Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES MANUEL AND G.R. No. 170575

FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO,

Petitioners,
Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION,
INC.,
Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the
determinants of the nature of the action1 and of which court has jurisdiction over the
action.2

1 Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 176-177 (2003).

2 Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672, 683-684 (1946).

 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review
before it. Also assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated November 15, 2005 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative
thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A
of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and
occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and
between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the
character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to
vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it still
has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.5

3 CA rollo, pp. 98-104; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by
Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas.

4 Id. at 118-119

5 Id. at 99.
 On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as
Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint contains, among others, the following significant
allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land,
situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by
a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex A.

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant
took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it
for commercial purposes.

xxxx

7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land
without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property
is only by tolerance.

8. But [plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last
quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay
rentals for the use of the property.

xxxx

10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as
it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy
of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period
specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.7

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer8 dated July 31, 2003 where
it averred that:

6 Rollo, pp. 139-141.

7 Id. at 140-141.

8 Id. at 129-138.
 3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the
Complaint to the effect that the defendant took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and has been using the premises in accordance with its
agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without
any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two
long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last part of
this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the property leased for
commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the defendant has used and [is] still
using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the
defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection,
and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere in
the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of
its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the
improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the
Foundation shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever,
upon the expiration of this Lease (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex 2 hereof), eighteen
(18) years hence;

xxxx

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of

the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property
by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes 1 and 2 and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of
Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject
property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;

xxxx

8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the

Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the
premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that
defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or
lessors of the land occupied by defendant;

xxxx

As and by way of

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of
the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs
way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto
attached as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said certificate
of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the property
covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article
1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee
from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501,
or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when
the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to
 the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Annex 3), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in
favor of the vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of
the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have
no more right, whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by
virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes 1 and 2 hereof), which has the legal
right to have possession of the subject property;9

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference,
respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping
and Lack of Cause of Action. Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City
of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for Surrender of Withheld Duplicate
Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529 docketed as Special Case
No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City. Subsequently, on
October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order10 resolving the respondents
Motion. In the said Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant is
the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no previous
contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas
Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of the land it is
leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by it from the
City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease
according to its terms and pursuant to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold
by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.

9 Id. at 129-132.

10 CA rollo, pp. 69-73; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Filpia D. Del Castillo.
 Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of
Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely defective.
They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale; specifically the
authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it
as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.

When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the
factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general
denial; there is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence
anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a judgment on the
pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of
Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent
and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many
years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make representation to them regarding the
use of the subject property, but the same never happened. Plaintiff[s] have allowed the
defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.
Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

xxxx

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant took full
control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and has been using the
premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the
defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the
plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.

That the defendants possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of

lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and
lawful owner, the latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundations occupation of the
property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate possession and
occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity
of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping

interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this
Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action
and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

11 Id. at 71-73.
 On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision12 dated July 9,
2004 affirming the MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA,
in a Decision13 dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 which was, however,

denied in a Resolution15 dated November 15, 2005.

Issues

Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising the following issues:

12 Id. at 22-27; penned by Judge Edward B. Contreras. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied for lack of merit, and the questioned Order of the
court a quo in Civil Case No. V-2391 is affirmed.

13 Id. at 98-104. The dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed decision and order of the RTC in Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-009-04.

14 Id. at 105-111.

15 Id. at 118-119.
 I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should
limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,

II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.16

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioners Complaint constitute

judicial admissions.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991,
without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several
years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that
respondents possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x

A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the
introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be
observed and complied with.17 Correspondingly, facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions
of the plaintiff and binding upon him.18 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.19

16 Rollo, p. 9.

17 FRANCISCO VICENTE J., THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EVIDENCE, Volume VII Part I, 1997 edition, p. 90 citing 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 894;
Andersons Dict.; Bouv. Dict.; 1 Green on Evidence, Sec. 27.

18 Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 328, 401 (1981).

19 Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460.
In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject
property without their consent and authority and that respondents use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis.

Nature of the action is determined by the judicial

admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,20 citing Caiza v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court held that what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,22 differentiated the distinct causes of action in
forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession
of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In
forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has
the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of
rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in
actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's
right to continue in possession.23

The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession, therefrom.24 The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original
possessor by a person who has entered without right.25

20 Supra note 1 at 175. Emphasis supplied.

21 335 Phil. 1107 (1997).

