Augustinian Studies 41:1 (2010) 255–274

Augustine and Philosophy

Frederick Van Fleteren

LaSalle University

Introduction: Two Recent Opinions as Context

Two eminent German scholars have recently maintained that in Augustine himself
philosophy exists as a separate entity.1 In his commentary on conf., Johannes Brachten-
dorf explicitly states that in Augustine himself reason—read here “philosophy”—can
be considered autonomously from faith. “Die Wahrheitsansprüche der Vernunft als
eines natürlichen Vermögens [ist] grundsetzlich zu respekiteren.”2 Although he nuances
his position somewhat, his reading of most of lib. arb. is as a purely philosophical
discussion concerning the freedom of the will. In Augustinus und die phänomenolo-
gische Frage nach der Zeit, Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann explicitly contends that
Augustine’s discussion of time in conf. XI is purely philosophical and can be separated
from the remainder of the book for investigation.3 These two interpretations are subject
to serious question and it is with them that I shall concern myself here.

Augustine and Blondel

The (as yet) unedited and unpublished manuscripts of Maurice Blondel are
currently held in the library archives of the Universität Eichstätt in Oberbayern. In

1. See J. Brachtendorf, Augustinus “Confessiones” (Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-

schaft, 2005), pp. 125–133. See F.-W. von Herrmann, Augustinus und der phänomenolgische
Frage nach der Zeit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992).
2. J. Brachtendorf (trans. Introduction and notes) Augustinus. De libero arbitrio—Die freie Wille
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), passim.
3. F.-W. von Herrmann, Augustine and the Phenomenolgical Question of Time, trans. F. Van Fleteren
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).

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two of these folios, Blondel addresses the possibility of a Christian philosophy in

general and an Augustinian Christian philosophy in particular. He writes:
To enter truly into Augustine’s perspective on certain knowledge, fundamental
and implicit knowledge of ourselves, of truth, and of God, it is necessary and
sufficient to perceive what has escaped nearly all philosophers, which Augustine
had so long himself ignored or misconstrued, but which he constantly experienced
and was sovereignly evident from the day of his conversion: We are not ourselves
our own light and nothing exterior or interior to ourselves illumines us. Insofar
as we believe we initiate our life from sensible things, from our own emotions,
from reason and even the idea we create of God, we err in the darkness of idola-
try. The true way is the inverse: error meus erat Deus meus. It is in avowing our
own darkness we receive true light; in making place for the interior master we
are instructed. If we think we find a home within ourselves, it is then and there
we remain alien to ourselves. God is more interior than our inmost self. It is of
him we ought to say: Intus est, ego foris. Do we see how this inversion of cus-
tomary perspective reverses every method of investigation? How this inversion
is linked to spiritual conversion? How this inversion constitutes the unity of the
speculative and the ascetic which we customarily oppose to one another? Do
we see how in the face of our Host who alone can fill our void, who alone can
illuminate our darkness, who alone can purify our presumption of philosophy’s
self sufficiency, it is humility which is truth and intellectual virtue and which
awaits the vision in an analogous and complementary perspective of the salutary
alliance of freedom and grace?
It has been asked whether Christian philosophy is possible, or if philosophy
is not on one side and Christianity on the other.4 Augustine offers us, at least in
an implicit state, Christian philosophy. Philosophy is not one and complete, but
exists only in spontaneous correspondence with concrete universalism, unique to
the search of the catholic spirit. Philosophy presents a cavernous void which only
plenitude of faith and love can fill. Perhaps no other doctrine is so adapted to the
actual state of man which is not nor ever has been a state of pure nature and which
is not of itself . . .5 a supernatural state, but in fact a transnatural state. This trans-
natural state is effectively placed in the perspectival center which alone permits
us to distinguish and unite intelligibly and actually all aspects of the philosophical
and religious problem which forms only one destiny and bears only one solution.
No one has done that as Augustine—he is unique. The fact that his teaching has
never yet been explicitly combined into a unity nor thoroughly developed in its
consequences explains to us the perpetual revival of Augustinism.6

4. Cf. vera rel., 8.

5. At this point in the manuscript, elements were stricken through and rendered illegible.
6. Archives Blondel f°21623 (Katalog Abb. 27) and f°21803 (Katalog Abb. 28). See also Augusti-
nus. Ein Lehrer des Abendlandes. Einführung und Dokumente, eds. C. Dittrich et al. (Wiesbaden :
Harrassowitz, 2009), pp. 99f.

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The twenty-first century has found renewed interest in the reception of Augus-
tine. Blondel is a contributor to twentieth-century Augustinianism. His reception of
Augustine is more a matter of spirit than particular texts. Rationalism was Blondel’s
opponent. In this regard, he apparently confused the thirteenth-century approach
to dialectic with rationalism. But Blondel’s appraisal of Augustine is accurate. His
estimate of Christian philosophy is “bang on.” There can be no completely suc-
cessful pursuit of truth by reason alone apart from revelation.
Augustine’s intellectual conversion in June, 386 has been the focus of countless
studies.7 He was surely converted, but to what? To Neoplatonism or Christianity?
When the question was put in these terms, scholars usually opted for one or the other.
In 1950, Pierre Courcelle’s Recherches sur les Confessions successfully advocated
for a new way to frame the question. He clearly showed Augustine’s conversion
was to Neoplatonic Christianity. An informal circle of Milanese Christians was
searching for parallels between Neoplatonism and Christianity. This circle provided
a favorable environment for Augustine’s conversion. In principle, Courcelle’s ob-
servation has been universally accepted. In practice, however, it has been honored
more in the breach than in the observance. Scholars of nearly all stripes, enamored
of Quellenforschung, constantly write of Ciceronian, Neoplatonic or Christian
elements in Augustine’s thought, as if they were disparate. Such analyses aid our
understanding of Augustine no doubt, but Augustine would be astonished.
In Augustine, the word philosophi indicates ancient Greek and Roman phi-
losophers. Augustine’s use of this term does not evolve.8 Pythagoras, Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, Varro, Cicero, and Apuleius, to mention the more prominent,
are philosophi. Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, the Cynics, Peripatetics, and
Academics are schools of philosophi. Christians are never called philosophi. The
chief characteristic of philosophi is their division into mutually exclusive sects.9
They argue interminably concerning the world, the human being, happiness, and
acquisition of that happiness. This very diversity renders philosophers incapable
of leading man to happiness. In fact, it has led only to confusion. The similarity to
our own day is only too evident.

