1.

People vs Acosta-Andrea

People vs. Acosta

G.R. No. 140386, November 29, 2001
FACTS: At about past 12 o'clock midnight of March 14, 1993, after attending a dance in celebration of the town fiesta at
Sitio Tuway, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, the victim, Norton Baguio, together with Hansel Cañete, Leonardo Cabunalis, and
Joy Boganutan, decided to go home. Somewhere on the way, Norton Baguio stopped to urinate at the back of a store,
while his companions waited for him.

As Baguio was thus urinating, accused-appellant Benny Acosta suddenly attacked and stabbed him from behind. When
Baguio fell down and rolled facing downward, accused Renny Boy Acosta rushed towards the victim and took his turn in
stabbing him.
Baguio was helped by his companions. Although he died shortly thereafter, Baguio was able to tell his companions who his
assailant was. He pointed to accused-appellant Benny Acosta.

Accused Renny Boy Acosta claimed that he was acting in self-defense, as victim was about to hit him with an ice pick.
Renny Boy, however, was able to parry the blow and drew his hunting knife which he used to stab the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of self-defense of accused Renny Boy Acosta was correctly rejected by the trial court

RULING: The trial court correctly rejected the plea of self-defense of accused Renny Boy Acosta. In a plea of self-defense,
the burden shifts to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of the plea before he can avail
himself of this justifying circumstance. He must thus prove that the following requisites are present: (1) unlawful aggression,
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

In this case, accused Renny Boy Acosta was the aggressor. On cross-examination, he admitted that he stabbed the victim
despite the fact the latter was already lying on the ground.

Granting that the victim gave the initial unlawful aggression, it had certainly ceased from the moment he fell to the ground.
At that point, accused Renny Boy became the aggressor.35 When the unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the one
making the defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor.

2. People vs Aleta-Carlisle

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . MARCELO ALETA et al.

179708
April 16, 2009

Facts: On about May 22, 1994, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon,Marcelo and his sons-co-appellants Ferdinand,
Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed Aleta killed Celestino Duldulao and Fernando Acob through clubbing them with
wood. Based on testimonies of witnesses and report on investigation, the victims suffered deep and large amount of
clubbing which couldn’t be performed by a single person. Also the victims fell on the ground due to the impact of the
wood but they were continuously clubbed and hit with wood until they died. The court found all of them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder. It also rules out the accused claim on self-defence and defense of relative. With that all the
accused petitioned.
Issue: Whether or not the accused can interpose self-defense and defense of relative.
Ruling : No. Alibi, self-defense or defence of relatives are inherently weak defences which, as experience has shown, can
easily be fabricated. For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on self-defense or defense of relatives, complete
or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression,
there would be nothing to prevent or repel. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,. On the case, lawful aggression on the part of the victims is not
present. The moment the victims fell on the ground extinguished any imminent danger they pose. With that the accused
should have stopped but instead they continued clubbing the victims until dead.

3. People vs Juarigue-Cole

Facts:

Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted for the crime of murder for which Nicolas wasacquitted
while Avelina was found guilty of homicide. She appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon onJune 10, 1944 to
completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility for having acted in defense of her honor, to find inher favour additional
mitigating circumstances and omit aggravating circumstance.

•
At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim, went to the chapel of Seventh DayAdventists
to attend religious services and sat at the front bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapelshortly after the
arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door.Upon seeing Avelina,
Amado went and sat by Avelina’s right side from his seat on the other side of the chapel, and without saying a word,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
•
Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her dress with
theintention of punishing Amado’s offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife on
herleft hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a wound about 4 ½
inchesdeep, which is mortal.
•
Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter approached her andasked
her the reason for her action to which Avelina replied, “Father, I could not endure anymore”.
•
Amado Capina died a few minutes after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada was there and Avelina surrenderedherself.
Lozada advised the Jaurigues to go home immediately for fear of retaliation of Capina’s relatives.
EVENTS PRIOR:
One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelina’s handkerchief bearing her nickname while it was
washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
•
7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her and professed his love for her which wasrefused,
and thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped him, gave himfist blows and
kicked him. She informed her matter about it and since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife whenever she went
out.
•
2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of Avelina and entered the room where she wassleeping.
She felt her forehead and she immediately screamed for help which awakened her parents and brought themto her side.
Amado came out from where he had hidden and kissed the hand of Avelina’s father, Nicolas.
•
Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on the day of the incident (September 20, 1942)
thatAmado had been falsely boasting in the neighbourhood of having taken liberties with her person. In the
evening,Amado had been courting the latter in vain.

Issues:
Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility because she is justified in having
acted in the legitimate defense of her honor.
•
Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, presence of
provocation and absence of intent in her favour
•
Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an aggravating circumstance in this case

Ruling:
1.Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared completely exempt from criminal liability. To be entitled
toa complete self-defense of chastity, there must be an attempt to rape. When she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the
base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound causing his death moments later, the means employed
by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive.
2. Defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said
chapel. Admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly
thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said agent of the authorities, and that she had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to
produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control and the further claims that she had not
intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she
inflicted upon him only one single wound, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favour.
3. Claim of the prosecution that the offense was committed by the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating
circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained, as there is no
evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night.
She happened to kill under the greatest provocation.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner
and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide,
with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to
be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to
a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the
instant case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law

4. US vs Guy-sayco- Jarwin

Facts:
Gelasio Galupitan, the husband of the accused, entered into unlawful relations with the deceased Lorenza Estrada; all
were residents of the town of Santa Cruz, the capital of the Province of La Laguna. The accused, Emilia Guy-sayco, duly
became aware of this relation. As her husband had stayed away from the home for more than two weeks, remaining in the
barrio of Dujat, distant about two or one-half hours' walk from the said town under the pretext that he was engaged in field
work, on the 20th of March, 1907, at about 2 p. m., she decided to go to said barrio and join him. To this end she hired a
carromata, and after getting some clothes and other things necessary for herself and husband, started out with her infant
child and a servant girl; but before reaching the barrio and the camarin where her husband ought to be, night came on,
and at about 7 o'clock she alighted and dismissed the vehicle after paying the driver. They had yet to travel some distance,
and for fear of being attacked she disguised herself, using her husband's clothes and a hat given to her by her companion,
and dressed in this manner they continued on their way. On seeing her husband's horse tied in front of a house she
suspected that he was inside; thereupon she went to the steps leading to the house, which was a low one, and then saw
her husband sitting down with his back toward the steps. She immediately entered the house and encountered her
husband, the deceased, and the owners of the house taking supper together. Overcome and blinded by jealousy she
rushed at Lorenza Estrada, attacked her with a penknife that she carried, and inflicted five wounds upon her in
consequence of which Lorenza fell to the ground covered with blood and died a few moments afterwards. The accused
left the house immediately after the aggression, and went to that of Modesto Ramos where she changed her clothes.
From an examination of the body made on the following day by Dr. Gertrudo Reyes, it appeared that five wounds had
been inflicted by a cutting and pointed weapon, one of which was on the left side of the breast and penetrated the left
ventricle of the heart; this wound was of necessity mortal, the others being more or less serious.
May 31, 1907, complaint was thereupon filed by the provincial fiscal on and the corresponding proceedings were instituted.
June 29, 1908, court below entered judgment sentencing the accused, Emilia Gut-Sayco, to the penalty of twelve years
and one day of reclusion temporal, to suffer the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.

Issue(s): Whether or not the defendant-appellant can avail of the self defense basing from her testimony corroborated by
the husband and the servant of the accused as a justifying circumstance?

Ruling:
No. It has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that as soon as the accused entered the house where she found her
husband, without saying a word, she attacked the deceased with a penknife and inflicted wounds that caused the
immediate death of the latter. Such an allegation can not therefore be admitted, even though corroborated by the
husband and the servant of the accused, inasmuch as the testimony of the latter is entirely contradicted and destroyed by
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, who were present at the aggression, and who deny that the servant was
present; it is not true that a penknife was found on the floor of the house; it is probable that the instrument with which the
crime was committed was carried by the accused when she went to said house; and even though it were true that when
the accused, Emilia, made her appearance, the deceased Lorenza arose with a knife in her hand and in a threatening
manner asked the accused what had brought her there, such attitude, under the provisions of article 8, No. 4 of the Penal
Code, does not constitute that unlawful aggression, which, among others, is the first indispensable requisite upon which
exemption by reason of self-defense may be sustained.
In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material
aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se, and
allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense. It has always been so
recognized in the decisions of the courts, in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code.

5. People vs De la Cruz-Gerard
FACTS:

Spouses Eustaquio Cabasan and Librada Bunghanoy lived at Francisco de la Cruz's (accused) house even though he didn't
want them to live there. They earnestly requested him to allow them to live there at least until the completion of their house.
Leonico Nanos (deceased) interceded in behalf of the spouses and told De la Cruz to permit them to stay. De la Cruz
disliked this intervention of Nanos.

Sometime after six on the morning of the following day, De la Cruz, carrying his loaded rifle, and accompanied by his wife
Petra Salcedo, returned to the place of the spouses Eustaquio Cabasan and Librada Bunghanoy. He sighted Nanos, who
was a short distance from the house the spouses were living in, the same house which De la Cruz wanted the spouses to
vacate.
Addressing Nanos, he spoke thus "unsa na?" Nanos then had with him his kris and a small bolo, as was his custom in going to
the field, for purposes of defense against the Moros and the animals. He carried the kris in its sheath in his right hand and the
bolo on his belt, also sheathed. Believing that the deceased as well as Eustaquio Cabasan whom he met moments before
had evil intentions against him because the first, as already said, was armed with a kris and the latter with a bolo. De la
Cruz, on seeing Nanos approaching him, fired at him hitting his legs with a rifle loaded with buckshots, which caught him on
both legs below the knee, causing nine wounds in the left leg and one in the right, Leonico Nanos died in the sitio of Boroon,
municipality of Iligan, Province of Lanao, during the early hours in the morning of February 1, 1933.

Issue: Did Francisco De La Cruz In not holding that the accused, in firing at Leoncio Nafios, acted in legitimate defense of
his person and that of his wife?

