Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, G.R. No. 156358
Petitioner,

- versus - Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
LEONILA FLORES, BERSAMIN,
ANANIAS SEDONIO, ADELINO DEL CASTILLO, and
MONET, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
ANGIE MONET,
JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR
GARCIA, Promulgated:
BENITA MOYA,
JULIO ALTARES,
LEA ALTARES, August 17, 2011
CLARITA SABIDO,
JULIE ANN VILLAMOR,
JUANITA TUALA,
VICTOR FLORES III, JOHNNY
MOYA,
HAZEL AVANCEA,
SONIA EVANGELIO, and
GENNY MONTAO,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable.[1] The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or
evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a
major component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any
delay in the full execution of final and executory decisions.[2] Thus, a remedy intended to
frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution
and upon a strict observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence. Any
such remedy allowed in violation of established rules and guidelines connotes but a capricious
exercise of discretion that must be struck down in order that the prevailing party is not deprived
of the fruits of victory.

Via her pleading denominated as a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner has
come directly to the Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, in Bacolod City
for the nullification of the order dated November 12, 2002 (granting the respondents
application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction [enjoining the execution of the
final and executory decision rendered in an ejectment suit by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities [MTCC], Branch 6, in Bacolod City]) issued in SCA Case No. 01-11522[3] for being in
violation of law and jurisprudence.

The petitioner also prays that the Court should enjoin the RTC from taking further
proceedings in SCA Case No. 01-11522, except to dismiss it.

Antecedents

On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for
ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants,
including the respondents herein, from his properties, docketed as Civil Case No. 23671 and
raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some
of the defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving
spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him on September 24,
1998.

The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two discrete groups. The first group,
represented by Atty. Romeo Subaldo, included those defendants occupying Lot 641-B-1,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-167924; Lot 641-B-2, covered by TCT No.
T-167925; and Lot No. 641-B-3, covered by TCT No. T-167926, all owned by the plaintiff.
The defendants in this group relied on the common defense of being agricultural tenants on
the land. The second group, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Ranela de la Fuente
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and counted the defendants occupying Lot No. F-V-3-
3749-D, covered by TCT No. T-55630, also owned by the plaintiff. The second groups
common defense was that the plaintiffs title was not valid because their respective portions
were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas were
subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the MTCC rendered a decision
dated March 17, 1999 in favor of the petitioner,[4] to wit:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN FAVOR OF THE

PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS except the defendant
Damiana Daguno, as follows:

1. Ordering the affected defendants or any person or persons in

acting in their behalf, assignees or successors-in-interests
including members of their family to vacate portions of Lot No.
641-B-1 covered by TCT No. 16742, Lot No.641-B-2 covered by
TCT No. T-167926 and Lot Plan-F-V-337490-D covered by TCT
No. T-55630 which they occupy and turn over the possession of
the said property to the plaintiff, and to pay the cost of the suit.
 The prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order is denied for lack
of basis.

All the defendants appealed. On September 22, 1999, the RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the
decision of the MTCC.[5]

Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTCs
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the
petitioners title (TCT No. 55630) was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal,
the RTCs decision became final and executory as to them.
On December 6, 1999, the CA dismissed the second groups appeal, and later denied
their motion for reconsideration on April 17, 2000.[6]

The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition
for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458), but the Court rejected their recourse on July 19, 2000, and
issued an entry of judgment on October 20, 2000.[7]

In the meantime, on February 16, 2000, the MTCC amended its decision to correct
typographical errors in the description of the properties involved.[8] None of the parties
objected to or challenged the corrections.

On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners
motion.[9] The writ of execution was duly served on August 24, 2000 upon all the defendants,
including the respondents, as the sheriffs return of service indicated.[10]
On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5, 2000
writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the March 17, 1999
decision and the February 16, 2000 amended decision.[11] They anchored their motions on the
supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ of execution was foreshore
land belonging to the State. To support their contention, they presented the following
administrative issuances from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), namely:

(a) Memorandum dated August 30, 2000 issued by the Community

Environment and National Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
recommending the cancellation of Free Patent F.P. No. 309502 from which
was derived Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1, and petitioners
TCT No. T-55630; and

(b) Memorandum dated November 13, 2000 of the DENR Regional Executive
Director for Region VI in Iloilo City.

They argued that such supervening event directly affected the execution of the March 17, 1999
decision and its amendment, whose continued execution affecting foreshore land would be
unjust to the occupants or possessors of the property, including themselves.[12]
 On May 4, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents motion to quash, observing that
the cancellation of the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not
happen, and was not the supervening event that could stay the execution.[13] A month later, on
June 8, 2001, the MTCC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration,[14] viz:

As of this point in time the movant has not shown that she has a better
right to possess the land she is presently occupying as a squatter, than the
plaintiff who is in possession of a clean Torrens Title. It is not true that the
execution of the decision of this court would be unjust to her. To put it bluntly,
it would be more unjust to the plaintiff who was deprived of possession of his
land for a very long time, because of the movants insistence in occupying said
land even after the decision ejecting her from the plaintiffs land had become
final and executory.

In fine, the movant has not shown additional evidences or arguments

which would warrant the reversal of the order dated May 4, 2001.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated June 1, 2001 is

denied.

SO ORDERED.

The story would have ended then but for the fact that on October 1, 2001, or more than
a year after the writ of execution was served upon the defendants in Civil Case No. 23671, the
respondents, led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo, and now assisted by Atty. Leon Moya, filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order) in the RTC in Negros Occidental, docketed as SCA Case No.
01-11522,[15] praying:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this

HONORABLE COURT that the assailed ORDERS dated 4 May 2001 and 8
July 2001 be REVERSED, ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

PETITIONERS are further praying that after due notice and hearing, a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be
issued to enjoin the execution/implementation of the Decision dated 17 March
1999 and the 16 February 2000 Amended Decision.

Such other and further reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

On October 11, 2001, Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez, to whose branch SCA Case No. 01-
11522 was raffled, granted the respondents prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in
the following terms,[16] to wit:

xxxx
WHEREAS, the matter of issuance or not of a TRO was summarily heard
on October 5, 2001 in the presence of the parties and counsels who were both
heard in support/amplification of their respective stand(s);
 WHEREAS, it appears that the issuance of a TRO prayed for would be in
order at this stage in this case because there appears an imminent danger of
demolition of the structures of herein petitioners at the premises in question,
pending the trial and final determination of the merits in this case in this case
(sic) wherein the private respondent Pahila does not appear to have prior
possession of the premises in question, and, wherein although it appears that
the title of the premises in question is in the name of respondent Pahila, there
also is a showing that the same title may have been illegally issued;

WHEREAS, the very imminent danger of demolition may result to

irreparable damage to herein petitioners, thus, the impending demolition
appears to be a compelling reason for the issuance of a TRO at this stage in this
case.
NOW THEREFORE, YOU, the herein respondents, YOUR AGENTS,
REPRESENTATIVES, or ANY PERSON acting for and in your behalf, are
hereby ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further implementing the 5
April 2000 Writ of Execution and/or any of its Aliases or any demolition order,
if one might have already been issued, in civil case No. 23671, MTCC, Branch
6, Bacolod City, until further orders from this Court.

On October 25, 2002, the petitioner sought a clarificatory order,[17] moving that the TRO
be vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and because such effectivity could
neither be extended nor be made indefinite. She complained that her hands had already been
tied for a year from executing the decision and from availing herself of the writ of demolition;
and pleaded that it was time to give her justice in order that she could already enjoy the
possession of the property.

On October 30, 2002, the respondents moved for the early resolution of the case and
for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory injunction.[18]

On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction,[19] as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, YOU, the herein respondents, YOUR AGENTS,

REPRESENTATIVES, or any person acting for and in behalf, are hereby
ENJOINED to CEASE and DESIST from further implementing the April 25,
2000 Writ of Execution and/or any of its aliases, or any demolition order, if
one might have been issued already, in Civil Case No. 23671 before MTCC,
Branch 6, Bacolod City, pending the hearing and final determination of the
merits in this instant case, or until further orders from this Court.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner then directly came to the Court through her so-called petition for review
on certiorari, seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
issued by the RTC pursuant to its order dated November 12, 2002. She contended that: (a) the
RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in a way not in accord with law or
the applicable jurisprudence, because the injunction was directed at the execution of a final
and executory judgment of a court of law; (b) the respondents (as the petitioners in SCA Case
No. 01-11522) had no existing right to be protected by injunction, because their right and cause
of action were premised on the future and contingent event that the petitioners TCT No. T-
55630 would be cancelled through a separate proceeding for the purpose; and (c) the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution was issued long after the March 17,
1999 judgment of the MTCC had become final and executory.

Issues

The petition presents the following issues, to wit:

a. Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November

12, 2002 order of the RTC; and
b. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and
executory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC.

Ruling

We give due course to the petition as a petition for certiorari.

The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in issuing the TRO
and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to restrain the execution of the final and
executory decision of the MTCC.

I
November 12, 2002 order of the RTC is an
interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal

With the petition being self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, a mode of
appeal, we have first to determine whether the assailed order of November 12, 2002 was an
interlocutory or a final order. The distinction is relevant in deciding whether the order is the
proper subject of an appeal, or of a special civil action for certiorari.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined,
but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon.[20] An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment rendered.[21] The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
 The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject
of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision
on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals
will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and
will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties
may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.[22] An interlocutory order may be
the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate

special civil action under Rule 65,[23] provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.[24]

II
The petition, by alleging acts constituting manifestly grave abuse of
discretion, was a petition for certiorari

Without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of
appeal, the Court is constrained to treat the present recourse as a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.

Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or other

tribunal or officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the
former of some proceeding then pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already
terminated, in cases where the procedure is not according to the course of the common
law.[25] The remedy is brought against a lower court, board, or officer rendering a judgment or
order and seeks the annulment or modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.[26] It is
available when the following indispensable elements concur, to wit:

1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial

or quasi-judicial functions;

2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and

3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[27]
Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same
must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.[28] The extraordinary writ of certiorarimay
be availed of only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.[29]

For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it must
be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory order
is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious
relief.[30] Yet, the allegation that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion will not alone suffice. Equally imperative is that the petition must satisfactorily
specify the acts committed or omitted by the tribunal, board or officer that constitute grave
abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[31] To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted
without jurisdiction.[32]

A reading of the petition shows that the petitioner has satisfied the requirements to
justify giving due course to her petition as a petition under Rule 65. She has identified therein
some acts as constituting the RTC Judges manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, namely: (a) despite the final and executory nature of the
judgment sought to be enjoined, the RTC still issued the TRO and, later on, the assailed writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution;
(b) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to protect the respondents
alleged right in the subject properties, but the right did not appear to be in esse; and (c) the
issuance of the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction was in violation of the
requirements imposed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.

Did the petitioners failure to first make a motion for reconsideration in the RTC
preclude treating her petition as a petition for certiorari?

The answer is in the negative. That the petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration in the RTC before coming to this Court did not preclude treating her petition
as one for certiorari. The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no appeal,
or any plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits exceptions. InFrancisco
Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court has recognized exceptions to the
requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a
party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where
there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate,
and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is
involved; and (g) in case of urgency. The allegations of the petition definitely placed the
petitioners recourse under most, if not all, of the exceptions.

Was the petition timely filed?

It was. The petitioner received a copy of the order dated November 12, 2002 on
November 15, 2002. Pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 65,[34] she had until January 14, 2003, or
60 days from November 15, 2002, within which to file a petition for certiorari. She filed the
petition on January 2, 2003,[35] well within the period for her to do so.

We also observe that the rule that a petition should have been brought under Rule 65
instead of under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (or vice versa) is not inflexible or rigid.[36] The
inflexibility or rigidity of application of the rules of procedure is eschewed in order to serve
the higher ends of justice. Thus, substance is given primacy over form, for it is paramount that
the rules of procedure are not applied in a very rigid technical sense, but used only to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is
made, their aim is defeated.[37] Verily, the strict application of procedural technicalities should
not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.[38] To institute a guideline,
therefore, the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the rules of procedure shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.[39]

III
March 17, 1999 Decision of the MTCC, being already final
and executory, could not be assailed; nor could its
execution be restrained
The respondents elevated to the Court the CA decision dated December 6, 1999 and
resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458
entitled Damiana Daguno, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.) The Court dismissed the
petition on July 19, 2000, and the dismissal became final and executory on October 20,
2000 becausethe respondents did not timely file a motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
the MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution on April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriffs return
of service, the writ of execution was duly served upon all the defendants.

Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now
be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents. They could not anymore
be permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their
interposition of new petitions or pleadings.[40] Even as their right to initiate an action in
court ought to be fully respected, their commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of
securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully and
finally adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement
of the judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties
to appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right of the winning
party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through execution and
satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the law.[41] To frustrate the winning
partys right through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the
courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation. The interest of justice undeniably
demanded that we should immediately write finis to the litigation, for all courts are by oath
bound to guard against any scheme calculated to bring about the frustration of the winning
partys right, and to stop any attempt to prolong controversies already resolved with finality.[42]

It is true that notwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments, equity

still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and executory judgment,
specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment based on the ground of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.[43] He may also have a competent court
stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment when facts and
circumstances that render execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire;[44] or when a
change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.[45]

Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is available anymore to the respondents,

however, for the time for such remedies is now past. Indeed, it is now high time for the
respondents to bow to the judgment, and to accept their fate under it.

IV
Issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction is patently without basis and violated the
requirements of the
Rules of Court and jurisprudence

At this juncture, we find and declare that the RTC Judges issuance of the assailed
order dated November 12, 2002 granting the respondents application for the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted manifestly grave abuse of discretion.

A.
Respondents had no existing right violated
by the implementation of the writ of execution

Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive

rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct
to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The controlling
reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is that the court
may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. The
application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason
for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions
for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to
be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from
both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably
necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.[46]

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights.
Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts
bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck
down for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a
right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action.[47]

Here, the respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be protected
by injunction. They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject
of the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. The Memoranda and investigative report,
whereby the DENR appeared to classify the property as foreshore land, conferred upon the
respondents no interest or right in the land. Under all circumstances, the classification was not
a supervening event that entitled them to the protection of the injunctive relief. Their claim to
any right as of then was merely contingent, and was something that might not even arise in the
future. Simply stated, they could not lay proper claim to the land before the State has taken a
positive act of first properly classifying the land as foreshore land and the courts have first
conclusively determined and adjudged the ownership in their favor in a suit brought for the
purpose. Without the States positive act of classification and the courts adjudication, all that
the respondents had was an inchoate expectation that might not at all materialize, especially
if we consider that the petitioner was already the registered owner of the same property, as
evidenced by her existing and valid transfer certificate of title covering the land (a fact that
they themselves admitted and acknowledged),[48] for which she enjoyed the indefeasibility of
a Torrens title.[49]

Presumably well aware that the respondents held absolutely no valid and existing right in the
land, the RTC Judge had plainly no factual and legal bases for enjoining the enforcement of
the writ of execution through the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction. He obviously
acted arbitrarily and whimsically, because injunction protected only an existing right
or actual interest in property. Thus, he was guilty of committing manifestly grave abuse of
discretion, and compounded his guilt by stopping the enforcement of a final and executory
decision of the MTCC.
 B.
TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
were wrongfully issued for an indefinite period

We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO effective until further
orders from him. He thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure. He knowingly did so,
considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and purpose of the TRO as a temporary and
limited remedy, instead of a permanent and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, which expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days
from service of the TRO on the party or person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the
limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and basic rule of procedure, he consciously
arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a rule as elementary as the 20-
day life span of a TRO amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure. His violation is
seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby usurped the authority of the Court as the
only court with the power to issue a TRO effective until further orders.[50]

Due to its lifetime of only 20 days from service on the party or person to be enjoined,
the TRO that the RTC Judge issued automatically expired on the twentieth day without need
of any judicial declaration to that effect. Yet,

by making the TRO effective until further orders, he made the effectivity of the TRO
indefinite. He thus took for granted the caution that injunction, as the strong arm of
equity,[51] should not be routinely or lightly granted. Again, restraint was required of him, for
the power to issue injunctions should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great
caution and deliberation. The power is to be exercised only where the reason and necessity
therefor are clearly established, and only in cases reasonably free from doubt. [52]For, it has
been said that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, requires greater caution
and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction.[53]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari.

We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued
on November 12, 2002 for being devoid of legal and factual bases; and DIRECT the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City to dismiss SCA Case No. 01-11522.

Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod
City is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten days from notice why he should
not be administratively sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law and procedure for his
manifest disregard of the prohibition under the Rules of Court against unwarranted restraining
orders and writs of injunction, and for issuing a temporary restraining order effective until
furthers of the court.
 Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 568.
[2]
Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. No.
172149, February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 10.
[3]
Entitled Elisa M. Tortogo, et al. v. Hon. Eliseo C. Geolingo, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 6, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, Nicolas G. Albayda, in his
capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Branch 6, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, and
Domingo Pahila, as represented by Angelina Pahila-Garrido.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 32-51.
[5]
Id., p. 58.
[6]
Id., pp. 55-56.
[7]
Id., p. 57.
[8]
Id., pp. 52-54.
[9]
Id., pp. 58-60.
[10]
Id., pp. 61-64.
[11]
Id., pp. 67-69.
[12]
Id., p. 68.
[13]
Id., pp. 71-72.
[14]
Id., pp. 73-75.
[15]
Id., pp. 76-91.
[16]
Id., pp. 92-93.
[17]
Id., pp. 94-95.
[18]
Id., pp. 96-97.
[19]
Id., pp. 99-100.
[20]
Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 170740, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 203, 210-211.
[21]
See Miranda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33007, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 295.
[22]
United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Judge Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August
7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334; citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Singson, G.R. No.
150798, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 612, 629; also, Sitchon v. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80
Phil. 397, 399 (1948).
[23]
Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, pertinently states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (emphasis
supplied)
[24]
1 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 540 (8th revised ed.).
[25]
I Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Rev., p. 442.
[26]
Sec. 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[27]
Gelindon v. Judge Dela Rama, G.R. No. 105072, December 9, 1993, 228 SCRA 322; Tan
vs. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302,
322; Cochingyan, Jr. v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27070-71, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 361.
[28]
Manila Midtown Hotels & Land Corp. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 118397, March 27, 1998, 288
SCRA 259, 265.
[29]
Camacho v. Coresis, Jr., G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 628.
[30]
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60036, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA 334.
[31]
Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348; Uy v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 73.
[32]
Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693; Nationwide
Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155844, 14 July 2008, 558
SCRA 148.
[33]
G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8; see also Cervantes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 562; Flores v. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Pampanga, G.R. No. 159022, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 278,
282; Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 548, 558-
559.
[34]
Section 4. When and where position filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case of a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. x x x
[35]
Rollo, pp.19-20.
[36]
See, e.g., Salinas v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 114671, November
24, 1999, 319 SCRA 54.
[37]
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA
166; citing Salazar v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109210, April 17, 1997, 256 SCRA 273.
[38]
Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124516, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 579.
[39]
Section 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
[40]
Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156687-88, May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 64.
[41]
Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos. 158848 and 171994, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520.
[42]
Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211, 224; citing Banogon v.
Serna, G.R. No. L-35469, October 9, 1987, 154 SCRA 573.
[43]
Salting v. Velez and Velez, G.R. No. 181930, January 10, 2011.
[44]
Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, September 25, 1998, 296
SCRA 487, citing Lee v. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 90926, July 6, 1990, 187 SCRA 276.
[45]
Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, id.; citing Luna v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. L-68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7; Heirs of Pedro Guminpin v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21, 19883, 120 SCRA 687.
[46]
Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115106, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 152, 158.
[47]
43 CJS Injunctions 18.
[48]
Rollo, p. 382.
[49]
Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 376; Seville v.
National Development Company, G.R. No. 129401, February 2, 2000, 351 SCRA 112; De
Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 158002, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 564,
575.
[50]
Section 5, Rule 58, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
[51]
43 CJS Injunctions 2; citing Anderson v. Smith, 8 Alaska 470; Miollis v. Schneider, 222 N.
E. 2d 715, 77 Ill. App. 2d 420; Triangle Sign Co. v. Randolph & State Property, Inc., 147 N.
E. 2d 451, 16 Ill. App. 2d 21; Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, Com. PI.,
105 N. E. 2d 685.
[52]
43 CJS Injunctions 15.
[53]
Detroit Newspaper Publishers Association v. Detroit Typgraphical Union No. 18, Intern.
Typographical Union, C. A. Mich., 471 F. 2d 872; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, 115 Cal.
Rptr., 879, 41 C. A. 3d 16; Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 330 P. 2d 423, 164 C. a. 2d 178.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. G.R. No. 159941

RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA,
namely: EDUARDO M. RETERTA,
 CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and Present:
AVELINA M. RETERTA,
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and Promulgated:

VIRGINIA LOPEZ,
Respondents. August 17, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and
reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion that can
be corrected through certiorari.

The petitioners, whose complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance the RTC had
dismissed, had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals
(CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal,
the proper recourse against the dismissal. They now appeal that ruling of the CA promulgated
on April 25, 2003.[1]

Antecedents

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983),[2] averring that
they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes,
Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from their
father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by
virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest
had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than
30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father
had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the
land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of
respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
 On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting
that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land
being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No.
TM-983.

On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding:[3]

Considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of the propriety
of the grant of lot 2938 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the
Lands Management Bureau of the defendant Lorenzo Mores through the use of
the forged Affidavit and Sales Certificate No. V-769 which eventually led to
the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-64071 to defendant Lorenzo Mores and wife
Virginia Mores, and considering further that the land subject of this case is a
friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the
law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive
administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the determination
whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales
certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this
Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this
action. On the second ground relied upon by the defendants in their Motion To
Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court deemed not to discuss the same.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let this instant case be dismissed as it

is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied
their motion for reconsideration on February 21, 2002.[4]

On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition
for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003, holding: [5]

Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision, the
remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But
petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil action
for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court a quo has become
final.

The Order dismissing the case was issued by the court a quo on 29
October 2001, which Order was received by the petitioners on November 16,
2001. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 26, 2001
but the same was denied by the court a quo on 21 February 2002. The Order
denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioners on 20
March 2002.

Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15, 2002. Certiorari,
however cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
 In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, the Supreme Court
had the following to say:

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and

bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to
a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies
of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[6]

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioners submit that:

I.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
TO DISREGARD THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, RULE 41, SECOND
PARAGRAPH, SUBPARAGRAPH (a), AND SECTION 9, RULE 37, 1997
RULES OF COURT;

II.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS TO APPLY THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ROSETE vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 339 SCRA 193, 199,NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ALREADY
TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1997.

III.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE NATURE OF
THE ACTION, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME.[7]

Briefly stated, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari.
 Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

1.
Propriety of certiorari as remedy
against dismissal of the action

The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that
the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari,
as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when
there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[8]

Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their
proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure,specifically
pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court (An order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an
appeal from the judgment or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for
reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
( No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration) expressly declared that an order denying a motion for reconsideration was
not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly
provided that in the instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
The petitioners position has no basis.

For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order
granting the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely
disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called
for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an
interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[9] viz:

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has

become final (or executory as of right [final and executory]), is definite and
settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the
Court except to await the parties next move (which among others, may consist
of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an
 appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once
it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and
executory.
xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for
postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike
a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part
of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners,
indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly:

Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or

reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final
order.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for

reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion
for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final
order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages
awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order;
or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.[10] By denying a motion for
reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either
to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to
stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the
judgment or final order itself.

The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the time when the CA rendered
its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 included an order denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or

final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
 No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,

confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any
other ground vitiating consent;

(f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties
or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65. (n)

It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has
since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that
such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA
on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule
of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.

2.
RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action

The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is
available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and
granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest
of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust
result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting
the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court has declared that the requirement that there
must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and
injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be
slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where
public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorariif
appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy,
not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without
the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.[12] A remedy is plain, speedy
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.[13] It is understood, then, that
a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have
an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply
with the Rules of Court.[14]

Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available
as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond
procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory
powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable
to law and justice.[15] Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined,
because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ.
The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting
to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in
the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ
will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice.[16]

The petitioners complaint self-styled as being for the quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate, reconveyance and
damageswould challenge the efficacy of the respondents certificate of title under the theory
that there had been no valid transfer or assignment from the petitioners predecessor in interest
to the respondents of the rights or interests in the land due to the affidavit assigning such rights
and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.

The petitioners cause of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing
upon the manner by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land. According to Arayata v.
Joya,[17] in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands
may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and
submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The
law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar
lands. In other words, where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers
his rights thereon, such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law.
Under Director of Lands v. Rizal,[18] the purchaser in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120
is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot purchased even before the payment of
the full payment price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the
obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming
that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.[19]

Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120,[20] had grantee Teofilo Reterta perfected
his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken title from him upon
his death. By law, therefore, should the execution of the deed in favor of the respondents be
held invalid, the interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to the petitioners and the deed
should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the petitioners claim was their allegation in
the complaint that they were in possession of the land. Moreover, as alleged in the
petitioners opposition to the motion to dismiss of the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had
partially paid the price of the land.[21]

Given the foregoing, the petitioners complaint made out a good case for reconveyance
or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well warrant the reconveyance of
the land from the respondents to the petitioners. It did not matter that the respondents already
held a certificate of title in their names. In essence, an action for reconveyance respects the
incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks the transfer of the property to its
rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly registered
in another persons name. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is
enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of
the registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.[22] On this score, it is also worthy to stress that the title of a piece of a friar
land obtained by a grantee from the Government without conforming with the requirements
set by the law may be assailed and nullified.