7. Among the most important have been A. Alfaric, L’évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin: I. du
manicheisme au néoplatonisme (Paris: 1918); C. Boyer Christianisme et Néoplaotnism dans la
formation de saint Augustin (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1953); P. Courcelle, Recherches sur
les Confessions de saint Augustin (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1968); J. O’Meara, The Young Augustine
(London/New York: Longmans, Green, 1954); and J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions: A Text
and Commentary, 3 Vols., (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992).
8. C. Acad. III,37–42; ep.118; civ. Dei, VIII–X.
9. Most famously in civ. Dei, XIX,2, but cf. also c. Acad. III,42; conf. III,iv,8 and VI,v,7.

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The best of the philosophi (Plotinus and Porphyry), however, have known and seen
human destiny, the vision of God.10 Changing but a few words, these philosophers could,
and indeed have, become Christians.11 But even the best of the philosophers have not of
themselves possessed the means to attain this end permanently. They have attained this
end only fleetingly.12 Plotinus and Porphyry knew the proper end for man, namely, the
vision of the One, but they did not know the means to attain it, Christ’s incarnation.
The word philosophia however is another case. It has several related meanings.
Philosophia literally means a love or desire for wisdom.13 Vera (uerissima) philoso-
phia can designate a teaching which has been purified through the centuries from
Pythagoras until the Augustine’s day, a kind of philosophia perennis.14 In Augustine’s
day, this philosophia was found preeminently in Plotinus and Porphyry. Interpreted
correctly, it harmonizes with the Christian mysteries (sacra mysteria).15 Philosophia
is divided into three parts: moral (ethics), physical (physics), and rational (philoso-
phy of knowledge).16 Augustine gradually assimilates this philosophia into his own
synthesis. Christianity is sometimes designated as vera philosophia.17

Confessiones
Conf. reports various conversions, some experienced by Augustine and some
by others. In reading Cicero’s Hortensius, Augustine is converted to the pursuit of
wisdom;18 in reading the libri platonicorum,19 he is converted to pursuit of beauty
and truth; under the fig tree in Milan, he is converted to a celibate form of ascetic
Christianity.20

10. Conf. VII,xx,26; civ. Dei, X,23–32.

11. Vera rel.,7; ep.118,21.
12. E.g., cons. ev. I,15.
13. Civ. Dei, VIII,1; c. Acad. II,7.
14. For example, c. Acad. III,42.
15. Ord. II,v,16. Following G. Madec, I have taken sola to modify sacra mysteria, not philosophia (cf.
“A propos d’une traduction de De ordine II,v,16,” Révue des Études Augustiniennes 16 (1970):
pp. 179–186). It is the task of philosophia to understand only the Christian mysteries. If sola were
to modify philosophia, then the meaning would be that only philosophy gives understanding.
This translation is part of the debate as to whether philosophia is a separate means of salvation in
Augustine’s early works.
16. C. Acad. III,37; civ. Dei, VIII,4.
17. Ord. II,5; civ. Dei, XXII,22; c. Jul. IV,72.
18. Conf. III,iv,7—v,9.
19. Ibid.,VII,ix,13
20. Ibid., VIII,xii,28–30. On the literary form of conversion in conf., see. F. Van Fleteren, “St. Augus-
tine’s Theory of Conversion,” Augustine: Second Founder of the Faith, Collectanea Augustiniana,

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Augustine recounts reading Cicero’s Hortensius at age eighteen as his first con-
version, a conversion to philosophy. He read this work during the normal course of
his studies. Hortensius is a protreptic to philosophy similar to and, in fact, an imita-
tion of, Aristotle’s protrepetic. Neither is extant. This work reached Augustine at a
very opportune time. As an exhortation to the philosophic life, Hortensius influenced
Augustine to abandon fame and fortune, and to seek wisdom itself. Augustine was
introduced to a philosophical life of leisure in the pursuit of truth. Traces of this
life can be found in Augustine’s monasteries in Thagaste and Hippo.21 In Horten-
sius Augustine found the predominant thesis of ancient Greek philosophy: all men
seek happiness.22 This fundamental thesis remains with Augustine throughout his
entire life.23 Through Cicero’s eclecticism Augustine became familiar for the first
time with various philosophical sects. Many years later, Hortensius finds a place
in trin. XIV,19. In fact attempts to reconstruct Hortensius have used Augustine’s
works as the central source.24
That time, Augustine was restrained, however, in his pursuit of wisdom. He
later claimed that his reluctance was due to the fact that the name of Christ did not
appear in Hortensius.25 This comment is an historical anomaly—how should we
expect the name of Christ in Cicero’s works? But it indicates Monnica’s Christian
influence on the young Augustine and on his expectations. Cicero’s inquiry, as
Augustine came to know it, was incomplete. Man could seek beatifying truth, but
could not ultimately attain it. Augustine turned to Scripture, as he did at other cru-
cial junctures of his life, in his pursuit of truth.26 However, Hebrew literary style
did not compare favorably to the canons of Ciceronian rhetoric and, as a result,
Augustine’s aspirations remained unfulfilled. Looking back from his vantage point
as bishop, Augustine regarded youthful pride as the underlying reason why he did
not accept Scripture.
Augustine the bishop exegeted Col. 2:8, a verse which reads: Videte ne quis
uos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum traditionem
hominum, secundum elementa huius mundi, et non secundum Christum; quia in
ipso inhabitationis plenitudo diuinitatis corporaliter, in a manner entirely different

Vol. I, ed. F. Van Fleteren and J. Schnaubelt (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), pp. 65–80.
21. See L. Verheijen, La Règle de saint Augustin, 2 vols (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967); G.
Lawless, Augustine and His Monastic Rule (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
22. See, e.g., Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, I,4f.; X,6f.
23. See, e.g., b. vita 1; lib. arb. II,9; conf. X,xiii,20—xv,23; mag.14; s.150; trin. XIII,5–6.
24. M. Ruch, L’Hortensius de Cicéron; histoire et reconstitution (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1958).
25. Conf. III,iv,7—v,9.
26. Conf. VII,xxi,27; VIII,xii,29; IX,v,13; and c. Acad. II,5.

