THE FALL OF THE SOUL IN SAINT AUGUSTINE:

A QUAESTIO DISPUTATA

In 1968 Robert 1. O'Connnell, S.l. of Fordham University published a

book, St. Augustine's Early Theory ofMan, A.D. 386-391 which sparked a
controversy which continues unabated to this day. The debate rages despite
the fact that all the disputants readily acknowledge the brilliance of
O'Connell's thesis. In a word, O'Connell argues that the soul, for St.
Augustine, is fallen and yet not fully fallen, that memory and illumination
are identical, that souls are diversely fallen and differ in their way of return.
O'Connell adds that Plotinus said the same paradoxical set of things and
that Augustine was conversant with the former's ways of saying them.
O'Connell comes to his conclusions based on a very careful analysis of the
relevant texts in St. Augustine, particularly from the De Genes; contra
Manichaeos.
This essay commences by giving a short precis of O'Connell's thesis,
(Part I), while Part II lists some of the criticisms levelled against
O'Connell's theory by such scholars as Ernest Fortin, Robert Russell,
Mary T. Clark and Gerald 1.P. o 'Daly. No attempt is made to take into
consideration the views of every critic, for, or against, O'Connell's views.
However, it is hoped that a representative sample of the criticism does
appear in this essay. Part III concludes by offering some reflections on the
controversy.

Part I - The Fall Of The Soul In St. Augustine

This section attempts to summarize O'Connell's thesis. Most of the

discussion centers around O'Connell's first book, St. Augustine's Early
Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391. This does not mean that O'Connell's
subsequent works are ignored. St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey
of Soul (1969) and Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine
(1978). However, these latter works are treated only secondarily and
tangentially since the Plotinian fall of the soul idea is argued most
powerfully in O'Connell's first work and earlier articles.'

* A version of this article was delivered at the Seventh International Conference On Patristic,
Mediaeval And Renaissance Studies, Villanova University, September, 1982. I am grateful to Robert
O'Connell, S.J. for the critical comments he made on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine'sEarly Theory OfMan, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press, 1968), p. 5. (Hereafter as O'Connell, Early Theory).

Augustinian Studies, Volume 17,1986 135

Richard Penaskovic 136

O'Connell argues that the early Augustine did hold for a fall of the soul.
O'Connell bases his conclusion on a very careful analysis of the relevant
texts in St. Augustine. It is important to put O'Connell's theory into
context. O'Connell's theory may be seen as a reaction to P. Henry's claim
that Augustine read only paucissimi Iibri of Plotinus. 2 Unfortunately,
Henry's judgment kept some scholars from searching further into Plotinus.
Instead, it veered others, such as Olivier Du Roy, off to an investigation into
Porphyry.3 In order to break the log-jam set up by Henry's
interpretation, O'Connell focused in, initially, on one treatise, Ennead VI,
4-5 developing the case for dependence and for method jointly. After a
vindication of his method, O'Connell proceeded to apply it to other
Enneads in order to illuminate Augustine's text. O'Connell argues that
Augustine read Ennead III,7 on "Eternity and Time," Ennead IV, 3-5 on
"Problems concerning the Soul," Ennead IV,8 on "The Soul's Descent into
Body," and Ennead V. 8 "On the Intelligible Beauty."4
O'Connell commences his study with some important methodological
reflections. P. Henry saw a dependence of Augustine on Plotinus on the
basis of "textual parallels" only. This was in sharp contrast to the work of
Bouillet who allowed for "doctrinal parallels", that is to say that the
influenced author creatively transformed the writings of another writer. S
O'Connell, on the contrary, opts for a tertium quid. He sees "parallel
patterns" of thought-drive, image, language and emotional tone as an
intermediate possibility between textual parallels (Henry) and doctrinal
parallels (Bouillet). Professor O'Connell maintains that there exist parallel
patterns of thought-drive, image, language and emotional tone between
certain works of Plotinus and those of Augustine. These parallel patterns
consist not only in concepts and images taken singly, but also in complex
constellations of them, arranged in formal and dynamic patterns. These
parallel patterns are examined by O'Connell as organically interlocking
units. He argues that in some instances the reappearance in Augustine of
such a distinctive cluster may be established just as objectively as any
linguistic cluster. 6
In other words, O'Connell wants to amplify our understanding of the
term, source. Source may mean the linguistic model from which another
linguistic fragment is derived without the intervention of any significant
creative transformation on the part of the influenced author. However,