Was the petitioners action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?

We answer the query in the affirmative.

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[24] which provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
 xxx

Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a

cloud on ones title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value
of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial
jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court
had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the
property) and the principal relief thereby sought.[25]

The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their
position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was
without basis. The provisions read:

Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the
said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the
Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land
so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the
office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx and that upon the payment
of the final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will
convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land
Registration Act xxx.

Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary
of the Interior.

As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to
the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a
private person and title duly issues in the latters name. By ignoring the petitioners showing of
its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the
complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.

Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.[26] The abuse must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[27]

The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners
bereft of any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they
would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation,
the RTCs dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to
do justice to the unjustly aggrieved.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari; sets aside the decision the
Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and directs Branch 23 of the Regional Trial
Court in Trece Martires City to resume the proceedings in Civil Case No. TM-983 with
dispatch.

The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-33; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo
F. Sundiam (deceased).
[2]
Id., pp. 96-101
[3]
Id., pp. 49-50.
[4]
Id., p. 93.
[5]
Supra note 1.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[7]
Id., p. 15.
[8]
Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
[9]
G.R. No. L-60036, 27 January 1987, 147 SCRA 334, 339-341.
[10]
Section 1, paragraph (b), Rule 37, Rules of Court.
[11]
G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8, 20.
[12]
Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 107,
129.
[13]
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity
Commission, G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 346.
[14]
Lu Ym v. Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 298, 311.
[15]
Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365.
[16]
Id.
[17]
No. 28067, 51 Phil. 654 (1928).
[18]
No. L-292587, 87 Phil. 806 (1950).
[19]
Id., p. 814.
[20]
The provision pertinently states: xxx [i]n the event of death of a holder of a certificate the
issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by
the Government to any purchaser, the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and
deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken
had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate.
[21]
Rollo, p. 124.
[22]
Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540
SCRA 1, 13-14.
[23]
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[24]
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa, Blg.
129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. (Approved on March 25,
1994; effective on April 15, 1994).
[25]
Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009,
603 SCRA 395, 400.
[26]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 484
SCRA 119; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163
SCRA 489.
[27]
Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440
SCRA 467; Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11.
[28]
E.g., Alba v. Nitorrada, G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 753, (That the
petitioner and all other public officials are deprived of a legal recourse in the event that the
Ombudsman or his Deputy `hastily, arbitrarily, if not oppressively and/or inhumanly, acts to
find him administratively liable for an imagined violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. 6713 x x x is belied
by the fact that the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is always available to an aggrieved public official in such a case. The Rules of Court
which apply suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides
that in the absence of an appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved by any decision rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, may file
a petition for certiorari with this Court); Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85723, June
19, 1995, 245 SCRA 150, 152 (Certiorari is justified in order to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party, where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment, or where there may be a failure of justice.)
 SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173089

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and
JAIME ABORDO,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

August 25, 2010

X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7,
2006 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed
outright its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.

From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 oclock in the morning,
respondent Jaime Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met
by private complainants Kennard Majait (Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose
Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.

Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos.
N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211
before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no
treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,[2]the RTC held
Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical
Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances
in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.

All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They
filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For
said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its
supplement.

On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majaits motion for reconsideration
while Calvezs motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed
Calvez appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunos Indorsement[3] of the October 11,
2005 letter[4] of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the
OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the following
grounds:

GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE

 OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD
OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
N-2211 AND N-2212, RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING FOUR
(4) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[5]

The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the
appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State
was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the
remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed the accused
in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:

x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it

has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the
province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an
error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy. In view
of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant
petition should be dismissed.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final
order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In the
instant petition, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the
Philippines is assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding
the accused guilty of lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was
charged and of acquitting him in another. It appears to us that the
Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private
 complainant Calvez when it questioned the dismissal of the latters
Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect
of the case.Although the Solicitor General is allowed to file an appeal
under such rule; however, we must point out that in filing this petition for
certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse
is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal,
contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.

We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a

decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase
the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would place him in
double jeopardy. Hence, this petition is dismissible not only on the ground
of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment
but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double
jeopardy.[6] [emphases and underscoring supplied]

Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule
45 presenting the following:

GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
SEEKING TO ANNUL THE JOINT JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF
HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC
OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213
WHICH WAS CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS
JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN CRIM.
CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213.[7]
 On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered
to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order.

We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict
of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere
to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable.[8] The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases,[9] the Court
has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the
dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,[10] the Court has held:

Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In People v. Laguio, Jr.,[11] where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his
demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari.
Thus:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review

dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered
void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special
civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated. [Emphases supplied]
 In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213
was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the
CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.

As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for
certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the
CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition for certiorari, which forms part of the
records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply
because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only
prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. On many occasions, the
Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where
the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case.[12]

The rule is that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.[13] The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[14] presents an instructive
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due
process of law. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason,
void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.[15]

A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show
that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does
not mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the
prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the
defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both
parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of
evidence. Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before
it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no mistrial.

The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a
recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving
full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:
 In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private
complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith and credit to
the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas
and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and
the evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]

It further pointed out that the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[17] Subsequently, in its
memorandum, it merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and
assessing the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a
review of the trial courts judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.

The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated
by the trial court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill
on his part.

What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however,
cannot be resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against
double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule
65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,[18] it was
written:

Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the

nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public respondent
acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her
discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the
discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the
lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent
from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the
evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public
respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what
is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence
was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment
that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on
 the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction
can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the
evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]

Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need
for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given
due course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being
the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves
to DENY the same for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Designated as additional member in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle
dated January 2, 2008.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 59-63. Penned by Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Isaias P. Dicdican and Agustin S. Dizon.
[2]
RTC Decision, Id. at 85, 87, 90-93.
[3]
Id. at 235.
[4]
Id. at 236-237.
[5]
Id. at 238.
[6] Id. at 6163.
[7]
Petition, rollo, p. 19.
[8]
People v. CA, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); cited in People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, September 30,
2005, 471 SCRA 668, 679-680.
[9] Jerome Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676; Yuchengco v.

Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 11 (2002); and Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil 43 (1986).
[10]
G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668, 680-681.
[11]
G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 408-409.
[12]
Metro Eye Security, Inc. v. Salsono, G.R. No. 167637, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA
375, 385.
[13]People v. Laguio, supra note 11 at 408, citing San Vicente v. People, 441 Phil. 139 (2002).

[14]
228 Phil 42 (1986).
[15]
Jerome Castro v. People, supra note 9 at 684.
[16]
OSG Petition for Certiorari before the CA, rollo, p. 252.
[17]
Petition, id. at 26.
[18] G.R No. 130106, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 462, 470.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
 DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case
No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel
Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents

Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John Lim,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:

That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor
and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at
Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal
knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd
designs, kissed her against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of

not guilty to the offense charged.5

Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim,
however, remains at-large.

The factual antecedents follow:

On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the
Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an
election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about
7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party
with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at
the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim
invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking distance away
from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin
Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside
and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco
with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a
certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking
session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.

They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the
drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the
sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to
drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they
shared their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became
emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses
were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador
Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto
then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This
angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap.
But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was
already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand
up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You
make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, "You drink
it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke
her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor
inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle.
Again, she fell asleep.

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and
then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she
was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because
she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up
again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top
of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her.
She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also
saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto
abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and
started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her
body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her
lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were
on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a
trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for
her and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother
started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.

Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of
March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed
the presence of sperm.

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA
had dinner at Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the
graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family.
When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for
Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and
Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party
subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela
Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one
(1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana,
Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did
not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego,
Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA
not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt.
During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto’s lap. She even showed her
scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she
remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the
latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA also kissed him. After Oporto,
Roda and AAA kissed each other again.

Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They
stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany
her to Alson’s Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor
and there they saw AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because
her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head,
and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house.
After thirty minutes, they went to Alson’s Palace again,and saw AAA and Oporto
kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently,
they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.

After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house.
When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep
here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized
bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter
approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily
raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the
while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants.
AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear down.
Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other
hand, placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he
finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep.
When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room.
When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a
problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts. Oporto stood up and opened
his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and
Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto
went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse
with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At
around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They
tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home.
Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was
no longer there when he arrived.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however,
acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
 indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of
₱50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of ₱50,000.00
as moral damages and another amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as

ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages and another sum of ₱30,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity;

d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,

Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering
accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the
costs of suit.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided
they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and

detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered
voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this time, while accused
Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered
released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and
subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004
duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release
from the custody of the DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the
prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as
he is apprehended.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA.
On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the
trial court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal
portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES
ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware
of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed
any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her
alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which
showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the
impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA
also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she
discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a
parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than one who was
sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for
Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private
respondents’ conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10

The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:

I.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND

THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE
PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.

III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS

FIRST FILED. IV. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE
APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL
CRIMINAL CASES.11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It
assigns the following errors:

I.

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF

ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.

II.

THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING

BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12

The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must
not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules
should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling
reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities. 14

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of
acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in
double jeopardy.17

As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in
People v. Santiago:18

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to
that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of
the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state
that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name
of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the action should have been
filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to
represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the
CA is solely vested in the OSG.20

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her
private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the
right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has
an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the
subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court
sustained the private offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil
action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled
that the Solicitor General’s intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the
complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in
that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause
in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 23

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of
argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating
their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure
to previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a
condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the
court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule,
however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.24

Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same
questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving
on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve
the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the
petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the
CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that
the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a
sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the
respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very
power to dispense justice.25

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of
fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’ narration of
facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion
when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.27

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving
that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it
may seem that its narration of the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from
the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply
lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that
of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case
before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies,
particularly those as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period -
from the dinner at Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola
Lodging House. As a result, it presented the private respondents’ account and
allegations as though these were the established facts of the case, which it later
conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.

Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply
cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It
cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes
particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting
versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was
a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material
prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes
grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process. 33

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC
and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for
help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the
latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–

 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present;

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in

paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to
drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having
sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or
unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however,
readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not
shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was
rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the
crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should
deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In
reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself,
sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has
been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can
usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s
testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her
accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public
trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as
she narrated her harrowing experience.37

AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She
tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed.
The RTC found AAA’s testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling
the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and
humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a
rehearsed testimony.38 Thus:

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when
did you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the
bottle of Emperador Brandy.

xxxx

Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining
contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?

A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.

Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying
you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry
you?

A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was
awakened by the flash of light.

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that
(sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?

A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.

Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.

Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on
top of you?

A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?

A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually

abused me.

ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the

witness is crying.

xxxx

ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.

ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of
you, who else was there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?

A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw

Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: On top of you?

A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?

A: Only the three of them, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

Q: Where in particular?

A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

 Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said
that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund
Carampatana?

A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39

On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense.
It noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and
incredible.40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked
and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never
mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know
about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by
surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape
case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is
now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with
sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual. 42 Generally, the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the
crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is
because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of
guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to
overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party
having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and
adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges
consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes,
mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship
between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge
of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by
substantial evidence.45

Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana
narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the
bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her
shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments and
then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA’s legs
and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he
had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing
AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he
removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it
easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having sexual
intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and
took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with
Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room
and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he
woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA
for the third and last time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the
accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAA’s
part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual
intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was
seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid and
intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused
after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the
testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the attending circumstances.49

When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and
is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying,
the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial
judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight
and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared
before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama
during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the
matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges
said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must
be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show
any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and
binding.53

The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary,
could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta,
when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the
penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no
longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have
resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show
that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex
orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the
incident, having just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar
case,54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have
sexual intercourse with two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the
presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one.
Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old,
first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her
testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact,
appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute
to them the commission of the crime charged.55

No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if
her claim were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a
young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even
a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape.
Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is
immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason
or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents
to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a
woman against her consent.57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential
elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape
cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina,
even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for
rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s
genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAA’s mother’s
act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that "the
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable,
and the people react differently."59 Different people react differently to a given type
of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely
indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had
been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when there is
no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making the
accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and
credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to
immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself?
Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love
with any of the private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a
relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She never became
pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why
would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as
her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the
charge against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated
and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA
had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely
seeks justice for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to
ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of
the facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common
human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on
the crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy
because his participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It
found that his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the
crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that
Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To
establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement
to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence
to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a
common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on
direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the
parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 70

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:

We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and

Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during
the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing
the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not
necessary.1âwphi1 In this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with
respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the
crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)

In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there
was conspiracy:

The RTC held that:

While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based
on the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his
penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely
kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held
liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them
conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.

