1987 Constitution, Art II Section 12.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
III Persons and Personality
NCC 37 – 39
BOOK I
PERSONS
Title I. - CIVIL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his
acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
CHAPTER 2
NATURAL PERSONS
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined
by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of
one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed
that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from
one to the other. (33)
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE PD 603 Art. 5. Commencement of Civil
Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his
conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article
41 of the Civil Code.
FC Art. 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm
of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the
husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth
of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the
birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
Section Two. — Infanticide and abortion.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 255. Infanticide. — The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for
murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less
than three days of age.
If the crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed
for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty
shall be prision mayor.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 256. Intentional abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of
the pregnant woman.chanrobles virtual law library
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the
consent of the woman.chanrobles virtual law library
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
woman shall have consented.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause
an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.
Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her parents. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon
a woman who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other
person should do so.chanrobles virtual law library
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.chanrobles
virtual law library
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of
them, and they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of
abortives. — The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum
period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the
same.chan
ROC Rule 131 Sec 3 (jj) (jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two
persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is
not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it
can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from
the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have
survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter
is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of
one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be
considered to have died at the same time. (5a)
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a
physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced,
the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's
daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave
his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action
and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we
granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the
sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing
a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case
of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our
Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" the abortive creature does
not reach the category of natural person and in consscuencia is a being not born to
the life of the Right(Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49),
being incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held
that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway
Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and
numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But
such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from
an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal
arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages,
if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did
not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and
P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels
outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a
physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and
with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he
had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages
of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's
wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the
woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of
the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board
of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action
against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and
JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590,
dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying
amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court
below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan
City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since
the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child,
although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is
true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is
not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code,
clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el
sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino
que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to
force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint
in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her
to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this
decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution [2]dated
9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave and other
death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his
unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees
to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case
of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents,
spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7
days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe
Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case
the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate
parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document
to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos
wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she
was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity
leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos
claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held,
the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice
to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). [9] In a
Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X,
Section 2

[10]
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue. [11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling
the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers, [12]Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X,
Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK
Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of
Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an
employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had
already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union
[15]
and Mayer Steel. Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb
and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees
unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the
existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides
that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of
the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 [16] of
the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was
dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependentcould not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered
a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to
be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition
of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have qualified the
parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union
to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the
employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by
the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and
distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim
that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-
employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits,
thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of
bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is death; (2)
such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such
dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for
death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is death; (b)
such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such
dependent must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document
to be presented.[18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported
by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore,
the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or
delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully
married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is
hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental
Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00),
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00)
representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is
ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully
abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos
claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because
no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of
a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed
out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified
by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only
be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed
Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
interpreted deathto mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on
the legal sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails
to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining
the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death
benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive
upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to
be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing
loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead
fetus stands in a legitimate relation.[Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term death
of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting
bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
Following [Continental Steels] theory, there can be no
experience of death to speak of. The Court, however, does not
share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than loss of human life, especially for the
expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death
benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather
than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate
of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this
crucial point.[20]
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental
Steel].[21]
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is
clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be
applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired
a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e.,
parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations
of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance
under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper
legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental
Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental
argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and
dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction
of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management
nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and
other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37
of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death.Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations
prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. [24] Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is
a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of
its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in
relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is
a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid
and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic
 on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be
as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code.
Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and
those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted
by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and
his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents
grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this
case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and
other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of
doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor. [29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should
be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the
Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum
of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both
sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While
petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that
what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a
contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost
sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a
policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor
and capital are to be weighed on the scales
of social justice, the heavier influence of the
latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law must
accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services
Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights
of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27
February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the
Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and
BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria,
Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay
the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
"is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for
the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound
themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven
and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision
had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of itle No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was
confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when
the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the
same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven,
the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of
the original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and
all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products,
Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received
the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at
the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of
the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to
question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the
other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It
reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court
that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the
person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the
plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the
issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro
Oria who, being already in the other world, was never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and
Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil.
4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case
No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could
not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality . His
juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as
counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to
acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-
defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in
order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled
to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their
stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death.
Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in
Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The
execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO
VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA
VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-
appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as
G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the
Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and
orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to
declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October
1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but
denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity),
her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for
brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpusbefore the RTC of
Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was
forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein
petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to
escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority.