2. Paul Henry, S.l., Plotin et L'Occident (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), p.
104.
3. Olivier Du Roy, L'/ntelligence De La Foi en La Trinite selon Saint Augustin (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1966), p. 189, n.5.
4. R.l. O'Connell, S.l. "The Enneads and S1. Augustine'S Image Of Happiness," Vigiliae
Christianae 17 (1963), p. 130.
5. O'Connell,Early Theory, p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 17.
The Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata 137

source may also mean the original dynamic pattern of thought-drive image,
language and emotional tone which inspired another writer to create a
thought-drive, image, language-pattern (now language identity is demoted
in importance) and emotional tone analogous to it. Methodologically
speaking, one cannot consider purely linguistic correspondences in
isolation from "doctrinal" content. One must examine and take into
consideration the entire pattern of thought-drive, image, language-pattern
and emotional tone having both shape and movement. 7 In this sense certain
Enneads of Plotinus did function as a source for Augustine, at least in the
years 386-391 A.D.
What influence did Plotinus have on the early Augustine? In answering
this question one is forced to consider the fall of the soul in Plotinus and
then in Augustine. O'Connell argues that Enn. 111,7; IV,3-5; IV,8; V,8 and
VI, 4-5 had an influence on Augustine. Ennead VI, 4-5, for instance, serves
to unlock the hidden resonances of meaning in Augustine. An example may
clarify matters. Confessions VII,26 deals with the relationship between
Creator and creature. However, the key notion in understanding that
relationship is participation and the core of participation is omnipresence. 8
In Plotinus one notices a vascillation between pure omnipresence
images and pure emanation images/thoughts. A careful reading of Ennead
VI, 4-5 on "Omnipresence" shows a certain antimony between a doctrine
of emanation and one of immanent omnipresence which verges on an
outspoken pantheism. Plotinus tends to stress the immanence of the divine
to such an extent that he finds it hard to account for other, lower beings at
all. 9
In Ennead V, 1 Plotinus discusses individual human souls, thus
resuming the teaching of Ennead IV, 8 "On the Descent of the Soul."
Plotinus sees the individual human soul as 'part' of the All-Soul, which has
'fallen' from the All-Soul into the sense world. As a result of this fall, the
soul cannot remember its true station. Nonetheless, its identity with the
All-Soul continues because the soul remains in the uppermost regions at its
highest point. The soul needs to be reminded of its innate dignity by being
persuaded to find in itself the evidence that it is linked with the All-Soul and
the other two Hypostases of the Neo-Platonic Trinity. Then the soul will see
that each lower hypostasis is an emanation of the higher, similar to the way
the Logos or spoken word is, in a certain sense, image and prolongation of
the thought or inner word. The soul will then know that in its unity with the
All-Soul it is the creative Logos of the sensible universe, that all the order in
it is of its making. 10

7. Ibid., p. 13
8. Ibid., p. 48
9. Ibid., p. 106.
10. Ibid., p. 115.
Richard Penaskovic 138

Ennead V,l uses the emanation image. Inferior reality 'cascades'

