POLITICAL LAW CASES
Jann Claudine M. Amago – Law 4
1. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997
Doctrine: Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos (Art 12, Sec 10, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the
eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a
close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent
a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused
to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale
of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
Issues: Whether or not Art 12, Sec 10 of the Constitution is self-
executing; Whether or not the MHC forms part of the national economy
and patrimony
Ruling: YES.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly
a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during
the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not
bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all
the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land.Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid
in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely
to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to
be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any
reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of
the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede
and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign
investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes
more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained
by the Constitution.
2. Macariola vs. Asuncion
Doctrine:
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered
a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal. On October 16,
1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The
project of partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but
only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R.
Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.
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 One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which
was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio
Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer
of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion
and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed
their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the
President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and
Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming
a Judge" for violating the following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the
New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3
par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act.,
Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno
dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned
provisions
Ruling: NO.
Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions
constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more
discreet in his private and business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier
purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought
the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the
decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and
his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property
was no longer the subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no
legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent. Upon the
sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the
Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the
Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because
whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the
former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are
reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3
of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake in any business
in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967
from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and
it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of
the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles
of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their
interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.
3. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
Doctrine: EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out
the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order.
Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the
successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to
recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No.
1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may
be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this
order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Accordingly,
the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in
the active service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various
reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). AFP Board issued a Resolution on its
findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas. Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q.
Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property. Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a
petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No.
1379) against Ramas.
Issue/s: The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the
jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
Ruling: NO.
Jurisdiction of PCGG
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in
the active service or retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on
the action to be taken based on its findings. The PCGG gave this task to
the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No.
1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish
and to carry out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG
specific responsibilities. he PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only
investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in
Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public
office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President
assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in
the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him
a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent
a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos.
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the
Philippine Army with the rank of Major Generaldoes not suffice to make
him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1
and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing
that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the
same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees
of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is
manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in
the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by
former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth if any.
4. Angara vs. Electoral Commission
Doctrine: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
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supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that
the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.
Facts:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering
the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th.
On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality
the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he
be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission
passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission
a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out
of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's
protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested
elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Issue:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts,
and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling: NO.
The Electoral Commission did not act without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest
filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests
against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
5. Lagman vs. Medialdea
Doctrine:
6. Ocampo et al vs. Medialdea
Doctrine:
7. Biraogo vs. Truth Commission
Doctrine:
Facts:
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their
respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and
to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Ruling:
1. Legal standing
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives
as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has
no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its
operations. It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and
operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already
appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of
funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will
simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere
in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor
for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
2. Separation of powers
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation
of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed
in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31
contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
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Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa.Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to
be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is
in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of
the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an
existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of
the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order
No. 1.
3. Quasi-judicial functions
As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in
the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before
it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial
discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such
that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as
such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in
a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even
respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any
quasi-judicial power[
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation
to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission
to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the
charges against them[ is certainly not a function given to the
commission. At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under
R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies
4. Equal Protection Clause
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is
to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent
to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The
PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is,
a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation.
8. Magallona vs. Ermita
Doctrine:
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant
to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over
their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446,
correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant
with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to
shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and
classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three
main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages
hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken
our claim over those territories.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
3. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: ON THE THRESHOLD ISSUES, WE HOLD THAT (1)
PETITIONERS POSSESS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT
AS CITIZENS AND (2) THE WRITS OF CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION ARE PROPER REMEDIES TO TEST THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA 9522. ON THE MERITS, WE FIND
NO BASIS TO DECLARE RA 9522 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RA 9522 is Constitutional.
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
Territory.
The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law
and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the country’s maritime
zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly,
the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested
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by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines’ enjoyment of
territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and
the Scarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah
remained even with the adoption of the amendments.
Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere
mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations.
It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no
way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of
territories.
With regard to the petitioners’ assertion that RA 9522 has converted the
internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be
persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of
Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent
security measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage. Since
the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary
law, it also believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny
a right acknowledged by modern states.
In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the
imposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to
claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible for
archipelagic states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the
UNCLOS III.