22 G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.

23 Id. at 382-383, citing 3 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT

312 (1980 ed.). Emphasis supplied.

24 Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil 752, 756 (1918).

25 Id.
The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.26 The employment of force, in this
case, can be deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the
subject property without their consent and authority.

Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain
entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,27 while strategy connotes the
employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.28 The CA found that
based on the petitioners allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the land of the petitioners was
by stealth x x x.29 However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not availing in
the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be with the knowledge of the
petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation in their complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind
the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and
now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual
right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation
using their property.30 To this Courts mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint

establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not for
unlawful detainer.

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.31 [W]here the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab
initio, the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.32

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject
property without any contractual or legal basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence
follows that respondents possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of
petitioners complaint is one for forcible entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a

26 Id.

27 Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 384.

28 Id.

29 Rollo, p. 23.

30 Id. Emphasis supplied.

31 Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 382.

32 Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572 citing Emilia
v. Bado, 131 Phil. 711 (1968).

33 Rollo, p. 21
person who has entered without right.34 Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no
tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the inception.35

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that
the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for
unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible

Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the
time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject
property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the
time of dispossession,36 the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their
Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the
respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said
order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated
November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

34 Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118, 124.

35 Muoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216, 224.

36 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 1.

 WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief

Justice

gist
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174191 January 30, 2013

NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA GALABO, and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 of petitioner Nenita Quality Foods Corporation (NQFC) to nullity the February 22,
2006 Decision2 and the July 13, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006. The CA reversed the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which affirmed in toto the decision5 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 10,958-E-01. The MTCC dismissed the complaint for forcible
entry and damages, which respondents Crisostomo Galabo, Adelaida Galabo, and Zenaida Galabo-Almachar filed against
NQFC.

The Factual Antecedents

The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 102, PSD-40060, the former Arakaki
Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City with an area of six thousand seventy-four square meters (6,074 sq. m.).

As the CA summarized in the assailed decision, the respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot
No. 722, Cad-102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation. Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey of 1916 to
1920.

When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation in the 1950s, it had Lot No. 722
resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
214966 for Lot No. 722 on April 26, 1953, Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents, however, continue to posses, occupy
and cultivate Lot No. 102.

When NQFC opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the late 1950s, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102.
Donato declined and to ward off further offers, put up "Not For Sale" and "No Trespassing" signs on the property. In the 1970s,
Crisostomo fenced off the entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it.

On August 19, 1994, the respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos
claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Deed of Transfer)7 dated July 10, 1972, which the respondents
and their mother allegedly executed in Santos’ favor. The respondents denied this claim and maintained that they had been
occupying Lot No. 102, which the BOL itself recognized per its letters8 and the Certification9 dated April 12, 2000 confirming
Donato as the long-time occupant and awardee of the property. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for free patent over
Lot No. 102 on September 6, 2000.

On January 3, 2001 and again on a later date, NQFC’s workers, with armed policemen of Toril, Davao City, entered by force Lot
No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. On April 16, 2001, Crisostomo received a letter from
NQFC’s counsel demanding that he remove his house from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut
down various trees that the respondents had planted on the property.

NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102 after he purchased it from the
respondents in 1972 and declared it under his name for taxation purposes. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the
property by the Bureau of Lands, and obtained Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-403510 on June 18, 1974. On December
29, 2000, the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102 to NQFC via the Deed of Absolute Sale11 of even date. NQFC then filed a
petition for cancellation of the respondents’ patent application over Lot No. 102, which the BOL-Manila granted on April 19, 2001,
on the ground that Donato failed to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has long been titled in Santos’ name.
When conciliation failed, the respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a complaint12 for forcible entry with damages before the
MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them
of possession through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth.