downward from the One. In this way various reality-levels are formed each
distinct from, and subordinate to, the level above it. The radical distinction
differentiates the higher world of the three hypostases from the lower world
of sense and body. Hence one needs to explain the presence of the soul in
this sphere of 'genesis' using the notion of a 'fall'.l1
In short, there exists a certain tension (one which should not be
overemphasized) between Ennead VI, 4-5 and Ennead V, 1, between
omnipresence thoughts/images and emanation thoughts/images. Plotinus
uses a dualistically conceived 'non-being' and some features of the
emanation style of thinking (that Ennead VI, 4-5 questions) in order to
explain the soul's fall and alienation from the Higher World from which it
originates. O'Connell puts it well when he remarks that pure emanation
thinking aids, whereas pure omnipresence thinking makes difficult, the
business of thinking out the soul's fall. 12
What causes the soul to fall? Plotinus answers that we either desired to
fall or desired something that brought the fall in its train. Nevertheless, the
cosmic laws are inexorable and even perfect. Cosmic necessity, that is to say,
the Divine Law, and the freedom of the soul are identical. It should be
noted that the soul still retains a connection with the Intelligible World,
and, for this reason, is not entirely fallen. Plotinus uses the term,
reminiscence, to characterize this link. One finds a discussion of this in
Ennead IV,S, S, 1-913
It should be pointed out that not all souls are equally fallen. In fact, the
diversity of fall is a hallmark of the Plotinian view, one which is not found
in Porphyry. Plotinus comes to the conclusion that not all souls are equally
fallen in raising the question of whether or not the soul can return from its
fallen condition. Plotinus believes that the liberal disciplines both sharpen
the mind and strengthen the soul's eye for eventual contemplation of purely
intelligible reality. For this intellectual task some souls are more adept than
others. 14
How does Augustus see the fall of the soul? Augustine has difficulty
relating the intelligible, spaceless world and the changing, spatial world of
human experience. He also has trouble in achieving a synthesis between
pure omnipresence thinking and pure emanation thinking, the same
difficulty Plotinus faced. Augustine has a hard time accounting for the
soul's fall, alienation, even, at times, distinction from God, when pushing
to its extreme the omnipresence thought-style. On the other hand,
Augustine uses emanation thinking to depict the fall of the soul and to

11. Ibid., p. 117.

12. Ibid., p. 120.
13. Ibid., p. 154.
14. Ibid., p. ISS.
The Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata 139

account for the diversity of reality-levels. Augustine has this difficulty

partly because he did not know the Platonic tradition whose varied strands
went into Plotinus' developing thought. IS
One observes the same doctrinal pattern between Ennead rv,8 and
Augustine's De Genesi contra Manichaeos (388-389 A.D.). Augustine
looks upon the whole corporeal world as a'lying image' which the soul,
fallen into time and action, fabricates in imitation of the intelligible world.
The works Augustine wrote at Cassiciacum show him looking for a theory
(namely, the fall of the soul), one that takes firmer shape in the middle
works. O'Connell argues that the works of the Cassiciacum period can then
be re-read as showing Augustine groping for the theory encased in De
Libero Arbitrio II, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Vera Religione etc.
Because Augustine sees man as fallen soul, he can then speak of the
body in terms of filth, stain, prisonhouse and similar terms. How does
Augustine square such a negative view of the body with the Christian
concept of creation? O'Connell writes that Augustine works with a notion
of nihil (defined as 'all that flows') akin to the Plotinian concept of on. me
Augustine has no doubt that the soul will profit from its experiences in the
fallen state (another Plotinian theme) and with renewed vigor return to
God (De Ordine 1,20).16
There are numerous other thought patterns which are the same in both
Plotinus and Augustine. It would exceed the parameters of this essay to
treat them extensively. In this essay they are briefly noted. Plotinus says
that the soul's desire to be "its own" is the root-fault in the fall, while
Augustine speaks of superbia. For Plotinus the notion of to/rna helps ease
the problem involved in deciding between pride on the one hand, and
concupiscence on the other. If one considers curiositas, the third member of
Augustine's moral triad, the situation becomes confused, says O'Connell.
One is then led to find curiositas in the 7rOAU7rpa'YJLWJI of Plotinus. 17Another
example may help clarify the similarities between Plotinus and Augustine.
For both thinkers the term, memory, has a salvific function. Memory
recalls the bliss the soul once had in the intelligible sphere and brings the
soul back to the vision that it once had in the pre-existent past.
Even Christ's soteriological role may best be understood in terms of the
Plotinian fall and return of the soul. One sees this idea implied in the
Soliloquies 1,3: for Christ is God "from whom to turn away is to fall, to
whom to turn is to rise again, in whom to abide is to stand firm." 18 Granted
that Augustine'S Christianity overcomes the deficiencies in the