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from his predecessor and fellow African Tertullian.27 Here, Paul does not advise
against philosophy, but prohibits philosophizing secundum elementa huius mundi.
The best of ancient philosophy, however, is in conformity with Scripture. Like Paul,
agreement with Scripture is Augustine’s criterion of acceptance of Greco-Roman
philosophy. He retains this principle his entire life. Ancient philosophy at its best
is interpreted in terms of Christianity and can be assimilated. There is no true phi-
losophy without Scripture.
During his Manichean years, Augustine reports a direct acquaintance with
philosophical works.28 He found Manichaeanism at variance with the science of
his time.29 Encyclopedias and doxographies of philosophy engaged scholars of
his time. But these philosophers do not worship the true God. Philosophy has not
led them to religion.30 According to Augustine, philosophy is not one thing and
religion another.31
Augustine records his intellectual conversion through reading libri platonicorum,
given him by a non-Christian Neoplatonist.32 What he found in the Platonist books
was in harmony with Scripture: “Not in the same words, but with several various
reasons.”33 Augustine cites the prologue of John’s Gospel and a few Pauline texts as
a means of explaining the doctrines he found in the Platonist books: in particular,
the relationship between the Father and the Son, a metaphysics of esse and non esse,
the nature of spiritual being, and a theory of knowledge. These doctrines, properly
interpreted, harmonize with Scripture and help explain scriptural truths.
What he did not find in the libri platonicorum was Christ’s incarnation and the
salvation that it made possible; this was not unlike his experience with Cicero.34 A
few years later, he will recognize that the resurrection of the flesh is at odds with

27. Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, p. 7.

28. Conf. V,iii,3.
29. Speculation has abounded concerning the identity of the precise works Augustine read. As a pro-
fessional rhetor, Augustine would have read Seneca, Terence, Horace, and Quintillian, just to
name a few. This reading would have acquainted him with a philosophical koine, the “stock-
in-trade” of professional rhetors. Cf. A. Solignac, “Doxographies et manuels dans la formation
philosophique de saint Augustin,” Recherches augustiniennes 1 (1958): pp. 113–148.
30. See Rom. 1:20, a text referenced well over one hundred times in Augustine’s corpus.
31. See vera rel. V,8 (CCSL 32, p. 193): “. . . est humanae salutis caput, non aliam esse philosophiam,
id est sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem . . .”
32. Conf. VII,ix,13f.
33. Ibid. (CCSL 27, p. 101): “. . . non quidam his verbis, sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiciplibus
suaderi rationibus, . . . .” This translation is my own.
34. Ibid., VII,xx,26.

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Neoplatonic teaching.35 In these matters, Augustine followed Scripture—at least

as he understood it. Obviously, Augustine not only read, but also interpreted and
then assimilated his sources in ways very similar to what Marius Victorinus and
Ambrose had done before him.
The effect of reading these libri platonicorum on Augustine, which were very
influential on him throughout his life, was to inspire him to attempt an ascent of his
soul to God.36 He achieved some momentary success. However, Augustine expected
much more. The precise impetus of these attempts was Augustine’s reading of the the
Peri Kalou, that is Enneads I,6. He had been prepared for this reading by the sermons
of Ambrose.37 The scriptural justification for these ascents was Pauline, specifically
Rom. 1:20.38 Throughout his life, this verse was of paramount importance—not least
because it provided scriptural criteria for the ascent of the soul. The vision at Ostia
is of the same kind as those in Milan.39 Not surprisingly, Augustine had interpreted
Enneads I,6 in light of the scriptural Trinity: aeternitas, ueritas, caritas.40
At the end of the nineteenth century, von Harnack and Bossier commented upon
Augustine’s conversion.41 Discrepancies between Augustine’s account of his conver-
sion shortly after its occurrence in the Cassiciacum dialogues and his conversion
narrative in conf. were duly noted. Since that time, the works of Augustine, Plotinus
and, to a lesser extent, Porphyry, have been mined to ascertain their respective degrees

35. On this point, see F. Van Fleteren, “Augustine and the corpus spirituale,” Augustinian Studies 38/2
(2007): pp. 333–352.
36. Conf. VII,ix13; VII,xiv,20; and VII,xx,26. The bibliography on this question is vast. A resume of
the bibliography can be found in the following works: F. Van Fleteren; “Mysticism in the Confes-
sions—A Controversy Revisited,” in Augustine Mystic and Mystagogue (New York: Peter Lang,
1999), pp. 309–336; P. Courcelle, Recherches, pp. 157–166 (n. 7); O. du Roy, L’Intelligence de la
foi en la trinité selon saint Augustin (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1966), pp. 72–81; J. P. Kenney,
The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the Confessions (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp.
49–109. For this last work, cf. also F. Van Fleteren, review of The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Re-
reading the Confessions, by John Peter Kenney, in Augustinian Studies 37 (2006): pp. 287–291.
37. Conf. V,viii,14–iv,5.
38. In the rather literal NASB version, this v. reads: “For since the creation of the world His invisible
attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through
what has been made, so that they are without excuse.”
39. Cf. H. Brennecke, Augustin Handbuch, ed. V. Drecol (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), pp.
115–127; for a resume of contrary views, see J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Vol. 3, pp.
122–137 (n. 7).
40. K. Kienzler, Gott in der Zeit zu Beruhren (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1998); for a contrary view
see, e.g., J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Vol. 2, pp. 440f. (n. 7) and J. Brachtendorf, Au-
gustins “Confessiones,” (n. 1).
41. A. von Harnack, Augustins Confessionen: Ein Vortrag (Giessen: J. Ricker, 1881;1895); G. Bois-
sier, “La conversion de saint Augustin,” Revue des deux mondes, 85 (1888): pp. 43–69.

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of influence on Augustine and his writings.42 Some modernists even went so far as to
posit a conversion to philosophy in 386 and conversion to Christianity ca. 390. This
thesis has been superseded. Courcelle proved a conversion to both, always with the
proviso that Scripture provided the criterion of truth. In general two schools of thought
have arisen: a maximalist and a minimalist school. The maximalist school includes
Grandgeorge, Alfaric, O’Connell, and their disciples. These men claim that, at the
time of his conversion or shortly thereafter, Augustine read as many as twenty-six
treatises of Plotinus. This conclusion hardly accords with the “few drops” Augustine
mentions.43 The minimalist school would include Henri, O’Meara, and their disciples,
who think that Augustine read four or five treatises at Milan and perhaps a few others
later.44 It is often said that Augustine possessed an “in depth” knowledge of Plotinus
and Porphyry.45 What does this statement mean? If it means that Augustine possessed
knowledge of all or most of the treatises in the Enneads, the statement is clearly
false. Augustine did not have access to a complete copy of the Enneads or anything
comparable to what we possess today. He would have read select treatises according
to need and interest. If the statement means that Augustine knew a few treatises, but
knew these well, the statement is true. Even then, we must bear in mind that Augustine
interpreted and assimilated these treatises. He was not involved in textual analysis.
In fact, most of Augustine’s citations of Plotinus are epigrams.
Beginning in the third decade of the twentieth century, some (mostly Protestant)
scholars concluded that Neoplatonism—and especially its version of eudaimo-
nism—was inharmonious with Christianity.46 The eros and agape worlds—so they
thought—were antagonistic. Augustine’s teaching of uti and frui, the use of this
world to attain enjoyment of God, was thought to be a Neoplatonic doctrine that
was at odds with Christianity. This modern emphasis on disharmony between eros
and agape may well come from Kant’s denial of metaphysics. In some quarters, it
is taken as almost axiomatic that Augustine’s doctrine of uti and frui stands in op-
position to Kant’s second principle. This is untrue. Augustine has a metaphysical
perspective—Kant does not. This world has only a relative value. Full enjoyment
of God exists only in the next. Augustine himself realized that the analysis of uti