The Ruling of the MTCC

Relying on the ruling of the BOL-Manila, the MTCC dismissed the respondents’ complaint,13 explaining that the questions raised
before it required technical determination by the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters, which the
BOL-Manila did in this case.14

The MTCC held that the pieces of evidence NQFC presented – the Deed of Transfer the respondents executed in Santos’ favor,
Santos’ OCT P-4035 over Lot No. 102, the Deed of Absolute Sale in NQFC’s favor, and the findings of the BOL-Manila –
established NQFC’s rightful possession over the property. It further held that: (1) the respondents relinquished their rights over
Lot No. 102 when they executed the Deed of Transfer in Santos’ favor; (2) the certificate of title over Lot No. 102 in Santos’ name
shows that he was in actual physical possession since actual occupation is required before an application for free patent can be
approved; and (3) NQFC validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 102 when it purchased it from Santos, entitling it to the right,
among others, to possess the property as ancillary to such ownership.

The Ruling of the RTC

The respondents appealed the MTCC decision to the RTC but the latter court denied the appeal.15 As the MTCC did, the RTC
relied on the findings of the BOL-Manila. It held that: (1) the respondents failed to perfect whatever right they might have had
over Lot No. 102; and (2) they are estopped from asserting any right over Lot No. 102 since they have long transferred the
property and their right thereto, to Santos in 1972.

In resolving the issue of possession of Lot No. 102, the RTC also resolved the question of ownership, as justified under the
Rules, explaining that the NQFC’s possession of Lot No. 102 was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the
respondents was based merely on the allegation of possession and occupation by Donato, and not on any title.16

Thus, the question of concurrent possession of Lot No. 102 between NQFC and the respondents should tilt in NQFC’s favor.

When the RTC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration in an order17 dated March 5, 2003, the respondents elevated
their case to the CA via a petition for review.18

The Ruling of the CA

The respondents claimed before the CA that the RTC erred when it held that NQFC had prior possession of Lot No. 102, based
solely on its Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued, among others, that: (1) Santos should have taken the necessary steps to oust
the respondents had he been in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972; (2) Santos could not have validly obtained title over
Lot No. 102 since it was still in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) as of 1980;19 and (3) NQFC no longer had
to forcibly evict the respondents in January 2001 if it had been in possession of Lot No. 102 after it bought this land from Santos
in 2000.

The CA found reversible error in the RTC’s decision; thus, it granted the respondents’ petition and ordered NQFC to vacate Lot
No. 102. The CA explained that a plaintiff, in a forcible entry case, only has to prove prior material and physical possession of the
property in litigation and undue deprivation of it by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. These, the
respondents averred in the complaint and sufficiently proved, thus entitling them to recover possession of Lot No. 102. Relying
on the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, the CA especially took note of the letters and the
Certification which the BOL sent to the respondents acknowledging Donato as the awardee of Lot No. 102 and the respondents
as the actual occupants and possessors.

In brushing aside the RTC’s findings, the CA ruled that: (1) Donato’s failure to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 should not weigh
against the respondents as the issue in a forcible entry case is one of possession de facto and not of possession de jure; and (2)
NQFC’s ownership of Lot No. 102 is beside the point as ownership is beyond the purview of an ejectment case. The title or right
of possession, it stressed, is never an issue in a forcible entry suit. The CA, however, denied the respondents’ prayer for moral
damages and attorney’s fees, and rejected the other issues raised for being irrelevant.

In its July 13, 2006 resolution,20 the CA denied NQFC’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the NQFC’s present recourse.

The Petition

NQFC argues that the CA erred in holding that the respondents had prior physical possession of Lot No. 102.21 It claims that,
first, in reversing the RTC findings, the CA relied solely on the letters and the Certification of the BOL,22 which has been
controverted by the following pieces of evidence, among others: (1) the Deed of Transfer that the respondents executed in favor
of Santos; (2) the order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ patent application; (3) Santos’ OCT P-4035; and (4) the Deed
of Absolute Sale that Santos executed in favor of NQFC.