The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep,
molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a
co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission
of the crime.73

Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is
not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a
room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise
inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused
AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even
admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably,
there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse
AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola
including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found
Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial
court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon
to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information,
it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a
complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not
heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however,
cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash
questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are
deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations
of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of
perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak
of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they "took turns in
having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further,
allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA
was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her
legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had
sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in
a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
upon him the proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four
(4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held
liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified
that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of
rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the
Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape
through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more

persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the
RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the
lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them, 84 for each count.
With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion
temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor(the penalty next
lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the
range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count
of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to one who has exceeded
the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he
was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:89

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may
be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing
provision should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children
in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of
age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary
damages of ₱30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to
deter others from committing the same bestial acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-
MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:

a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;

b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years and one (
1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and

c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and
severally, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of
rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case
be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H.

Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1934 dated February 11, 2015.
1Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanez, with Associate Justices
Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez; concurring; rollo, pp. 69-103.
2 Penned by Judge Jacob T. Malik; rollo, pp. 28-67.
3 In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 426; citing Rule on Violence Against
Women and their Children, Sec. 40; Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act," the real names of the rape
victims will not be disclosed.

The Court will instead use fictitious initials to represent them

throughout the decision. The personal circumstances of the victims or
any other information tending to establish or compromise their
identities will likewise be withheld.
4 Records, pp. 39-40.
5 Id. at 58, 86, 157-162.
6 Id. at 157-172.
7 Rollo, pp. 66-67.
8 Id. at 102. (Emphasis in the original)
9 Id. at 3-27.
10 Id. at 10.
11 Id. at 241-242.
12 Id. at 292, 298.
13Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. CA, G.R. No. 165155,
April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 181, 184.
14Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November
22, 2010, 635 SCRA 637, 645.
15
M. GUBAT, THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ANNOTATED 481 (3rd ed. 2009).
16 Id. at 481-482.
17Goodland Company, Inc. v. Co and Chan, G.R. No. 196685, December 14,
2011, 662 SCRA 692, 701.
18 255 Phil. 851 (1989).
19 People v. Santiago, supra, at 861-862. (Emphasis ours)
20Bautista v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA
521, 534.
21 323 Phil. 596 (1996).
22 Rollo, pp. 272-301.
23 Merciales v. CA, 429 Phil. 70, 79 (2002).
24 Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 323.
25 People v. CA, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012.
26 Yu v. Reyes Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.
27Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in
Chemplex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, 156 Phil. 408, 457 (1974).
28 Rollo, pp. 72-78.
29 Id. at 38-41.
30 Id. at 46-48.
31 Id. at 42-43.
32 Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, 504 Phil. 242, 249 (2005).
33 Id.
34People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 245,
255.
35 People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 712 (1999).
36 People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 453 (2001).
37 Rollo, p. 55.
38 Id.
39 Rollo, pp. 49-53.
40 Id. at 58-59.
41 Id. at 57-58.
42People v. Alcober, G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 479,
488.
43 Timbal v. CA, 423 Phil. 617, 623 (2001).
44 People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 761, 772.
45 People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004).
46 Rollo, p. 48.
47 Id. at 40-41.
48 Id. at 60.
49People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537,
553.
50People v. Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 335,
349.
51
Valbueco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013, 698
SCRA 57, 77.
52 People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 412, 421.
53 People v. Apattad, supra note 50, at 350.
54 People v. Soriano, 146 Phil. 585 (1970).
55 Id. at 589. (Emphasis ours)
56 People v. Zabala, 456 Phil. 237, 243.
57 People v. Baluya, 430 Phil. 349. 363 (2002).
58 People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).
59 People v. Buenviaje, 408 Philo. 342, 346 (2001).
60 People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698. 714 (2003).
61 People v. Balya, supra note 57.
62People v. Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 185,
192.
63 People v. Ramos, 467 Phil 376, 389 (2004).
64 People v. Baluya, supra note 57, at 364.
65 Chempex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, supra note 27.
66 Rollo, p. 63.
67 410 Phil. 283, 291 (2001).
68 Rollo, p. 62.
69 People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 722-723 (1968).
70People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508,
527.
71 People v. Jabonera, supra note 67. (Emphasis ourts)
72 588 Phil. 937 (2008).
73 People v. Dela Torre, supra, at 943. (Citations omitted)
74 Rollo, p. 81.
75 Supra note 44.
76 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 13.
77 Supra note 15, at 90.
78 Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

xxxx
79Section 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea,
the accused may move to quash the complaint or information.
80 People v. Lucena, 408 Phil. 172, 191 (2001).
81Supra note 15, at 91; citing Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2,
9th ed., p. 271.
82 Supra note 4.
83 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Section 3.
84 Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. 3.
85 Revised Penal Code, Art. 64 (2).
86 People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.
87Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
88 People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011.
 89 People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 172218 November 26, 2014

FELICIANO B. DUYON, substituted by his children: MAXIMA R. DUYON-

ORSAME, EFREN R. DUYON, NOVILYN R. DUYON, ELIZABETH R. DUYON-
SIBUMA, MODESTO R. DUYON, ERROL R. DUYON, and DIVINA R. DUYON-
VINLUAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS and
ELEONOR P. BUNAG-CABACUNGAN, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the September 16, 2005 Decision 1 and
April 6, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86630.

Herein petitioner Feliciano B. Duyon (Duyon), on August 27, 1979, was issued
Certificate of Land Transfer (CL T) No. 0-0052243 over the 6,358-square meter
parcel of land (subject land) he had been tilling since 1957. The subject land was
denominated as Lot 20 of Lot 797 under subdivision plan PSD-03-012599 dated
January 7, 1987.4

Apparently, the same parcel of land was also covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) E.P. No. 440975 under Emancipation Patent No. A-347307, which had been
issued to herein private respondent Eleonor P. Bunag-Cabacungan (Bunag-
Cabacungan) on June 6, 1989.

Sometime in November 2002, Duyon discovered the double registration and filed a
complaint-affidavit6 for misconduct or abuse of authority, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-
0111-A (administrative aspect of the case) and for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 and Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, docketed as OMBL-C-03-0125-A (criminal aspect of the case) against Bunag-
Cabacungan, who was an employee of the Municipal Agriculture Office of Nueva
Ecija under the Department of Agriculture, and her husband, Eutiquio Cabacungan
(Cabacungan), who then worked at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), for
allegedly taking advantage of their official positions to cause the issuance of the
TCT in favor of Bunag-Cabacungan. Duyon further asseverated that Bunag-
Cabacungan misrepresented herself in her application with the DAR by stating
therein that she was single despite having been married to Cabacungan since
1979.7

Explaining their side, Cabacungan and Bunag-Cabacungan, in their Joint Counter-

Affidavit,8 denied Duyon's accusations and alleged that he was never deprived
possession of the subject land. They claimed that an error had been made in the
issuance of the Emancipation Patent, such was not their fault, and that the DAR
Office in Nueva Ecija had already requested for its correction. Moreover, they
argued, the lot Bunag Cabacungan applied for had a bigger land area at 18,257
square meters than the 6,358-square meter subject land of Duyon.

Finding that the Cabacungan spouses flaunted unlawful behavior and intentional
neglect, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for Luzon, on December 11,
2003, issued its Decision9 in OMB-L-A-03-0111-A, finding the spouses guilty of
simple misconduct, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the respondents Eutiquio Cabacungan and Eleonor P. Bunag-
Cabacungan be meted a penalty of suspension of SIX (6) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY
for Simple Misconduct. Respondents are sternly warned that repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.10

The same OMB for Luzon recommended in OMB-L-C-03-0125-A, the filing of an

Information for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the
Cabacungan spouses in its Resolution dated December 11, 2003 for causing undue
injury to Duyon by evident bad faith.11

However, acting on the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the Cabacungan

spouses and the Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by Duyon, the OMB for
Luzon, in a Joint Order12 dated August 27, 2004, modified its December 11, 2003
Decision and Resolution by dismissing the charges filed against Cabacungan, and
reducing the suspension imposed against Bunag-Cabacungan. The dispositive
portion of the Joint Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended

that the Resolution and Decision both dated 11 [December] 2003 be MODIFIED as
follows: The criminal as well as the administrative case filed against respondent
Eutiquio Cabacungan are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency and lack of
substantial evidence, respectively. The recommendation for the filing of an
information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against respondent
Eleonor Bunag-Cabacungan is AFFIRMED. The penalty of six (6) months
suspension imposed upon Eleonor Bunag[-Cabacungan] is hereby REDUCED to
three (3) months suspension from office without pay.

The Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to file the hereto
attached information against respondent Eleonor Bunag Cabacungan before the
proper court.13 Accordingly, Bunag-Cabacungan filed a Petition for Review on
Ceriorari14 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 8663 0,
seeking the reversal of the December 11, 2003 Decision and August 27, 2004 Joint
Order with respect to the administrative aspect of the case; while Duyon filed his
own Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87325, assailing the Joint Order dated August 27, 2004 and a motion to consolidate
CA-G.R. SP No. 87325 with CA-G.R. SP No. 86630.
In a Resolution15 dated January 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals resolved Duyon's
petition for certiorari and his motion to consolidate the aforementioned cases, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for

petitioner's failure to avail of the proper mode of appeal (with respect to the
administrative disciplinary aspect of the case) and for lack of jurisdiction (with
respect to the criminal asftect of the case), and DENY as well petitioner's Motion for
Consolidation.16

Laying down the grounds for its dismissal of the petition for certiorari and denial of
the motion for consolidation, the Court of Appeals held:

Our examination of the present petition shows that it is, on its face, fatally defective
so that a consolidation with a pending related case is legally inappropriate.

The defect in the present petition is rooted in the petitioner's use of a petition for
certiorari as a remedy against the assailed order. Under current case law, all
appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases shall
be taken to this Court under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; on the other hand,
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases are unappealable. However, where
the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause (in criminal
cases) are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file before the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.17 (Citations omitted.)

Duy on filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Resolution,

claiming that a Petition for Certiorari would best serve him.18

Verily, the Court of Appeals denied such motion for lack of merit on August 12,
2005.19 Emphasizing the grounds for such denial, the Court of Appeals held:

The petitioner completely misses our point. We dismissed the petition not because
of strict adherence to the rules of court on matters of appeal but because of
jurisdictional grounds. Jurisprudence dictates that all appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases shall be taken to this Court under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Rules only allow fifteen (15) days from notice of
the award, decision or order within which to file a petition for review. The petitioner
filed this petition for certiorari sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed order.
Thus, the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (as to the administrative aspect
of the case) was already final at the time this petition was filed. As a final decision,
the Ombudsman's decision on the administrative aspect of the case is no longer
within the scope of the power of review of any court in the absence of grounds for
review affecting jurisdiction. This ground for dismissal is a substantive ground rather
than mere technicality. The Honorable Supreme Court in its Circular No. 2-90
specifically commands that, "an appeal taken to the Court of Appeals by the wrong
or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. "

We cannot entertain the criminal aspect of the case for lack of jurisdiction. By law,
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases are unappealable. However, where
the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause (in criminal
cases) are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the remedy i s a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed, not with us,
but before the Honorable Supreme Court.20

(Citations omitted.)
However, notwithstanding that the issue raised in Bunag Cabacungan's petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86630 was limited to the administrative aspect of the case, the
Court of Appeals promulgated a contrary decision dated September 16, 2005, which
reversed and set aside the assailed Decision and Joint Order and dismissed
Duyon's complaint against Bunag-Cabacungan for violation of Section 3( e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.