Ruling:
Appellant's defense at the trial and in his brief on appeal to this court is, that he did nothing more than to defend himself,
because knowing as he did that the deceased was a man of violent temper, quarrelsome, and irritable, on seeing him
approaching them with a kris, he had no other recourse but to shoot him before the deceased could harm him and his
wife, thereby making it appear that all he did was to prevent and avoid an aggression directed against them.

The evidence, however, shows that there was no necessity for the appellant to defend himself, because although the
deceased carried a kris in his hand, the said weapon was sheathed.

It is true that the accused and his wife testified that said deceased has his kris unsheathed, but the witnesses for the
prosecution to whom the lower court gave more credit, and we believe correctly, because their answers impress us as
having been given in a very natural manner, categorically stated that said weapon was in its scabbard. there was no
necessity for the appellant to fire at the deceased because the latter’s weapon was in its sheath.

The fact that the accused had gone to the house of Eustaquio Cabasan with his rifle loaded in advance, and the fact that
he fired at the deceased without any prior provocation which could properly be considered as such, are indicative not only
of appellant's intention to defend himself in case of aggression, but also to provoke and commit the same. This explains
why, on seeing the deceased, he said, "so what?" a question which can mean no other than a challenge. Furthermore we
cannot believe that the deceased would have set upon the appellant, because the latter was accompanied by two of his
men: Nestorio Salcedo who is his own brother-in-law, and Pancracio Macatol, who is a street cleaner, working under him as
a foreman. It would have been sheer foolhardiness on the part of the deceased to attempt such a thing, not only because
the appellant was accompanied by his men, but also because he was armed with a rifle which is doubtless more effective
than a kris. In order that legitimate self-defense may be taken into account and sustained as a defense, it is necessary,
above all, that the aggression be real, or at least, imminent, and not merely imaginary.

6. Colinares vs People-Jehanne
1.a. Unlawful aggression

Colinares vs. People, GR No. 182748, Dec. 13, 2011

FACTS:
On June 25, 2000, around 7 o’clock in the evening, Rufino Buena (Rufino-victim) and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere,
Arnel Colinares (Arnel-accused) immediately sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone,
about 15 ½ inches in diameter, causing Rufino to fell unconscious. When Ananias passed by and saw Rufino on the
roadside, he tried to help out but someone struck him with something hard on his right temple. When Rufino was brought to
the hospital for treatment, Dr. Albert Belleza certified that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the
hairline area and testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal. However, during the cross examination, there
is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino would have died without timely
medical intervention.
***On the other hand, Arnel, together with Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes), presented a different version of the incident and
claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who
were all quite drunk from a pre-wedding party. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather
than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried
to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone, and defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When
Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff (stick with a hook). Arnel was able to avoid
the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone; or
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that qualifies Arnel’s claim of self-defense.
RULING:
No. The court ruled that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that qualifies Arnel’s act of self-defense.
The testimony of the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—that Arnel was the aggressor was held more
believable, consistent with reality, and deserved credence compared to Arnel’s defense.
The requirements in order that self-defense can be claimed must include the following (Art. 11 (1), RPC):
 (1) That the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression;
- Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or
with a weapon.
(2) That the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(3) That the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the
other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated.
In the case at bar, Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias
rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him and no one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it
was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated
argument in the middle of the street. And there was no medical certificate submitted by Arnel to prove his point that he
suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.

7. People vs Concillado - Jocelie

SUMMARY:

On or about the 24th day of August, 2002, in the Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Leyte, the accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and shoot one DIOSDADO PIDO with a
homemade shotgun (surit) which the accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter
the 26 incised, stabbed and bullet wounds.

Edgar admitted that he was the one who inflicted all the 26 wounds on the victim, although he claimed that he was only
acting in self-defense. He narrated that shortly after 11:00 p.m. of August 23, 2002, he and his wife Dolores arrived at their
house in BarangayGuinciaman after partaking in a drinking spree at the house of Imelda Obio (Imelda) which is located
about 40 meters from their house. His wife immediately went upstairs to sleep as she has fever. Edgar remained downstairs
and sat on the concrete floor near the door. After a while, he urinated near their fence whereupon Diosdado suddenly
appeared and challenged him to a fight. Diosdado immediately delivered a hacking blow using a bolo about 25 inches
long hitting Edgar on his right chest. Edgar ran towards the door of their house, took his "surit"• and fired at Diosdado who
continued on hacking him. Edgar was able to parry the blows coming from Diosdado as he was able to grab a long bolo
immediately after he fired his gun. Edgar and Diosdado kept on exchanging blows until they were already outside the
former’s gate. After some time, Diosdado turned his back on Edgar. Thinking that Diosdado was already fleeing, Edgar went
back to their house and eventually surrendered himself at the police station. He was thereafter treated by Dr. De Veyra for
his wounds.

ISSUE:

Whether unlawful aggression exist to justify circumstance of self-defense.

RULING:

Trial court and CA disregarded Edgar’s theory of self-defense.

For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be properly appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

The most important among all the elements is x x x unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for
self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete." "There can be no self-defense unless there was
unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel."
"Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person."

There is no unlawful aggression on the part of Diosdado. According to the trial court, "the distance of the accused from the
fence while he was urinating was about 1’½ meters, while the victim was outside and in-between them was a bamboo
fence about four feet high. With the height of the fence and his distance from the fence, there is an impossibility of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It also concluded that the victim could not have entered the yard of the
accused. The dead body of Diosdado was found lying on the road about eight meters from the house of Edgar. However,
no traces of blood could be found in the yard of the accused.

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that the disparity of the injuries sustained belies all pretensions of self-defense.
Diosdado suffered a total of 26 incised, stab and bullet wounds. On the other hand, Edgar suffered only three superficial
wounds. "As has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a
plea of self-defense." Moreover, during his cross-examination, Edgar admitted that he continued to inflict injuries on
Diosdado notwithstanding the fact that he was already lying lifeless on the ground.

8. US vs Merced, G.R. No. L-14170, November 23, 1918 - Jose Louigi

Facts:

On the night of March 4, 1918, Catalino Merced went to the house of Teodora Sarasin, situated in the barrio of Palimpinon
of the town of Luzuriaga (now Valencia), Negros Oriental, and, at the invitation of the mistress of the house, sat down to
supper with her; a short while afterwards Apolonia Patron also arrived, and, fetching some morisqueta or cooked rice from
her house nearby, likewise sat down to supper with the two other persons above-mentioned. After supper Merced and
Patron successively went down from the house, and the former, upon his return to it and with the permission of its owner,
went into the main room thereof to rest. Apolonia Patron, who returned to the house a short while afterwards, did likewise,
and they both met in said room to lie down to sleep there. Thereupon, the mistress of the house, Teodora Sarasin, went to
bed with her children, and while asleep was awakened by the noise caused by a struggle waged in the aforementioned
room. Just at that moment, Sarasin heard Apolonia say to her (the latter's) husband that she (Apolonia) was wounded, and
heard the husband reply to her, saying: "that is what you got." On account of these happenings, and out of fear, the owner
of the house left it, passing through the kitchen, and on her return a few moments afterwards to get her children, she found
Pantaleon Arabe, the husband of Apolonia Patron, stretched out on the mat on which she had been sleeping; he was
bloody and was pressing in his stomach. This witness now found the light which had previously been put out lit inside the
house. When, several hours afterwards, the justice of the peace proceeded with the investigation of the crime, he found
Arabe's body on the river bank, near the house of the deceased. Such was the testimony of Teodora Sarasin.
Upon the examination of Filomena Ago, the defendant Merced's sister-in-law, she testified as follows: On the
morning of March 2, 1918, two days prior to the crime, Apolonia Patron went to witness' house and complained that her
husband Pantaleon Arabe had quarreled with her because he suspected that she was maintaining relation with Catalino
Merced, her brother-in-law. Witness Filomena replied to her, saying that, in order to avoid such quarreling, she ought not to
have any dealings with Merced. This advice angered the defendant Patron and, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that
same day, she again went to Ago's house; she had a dagger (Exhibit B) in her hand and showed a disposition to quarrel
with witness. Several days afterwards witness found this same dagger on the floor of Patron's house, near the bed on which
the defendant Merced lay down on the night of the 4th of March of this year when he returned to the said house in which
he was living as a brother of witness' husband. When Merced was questioned as to where he had been wounded, he
replied that it was in the house of Teodora Sarasin, and the witness learned of the occurrence, for it was told to her while
Sarasin was in witness' store. Ago had seen the dagger, Exhibit B, bathed in blood, and it was the same one that Apolonia
Patron was carrying two days before when she became angry in witness' house.
Issue: WON there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased from which the defendant Merced can invoke self-
defense as a justifying circumstance

Ruling: No, according to the Supreme Court, the assault was natural and lawful. Aside from the fact that there is no proof in
support of the statement made by the defendant Merced to the effect that when Pantaleon Arabe entered the house in
question, he (Merced) told the defendants to prepare himself for Arabe was going to kill him, and that immediately
thereafter Arabe put out the light and assaulted him with the weapon which he was carrying, on which account he claims
it became necessary for him, in self-defense, to wound Arabe with the dagger which he succeeded in snatching from the
latter's belt, this plea is unsustainable, because it is not true and because, even though it were true and even if the
deceased did succeed in entering the room in which the defendants Merced and Patron were lying, and did immediately
thereupon assault Merced, giving him several blows with the bolo which he, Arabe, carried, that assault was natural and
lawful, for the reason that it was made by a deceived and offended husband in order to defend his honor and rights by
punishing the offender of his honor, and if he had killed his wife and the other defendant, he would have exercised a lawful
right and such acts would have fallen within the sanction of article 423 of the Penal Code, and not of the article thereof
which penalizes the crime of homicide.

9. People vs Matibag-Katrina
FACTS:

That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 o’clock in the evening at Iron Street, Twin Villa Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang
Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines, the accused (Daniel “Dani/Danilo” Matibag), while armed with a Beretta Caliber .9MM
Pistol, feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, while the latter was completely
defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot wounds at his head and chest, which directly resulted to the victim’s
death.

Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his neighbor when Duhan arrived together with the
other officers of the homeowners’ association. However, Duhan pushed it away and said, "putang ina mo, ang yabang
mo," thereby provoking Matibag to punch him in the face.

Dr. Antonio S. Vertido who conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head
and chest which led to his death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Matibag’s claim of self-defense resulted to the death of Duhan.
RULING:

NO. The Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.

This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in
effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would
have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of Duhan was
attended by the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.

Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is well-settled that there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self- defense.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense.

*Note
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful aggression in the sense above-
discussed. The prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so sudden and unexpected, and the victim was
completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibag’s version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which
thereby impelled his reaction), remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the victim. Hence, by
these accounts, Matibag’s allegation of unlawful aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be
sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court upholds Matibag’s conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, as charged.

10. Baxinela vs People-Kristian

Facts:
Petitioner SP02 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a pub drinking with two other policemen in as early as 11:00 pm of October 18
1996. At around 12:00 am to 12:30 am there was a minor altercation between the deceased Sgt. Lajo and another
customer at the pub but eventually the two were able to patch things up. While on his way out, Lajo was followed by
Baxinela with a gun already drawn out. From behind, Baxinela held Lajo’s Left arm and asked why he was carrying a gun.
Thereafter an explosion coming from Baxinela’s gun was heard. Lajo, still standing, took two steps and then fell down.

Issue:
Whether or not fulfilment of duty may validly be invoked by the petitioner?

Ruling:
No. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.25 While the first condition is present,
the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a
public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety,
edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The
shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to
Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub. The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a
duty as a privileged mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held that if the first condition is
fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower than one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.

11. US vs Laurel-Krizabel
Facts:
In the evening of 26 December 1909, Concepcion Lat was walking along the street, on her way to the house of Exequiel
Castillo (her suitor), when she was approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately ran off. On the
second night after that, Castillo and Laurel, together with Domingo Panganiban and other co-defendants, were at an
entertainment on an upper floor of the parochial building. Allegedly, Castillo and Laurel were invited by Panganiban to
come out into the yard. They talked about matters concerning the kiss given by Laurel to Lat. But then a quarrel arose
between Laurel and Castillo in which the rest of the defendants took part. Castillo and Laurel accused the other of having
commenced the assault. Castillo testified that Laurel, after the exchange of few words between them, suddenly and
without warning stabbed him with a knife, while Laurel swore that, after a short conversation Castillo struck him two blows
with a cane, on which account, in order to defend himself, he seized a pocketknife he carried in his pocket. As a result of
the quarrel, Castillo was seriously wounded and Laurel received 2 slight wounds on the head. Castillo successfully received
a first aid treatment on a nearby drug store.
Issue: Whether or not Laurel and his co-defendants are guilty of a crime against Castillo?

Ruling: No. The court ruled that they have committed no crime and are exempt from all responsibility. Exequiel Castillo's
wounds were very serious, but, in view of the fact that conclusive proof was adduced at the trial, of the attendance of the
requisites prescribed in Nos. 4 and 5 of article 8 of the Penal Code, in favor of those who inflicted the said wounds, it is
proper to apply to this case the provision contained in the next to the last paragraph of rule 51 of the provisional law for the
application of the said code. The defensive act executed by Laurel was attended by the three requisites of illegal
aggression on the part of Exequiel Castillo, there being a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who did not
provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did he direct that Exequiel Castillo be invited to come down from the
parochial building and arrange the interview in which Castillo alone was interested, and, finally, because Laurel, in
defending himself with a pocketknife against the assault made upon him with a cane, which may also be a deadly
weapon, employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the same.

12. People vs Cabungcal-Leo Carlo

Facts: On march 21 1926 the appellant invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery on his property in the barrio of Misua,
Municipality of Infanta, Province of Tayabas. They spent the day at said fishery and in the afternoon returned in two boats,
one steered by the an old woman and the other by appellant , the great majority of whom were women and among them
the appellant’s wife and son and a nursing child, son of a married couple who had also gone in the boat. The deceased
Juan Loquenario was another passenger in the boat, upon reaching a place of great depth the deceased rocked the
boat which started it to take water , and the appellant , fearing that the boat might capsize, asked the deceased not to do
it. As the deceased paid no attention to the warning and continued rocking the boat, the appellant struck him on the
forehead with an oar. The deceased fell into the water and was submerged, but a little while, after appeared on the
surface having grasped the side of the boat, saying that he was going to capsize it and started to move it with this end in
view, seeing which the women began to cry whereupon the appellant struck on the neck with the same oar which resulted
in the death of the deceased.

ISSUE: was there an unlawful aggression committed by the deceased?

Ruling: yes.due to the condition of the river at the point where the deceased started to rock the boat, if it had capsize, the
passengers would have run the risk of losing their lives, that the majority of whom are women, especially the nursing child.
The conducts of the deceased in rocking the boat until the point of having it taken water and his insistence on this action in
spite of the appellants warning , gave rise to the belief on the part of the appellant that it would capsize if he did not
separate the deceased from the boat. The appellant has no criminal liability because the danger was greater if the boat
might capsize especially as the deceased had expressed his intention to do it.

13. People vs Sabio-Luigi

On the morning of May 7, 1900, the agents of the steamer Don Jose, which was anchored in the river in this city at the time,
and of which the accused was captain, dismissed the latter from said position, ordering him to turn over command of the
vessel to the first mate of the same. With or without cause the defendant attributed his dismissal to a difficulty that he had
previously had with Rojas, who was the engineer of the same steamer, and he so stated to the employee of the agents who
notified him of his discharge. This took place in the office of the said agents, and upon the return of the defendant to the
steamer Don Jose there occurred on board of the same the act which is here prosecuted.

The accused fired two shots from a revolver — the first aimed at Rojas, who fell dead on the spot, and the second aimed at
Anastasio Franco, who was standing near Rojas at that moment, causing the latter wounds which were healed in twenty —
eight days.

Issue:Was there unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased?

Ruling:No, there was no unlawful aggression. As a general rule the mere attitude of attack does not itself constitute a real
attack, that conclusive and positive aggression which justifies the defense of one’s person. In the present case if the said
attitude had been a real attack and the defendant had made use of his revolver necessarily to prevent or repel the same,
this defensive act must needs have occurred at the very moment at which the supposed attack was made, in which case
the witnesses who saw the attack would not have failed to see the use of the revolver, nor would there have intervened
between the one and the other the interval of time which they give to understand in their respective statements.
In view of the foregoing considerations we hold the testimony of the said witnesses insufficient to prove the fact of the
attack attributed to the deceased. We are confirmed in this view by the testimony of the wounded man, Anastasio Franco,
who was standing by the deceased when the occurrence in question took place. He gives positive assurance that the
deceased had not committed any act of aggression when he was attacked by the defendant.It is likewise noteworthy that
none of the remaining witnesses offered by the defendant say a single word concerning any such attack.
Inasmuch as the said attack is not proved it is not necessary to enter upon an examination of the remaining requisites which
the Penal Code establishes as necessary for the exemption from responsibility on the ground of self-defense. Since the
unlawful attack is the basis and foundation of this defense, when the same does not exist it is not possible to imagine a case
of defense in the true meaning of the law

14. People vs Macaso- monique

FACTS: Appellant Macaso went to the wharf, he saw the jeep of Suaso (deceased) parked in a prohibited area. He called
his attention to the apparent violation of traffic rules. Suaso resented Macaso's behavior; thus, an altercation between the
two ensued. Macaso reported the incident to Inspector Fortuno Ramos, the Chief of the Traffic Division.
Macaso charged Suaso with having overloaded his jeep and for defying his signal to stop. Suaso then shouted at Macaso:
"Prove it! Prove it!" At this juncture, Inspector Ramos cautioned Macaso to move back and the latter did, while Suaso
returned to his jeep and sat behind the steering wheel. Suaso then told Macaso: "The trouble with you is that you are stupid".
Thereafter Macaso asked Inspector Ramos: "What now, sir?" Upon hearing this, Suaso angrily told Macaso: "What do you
want?" and immediately got off his jeep to confront Macaso. It was at this instant when Macaso fired at Suaso hitting him
on several parts of his body.
The death of Suaso was due to internal hemorrhage caused by multiple gunshot wounds.
After trial, the lower court convicted Macaso of the crime of murder after finding that the killing of the deceased was
attended by treachery and evident premeditation. He is appealing before the Court claiming self defense

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE

RULING: A review of the evidence fails to lend credence to the accused-appellant's claim that the deceased was the
unlawful aggressor. He was not even armed at the time, while the man he was up against was a policeman who was in
possession of his service pistol. Furthermore, another police officer who was likewise armed was present. Under these
circumstances, it is very unlikely that the deceased would attack the accused-appellant. Evidence, to be worthy of credit
must not only proceed from a credible source, but must, in addition, be credible itself. And by this is meant that it should be
natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe.
The peril to the latter's life was not imminent and actual. To constitute unlawful aggression, it is necessary that an attack or
material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been
made. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per
se, and to allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense.
For unlawful aggression to be present in self-defense, there must be real danger to life or personal safety. In the present
case, the Court failed to see any. The deceased's actuation against the accused-appellant before the incident did not
amount to an unlawful aggression that would justify the latter to shoot the former. True it is that the deceased had shown
gross disrespect to and utter disregard of the accused-appellant's authority. He even boldly announced before Inspector
Ramos and of the people around that he had no respect for accused-appellant whom he branded as ignorant of traffic
rules and regulations. He defied the authority of accused-appellant by refusing to surrender his license. He even had the
temerity to call accused-appellant "stupid". Finally, in what appeared to be a challenge, the deceased dared the
accused-appellant by asking him: "What do you want?", at the same time jumping from his jeep and rushing towards the
latter. Unmistakably, the challenging attitude, demeanor and insolence of the deceased was enough to provoke the
accused-appellant to anger to the extent of using his pistol against him. But, since the deceased's act and behavior before
the shooting did not amount to unlawful aggression, accused-appellant could not claim self-defense, not even an
incomplete one.