NQFC maintains that the Bureau of Lands would not have granted Santos’ free patent application had he not been in possession
of Lot No. 102 because continued occupation and cultivation, either by himself or by his predecessor-in-interest, of the property
is a requirement for such grant under the Public Land Act. By the very definition of "occupy," Santos is therefore deemed to have
possessed Lot No. 102 prior to 1974, the year his free patent application was granted,23 and under the principle of tacking of
possession, he is deemed to have had possession of Lot No. 102 not only from 1972, when the respondents transferred it to him,
but also from the time Donato acquired the lot in 1948. Thus, Santos had no reason to oust the respondents since he had been
in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972, by virtue of the transfer.24

Second, the respondents had no documents to prove that they were in actual occupation and cultivation of Lot No. 102 – the
reason they did not heed the BOL’s request to perfect their title over it. Finally, citing jurisprudence,25 NQFC argues that the RTC
rightly ruled on the issue of its ownership over Lot No. 102 in deciding the issue of prior physical possession as the Rules allow
this, by way of exception.26

The Case for Respondents

The respondents’ arguments closely adhere to the CA’s ruling. They argue that NQFC, rather than meeting the issues, focused
on its alleged ownership of Lot No. 102 and the possession flowing out of its ownership. They deny ever meeting Santos and
they maintain that their continued possession and occupation of Lot No. 102 belie this supposed sale. Even granting that this
sale occurred, Santos could still not have acquired any right over Lot No. 102 for as of 1980, it was still in the name of the
Republic.27 Thus, they could not have transferred ownership of Lot No. 102 to Santos, and he cannot claim ownership of Lot No.
102 by reason of this sale.28

On the other hand, the respondents’ open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession of Lot No. 102 for three
decades, coupled by a claim of ownership, gave them vested right or interest over the property.29 This vested right is equivalent
to an actually issued certificate of title so that the execution and delivery of the title is a mere formality. To say the least, NQFC
did not have to send them a formal demand to vacate30 and violently oust them from the premises had it been in actual
possession of the property as claimed.31

Lastly, the respondents invoked the settled rule that the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited only to reviewing errors
of law. NQFC failed to show misapprehension of facts in the CA’s findings to justify a departure from this rule.32

The Court’s Ruling

We first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires us to delve into factual
issues, a course not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law, not
questions of fact.33 This rule is read with the equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the
parties and are therefore not reviewable by this Court.34 By way of exception, we resolve factual issues when, as here, conflict
attended the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one hand, and of the CA, on the other. Of minor note, but which we deem
important to point, the petition needlessly impleaded the CA, in breach of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.35

Substantively, the key issue this case presents is prior physical possession – whether NQFC had been in prior physical
possession of Lot No. 102.

We rule in the negative.

First, on the reliance on the BOL letters and Certification and the CA’s alleged disregard of NQFC’s evidence. To prove prior
physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer, Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale,
and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is
apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession. The
latter type of possession is, however, different from and has different legal implications than the former. While these documents
may bear weight and are material in contests over ownership of Lot No. 102, they do not per se show NQFC’s actual possession
of this property.

We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not
exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession
de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts36 for
which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession.37 As we explained in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,38 and
again in the more recent cases of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,39 De Grano v. Lacaba,40 and Lagazo v. Soriano,41 the word
"possession" in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession
de jure42 or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.43 Title is not the issue,44 and the absence of it "is not a ground
for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."45

Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him."46 He cannot be ejected by force,
violence or terror -- not even by its owners.47 For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only at
providing an expeditious means of protecting actual possession.48 Ejectment suits are intended to "prevent breach of x x x peace
and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is
his."49 Thus, lest the purpose of these summary proceedings be defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided unless
it is necessary to resolve the issue of de facto possession.

We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely addressing the issue of possession and presenting evidence showing
that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot No. 102, the former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of Lot
No. 102 and presented documents to this effect. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972 is uncorroborated. Even
the tax declarations under Santos’ name are hardly of weight; "tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof
of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner"50 but not necessarily of the actual possession
required in forcible entry cases.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry, and unlawful detainer, is proper:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]

Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical possession of the
property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth.51 As in any civil
case, the burden of proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by
preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements.

To support its position, NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it bought Lot No. 102 from Santos on
December 29, 2000, its possession is, by operation of law, tacked to that of Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato
acquired Lot No. 102 in 1948.

NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law52 allows a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his
predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard,
however, pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or
losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate – possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession.

The CA brushed aside NQFC’s argument on the respondents’ failure to perfect their title over Lot No. 102. It held that the issue in
this case is not of possession de jure, let alone ownership or title, but of possession de facto. We agree with the CA; the
1âwphi 1

discussions above are clear on this point.

