PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL

ETHICS

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGEST

Submitted to:
Atty. Giduquio

Submitted by:
Clauden S. Arrabis LLB-3

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 CHAPTER 1
Zoreta v. Simpliciano

A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004.

FACTS:

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of

COntract and Damaes against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated 22 June
2001 due to the latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286,
where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said
cases, respondent who was not a dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per
Certifications issued by teh CLerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan,
performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by presented documents.

ISSUE:

WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules of
Court.

RULING:

Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the
lawyer’s oath to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is
duly commissioned when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the
lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct, “Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility). The lawyer violates, likewise, Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.,

FACTS:

Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from
1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951…………. 70%

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1952……………….. 71%

1953……………….. 72%

1954……………….. 73%

1955……………….. 74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “ A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/s shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A No. 972 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of
1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take into account
of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar.

G.R. No. L-1179 January 8, 1913

FACTS:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case
seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that
he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

The applicant took and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per
cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling
four points short of the required percentage of 75.

It is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon

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motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes.

The clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
and examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in
the Philippine Islands without an examination." It is contended that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

ISSUE:

Whether section 2 of Act No. 1597 is mandatory.

Ruling:

"In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was
the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should
change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of
the act in question. The construction should be in harmony with this assumption whenever
possible."

The word "may" may be construed as either mandatory or permissive in its effect. But to
construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we
conclude therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of
the legislator, that it should be given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that
the true intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to admit
to the bar without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the
court is otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary qualifications.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the
bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.

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In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002
bar examinations and for disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.

FACTS:

Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez

and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.

ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary
to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.

MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding. Believing in good
faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and
terminated.”

i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral
turpitude.

Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk. Office of Bar Confidant disposed
of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:

Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases,
not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the
same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE:

WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:

PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the

Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic (Meling did not pass the bar).

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Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”

He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
“attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. Unauthorized use of the appellation
“attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.

PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE. Limited to citizens of good moral

character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.

Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver
that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused
or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.”

Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, A.C.
No. 3910. August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for
the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given
the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. However, complainant and his
family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and, when
confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers
of Canares and were there to construct a piggery.

Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply
however, the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to
respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property .

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Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale
covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin,
who notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be
disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his
signature and selling the subject property without his consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer
may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and
good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the profession.

It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares
located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of
complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the
property was orally given to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the
complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat,
Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be
in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a
proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is
presumed to know, or ought to know, this process.

Respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct,
and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,

represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL, vs. ATTY.
HOMOBONO T. CEZAR,

FACTS:

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 Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent
sold them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to
return to them the amount they have paid him for it.

Complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment. Respondent received

from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance
was to be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each.
Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount
of P187,500.00 each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not
paid in full the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly
executed with Crown Asia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into
a contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell
short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this
lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet
paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right
to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Assignment.

Respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.

VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, vs. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA,

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FACTS:

On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa
Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through
their counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting,
docketed as Civil Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against
herein complainant, Victoria V. Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late Faustina
Borres. The action sought, among others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-24150 in the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of
215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of
land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs.

Judge Alovera presided over the hearing in the presence of Teresita Bauzon, court
stenographer of Br. 17, Atty. Villaruz, who presented the evidence ex parte. After hearing,
Judge Alovera rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Borres the lease property which
is the subject of this case.

Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type
the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if
he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to decide cases. With
this assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as
Judge Alovera was dictating it.

Complainant who was in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her property
and she was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines.

Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting
presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order. He
observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for decision,
except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the "simulated
proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his
offer of exhibits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Alovera should be disbarred.

RULING:

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to

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practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What
transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only
Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from
another court, were present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as
there was actual court session in open court going on at that time.

The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained with
him even after his retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs.
Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.

The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the
"Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January
25, 1995, after the retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the
exhibits were not properly filed and do not bear markings of having been received by the
court.

The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the
court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer a
judge his submission was refused.

This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and
impartial administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is
disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as
demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.

Respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED.

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REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL,
ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, vs. PEDRO
QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT, and
ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT,

G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000

FACTS:

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat filed
an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene,
Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean -- all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.

The case was submitted for decision for fourth time due to non-appearance of petitioner’s
counsel and for repeated motion for extension.

Petioner’s counsel filed a motion to reopen the case however the court denied the said
motion. Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his law
firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of communication he had sent to
them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact only after he had filed his
withdrawal as their counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial
was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because private respondents were equally guilty of
delay and procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their
remaining evidence would be "in the interest of substantial due process and humane
justice."