16. Cano vs People-Amzie

Facts:
Petitioner Conrado Cano y Sampang and his deceased brother Orlando Cano were rivals in the Rush ID Photo business and
had booths along the sidewalk of Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila fronting the Philippine Trust Bank and Uniwide Sales
Department Store. The fateful altercation which culminated in the fatal stabbing of Orlando Cano stemmed out of this
rivalry, particularly the incident where Conrado took the business permit from the booth of Orlando without his permission
thus incurring the latter’s ire.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner killed his brother in self-defense?

Ruling:All told, evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of killing the victim was attended
by a justifying circumstance, for which no criminal and civil liability can attach. Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
expressly provides that anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does not incur any criminal liability. Likewise, petitioner is not
civilly liable for his lawful act. The only instance when a person who commits a crime with the attendance of a justifying
circumstance incurs civil liability is when he, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. Otherwise stated, if a person charged with
homicide successfully pleads self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
17. People vs Alconga-Phil
Facts:
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of May 29, 1943, when the latter was in
the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home guard". While the said accused was seated
on a bench in the guardhouse, the deceased came along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast,"
followed forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan". The accused avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench
with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow was given but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench
instead. The accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While the deceased was in the
act of delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a crawling position, fired at him with his revolver, causing him to
stagger and to fall to the ground. Rising to his feet, the deceased drew forth his dagger and directed a blow at the
accused who, however, was able to parry the same with his bolo. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. Having sustained several
wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed by the accused. After running a distance of about 200 meters, the
deceased was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one which slashed the
cranium — was delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, besides many other blows deliver
right and left.

Issue: Whether or not that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act?

Ruling: Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven by the accused.
This the instant appellant has utterly failed to do. Any way, it would seem self-evident that appellant could never have
succeeded in showing that whatever remained of the effects of the deceased's aggression, by way of provocation after
the latter was already in fight, was proportionate to his killing his already defeated adversary.

To further strain it so as to find that said aggression or provocation persisted even when the deceased was already in flight,
clearly accepting defeat and no less clearly running for his life rather than evincing an intention of returning to the fight, is
more than we can sanction. It should always be remembered that "illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least
threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.

18. People vs Lara-Rachelle/Hannah

FACTS:At about 8 o'clock on the night of September 25, 1924, the deceased, accompanied by four other persons, planted
himself at the crossing immediately in front of the appellant's house and began to entertain his companions by speaking
insulting words of and to the appellant to the effect that a concubine to whom the appellant was supposed to be devoted
had been, or was about to be, enticed away by some other person.

An employee of the Bureau of Lands, named Rufino Roque upon an official errand and, being acquainted with Gregorio
Lara, he stopped at the latter's house as a guest for the night. Being an employee of the Bureau of Lands, Roque carried a
revolver.

Lara, after his patience had become exhausted towards Querido and his companions he took the revolver down, placed
two cartridges in the cylinder at the same time starting for the street. Upon seeing this, Querido and his companions
scattered. Lara then discharged his pistol into the air, as a sort of warning against a repetition of the incident.

After Lara passed the spot where Querido was hiding, the latter jumped out from behind and threw his arms around Lara in
an effort to pinion his hands and get possession of the pistol. Lara at once attempted to free himself from Querido and
succeeded in breaking hold. In the course of this struggle, perhaps immediately after Lara turned, the revolver was
discharged. The bullet passed into Querido's abdomen on the left side, passed entirely through the body, and emerged in
the right gluteal region. The shot did not immediately disable Querido, who continued his efforts to get possession of the
pistol.

The wound, produced in the manner above stated, caused the death of Querido within about three days.

ISSUE:Whether there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by the appellant to repel the attack

HELD: YES
It is necessary to bear in mind the following circumstances:
· the darkness of the night
· the element of surprise involved in the assault
· the revealed intention of the deceased to beat the appellant up
Under these conditions Lara have reasoned that if the struggle continued upon equal terms his assailant would
undoubtedly in a moment get possession of the revolver. If this should happen, Querido (deceased) would have shot him.
On the threat of Lara's life, he could not permit Querido to get possession of the weapon, and the only means of preventing
it was the firing of the pistol for the purpose of defense.
When Querido sprang from behind on the appellant in the dark, though Lara was known to have a pistol in his hand, the
deceased acted at his own will and danger, for it was but reasonable to suppose that in the moment of surprise and
struggle Lara would use the pistol against Querido, if it should be within his power to do so.

The struggle for the possession of the pistol continued for some time after the deadly shot was fired. While the appellant was
under cross-examination, he was asked why he continued to fight for the retention of the pistol when, as he then knew,
there was no other cartridge in the cylinder. He replied, very reasonably, that he knew that if the deceased should get the
weapon in his hands he could easily kill the appellant by using it as a cudgel.

In emergencies of this kind human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of
self-preservation.

19. US vs Macasaet-Rhea
FACTS:
At about 7 o'clock on the night of the 10th of April, 1915, the accused was standing just outside a neighbor's house in
conversation with a friend, discussing his marriage which was to take place two days later; that without warning one
Raymundo Briones approached him from behind and struck him over his shoulders with a cane 1 ½ centimeters thick and 75
centimeters long; that the accused snatched a knife from his pocket, opened it and stabbed his assailant to death; and
that the assault upon the accused, which was made from behind, was wholly unexpected. Also, deceased was armed with
a heavy whip made of iron wire, 56 centimeters long, 5 centimeters in circumference at the handle, and 2 centimeters in
circumference at the end, attached by a string to his left wrist. The motive for the unprovoked assault upon the accused
was the feeling of jealousy that had been aroused by his successful suit for the hand of the young woman to whom he was
betrothed.

ISSUE: Won there is reasonable necessity as justifying circumstance on the act of self-defense by the accused

RULING: Yes. The Court cited in this case that there is "reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel" the
assault, and that the accused was justified in defending himself from the assault with his pocketknife, that being the only
available weapon at hand.
In the case at bar, the accused acted on self-defense since assailant, even the cane fell from his hand as a result of the
force of the first blow struck, still had in his left hand a heavy iron whip. The heavy iron whip held in reserve by the assailant,
and the cold-blooded and unprovoked character of the assault may well have led the accused to believe that the
deceased intended to do him a grave injury, and by surprising him in the dark, without any arm in his hand, make it
impossible for him to defend himself. That even if the accused struck the deceased several blows and after afflicting one
fatal blow, there was no need to repeat it, still the accused was justified in making use of his knife to repel the unprovoked
assault as best he could and it would be impossible to say that a second or third blow was unnecessary under all the
circumstances of the case, it appearing that the accused instantly and without hesitation inflicted all the wounds at or
about the same time.

20. Apego-Roexcel

Victim : Pio Bautista

Defendant: Genoveva Apego

Facts: Pio Bautista and Maria Apego are married. Genoveva was Maria’s sister that lived with the couple for two years. One
evening at 8:00 pm, Maria and Pio arrived at their house. Maria called for Genoveva but there was no reply from
Genoveva. The couple went to the upper floor of the house. Pio led the way and he proceeded on opening the outside
door which is a sliding door but because there was no light stumbled upon Genoveva who was sleeping near the said door.
In the process, Pio accidentally touched Genoveva’s left arm. Genoveva woke up believing that somebody was going to
abuse her, seized a pocket knife. Genoveva ask the person of his identity but she did not receive a reply immediately, she
got up and struck a blow to Pio with the pocket knife. Meanwhile, Maria was separated from his husband to light a
kerosene lamp and was not aware of the assault made upon her husband by his sister. Genoveva called for help outside
their house and was arrested by a policeman. She then delivered the pocketknife to the policeman. A few moments after
its infliction, the injured man died.

Result of the medical examination: Pio received a downward, penetrating wound, in the shape of a T, in the intercostal
space between the 2nd and 3rd ribs of the left side that it reached one of the lungs, and the heart- was necessarily fatal,
determined to be inflicted with a sharp-pointed, cutting instrument, consistent with the pocket knife.

Issue: WON the defendant is criminally liable for killing her brother-in-law?
Ruling: There was no known misunderstanding between Pio and Genoveva as supported by Maria’s testimony. The events
made Genoveva believed that an attempt was being made against her honor and there was no previous provocation on
her part. Even in the defense of her person and right, by deciding to wound Pio who had caught her by the arm, Genoveva
exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real need of wounding Pio with the pocketknife who had merely caught
her arm, maybe to wake her up. Pio performed no other act of aggression that may indicate a purpose to commit an
attempt against her honor. Once awake and provided with an effective weapon for Geneveva’s defense, there was no
just nor reasonable cause for striking a blow therewith in the center of the body, where the principal vital organs are seated.

“From the foregoing considerations it is concluded that in the commission the crime there was present the circumstance of
incomplete exemption from responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in subarticle 4 of the Penal Code are not
applicable; wherefore the criminal act is altogether excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said
requisites, although a majority of them were present, that is, the first the third requisites; and, therefore, in accordance
with the provisions article 86 of the code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by article 404 of the
code, in the discretion of the court, m imposed upon the defendant.

In view of the fact that the accused is an ignorant woman, wholly uneducated, and that it was not shown that, at the time
when she assault the deceased, she knew that he was her brother-in-law, account must b taken of the circumstance
prescribed by article 11 of the code, in conne with Act No. 2142, as no aggravating circumstance whatever was present t
counteract the effects of the said extenuating circumstance; therefore penalty applicable to the defendant is the one
lower by two degrees in the minimum period.”

Final Conviction: Homicide (because it does not appear that there was present any any of the qualifying circumstance that
determine a more serious crime and penalty)

21. Onas case-Jolina

FACTS: The deceased Simeon Gallego had a debt of P5.80 to Sergio Oñas. In the evening of September 4, 1958, Simeon
Gallego was assaulted with a bayonet by Sergio Oñas in front of the latter's house. When the chief of police arrived at the
place in the evening, he made an investigation and was told by the wife of Oñas that Simeon Gallego was about to enter
their house; that she and her daughter blocked Simeon's way but Simeon pushed the daughter aside and hit the left and
right arm of Oñas wife; and that upon seeing his wife hurt Oñas rushed with his bayonet and in the struggle with Simeon, the
latter died.