42. For a bibliography and commentary, see J. O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Vol. 2, pp. 413–
424 (n. 7).
43. C. Acad. II,5.
44. There are, of course, shades of opinion in between these two poles and these various shades are
associable with a host of names. The list is too long to mention here.
45. See, e.g., B. McGinn, “Augustine’s Mysticism,” Augustinian Studies 37 (2006): pp. 1–26. This is the
printed version of McGinn’s 2006 St. Augustine Lecture that was given at Villanova University.
46. Again the bibliography is vast. However, an excellent place to start is I. Bochet, De doctrina
christiana, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, XI/2 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1990).

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and frui, as he had received it, was flawed. He corrected the doctrine in light of
Paul. Human beings can enjoy each other in God, frui in deo.47 In any event, it is
demonstrable that Augustine never saw uti and frui as antagonistic to Scripture.48
Methodologies have been developed to study the question of Augustine and his
sources—Quellenforschung. At first, thematic similarities were pointed out. This
method was insufficiently rigorous. Therefore, methods of philological parallelism
were developed to show precisely what treatises Augustine had read and when he
had done so.49 Such methodologies tended to minimize the number of treatises read
by Augustine. By its very nature this methodology is limited to extant treatises. It is
certain that Augustine, even while in Milan in 386, had read treatises which are no
longer extant. Many otherwise brilliant scholars today tend to minimize the influence
of Porphyry on the grounds that the treatises which Augustine had surely read cannot
possibly be studied directly. At Milan, Augustine probably read parts of four or five
treatises of Plotinus and parts Porphyry’s de regressu animae as well as his Philosophy
of Oracles. What precisely these Porphyrian works contained is difficult to judge.50
Philological methodologies are by nature analytic. Texts of Augustine and Ploti-
nus, for example, are broken down and then analyzed for specific verbal influence.
But Augustine himself never used such a methodology. His interest was res, not
uerba. Ours should be the same; that is, we should not reduce questions of influ-
ence to words or to a “synthesized” Augustine. A synthetic mentality will make it
difficult for those who want to analyze Augustine and to understand him. Since, for
Augustine, philsosophy was the pursuit of truth, the life of faith cannot be set aside
in any way that might limit him to some kind of secular philosophy.

Cassiciacum Dialogues
Examples of the importance of the life of faith (intellectus fidei) are found in
Augustine’s earliest writings. In the preface to b. vita, one of the first works which
Augustine completed following his conversion, an allegory of conversion to philoso-
phia is found.51 The harbor of philosophia, to which one enters by various routes, is

47. See, e.g., Philem. p. 20.

48. Augustine discusses uti-frui in, e.g., doc.chr. I,34–37.
49. The pioneers in this endeavor were P. Henri, Plotin et l’Occident, Specilegium sacrum Lavaniense
(Louvain: Gnomom, 1934); and P. Courcelle, Lettres Grecques en L’Occident: De Macrobius à
Cassiodore (Paris: 1943).
50. J. O’Meara,“Porphyry’s Philosophy of Oracles in the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Recherches Au-
gustiniennes 6 (1969): pp. 103–139.
51. B. vita 1–4.

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Christianity. The mountain which lies in front of the harbor as a sort of trap probably
represents either Manicheanism or, perhaps, even non-Christian Neoplatonism. Au-
gustine often accuses both movements of pride. At the end of the work, union with the
triune Christian God is proposed as beata uita.52 An Ambrosian hymn, Deus creator
omnium, referred to by Monnica, offers evidence of this God. A solid faith, an eager
hope, and a burning love lead us there (cf. 1 Cor. 13). Attempts have been made to
cull the Neoplatonic from the Christian elements in b. vita. Such analysis may help
us to understand Augustine, but they can also lead us astray. Such is not Augustine’s
synthesis. He sees these various “elements” as a unity. The last paragraphs of b. vita
represent Augustine’s first attempt to reach an intellectus fidei concerning the trinity.
Similarity to conf. VII,ix,13f. (and IX,x,23–26) is evident.
In c. Acad., Augustine asserts his position on philosophy and Christianity quite
succinctly.
After a short temporal interval stubbornness was removed. The purified and
clear mouth of Plato emanated especially in Plotinus, with the clouds of error
removed. He is judged to be the Platonic philosopher so similar to him [Plato]
that he [Plotinus] is thought to have lived at the same time, but since there is
great temporal distance between them he is thought to be Plato redivivus. . . .
In my opinion one true philosophy has been purified. It is not a philosophy of
this world which our sacred mysteries rightly detest, but of another intelligible
world.53 To this world most subtle reasoning54 would never recall souls, blinded
by the darkness of error in its many forms and stained by the deepest filth unless
the highest God by a certain clemency for the masses would lower and submit
the authority of the divine intellect to the human body. Awakened by precept and
deed souls can turn into themselves to breathe once again the fatherland without
use of the dialectic. . . . No one doubts that we are impelled to learning by a two-
fold weight of authority and reason. To me it is certain never to depart from the
authority of Christ, for I do not find a stronger. With regard to subtle reasoning
I am now so affected that I desire impatiently to apprehend truth not only by
belief but also by understanding. I provisionally trust that I will find among the
Platonists what is not repugnant to our sacred [mysteries].”55

