Findings

1. A combustion gas leak through the right Solid Rocket Motor aft field
joint initiated at or shortly after ignition eventually weakened and/or
penetrated the External Tank initiating vehicle structural breakup and
loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger during STS Mission 51-L.

2. The evidence shows that no other STS 51-L Shuttle element or the
payload contributed to the causes of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft
field joint combustion gas leak. Sabotage was not a factor.

3. Evidence examined in the review of Space Shuttle material,

manufacturing, assembly, quality control, and processing of
nonconformance reports found no flight hardware shipped to the
launch site that fell outside the limits of Shuttle design specifications.

4. Launch site activities, including assembly and preparation, from

receipt of the flight hardware to launch were generally in accord with
established procedures and were not considered a factor in the
accident.

5. Launch site records show that the right Solid Rocket Motor segments
were assembled using approved procedures. However, significant out-
of-round conditions existed between the two segments joined at the
right Solid Rocket Motor aft field joint (the joint that failed).

a. While the assembly conditions had the potential of generating debris

or damage that could cause O-ring seal failure, these were not
considered factors in this accident.

b. The diameters of the two Solid Rocket Motor segments had grown as
a result of prior use.

c. The growth resulted in a condition at time of launch wherein the

maximum gap between the tang and clevis in the region of the joint's
O-rings was no more than .008 inches and the average gap would have
been .004 inches.

d. With a tang-to-clevis gap of .004 inches, the O-ring in the joint would
be compressed to the extent that it pressed against all three walls of
the O-ring retaining channel.

e. The lack of roundness of the segments was such that the smallest
tang-to-clevis clearance occurred at the initiation of the assembly
operation at positions of 120 degrees and 300 degrees around the
circumference of the aft field joint. It is uncertain if this tight condition
and the resultant greater compression of the O-rings at these points
persisted to the time of launch.

6. The ambient temperature at time of launch was 36 degrees

Fahrenheit, or 15 degrees lower than the next coldest previous launch.

a. The temperature at the 300 degree position on the right aft field
joint circumference was estimated to be 28degrees +/- 5 degrees
Fahrenheit. This was the coldest point on the joint.

b. Temperature on the opposite side of the right Solid Rocket Booster

facing the sun was estimated to be about 50 degrees Fahrenheit.

7. Other joints on the left and right Solid Rocket Boosters experienced
similar combinations of tang-to-clevis gap clearance and temperature.
It is not known whether these joints experienced distress during the
flight of 51-L.

8. Experimental evidence indicates that due to several effects

associated with the Solid Rocket Booster's ignition and combustion
pressures and associated vehicle motions, the gap between the tang
and the clevis will open as much as .017 and .029 inches at the
secondary and primary O-rings, respectively.

a. This opening begins upon ignition, reaches its maximum rate of

opening at about 200-300 milliseconds, and is essentially complete at
600 milliseconds when the Solid Rocket Booster reaches its operating
pressure.

b. The External Tank and right Solid Rocket Booster are connected by
several struts, including one at 310 degrees near the aft field joint that
failed. This strut's effect on the joint dynamics is to enhance the
opening of the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10-20
percent in the region of 300-320 degrees.

9. O-ring resiliency is directly related to its temperature.

a. A warm O-ring that has been [71] compressed will return to its
original shape much quicker than will a cold O-ring when compression
is relieved. Thus, a warm O-ring will follow the opening of the tang-to-
clevis gap. A cold O-ring may not.

b. A compressed O-ring at 75 degrees Fahrenheit is five times more

responsive in returning to its uncompressed shape than a cold O-ring
at 30 degrees Fahrenheit.
c. As a result it is probable that the O-rings in the right solid booster aft
field joint were not following the opening of the gap between the tang
and clevis at time of ignition.