ISSUE:

Whether or not a motion to reopen the case is proper.

RULING:

The court frowns on lawyer’s practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to

file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any
pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of the failure. The same principle applies
more forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion. The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers,
after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do
so. Moreover, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

In the case at bar, counsel’s excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA
ruled that petitioners were given “more than enough time” to complete their
representation of evidence.

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QUINGWA VS. ARMANDO PUNO

Adm Case No. 389- February 28, 1967

FACTS:

Flora Quingwa filed a complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of Bar, with
gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a
public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that the respondent took her to
the Hotel, registered as Mr. and Mrs. Puno and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her
on the promise of marriage. And when the complainant got pregnant, the respondent refused to fulfil
his promise. Thereafter, the complainant gave birth to a baby boy whom the respondent
disowns to be his child. The complainant used to give money to the lawyer whenever hea sked from her.

The respondent denied all the allegations of the complaint, and therein allegations do not
constitutegrounds for disbarment or suspension under Section 25, Rule 127 of the former
Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent be disbarred from the practice of his profession.

RULING:

Section 25 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court- it is already a settled rule that the
enumeration of grounds of disbarment or suspension is not taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. Supreme court held that an attorney be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him.

Section 2, Rule 127 of the old rules of court- now Section 2, Rule 138 of Rules of
Court – One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character.

Legal and Judicial Ethics by Malcolm – When integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for
the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him.

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Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court – grossly immoral conduct is one of the grounds for
suspension or disbarment.

Paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics – profession of law must conform

themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality.

WHEREFORE, respondent Armando Puno is hereby DISBARRED and, as a consequence, his

name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Robert Soriano v. Atty. Manuel Dizon

A.C No. 6792

January 25, 2006

FACTS:

Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor when along
Abanao Street, Baguio City, a taxi driver overtook him. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi,
pulled it over, and berated Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver, and held him by his shirt. To
stop the aggression, Soriano forced open his door, causing Dizon to fall to the ground.
Soriano tried to help Dizon get up, but the latter was about to punch him so Soriano
punched Dizon first to fend off an impending attack. Soriano prevented another attempt by
Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car and got his revolver with the handle wrapped
in a handkerchief. As Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up from
the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him. Soriano fell on the thigh of the accused, and the
latter merely pushed him out and sped off. The bullet hit Soriano’s neck and lacerated his
carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated him, he would have died if not for the
timely medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal cord injury causing the left side of his
body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his job as a taxi driver.

Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation,
conditioned on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was
rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for
Dizon’s disbarment. The Commissioner of the CBD recommend that respondent be
disbarred for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the
recommendation of the CBD and sent their resolution to the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

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RULING:

The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of frustrated
homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The Supreme Court held that
Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
“A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.” Dizon failed to obey the laws of the land through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect legal processes through his unjust
refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his probation.

Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

provides that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” Dizon’s violation was exhibited when he tried to reach an out-of-court settlement
with the family Soriano but when negotiations failed, he made it appear as if it was the
family who approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon
fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According to
the three doctors who examined Dizon, his injuries were so minor that his allegation was
impossible.

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In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:

Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again
took it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in
which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the
1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar.
However, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario,
together with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some
documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two
were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty
but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del
Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

RULING:
Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy
of the certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited
only Del Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal
machination.
But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?
No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the
Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe
him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a
duly authorized member of the bar.

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SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for
Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT

A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented
by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort
on the ground of grave misconduct.

Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of
land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as
commission. Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated
demands, he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action
for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.

The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as
principal obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.

An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay
the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that
only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied.
In payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but was dishonored because
the account against which they were drawn was closed.

Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
before the MTC, Quezon City.

In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated
checks in favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already
been encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified
that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.

The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the
favorable action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure
to do so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that his
strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment “smacks of
a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.”

The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment
against him. It recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings
with complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay
the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

ISSUE:

16 | P a g e
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with
complainant.

RULING:

YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.

diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such
confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal
profession.

His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His
failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the
court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even
had the temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his
three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet,
not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such
failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the
comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to
willful disobedience to its lawful orders.

Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility stating that:

Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.

The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to
pay Soledad P13,800.

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 CHAPTER 2

LIM SE V. ARGEL

Facts:
Lim Se and Benito Lim were leasing from Chiombon, through her attorney-in-fact
San Pedro, the ground floor, mezzanine, and basement of the Venancia Building in Baguio
City from 1965 to 1970. When the lease expired, Lim Se leased the same premises from the
Estates of Reyes, Sr. from 1971 to 1973.
An interpleader action was filed by Lim Se and the other tenants against San Pedro and the
Estate to determine to whom rentals will be paid; the Court ruled in favour of the Estate.

