Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193, xi, 471pp., US$ 59.95, 0 521 36087 0
Robin Horton's collection of essays offers something to offend everyone. Highly iconoclastic,
and frequently idiosyncratic, some thirty years of Professor Horton's thinking on thought in "Africa" and
"the West" is presented in a comprehensive fashion. Readers of these papers may find themselves
occasionally railing against Horton's perspective (particularly his own critics, whom he rails against),
but often rewarded with some trenchant observations about the pitfalls of much anthropological
1960 and 1987, plus an Introduction and Postscript to the collection. Eight of the papers were published
previously; the ninth is an expanded version of the 1987 Frazer Lecture. The collection is divided into
two principal sections, whose pithy titles "Mainly Critical" and "Mainly Constructive", ably capture
their content and (especially) their tone. The chronological scope of this volume allows the reader to
appreciate the development of Professor Horton's approach to the comparative study of systems of
thought. We see his response to the challenges of his critics, responses which include the revision,
clarification, and even rejection of ideas that he no longer finds satisfactory. On the whole, however,
Horton holds his ground, and remains unpersuaded of the virtues of alternatives to his position.
Horton's dissatisfaction with prevailing interpretive frameworks for assessing African religious
thought (which he labels "Symbolist" and "Theological") lead him to propose an avowedly
Intellectualist perspective. One of the premises of this perspective is the insistence that there is nothing
unique or novel about religious or African systems of thought, but, rather, that these are examples of a
much more general, indeed, universal cognitive capacity. Given such a premise, Horton turns
necessarily to a comparison of thought systems in Africa and the West in order both to demonstrate the
underlying continuity between these systems, and to describe and account for the apparent differences
between them. His analyses, then, concern not only the common intellectual
foundations of African and Western thought systems, but also the transformation, and, indeed, evolution
The cornerstone concept of Horton's Intellectualism, as derived in broad outline from Tylor and
Frazer, is that magic, religion, and science can all be characterized as bodies of theory designed for the
"explanation/prediction/control" of events in the world. It is this fundamental "goal" that constitutes the
"common core" of human rationality at all times and in all places. This focus on these cognitive
concerns leads Horton to devote the preponderance of his analysis to the question of "theory building."
How, asks Horton, can we account for the construction of different explanatory theories, in both
intellectual and sociological terms? Cognitive processes, he asserts, consist of a relationship between
two distinct kinds of theories: "Primary theory" defines the everyday world of common sense, objects,
events, and persons. Its objects are experienced as directly given. "Secondary theory" posits an order of
"unseen" forces that provide the intellectual resources for demonstrating that there is an organization and
regularity underlying the apparent disorder of everyday experience. All such "secondary theories"
attempt both to explain the ordinary experiences of everyday life, but must also rely on that primary
level of theory, drawing its systematic models by analogy with those features of commonsense
experience most often associated with order and regularity. Since, according to Horton, "primary
theory" is more or less the same universally, but the domains of experience associated with order and
systematicity vary from culture to culture, "secondary theory" can be seen as both grounded in a
universal rationality, but subject to variation relative to the social contexts of ordinary experience from
These dual-dimensions of theory building provide, to Horton's mind, both the intellectualist
foundations as well as the sociological variability of all explanatory ideas, from the "wavicles" of
quantum physics, to Water-Spirits in Kalabari possession cults. He elaborates on the implications of this
cognitive model most directly, developing his ideas about both the intellectual and sociological sides of
his equation, in the papers described as "Mainly Constructive". The two most important essays in this
section, and indeed, the entire volume, "African traditional thought and
Western science" ("ATWS") and "Tradition and modernity revisited" ("TMR") are companion pieces,
the latter Horton's response to criticisms, and reevaluation of the former effort some fifteen years after
its initial publication. In "ATWS", Horton argues that "explanatory theory" must be clearly
differentiated from "common sense", or "everyday discourse", as all theory departs from commonplace
experience in an effort to place phenomena in a wider causal context than common sense can provide.
Horton subsequently rejects the "antithesis" that this formulation implies, and acknowledges that those
things that seem given to us in everyday experience are no less "theoretical" than the phenomena defined
by either science or religion. He therefore rejects the antithesis, but retains a distinction between, as we
have seen, "primary" and "secondary" theories. Horton, in fact, goes even further in "TMR" in his
description of "primary theory"/everyday experience, by insisting that this level of theory does not differ
very much from culture to culture, and that, indeed, its foundations may be a part of our genetic make-
up.
The second principal, and in many ways more substantial revision of "African traditional thought
and Western science" concerns the sociological dimensions of theory building, specifically the
conditions that give rise to the "secularization" of theory. In "ATWS" Horton, invoking a contrast first
posed by Karl Popper, argues that the discontinuities between African religion and Western science can
This fundamental contrast generates an extreme conservatism in closed societies, such that any
challenge to received wisdom, which is held to be "sacred", produces an intense "anxiety" in the
members of that society. Open societies, in contrast, see their prevailing ideas as merely one possibility
among numerous alternatives, and, rather than feeling anxious about possible threats to theory, relish the
opportunity to produce new and better ones. Thus, the "cognitive superiority... of the modern, Western
world-view" (383) in terms of its explanatory abilities, can be accounted for by reference to this
willingness to consider all manner of theories in the quest for evermore adequate causal contexts.
