
➢ Structure: compact 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 (rarely 4-2-3-1 as a rather transitional module), with 10-15m between the lines and composed of:
- the usual 4-men defensive line (DCs + FBs) and
- a 6-men pressing unit composed by
a) a 4-men midfield line (DMCs + wingers falling back as lateral midfielders), staying behind
b) the striker and the AMC, who are chasing the ball; the latter is prepared to launch a counterattack if the ball is intercepted;
➢ Area: pressing starts in the 20m deep stripe containing the centre circle;
➢ Dynamics: defensive line closely follows the well-coordinated, highly mobile and narrow midfield line, which deliberately cedes the flanks (blue triangles in
the images below).
D.2 POSITIONAL DEFENDING
C.2Intermediary
POSITIONAL DEFENDING (2/2)
/ middle-pressing
As was the previous case of allowing long aerial balls into their own half even though outnumbered at the back, the here discussed deliberate cessation of the
flanks is also not a shortcoming of some sort, but only a tactical tool meant to, one might say, entice the opposition into a trap. Specifically, Germany employs the
high mobility and good coordination of its pressing unit members in executing a double maneuver that encircles and outnumbers the opposition on the flank until
either (maximally) an interception is made and the attack is resumed or (minimally) the opposition players play the ball backwards to their own goalkeeper: 1.) the
midfield line swings onto the flank (sometimes joined by the full-back), while 2.) the front two players curl in the same direction, engulfing the ball-keeper.
D.2 DEEP POSITIONAL DEFENDING
Deep positional defending
Employed considerably less often than middle-pressing, Germany’s deep positional defending takes the shape of a very compact 4-4-2 or 4-5-1 (with about 10m
between the lines) and may be deemed necessary by different reasons depending on situation:
a.) a purely defensive measure against strong opponents, capable of fast, penetrating passes or quick switches of the flanks;
b.) a contextual measure (for
instance, positional regrouping
after an opposition throw-in in
Germany’s own third);
c.) an actually offensive measure,
especially against defensive
opponents, meant to entice them
to attack and thus create spaces
exploitable on the counter.
The same compactness, but with

the back-line variably at 30-45m
away from the own goal and in,
depending on situation, either a
4-4-2 (more often) or a 4-3-3
shape (less often), is displayed
by Germany when defending
against long aerial balls of the
opposition goalkeeper:
D.3. DEFENDING SET-PIECES:
Throw-ins:
Man-mark plus zonal (blocking passing lanes), depending on situation, for instance:
D.3. DEFENDING SET-PIECES:
Corner kicks or assimilable:
Standard positioning at corners (or assimilable set-pieces): zonal two