Simeon had a stab wound one inch long penetrating the thoracic cavity and the right lung and passing through the right
back; an incised wound two inches long on the face at the right mandible penetrating the masseter muscle and piercing
the back at the neck.

The prosecution maintained at the trial through the testimony of Isabelo Gallego, son of the deceased Simeon Gallego,
that in the afternoon of that day, September 4,1958, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Sergio
Oñas offering to pay the sum of P2.50, which his father had sent to Oñas in part payment of his debt; that on finding that
the amount was less than the amount of the debt of P5.80, Oñas refused to accept uttering these threatening words: "If he
does not pay this afternoon something will happen to him”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sergio Oñas can be acquitted for acting in self-defense in killing Simeon Gallego.

RULING: No. The Court did not believe that defendant-appellant is entitled to a complete acquittal because of the
absence of the third element of self-defense, namely, the reasonableness of the means used to repel the unlawful
aggression.

The Court found that the encounter must have been provoked by the deceased Simeon Gallego who wanted to seek an
explanation for the conduct of Sergio Oñas. Since there is no question that the appellant had a wound on the head and so
did his wife in the arm, the deceased Simeon Gallego must have started the aggression, because if the defendant-
appellant was already provided with a bayonet before Simeon attacked him with his cane, Oñas and his wife would never
have received said injuries, because a bayonet is a more deadly and effective instrument of attack than the cane with
which the deceased was provided.

If the accused had only drawn his bayonet in defense that would have been enough to discourage and prevent the
deceased when he attacked the accused. In stabbing the deceased with his bayonet, the defendant-appellant went
beyond what was necessary to defend himself against the unlawful aggression made by the deceased.

The accused is declared guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
22. US vs Mendoza-Andrea
FACTS: The deceased, Rufino Dizon, was creating a disturbance in front of the store of Alejandro Guevara. The defendant,
Licerio Mendoza, a policeman, attempted to arrest him and take him to the presidencia, in which the deceased declined
to go.
The deceased did not content himself with a passive resistance, but carried it to the extent of attacking the defendant. The
defendant himself so testifies, and his testimony is corroborated by that of said Alejandro Guevara.

The latter says that he intervened between the two men in order to separate them and that the defendant’s revolver was
discharged almost in his face.

Court’s perspective of the facts: If the resistance of Dizon had been passive, Guevara could hardly have intervened, for
fear that he himself might be arrested for interfering with an officer in the performance of his duty. His intervention can be
explained only on the theory that the deceased was making an attack on the defendant. We accordingly hold that the
proof shows an unlawful aggression on the part of the former. It was also shown that there was no provocation moving from
the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not employing force was necessary on the part of the defendant.

RULING: Although a police officer may employ force to overcome active resistance to an arrest, it is not reasonably
necessary to kill his assailant to repel an attack with a calicut, and only an incomplete defense is made out.

The complete defense of article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code, is not made out because the second requirement thereof was
not proved. When the defendant fired his revolver and killed Dizon, the latter, according to the defendant’s own testimony,
had already struck twice at him with a calicut. The character of this weapon is such that in our opinion the defendant could
not then have reasonably believed that it was necessary to kill his assailant in order to repel the attack.

23. US vs Mack-Carlisle

Facts :
On May 4, 1906, the accused, a negro soldier, shot and killed a municipal policeman named Estanislao Indic. Just before
the shooting, the accused was sitting on a bench a few feet back from the street, in the town of Tacloban, in the Province
of Leyte, in an open space some 3 or 4 feet, width, between the tienda or content of a woman named Olimpia and
another building. The deceased, with another policemen, approached the place directed Olimpia to close her tienda,
and, later, ordered the accused and another soldier who was standing near by to go to their quarters. The accused did not
obey this order, and it is probable that some words passed between the soldiers, the policemen, and the woman which
angered the deceased, though the weight of the evidence clearly maintain the contention of the accused that he did
and said nothing to provoke or offend the deceased, except in so far as his failure to obey the order to go to his quarters
may have had that effect. The deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12 feet from the accused, cursing and abusing him
for his failure to obey the order, wrought himself into a passion dragged himself free from his companion, who was
endeavoring to restrain him and take him away, and started toward the accused, at the same time drawing his bolo and
brandishing it in a threatening manner. Thereupon the accused got up, drew his revolver, and the deceased having then
approached within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet, the accused fired three shots, one of which took effect in the left breast
of the deceased, just above the nipple, and another in the back of his head.
Issue: Whether or not the accused can be exempted from criminal liability on the ground that the act was committed in
self-defence.

Ruling : Yes. The accused can be exempted from criminal liability. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the
appellant acquitted of the crime with which he was charged, with the costs of both instances de oficio; and if in custody,
he will be discharged forthwith, or if a liberty under his bond will be cancelled and his sureties exonerated
‘We think it affirmatively appears from the evidence of record that there was an unprovoked, illegal aggression on the part
of the deceased, as held by the trial court, after a careful analysis of the testimony; and further that there was reasonable
necessity for the use of the means employed by the accused to defend himself from this unlawful aggression.’

It was reasonably necessary to make use of the revolver, it would be unreasonable to hold that in the shades of night the
defendant, with his adversary advancing upon him and within a few feet of striking distance, should be held responsible for
a failure to take deliberate and careful aim at the arm or hand that held the bolo or at the legs or the effect of his assailant.
The reasonable and natural thing for him to do under the circumstances was to fire at the body of his opponent, and thus
make sure of his own life.
It is suggested that since the first shot inflicted a fatal wound there was no necessity for the firing of the two succeeding
shows in order to prevent or repel the attack. The record discloses that the shots were fired in rapid succession. Not every
wound which proves fatal is sufficient to stop an enemy's attack, and the accused and his assailant were so close at hand
that until the assailant fell to the ground it can be said that the accused was out of danger. Even a wounded man with a
drawn bolo in his hand might prove to be no mean antagonist at close quarters.
24. People vs Ignacio-Cole

Facts:
Evening of April 25, 1933 Jose Vizcarra, the deceased, was at the Paco railroad station attending to the unloading of some
boxes of fish belonging to his father which had arrived about half past six that evening. Anselmo Ignacio, the accused, was
one of the two laborers that unloaded the boxes, one of which dropped to the ground and was damaged. This provoked
Jose Vizcarra, and he addressed some injurious epithets to the accused. A fight ensued, but they were separated after Jose
Vizcarra had received a blow in the face. The accused was then hired by a woman to take a box of fish to the Quinta
Market in Quiapo, and left with her in a carretela. Jose Vizcarra sent a messenger to inform his father, Felix Vizcarra, in
Baclaran, Parañaque, as to what had occurred. Upon receiving the message, Felix Vizcarra notified his brothers, Julian and
Fernando, and the three of them set out for the Paco station in an automobile of Sebastian Vizcarra, driven by Sabino
Morento. When they reached the station the accused had not yet returned from the Quinta Market.

Prosecution’s Version:
Julian Vizcarra asked a laborer named Totoy where the accused was, while Felix Vizcarra went towards a carretela where
Jose Vizcarra was watching the boxes of fish; that Felix Vizcarra took charge of the loading of the boxes, and while he was
thus engaged the accused arrived and began to wrangle with Julian Vizcarra; that a fight ensued, but that after they had
exchanged a few blows they were separated; that Julian Vizcarra, who used only his fist, was wounded in the left arm with
a cutting instrument; that the accused then attacked Felix Vizcarra and wounded him twice in the shoulder, causing him to
lose consciousness and fall to the ground; that when Jose Vizcarra saw what had happened to his father he ran to help
him, but before he could reach his father, the accused attacked Jose Vizcarra and stabbed him in the back with a knife,
and that as a consequence thereof the injured man died three days later; that when the accused saw that Jose Vizcarra
had also fallen to the ground he began to run, and meeting Fernando Vizcarra coming out of a shop in the station where
he had gone to buy cigarettes the accused attacked him with a pocketknife, wounding him in the left shoulder; that Julian
Vizcarra, as well as Felix and Fernando Vizcarra, struck the defendant in the face and on the head with their fists.
Defendant’s version: (Court leaned more on the defendant and witnesses’ testimony)
Marcelino Baltazar and Jose Torno, that the Vizcarras were the aggressors;Felix Vizcarra struck the accused, and that when
he ran, the Vizcarras pursued him; that the accused retreated until he reached the iron railing of the station, where he was
cornered by the Vizcarras and struck by them with their fists and with sticks; that believing his life to be in danger and
remembering his knife he snatched it out and struck at his assailants until he was able to free himself

Issue: WON accused is guilty of homicide to the effect that he acted in defense of his person or rights and committing said
offense by the accused is a justifying circumstance?

Ruling:
NO. Decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted. Although under ordinary conditions the use of a
knife in repelling an aggression when one has been assaulted by another with his fists is not sanctioned by the law,
nevertheless under the special circumstances of this case we are convinced that there was reasonable necessity of the
means employed by the accused to protect his life
In the case of the People v. Sumicad (G.R. No. 35524, promulgated March 18, 1932, 56 Phil., 643), this court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is undoubtedly well established in jurisprudence that a man is not, as a rule, justified in taking the life of one who assaults
him with his fist only, without the use of a dangerous weapon. The person assaulted must, in such case, either resist with the
arms that nature gave him or with other means of defense at his disposal, short of taking life. But that rule contemplates the
situation where the contestants are in the open and the person assaulted can exercise the option of running away. It can
have no binding force in the case where the person assaulted has retreated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a
defensive way the only weapon at his disposal. One is not required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the
extent of the injury which a reckless and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Brownell v. People, 38 Mich.,
732)."cralaw virtua1aw library

". . . it is not true as a matter of law that in all cases an attack with the fists alone or an attack by an unarmed man does not
justify accused in the use of a deadly weapon in such manner as to produce death; there may be other circumstances,
such as the very violence of the attack or a great disparity in the age or physical ability of the parties, which give deceased
[accused] reasonable ground to apprehend danger of death or great bodily harm and justify him in employing a deadly
weapon in self-defense." (30 C.J., 74.)