We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving the
issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court53 provides that the issue of
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance-- to determine the issue of
possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.54 Save for this
instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case.55

As a final reiterative note, this Decision deals only with de facto possession and is without prejudice to an appropriate action for
recovery of possession based on ownership.

WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition; the decision dated February 22, 2006 and the
resolution dated July 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VII I of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Dated September 7. 2006 and filed on September 11, 2006 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
rollo. pp. 17-32.

2Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim. Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco
Flores. Romulo V. Borja, Ramon R. Garcia, and Ricardo R. Rosario; id. at 276-292.

3 Id. at 39-42.

4Dated November 29, 2002. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 29, 139-2002; id. at 143-151. Penned by
Judge Renato A. Fuentes.

5 Dated February 20, 2002; id. at 112-122. Penned by Presiding Judge Daydews D. Villamor.

6 Id. at 167.

7 Id. at 68-69.

8 Id. at 65-66.

9 Id. at 67.
10 Id. at 71-73.

11 Id. at 74-76.

12 Id. at 43-52.

13 Supra note 5.

14 Id. at 118-119.

15 Supra note 4.

16 Id. at 147-148.

17 Id. at 159.

18 Under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; id. at 123-140.

19 Id. at 77. See also the MTCC’s findings; id. at 118-119.

20 Supra note 3.

21 Rollo, p. 23.

22 Id. at 28-30.

23 Id. at 27-28; cf. page 335.

24 Id. at 334.

25Quoted portions of the Supreme Court ruling in Refugia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, July 5, 1996,
258 SCRA 347; id. at 30-31.

26 Supra; cf. pp. 343-345.

27 Supra note 19.

28 Id. at 317-319.

29 Id. at 319.

30 Copy of the Notice to Vacate; id. at 188.

31 Id. at 319-320.

32 Id. at 320-321.

33See Dr. Seriña v. Caballero, 480 Phil. 277, 284 (2004); Go Ke Chong, Jr. v. Chan, G.R. No. 153791, August 24,
2007, 531 SCRA 72, 80-81, citing Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 593, 606;
and Lagazo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 170864, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 616, 620.

34 Dr. Seriña v. Caballero, supra, at 284.

35SEC. 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing
party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents. [italics supplied; emphasis ours] cf. Dela Cruz v. CA and Te, 539 Phil. 158,
169 (2006).

36 Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130841, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 532, 542.
37 Ibid.

38 G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 509-510.

39 Supra note 36, at 540.

40 G.R. No. 158877, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 148, 158-159, citing Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, supra.

41 Supra note 33, at 621, citing De Grano v. Lacaba, supra.

See also Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 165, 170-171, citing Carbonilla v.
42

Abiera, G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461, 469.

43See De Grano v. Lacaba, supra note 40, at 159, citing Sps. Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 298 (2001); cf.
Lagazo v. Soriano, supra note 33, at 621.

44Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, G.R. No. 146815, April 9, 2003, 401 SCRA 181, 184; and
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 36, at 541, citing Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, at
184.

45Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. Nos. 142676 and 146718, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344, 376, citing Pajuyo v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 38.

46Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, at 510-511, citing Rubio v. The Hon. Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
322 Phil. 179 (1996); and Antazo v. Doblada, G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 586, 593, citing
Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38.

47
Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, supra note 44, at 185, citing Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216; Joven v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, August 20, 1992,
212 SCRA 700; German Management and Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76216 and 76217,
September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495; and Supia and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312 (1933).

48 See Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, at 511-512; David v. Cordova, 502 Phil 626, 645-646 (2005),
citing Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, at 511-512; and Pagadora v. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662
SCRA 14, 29-30.

49 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 512.

De Grano v. Lacaba, supra note 40, citing Estrella v. Robles, Jr., G.R. No. 171029, November 22, 2007, 538
50

SCRA 60, 74; and Ganila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 435.

51See Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 36, at 540, citing Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 15,
2007, 516 SCRA 84, 91.

52 Article 1138 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession
to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest.

53SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. – When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue
of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (emphasis ours)

54 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 38, at 510.

See De Grano v. Lacuba, supra note 40, at 159, citing Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.,
55

G.R. No. 155110, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 653, 670; and Pajuyo v. CA, supra note 38
 In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse and set aside the
findings and conclusions of the CA.