From 1974 to 1977, Lim Se and his son Benito leased the premises from the Estate. The
New Life Café and Restaurant was operated by Benito on the premises.

Meanwhile, Bulatano, who claimed to have purchased on December 9, 1970 the said
building from Ocampo, who allegedly bought it from Chiombon, filed an action for the
recovery of rentals and damages from the Estate, Lim, Ocampo and Remedios for their
occupancy of the building. He also filed a case in the Caloocan City Branch of CFI of Rizal to
recover possession against Ocampo and San Pedro. Ocampo and San Pedro thus instituted a
third party complaint against Lim Se and Benito to vacate the premises. Lim Se and Benito
opposed due to improper venue (there was a stipulation in the contract that in case of a
suit, it should be filed in the City of Baguio, which was denied.

A summary judgment was granted in favour of Ocampo and San Pedro, in which Lim Se and
Benito were ordered to vacate the premises. Lim Se and Benito appealed while Ocampo and
San Pedro asked for a writ of execution. Lim Se and Benito also filed an MR and to hold the
case in abeyance, which was denied. The summary judgement was declared final and
executory, the appeal not having been perfected.
A writ of possession instead of the usual writ of execution was issued by the Branch Clerk
of Court, in which the City Sheriff was ordered to take possession of the premises occupied
by Lim, to eject them and anybody claiming under them and to deliver the possession to
Ocampo and San Pedro.

Sheriff Par then delivered the writ to Lim and issued an ultimatum that they should remove
all their properties from the premises within two hours.

Petitioners are claiming that the writ was enforced in a most cruel and oppressive manner
and that the Court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in
rendering a summary judgment in the ejectment case (the third party complaint). After a
bond was given by petitioners, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued,
directing the Sheriff to place petitioners in possession of the premises from which they had
been ousted.
Atty. Adaza, a lawyer who never appeared in the lower court and acted independently of
both San Pedro’s and Ocampo’s lawyers, filed a motion to lift the injunction.

18 | P a g e
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Adaza should be cited for contempt.

Held:
Yes. Atty. Adaza’s characterization of the mandatory injunction as “unjust and a
miscarriage of justice” and as devoid of factual and legal basis is unfounded and
unwarranted. He treated a resolution of the Court as if it were a pleading of the adversary
which he could assail in unrestrained or abrasive language. His unjustified and
disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious derogatory implications or innuendos
which clearly constitute direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae.

Salcedo vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-42992. August 8, 1935

FACTS:
Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged
contemptuous paragraph in his motion for reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to
the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out
power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire
to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the
eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider
unjust, increase the proselytes of “sakdalism” and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.
The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of
contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco,
far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion,
reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because,
according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

HELD:
YES. Atty. Francisco ordered to pay a fine of P200.00 in ten days and reprimanded.

RATIO:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not

19 | P a g e
only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics,
158 and 160), of being what he now is.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guarranty,
said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

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 CHAPTER 3

Montecillo and del Mar vs Francisco Gica et al

FACTS:

Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del
Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay
Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a
veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices
“knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered
del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the
President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of
the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a
compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually,
the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as
well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire
of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges
who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not
be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating
that had he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless”
he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del
Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters
and those allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

21 | P a g e
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In
short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of
the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez

FACTS:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan
for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court,
acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to
temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations
against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that
he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a
manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then
ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the
newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is
entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the
Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not
embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

22 | P a g e
 Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and
call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements
necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such
statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the
entire system of administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor
who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona
fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members
of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

23 | P a g e
 CHAPTER 4
DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10,
2002

FACTS:

Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of
money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which
were not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a
result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the
case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the
status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come
with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for
hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to
inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk
of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of
court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has
been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did
he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse
him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the
Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s
deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part
of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame

24 | P a g e
contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse
of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.

WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES

A.C. No. 5280 : March 30, 2004

FACTS:

Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a

petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the
circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent
prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial
Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office
demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left
his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was
shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained
facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject
matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that
he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another
lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two
of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the
facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from
public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

HELD:

25 | P a g e
 No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent
due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to
hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to
their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by

respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally
owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa
against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate
the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any
lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary
interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BLANDINA HILADO VS JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID

FACTS:

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled
against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented
by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he
thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that
no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s
story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado
returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado
returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain
Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving
behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was
stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco
sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was
merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was
already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty.