At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age,
single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ
of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a
burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing
the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian
Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the
Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband,
petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an
explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30
September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the
deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion
to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not
applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below)
were granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the
death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas
Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with
their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings
followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October
1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before
the respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills
Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of
respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an
order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to
the second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of
Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the
petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the
body of said deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana
Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on
September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the
allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to
the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or
interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is
within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in
Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course,
rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or
not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for
custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action
for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition
for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and
308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas
has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for
the custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were
but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court
strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case
as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the
petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the
exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and
dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of
rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of
preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since
there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter
being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No.
86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to those
raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both
cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of
an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a
resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to
sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for
decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest
surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of
the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family
Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged
to give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not
the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the
nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper
relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint
and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not
certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right,
it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the
filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts
must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his
judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may
refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ
should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments
make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ
of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear
grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry
into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or
defects in the petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of
a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister,
stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have
been dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and
scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent
Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the
minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should
not allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to
stand in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas
corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody to the
petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all
parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the
records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not
dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order
that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order
to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense,
unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to
amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a
remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had
to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code
(Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried
Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must
be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing
to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying
the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin,
the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be
adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the
necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE
M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.
RESOLUTION
EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven
(7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a
threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and
order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising
the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is
to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of
birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to
Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she
had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents
to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and
Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from
implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr.
Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that
the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr.
Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the
Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos'
remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide
the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for
lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is
upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to
reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for
reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been
established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has
not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the
contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the
return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar
their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr.
Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and
declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."
[Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution
is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have
patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate
branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely
accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific
executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the
difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the
conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted
that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be
considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the
definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of
that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition,
concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power
from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text:
the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms
where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions
where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes
clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power
without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the
Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a
sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless
there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's
implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6
which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may,
in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant
to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of
power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President
of the specific power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his
(or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision,
the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit."
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The
death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called
"loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest if not
outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in death no
El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip
the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was
already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses,
he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid
of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that or whatever
except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be interred in this
country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating
over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it
be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it forever.
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights.
It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has
ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the
commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if we were to assume
the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of his
widow and the other members of his family?
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained
unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any
possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In fact, the converse
appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not allow the remains to come,
more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the
return is granted. To refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against
the well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the
petition may well soften the hearts of the oppositionists; paving the way for a
united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As
Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion
is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason
against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our country into a mainstream of
fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question will no longer
be what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after
decision in this case had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my
original dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and decisive
proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to
return to, die and be buriedin this country." I have only to add a few statements to
that dissenting opinion.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to
return to and die in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out
for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in this country. Will the
respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying the constitutional and
human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion,
includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should
be in the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the
negative if we are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the
last right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the
treasured land of his birth.
Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that
can be accorded him now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried
in this country would apply to any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a
dictator and he plundered the country. This is the most irrelevant argument that
can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the fundamental
assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply
to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic
as long as he is a Filipino.
It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose
a serious threat to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out
in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is
that respondents have not presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases) or
convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general conclusions of national
security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and enforceable
constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind,
served to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national
security, the situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a
dead Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth, where there are no
protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that reigns, in the language of
Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten
national security, his supporters would pose that threat to national security. This
argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose
a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived of his right to burial in
this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the
country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled,
Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argument—so
conducive to mass protests and even violence—that their Idol has been cruelly
denied the right to be buried in his homeland.
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human
rights, to speak of. This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one
cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this
country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted
long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be buried
in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on
the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the
right to lay down conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I
submit that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate, recognize the right
of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now.
Without in any way affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in
the majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed that, with their decision
banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they have passed an opportunity
to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment, threatens to ignite
an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional
dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people
for respect and deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a
continuing strife, among our people, of unending hatred, recriminations and
retaliations. God save this country!
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return
and burial in the Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, subject to such conditions as the Philippine government may impose in the
interest of peace and order.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet,
as I stated before, I can not allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened
impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of the ex-President's bereaved
to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to return from exile. As I had,
then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct
grant or by implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens
from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have
found none. I am not agreed, that:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed
limitations on specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a
diminution of executive power. The Charter says that the right may only be
restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental law
intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also
completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the
right. No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against
legislative encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential
intrusions. And especially so, because the President is the caretaker of the military
establishment that has, several times over, been unkind to part of the population it
has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has
been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased"
(Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The military has
shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose
a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority itself is not convinced
("has been viewed...").