52. B. vita 35.

53. See retr. I,iii,2. Augustine rescinds as too facile the identification of Plato’s intelligible world with
the new heaven and the new earth of Rev. He does, however, accept the intelligible world as the
eternal and unchangeable ratio by which God made the world.
54. O. du Roy’s opinion that ratio subtilissima is equated with the Holy Spirit is to be rejected. See
his L’intelligence, p. 116 (n. 36).
55. C. Acad. III,18,41–19,43 (CCSL 29, pp. 59–61): “Adeo post illa tempora non longo intervallo
omni pervicacia pertinaciaque demortua, os illud Platonis quod in philosophia purgatissimum est
et lucidissimum, dimotis nubibus erroris emicuit, maxime in Plotino, qui platonicus philosophus
ita eius similis iudicatus est, ut simul eos vixisse, tantum autem interest temporis ut in hoc ille

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Although Augustine began c. Acad. at Cassiciacum before he started b. vita, he

finished the latter first, in the autumn of 386. In it he clearly indicates the relation-
ship between biblical teaching and rational thought, a position he will consistently
maintain throughout his life. Philosophia perennis exists. This philosophia resides
in Plotinus and is a philosophia of the intelligible world.56 Subtle reasoning is not
capable of delivering man to this world. Human salvation comes through the incarna-
tion of the divine intellect. Augustine has rejected skepticism and seeks intellectus
fidei; in fact, the purpose of the ancient wisdom is to provide this understanding.
Neoplatonism is provisionally accepted as a means to attain it. Accord with the
authority of Christ and sacra mysteria provides the criterion of acceptance of this
philosophia. Augustine intends to assimilate ancient wisdom. Mt. 7:7’s quaerite et
inuenietis is the biblical foundation for the success of his enterprise.57 Augustine
states here in prospect what will turn out to be his life’s work: understanding the
Christian mysteries with the help of philosophia. Augustine’s rejection of skepti-
cism, a life of seeking and never finding, as he found in Cicero, entails the belief
that it will be possible to find beatifying truth.
De ordine, composed during the same period, widens our understanding of
Augustine’s perspectives on philosophia:
There is a twofold way for us to follow when obscure matters trouble us: reason
or, at least, authority. Philosophy (philosophia) promises reason and frees very
few. Philosophy forces them nevertheless not only not to despise these mysteries,
but to understand them alone58 as they ought to be understood. The true and, as
I say, genuine philosophy has no other business than to teach what is the begin-

revixisse putandus sit. . . . sed tamen eliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disci-
plina. Non enim est ista huius mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed
alterius intellegibilis; cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas, et altissimis a corpore
sordibus oblitas, nunquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus Deus populari quadam
clementia divini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret, atque sub-
mitteret; cuius non solum praeceptis, sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semetipsas, et
resipiscere patriam, etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent. . . . Nulli autem dubium
est gemino pondere nos impelli ad discendum, auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi ergo certum est
nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentiorem. Quod autem sub-
tilissima ratione persequendum est; ita enim iam sum affectus, ut quid sit verum, non credendo
solum, sed etiam intellegendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim
quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido.” This translation is my own.
56. See retr. I,iii,2.
57. C. Acad. II,9. Using Mt. 7:7 in this way was common among the later Western fathers of the
church. See B. Viviano, “The Gospel according to Matthew,” in The New Jerome Biblical Com-
mentary (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1990), p. 646.
58. See n. 15 supra. I have taken sola as a third person plural neuter modifying mysteria—although it
could modify philosophia. In the latter case, the translation would be “philosophy alone provides

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ning of all things itself without beginning, how great an intellect remains in him,
and what has thence flowed for our salvation without any degeneration. These
venerable mysteries teach the one, omnipotent and tripotent (tripotentem) Father,
Son and Holy Spirit who free people of sincere and unshakeable faith, not with
confusion, as some preach, and not with pride, as many preach.59
This is a clear example of what philosophia is to do: it is to help the few understand
the Christian mysteries, in this case the triune God. Philosophia is not separate from
the Christian mysteries—it is united with them. Faith in these mysteries offers sal-
vation, with neither confusion, as did Porphyry, nor pride, as did the Neoplatonists
in general.60 Augustine presents us with an intellectus fidei.
In summary, Augustine uses Neoplatonism to interpret Scripture. Likewise, he
interprets Neoplatonism in terms of Christianity. In this endeavor he had predeces-
sors: Marius Victorinus and Ambrose of Milan, to name two.61 Both of these men
interpreted the Neoplatonism of Porphyry and Plotinus in terms of the Council of
Nicea, that is, in terms of the substantial equality of the Father and the Son.

De vera religione
Four years later, in 390, Augustine fulfilled a promise to Romanianus, his close
friend and patron, to dedicate a work on true religion to him.62 This work, vera rel.,
is both anti-Manichean and anti-Porphyrian. The text may contain various redac-
tional levels.63 In a preface intended to facilitate the conversion of non-Christian
Platonists—no doubt Porphyrians—to Christianity as the universal way of salvation,

understanding.” The former translation underscores the use of philosophia to understand only as
a means of understanding the Christian mysteries. All other uses are curiositas.
59. Ord. II,v,16 (CCSL 29, pp. 115–116): “Duplex enim is uia quam sequimur, cum rerum nos ob-
scuritas mouet, aut rationem, aut certe auctoritatem. Philosophia rationem promittit et uix pau-
cissimos liberat, quos tamen non modo non contemnere illa mysteria sed sola intellegere, ut
intellegenda sunt, cogit, nullum que aliud habet negotium, quae uera et, ut ita dicam, germana
philosophia est, quam ut doceat, quod sit omnium rerum principium sine principio quantus que
in eo maneat intellectus quid ue inde in nostram salutem sine ulla degeneratione manauerit, quem
unum deum omnipotentem, eum que tripotentem patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, docent
ueneranda mysteria, quae fide sincera et inconcussa populos liberant, nec confuse, ut quidam, nec
contumeliose, ut multi, praedicant.” This translation is my own.
60. See F. Van Fleteren, “Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the Thought of St. Au-
gustine,” Augustinian Studies 4 (1973): pp. 33–71, here 48–49.
61. See E. Schultz-Flügel, “Paulusexegese: Victorinus, Ambrosiaster,” in Augustin. Handbuch, ed. V.
H. Drecoll (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), pp. 115–119; and H. Brennecke, “Der trinitarische
Streit im Westen bis Ambrosius,” ibid., pp. 119–127.
62. See c. Acad. II,8 and vera rel.12.
63. O. du Roy, L’ntelligence, pp. 126f. (n. 36).