In resolving the criminal aspect of the case, the Court of Appeals found that the
elements of Section 3( e) of Republic Act No. 3019 were not present in the case,
given the evidence on record. Thus, it held that "no probable cause exists to warrant
the filing of charges against [BunagCabacungan]."21 The Court of Appeals added
that there was nothing to show that Bunag-Cabacungan, an employee of the
Department of Agriculture, had acted in conspiracy with the officers or officials of the
DAR, the office responsible for the issuance of the Emancipation Patent. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals said, while Duyon alleged undue injury, he nevertheless failed
to present proof of such on him or to the Govemment.22

The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision, reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated December

11, 2003 and the joint order dated August 27, 2004 are hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent Feliciano Duyon against petitioner
Eleonor Bunag-Cabacungan for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 is
accordingly DISMISSED.23

Duyon filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on October 10, 2005, which the Court of
Appeals denied for lack of merit in its Resolution25 dated April 6, 2005.26

Issues

Now before us is a petition for certiorari, filed by Duyon, questioning the

aforementioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
86630, which reversed and set aside the OMB for Luzon's December 11, 2003
Decision, which found Bunag-Cabacungan and her husband, Cabacungan, guilty of
simple misconduct; and August 27, 2004 Joint Order, which modified the December
11, 2003 Decision (for Simple Misconduct) and December 11, 2003 Resolution (for
violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019) by: 1) reducing the administrative
penalty on Bunag-Cabacungan; 2) affirming the recommendation of filing an
information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against her; and 3)
dismissing both administrative and criminal charges against Bunag-Cabacungan's
husband, Cabacungan. The following are the issues presented for our resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACTING UPON AND DISMISSING THE
CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLEAR
IMPORT OF THE FABIAN CASE THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE DECISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WITH
RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASES.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

REVERSING THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO ITS
FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE.27 Duyon28 argues that the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion as it has no power to review the
criminal aspect of Ombudsman cases, which was also the subject of the
August 27, 2004 OMB for Luzon Joint Order. Duyon contends that although
Bunag-Cabacungan correctly filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
 Appeals, such review should have been limited only to the administrative
aspect covered by the OMB for Luzon's Decision of December 11, 2003. 29

To reiterate his point, Duyon cited and attached the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87325, wherein the Court of Appeals, in resolving his
petition for certiorari, elaborated on the remedies the parties to an Ombudsman
case may take with regard to both its administrative and criminal aspects.

Bunag-Cabacungan, in her Comment,30 avers that the Court of Appeals has now
appellate jurisdiction to review orders and decisions of the Ombudsman regardless
of its nature by reason of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 17, dated
September 15, 2003, amending Section 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07
dated April 10, 1990 of the implementing rules of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Bunag-Cabacungan argues that the phrase "in all other cases" in the amendment
does not categorically limit the cases that can be appealed to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43, in contrast to the explicit provision in the old rule, that only
appropriate administrative cases can be appealed to the Supreme Court via a
petition for certiorari.31 Hence, Bunag-Cabacungan contends that the Court of
Appeals correctly reversed and set aside both the OMB for Luzon's December 11,
2003 Decision on the administrative charge against Bunag-Cabacungan and her
husband and the August 27, 2004 Joint Order on both the administrative and
criminal charges against Bunag-Cabacungan.

Court of Appeals' Jurisdiction Over the Criminal Aspect of the Case

Duyon was correct in his insistence that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction
over the criminal aspect of an Ombudsman case. "The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
administrative cases."32

In Kuizon v. Hon. Desierto33 this Court clarified:

The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled
that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said
provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken
from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a
remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. (Citations
omitted.)

Bunag-Cabacungan's argument that the Court of Appeals now has appellate

jurisdiction to review both the administrative and criminal aspects of orders and
decisions of the Ombudsman because of the September 15, 2003 amendment to
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman deserves no
merit at all.

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative

Order No. 17, reads:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of

the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)

Bunag-Cabacungan's contention that the phrase "in all other cases" has removed
the distinction between administrative and criminal cases of the Ombudsman is
ludicrous. It must be stressed that the above-quoted Section 7 is provided under
Rule III, which deals with the procedure in administrative cases. When
Administrative Order No. 07 was amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Section
7 was retained in Rule III. It is another rule, Rule II, which provides for the procedure
in criminal cases. Thus, the phrase "in all other cases" still refers to administrative
cases, not criminal cases, where the sanctions imposed are different from those
enumerated in Section 7.

It is important to note that the petition filed by Bunag-Cabacungan in CA-G.R. SP

No. 86630 assailed only the "administrative decision" rendered against her by the
OMB for Luzon. Quoted hereunder is the pertinent portion of her petition:

Believing that she is innocent of the administrative charges against her, your
petitioner interposes this instant petition for the review of the administrative decision
against her by the Office of the Ombudsman and the denial of her motion for
reconsideration thereof.34 (Emphases ours.)

Moreover, the lone issue she submitted to the Court of Appeals for its consideration
reads:

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED A GRAVE

ERROR AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN HOLDING COMPLAINANT GUILTY OF
SIMPLE MISCONDUCT FOR THE MISTAKE COMMITTED BY ANOTHER
[PERSON] IN THE ISSUANCE UNDER HER NAME OF EMANCIPATION PATENT
No. A-347307.35

Furthermore, her arguments all throughout her petition for review before the Court of
Appeals centered on how she should not have been found guilty of simple
misconduct by the OMB for Luzon. Even the jurisprudence she cited in support of
her arguments pertained to "misconduct in office." The same is true with Duyon's
Comment,36 which focused on why Bunag-Cabacungan should be judged guilty of
misconduct. Duyon actually argued for a more severe administrative punishment
and prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of

the Honorable Court to MODIFY the Decision dated December 11, 2003 and the
Joint Order dated August 27, 2004 imposing upon [Bunag-Cabacungan] and her
husband the penalty of DISMISSAL from the government service for gross
misconduct. Alternatively, should the Honorable Court find the punishment to be too
harsh, it is humbly asked that they be punished for conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service punishable to a maximum period of one (1) year
suspension, without pay, in accordance with Executive Order No. 292.37

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that in the case before us, the Court of
Appeals went beyond its jurisdiction by touching on the criminal aspect of the
Decision and Joint Order of the OMB for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0111-A and OMB-L-
C-03-0125-A. As such, the Court of Appeals' ruling on the criminal aspect of the
aforementioned cases is void.38
On the Administrative Aspect of the Case at bar

Considering that the petition for review filed by Bunag-Cabacungan in CA-G.R. SP

No. 86630 deals with the administrative aspect of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the herein petition for certiorari filed by Duyon seeks the dismissal
of the said petition for review, and to expedite the decision in this case, this Court
shall pass upon the aforesaid issue raised particularly as to whether or not the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the
OMB for Luzon Decision dated December 11, 2003 and Joint Order dated August
27, 2004, both of which imposed, among others, administrative sanctions on
respondent Bunag-Cabacungan.

A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.-When any tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.39

This Court has defined grave abuse of discretion as such "capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at
all in contemplation of law."40

The Court of Appeals granted Bunag-Cabacungan's petition and reversed and set
aside both the December 11, 2003 Decision and the August 27, 2004 Joint Order of
the OMB for Luzon. Since the December 11, 2003 Decision strictly dealt with the
administrative charge against Bunag-Cabacungan, and the August 27, 2004 Joint
Order resolved also said administrative charge aside from the criminal charge
against respondent Bunag-Cabacungan, the Court of Appeals in effect also
dismissed the said administrative charge.

The Court, shall, resolve the issue raised by the petition in this case, specially
Duyon's prayer for this Court to order the denial of the petition for review filed by
Bunag-Cabacungan before the Court of Appeals, relying upon the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals, which are pertinent to the resolution of the administrative
charge against respondent Bunag Cabacungan.

The Court of Appeals found the following facts to have been established:

As pointed out by [Bunag-Cabacungan], she is an employee of the Department of

Agriculture and not the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which office was
responsible for the issuance of the subject emancipation patent. No evidence was
presented to show that she acted in conspiracy with the officers or officials of the
DAR or that they acted with manifest partiality, bad faith or inexcusable negligence.
It must be noted that the charges against [Bunag-Cabacungan]'s husband Eutiquio
Cabacungan, who could have provided some link between the DAR and [Bunag-
Cabacungan], were dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman for lack of evidence.
Other than the fact of misrepresenting herself as single in the application form and
her alleged failure to rectify the error committed in the title, no specific allegations
were made regarding her actual or direct participation in the erroneous issuance of
the same. Neither was it specifically shown that she committed the alleged
prohibited acts in the performance of her official duties or public functions. Likewise,
while undue injury was alleged by x x x Feliciano Duyon, he nevertheless failed to
present proof of such actual injury or damage to him or to the
govemment.41(Empahsis ours.)

Bunag-Cabacungan and her husband were charged with misconduct for allegedly
taking advantage of their official positions to cause the issuance of the emancipation
patent in the name of respondent BunagCabacungan and failing to rectify the
erroneous issuance of the said emancipation patent, as well as the wrongful use of
respondent's maiden name in her application for such emancipation patent.
Misconduct in office has a specific legal meaning in our jurisdiction. Misconduct is "a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."42 Moreover, "to be
considered as 'misconduct,' the act must have a 'direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of his official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. "' 43

As the Court of Appeals has determined, there were no specific allegations

regarding Bunag-Cabacungan's actual or direct participation in the erroneous
issuance of the emancipation patent, nor was it specifically shown that she
committed prohibited acts in the performance of her official duties or public
functions. The Court of Appeals also found no evidence to establish that she acted
in conspiracy with the officials of the DAR, which was the government office
responsible for the issuance of the emancipation patent. Thus, the charge for
misconduct in office against respondent BunagCabacungan has no merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

1. The September 16, 2005 Decision and April 6, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86630 are hereby SET ASIDE in so far
as the said Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution ordered the dismissal
of the complaint filed by petitioner Feliciano B. Duyon against respondent
Eleanor Bunag Cabacungan in OMB-L-C-03-0125-A (for Violation of Section
3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019) for lack of jurisdiction; and

2. The September 16, 2005 Decision and April 6, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86630 are hereby AFFIRMED in so far
as the said Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution reversed and set aside
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's December 11, 2003
Decision and August 27, 2004 Joint Order, which imposed the administrative
penalty of suspension on respondent Eleanor Bunag-Cabacungan in OMB-
LA-03-0111-A for Simple Misconduct.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 1885 dated November 24, 2014.

1Rollo, pp. 19-30, penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis with
Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
2 Id. at 32-33.
3 CA rollo, p. 42.
4 Rollo, p. 20.
5 CA rollo, p. 43.
6 Id. at 40.
7 Rollo, p. 21.
8 CA rollo, pp. 44-46.
9 Rollo, pp. 74-78.
10 Id. at 77.
11 Id. at 69-73.
12 Id. at 79-86.
13 Id. at 84-85.
14 CA rollo, pp. 10-39.
15 Rollo, pp. 33-36.
16 Id. at 36.
17 Id. at 34-35.
18 Id. at 37-38.
19 Id. at 37-39.
20 Id. at 38-39.
21 Id. at 27.
22 Id. at 28.
23 Id. at 30.
24 Id. at 87-95.
25 Id. at 32.
26Later amended in a Resolution dated August 3, 2006 (rollo, p. 152), in
response to Bunag Cabacungan's Motion to Amend Resolution, as it was
Duyon who filed the Motion for Reconsideration, and not her, as stated in the
April 6, 2006 Resolution. The August 3, 2006 Resolution read:

Before Us is the Petitioner's Motion to Amend Resolution alleging

therein that the respondent, and not the petitioner, was the one who
filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court dated
September 16, 2005.

As prayed for, this Court hereby resolves to AMEND the Resolution of

this Court dated April 6, 2006 to read as follows:

"After a careful perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondent of the Decision of this Court dated September 16, 2005, as
well as the Comment and/or Opposition filed by the petitioner, the
Court finds no cogent reason to reconsider the Decision." (Citations
omitted.)
27 Id. at 9.
28Duyon, during the pendency of this case, passed away and was
substituted by his children Maxima R. Duyon-Orsame, Efren R. Duyon,
Novilyn R. Duyon, Elizabeth R. Duyon-Sibuma, Modesto R. Duyon, Errol R.
Duyon, and Divina R. Duyon-Vinluan. (Rollo, pp. 174-183; Resolution
granting Motion for Substitution and Reply.)
29 Rollo, p. 10.
30 d. at 119-150.
31 Id. at 131-132.
32 Office of the Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. de Ventura, 620 Phil.
1, 8 (2009).
33 406 Phil. 611, 625-626 (2001).
34 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
35 Id. at 52.
36 CA rollo, pp. 106-111.
37 Id. at 109.
38Office of the Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita V da. de Ventura, supra
note 32.
39Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp., 479 Phil. 768, 779
(2004).
40Office of the Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. de Ventura, supra
note 32 at 11.
41 Rollo, pp. 27-28.
42 Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., 570 Phil. 464, 472 (2008).
43 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, G.R. No.
191218, May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 667, 685, citing Manuel v. Judge Calimag,
Jr., 367 Phil. 162, 166 (1999).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 187896-97 June 10, 2013

AMANDO P. CONTES, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ, JULIO
E. SUCGANG and NILO IGTANLOC, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this petition for review, is the dismissal of the criminal and
administrative complaints filed by petitioner Amando P. Cortes with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) against respondents Victory M. Ferrnandez (Fernandez).
Julio E. Sucgang (Sucgang) and Nilo Igtanloc (Igtanloc), who were sued in their
capacity as Provincial Engineer, Barangay Captain of Barangay Soncolan and
Grader Operator, respectively, of the Province of Aklan.