26 | P a g e
Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said
case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD:
Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s
consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating
his client’s cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against
the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was
only signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real
author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco
filed his entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time
is not a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on
previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional
confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.

BARBUCO VS. BELTRAN

A.C. No. 5092. August 11, 2004

FACTS:

Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent Beltran for malpractice

of law. Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for
the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, which adverese to the complainants interest. On the same

27 | P a g e
day, complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for
payment of the docket fees.

However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant's brief. The brief
was only filed by respondent 43 days after the deadline of submission of the same.

When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade liability by alleging that he met a
vehicular accident, which incapacitated him for several days, thus he cannot finish the
appellants brief. Moreover, he sustained injuries in the head, which as a result respondent
lost track of schedules of hearings and deadlines for submitting briefs.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent's failure to file appellant's brief warrants sanctions.

Held:

Yes. the SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers states:A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. An attorney is bound to protect
his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief
within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the
delay of FORTY THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries
as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering
that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. This is shown by the
receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of the
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent could have asked any of his
partners in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for
Extension of Time to file the said pleading.

Moreover, every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of
his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of
him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within the
bounds of the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. "

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ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his
counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. praying that: 1. That
Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this petition; 2. That the the subject Sandiganbayan
resolutions be vacated and set aside;

Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members
of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the
EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
to the Presidency which in effect would mean that they have prejudged a case that would
assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the
Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent
mockery of justice and due process. On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
denying their motion to include obviously undeniable material facts regarding Chief Justice
Davide’s acts in relation to the Proclamation of President Arroyo during EDSA 2, which
would be the only defense of Preseident Estrada, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by
petitioner. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made
manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she
blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its
comments or opposition thereto, remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion
would result in chaos and disorder.

Held:

The Supreme Court has dismissed the foregoing petition as the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the
authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would
elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He
denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process.

Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the
judicial forum; he has also repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion

29 | P a g e
for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice. clearly
disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before
the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned
Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making,
directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of
the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task
of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our
peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and ROMEO A. BRAWNER

582 SCRA 474 (2009)

An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being
impeached

FACTS:

Rodante D. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents

Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Romeo A. Brawner of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) charging them with violating Canons 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint arose
from the resolution of the Comelec’s First Division in favor of one Diogenes S. Osabel, the
head of one of the factions in the party-list group Alagad. The ponencia was written by
Commissioner Borra while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The dispute was elevated to
the Comelec En Banc. The latter affirmed the decision of the Comelec’s First Division.

Brawner, in his answer asserted that the complainant should have filed an appeal via
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and that being members of a constitutional
body he and Borra ―are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment complaint for being
impeachable officer.‖ For his part, Borra contends that the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canons of Judicial Ethics cannot be made to apply to him and Brawner because they
are not members of the judiciary.

Marcoleta argues that Brawner and Borra cannot take refuge in their being impeachable
public officers to insulate them from any disbarment complaint. For him ―the insulation
from disbarment complaint of impeachable public officers when referring particularly to
the members of the Comelec applies only to the majority of its members who should all be
members of the Philippine bar,‖ citing Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Borra and Brawner are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment
case for being impeachable officers

HELD:

30 | P a g e
 At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In
Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco v. Fernan, has laid down the rule that an impeachable
officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached.
Marcoleta’s availment of Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to skirt this rule is
specious.

It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec members should be lawyers
pertains to the desired composition of the Comelec. While the appointing authority may
follow such constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full complement of lawyers in the
Comelec membership is not precluded.

At the time the present complaint was filed, Brawner and Borra and three other
commissioners were all lawyers. As an impeachable officer who is at the same time a
member of the Bar, Borra must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of
impeachment before he may be held to answer administratively for his supposed errant
resolutions and actions.

The Court thus finds respondent Borra’s contention that the grounds-bases of the
disbarment complaint, fastened on supposed errors of judgment or grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts, are proper for an appeal, hence, complainant’s
remedy is judicial, not administrative.

As for complainant’s invocation of Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
the same relates to the quasi-judicial function of the Comelec, which function rests on
judgment or discretion, so that while it is of judicial nature or character, it does not involve
the exerciseof functions of a judge.