9. North Cotabato vs. Government of the Philippines
Doctrine:
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP
- MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court
issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is
ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information
on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to
the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
Ruling:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by
the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David
v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people
to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided
by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right
to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to
the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations
on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-
building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
5
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever
any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of
the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the
MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to
the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon
the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment
of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-
AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the
amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath
of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential
power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-
discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could
do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves
and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the
MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by
Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous
peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has
not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively
in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does
not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant
the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement
or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project
or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of
a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive
duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
10. Poe Llamanzares vs. COMELEC
11. People vs. Enojas
Doctrine:
Facts:
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity
of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously
parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his
documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of
documents shown them, they invited him in their mobile car to the police
station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi behind.
Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the
store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and a
shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the
other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan
causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with
two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He then went back
to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas
was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned
taxi and found a mobile phone apparently left behind by Enojas. The
police officers monitored the incoming messages and posed as Enojas.
The accused appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment
operation and were convicted of murder by RTC Las Pinas.
6
Issue: Admissibility of the text messages
Ruling: ADMISSIBLE.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted
them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules
on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in
order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid
warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground
for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence
that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as
an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any
rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and
the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The
text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused
Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the
accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this
knowledge.
12. De Castro vs. JBC
Doctrine: Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly
stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found
in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article
VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC,
the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether
the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once
the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is,
of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to
fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Issue: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
Ruling: YES.
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section
15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court
in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of
the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of
the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the
same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if
they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
7
If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
13. Legaspi vs. City of Cebu
Doctrine: Section 16. General Welfare. –Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare.
Facts:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers
ofCebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking
restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.On
July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty.
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) broughtsuit in the
RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its
City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of CebuCity and its Presiding
Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or
officers of the City Traffic OperationsManagement (CITOM),seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in
violation of due process and forbeing contrary to law,
and damages.Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr.
had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street,
CebuCity to get certain records and documents from his office and after
less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by asteel
clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the
office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as afine to the
City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition
the fine was without any court hearing and withoutdue process of law.
He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the
clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) withoutany court hearing
and final judgment;That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a
very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that
his car wasimmobilized by CITOM operative and that he was compelled
to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a
courthearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.On
August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC
the City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of
personal property,declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City,
and damages.He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had
left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside
the gate ofhis house to make way for the vehicle of
theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the
group even if it was notobstructing the flow of traffic.The cases were
consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No.
1664 as null and voidThe City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed
to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring
the Ordinance No. 1664valid.Upon the denial of their respective motions
for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via
separate petitions for reviewon certiorari. The appeals
were consolidated.
Issues:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664was enacted within the ambit of the
legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664complied with the requirements for
validity and constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the
Constitution and the relevant statutes.
Ruling: PETITION HAS NO MERIT.
Tests for a valid ordinance
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line
of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the
formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate
powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e.,involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements
of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
Powers of the LGU
Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the
formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we
presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress
enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the
various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the
power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was
fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be
complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers
with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the
State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.
A LGU has a legislative power to enact traffic rules and
regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and
also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in
Section 16 of the LGC.24Section 458of the LGC relevantly states: Section
458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. –(a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants.
Compliance with the substantive requirements
Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy.To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458
of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles
or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which
were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in a vowedly aiming
to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City
of Cebu at all times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas
Clauses.
14. Small Land Owners vs. Juico
Doctrine:
Facts:
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related
laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was
8
enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A.
No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless
gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657.
The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands
whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves
have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong
to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD
27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated
their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount
must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for
Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may
be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay
averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money
and not in bonds.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform
program, must be in terms of cash.
Ruling:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the
law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other
in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they
belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must
be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes
of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There
is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision
is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only
where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In
the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small
landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power
lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation.
In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so
long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is
that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of
just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court
and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This
is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a
concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform
program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program
will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made
in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of
stocks, may be used for just compensation.
15. Air Transportation Office vs. Spouses David
Doctrine: Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which
they have assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and
various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against the state.
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered
that a portion of their land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square
meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents
agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale
to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the
ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the
ATO and some of its officials in the RTC (docketed as Civil Case No.
4017-R and entitled Spouses David and Elisea Ramos v. Air
Transportation Office, Capt. Panfilo Villaruel, Gen. Carlos Tanega, and
Mr. Cesar de Jesus).
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an
affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby
President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They
asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without
the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered
into in the performance of governmental functions.
On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the ATOs motion for a
preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense.
After the RTC likewise denied the ATOs motion for
reconsideration on December 10, 1998, the ATO commenced a special
civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTCs orders. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the
assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO
could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling: THE PETITION FOR REVIEW HAS NO MERIT.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or
non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity
was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
9
 Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various
suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true,
although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for
by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state
divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication
consents to suits against the corporation.
Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the
management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary
functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to
government agencies performing strictly governmental functions. ATO
as an agency of the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved
in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an
activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
States immunity from suit.
Further, the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising
from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs
property. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for
perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent
domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in
that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation
without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from
suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by
the owners.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued
without the States consent has been rendered moot by the passage of
Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority
Act of 2008.
R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO, to wit:
Section 4. Creation of the Authority. There is hereby created an
independent regulatory body with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), herein after referred to as
the Authority attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For
this purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 776, as amended is
hereby abolished.
xxx
Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the
ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby
assumed all of the ATOs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and
personal properties, funds, and revenues, viz:
CHAPTER XII
TRANSITORTY PROVISIONS
Section 85. Abolition of the Air Transportation Office. The Air
Transportation Office (ATO) created under Republic Act No. 776, a
sectoral office of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), is hereby abolished.
All powers, duties and rights vested by law and exercised by the
ATO is hereby transferred to the Authority.
All assets, real and personal properties, funds and revenues
owned by or vested in the different offices of the ATO are transferred
to the Authority. All contracts, records and documents relating
to the operations of the abolished agency and its offices and
branches are likewise transferred to the Authority. Any real
property owned by the national government or government-
owned corporation or authority which is being used and
utilized as office or facility by the ATO shall be transferred and
titled in favor of the Authority.
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in
the CAAP, including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into
contracts of every class, kind and description, to construct, acquire,
own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real
properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most
advantageous to it, any claim by or against it.
With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to
R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of
the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against
the CAAP.
16. People vs. Perfecto
Doctrine:
Facts:
On September 7, 1920, Gregorio Perfecto published an
editorial for the newspaper La Nacion, about the loss of documents in
the Senate. The said documents were records of witness testimonies
regarding the investigation of Oil Companies. The Philippine Senate
deemed the editorial of Mr. Perfecto to be libellous and in direct violation
of Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, which states, "Any person
who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by
reason of such performance, provided that the offensive
minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to
him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor,". Defendant
argued whether Article 256 is still in force with the new American
occupation. Defendant was found guilty in the municipal court and also
in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not Mr. Gregorio Perfecto violated Article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code
Ruling: NO.
It is a general principle that whenever there is acquisition of
new territory, the previous political relations are totally abrogated,
although some laws from the Spanish Penal Code are still used in force,
it was only done so because of convenience. However, with the new
American occupation all laws that are inconsistent with the democratic
nature of the new government are displaced without the need for any
declaration.
Article 256 is a law that is monarchical in nature, aiming to
protect ministers of the crown and persons of authority as
representatives of the king of Spain, upholding said officials as higher
from the general population and protecting them from contemptuous or
dissatisfied statement from the public. It is completely against the
nature and the spirit of the American System of Government which
states that every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has
equal right with every other man.
17. Araullo vs. Aquino
Doctrine:
Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World
Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called
the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from
slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a
certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
10
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by
the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds
from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are
standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M
from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon
the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that
the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out
that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for
the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of
the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity
of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art.
VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38
and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
Procedural Issue:
A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541,
and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for
judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments
withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the term is used
in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012
and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs
not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2)
the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a
temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP,
NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing
the DAP.
In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of
unprogrammed funds in order to support its argument regarding the
President’s power to spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of
releasing unprogrammed funds to support projects under the DAP was
considerably discussed. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their
respective memoranda. Hence, an additional issue for the oral
arguments is stated as follows:
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP
was in accord with the GAAs.
Ruling:
1. NO, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is
not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise,
an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth. he economic situation prevailing in the
middle of 2011 thus paved the way for the development and
implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-
track public spending and to push economic growth by investing
on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "savings"
generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed
funds.105 In that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain
executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way of
accelerated spending.106The Administration would thereby
accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the
implementation process through the clustering of infrastructure
projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
and the Department of Education (DepEd),and (2) front loading
PPP-related projects107 due for implementation in the following
year. DAP was not an appropriation
measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it.
2. NO, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment
of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless
there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit
(which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in
the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer
of funds.
3.NO.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under
Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices.
First requisite – GAAs of 2011 and
2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional.
Provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually
unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their
respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the
phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only transfers of
funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer
11
was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions
carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the
effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the
transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if
the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did
the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least,
the aforequoted provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer
appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a
constitutional commission.