In his Complaint-Affidavit filed on 28 November 2006. petitioner charged

respondents with violation of Section 3( c) of Republic Act No. 3019. or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. and Misconduct. Petitioner alleged that during the
period of 29 March 2006 to 1 April 2006, respondents utilized a heavy equipment
grader owned by the Province of Aklan in levelling a portion of his land. Petitioner
claimed that the portion of the land destroyed has an area of 1.125 square meters
and that several fruit trees were destroyed. Petitioner impleaded Fernandez for the
latter's failure to ascertain from the Barangay Captain whether the roads sought to
be levelled were barangay roads. and for issuing a driver's trip ticket to the Grader
Operator.1

In a Consolidated Evaluation Report dated 14 December 2006, the Office of the

Ombudsman (Visayas) recommended the dismissal of the cases due to the fact that
two (2) other cases involving the same parties and issues had already been filed by
petitioner.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Consolidated Evaluation Report. On

7 February 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner takes the appeal directly to this Court, via a petition for review on
certiorari, pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his
motion for reconsideration by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).

Petitioner cites the following errors as grounds for the allowance of the petition:

(1) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred when it dismissed the

complaint-affidavit of herein petitioner on the ground that two cases involving
 the same issues as in the complaint-affidavit were previously filed by
petitioner, as complainant therein.

(2) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in finding that a mere

Inventory of Barangay Roads and Bridges as of 1999 could prevail over an
Original Certificate of Title registered on 28 May 1985.

(3) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in allowing respondents

Fernandez, Igtanloc and Sucgang, to grossly violate the constitutional
mandate provided for in the Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines.

(4) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in not expressing clearly

and distinctly in its Order dated February 7, 2008 and Consolidated
Evaluation Report dated December 14, 2006, the law on which it is based in
careless disregard of a constitutional mandate.2

Petitioner refutes the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) that he had
filed a similar administrative and criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner
claims that the complaints adverted to were filed by one Hernando Cortes and they
pertained to another parcel of land that was also graded and levelled by
respondents. Petitioner maintains that the affected portion of his land is covered by
an original certificate of title and that a document such as the inventory of barangay
roads upon which the authority to scrape and level barangay roads is based should
have been first annotated as lien to petitioner’s certificate of title.1âwphi1 Petitioner
stresses that respondents’ actions violated his constitutional right to due process
and that his property was taken without just compensation. Finally, petitioner assails
the Consolidated Evaluation Report and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) for having been issued in violation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions must state the factual and legal basis thereof.

In their Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the
petition because petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Moreover, the Office of the
Solicitor General supports the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint due to identity of
issues and respondents in the previous and the present complaint.

Respondents also filed their respective Comments. Igtanloc denied levelling and
grading a portion of petitioner’s land. According to Igtanloc, he only followed the
contours of the existing barangay road and did not widen or create a new one.
Fernandez asserts that he was merely acting in his official capacity and exercising
his duty in issuing a driver’s trip ticket to Igtanloc. Sucgang characterizes the
complaint as a case of the "second brother (Amando P. Cortes)" filing cases against
the same respondents, raising the same issue that was previously disposed of by
the same office, in the cases filed by his brother (Hernando P. Cortes).3

Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural misstep which
warrants an outright dismissal.

Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman

Act of 1989 and disregarded prevailing jurisprudence. Section 27 provides, in part,
that:

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office

of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared
unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto. 4 We
ruled in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.5

Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal

case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in
Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon6 that the remedy of an aggrieved party in
criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a

criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under
Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65
before this Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.

By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal.

A review of the substantial merit of this petition would likewise yield to the same
conclusion.

It appears that prior to the filing of the instant complaint, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes
(Hernando) had filed both criminal and administrative complaints against
respondents Igtanloc and Sucgang, who were the Provincial Engineer and
Barangay Captain, respectively. These complaints involved the alleged grading and
levelling of a portion of Hernando’s property. On 15 August 2006, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Decision on the administrative case docketed as OMB-V-A-
06-0344-F and a Resolution on the criminal case docketed as OMB-V-C-06-0315-F,
dismissing both complaints for lack of merit. Three months later, petitioner filed an
administrative and criminal complaint bearing the same facts and issues. The cases,
docketed as OMB-V-C-06-0577-K and OMB-V-A-06-0639-K, were consolidated by
the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner additionally impleaded Fernandez as
respondent. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dismissed the case on the
ground that a similar complaint involving the same facts and issues had already
been filed against the same respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
was referring to the Hernando complaint.

Records disclosed that Hernando and petitioner are not only brothers but are also
registered as owners of the property allegedly levelled and graded by Igtanloc. In his
complaints, Hernando alleged that he, together with Amando P. Cortes, is the
registered owner of a land denominated as Lot 427, Psc 35, of Batan Cadastre,
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34885.7 However, TCT
No. T-348858 could be traced back to the mother title, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-15197,9 registered under the name of petitioner. The same OCT was
attached to the complaints filed by petitioner, wherein he also asserted ownership
over the subject property.

The facts point to the result that the previous and the present complaints, bearing
complainants who are owners of the same affected property, same respondents,
same issues and same arguments, in reality are one and the same. The Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) explained:

To reiterate, the issues are identical and were in fact already resolved and decided
upon by the assigned investigator handling the complaints which were filed earlier.
To allow a similar complaint to proceed before the same forum using the same
arguments and counterarguments already raised and discussed in a previous
complaint would cause endless litigations which is frowned upon by the courts. It is

(xxx source text unreadable xxx)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN**

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of Court’s
Division.

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Second Division, Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 1460 dated 29 May 2013.

** Per Special Order No. 1461 dated 29 May 2013.

1 Rollo, p. 37.
2 Id. at 14-15.
3 Id. at 176.
4 G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998, 295 SCRA 470.
5 Id. at 481-482.
6 490 Phil. 640, 649 (2005).
7 Rollo, p. 102.
8 Id. at 132.
 9 Id. at 131.

10 (xxx source text unreadable xxx)

FIRST DIVISION

CEFERINA LOPEZ TAN G.R. No. 187208

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson
-versus- VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*
DEL CASTILLO, and
 PEREZ, JJ.
SPOUSES APOLINAR P.
ANTAZO and GENOVEVA O.
ANTAZO Promulgated:
Respondents. February 23, 2011
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Ceferina Lopez Tan seeks to nullify the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 105514 which dismissed her petition for certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal.

The factual antecedents follow.

Respondent Spouses Apolinar and Genoveva Antazo are the registered owners of two parcels
of land, namely: (1) a 1,024-square meter lot identified as Lot No. 2190, Cad 609-D, Case-17,
AP-04-004442, situated at Barangay Pilapila, Binangonan, Rizal and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-11592; and (2) a 100-square meter portion of a 498-square
meter lot identified as Lot 2175, Cad 609-D. An accion reinvindicatoria suit with damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-019, was filed by respondents against petitioner for encroaching
on their properties. On 25 July 2008, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Binangonan,
Rizal, rendered judgment favoring respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

A. That the defendant encroached on the property of the plaintiffs by

114 square meters.
B. The defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the 114 square meters
of the plaintiffs property illegally occupied by the defendant and to turn
over its full possession and ownership in favor of the plaintiffs. To
remove the fence constructed on the encroached area.
C. The plaintiffs are awarded attorneys fees in the amount of 50,000
pesos.[2]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was later denied by the RTC on 21
August 2008.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on 2
October 2008.

On 6 November 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for adopting a
wrong remedy or mode of appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
subsequently denied in a Resolution dated 10 March 2009.
 Hence, the instant recourse grounded on a sole assigned error that the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court.[3]

Petitioner maintains that she rightfully filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.While
conceding that certiorari is available only if there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioner avers that her case presents an
exception to such general rule because the decision rendered by the trial court is an example
of an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Petitioner justifies the mode of appeal she
adopted before the Court of Appeals in that under the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken
from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, i.e., the 21 August 2008 Resolution of the
RTC. Petitioner now prays for a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the instant petition deserves outright
dismissal for being fatally defective due to failure to show competent evidence of the identities
of the affiants who signed the affidavit of service and the verification and certification against
forum shopping. Respondents also assert that certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
decision issued by the RTC. Being improper, respondents argue that the filing of
the certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals did not toll the running of the appeal
period. Consequently, the RTC judgment had already lapsed into finality. Respondents also
emphasize that petitioner raises questions of facts which are beyond the purview of this Court
to resolve.

The pivotal issue in this case is the correctness of a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as a remedy against the Decision and Resolution of
the Regional Trial Court.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a pleading limited to
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged
in and established by the petition: (1) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[4]

Only the first requisite is here present. Petitioner correctly impleaded the trial court
judge in her certiorari petition.

Regarding to the second requisite, it is well-settled that a petition for certiorari against
a court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner because of passion or hostility.[5]

The petitioner lists the particulars of the alleged grave abuse of discretion, thus

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE OR TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS ANNEXES A AND B.

Under this heading, the following are disputed as tantamount to grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or without jurisdiction
that led to the questioned orders Annexes A and B, viz:

I. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FAILING
TO APPRECIATE THE DEFENSES AND ARGUMENTS
ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER;

II. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FINDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT
SPOUSES ANTAZOS PROPERTY WAS ENCROACHED BY THE
PETITIONER BY 114 SQUARE METERS;

III. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO VACATE AND TURNOVER
THE FULL POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OF SAID 114
SQUARE METERS TO RESPONDENTS SPOUSES ANTAZO
DESPITE THE LATTERS ABSENCE OF A CLEAR TITLE
THERETO;

IV. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING;

V. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
AWARDING RESPONDENTS SPOUSES ANTAZO WITH
ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF 50,000.00 PESOS IN
THE ABSENCE OF FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES THEREFOR;

VI. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT
AWARDING PETITIONERS COUNTER-CLAIMS DESPITE THE
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT THE SAME;
 VII. THE HONORABLE JUDGE/TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
RENDERING A JUDGMENT WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES, HENCE, THE SAME IS A VOID
DECISION.[6]

Item VII argues that the trial courts judgment is void for lack of factual and legal
bases. This allegation is worthy only if it is read to mean that the questioned judgment did not
state the facts and the law on which it is based, i.e., that it violates Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

After perusing the trial courts decision, we find that the assailed decision substantially
complied with the constitutional mandate. While the decision is admittedly brief, it however
contains all factual bases to support its conclusion. The first two (2) paragraphs of the decision
established the ownership of respondents through certificates of title. The fact of
encroachment was proven by the relocation survey conducted by the geodetic engineer, which
the trial court found to be credible. The trial court held that these evidence are more than
sufficient to prove two mattersownership by respondents and encroachment by petitioner.

Petitioner herself disproved the absence of the required statements. She questioned the
trial courts appreciation of her arguments and defenses; the sufficiency of evidence to prove
encroachment; and the existence of a clear title to the alleged encroached properties in Errors
(I), (II), and (III). Errors (IV), (V), and (VI) pertain to legal questions such as whether there
was violation of forum-shopping; whether the award of attorneys fees is proper; and the
validity of the counterclaims. A petition for the writ of certiorari does not deal with errors of
judgment. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties'
respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.[7]Verily, the errors ascribed by
petitioner are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.

Anent the third requisite, a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal
is available to the aggrieved party. The party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals
is proscribed from assailing the decision or final order of said court via Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law.[8] Furthermore, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.[9]

In this case, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was clearly available to
petitioner. She however chose to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As the Court of
Appeals correctly surmised and pointed out, petitioner availed of the remedy of certiorari to
salvage her lost appeal, thus:

In the instant case, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
dated 25 July 2008. Public respondent denied said motion on 21 August 2008,
a copy of which petitioner received on 28 August 2008. Petitioner had fifteen
(15) days or until 12 September 2008 within which to file her appeal, but none
was made. In an effort to salvage her lost appeal, petitioner comes before this
Court via a petition for certiorari filed on 2 October 2008.[10]
 In her final attempt to reinstate the case, petitioner invokes a liberal interpretation of
the procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. We are not persuaded. Aside from
citing cases wherein this Court disregarded procedural infirmities to pave the way for
substantial justice, petitioner failed to specifically cite any justification how and why a normal
application of procedural rules would frustrate her quest for justice. Indeed, petitioner has not
been forthright in explaining why she chose the wrong mode of appeal.