The same provision thus directs that in the exercise of the Comelec’s quasi-judicial power,
the chairman and members should be guided by the canons of judicial ethics. It bears
emphasis that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applies only to
courts of law, of which the Comelec is not, hence, sanctions pertaining to violations thereof
are made exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial
officers like the Comelec chairmanand members, who have their own codes of conduct to
steer them.

Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under the Code
of Professional Responsibility, no specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered
to show that respondent did engage in dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in his
capacity as a lawyer. It bears reiteration that the acts particularized in
the complaint pertain to respondent Borra’s duties as a Comelec

commissioner.BARRIENTOS VS. LIBIRAN-METEORO

A.C. No. 6408, August 31, 2004

FACTS:

In September 2000, the lawyer issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of
Barrientos and Mercado for the payment of a pre-existing debt. The checks bounced due to
insufficient funds, thus, charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed. The lawyer asked for
deferment of the criminal charges and promised to pay her debt several times, but failed to
pay the full amount, even after a complaint for disbarment was filed against her.

31 | P a g e
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law. Lawyers are the instruments for the administration of justice and the vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealings so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment
of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It
shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the
image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were
issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures.

CHUA VS. MESINA; GROSS MISCONDUCT

A.C. NO. 4904. AUGUST 12, 2004

FACTS:

Complainants Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged

respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional
misconduct, and culpable malpractice.

Complainants were lessees of the property of respondent's mother. Respondent's mother

defaulted in paying a loan that she obtained in a bank, thus respondent convinced
complainants to help her mother if paying the said obligation, to which the complainants
acceded. It was agreed among that that in consideration for the act of complainants, the

32 | P a g e
property which they are leasing will be transferred to their name. The complainants
complied with the terms of the agreement. A deed of sale concerning such property was
executed.

However, to evade liability for paying capital gains tax, respondent instructed complainants
to execute another deed of sale which will be antedated 1979, wherein the capital gains tax
was not yet in effective.

Subsequently, after the execution of the deed of sale, respondents instructed his clients
[complainants] to execute a simulated deed of sale which will reflect that the property was
re-conveyed to his mother.

The cunning acts of respondent did not end there. Respondent went to the house of
complainants and got the owners certificate of title of the said property which is still under
the name of her mother. he promised to the complainants that he will process the transfer
of the property to their name. Years passed, but respondent never returned the said title to
the complainants.

Meanwhile, another lessee file a criminal case against the complainants and respondents
for falsification. He claims that was also given the promise that the property will be offered
to him before it will be sold to another, but respondents sold it to complainants without
offering to him. Because of the foregoing circumstances, complainants filed an
administrative case against respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Held:
Yes, said the Court- "This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct.

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979
to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and
legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent
intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a

simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants
reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into
turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation that
he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of
complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.

That the signature of “Felicisima M. Melencio” in the 1985 document and that in the 1979
document are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or
the 1985 document or even both.

A propos is this Court’s following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith
which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher

33 | P a g e
standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.”
Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged
by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no
advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing
is considered in an attorney’s favor.

Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio
property to complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such
promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being one
of ownership while that in the case at bar is moral fitness.

Respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., COMPLAINANT VERSUS ATTY. LEO J. PALMA,

RESPONDENT.
ADM. CASE NO. 2474 SEPTEMBER 15, 2004

FACTS:

Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.

Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and
respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. He hired respondent as his
personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s relationship with complainant became
intimate. On June 22, without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married
Lisa, the complainant’s daughter in Hongkong. Complainant came to know that, a) on the
date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his (complainant’s) office and
airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hongkong; b) respondent
misrepresented himself as bachelor in the Hongkong authorities to facilitate his marriage
with Lisa; and c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children.
Complainant filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and
Lisa. The complainant contented that with the moral ascendancy of the respondent over
Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition
to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her
into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of the Philippine law that he
should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and
that the “advice” of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-
two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong
in June 22, 1992 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is
a “bachelor.”

The respondent contented that “….. and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for
an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of respondent to Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.

HELD:

34 | P a g e
To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.

Respondent admits that he married Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor;

however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from the
term “spinster” with respect to Luisa. There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well
versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a
bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting
marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at the Cardial’s Private
Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage from the Deputy Registrar
of Marriages in Hongkong proves respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9,
1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second marriage was confirmed.
In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married
her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a
brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and woman are
obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really
loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Furthermore, (not stated in the case) under Article 35 paragraph 3 of the Family Code, “a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void ab initio except those covered by
the preceding chapter”. Though the marriage was solemnized in Hongkong,
the intrinsic validity of the marriage is governed by the national law of the contracting
parties. In the case at bar, since both of the parties are Filipino citizens, the validity of their
marriage shall be governed by the Philippine law. Under the Philippine law, absence of the
essential and formal requisites of marriage shall make the marriage void ab initio. Their
marriage was contracted without the valid marriage license, thus, the marriage of
respondent and Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.