15. Robert J. O'Connell, S.J., St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey Of Soul (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press, 1969), p. 81.
16. Ibid., p. 188
17. Ibid., p. 182.
18. Ibid.; p. 266.
Richard Penaskovic 140

subordinationism of Plotinus, nevertheless, Christ's Incarnation seems to

fit right into the Plotinian theory of the soul's fall and return. 19

Part II - The Critic's Corner

This section summarizes the reactions to O'Connell's thesis on the part

of Augustine scholars. Ernest Fortin feels that O'Connell judges the early
Augustine more severely than did the later Augustine himself. Fortin asks
why did Augustine revise/re-edit his early works, instead of just
withdrawing them, if the Christianity of these dialogues is as
underdeveloped as O'Connell claims it is.20
According to Fortin, Prof. O'Connell reproaches Augustine for
showing little concern for the political or secular aspects of human life.
Fortin finds this strange in light of the fact that Augustine is the only Latin
Father who offers us a well-conceived political theology. The political
dimension is lacking in Plotinus but not in Plato, whose political thought
influenced Augustine via Cicero. Fortin argues that Cicero, albeit in a
different way, influenced Augustine as much as did Plotinus. Fortin sees
Augustine's thought embedded in a political context, one which
O'Connell's thesis seemingly ignores. 21
Robert P. Russell, the founding editor of Augustinian Studies, objects
to O'Connell's thesis of the 'fallen soul' on the basis of Augustine's own
literary history. Throughout his lifetime Augustine acknowledges the fact
that we cannot reach a decision in regard to the origin of the soul. One sees
this in De Libero Arbitrio (completed in 395 A.D.), in the Retractions
(426-427), and in his last unfinished work, Contra secundam Juliani
responsionem (429-430). Russell notes that even if Augustine subscribed to
the 'fallen soul' theory at an earlier period, it is surprising that he did not
reject an error for which he was later to censure Origen in the
Retractations. 22
Russell adds that in the Contra Academicos 2.22 and in De ordine 1.20
O'Connell mentions the theme of 'return', which he terms the personal
hallmark of the Plotinian view. However, in reviewing the former in the
Retractations, Augustine says that although it would have been safer to
have said 'go' (lturus, as opposed to rediturus), he had only intended to
speak of the soul's return 'to heaven' as a return 'to God', its Author and
Maker, observes Russell. The passage concludes by saying, quite explicitly,

19. Ibid.
20. See Ernest Fortin's review of O'Connell's Early Theory in Theological Studies 30 (1969), p.
342.
21. Ibid., p. 343.
22. See Robert P. Russell's review of O'Connell's two early books in Thought 44 (1969), p. 304.
The Fall of the Soul in 8.aint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata 141

that Augustine neither knows, nor had he known the answer to the origin of
the soul. 23
Mary T. Clark accuses O'Connell of boxing Augustine into a tight·
Plotinian framework without real evidence for doing so. She argues that
O'Connell has read all the works of the early Augustine through the lens of
Ennead VI, 4-5, the controlling paradigm which regulates Augustine's
thought on God and man. In so doing O'Connell downplays other
influences on the early Augustine such as Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero,
Varro, S1. Paul and especially Ambrosiaster's Commentary on St. Pau/. 24
Professor Clark observes that nowhere in the Confessions does
Augustine state that the soul has fallen from the intelligible world through
desire to join a body, yet O'Connell says that our presence in the world of
bodies is a result of our having fallen. Clark finds the notion of a fallen soul
in Plato, but not in Plotinus since the Plotinian soul never entirely fell. She
also maintains that O'Connell thinks of the expression 'fallen soul'
spatially, whereas in Plotinus the inward attitude makes for any fallen
aspect of the soul. Clark has two other caveats in regard to O'Connell's
thesis. First, she feels that O'Connell identifies Porphyrian positions with
Plotinian ones, and second, believes that Augustine was the first
philosopher-theologian of the Future, that is to say, that he was concerned
with future existence rather than pre-existence. 2s
Another critic, a Plotinian scholar who has lately become interested in
the thought of St. Augustine, looks through the relevant Augustinian texts
chronologically to see if they mention the pre-existence of the human soul.
Gerald J. P. O'Daly examines Contra Academicos 2.9.22; Retractationes
1.1.3; 1.4.4.1.8.2; De beata vita 1.1; So/i/oquia 2.20.35; De Immortalitate
animae 4.6; 6.10.11; De quantitate animae 20.34; De Libero Arbitrio
1.12.24; 3.20.55-21.59; De magistro 12.40 and Episto/a 7. O'Daly sees no
mention of the soul's fall in these texts. He concludes by saying that
Augustine's thought was greatly indebted to Plato, notably the Platonic
language of memoria and oblivio. 26