Based on the foregoing, a denial of the petition is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

* Per Special Order No. 947, Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura is hereby
designated as additional member in place of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro who is on official leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Presiding Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. Rollo, pp.
46-48.
[2]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Rollo, p. 86.
[3]
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court. Rollo, p. 16.
[4]
Equitable-PCI Bank Inc. v. Apurillo, G.R. No. 168746, 5 November 2009, 605 SCRA 30,
42-43 citing People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1, 10 (2004); Salvacion v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175006, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 163, 180-181.
[5]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, G.R. No. 178923, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 272,
286-287 citing Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 438
Phil. 408, 414 (2002); Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166046, 23
March 2006, 485 SCRA 219, 233; Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil.
1, 19-20 (2002); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Goimco, Sr., 512 Phil. 729, 733-
734 (2005) citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 786
(2003); Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 20 (2002) citing Cuison v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128540, 15 April 1998, 289 SCRA 159, 171.
[6]
Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 65-67.
[7]
Romys Freight Service v. Castro, G.R. No. 141637, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 160, 166
citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5 at 787 citing
further Cruz v. People, 363 Phil. 156 (1999).
[8]
California Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145408, 20 August 2008, 562
SCRA 403, 413 citing Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164561, 30 August 2006, 500 SCRA 226, 236-237; Hanjin Engineering and
Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, 10 April 2006, 487
SCRA 78, 96-97.
[9]
Cua, Jr. v. Tan, G.R. No. 181455-56, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 645, 687.
[10]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 November 2008. Rollo, pp. 47-48.
 SECOND DIVISION

MARCIAL FAJARDO, G.R. No. 157707

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.,

Chairperson,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RUBY GAMBOA BRION, JJ.
VDA. DE DIZON, ET AL., MYRNA ILAGAN VDA.
DE MANGUNE, ET AL., CAPT. GENER
MANGUNE, and OLIVIA PAYAD VDA. DE
GUTIERREZ, ET AL.,
Promulgated:
Respondents.

October 29, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 DECISION

QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision[1] dated January 31, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48419.

It stemmed from four civil cases involving damages filed by the heirs of Alexander T.
Dizon, Eduardo and Elizabeth P. Mangune, and Mario C. Gutierrez (the four victims), who
died in a vehicular accident along the North Expressway in Angeles City. These cases,
docketed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57 as Civil Cases Nos.
5215,[2] 5216,[3] 5217[4] and 5218,[5] were filed against Perfecto Dacasin and petitioner
Marcial Fajardo, being the driver and owner, respectively, of the truck which allegedly
sideswiped the jeep carrying the victims.

A criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to

property was also filed against Dacasin as a result of the incident. The criminal case and the
above-mentioned civil cases were consolidated and tried jointly, but the trial court
nevertheless resolved the criminal case separately, finding Dacasin guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.[6] The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 17302.[7]

As regards the civil aspect, SPO2 Romulo M. Bagsic testified that at around 6:15
p.m. of October 12, 1987, he received a phone call regarding a vehicular accident that took
place 500 meters away from Magalang/Angeles City along the North Expressway. Bagsic
went to the scene of the incident and saw the four victims sprawled on the right outer lane
of the expressway, on the lane bound for Manila. The owner-type jeep of the four victims
had fallen into the canal by the side of the road, and a six-wheeler truck rested on its side
facing northeast. A portion of the jeep was still attached to the body of the said truck. [8]

Bagsic prepared his investigation report based on the location of the two vehicles and
the dead bodies, the debris, and the skid marks of the vehicle for the possible point of
impact. Afterwards, Bagsic concluded that the jeep was sideswiped by the truck.[9]

Upon further investigation, Bagsic found at the trucks compartment a gasoline receipt
indicating its owner to be a certain M. Fajardo. The lady attendant at the Caltex Gas Station
of Balagtas, Bulacan confirmed to Bagsic that the said M. Fajardo is their
customer.[10] Petitioner, during trial, acknowledged ownership of the subject truck, an Isuzu
six-wheeler truck with license Plate No. CCF-330.

Bagsic further testified that he had the vehicles and dead bodies photographed by a
certain Rolledo Sanchez, a member of the Pampanga Press Club. The jeep was then towed
to Angeles City, while the towing of the truck was left to the CDCP, the authority in charge at
the North Expressway. However, when Bagsic returned to the scene of the incident, the truck
was nowhere to be found. The CDCP disclaimed any knowledge as to the whereabouts of the
truck.[11]

In defense, both petitioner and Dacasin denied that it was their six-wheeler truck which
figured in the said incident involving the deaths of the four victims, but they admit that at
around the same time and place, their truck met an accident when it fell on its side after
allegedly running over a hole on the expressway. This alleged accident, as narrated by Dacasin,
happened at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 12, 1987. After the accident, he
left at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon and proceeded to Nepo, Angeles City. Then, at around 9:00
oclock in the evening, he proceeded to Bulacan. He left Bulacan at 11:30 oclock in the evening,
and reported to his employer (petitioner) around 12:00 oclockmidnight. Afterwards, he left for
Pangasinan.[12]

Dacasin admitted not responding to the subpoena sent by the prosecutors office
asking for his counter affidavit, and added that he was arrested on June 5, 1991, after four
years of hiding. Dacasin claimed that he executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay in the presence of
his wife at the Mabalacat Police Station, but averred that he was forced to sign the same.[13]

On June 30, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision[14] finding petitioner and
Dacasin liable for damages. Upon review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision and adjudged double costs against petitioner and Dacasin.

Claiming to have no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy, petitioner now comes
before us, contending:

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE SUBJECT
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANGELES CITY, BRANCH 57.[15]

Simply put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the trial courts decision?

Petitioner contends that the findings of the Court of Appeals were based on conjectures
as there was no eyewitness when the incident happened. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in giving credence to the testimony of police
investigator Bagsic, the sole witness for the respondents. Also, petitioner claims that the award
of damages against them is unwarranted and excessive. Petitioner likewise maintains that it was
not his truck that was involved in the incident. However, assuming that it was indeed his truck
that got involved in the incident, petitioner is absolved from liability as he was not in the truck
when the incident occurred, and that he exercised the due diligence required by law.[16]

After due consideration of the contentions and submissions in this case, we are in
agreement that the petition lacks merit.

At the outset, in our view, this case warrants an outright dismissal. Time and again,
we have ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition
before resorting to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the
opportunity to correct its error, if any.[17] While this rule admits of exceptions,[18] none is
present in this case.

The records show that the January 31, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals was
received by petitioner on February 12, 2003. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on April 14, 2003. In
doing so, petitioner did not afford the Court of Appeals an opportunity to rectify its alleged
errors. Petitioner did not even attempt to explain why he was unable to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period or even explain why the instant case is an
exceptional one.
 It bears stressing that he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it in a manner
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.[19] The liberal construction
of the Rules should not be a remedy for all procedural maladies. This Court will not tolerate
wanton disregard of the procedural rules under the guise of liberal construction.[20]

In addition, petitioner adopted the wrong remedy in bringing this case before
us. Instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us
by filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case.[21]

On the other hand, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent
action based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only if there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for
certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. Grave
abuse of discretion, under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross.[22] Such is not the case here.

The assailed Court of Appeals decision admitting in evidence the documents presented
by respondents and giving weight to the testimonies of respondents witness, if erroneous,
involves a mere error of judgment and not one of jurisdiction.[23] Where the real issue involves
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January
31, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48419 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1]
CA rollo, pp. 91-99. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, with
Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino concurring.
[2]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 5-9.
[3]
Records, Vol. II, pp. 5-8.
[4]
Records, Vol. III, pp. 4-7.
[5]
Records, Vol. IV, pp. 1-4.
[6]
CA rollo, pp. 37-44. Penned by Judge Mariano C. Del Castillo.
[7]
Rollo, p. 15.
[8]
Folder of Exhibits, Vol. I, pp. 22, 26 and 53.
[9]
Id. at 26 and 31.
[10]
Id. at 57-58.
[11]
Id. at 39, 49-51 and 63.
[12]
CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
[13]
Id. at 40.
[14]
Id. at 45-60.
[15]
Rollo, p. 5.
[16]
Id. at 8-9.
[17]
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142133, November 19,
2002, 392 SCRA 229, 235.
[18]
Id. at 236.
The following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
[19]
Tower Industrial Sales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165727, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA
556, 569.
[20]
Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150241, November 4, 2004, 441 SCRA 463, 470.
[21]
Id. at 469.
[22]
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 158780-82, October 12, 2004, 440 SCRA 206, 212.
[23]
See Deutsche Bank Manila v. Chua Yok See, G.R. No. 165606, February 6, 2006, 481
SCRA 672, 693.
[24]
Estrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 154235-36, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 86, 94
citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142051, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 605,
613.
What is the legal definition of grave abuse of discretion?

“Grave abuse of discretion,” under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.”1
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.2

1FAJARDO vs. CA, G.R. No. 157707, 2008 October 29.

2 PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 76001,
1988 September 5.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, G.R. No. 171513

Petitioner,
- versus -

HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-

DE CASTRO, HON. DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA and HON. EFREN N.
DE LA CRUZ, in their official capacities
as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices,
respectively, of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, and NIERNA S. DOLLER,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190963

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

FIRST DIVISION OF THE Promulgated:

SANDIGANBAYAN and ARNOLD
JAMES M. YSIDORO,
Respondents. February 6, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions assailing the rulings of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 27963, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold James M. Ysidoro.

G.R. No. 171513 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court (Rules) filed by petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro to annul the resolutions, dated
July 6, 2005[1] and January 25, 2006,[2] of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite.
 G.R. No. 190963, on the other hand, is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by
the People of the Philippines through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (People) to annul
and set aside the decision,[3] dated October 1, 2009, and the resolution,[4] dated December 9,
2009, of the Sandiganbayan which acquitted Ysidoro for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts), as amended.

The Antecedents

Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan,
with the following information:

That during the period from June 2001 to December 2001 or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Leyte, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, above-
named accused, ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality
and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, withhold and fail to give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any
legal basis, her RATA for the months of August, September, October,
November and December, all in the year 2001, in the total amount of
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE
PESOS (P22,125.00), Philippine Currency, and her Productivity Pay in the
year 2000, in the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00),
Philippine Currency, and despite demands made upon accused to release
and pay her the amount of P22,125.00 and P2,000.00, accused failed to do
so, thus accused in the course of the performance of his official functions
had deprived the complainant of her RATA and Productivity Pay, to the
damage and injury of Nierna S. Doller and detriment of public service.[5]

Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and, in the alternative, for
judicial determination of probable cause,[6] which were both denied by the Sandiganbayan. In
due course, Ysidoro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.

The Sandiganbayan Preventively Suspends Ysidoro

On motion of the prosecution,[7] the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro

for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states:

Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution

under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and
 in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office.

Ysidoro filed a motion for reconsideration, and questioned the necessity and the
duration of the preventive suspension. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
reconsideration, ruling that -

Clearly, by well established jurisprudence, the provision of Section

13, Republic Act 3019 make[s] it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to
suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer
who has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as
amended or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense
involving fraud upon government of public funds or property.[8]

Ysidoro assailed the validity of these Sandiganbayan rulings in his petition (G.R. No.
171513) before the Court. Meanwhile, trial on the merits in the principal case continued before
the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence.

The prosecution presented Nierna S. Doller as its sole witness. According to Doller,
she is the Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer of Leyte. She claimed that Ysidoro
ordered her name to be deleted in the payroll because her husband transferred his political
affiliation and sided with Ysidoros opponent. After her name was deleted from the payroll,
Doller did not receive her representation and transportation allowance (RATA) for the period
of August 2001 to December 2001. Doller also related that she failed to receive her
productivity bonus for the year 2000 (notwithstanding her performance rating of VS) because
Ysidoro failed to sign her Performance Evaluation Report. Doller asserted that she made
several attempts to claim her RATA and productivity bonus, and made representations with
Ysidoro, but he did not act on her requests. Doller related that her family failed to meet their
financial obligations as a result of Ysidoros actions.

To corroborate Dollers testimony, the prosecution presented documentary evidence in

the form of disbursement vouchers, request for obligation of allotment, letters, excerpts from
the police blotter, memorandum, telegram, certification, order, resolution, and the decision of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman absolving her of the charges.[9]

On the other hand, the defense presented seven (7) witnesses,[10] including Ysidoro,
and documentary evidence. The defense showed that the withholding of Dollers RATA was
due to the investigation conducted by the Office of the Mayor on the anomalies allegedly
committed by Doller. For this reason, Ysidoro ordered the padlocking of Dollers office, and
ordered Doller and her staff to hold office at the Office of the Mayor for the close monitoring
and evaluation of their functions. Doller was also prohibited from outside travel without
Ysidoros approval.

The Sandiganbayan Acquits Ysidoro

In a decision dated October 1, 2009,[11] the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held that the
second element of the offense that there be malice, ill-motive or bad faith was not present. The
Sandiganbayan pronounced:

This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA.
However, the antecedent facts and circumstances did not show any indicia
of bad faith on the part of [Ysidoro] in withholding the release of Dollers
RATA.

In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in honest
belief that Doller was not entitled to her RATA based on the opinion of the
COA resident Auditor and Section 317 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual.

It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless, [Ysidoros]

reliance to the same was a clear basis of good faith on his part in
withholding Dollers RATA.