Second Requisite – There were
no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which
are: (i) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances
realized from the implementation of measures resulting in
improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies
to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs
and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from
a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings
was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
“savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
Third Requisite – No funds from
savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the
transfer should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge
or increase in size, amount, or degree.
Cross-border
augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to
augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section
25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that
funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to
another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or
items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or
cross-border augmentations.
4.Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid
Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds
provided in the GAAs for 2011, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress,
however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the
DAP as savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that,
consequently, the release and use of unprogrammed funds were not
subject to the restrictions under Section 25(5), supra. The documents
contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have confirmed that the
unprogrammed funds were treated as separate sources of funds. Even
so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds were still subject to
restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs precisely specified the instances
when the unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for
which they could be used.
18. Belgica vs. Ochoa
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines
since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to –
P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads,
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million
for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in
the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources:
(a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has
been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is
derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel
system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20
bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted
by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the
exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
Ruling:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release
of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand,
implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part
of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their
PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law
they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note
in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
12
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone.
(The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only
insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the
Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation
of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members.
Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of
the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify
the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if
the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively
renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman
is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government –
and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel
is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI
of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the
earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation
from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29,
Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein
does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
19. Imbong vs. Ochoa
Facts:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be
declared unconstitutional.
Issues:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties,
the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal
issues:
1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
a. Power of Judicial Review
b. Actual Case or Controversy
c. Facial Challenge
d. Locus Standi
e. Declaratory Relief
f. One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
a. Right to Life
b. Right to Health
c. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
d. The Family
e. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
f. Due Process
g. Equal Protection
h. Involuntary Servitude
i. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
j. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
Same; Access to Information; Principle of Double Effect;
Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Supreme
Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take
proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After
all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State
to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn
child.—There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second
paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her
own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the
mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to
enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection
and maintenance of ones’ health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the
fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is
unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
13
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.
Same; Same; Right to Life; No person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.—As in the case of the
conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such
cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of
consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial
right, that is, the right to life. In this connection, the second sentence
of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to “only in elective surgical
procedures,” it denies the parents their right of parental authority in
cases where what is involved are “non-surgical procedures.” Save for
the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child
as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents
should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority.
To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
Same; Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.—Suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section
14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age--
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on
the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
Statutes; Principle of Void for Vagueness; A statute or act
suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application.—A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining
whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation
to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of
it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Equal Protection
of the Law; To provide that the poor are to be given priority in
the government’s reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause; It should be noted that
Section 7 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to
reduce their number.—To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that
they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be
noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law
only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(l) explains, the “promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health.”
Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; Clearly, no compulsion,
force or threat is made upon reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service against their will. While
the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Supreme Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of
a perceived legitimate state interest.—The OSG counters that the
rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health
care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of
giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of
medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken. It should first be mentioned that the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order
to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with
conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori,
this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications
for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare,
the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether. Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the
notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A
reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose
to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to
be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed
by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Same; Same; From the declared policy of the Reproductive
Health (RH) Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.—The
functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the
agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country’s
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers
and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health
and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
“service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
14
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards.
Same; Same; The fact that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law
does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be
equally applied to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.—
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments canbe equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not
infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11
of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner
Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of
the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners
simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication
by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the
ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now
stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments. Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power
to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.
Same; Same; Abortion; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law does
not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion
in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information
and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.—Unless, a natural
right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis
to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10
(2003), the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the
Court is not duty--bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law
is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances
involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. At any rate,
as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of
life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Same; Same; In general, the Supreme Court does not find the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies.—In general, the Court
does not find the RHLaw as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods,
devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit
of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard
to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State. In conformity with the principle of
separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed
to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modern society
leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is not the province of the
judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business
of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature
to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises.—Indeed, at the present, the country has a population
problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom
of a law. x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has
laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is
the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of
the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this
Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always,
with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution
and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court’s
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the
judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking
body.