Part III - Some Reflections on the Controversy

In offering some observations on this controversy, Professor

O'Connell's own frequent responses to his critics have been of enormous
help to me. In fact, what one notices is how scrupulous O'Connell has been
in raising his lance to have a friendly joust with a long line of eager critics.
23. Ibid., p. 305
24. See Mary T. Clark's review of O'Connell's thesis in International Philosophical Quarterly J 1
(1971), p. 428.
25. Ibid.
26. Gerald J.P. O'Daly, "Did S1. Augustine Ever Believe In The Soul's Pre-Existence?"
Augustinian Studies 5 (1974). p. 235.
Richard Penaskovic 142

No, O'Connell's critics are not about to find him napping. Ifthey do, it will
not be certainly under the shade of some Porphyrian tree!
It seems to me that Professor O'Connell is certainly on target with his
thesis concerning the fall of the soul in S1. Augustine. O'Connell bases his
conclusions on a careful, even meticulous, analysis of the relevant
Augustinian texts, particularly the De Genesi contra Manichaeos. In
addition, it appears highly plausible to suppose that Augustine was, in fact,
familiar with such Plotinian notions as the idea that the soul is fallen, yet
not fully fallen, that souls are diversely fallen and differ in their ways of
return, and that memory and illumination are identical.
What one notices in regard to this quaestio disputata is this: whereas
O'Connell bases his thesis about the fall of the soul on the relvant texts in
S1. Augustine, some of his critics, for example, Gerald O'Daly, do not
examine the texts themselves. 27 Other critics seem to ignore O'Connell's
theory about the fall of the soul and get bogged down in secondary
questions, for example, to what extent was S1. Augustine influenced by
Porphyry rather than by Plotinus.
Some of the objections to O'Connell's thesis arise because critics, such
as O'Daly, take each text individually and in isolation from the others.
O'Connell, on the other hand, takes the texts as interconnected in a
pattern, one that imposes the Plotinian view as its more natural
interpretation. One may ask if it is sound interpretative method to take the
texts singly and in isolation as O'Daly does. One may also ask why O'Daly
limits himself to the few texts that he does instead of taking a hard look at
the texts in St. Augustine that O'Connell examines so carefully. The
question that naturally arises in my mind is this: what must count as proof
for O'Daly to accept O'Connell's thesis?
Some scholars, such as Goulven Madec, say that O'Connell's theory of
the fallen soul is a subtle one and sometimes lack clarity. Madec's statement
needs to be distinguished. If asked whether the Augustine of the
Cassiciacum period held the soul's pre-existence, O'Connell would say that
the early texts viewed pattern-wise, have the force of probability, as
opposed to certainty. It is only from hindsight granted by the clearer
Plotinian dependence found in such later works as De Libero Arbitrio, De
musica and especially in the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, that one sees the
Plotinian pattern taking shape, although hesitantly, in the words of the
Cassiciacum period. There is a certain subtlety to this, however, the key