lines of 5 (the 4 defenders plus another tall player, placed on the six-
yards line when defending corner kicks), respectively 3-men (in front of
the penalty spot).
Base line rushes forward (well, in most of the cases) in an offside-
maneuver once the ball is kicked.
Özil in the box-corner area or, depending on the situation, in the hemi-
circle, preventing a short pass, but also ready to launch counterattacks,
alongside Werner right in front of the box, ready to sprint on the
counter simultaneously with Özil and collect his creative pass
DEFENSIVE WEAKNESSES
Fully expectable considering their pronounced attack-mindedness, Germany’s main vulnerabilities are of defensive nature and classifiable in two categories
sometimes overlapping:
1. Those generally common to teams as intensely (counter-) pressing as they do
2. One specific, and somewhat surprising, weakness in defending set-pieces
Weakness No. 1: spaces left behind when attacking or (counter-) pressing (1/6)
It is only natural for a team attacking and pressing so intensely and high up the pitch
as Germany to expose themselves at the back, where the considerable spaces left
behind make them extremely vulnerable to counterattacks*.
In most of the cases, this vulnerability stems from the specifically offensive dynamics
of the team, being thus a system-and-style-of-play problem. In other cases, however, it
is caused or, depending on the situation, aggravated by individual shortcomings, such
as the occasional slowness of Germany’s DMCs (Kroos, Khedira, or Gündogan), who
cannot always keep pace, nor compensate it by their positional intelligence.
The following approaches the two types of vulnerable spaces left behind depending
on Germany’s specific offensive movements, as represented in the image to the right.
Sometimes, these spaces are generated simultaneously – a relatively rare situation
when disaster is almost guaranteed.
For exemplifications of this weakness, see for instance the matches against: ESP (minutes 21:34, 22:30; 23:55, 29:47, 31:28, 39:37 - failed Gegenpressing, 54:49, 67:27, 84:55), BRA (minutes 35:42, 36:36, 42:51, 48:46, 59:10,
81:31), FRA (27:04, 43:27, 88:44), AUT (7:23, 15:05, 47:24 – failed high-pressing, 86:49, 89:58), NIR (38:55, 46:33, 77:49), or KSA (29:14, 36:45, 38:15, 56:56, 71:05).
➢ The central space in-between the defensive line and the DMCs
= a resultant of: - a style-of-play issue - the defenders remaining too far behind the midfield, especially the DMCs, combined with
- an individual weakness – the DMCs too slow to cope with opposition’s sudden verticalization in the centre of the park
E.g. Quick FRA pass from the flank beyond Germany’s DL, with Kroos and E.g. Kroos and Khedira press, interception fails, 3 + 1 Saudi players in the
Khedira unable to retreat timely enough to prevent a 3 vs 3 at back critically empty space behind them
E.g. high-pressing with all midfielders plus striker, all the more E.g. NIR counterattack, long aerial ball in the empty space behind Kroos
dangerous, since the right-back also joins them. Plenty of space left and DMC partner Rudy. Hummels sprints out of the defensive line to fill
behind, with Spain’s left-back theoretically able to head the ball behind the void, but misses the interception. Quick pass, narrow miss by the
Germany’s pressing line or try dribbling DEU’s right-back and continue North-Irish striker
on his own towards the goal.
This central space vulnerability has for instance been exposed vividly and repeatedly in the March 2018 friendly against Spain The latter’s fast and technical players
and their use of inverted wingers have caused problems for Kroos and Khedira, neither of them particularly fast, nor skilled in tackles:
E.g. DEU’s wingers in (too) advanced positions on the pitch, Spain intercepts E.g. ESP’s striker drifts outwards, keeping DEU’s defence put, while the winger
the ball somewhere at the half line. Their central midfielders midfielders keep and a central midfielder cut inside, occupying the empty space between
Kroos and Khedira busy, while their wingers cut inside in the empty space Germany’s lines (marked in red). The ball-holder has two options to deliver the
between Germany’s lines. ball into the targeted area.
Not rarely, in order to increase Germany’s pressing force, one of the DMCs (usually Kroos) steps forward, creating in turn another space at the back:
E.g. Kroos steps out of the line and joins Özil’s in chasing the ball, although Spain can clearly pass behind him. The interception however fails, and the Spanish player sends
49 the ball exactly into the empty space left behind him. © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
Finally, in a chain of compensatory measures, sometimes one of the DCs (almost always the left one, i.e. Hummels or Rüdiger) rushes forward into the empty
space, chasing a retreating opposition forward who tries exploiting the void. Usually it works, but sometimes it can backfire.
➢ The space behind the advanced full-backs on positional attacks or high-pressing situations
The FBs being extremely attack-minded, the spaces behind them This is a problem particularly, but not solely, in the case of right-back Kimmich, who not rarely