With regard to the Productivity Incentive Bonus, Doller was aware that the
non-submission of the Performance Evaluation Form is a ground for an
employees non-eligibility to receive the Productivity Incentive Bonus:

a) Employees disqualification for performance-

based personnel actions which would require the rating
for the given period such as promotion, training or
scholarship grants, and productivity incentive bonus if
the failure of the submission of the report form is the
fault of the employees.

Doller even admitted in her testimonies that she failed to submit her
Performance Evaluation Report to [Ysidoro] for signature.

There being no malice, ill-motive or taint of bad faith, [Ysidoro] had the
legal basis to withhold Dollers RATA and Productivity pay.[12] (italics
supplied)

In a resolution dated December 9, 2009,[13] the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutions motion
for reconsideration, reasoning that -

It must be stressed that this Court acquitted [Ysidoro] for

two reasons: firstly, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden
of proving that accused Ysidoro acted in bad faith as stated in
paragraph 1 above; and secondly, the exculpatory proof of good
faith xxx.

Needless to state, paragraph 1 alone would be enough

ground for the acquittal of accused Ysidoro. Hence, the COA
 Resident Auditor need not be presented in court to prove that
[Ysidoro] acted in good faith. This is based on the legal precept
that when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused
need not even offer evidence in his behalf.[14] (italics supplied)

Supervening events occurred after the filing of Ysidoros petition which rendered the
issue in G.R. No. 171513 i.e., the propriety of his preventive suspension moot and
academic. First, Ysidoro is no longer the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte as his
term of office expired in 2007. Second, the prosecution completed its presentation of evidence
and had rested its case before the Sandiganbayan. And third, the Sandiganbayan issued its
decision acquitting Ysidoro of the crime charged.

In light of these events, what is left to resolve is the petition for certiorari filed by the
People on the validity of the judgment acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.

The Peoples Petition

The People posits that the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 have been duly
established by the evidence, in that:

First. [Ysidoro] was the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte when he

ordered the deletion of private complainants name in the payroll for RATA
and productivity pay.

Second. He caused undue injury to [Doller] when he ordered the

withholding of her RATA and productivity pay. It is noteworthy that
complainant was the only official in the municipality who did not receive
her RATA and productivity pay even if the same were already included in
the budget for that year. x x x

Consequently, [Doller] testified that her family suffered actual and moral
damages due to the withholding of her benefits namely: a) the
disconnection of electricity in their residence; x x x b) demand letters from
their creditors; x x x c) her son was dropped from school because they were
not able to pay for his final exams; x x x d) [h]er children did not want to
go to school anymore because they were embarrassed that collectors were
running after them.

Third. Accused clearly acted in evident bad faith as he used his

position to deprive [Doller] of her RATA and productivity pay for the
period mentioned to harass her due to the transfer of political affiliation of
her husband.[15] (emphasis supplied)

The People argues[16] that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and exceeded its,
or acted without, jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith when he withheld Dollers
RATA and deprived her of her productivity bonus. The Sandiganbayan failed to take into
account that: first, the Commission on Audit (COA) resident auditor was never presented in
court; second, the documentary evidence showed that Doller continuously discharged the
functions of her office even if she had been prevented from outside travel by Ysidoro; third,
Ysidoro refused to release Dollers RATA and productivity bonus notwithstanding the
dismissal by the Ombudsman of the cases against her for alleged anomalies committed in
office; and fourth, Ysidoro caused Dollers name to be dropped from the payroll without
justifiable cause, and he refused to sign the disbursement vouchers and the request for
obligation of allotment so that Doller could claim her RATA and her productivity bonus.

In the same manner, the People asserts that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that Doller was not eligible to receive the productivity bonus for her
failure to submit her Performance Evaluation Report. The Sandiganbayan disregarded the
evidence showing the strained relationship and the maneuverings made by Ysidoro so that he
could deny her this incentive.

In his Comment,[17] Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and
substantive infirmities. First, he claims that the petition was filed out of time considering the
belated filing of the Peoples motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan. He argues
that by reason of the late filing of the motion for reconsideration, the present petition was filed
beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Ysidoro also argues that the 60-day reglementary
period should have been counted from the Peoples receipt of the Sandiganbayans decision
since no motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed. Second, Ysidoro claims that the
Sandiganbayans ruling was in accord with the evidence and the prosecution was not denied
due process to properly avail of the remedy of a writ of certiorari. And third, Ysidoro insists
that he can no longer be prosecuted for the same criminal charge without violating the rule
against double jeopardy.

The Issue Raised

The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
and exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction when it acquitted Ysidoro of the crime charged.

The Courts Ruling

We first resolve the preliminary issue raised by Ysidoro on the timeliness of the Peoples
petition for certiorari. The records show that the motion for reconsideration was filed by the
People before the Sandiganbayan on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to file the
motion which fell on October 16, 2009, a Friday. Although the date originally appearing in
the notice of hearing on the motion was September 22, 2009 (which later on was corrected to
October 22, 2009), the error in designating the month was unmistakably obvious considering
the date when the motion was filed. In any case, the error cannot detract from the circumstance
that the motion for reconsideration was filed within the 15-day reglementary period. We
consider, too, that Ysidoro was not deprived of due process and was given the opportunity to
be heard on the motion. Accordingly, the above error cannot be considered fatal to the right
of the People to file its motion for reconsideration. The counting of the 60-day reglementary
period within which to file the petition for certiorari will be reckoned from the receipt of the
People of the denial of its motion for reconsideration, or on December 10, 2009. As the last
day of the 60-day reglementary period fell on February 8, 2010, the petition which was filed
on February 5, 2010 was filed on time.
Nevertheless, we dismiss the petitions for being procedurally and substantially infirm.
A Review of a Judgment of Acquittal

Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to
appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by ordinary
appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
second is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is by
filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique
and provides for a different mode of review. In addition, each procedural remedy may only be
availed of depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed.
A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues. Issues which have not
been properly raised by the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case
are also resolved in this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45
petition is generally limited to the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of
law which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under
this mode, the Court determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given
set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of
the propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so,
whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition

is considered an intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule
65 is characterized as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial courts authority to rule.
Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition tackle errors committed by the trial court in
the appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In contrast, a Rule 65 petition
resolves jurisdictional errors committed in the proceedings in the principal case. In other
words, errors of judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45
petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.

As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65

petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45
petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno,[18] the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the remedies of
ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition, thus:

The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy

and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming
that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the
criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter
a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendants already established innocence at the first
trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same
untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the
government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a
second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that
had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power
and resources are once again employed against the defendants individual
means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make
the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience.[19] (emphases supplied)

However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65
petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process.[20] The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances
because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the
manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and
assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence.[21] It does not
include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.[22] A review under Rule
65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the
question of whether the decision is legally correct.[23]In other words, the focus of the review is
to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.[24]
 Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was
procedurally correct in filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not
raise any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is clear
is the obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the case reviewed by the Court
under the guise of a Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by examining the petition
itself which does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith committed by the Sandiganbayan
in its proceedings. The petition does not also raise any denial of the Peoples due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

We observe, too, that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of
judgment which are more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition.
The grounds cited in the petition call for the Courts own appreciation of the factual findings
of the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the Peoples evidence in proving the element of bad
faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus to Doller.

The Merits of the Case

Our consideration of the imputed errors fails to establish grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a rule,
misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by
the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion.[25] That
an abuse itself must be grave must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court,
no less, will be affected.[26] We have previously held that the mere fact, too, that a court
erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.[27]

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in this wise:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[28]

Under this definition, the People bears the burden of convincingly demonstrating that
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in the appreciation of the evidence. We find
that the People failed in this regard.
 We find no indication from the records that the Sandiganbayan acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its verdict of acquittal. The settled rule is that
conviction ensues only if every element of the crime was alleged and proved.[29] In this case,
Ysidoro was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for two reasons: first, his bad faith (an element
of the crime charged) was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution evidence; and second,
there was exculpatory evidence of his good faith.

As bad faith is a state of mind, the prosecution must present evidence of the overt
acts or omissions committed by Ysidoro showing that he deliberately intended to do wrong or
cause damage to Doller by withholding her RATA. However, save from the testimony of
Doller of the strained relationship between her and Ysidoro, no other evidence was presented
to support Ysidoros bad faith against her. We note that Doller even disproved Ysidoros bad
faith when she admitted that several cases had been actually filed against her before the Office
of the Ombudsman. It bears stressing that these purported anomalies were allegedly committed
in office which Ysidoro cited to justify the withholding of Dollers RATA.

The records also show other acts that tend to negate Ysidoros bad faith under the
circumstances. First, the investigation of the alleged anomalies by Ysidoro was corroborated
by the physical transfer of Doller and her subordinates to the Office of the Mayor and the
prohibition against outside travel imposed on Doller. Second, the existence of the
Ombudsmans cases against Doller. And third, Ysidoros act of seeking an opinion from the
COA Auditor on the proper interpretation of Section 317 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual before he withheld the RATA. This section provides:

An official/employee who was wrongly removed or prevented from performing

his duties is entitled to back salaries but not RATA. The rationale for the grant
of RATA is to provide the official concerned additional fund to meet necessary
expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise or the discharge of the
functions of an office. If he is out of office, [voluntarily] or involuntarily, it
necessarily follows that the functions of the office remain undischarged (COA,
Dec. 1602, October 23, 1990). And if the duties of the office are not discharged,
the official does not and is not supposed to incur expenses. There being no
expenses incurred[,] there is nothing to be reimbursed (COA, Dec. 2121 dated
June 28, 1979).[30]

Although the above provision was erroneously interpreted by Ysidoro and the COA
Auditor, the totality of the evidence, to our mind, provides sufficient grounds to create
reasonable doubt on Ysidoros bad faith. As we have held before, bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence but imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong or a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or
ill-will to partake the nature of fraud.[31] An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law,
absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not
necessarily amount to bad faith.[32]

Similarly, we find no inference of bad faith when Doller failed to receive the
productivity bonus. Doller does not dispute that the receipt of the productivity bonus was
premised on the submission by the employee of his/her Performance Evaluation Report. In
this case, Doller admitted that she did not submit her Performance Evaluation Report; hence,
she could not have reasonably expected to receive any productivity bonus. Further, we cannot
agree with her self-serving claim that it was Ysidoros refusal that led to her failure to receive
her productivity bonus given that no other hard evidence supported this claim. We certainly
cannot rely on Dollers assertion of the alleged statement made by one Leo Apacible (Ysidoros
secretary) who was not presented in court. The alleged statement made by Leo Apacible
that the mayor will get angry with him and he might be laid off,[33] in addition to being hearsay,
did not even establish the actual existence of an order from Ysidoro or of his alleged
maneuverings to deprive Doller of her RATA and productivity bonus.

In light of these considerations, we resolve to dismiss the Peoples petition. We cannot

review a verdict of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed
by the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

1. DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
171513, filed by Arnold James M. Ysidoro for being moot and academic.

2. DISMISS the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190963, filed by the
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 171513, pp. 14-16.
[2]
Id. at 17-18.
[3]
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, pp. 42-50.
[4]
Id. at 57-60.
[5]
Rollo, G.R. No. 171513, p. 20.
[6]
Id. at 33-45.
[7]
Id. at 59-60.
[8]
Supra note 2, at 18.
[9]
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, p. 43.
[10]
They are: (1) Lolita Retorbar, Welfare Aide assigned at the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, Leyte, Leyte; (2) Cristina Polinio, Youth Development Officer II,
Municipal Social Welfare Office, Leyte, Leyte; (3) Dennis Q. Abellar, Human Resource
Management Officer IV, Leyte, Leyte; (4) Ethel G. Mercolita, Municipal Accountant for the
year 2000-2001, Leyte, Leyte; (5) Elsie M. Retorbar, Barangay Daycare worker, Leyte, Leyte;
and (6) Domingo M. Elises, former Municipal Budget Officer, Leyte, Leyte.
[11]
Supra note 3.
[12]
Id. at 47-48.
[13]
Supra note 4.
[14]
Id. at 58.
[15]
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, pp. 20-24,
[16]
Id. at 16-33
[17]
Id. at 78-85.
[18]
G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
[19]
Id. at 450.
[20]
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42, 87 (1986).
[21]
People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010, 631
SCRA 128, 133, citing First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564.
[22]
Id. at 133.
[23]
People v. Nazareno, supra note 18, at 451
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Id. at 452.
[26]
Id. at 452-453.
[27]
Id. at 453.
[28]
Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 and
170510-11, June 1, 2011.
[29]
Aisporna v. CA, et al., 198 Phil. 838, 848 (1982).

[30]
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, p. 47.
[31]
Sampiano. v. Indar, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 597, 613.
[32]
Cabungcal, et al. v. Cordova, et al., 120 Phil. 567, 572-573, (1964) insofar as it
applies mutatis mutandis.
[33]
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, p. 26