27. O'Daly does examine Augustine's texts, but not those O'Connell believes are crucial to his fall
of the soul thesis. See Robert J. O'Connell, S.J., "Pre-Existence in the Early Augustine," Revue Des
Etudes Augustiniennes 26 (1980), p. 177.
The Fall oj the Soul in Saint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata 143

question has to do with the truth of the matter, rather than whether or not
O'Connell's thesis of the fallen soul is subtle or not. 25
Goulven Madoc does, however, have a point. O'Connell has difficulty,
at times, in packaging his product, that is to say, that it is hard sometimes to
unravel the thread of his argument. O'Connell's case would have been
better served if he had attempted to summarize his argument at the end of
each chapter, thus pulling together his book more tightly.
One would think that critics would object to O'Connell's thesis on
methodological ground. Generally speaking, they do not object to his
method. The one notable exception in this regard is Olivier Du Roy. 29
However, the critics do have a hard time accepting O'Connell's conclusions.
In reading the objections to O'Connell's thesis, one sometimes has the
impression that some scholars have trouble listening to what O'Connell
says. Some reviewers, notably Professor Mary T. Clark, seem to launch
right into their critique before giving an impartial exposition and fair
assessment of O'Connell's work.30
A few examples may make this clear. Professor Clark remarks that in a
sense there is no descent of the soul in Plotinus since a part of the soul
remains forever in contemplation of the Eternal Forms and hence is not
immersed in the corporeal world. 31 It seems strange to me that Professor
Clark can make such a statement as if O'Connell disputed this. O'Connell
states quite clearly, "Yet, despite that fall, the soul remains at its topmost
point still in the uppermost regions. Its identity with All-Soul is not entirely
severed; the charioteer's head still is lifted into those lofty heights."32
Mary T. Clark also says that it seems that O'Connell sometimes allows
himself to think spatially of the expression' fallen soul' .33 One wonders how
Prof. Clark has arrived at such a conclusion. One may conceivably take the
matter one step backward and make the same accusation of Plotinus
himself. The very language of 'fall,' 'return,' is, it itself, spatial. It seems
inappropriate to fault O'Connell on this particular point.
Has O'Connell boxed St. Augustine into a tight Plotinian framework
and played down the influence of Cicero, Varro, Antiochus of Ascalon, St.
Paul and Ambrosiaster? Fortin, for example, argues that Cicero
influenced Augustine as much as did Plotinus. 34 In this regard a few

a
28. Goulven Madec, "Une lecture de Confessions VII IX,13-XXI, 27 (Notes critiques propos
d'une these de R.J. O'Connell)" Revue Des Etudes Augustiniennes 16 (1970), pp. 79-137. For
O'Connell's reply see "Confessions VII, IX,13- XXI, 27. Reply to G. Madec," Revue Des Etudes
Augustiniennes 19 (1973), pp. 87-100.
29. Oliver Du Roy, (see n. 3 above), p. 189, n. 5 who says that "Ia methode de l'A est trop peu
rigoreuse pour qu'on puisse retenir ses rapprochements."
30. Mary T. Clark, (see n. 24 above), pp. 427-439.
31. Ibid., p. 430.
32. O'Connell, Early Theory, p. 114.
33. Mary T. Clark, (n. 24 above), p. 437.
34. Fortin (n. 20 above), p. 342.
Richard Penaskovic 144

distinctions are in order. First, Cicero did have a great influence on

Augustine inasmuch as Cicero was a role-model for the ancient rhetor. 35
Second, the influence of Cicero's Hortensius on Augustine's conversion
appears to be a matter of scholarly debate. Professor O'Meara, in contrast
to O'Connell, tends to minimize the role of Cicero relative to Augustine's
conversion to philosophy, stating that the youthful student's dramatic
reaction is best explained by his strong psychological predisposition, in
contradistinction to the content of the Hortensius itself.36 The important
point is this: Plotinus had a much greater influence on Augustine's thought
than did Cicero in regard to questions about the soul, its origin and nature.
It should also be said that O'Connell's works do not pretend to pinpoint
all of the influences on the early Augustine. Granted that St. Paul and
Ambrosiaster influenced Augustine as a number of recent studies have
shown, nonetheless, it is the later Augustine who is heavily influenced by
St. Paul and Ambroisiaster, not the early Augustine. 37
Fortin goes on to reproach O'Connell for ignoring the political context
in Augustine's work. One might ask to what extent Fortin has read the early
Augustine as if he were the later Augustine. The political dimension does
seem to be absent in the early works of the Doctor Gratiae. In these early
works the apologetic "Christian" viewpoint is very subtly brought forward
in contradistinction to the later works.
A more serious objection to O'Connell's thesis comes from Robert P.
Russell, who rejects the 'fallen soul' theory on the basis of Augustine's own
literary history. Russell notes that even if Augustine accepted the fallen soul
theory initially, it seems strange that the scrupulous redactor of the
Retractations would not have expressly rejected an error for which he later
censured Origin. 38
In a later article O'Connell answers Russell's objection, arguing that a
reference to the 'fall' is implicit in the four hypotheses of the De Libero
Arbitrio. Because Augustine did not choose anyone of the four hypotheses
does not necessarily mean that he had no personal preference in the matter.
In regard to the Retractations, O'Connell points out that Augustine's
expressions of outright disapproval do not always enlighten us in re the
original intention of the texts he is correcting. Moreover, in the
Retractations Augustine can slip from reprehensio in one place to a
defensio in the next, although it is a question of the same error in both