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Augustine turns to the relation between Christianity and the ancient wisdom.64 Dur-
ing pre-Christian times, philosophers differentiated between esoteric doctrine and
public worship. Not so with Christianity. Religion is not one thing and philosophy
another.65 Teaching and worship are united. Plato would have thought that a man
who was the power and wisdom of God and who could persuade the masses to
purify their lives and minds was divine. Such purification was occurring through-
out the then-known world due to the spread of Christianity. With the change of a
few words and opinions, Platonists would have become Christians. In fact, such
conversions were occurring during Augustine’s lifetime—he may be referring to
Milanese Porphyrians whom he knew personally. Comparison of vera rel. and civ.
Dei X,23–32 is instructive for understanding the Porphyrian background of this
preface. The unity of faith and reason as the true way to salvation, the very thing
sought by Porphyry, is the theme of both.

De doctrina christiana
Augustine wrote doc. chr. I–III,25 at the same time he was at work on the conf.,
that is, ca. 396–398.66 The work is a Christian De oratore67 (or Christian Orator)
and, at the same time, a charter of Christian education.68 The learned Christian
should be acquainted with ancient wisdom and contemporary science in order to
interpret Scripture. Philosophers, especially Platonists, have spoken truth. They are

64. Vera rel. 1–11.

65. Ibid., 8.
66. Augustine regarded the doc. chr. highly enough that, in the late 420s, he interrupted the writ-
ing of retr. in order to finish it. The work is of one piece. Augustine’s reason for discontinuing
doc. chr. was, in all likelihood, rooted in not knowing exactly what he wanted to say about
Tychonius’s regulae of exegesis; Augustine was still in the process of developing his own ex-
egetical principles. It could be that it was not ecclesiastically opportune in 397 for an orthodox
Christian to write about a Donatist. In 426, there would have been no such limitation. See. C.
Kannengiesser, “The Interrupted De doctrina Christiana,” in De doctrina Christiana: A Classic
of Western Culture, ed. D. Arnold and P. Bright (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame:
1995). Clearly, Augustine assimilated many of Tychonius’s principles; for this, see P. Bright,
“Tyconius and His Interprerters: A Study of the Epitomes of the Book of Rules,” in A Conflict of
Christian Hermeneutics, ed. C. Kannengiesser and P. Bright (University of California, Berke-
ley: 1989), pp. 23–39.
67. Augustine knew Cicero’s De oratore and Orator ad Brutum well. He did not follow them slav-
ishly. Rather what we have in De doctrina Christiana is a guide for the Christian preacher much
in the same sense that Cicero’s De oratore and Orator are guides for the political orator.
68. See, A. Primmer, “The function of genera dicendi in De doctrina Christiana 4,” in De doctrina
christiana, A Classic of Western Culture, pp. 68–84 (cf. n. 66). See also Reading and Wisdom:
The De doctrina christiana of Augustine in the Middle Ages, ed. E. English (University of Notre
Dame Press, Notre Dame: 1995).

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not to be feared but, rather, appropriated. The divine command to the Hebrews in
Exodus to take Egyptian gold with them69 is an allegory for a divine command for
the Christians to assimilate ancient wisdom. The criterion of acceptance of ancient
wisdom is harmony with Scripture. In fact, doc. chr. I is a Christian metaphysics
assimilating ancient wisdom—probably Porphyrian. It provides the metaphysical
foundation for the semiotic principles of doc. chr. II–III.
The scriptural basis for the unity of faith and reason is nisi credideritis, non
intelligetis.70 Augustine is aware of a variant translation, nisi credideritis, non per-
manebis. Today the latter is preferred. But, for Augustine, this textual ambiguity
was intentional; it was a function of divine providence. The divine author could
have intended both. Both lead to divine truth. Augustine’s understanding of this
text is well known in the Middle Ages.71

Epistula 118
Ca. 410, Augustine replied to a letter of a student named Dioscorus concerning
ancient philosophy.72 At first, Augustine excoriates the student for asking unneces-
sary questions out of pride—the student did not want to appear unlearned.73 Such
pride is not worth a bishop’s time. Eventually, however, while recuperating from
an illness, Augustine answers his questions—though we may surmise that he did
not do so to Dioscorus’s satisfaction. All men desire happiness. Happiness is at-
tained by possession of the highest good and truth. This true Platonic doctrine
lay hidden within the Academy for centuries, to protect it from materialism. In
due course, several Platonists became Christians. The universal spread of Chris-
tianity is testimony to its truth—the Truth and Wisdom of God its foundation.74
His answer constitutes a distillation of Greco-Roman philosophy, appropriated
into his own synthesis. It is a realization of Augustine’s search which began with
his first reading of Hortensius thirty-eight years previously. During his expla-
nation, Augustine refutes the materialism of Epicureans, Stoics, Anaximenes,
and Anaxagoras.75

69. Ex. 3:22 and12:33.

70. Is. 7:9 (LXX).
71. See Anselm, Proslogion 1; Epistula de incarnatione verbi, prior recensio 4.
72. Ep. 118.
73. Ibid., 2–12.
74. Ibid., 13–22.
75. Ibid., 23–31.

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De trinitate
The various books of trin. are almost impossible to date—the work was begun ca.
400 and completed ca. 421. Augustine discontinued the work, but resumed working
on it at the request of Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage. Somehow, to Augustine’s great
displeasure, the first twelve books were published without his permission. Undoubt-
edly, he ceased writing the work because he did not know what to say about human
knowledge of God in this life. The principle of the work is fides quaerit, intellectus
invenit.76 Trin. V–VII translates philosophical terms, borrowed from the Greek, and
uses them to reach some understanding of God. Arianism provides the background.
Augustine’s approach is apophatic,77 but God has asked us to say something rather
than nothing.78 Trin. VIII–XV is an ascent of the soul to God. From 386–394, Au-
gustine thought that a permanent vision of God was possible for man in this life.
By ca. 400, that hope is now only a distant memory. In trin., Augustine analyzes
the activities of the human mind as an exercitatio animae in search of an image of
God within man. The ascent proceeds from the exterior to the interior, and then
to God. This entire procedure reminds one of Porphyry. Gen. 1:26–27 informs us
that man is made in God’s image. In what does this image consist? From the time
of his first encounter with Ambrose, Augustine believed this image to lie within
the rational human soul. After much effort, Augustine offers memoria dei, intel-
ligentia dei, amor dei under God’s grace as the closest things to the image of God
within man.79 This image is but distant—man can only know God per speculum et
in aenigmate.80 These passages do not contain a philosophy of the human person
in itself. The philosophy of the human person is a means to knowledge of God.
No doubt much can be learned of the human being and his powers from the ascent
that is found in trin. But no individual part can be understood without Augustine’s
goal, knowledge of God, in mind.