(especially in their disbalanced 2-2-3-3 attacking shape) remain ventures far away from the defensive line to either participate in Germany’s deep attack, or high-
particularly vulnerable to counterattacks. pressing, or to chase an opponent when defending positionally*:
Example: interception catches DEU vertically elongated, with both FBs on very high
positions. Kroos and Khedira are unable to retreat fast enough, the DL does, but
cannot prevent a pass behind him, leaving defence in a 2vs2.
Example: excessive pressing on the flank that fails, DL leaves a huge space behind,
with Saudis managing to deliver the ball into it. A very dangerous counterattack
ensues. *Sometimes aggravated by Müller not tracking back properly
➢ Finally, the most dangerous situations occur when both conditions are met, usually during prolonged attacks of Germany, with both the DMCs far away from the DCS, and the
full-backs very high up the pitch:
Example: French counter surprises DEU with both their full-backs on very high positions. Kroos Example. FBs next to the opposition’s box. ESP intercepts the ball and instantly attacks the
is left alone to handle three opponents who are attacking the empty space between DC and DL, flank. Kroos and Gündogan can’t keep pace. Boateng heads towards Asensio, Hummels stays
while on the opposite flank another three adversaries can attack the corresponding space. centrally, but cannot block Silva from receiving the cross. Narrow miss.
Example: Failed interception attempt by Hector on DEU’s left flank. Isco sprints into the Example: Lead-up to Brazil’s goal: DEU loses the ball, a counter ensues, with both FBS and
empty space, Kroos and Khedira too slow to make themselves useful, Germany being left Kroos in advanced positions. Two opponents attack the DC-DL spaces, Gündogan can track
in an extremely dangerous 4 vs 2 situation. only one of them, while in the centre, Paulinho, unmarked, closely follows his attacking
52 teammate. © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
Weakness No.2: defensive set-pieces (1/2)
Somewhat surprising for a team comprising players not only competent in offensive set-pieces, but also tall enough and (at least in open-play) positionally aware,
Germany seems to have been suffering recently from a certain weakness when defending set-pieces. Albeit not representative enough, within the sample of their
last ten games, three of the ten goals conceded by Germany have been scored from or in direct relation to a set-piece (KSA penalty excluded). Whereas, as
exemplified below, defending throw-ins might be related to Germany’s sometimes exaggerated pressing, the last two examples highlight an issue with their
narrow zonal defending at corner kicks.
➢ throw-ins: excessive flank pressing creates spaces in the back-central area
Throw-in with two Spanish players on the flank pressed by five Germans. Good density of Ten minutes later, another throw-in, and another failed pressing on the flank by Germany. DC
Germany’s immediate defensive block, but plenty of space left behind between the DCs. Iniesta, far Boateng completely out of position leaving a huge space between him and Hummels. With neither
enough from the three Germans surrounding him, receives the ball from Jordi Alba. Khedira can’t Kroos, nor Khedira, let alone Müller, filling the void, while the left-back seems preoccupied with an
reach him in time. Neither LB Hector, who seems preoccupied with Silva, nor DC Hummels, opponent far enough on the other flank (not even captured in the image), Iniesta, on the ball, could
immobile in the centre, mark Spain’s striker Rodrigo, who runs unhindered behind Hummels, try a penetrating pass to Rodrigo, who is already attacking the empty space between Germany’s DCs.
receives Iniesta’s well-timed through ball, and scores.
Weakness No.2: defensive set-pieces (2/2)
➢ defending corner kicks: a too narrow 5+3 zonal-defending block
Collective error, one involving, admittedly, four players who haven’t been selected Germany’s narrow zonal approach backfires again:
into Germany’s 2018 WC squad: - base line comprises the two DCs, the two full-backs who for some reason have
- base 5-men line de-structured, as Stindl (Y) does not join it; swapped places, and another tall player (Petersen), and is staying, as usual, on the
- 3-men second line hesitant between zonal or man-mark defending; six-yards line, with the second line only some 2 meters in front of them.
- long cross beyond Germany’s 5+3 narrow zonal block; - Long cross beyond the area of Germany’s defensive bloc, where an Austrian player
- failed offside-trap: while Hummels (5) & Boateng (17) sprint forwards, Wagner runs unhindered a curve behind DEU’s base line, shoots, scores.
(Z) probably thinks he should man-mark, so stays behind, same as Plattenhardt
(2).
North-Irish player re-heads the ball to his team-mate before being reached by Kroos
and Boateng can reach him, while Hummels pounces back, trying to no avail to
intercept the other opponent, who heads the ball into the net.
CONTENT
A General Remarks
B ATTACK
D DEFENCE
1. from pos. defending