20. Francisco vs. House of Representatives
Doctrine: Supreme Court|Impeachment|Separation of
Powers|Courts|Constitutional Law|Judicial Review|Separation of
Powe|Checks and Balances|Statutory Construction|Verba
Legis|Impeachment|Locus Standi|Words and Phrases|Real-Party-in-
Interest|Citizen’s Suits|Taxpayer’s Suits|Legislator’s Suits|Association’s
Suits|Class Suits|“Transcendental Importance|”
Explained|Intervention|Attorneys|Ripeness and
Prematurity|Justiciability|Political Questions|Separation of
Powers|Standards for Determining Political Questions|Lis
Mota|Legislative Inquiries|Judicial Restraint|Reddendo Singula
Singulis|Supreme Court|Courts|Jurisdiction|Judicial
Respect|Coordinacy Theory|Inter-Chamber Courtesy|Time-Bar
Rule|Accountability of Public Officers|Congress|Internal Rules
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted
to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members
of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
15
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress
is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power
to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The major difference between the judicial
power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme
Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was
given an expanded definition to include the power to correct
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality; There are also glaring distinctions
between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings.—The major difference between the
judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly
granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and
it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of
the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the
U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress—it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or “judicially
discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review.—Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to
exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that “whenever possible,
the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride.” But did not the people also express their will when they instituted
the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that
the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discre-tion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially
discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; There exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances.—There exists no constitutional basis
for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; Words
and Phrases; A determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature—
it is beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial power;
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates
six grounds for impeachment, two of these—other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust—elude a precise definition.—It is a well-settled
maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the
case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections, this Court held: x x x It is a
well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
16
question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question
will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon
such question will be unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless
it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Lis Mota; It is a well-settled maxim of
adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.—The
first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any
discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the
Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise
definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better
way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other
high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of
both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is guided by the
related canon of adjudication that it “should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is applied.”—Noted earlier, the instant consolidated
petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues
should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related canon of
adjudication that “the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.”
21. Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives
Doctrine: Impeachment|Separation of Powers|Status Quo Ante
Orders
Facts:
Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman
Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation
of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to
the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the
House of Representative Committee on Justice issued a Resolution
finding both complaints sufficient in form and substance. Consequently,
Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the Resolution violated
the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of
the Constitution.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due
process to the Petitioner
3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints
violated the Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Impeachment; Judicial Review; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; The
Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and
prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the
Court.—Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty
which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court reflects,
includes the power to “determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” In the present
case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction,
using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural
vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether
public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives
that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court. Indubitably, the Court is not
asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the
sovereign will.
Same; Same; Same; An aspect of the “case-or-controversy”
requirement is the requisite of ripeness; There is no doubt that
questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral
of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of
promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation;
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel
situation to invoke judicial power.—Respondents do not seriously
contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as
they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the
present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the
determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the
requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially relevant in
light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged
conduct. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on,
inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints
and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to
invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have
acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Same; Due Process; Bias and Partiality; Mere suspicion of
partiality does not suffice to prove bias; The act of the head of
a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body
itself.—The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and
vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof.
Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. The act of the head of a
collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So
GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils., 271 SCRA 790 (1997),
teaches: First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body
requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission
in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the
vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote
of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming
from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at
a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the
National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and
in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. In
the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in
17
fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on
the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.
Same; Same; Same; An abbreviated pace in the conduct of
proceedings is not per se an indication of bias.—Petitioner
contends that the “indecent and precipitate haste” of public respondent
in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear
indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent
five minutes to arrive thereat. An abbreviated pace in the conduct of
proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-
Concio v. Department of Justice, 543 SCRA 70 (2008), holds: Speed in
the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot
per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions.
For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly
administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to
each case. The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s
official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presump-tion, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical
calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of
the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or
shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not
just one but five state prosecutors. (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Same; Same; The respondent’s initial participation in the
impeachment proceedings—the opportunity to file an Answer—
starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint
sufficient in form and substance.—Rule III(A) of the Impeachment
Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the
Committee-level, particularly Section 5 which denotes that petitioner’s
initial participation in the impeachment proceedings—the opportunity
to file an Answer—starts after the Committee on Justice finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused
to accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its finding of
sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite,
conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Same; Same; The determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the
express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the
House of Representatives which committed such determinative
function to public Committee on Justice.—The determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an
exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of
the House of Representatives which committed suchm, determinative
function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the
exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable
standardsas to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint.
Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance
by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional
purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional
guidelines. Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules
do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must
be a “verified complaint or resolution,” and that the substance
requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.” Notatu
dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in
the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically
merely requires a “hearing.” In the discharge of its constitutional duty,
the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance
in an impeachment complaint is vital “to effectively carry out” the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Impeachment Rules.
