MPSTA vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 192708, Oct.

2, 2017

Issue: considering that the parties participated in the public consultation of GSIS policy
resolutions on PBP, APL and CLIP was its non-publication validly dispensed with?

Ruling:
No. The policies are invalid due to lack of publication. In Republic v. Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corp., 41this Court held that the requirements of publication and filing must
be strictly complied with, as these were designed to safeguard against abuses on the part
of lawmakers and to guarantee the constitutional right to due process and to information
on matters of public concern. Even in cases where the parties participated in the public
consultation and submitted their respective comments, strict compliance with the
requirement of publication cannot be dispensed with

ALFI vs. Garin, G.r. No 217872, Aug. 24, 2016

Issue: Did FDA observe basic tenens of due process when it certified, procured and
administered the contraceptive drugs and devices?

Ruling: No. The Court finds that theFDA certified, procured and administered such
contraceptive drugs and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of due
process, without notice and without public hearing, despite the constant opposition. From
the records, it appears that other than the notice inviting stakeholders to apply for
certification/re-certification of theirreproductive health products, there was no showing
that the respondents notified the oppositors and conducted a hearing on the applications
and oppositions submitted. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared as not
unconstitutional does not permit the respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional
rights, substantive and procedural, of the petitioners.

Lagman vs Medialdea, G.r. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Issue: What is the void-for-vagueness doctrine and where is it applicable?

Ruling: The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

Void for vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases. The vagueness
doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one, which is overbroad because of
possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid
being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence

Issue: Whether or not Proclaimation No. 216 is vague and thus void because if (a) its
inclusion of “other rebel groups”; and (b) the absence of any guideline specifying its
actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region?

Ruling: No. Inclusion of "other rebel groups " does not make Proclamation No.216
vague. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No.
216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of
reference in its Whereas clauses.

The absence of guidelines/ operational parameters does not make Proclamation

No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the
implementation of the proclamation. There is no need for the Court to determine the
constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest
orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review.

Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 209387, Jan. 11, 2016

Issue: Are routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done
without search warrants, unreasonable searches?

Ruling: No The court finds the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and,
therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights.
There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports
of travel. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel.

ADDITIONAL: The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee
the security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between
port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port personnel are not
necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article
III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at
ports have the color of a state-related function.
People vs. Pastrana, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018

Issue: Is search warrant No. 01-118 valid and constitutional?

Ruling: No. Search warrant no. 01-118 is ull and void for having been issued for more
than one offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for
seizure.

ADDITIONAL INFO: On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search

Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one
for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance
contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants
are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with
specificity the objects to be seized.

People vs. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018

Issue: Was there a valid “stop and frisk” search or a search of moving vehicle?

Ruling: No. The court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused
appellant. An examination of the records reveal that no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to the accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of the
arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing or was about to commit a
crime.