2. from set-pieces
F Varia
E. OFFENSIVE (POSITIVE) TRANSITION
Whereas the quick positive transitions along the flanks via the full-backs have already been covered in this analysis (see chapter “Attack”), Germany’s lethal weapon
in this regard is represented by its quick reactivity: suggestively, over last 10 matches, no less than 27.3% (6/22) of their goals have been scored on counterattacks. A
tool ruthlessly employed on any chance available and regardless whether they started from the defence of a set-piece or from positional defending in the own half*,
counterattacks play directly to the strengths of Germany’s players: the composure of Neuer, the technical skills of Kroos, the speed of especially Werner (but also
Müller, Draxler, or Kimmich) and, most importantly, the remarkable technique, creativity, and mobility of Özil.
Phase 1 (top): ESP counterattack

Phase 2 (bottom): DEU counter-counterattack
Three of Germany’s counterattacks from their last ten matches

(Legend: yellow = ball circulation; dotted = solo run; continuous = pass; X = opponents)
56 * For more examples of Germany’s counterattacking potency, see for instance the match against Spain (min. 22:43, 26:33, 29:35, 49:25, 54:33, 55:43, 63:37, 87:01, or 89:02) © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
E. OFFENSIVE (POSITIVE) TRANSITION
Whereas the counterattacks’ key-players remain in almost all situations the ones previously mentioned, the settings and dynamics depend obviously on whether
the preceding phase of the play was 1.) a positional defending situation or 2.) a set piece.
E.1 When defending positionally:

Juxtaposing two already displayed graphs from the friendly against Austria (left: Neuer’s retransmissions of the ball – in black; right: Özil’s ball (first) touches and
runs) hints at the first axis of Germany’s counters when defending positionally: it is the red-marked area that Neuer sends a good chunk of his intercepted or re-
passed balls when under pressure, that Özil prefers to stay in, as the second “1” in the team’s deep defending 4-4-1-1 formation, in order to collect any intercepted
ball. Once, if not already half a second before, the ball reaches Özil, Werner is already sprinting onto the closest flank waiting for the No. 10’s creative pass, whereas
at least two of three other players (the usual Draxler, Müller, and Kimmich) sprint vertically or diagonally, further increasing the spaces in the opposition’s defence.
Neuer’s punches, interceptions, and re-passed balls, and Özil’s ball touches & runs vs Austria
E.2 Defensive set pieces: permanent readiness to counter
One might argue that for Germany, any defensive set-piece represents but an opportunity to counterattack (this proactive, very offensive, mindset focusing
excessively on the possibilities to counter instead of properly defending might in turn explain why, as already analysed, the team has visible problems in doing the
actual job of defending against the opponent’s set-pieces). The standard positioning of the key-players in this type of situations is the following:
➢ Werner on a lateral third, ready to