Same; Same; Publication; Words and Phrases; While
“promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,”
there is a statutory difference in their usage.—Black’s Law
Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as To publish; to announce
officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of
announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is
given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or
obligatory. (emphasis supplied) While “promulgation” would seem
synonymous to “publication,” there is a statutory difference in their
usage. The Constitution notably uses the word “promulgate” 12 times.
A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules,
reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office
of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. To appreciate
the statutory difference in the usage of the terms “promulgate” and
“publish,” the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably
required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as
promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means
“the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication.” Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar
provision directing Congress to “promulgate its rules for the canvassing
of the certificates” in the presidential and vice presidential elections.
Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14,
2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, it did not require the
publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the
canvassing rules effective upon its adoption. In the case of
administrative agencies, “promulgation” and “publication” likewise take
on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in
quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case, the publication of
implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Promulgation must
be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that
is, to make known; Since the Constitutional Commission did not
restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense; It is not for
this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a
specific method of promulgation.—Promulgation must thus be used
in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally
spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and
the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was
clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the
Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation” to
“publication,” the former should be understood to have been used in its
general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on
how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that
the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision
means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position
to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; Publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue
for Congress to make known its rules; Had the Constitution
intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could
have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules
of procedure in legislative inquiries; Other than “promulgate,”
there is no other single formal term in the English language to
appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being
published.—Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its
rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that x x x in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is
devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept
18
of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs
of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well
as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. (italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Had the
Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it
could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than “promulgate,”
there is no other single formal term in the English language to
appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming arguendo that publication
is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken
prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which
faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of
the Constitution; The provisional adoption of the previous
Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House
to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the avowed purpose.—Even assuming arguendo that publication is
required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the
relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each
Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the
expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of
the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the
completion of thepublication requirement. Given that the Constitution
itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed
at “effectively carry[ing] out the purpose” of impeachment proceedings,
the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it
proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th
Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
keeping with the “effective” implementation of the “purpose” of the
impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the
previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House
to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
avowed purpose.
Same; Same; Same; The rules on impeachment, as
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment, and, being
procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application
to pending actions.—Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural
in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions.
“It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is
that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.” In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any
impairment of vested rights. It bears stressing that, unlike the process
of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved,
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
Same; One-Year Bar Rule; Words and Phrases; The initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving, i.e.,
Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint which is its
referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.—Contrary
to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco states that the term “initiate”
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with
an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint.The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is
the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The petitioner’s reliance
on the singular tense of the word “complaint” to denote the
limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule
of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and
plural sense.—Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment
complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment
“proceedings.” Her reliance on the singular tense of the word
“complaint” to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes
against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its
enlarged and plural sense. The Court, of course, does not downplay the
importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that
kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an
impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted
matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint
to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a
simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that
there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that
once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle.
Same; Same; The question as to who should administer or
pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated
rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to
the impeachment trial; It is the House of Representatives, in
public plenary session, which has the power to set its own
chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to
otherwise guard against the initiation of a second
impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently
unconstitutional complaint.—The question as to who should
administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been
initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to
the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’
disquisition in Francisco, a proceeding which “takes place not in the
Senate but in the House” precedes the bringing of an impeachment case
to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the
House of Representatives. Conscious of the legal import of each step,
the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately
decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame
and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of
Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual,
should own up to its processes. The Constitution did not place the power
of the “final say” on the lips of the House Secretary General who would
otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any
impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper
committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which
explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the
House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session,
which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by
referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a
second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional
complaint.
Same; Same; It becomes clear that the consideration behind
the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not
the number of complaints—the impeachable officer should
defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he
will not be precluded from performing his official functions and
duties, while, similarly, Congress should run only one
impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to
attend to its main work of law-making.—The Court does not lose
sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment
proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s
separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling. Justice
Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: “to
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the
19
legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,” with main reference
to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads: MR.
ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to
protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from
harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is
lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow
multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
legislature will do nothing else but that. (underscoring supplied) It
becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation
refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The
impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment
proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official
functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one
impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend
to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that
initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of
the constitutional provision.
Same; Same; What the Constitution assures an impeachable
officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself; In
considering the side of the impeachable officers, the
Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for
them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave
issues—the measure of protection afforded by the Constitution
is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride,
he or she should be made to traverse it just once; Similarly, if
Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should
do so just once.—Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the
exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional
to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the
Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous
effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment
of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of
complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable
officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for
them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The
framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media
tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when
they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions.