The incident began when Jose Vizcarra insulted the accused and struck him because the accused had dropped one of
the boxes; and when Jose Vizcarra was joined by his father and uncles at the railroad station they attacked the accused
because of the fight over the dropping of the box of fish. All the essential elements of self-defense, namely, lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused, unlawful aggression, and reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it,
were present when the accused stabbed the deceased.
 25. People vs Genosa-Harwin

26. Colinares vs People-Jehanne

1.d. Burden of proving self-defense

FACTS: (Same facts are applicable to the issue on the burden of proof re: self-defense)
On June 25, 2000, around 7 o’clock in the evening, Rufino Buena (Rufino-victim) and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere,
Arnel Colinares (Arnel-accused) immediately sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone,
about 15 ½ inches in diameter, causing Rufino to fell unconscious. When Ananias passed by and saw Rufino on the
roadside, he tried to help out but someone struck him with something hard on his right temple. When Rufino was brought to
the hospital for treatment, Dr. Albert Belleza certified that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the
hairline area and testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal. However, during the cross examination, there
is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino would have died without timely
medical intervention.
***On the other hand, Arnel, together with Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes), presented a different version of the incident and
claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who
were all quite drunk from a pre-wedding party. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather
than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried
to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone, and defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When
Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff (stick with a hook). Arnel was able to avoid
the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house.

ISSUE:Whether or not Arnel has the burden of proof when he invokes self-defense.

RULING:Yes. Arnel has the burden of proof when he invokes self-defense. When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears
the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish
the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence and when successful, the otherwise felonious deed would
be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.
Taking into account all the elements of self-defense** in the case at bar, Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him
and no one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely
testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. And there was no medical
certificate submitted by Arnel to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions. With
that, since the unlawful aggression of the victim against the accused was not proved, the latter has nothing to prevent or
repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated.
** The requirements in order that self-defense can be claimed must include the following (Art. 11 (1), RPC):
(1) That the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression;
- Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or
with a weapon.
(2) That the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(3) That the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.

27. People vs Nugas-Jocelie

SUMMARY:

On March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the evening, Glen Remigio, his wife, Nila Remigio, and their two children, were traveling
on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along Marcos Highway in COGEO, Antipolo, Rizal. Glen was driving, while Nila
sat to his extreme right because their children sat between them. While they were passing along Carolina Village, two men
hitched a ride and boarded on the rear of the vehicle. One of them was carrying a maroon plastic bag. When the vehicle
neared Masinag Market, the two men suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glen's and Nila's necks, warning
them not to make any wrong move if they did not want to be harmed. The two men demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia
Mall. Upon reaching Kingsville Village, the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck, then alighted and fled.
Glen pulled the knife from his neck, handed it to Nila and drove to the nearest hospital but collapsed on the way and lost
control of the vehicle, causing it to run over two pedestrians, one of whom died and the other suffered a broken arm. Once
the vehicle hit the railings of a gas station, Nila cried for help. Concerned citizens immediately rushed Glen to the nearest
hospital, about 50 to 60 meters away. Nila stayed behind to look after their children. She checked the vehicle and found
the knife, its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag left by the assailants at the rear of the vehicle. She gathered the articles
and later turned them over to the police officer in charge of the investigation. The maroon plastic bag was found to
contain the following items: a National Bureau of Investigation clearance, a police clearance, Social Security System
papers,and official receipts, all issued in the name of Araneta, a stainless fork knuckle, and a bunch of keys. Despite
undergoing treatment, Glen died.
Admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas claimed that he did so in self-defense. Accordingly, the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen
was a passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that when he and Araneta boarded the vehicle at Gate 1 in COGEO, Antipolo,
about four other passengers were already on board; that he argued with Glen about the fare, because Glen was
overcharging; that when he was about to alight in front of Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched him and leaned forward
as if to get something from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was reaching for a gun inside
the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand from where he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na
sya); and that when asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection because he was living
in a squatter’s area.

The autopsy revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on the left side of his neck originating from the front and
going towards the back and downwards towards the center of his body, piercing the apex of the left lung and transecting
the left common carotid artery; that the stab wound had been inflicted by a single bladed weapon; and that the
immediate cause of his death was the hemorrhage resulting from the stab wound. During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the
person who had sat behind her husband and who had stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta as the person who
had sat behind her and who had carried the maroon plastic bag that she had later recovered from the backseat.

ISSUE:Whether the elements of self-defense are present to satisfy the burden of proving self-defense.

RULING:The RTC found that Nugas did not establish the requisites of self-defense. The CA concurred.

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or
when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of
his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State's evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue
from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the
elements of the offense itself.

To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the victim
committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-
defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c)
there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.

With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having been established by Nugas, it is
superfluous to still determine whether the remaining requisites of self-defense were attendant. As the Court made clear in
People v. Carrero

Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of self-defense and the complete or
incomplete exemption from criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain that a person acted in
self-defense within the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other two conditions named in article 8,
No. 4, of the Penal Code. When an act of aggression is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as
a defense but as the punishment which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the
courts can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the
provisions of the Penal Code.

28. People vs Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011 - Jose Louigi

Facts:
In the early morning of August 24, 2002, Diosdado Pido (Diosdado) was shot, stabbed and hacked in Barangay
Guinciaman, San Miguel, Leyte. Having sustained a total of 26 wounds, he instantly succumbed to death. Blamed for his
untimely demise were Edgar Concillado (Edgar), Erlito Concillado (Erlito) and Dolores Concillado (Dolores). Thus, on
November 5, 2002, an Information was filed charging them with murder.

Edgar admitted that he was the one who inflicted all the 26 wounds on the victim, although he claimed that he was only
acting in self-defense.

Issue: WON Edgar’s claim of self-defense is lawful

Ruling: No. Both the trial court and the CA properly disregarded Edgar's claim of self-defense.

The Supreme Court examined the records and found no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the trial court
and the CA which disregarded Edgar’s theory of self-defense.

For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be properly appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
"[T]he most important among all the elements is x x x unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order
for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete." "There can be no self-defense unless there
was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel."
"Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person."

We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the CA that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Diosdado.
According to the trial court, "[t]he distance of the accused from the fence while he was urinating was about 1½ meters,
while the victim was outside and in-between them was a bamboo fence about four feet high. With the height of the fence
and his distance from the fence, there is an impossibility of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim." It also concluded
that the victim could not have entered the yard of the accused. The dead body of Diosdado was found lying on the road
about eight meters from the house of Edgar. However, no traces of blood could be found in the yard of the accused.

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that the disparity of the injuries sustained belies all pretensions of self-defense.
Diosdado suffered a total of 26 incised, stab and bullet wounds. On the other hand, Edgar suffered only three superficial
wounds. "As has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a
plea of self-defense." Moreover, during his cross-examination, Edgar admitted that he continued to inflict injuries on
Diosdado notwithstanding the fact that he was already lying lifeless on the ground.

There being no unlawful aggression to speak of, Edgar’s theory of self-defense has no leg to stand on. Having miserably
failed to discharge his burden of proof, we therefore find Edgar criminally responsible for the death of Diosdado.

29. People vs Maningding-Katrina

FACTS:
On September 13, 2006 at around 10:25 o’clock in the evening in Brgy. Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Philippines, the
accused (David Maningding), while armed with a bladed weapon, stab and hit MARLON MUYALDE, inflicting upon him a
stab wound on the vital part of his body, causing his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
The version of the accused states that on September 13, 2006 at about 10:25 in the evening, he was on his way home from
carrying passengers with his tricycle when he saw the victim with four other people at the sari-sari store of Aladino, having a
drinking spree. He stated that the victim actually called for him and invited him for a drink, which he refused. According to
the accused, the victim then embraced him by extending his arm to his shoulder. He testified that at this instant, he noticed
that the victim was pulling a knife from his waist with his right hand, which he was able to grab. As he was being embraced
by the victim at such time and since they both fell thereafter, he did not know that he was actually able to stab the victim.
When he saw blood coming out of the victim, he ran away out of fear. No other witness or evidence was presented by the
defense for its case.

ISSUE:Whether or not the stabbing of the victim is justified by self-defense.

RULING:NO. The Court ruled that self-defense does not exist in the present case.
According to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, "any person who acts in defense of his person or rights" do not incur any
criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Conversely, the accused must be able to establish that all three circumstances concur in order for the accused’s act to be
justified under the law.
In this case, the records would show that accused-appellant was clearly not able to establish the aforementioned
requisites. Worse, his sole evidence––his own testimony––was found by the RTC to be so weak and devoid of any credibility
as against those presented by the prosecution. From the facts of the present case, the RTC gave credence and weight to
the evidence presented by the prosecution, whose testimonies rule out accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense. As earlier
explicated, we do not disturb or interfere with the findings of fact of the RTC unless there is a clear showing of mistake or a
grave abuse of discretion. From the testimonies of Rommel and Aladino, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. If there was any, it came from accused-appellant himself for having unsuspectingly attacked the victim, who
was peacefully engaged in a conversation with Rommel during the stabbing incident.