35. O'Connell, Early Theory, p. 3.

36. See Ernest Fortin, "Augustine And The Problem Of Christian Rhetoric," Augustinian
Studies 5 (1974), pp. 85-100and Robert P. Russell, "Cicero's Hortensius And The Problem Of Riches in
Saint Augustine," Augustinian Studies 7 (1976), pp. 59-68.
37. See J. Patout Burns, "The Interpretation Of Romans In The Pelagian Controversy,"
Augustinian Studies 10 (1979), pp. 43-54.
38. Robert P. Russell, (n. 22 above), p. 304.
The Fall oj the Soul in Saint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata 145

places. 29 0' Connell adds that in the Retractations Augustine was

superimposing on his early writings a conviction he came to only decades
afterwards. In other words Augustine examines his earlier works in the light
of what he came to learn later on in life. Romans 9: 11 is the text which made
Augustine change his mind for a time in regard to the fall of the soul. This
was circa 415-417 A.D. However, Augustine did come back to this view
after making some subtle distinctions. Augustine came to see how Romans
9: 11 applied to pre-natal sin because of his controversy with the Pelagians.
In the Retractations Augustine firmly believed that the best course of
action might be to exercise a certain discretion vis-a.-vis his early errors. It
seems to me that O'Connell has successfully countered Russell's
objections. 4O
Mary T. Clark maintains that O'Connell identifies Porphyrian
positions with Plotinian ones. Other scholars argue for a Porphyrian
influence on the early Augustine. C. W. Wolfskeel, for example, sees a
certain similarity between Augustine's view of the soul in Chapter 22 of the
De Immortalitate Animae and in Porphyry's De regressu animae. The view
that human souls could be reincarnated is so striking, argues Wolfskeel,
that it leads one to think that Augustine read the De regressu animae in 386
A.D.41
These are very large questions, ones which cannot be treated
adequately within the parameters of this essay. A few observations,
however, are in order. First, O'Connell would grant that in some writings,
the Sententiae, for example, the thought of Prophyry and that of Plotinus
is the same. 42 Second, O'Connell does not deny the possibility that
Augustine read any Porphyry during 386-391 A.D. What O'Connell does
say is that no scholar offers clear proof that Augustine read any Porphyry
before the composition of De Consensu Evangelistarum in 400 A.D. and
that a Plotinian interpretation of Augustine was, then, a legitimate one.

Richard Penaskovic
Auburn University

39. In this matter O'Connell seconds the views of John Burnaby, "The Retractationes of St.
Augustine: Self-Criticism or Apologia?" in Augustinus Magister I (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes,
1954), pp. 85-92.
40. Robert J. O'Connell, S.J. "Augustine's Rejection Of The Fall Of The Soul," Augustinian
Studies 4 (1973), pp. 1-32.
41. C. W. Wolfskeel, "1st Augustin In "De Immortalitate Animae" Von Der Gedankenwelt Des
Porphvrios Beeinflusst Worden?" Vigiliae Christianae 26 (1972), p. 142.
42. Robert J. O'Connell, "Augustine and Poltinus: A Reply to Sr. Mary Clark," International
Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1972), p. 607.