The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the
impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be
made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to
operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat
ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional
safeguard of one-year bar rule.
Same; Criminal Procedure; The Constitution allows the
indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in
one set known as the “Articles of Impeachment”—it, therefore,
follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.—Without going into the effectiveness of the
suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out
the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution
vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the
application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial
determination of which must be made by the House which has yet to
pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of
that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state
that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment
offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment,
assembled in one set known as the “Articles of Impeachment.” It,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense.
22. Ivler vs. San Pedro
Doctrine: Criminal Law|Complex Crime|Quasi-offenses
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason
Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in
the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from
the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the
arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded
with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from
his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband.
Ruling: PETITIONER’S CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
82367 BARS HIS PROSECUTION IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 82366
The Accused’s Negative Constitutional Right not to be "twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting
that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the
[latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses.
Criminal Procedure; Dismissals of appeals grounded on the
appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his
bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.—Dismissals of appeals grounded on
20
the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail
bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to “also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.” The “appeal”
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.
Same; Arraignment; Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond.—The
mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s
treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment
hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman
potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period
granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact
that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s
status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Same; Double Jeopardy; The doctrine that reckless imprudence
under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded the Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People
v. Diaz, decided in 1954.—The doctrine that reckless imprudence
under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a
case for “damage to property thru reckless imprudence” because a prior
case against the same accused for “reckless driving,” arising from the
same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal
of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges,
Same; Same; Reason for this consistent stance of extending the
constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan.—The reason for this consistent stance of extending the
constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where,
in barring a subsequent prosecution for “serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence” because of the accused’s
prior acquittal of “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,” with
both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: Reason
and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence
is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not
be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x.
Criminal Law; Complex Crimes; Quasi-offenses; Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
(thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other;
Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act, defined
as a felony but the mental attitude xxx behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight xxx, a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.—The
confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules
in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution
of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing
not an act defined as a felony but “the mental attitude x x x behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,” a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Same; Same; Same; Court holds that prosecutions under Article
365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences; There shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information
shall be filed in the same first level court.—We hold that
prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Same; Same; Same; If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall
be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.—Our
ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of
non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as “light offenses” (or,
as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it
is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still
keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this
ruling.
21
23. MMDA vs. Viron Transportation Co.
Doctrine: Declaratory Relief|President|Police Power|Administrative
Law|Requisites|Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA)|Power of Control|Words and Phrases|Tests for Valid Exercise
of Police Power|Common Carriers|Due Process
Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby
creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA
recommended a plan to “decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manilathoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system.”
The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus
company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didn’t have
the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so
they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s power
under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public
Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the
implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the
trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDA’s
power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct
provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and
existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common
terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and
the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of
their real properties without due process of law should they be required
to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005,
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an
unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA
under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to
order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and
that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that
there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as
nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure
and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares
of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any
letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them
of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive
to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make
available for use government property along EDSA and South
Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the
E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials,
but not between third persons.
Issues:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Ruling: YES.
Declaratory Relief; Requisites; The requirement of the presence
of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual
controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the
parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.—The
following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d)
the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. The
requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied
when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between
the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A question
becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is
actually contested.
Same; Metropolitan Manila Development Authority; It is the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
and not the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar; By
designating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.—The
authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing
agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being
no legal basis therefor. It bears stressing that under the provisions of
E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject
of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish
or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development
and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized
to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By
designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by
law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
Same; Same; Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) is not vested with police power.—In light of the
administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid
of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence,
it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake
the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination
of respondents’ terminals. Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the
police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted
ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836 (2000),
and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176 (2005), that the MMDA is not vested
with police power.
Same; Tests for Valid Exercise of Police Power; The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes and the means.—Even assuming arguendo that police
power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not
satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz.: (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular
class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
Same; Due Process; A bus company’s certificate of public
convenience confers no property right, and are mere licenses
or privileges which must yield to legislation safeguarding the
interests of the people.—As to the alleged confiscatory character of
the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents’ certificates of public
convenience confer no property right, and are mere licenses or
privileges. As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the
interest of the people.
Administrative Law; It is the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC)—as the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications—which has the power to establish
and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the
case at bar.—This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the
roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering
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problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are
commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic
situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret,
not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is
the DOTC—as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop
and regulate networks of transportation and communications—which
has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like
the Project subject of the case at bar.