30. US vs Esmedia-Kristian

Facts: Esmedia and Abando family lived very near to each other and owned adjoining rice lands. Ciriaco Abando
instructed his son Santiago to go to the rice field to let out the water so that they could plant rice in the said field. Gregorio
Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago. Gregorio drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in
the back. Santiago fell to the ground but arouse immediately and attacked Gregorio with his bolo. The two accused
namely Potenciano and Mena arrived on the scene about the time the fight between the Santiago and Gregorio was
terminating, and seeing their father lying in the mud and water, fatally wounded and dying and believing Santiago inflict
the wounds to their father, in defense immediately killed Santiago. Ciriaco was near the scene at this time, the two accused
attack him and as a direct result of the blows inflicted by them he fell to the ground dying immediately.
Issue: Whether or not the two accused can be criminally responsible for the death of Ciriaco and Santiago Abando

Ruling: Potenciano and Mena Esmedia are exempted from criminal responsibility for causing the death of Santiago Abando
because, inasmuch as it has been shown that they inflicted these wounds upon him in defense of their father who was
fatally wounded at the time. Any person who, in defending his father against an unlawful attack, while he still honestly
believes him to be in a great danger, causes the death of the attacking party, is exempt from criminal responsibility. But the
two accused is guilty of homicide with aggravating circumstance for the death of Ciriaco Abando. Considering the age of
Ciriaco, 80 years of age and arrives upon the scene of an altercation after it has terminated, and is thereupon attacked
and killed, the aggravating circumstance must be considered in fixing the penalty because of the disregard and lack of
respect for age

31. People vs Toring-Krizabel

Facts: On May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for
the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. Samuel Augusto and his family attended the event since
his daughter was a candidate. Also present in the event were the kwaknit gang, a group known for their bird-like way of
dancing, propensity of drunkenness and provoking trouble. Shortly after Samuel’s daughter was proclaimed the winner, he
left the dancing area to answer the call of nature. Then he was approached by Luis Toring (president of kwaknit gang) and
two others and was stabbed from behind by Toring using a knife handed to him by a companion. Samuel died of stab
wound he sustained on the right side of his abdomen. Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel
was justified because he acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia, their fathers being brothers, although no
explanation appears on record why they have different surnames.
Issue: Whether the act of Toring in stabbing Samuel was justified for being done in defense of his relative, Joel Escobia.
Ruling: NO. The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part
of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative. Toring himself admitted
in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore,
that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the
immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a
"running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers.

32. People vs Caabay-Leo Carlo

Facts: On June 27, 1994, at 5:30 p.m., Paulino and Adelina were at their farmland. Paulino was cutting the overgrown
grasses in the middle portion of the land using a bolo. After a while, he rested and smoked a cigarette while seated.
Adelina was cooking dahon ng sili. Momentarily, Adelina told her husband that it was getting late and they should be
heading home. Paulino told his wife to go ahead as his clothes were drenched in sweat and he was waiting for them to dry.
Despite her proddings, Paulino refused to go home
Accused Rodrigo Caabay sauntered by and commented to Paulino that he was clearing a wide portion of the land.
Paulino replied that the farmland was very wide and it was about time that he cleared it. Rodrigo then inquired from
Adelina what she was doing and she answered that she was cooking. Rodrigo left. Adelina also decided to go home and
left her husband behind.
When Adelina was barely three meters away from their house, she met her son Aliguer, armed with a bolo, rushing to where
his father was. When Adelina looked back, she was shocked to see accused Virgilio and his children - Esteban, Rodrigo,
Valentino and Isidro each armed with bolos, hacking Paulino on the neck and the right hand. Accused Rodrigo hacked
Paulino on his back. The victim fell to the ground. Aliguer scampered away from the scene but accused Virgilio and
Esteban ran after and overtook him. Accused Virgilio, Esteban, Valentino and Isidro and other persons encircled Aliguer,
and thereafter ganged up and stabbed him. Aliguer fell to the ground, mortally wounded. The accused Caabays and their
cohorts placed the cadavers of Paulino and Aliguer side by side. Shocked and petrified, Adelina could do nothing but bow
her head in silent grief. She was afraid even to go to the place where her husband and son were. Alone in their house.

ISSUE: whether or not there was a defense of relatives in the part of the accused?

Ruling: No. The court ruled that the appellant’s are guilty of two counts of murder under Articles 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Republic act no. 7659 by abuse of superior strength. Because the mere fact that the deceased
Paulino Urbano cannot walk without his cane,is a clear indication that it would be difficult for paulino to have acted first in
attacking Rodrigo Caabay. The claim of the accused that they have acted only in defense of a relative did not carry much
wait for the court to consider, lack evidence to prove their claim and that the requisite of an unlawful aggression in the part
of the deceased are not present. It is Self-evident that the time the accused facilitated their commission of the offense was
done right after the wife of the deceased had left the place where the crime had been committed. The fact that the
accused acted in abuse of strength since they all have acted together in the commission of the crime by hacking and
stabbing the victims.
33. Balunueco vs CA-Luigi

Facts: On 2 May 1982 at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Amelia Iguico was coddling her youngest child in front of her
house at Bagong Tanyag, Taguig, when she saw accused Reynaldo, his father Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all
surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the five (5) individuals in
hot pursuit, Servando scampered into the safety of Amelia’s house.

Meanwhile, her husband Senando, who was then cooking supper, went out of the house fully unaware of the commotion
going on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention on him and gave chase. Senando instinctively fled
towards the fields but he was met by Armando who hit him with a stone, causing Senando to feel dizzy. Reynaldo, Ricardo,
and Armando cornered their quarry near a canal and ganged up on him. Armando placed a can on top of Senando’s
head and Ricardo repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on the head, shoulder, and hand. At one point, Ricardo lost his
hold on the ax, but somebody tossed him a bolo and then he continued hacking the victim who fell on his knees. To shield
him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but it was not enough to detract Ricardo from his
murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg.

In his defense, accused Ricardo testified that at that time he was fetching water when he heard somebody shouting:
"Saya, saya, tinataga," referring to his brother Reynaldo. When he hurried to the place, he saw his brother Ramon
embracing Senando who was continuously hacking Reynaldo. Thereafter, Senando shoved Ramon to the ground and as if
further enraged by the intrusion, he turned his bolo on the fallen Ramon. Ricardo screamed, "tama na yan, mga kapatid ko
‘yan." But the assailant would not be pacified as he hacked Ramon on the chest. At this point, Servando, the brother of
Senando, threw an axe at him but Reynaldo picked it up and smashed Senando with it.

Issue: Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

Ruling:NO. In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a positively
strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there
is nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando.

First, Ricardo’s theory that when he reached the crime scene he found Senando repeatedly hacking his brother Reynaldo
who thereafter retaliated by smashing an axe on the victim’s head is implausible in light of the seriousness of the wounds
sustained by the deceased as compared to the minor injuries inflicted upon petitioner and his two (2) brothers. The fact that
three (3) of the assailants suffered non-fatal injuries bolsters the fact that Senando tried vainly to ward off the assaults of his
assailants.
Second, Ricardo failed to present himself to the authorities. He may have accompanied the injured Reynaldo to the
hospital after the encounter but still he failed to present himself to the authorities and report the matter to them. The natural
impulse of any person who has killed someone in defense of his person or relative is to bring himself to the authorities and try
to dispel any suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have against him. This fact assumes a more special significance
considering that his co-accused, Juanito and Armando, have remained at large.
Third, petitioner had a rather erratic recollection of people and events. He vividly remembered how Reynaldo was injured
by Senando but conveniently failed to recall the events leading to the fatal wounding of the deceased. At another point,
he testified that Reynaldo axed Senando but later retracted his statement by declaring that it was in fact Senando who
hacked Reynaldo. We observe that the killing occurred within or near the premises of the deceased. This proves per
adventure the falsity of petitioner’s claim that it was Senando, rather than he and his kin, who had initiated the unlawful
aggression.

34. Cabuslay vs People-Monique

Petitioner SPO2 Jovito Luna Cabuslay, Senior Inspector Celso Gomera Regencia, SPO4 Rosello Rodriguez Canoy, C2C Nilo
Rico Montebon and C2C Gerry Orillaneda Cane were charged with murder as follows:
Victim Paquito Umas-as earned a living as a collector of payments for assorted articles such as jackets, mats, thermos and
plates that he sold on credit. In collecting payments, Paquito used a motorcycle he bought on credit from his employer.
Petitioner and his team thereafter halted the collector who was then riding a motorcycle. The policemen asked the
collector to show his identification card (ID). The collector took the ID out of his left pocket and when it reached the "front
man," one of the policemen, who Zaragosa later verified as the petitioner, opened fire at the collector whose right hand
was then raised. The four other policemen meanwhile had their firearms pointed at the collector.
Petitioner Cabuslay, who was four meters away from the collector, consumed the entire magazine of his M-16 armalite in
firing at him. The collector fell to the ground and was still moving when the police placed him on board a vehicle and
brought him to Kolambugan. One of the policemen rode on the collector’s motorcycle and likewise headed for
Kolambugan.
Dr. Tammy Uy, a medico-legal officer of the NBI in Cagayan de Oro City, conducted a post-mortem examination on the
body of Paquito Umas-as. At the time of examination, the victim’s body had already been cleaned and embalmed. Dr.
Uy’s examination disclosed that the cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. There
were eight (8) gunshot wounds and each wound was considered fatal.
One of the accused, Regencia, testified that he signaled the motorcycle rider to stop at the right side of the road. He asked
for the identification card of the motorcycle rider who pretended to reach for his wallet, but instead pulled out a gun. He
heard a shot and his thigh went numb. As he rolled to the ground, he heard a volley of gunshots after which petitioner
approached him. Regencia then approached the motorcyclist and removed his bonnet to be able to identify him.
Regencia later found out that the motorcyle rider was shot by petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition before the Court, insisting that the Sandiganbayan erred in not crediting him the
justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of a stranger or the lawful exercise of a right or office

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner acted in self defense and defense of a stranger (Regencia)?

RULING: No.Petitioner asserts that he was the victim’s next target, thus the need to shoot the victim in self-defense. His claim
should be disbelieved. As he himself had explicitly testified before respondent court, the hummer jeep was behind him and
was parked about three to four meters from the national highway. He also stated that Paquito could not have seen the
hummer jeep because it was obscured by Muslim houses. It only follows that if from Paquito’s perspective, he cannot see
the hummer jeep which is a fairly large vehicle, then he could not have seen petitioner as well. If Paquito cannot see
petitioner from where he was positioned, then Paquito could not have possibly aimed to shoot at petitioner. Petitioner’s
contention therefore that there was an imminent threat of bodily harm coming from Paquito upon his person is at best
illusory. There was no peril, ergo, there was no unlawful aggression.
In addition, the claim of the defense that Paquito shot Regencia on his right thigh is untenable. Petitioner would have the
Court believe that Paquito dared challenge five policemen, four of them in full battlegear, at a checkpoint and armed with
only a handgun. This is contrary to ordinary human experience, as well as the human instinct which is to flee for dear life and
seek safety. If indeed Paquito was armed and had criminal designs in his mind, the natural tendency upon seeing a
checkpoint ahead would be to abort one’s plans and leave the premises immediately. Petitioner’s story not only was
contrary to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life, in all appearances it was also contrived.
Respondent court was correct in rejecting it.
It is also worthy of note that the defense never presented in evidence the gun Paquito allegedly use to shoot Regencia. The
gun was also not clearly identified. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim must be positively proved and said gun
would have been a vital evidence to establish this requisite.