10. Experiments indicate that the primary mechanism that actuates O-

ring sealing is the application of gas pressure to the upstream (high-
pressure) side of the O-ring as it sits in its groove or channel.

a. For this pressure actuation to work most effectively, a space

between the O-ring and its upstream channel wall should exist during
pressurization.

b. A tang-to-clevis gap of .O04 inches, as probably existed in the failed

joint, would have initially compressed the O-ring to the degree that no
clearance existed between the O-ring and its upstream channel wall
and the other two surfaces of the channel.

c. At the cold launch temperature experienced, the O-ring would be

very slow in returning to its normal rounded shape. It would not follow
the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. It would remain in its
compressed position in the O-ring channel and not provide a space
between itself and the upstream channel wall. Thus, it is probable the
O-ring would not be pressure actuated to seal the gap in time to
preclude joint failure due to blow-by and erosion from hot combustion
gases.

11. The sealing characteristics of the Solid Rocket Booster O-rings are
enhanced by timely application of motor pressure.

a. Ideally, motor pressure should be applied to actuate the O-ring and

seal the joint prior to significant opening of the tang-to-clevis gap (100
to 200 milliseconds after motor ignition).

b. Experimental evidence indicates that temperature, humidity and

other variables in the putty compound used to seal the joint can delay
pressure application to the joint by 500 milliseconds or more.

c. This delay in pressure could be a factor in initial joint failure.

12. Of 21 launches with ambient temperatures of 61 degrees

Fahrenheit or greater, only four showed signs of O-ring thermal
distress; i.e., erosion or blow-by and soot. Each of the launches below
61. degrees Fahrenheit resulted in one or more O-rings showing signs
of thermal distress.
a. Of these improper joint sealing actions, one-half occurred in the aft
field joints, 20 percent in the center field joints, and 30 percent in the
upper field joints. The division between left and right Solid Rocket
Boosters was roughly equal. Each instance of thermal O-ring distress
was accompanied by a leak path in the insulating putty. The leak path
connects the rocket's combustion chamber with the O-ring region of
the tang and clevis. Joints that actuated without incident may also
have had these leak paths.

13. There is a possibility that there was water in the clevis of the STS
51-L joints since water was found in the STS-9 joints during a destack
operation after exposure to less rainfall than STS 51-L. At time of
launch, it was cold enough that water present in the joint would freeze.
Tests show that ice in the joint can inhibit proper secondary seal
performance.

14. A series of puffs of smoke were observed emanating from the 51-L
aft field joint area of the right Solid Rocket Booster between 0.678 and
2.500 seconds after ignition of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Motors.

a. The puffs appeared at a frequency of about three puffs per second.

This roughly matches the natural structural frequency of the solids at
lift off and is reflected in slight cyclic changes of the tang-to-clevis gap
opening.

[72] b. The puffs were seen to be moving upward along the surface of
the booster above the aft field joint.

c. The smoke was estimated to originate at a circumferential position

of between 270 degrees and 315 degrees on the booster aft field joint,
emerging from the top of the joint.

15. This smoke from the aft field joint at Shuttle lift off was the first
sign of the failure of the Solid Rocket Booster O-ring seals on STS 51-L.

16. The leak was again clearly evident as a flame at approximately 58

seconds into the flight. It is possible that the leak was continuous but
unobservable or non-existent in portions of the intervening period. It is
possible in either case that thrust vectoring and normal vehicle
response to wind shear as well as planned maneuvers reinitiated or
magnified the leakage from a degraded seal in the period preceding
the observed flames. The estimated position of the flame, centered at
a point 307 degrees around the circumference of the aft field joint, was
confirmed by the recovery of two fragments of the right Solid Rocket
Booster.
a. A small leak could have been present that may have grown to
breach the joint in flame at a time on the order of 58 to 60 seconds
after lift off.

b. Alternatively, the O-ring gap could have been resealed by deposition

of a fragile buildup of aluminum oxide and other combustion debris.
This resealed section of the joint could have been disturbed by thrust
vectoring, Space Shuttle motion and flight loads induced by changing
winds aloft.

c. The winds aloft caused control actions in the time interval of 32

seconds to 62 seconds into the flight that were typical of the largest
values experienced on previous missions.

Conclusion

In view of the findings, the Commission concluded that the cause of

the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft
field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The failure was due to a
faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These
factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the
character of materials, the effects of reusability, processing, and the
reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.