De ciuitate Dei
In civ. Dei VIII–X, Augustine confronts the best of ancient philosophy as found
in Plato and the Platonists. Philosophy is taken in its etymological sense, as love of

76. Trin. XV,2.

77. Ord. II,16. Cf. nn. 15 and 58 supra.
78. Doc. chr. I,6.
79. Trin. XV,17–22.
80. 1 Cor. 13:12; cf. F. Van Fleteren, “Per speculum et in aenigmate: 1 Corinthians 13:12 in the Writ-
ings of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 23 (1992): pp. 69–102.

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wisdom.81 The superiority of Plato and the Platonists to other ancient philosophers
consists in their belief that the human soul becomes ultimately happy by participa-
tion in an unchangeable and incorporeal light. Of all the ancient philosophers, Plato
and the Platonists are closest to the Christians because they have seen the summum
bonum. Plato and Porphyry are the most noble of the ancients.82 The error of even
the best of the Platonists—Augustine again has Porphyry in mind—was to seek
happiness through sacrifices to daemons. True adoration is found in adoration of
the one true God. Visible sacrifice should be a sign of internal sacrifice, a contrite
heart. Human interior sacrifice to the true God becomes acceptable by union with
Christ’s sacrifice.83 Porphyry sought a universal way of salvation, but, being a true
Platonist, could not accept incarnation as that means. The theme here is the same as
that which was central to his intellectual conversion: the best of ancient philosophy
saw the goal of human happiness, but was never able to attain it.

Retractationes
Augustine’s mature reflection on ancient philosophy appears in retr. In that
work, Augustine’s primary focus is the Pelagian controversy—he did not want
his early works read in a Pelagian manner. However, commentary on his earliest
works includes a retrospective on Platonism. He regrets his earlier, overly facile
homogenization of Scripture with ancient philosophy. He regrets any and every
trace of accepting Porphyry’s omne corpus fugiendum. He rejects study of the
liberal arts as a means to salvation. He regrets his failure to recognize the cen-
trality of the resurrection. He rejects any trace of Platonic reminiscence theory.
Nevertheless, he accepts Plato’s world of ideas, when placed within the divine
intellect, as a rational explanation for creation. His final assessment is important
for the present discussion:
It displeases me that I have approved of two worlds, one sensible and the other
intelligible, not from the person of Plato or the Platonists, but from myself, as if
the Lord wished also to signify this, since he did not say “my kingdom is not of
the world,” but rather “my kingdom is not of this world” (Jn. 18:36); although
what was said could be found in another manner of speaking. If another world
is signified by Christ there, the world would be better understood as the new
heaven and the new earth (cf. Rev. 21:1; 2 Pt. 3:13), for which we pray when we
say “your kingdom come” (Mt. 6:10). But Plato did not err when he said there

81. Civ. Dei VIII,2.

82. With regard to Plato, see cons. ev. I,35; with regard to Porphyry, see civ. Dei XXII,3; with regard
to the Platonists in general, see ibid. IX,1 and X,1.
83. Ibid. X,23.

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is an intelligible world. Even if the word does not accord with church custom
we should look at the thing itself. He called the intelligible world that eternal
and unchangeable reason by which the Lord created the world. Were anyone to
deny this, it would follow that he would say that God created what he created
irrationally, either when he created it or before he created it, he did not know
what he was making, were he to have had no plan for creating it. If there was
such a plan, as there surely was, Plato apparently called this the intelligible
world. But we would not have used this word had we been more educated in
church literature.84
Here Augustine uses Plato’s doctrine of an intelligible world to help explain the
biblical teaching of creation. Augustine’s attitude here applies, mutatis mutandis, to
his entire use of ancient wisdom. In many instances, ancient wisdom accords with
the Bible. Augustine interprets and assimilates this wisdom into his own Christian
synthesis. The standard of acceptance is the Bible. Church custom determines the
vocabulary that should be employed. But, again, Augustine’s interest lies in res,
non uerba.

Contemporary Discussion
Augustine’s corpus contains certain passages, indeed certain works, which would
seem to allow one to construct an Augustinian philosophy apart from Scripture. A
list of such passages and works would include: c. Acad., imm. an., quant., conf. X
(the discussion of memory), and conf. XI (the discussion of time). At first blush,
these writings appear distinctly and purely philosophical. Scholarly research into
literary sources could easily reinforce this conclusion. Upon further investigation,
however, such an interpretation is illusory. Augustine assimilates ancient philoso-
phy even into his incipient thinking. C. Acad. is a search for beatifying truth. Such
a search is both entirely biblical and entirely philosophical. Augustine is refuting

84. Retr. I,iii,2 (CCSL 57, pp. 12–13): “. . . et quod duos mundos, unum sensibilem alterum intel-
legibilem, non ex Platonis uel ex Platonicorum persona, sed ex mea sic commendaui, tamquam
hoc etiam dominus significare uoluerit, quia non ait: ‘Regnum meum non est de mundo,’ sed:
‘Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo,’ cum possit et aliqua locutione dictum inueniri, et si alius
a domino Christo significatus est mundus, ille congruentius possit intellegi, in quo erit caelum
nouum et terra noua, quando complebitur quod oramus dicentes: ‘Adueniat regnum tuum.’ Nec
Plato quidem in hoc errauit, quia esse mundum intellegibilem dixit, si non uocabulum quod eccle-
siasticae consuetudini in re illa inusitatum est, sed ipsam rem uelimus adtendere. Mundum quippe
ille intellegibilem nuncupauit ipsam rationem sempiternam atque incommutabilem, qua fecit deus
mundum. Quam qui esse negat, sequitur, ut dicat inrationabiliter deum fecisse quod fecit, aut,
cum faceret uel antequam faceret, nescisse, quid faceret, si apud eum ratio faciendi non erat. Si
uero erat, sicut erat, ipsam uidetur Plato uocasse intellegibilem mundum. Nec tamen isto nomine
nos uteremur, si iam satis essemus litteris ecclesiasticis eruditi.” This translation is my own.