MACARRUBO V MACARRUBO

FACTS:

In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career
as a lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with
Esparza was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against
Macarrubo. Teves alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza
was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and then
Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named Josephine Constantino whom he
subsequently abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbo’s
marriages as well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially
declared in default for failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given the
opportunity to defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to
marry Teves in order to save her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that
Teves sent some strangers to pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for being a
sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case serves as res judicata on the

35 | P a g e
disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He also avers that
his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to similar
circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in
supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is
void, recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for
grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is
subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
HELD:
Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is
still undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the
second marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman
while his first marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense
that both second and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely
to be coerced. One incident of a “shotgun marriage” is believable, but two such in
succession would tax one’s credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to the
institution of marriage and family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault
upon the basic social institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness
of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis
cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer
in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the
annulment of Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove such second marriage
as a ground for disbarment.

36 | P a g e
BARRIENTOS VS LIBIRAN-METEORO
477 SCRA 634 (2005)

A lawyer is prohibited from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his
firm.

FACTS:

Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr..
This sprung from the time that her father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the services
of the law office of Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan where the Republic was
claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT).

Ilusorio, with the assistance of Lokin, entered into a Compromise Agreement where
Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. Ilusorio-Bildner alleges that the informal gathering,
through the “high-handed and deceitful maneuvers” of Lokin, was suddenly and without
notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of
PHILCOMSAT were elected. Her father contested the validity of the meeting by filing before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were
purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case Lokin
appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting
interests.

Ilusorio, had earlier filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint. However, on account of the
death of Ilusorio, his complaint was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
new complaint by Ilusorio’s children. Ilusorio-Bildner now filed the complaint but the IBP
Board of Governorsdismissed it. No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon
petitioner. Ilusorio-Bildner, nonetheless, learned about the matter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lokin was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing an
interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm

HELD:

Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC cases,
respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he proffering
that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan “has been the
personal accountof Atty. Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the
law partnership.” Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by
respondent’s own evidence and statements.

As earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in the
Sandiganbayan case. In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of
ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm.

37 | P a g e
Plainly, when Lokin represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an
interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had
priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.

The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondent’s firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there
was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case “did not in any way
involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG.”

UYTENGSU III v. ATTY. BADUEL

A.C. No. 5134; December 14, 2005

FACTS:

Complainant is one of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a
pending patent application. He alleges that sometime in December 1998 respondent
requested him to sign a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing Luis Wee (Wee)
and/or Thomas Jacobo (Jacobo) to claim, demand, acknowledge and receive on his behalf
the certificates of title from the Register of Deeds, General Santos City, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and from any government office or agency due to
complainant and his co-heirs by reason of their application for Homestead Patent.

Complainant refused to sign the SPA as he wanted to obtain the documents personally.
In essence, complainant asserts that respondent caused Kokseng to execute an SPA in favor
of Wee and/or Jacobo to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. even if
he knew that Kokseng had no authority to do so.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Baduel exceeded his authority as counsel when he asked Uytengsu to sign
an SPA

HELD:

No, Atty. Baduel did not exceed his authority as counsel.

The Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of
agency and the general rules of ordinary agency apply to such relation. The extent of
authority of a lawyer, when acting on behalf of his client outside of court, is measured by
the same test as that which is applied to an ordinary agent.

Such being the case, even respondent himself can acquire the certificates of title and other
documents without need of an SPA from complainant and his co-heirs.

38 | P a g e
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

FACTS:

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent
and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a
petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the
PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents
Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed
motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central
Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired
by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio
Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent

Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.”

HELD:

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and
later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the
issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court
39 | P a g e
held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agencyprocedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from
the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and boundsof the
“intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code
of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the
government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting,
enforcing, or interpreting government or agencyprocedures, regulations or laws or briefing
abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent
to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the
role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

40 | P a g e
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005

FACTS:

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case

earlier filed by complainant against respondent.

In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,
Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mocamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola
Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli
Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

It appears from the records that the Bauduli Datus are relatives of respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Bubong violated Canon 6 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

RULING:

Yes. In the case at bar, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of
the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer.

By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership to the bar.

Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter: “A

lawyer in the government shall not use his public function to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.”

Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public

office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession.

The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing
less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

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