35. People vs Ricohermoso-Normita

About: Avoidance of greater evil

Facts:At about nine o'clock in the morning of January 30, 1965 Geminiano de Leon, together with his thirty-three-year old
common-law wife Fabiana Rosales, his twenty-four-year old son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales, encountered Pio
Ricohermoso in Barrio Tagbacan Silangan, Catanauan, Quezon. Geminiano owned a parcel of land in that barrio which
Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin. Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest. He added that he
should at least be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could go to
his house anytime and he would give the latter palay. Geminiano rejoined that he could not get the palay that morning
because he was on his way to Barrio Bagobasin but, on his return, he would stop at Ricohermoso's house and get the palay.
When Geminiano returned to Barrio Tagbacan Silangan, he stopped at Ricohermoso's place. It was about two o'clock in
the afternoon. Geminiano sat on a sack beside Fabiana Rosales in front of the house while Marianito stood about three
meters behind his father. A .22 caliber rifle was slung on Marianito's right shoulder. Ricohermoso stood near the door of his
house while Severo Padernal was stationed near the eaves of the house.
Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about the palay. The latter, no longer conciliatory and evidently hostile, answered in a
defiant tone: "Whatever happens, I will not give you palay." Geminiano remonstrated: "Why did you tell us to pass by your
house, if you were not willing to give the palay?" At that juncture, as if by pre-arrangement, Ricohermoso unsheathed his
bolo and approached Geminiano from the left, while Severo Padernal (Ricohermoso's father-in-law) got an axe and
approached Geminiano from the right. The latter looked up to the sexagenarian Severo Padernal, with both hands raised
and pleaded: "Mamay (Grandpa), why will you do this to us. We will not fight you." While Geminiano was still looking up to
Severo Padernal on his right, Ricohermoso walked to Geminiano's left, and, when about one meter from him, stabbed him
on the neck with his bolo. Geminiano fell face downward on the ground. While in that helpless position, he was hacked on
the back with an axe by Severo Padernal.
At that same place and time, while Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso were assaulting Geminiano de Leon, another
episode was taking place. Juan Padernal (Ricohermoso's brother-in-law and the son of Severo) suddenly embraced
Marianito de Leon from behind, with his right arm locked around Marianito's neck and his left hand pressing Marianito's left
forearm. They grappled and rolled downhill towards a camote patch. Marianito passed out. When he regained
consciousness, his rifle was gone. He walked uphill, saw his mortally wounded father Geminiano in his death throes, and
embraced him. He carried Geminiano for a short distance. The fifty-one year old Geminiano died at two o'clock on that
same day.
Issue: Was there avoidance of greater evil on the part of Juan Padernal?
Ruling:No. Appellant Juan Padernal invokes the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury (par. 4, Art.
11, Revised Penal Code) in explaining his act of preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo
Padernal. His reliance on that justifying circumstance is erroneous. The act of Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de
Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who were the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of
Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his assailants.
Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious intention was to forestall
any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-law on Geminiano. That situation is unarguably
not the case envisaged in paragraph 4 of article 11.
36. Tan vs Standard Vacuum Oil-Amzie

Anita Tan, plaintiff-appellant

Vs.
Standard Vacuum Oil Co., JULITO STO DOMINGO, IGMIDIO RICO, and RURAL TRANSIT CO.,defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-4160 July 29, 1952

Facts:Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials based in the City of Manila, Philippines. On May 3, 1949, the
Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery to the Rural Transit Company at its garage at Rizal Avenue Extension,
City of Manila, of 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo,
who was helped Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground tank, it caught fire, whereupon
Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street he
abondoned the truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first street causing the buildings on that side to be
burned and detroyed. The house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she spent P12,000.

Issue:Whether or not the accused’s acts where considered an avoidance of a greater evil?

Ruling:Considering the above quoted law and facts, the cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be
disputed, it appearing that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of driver
Julito Sto. Domingo to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-truck
trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company
which would have resulted in a conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the houses nearby or
surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented,
and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be
deemed a bar to a civil action against this company because its civil liability is completely divorced from the criminal
liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a separate civil action does not apply to it.

37. Ty vs People-Phil

Facts:On May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check
No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of ?30,000.00, said accused
well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

Issue:Whether or not the checks were issued under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a great injury or in avoidance of
a greater evil or injury?
Ruling:

Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of
the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.

The fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument
without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands.

Petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even
testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks "because the moment I will
not have funds it will be a big problem."
The evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available
option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security
instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.

The greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful
inaction of the actor.34 In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her
mother’s hospital bills.

The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability.

38. Cabanlig vs Sandiganbayan-Rachelle

FACTS: On 24 September 1992 a robbery occurred in the Municipality of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Four days later or on 28
September 1992, the investigating authorities apprehended three suspects: Magat, Reyes and Valino. The police recovered
most of the stolen items. However, a flower vase and a small radio were still missing. Cabanlig asked the three suspects
where these two items were. Reyes replied that the items were at his house.
Cabanlig asked his colleagues, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban, to accompany him in retrieving the flower vase
and radio. Cabanlig then brought out Reyes and Magat from their cell, intending to bring the two during the retrieval
operation. It was at this point that Valino informed Cabanlig that he had moved the vase and radio to another location
without the knowledge of his two cohorts. Cabanlig decided instead to bring along Valino, leaving behind Magat and
Reyes.
Around 6:30 p.m., five fully armed policemen in uniform - Cabanlig, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban - escorted
Valino to Barangay Sinasahan, Nueva Ecija to recover the missing flower vase and radio. The policemen and Valino were
aboard a police vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up jeep. Valino, who was not handcuffed, was between Cabanlig and Mercado at
the right bench.
Just after the jeep had crossed the Philippine National Railway bridge and while the jeep was slowly negotiating a bumpy
and potholed road, Valino suddenly grabbed Mercado’s M16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep. Cabanlig saw Valino’s
act of taking away the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig acted immediately. Without issuing any warning of any sort, and with still
one foot on the running board, Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino, and after two to three seconds, Cabanlig fired four more
successive shots. Valino did not fire any shot.
Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as an act of self-defense and performance of
duty.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENSE OF FULFILLMENT OF DUTY PUT UP BY CABANLIG
WAS INCOMPLETE

RULING:
The petition has merit. We rule for Cabanlig’s acquittal.
Applicable Defense is Fulfillment of Duty
The requisites of fulfillment of duty are:
1. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm.
In case injury or death results from the policeman’s exercise of such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the
injury or causing the death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force. However, a policeman is never
justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be affected otherwise.
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim
is not a requisite.
In this case, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were in the performance of duty as policemen when they
escorted Valino, an arrested robber, to retrieve some stolen items. Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate
performance of their duty when Cabanlig shot Valino. Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is
applicable to this case. To determine if this defense is complete, we have to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to
prevent Valino from escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger.
Fulfillment of Duty was Complete, Killing was Justified
The Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig because his defense of fulfillment of duty was found to be incomplete. The
Sandiganbayan believed that Cabanlig "exceeded the fulfillment of his duty when he immediately shot Valino without
issuing a warning so that the latter would stop."
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite
from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use
of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also
stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the
loose firearm. By grabbing Mercado’s M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the
policemen in grave danger.
In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there
is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is excusable.
In this case, the embattled policemen did not have the luxury of time. Neither did they have much choice. Cabanlig’s
shooting of Valino was an immediate and spontaneous reaction to imminent danger.
Cabanlig is thus not guilty of homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban are guilty only of gross
negligence. The policemen transported Valino, an arrested robber, to a retrieval operation without handcuffing Valino. That
no handcuffs were available in the police precinct is a very flimsy excuse. The policemen should have tightly bound Valino’s
hands with rope or some other sturdy material.

39. People vs Beronilla-Roexcel

Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior

Defendant- Appellants: MANUEL BERONILLA

FILIPINO VELASCO
POLICARPIO PACULDO
JACINTO ADRIATICO

Victim: ARSENIO BORJAL

Facts:Beronilla, after being appointed as Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra, received a copy of a memorandum issued by Lt.
Col. Arnold authorizing all military mayors to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or
the aiding of the enemy. He also received a list of all puppet officials of the province of Abra (Borjal included) with a
memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of
the municipality. Beronilla, upon the return of Borjal who left La Paz because of an attempt on his life, placed Borjal under
custody. Pursuant to his instructions, complaints were gathered, a 12-man jury was appointed, prosecutors and a clerk of
the jury were assigned. Trial lasted for 19 days and the jury found Borjal guilty on all counts (espionage, aiding the enemy,
abuse of authority). Death penalty was imposed. Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the
15th Infantry for review. The records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold adding that the matter was best handled by the La Paz
Government and whatever disposition taken was approved. Upon receipt of the letter, Beronilla then ordered the
execution of Borjal. The execution was reported to Col. Arnold and Beronilla received compliments based on the reply of his
superior. Two years after, those who were involved were indicted in the CFI of Abra for murder for allegedly conspiring and
confederating in the execution of Borjal. The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and
others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was
committed after the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation. The defendants were convicted, thus this appeal.
Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to lawful order of
superior.

Ruling:Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could not question
and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant
to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla received the radiogram from Colonel
Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had
Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not
show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial
based on doubts of illegality and death sentence review were sent to the superior officers.

“Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the
very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important, if
Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I
can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla
and ordering his court martial for disobedience”

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed
if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent). After finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had
really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be
captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason
that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal.

Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8
inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were contradictory, the court should have
found for the Beronila, et al because if there are “any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the
(amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.”FINAL JUDGMENT: ACQUITTED, NOT GUILTY