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Cicero’s skeptical inability to reach truth. In doing so, he cites Mt. 7:7: Quaerite
et inuenietis.85 Augustine uses this scriptural text to gain assurance that his intel-
lectual quest will succeed. According to retr., imm. an. emerges from notes that
were prepared for a projected Soliloquia III, though no such text ever appeared.86
The imm. an. is an attempt to prove the immortality of the human soul through
its spirituality. Quant. attempts to prove the spirituality of the human soul.87 Both
works are part of an ascent of the soul to God. In them, the ascent reaches interior-
ity, return to oneself. The conf. clearly indicates the import Augustine placed on
reaching a notion of spiritual being; it was preparatory for knowledge both of self
and of God. The early works are part of an Augustinian ascent of the soul to God,
a simultaneous effort of Christianity and Neoplatonism. Augustine assimilated the
ascent of the soul in a Christian sense. In a similar context, discussion of memory in
conf. X and of time in conf. XI are part of an ascent to knowledge of God, a theme
essential to conf. In conf. X, memory is the site of traces of true happiness, the hap-
piness that results from the possession of God. In Book XI, Augustine discusses
human time as a means to understand divine eternity—the nature of time is not
investigated for its own sake. This is a clear example of Augustine’s use of truths
arrived at through philosophy in order to explain Scripture. This is fundamental to
his methodology. No passage in Augustine has been found—nor indeed has one
even been credibly alleged—to show that he used philosophy to pursue goals other
than the attainment of a deeper understanding of Christianity or Scripture or both.
Agreement with Scripture is without exception the criterion of assimilation. We
must not let a perspective that includes the presumption of discontinuity between
Scripture and Greek philosophy, between the Hebrews and Hellenism intrude upon
our understanding. Augustine did not de-Hellenize. Neither should we. Efforts to
de-Hellenize Augustine inevitably lead to erroneous interpretation.
In Milan of 386, Augustine commences a serious and, ultimately, extended
effort to appropriate Neoplatonism into his own Christian synthesis. In the works
of Augustine’s immediate predecessors, assimilation of Neoplatonic sources is not
nearly as mature as it is in Augustine. There is no real synthesis in Marius Victorinus
or Ambrose of Milan; certainly what is there is not as profound as what we find in
Augustine. In these earlier attempts, whole passages are extracted from Porphyry
or Plotinus and, after having been emended with an eye to Christian doctrine, im-
bedded by the authors within their own works.

85. See n. 57 supra.

86. Retr. I,v,1.
87. Ibid. I,viii,1.

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Conclusion
On a third-century sarcophagus, Christ is pictured as shepherd and philosopher.88
Christ is pastor and he is also the fulfillment of the Greco-Roman ideal of the search
for happiness. Almost immediately after the intellectual conversion effected by his
reading libri platonicorum, Augustine began to assimilate Christ as philosopher.89
Later as priest and bishop, he followed Christ as pastor.90
At least three interpretations of Augustine as a Christian thinker have taken hold
in recent times: (1) Augustine is purely a theologian; (2) Augustine is a Christian
thinker acquainted with philosophy; and (3) Augustine possesses a philosophy not
only distinct, but actually separate from theology. The terminology used in this
discussion is anachronistic. Augustine does not use the term theology to describe
what he is doing. Theology is what Varro does. Though differing in their conclu-
sions, these three positions, implicitly or explicitly, interpret Augustine from the
same perspective. All of them think of philosophy as an entity, as something distinct
from the Bible. This is a perspective Augustine would not have understood, let alone
appropriated. In his work on medieval exegesis, Henri de Lubac shows quite clearly
that it is in exegeting Scripture that the fathers philosophize. Augustine evolved in his
understanding of which parts of ancient wisdom were capable of being harmonized
with Scripture. He interpreted the ancients in such a way as to put them in harmony
with Scripture. And then he incorporated them into his synthesis.
Is Augustine a philosopher? This survey of texts, brief as it is, should help both
to clarify and to answer this question. If philosophy is a love of wisdom, the answer
is a resounding “yes.” Augustine’s life is a continual search for beatifying truth, a
search for wisdom. Wisdom and Truth are both realized in Christ. If philosophy
is to be taken as an aid in understanding the Christian mysteries, once again the
answer is clearly “yes.” Augustine seeks intellectus fidei. Philosophy helps. If
philosophy is to be taken as a life of leisure in the pursuit of wisdom, Augustine
desired preeminently to be a philosopher. However, he was rather quickly saddled
with too many pastoral and ecclesiastical duties to pursue that goal. As a bishop,
judicial obligations intruded daily upon his philosophical leisure.91 Nevertheless,

88. Benedict XVI, Salvi Spe, 1.

89. Conf. VII,ix,13f.
90. Possidius, Vita Augustini, pp. 19–27.
91. See, e.g., ep. 213,5. At one point, Augustine thought he had reached an agreement in principle
with his parishioners to cease serving them in a judiciary capacity, but the deal was never final-
ized. In this same vein, it is interesting to note that the first duty that he ceded to Eraclius, his
successor, was his obligation to judge.

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he always desired to pursue wisdom as found in and encouraged by Scripture. If

philosophy is to be taken as a post-Cartesian rational pursuit divorced from truths
of faith, the answer is an unambiguous “no.” Augustine would have regarded such a
separation as utter foolishness. Such a pursuit is curiositas. Any attempt to wheedle
out an exclusively Augustinian philosophy without due regard to Scripture must end
in failure and disarray. There is no room for Augustine in a post-Cartesian philo-
sophical world. Of course, philosophical themes can be extracted from Augustine’s
writings. Time, freedom of the will, and refutation of skepticism are three such
themes though, obviously, there are many more. Augustine speaks eloquently to
these themes and has much to offer contemporary discussions. But to extract these
principles and speak of them alone, apart from Scripture, is to rip them from their
original Augustinian context. Were this done, we would not have Augustine; on the
contrary, we would have a contemporary philosopher.
History is replete with instances of appropriating Augustine and adapting him
to the questions that are germane in the era of the one making the appropriation.
Jansenism is one, ontologism another, and Calvinism is a third example. History
should make us both wary and weary of such efforts. The possibility of misappropria-
tion is only too apparent. A much better goal would be to determine what Augustine
himself meant and then attempt to show how such universal Augustinian truths apply
beyond his age. Pursuit of truth, Augustine teaches us, is paramount. Philosophy
does not advance like material science: one theory does not replace another. Rather,
certain geniuses have understood reality profoundly and have seen truths extending
beyond their time and place. Such intuitions are relevant to our, and to any age; it
is the human task to ferret out their universal relevance and significance.

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