That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate
President, does not, so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization
awaiting the nation. The military has said over and over that Marcos followers are
not capable of successful destabilization effort. And only this morning (October 27,
1989), media reported the assurances given to foreign investors by no less than the
President, of the political and economic stability of the nation, as well as the
Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions,
however, are beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny
requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let
them get their just deserts here too. And let the matter rest.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The
death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called
"loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest if not
outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in death no
El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip
the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was
already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses,
he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid
of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that or whatever
except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be interred in this
country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating
over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it
be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it forever.
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights.
It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has
ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the
commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if we were to assume
the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of his
widow and the other members of his family?
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained
unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any
possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In fact, the converse
appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not allow the remains to come,
more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the
return is granted. To refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against
the well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the
petition may well soften the hearts of the oppositionists; paving the way for a
united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As
Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion
is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason
against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our country into a mainstream of
fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question will no longer
be what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after
decision in this case had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my
original dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and decisive
proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to
return to, die and be buriedin this country." I have only to add a few statements to
that dissenting opinion.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to
return to and die in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out
for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in this country. Will the
respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying the constitutional and
human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion,
includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should
be in the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the
negative if we are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the
last right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the
treasured land of his birth.
Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that
can be accorded him now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried
in this country would apply to any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a
dictator and he plundered the country. This is the most irrelevant argument that
can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the fundamental
assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply
to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic
as long as he is a Filipino.
It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose
a serious threat to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out
in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is
that respondents have not presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases) or
convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general conclusions of national
security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and enforceable
constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind,
served to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national
security, the situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a
dead Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth, where there are no
protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that reigns, in the language of
Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten
national security, his supporters would pose that threat to national security. This
argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose
a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived of his right to burial in
this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the
country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled,
Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argument—so
conducive to mass protests and even violence—that their Idol has been cruelly
denied the right to be buried in his homeland.
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human
rights, to speak of. This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one
cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this
country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted
long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be buried
in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on
the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the
right to lay down conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I
submit that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate, recognize the right
of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now.
Without in any way affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in
the majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed that, with their decision
banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they have passed an opportunity
to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment, threatens to ignite
an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional
dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people
for respect and deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a
continuing strife, among our people, of unending hatred, recriminations and
retaliations. God save this country!
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return
and burial in the Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, subject to such conditions as the Philippine government may impose in the
interest of peace and order.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet,
as I stated before, I can not allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened
impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of the ex-President's bereaved
to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to return from exile. As I had,
then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct
grant or by implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens
from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have
found none. I am not agreed, that:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed
limitations on specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a
diminution of executive power. The Charter says that the right may only be
restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental law
intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also
completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the
right. No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against
legislative encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential
intrusions. And especially so, because the President is the caretaker of the military
establishment that has, several times over, been unkind to part of the population it
has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has
been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased"
(Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The military has
shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose
a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority itself is not convinced
("has been viewed...").
That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate
President, does not, so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization
awaiting the nation. The military has said over and over that Marcos followers are
not capable of successful destabilization effort. And only this morning (October 27,
1989), media reported the assurances given to foreign investors by no less than the
President, of the political and economic stability of the nation, as well as the
Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions,
however, are beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny
requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let
them get their just deserts here too. And let the matter rest.
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA
TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE
D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 9, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed
the October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City
(RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the
remains of the decedent.
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio
Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955.
The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters,
Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his
clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their
children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the
United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members
was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses
for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few
days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park.
Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty.
Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was
contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that
they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family
plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated
for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that
throughout the time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and
associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he
never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike
Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses
when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano
was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino,
it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought
by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time,
she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park.
Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time
that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show
love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the
duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably
presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum. 4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the
body of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial
Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful purpose and so he
should be spared and respected.5 Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to
have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It
likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the
remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife,
was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article
305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the
considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not
only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her
husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death,
notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due
to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when
the wife and the family were in the United States. All other claims for damages
were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to
the remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Court’s Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 6 of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In
case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall
be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
[Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability
shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases
supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay
the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 7 a petition
for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas
against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and
confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due
to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction
over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner
has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite,
the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:
"Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case
at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to
the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 8 [Emphases
supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United
States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and
duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as
having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. 9 While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still
alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not,
opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making
frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could
attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to
know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December
20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the
Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail
pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty.
Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should
be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent
that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite.
Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that
supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been
created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty.
Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury
her husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in
the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate
spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not
be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that
end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors
the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and obligations
accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the
children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in
the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same.
Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be
decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of
the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if
Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on
which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr.
Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally
recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be
established by some form of testamentary disposition. 10 As Article 307 itself
provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be
inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last
remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s
claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other
evidence was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect
to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be
contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions
concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the
time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be
observed.11 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by
Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and
subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper
arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the
appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of
Atty. Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even assuming
arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila
Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with
the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the
surviving spouse, and not to defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in
the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have
been very commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact that
husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-in-fact and had been
living apart for more than 30 years.12
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the
remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place
other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his
family. It does not only violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the
family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-
in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce
of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the
corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property
right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also
authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have
it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right.
There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from
third persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of
Atty. Adriano during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her
sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her.
As aptly explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe
Floro Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact
from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano
Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his remains when he had died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages.
Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains
of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family were all in the United
States and could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable,
they must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at bench, there was no iota of evidence
presented to justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.1âwphi1 Moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal
connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although
incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to
compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused
to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary
damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish
his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately,
neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would
appear to have been adequately established by plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award
thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's
fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code demands factual,
legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case,
we have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the
award of attorney's fees.14
Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for
the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and
disturbed the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the
purpose of preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to
include the provisions on "Funerals."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been
heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First
Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of
the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were
killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945.
The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st.
The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.;
3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de
Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his
mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by
the petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro
died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects
the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building
known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of
this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying
to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance;
and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a
safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them;
and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of
the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by
a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in
front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club,
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including
Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to
reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February
10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it
open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but
unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela
Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was
two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez,
who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals
opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory
presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is
thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by
proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate
proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case before
us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his
father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes
after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela
Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to
her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is
that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German
Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a variety of causes.
She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling
beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by
splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is
available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son
left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance
alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus
compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said
that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a
solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30,
must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly
above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the
question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the
deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A
second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to
be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety
of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the
same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is
clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall
cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the
Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro,
Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act
No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article
33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the
contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is
total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration
when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is
that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set
forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or
conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular
circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more
persons who would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior
death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption
shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to
the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for
lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference
to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the
facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific
evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be
produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the
law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore
on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied
with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is
taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred"
that one died before the other it means that there are circumstances from which
the fact of death by one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion
from the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would
shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one died before the other.
Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial
evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship
must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere
surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if
the matter is left to probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may
be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does
not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez'
testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of
this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was
described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of
Appeals as "entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15 meters
away from the building but I could see what was going on.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events,
that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? —
A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A.
Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few
minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed
over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence
to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
died, you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin
also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when the
building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out
of that building so I presumed she died there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had
set fire to the Club and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of
running away rather than be roasted.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro
girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? — A. to my
knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the entrance,
because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were
trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they were among those killed.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes
before you left the place? — A. That is what I think, because those Japanese
soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — . There
were many people shot because they were trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can
you explain that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve
the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the
conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at,
namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it
must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters
from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that
distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he
dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife
started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so
that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have
perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that
she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these,
according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and
were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband
and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an
idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove
that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so
imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the
clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the
head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela
Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death
and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer
than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin
was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the
building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative ,
and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading
Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only
remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form
protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside,
and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon
those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been
killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse,
more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous
death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's
departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section
69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from
which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by
the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of
New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As
the California courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is
sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient
when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's
Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according
to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from
collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The
vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary
facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if
certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells
us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person
who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person
who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That
conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the
illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case
at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son
is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure
foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her
son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience,
engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to
prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon,
"bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested
that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that
the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing
Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant
impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be
disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular
circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions
are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or
incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries
on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and
contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such
because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely
documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the
construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an
agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue
is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory
presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence
refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is
meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may
disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures
come within the exception to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the
question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory
that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.