sprint (except for free-kicks with a
proper wall – case in which he
remains centrally);
➢ Özil in the area of the box’s corner
on the side where the ball is
(except the previous situation,
when he swaps positions with
Werner), ready to collect any of his
team-mates intercepted balls Interception. Kroos passes to Özil, who sprints onto the flank, from Opposition throw-in. Kroos, Özil, Draxler, and Werner, clustered on
where he passes to Werner, has rushed centrally. Quick re- the flank, play a double role: zonal defending; keeping short distances
(usually Kroos, placed deep and among themselves in order to launch the counter, should the team
transmission of the ball to the right, where Müller and Kimmich have
centrally with a view of the entire sprinted. Werner collects assist in the box., shoots, scores. intercept the ball
pitch and ready to initiate the
counter) and, after a few steps
towards the flank, to launch
Werner;
➢ Draxler, Müller, and Kimmich in
the usual assisting roles, sprinting
depending on the situation either
onto the opposite flank or centrally,
dragging the defenders out of
position and creating further
Dangerous free-kick. Özil and Kimmich in the box corner area, Another throw-in. Kroos centrally, in close proximity to Özil, to whom
spaces, or, if free, collecting the ball
preventing any direct shot attempt, but also ready to sprint on the he can instantly pass any intercepted ball, while Werner lurks on the
and delivering the critical assist counter, whereas Kroos and Draxler stay centrally in a support role flank, and Draxler is able to support the counter from the centre.
should the ball be intercepted.
CONTENT
A General Remarks
B ATTACK
D DEFENCE
1. Psychological
F Varia 2. Fitness
F. A FEW PSYCHOLOGICAL & FITNESS-RELATED ISSUES
Psychological: Fitness
❖ Rather inexplicable (considering the sample below covers 25 games and 46
players used), Germany seem to have a problem focusing right before the
break and the end of the game: ❖ The German fitness school being one of, if not
the best around, as a feature absolutely and
generally required in order to implement
st.dev. Germany’s high-press, high-tempo, all-out
4.3
game-plan, their players tend to run, each on
his position, more than, for instance, the
10.1
Champions League averages (e.g. Kimmich –
11.9 km/match; Rüdiger – 10.6, Hummels –
10.1, Süle – 10.2, Boateng – 9.7; Gündogan –
12.1, Khedira – 12.0, Kroos – 11.8, Rudy – 11.4;
❖ This is relatively intriguing, since other indicators suggest the same usual
Müller – 11.6, Draxler – 12.8(!); Werner –
mental strength of Germany’s national team, for instance their renowned
11.6(!), etc.)
ability to come back into the games:
❖ Other issues
o the injury backgrounds of Neuer and Reus
especially;
Over their last 25 matches, they lost only one of the 17 games in which they had scored o Boateng – rumoured to have a chronical
first (the friendly against AUT, with only four of their usual starters). Conversely, they came back-problem;
back and died in 4 out of 5 cases in which they had been led (against CHL, DEN, ESP, FRA)
o Kroos and Kimmich surpassed a sensitive
mins/season * km/time-unit threshold;
❖ Other punctual issues:
- the general confidence level after the last ten games;
- the 11m-execution problems of Gomez, Werner, and Goretzka;
- Müller relatively irritable, protests often refereeing decisions; (transfermarkt.de)
- the politicised issue of Özil and Gündogan pro-Erdogan gestures.
SUMMARY
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C DEFENSIVE (NEGATIVE) TRANSITION

E OFFENSIVE (POSITIVE) TRANSITION

F VARIA (fitness, psychological, etc.)

Context Prompting some (mostly journalistic) voices to suggest the idea of

(as of June 14, 2018; source: transfermarkt.de)

System and personnel stability

Squad depth and system issues

Dominant playing style: Playing system:

Tactical philosophy / identity:

Jersey numbers vs. role-abbreviations: whenever the analysis focuses on system-

6 X = player not selected into this WC’s squad

Standard initiation when building from the back:

Both full-backs advance up the pitch, wider

Germany’s AMC drags an opponent out of

Kroos advances in line with the other

Weakness => compensation: accelerating the transition to finalisation

Corner kicks or similar: examples Throw-ins

Over 4/5 are taken by the full-backs. Main preoccupation is to maintain

GENERAL DYNAMICS OF PLAY (1/5)

➢ Seven of the top ten passing lanes occur among the

Germany national team RMA in a 4-3-1-2 shape RMA in a 4-4-2 shape:

vs Spain (DEU possession: 45%) vs France (DEU possession: 61%)

Key-man No.1: Kroos

vs NOR (Sept. 2017) vs ESP (March 2018)

Key-roles (and their corresponding men): the full-backs

As two noteworthy specific strengths,

Thus, bearing witness to Germany’s multiple build-up

Germany’s goal against Austria (June 2018)

The same compactness, but with

Standard positioning at corners (or assimilable set-pieces): zonal two

➢ throw-ins: excessive flank pressing creates spaces in the back-central area

➢ defending corner kicks: a too narrow 5+3 zonal-defending block

1. from pos. defending

Phase 1 (top): ESP counterattack

Three of Germany’s counterattacks from their last ten matches

E.1 When defending positionally:

➢ Werner on a lateral third, ready to

61 --- © Ionuț APAHIDEANU

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