24. DOH vs. Philippine PharmaWealth
Doctrine: Administrative Law|Public Officers|Qualified Immunity|State
Immunity
Facts:
Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an
Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation
of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can
transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH).
Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH
a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug
products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine.
Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the
procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite
the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter
submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the
lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non-accreditation of
respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded
to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS).
Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction,
mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the
Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award
of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and
direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest
complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they
accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge
defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to
plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state
immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The
Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed
the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners‘
motion to dismiss the case.
Issue: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in
their official capacity will prosper
Ruling: PETITION FAILS.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Qualified Immunity; The
suability of a government official depends on whether the
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional
capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability
against the government.—The suability of a government official
depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official
or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance
of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the
government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should
be impleaded as the proper party. In its complaint, respondent
sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been
tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution,
it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.
Same; Same; Same; State Immunity; The defense of state
immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do
not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the
State.—As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit
will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the
government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party
or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity
from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose
a charge or financial liability against the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule that a state may not be
sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law which we have now adopted as
part of the law of the land.—The rule that a state may not be sued
without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international
law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land. While
the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the
state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the
amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An officer who exceeds the power
conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of
sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.—In
the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities
for damages in connection with their alleged act of “illegal[ly] abus[ing]
their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would
not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad
faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers
given by law” is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles.
For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot
hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability
personally.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation that a government
official is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically
remove the same from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity,
and neither does the mere invocation of official character suffice to
insulate such official from suability and liability for an act committed
without or in excess of his or her authority.—It bears stressing, however,
that the statements in the immediately foregoing paragraph in no way
reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to respondent. The
mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his personal
capacity does not automatically remove the same from the protection of
the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand, does the
mere invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from
suability and liability for an act committed without or in excess of his or
her authority. These are matters of evidence which should be presented
and proven at the trial.
25. Heirs of Diosdado Mendoza vs. DPWH
Doctrine: Constitutional Law|Immunity from Suit|Department of Public
Works and Highways
Facts:
Issue:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ruling that the forfeiture of the contract in Package VI of HADP
and the non-payment of the cost of materials, labor on the
accomplishment and the rental value of the heavy equipment
were justified; and
23
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ruling that the DPWH has no juridical personality of its own and
that Mendoza’s action was a suit against the State.

Ruling:
Civil Law; Contracts; Rescission of Contracts; Negative
Slippage; The discretion of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) to terminate or rescind the contract comes
into play when the contractor shall have incurred a negative
slippage of 15% or more.—The discretion of the DPWH to terminate
or rescind the contract comes into play when the contractor shall have
incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more. In this case, Superior
Builders was warned of its considerable delay in the implementation of
the project as early as 29 April 1989 when the progress slippage reached
4.534% due to the late implementation of the project. Thereafter,
Superior Builders received the first, second and final warnings when the
negative slippages reached 7.648%, 11.743% and 16.32%,
respectively. By the time the contract was terminated, the negative
slippage already reached 31.852% or more than twice the terminal
stage under DO 102.

Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit; The general rule is

that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit
if it consents to be sued, either expressly or impliedly.—The
doctrine of immunity from suit is anchored on Section 3, Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides: Section 3. The State may not be
sued without its consent. The general rule is that a state may not be
sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be sued, either
expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so provides,
while there is implied consent when the State enters into a contract or
it itself commences litigation. This Court explained that in order to
determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a
contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered
into in its governmental or proprietary capacity, thus: x x x. However, it
must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State “will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,]
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,]
x x x no such waiver may be implied.” Statutory provisions waiving
[s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.

Same; Same; Department of Public Works and Highways; It is

clear from the enumeration of its functions that the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) performs
governmental functions; Thus, the Court of Appeals (CA)
correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and
may not be sued without its consent.—It is clear from the
enumeration of its functions that the DPWH performs governmental
functions. Section 5(d) states that it has the power to “[i]dentify, plan,
secure funding for, program, design, construct or undertake
prequalification, bidding, and award of contracts of public works projects
x x x” while Section 5(e) states that it shall “[p]rovide the works
supervision function for all public works construction and ensure that
actual construction is done in accordance with approved government
plans and specifications.” The contracts that the DPWH entered into with
Mendoza for the construction of Packages VI and IX of the HADP were
done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence, petitioners
cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by
entering into a contract. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued
without its consent.

26. Torio vs. Fontanilla

24