Upon reflection, in "TMR", Horton rejects the "open"/"closed" dichotomy as both to extreme and
too individualistic. African's cannot be said to be completely unaware of alternative theories, and are
certainly more critical and skeptical than the "closed" predicament suggests; moreover, the history of
Western science makes it plain that there is a good deal of conservatism and its attendant anxiety when
well-established theoretical frameworks are challenged. Nonetheless, Horton insists that the germ of
this contrast remains valid, but in place of the "open"/"closed" dichotomy he proposes a distinction
between different cognitive orientations: "traditionalism" and "modernism". "Traditional" societies may
not be unaware of alternatives, but they attempt to assure a consensus about knowledge that has been
validated by its transmission from ancestral sources. "Modern" societies compete in the process of
producing new theories, validated by the presumption that knowledge is progressively improving. The
sociological foundations of "traditional" and "modern", as opposed to "closed" and "open" societies,
then, have shifted only to a degree, and with very little consequence for the kinds of knowledge
produced under these "traditional" as opposed to "closed," or "modern" as opposed to "open" conditions.
Horton is to be commended for his intellectual honesty and self-scrutiny; yet his new approaches seem
to rise phoenix-like from the ash-can of his discarded ideas. Finally, in both "ATWS" and "TMR"
Horton suggests that the breakdown of tradition and the rise of modernity can be attributed to
transformations in "technology, economy and social organization," primarily literacy (a variable whose
relevance Horton calls into question in his Postscript) and increasing cultural heterogeneity (which
Horton claims was not characteristic of "Traditional African communities" (252 ff; 380).
These are Horton's "constructive" arguments - both original and revised - about the intellectual
and sociological dimensions of theory building. His "Mainly Critical" papers repeatedly defend this
argument against his critics, and attempt to demonstrate its superiority to two alternative analytic
perspectives, the "Symbolist" and the "Theological." Both of these perspectives, according to Horton,
begin with the premise that religious thought is fundamentally different from scientific thought. For the
Symbolist, a contrast is drawn between "expressive" and "instrumental" thought, and religion is placed
squarely in the expressive field. Religious statements from this perspective
are not meant to be taken literally, but must be understood as referring to, or "symbolizing" some other
Expressive thought may serve certain social functions when the experiences they refer to are social
groups, or institutions that need to be supported; alternatively Horton asserts that most symbolists hold
that religious thought is focused on "the production of symbolic images for their own sakes" (6; 119). In
Horton's view the Symbolist position simply flies in the face of ethnographic evidence to the contrary.
When, for example, a diviner diagnoses a client's illness to be the product of sorcery, she is attempting to
explain events in the real world. Intellectualists see no difficulty in taking this procedure at face value;
and from Horton's perspective, the Symbolist offers no evidence to support the claim that religious
adherents and practitioners of magic "really mean something else" by such statements and actions.
Symbolists simply dogmatically assert that religious thought is intrinsically expressive, and fail to
acknowledge the eminently pragmatic concerns of most religious practice. Moreover, the Symbolist
opposition between "expressive" and "instrumental" thought, Horton suggests, is drawn from a
misreading of Durkheim's contrast between the "sacred" and the "profane" as different kinds of thought.
But Symbolists here have "stood [Durkheim's] teaching on its head" (100). A proper reading of
Durkheim, according to Horton, should recognize that he sees a continuity between religion and science
as forms of theoretical reasoning that describe underlying causal relations in order to account for the
The "Theological" perspective (or in one of Horton's less generous characterization, "The Devout
Opposition") holds that all religious thought, Western and African included, forms a unified discourse
which allows the analyst to interpret or "translate" all religious claims according to a shared set of
concerns. This suggest that all religions have as their primary focus a supreme being, whose
worshippers adopt an attitude of reverential awe in their attempts to achieve communion with this
ultimate spiritual power. Again, argues Horton, such a conception runs roughshod over much African
ethnography, which clearly demonstrates the impossibility of seeing all spiritual beings, from Shango to
neighborhood witches, as different manifestations of a single, benevolent, all-powerful deity. With
explanation, prediction and control are the overriding aims of religious life" (177).
Furthermore, Horton concludes all of his critical essays with ideological critiques - which he
calls "diagnoses"- of the Symbolist or Theological theorists he examines. In each case, he finds a
variety of Romantic Liberalism at work, an agenda that is loathe to allow invidious comparisons
between the cognitive efficacy of the West and the Rest. Rather than seeing African traditional thought
(magical, religious or otherwise) as a form of universal rationality, which leads to the inevitable
conclusion that traditional thought is (at least) less successful than modern thought, both the Symbolists
and the "Devout" insist that religion and science are different kinds of thinking, thereby preserving
(because of their incomparability) the integrity and equality of all thought systems. It is this ideology
which blinds its adherents both to the ethnographic proof of all thought's underlying concern with
I have gone on at some length with this summary of Horton's perspective in the hopes of giving a
fair and representative account of his views. There are a number of strengths both to his critique of
frameworks that fail to account for the ethnographic data they address, and to his assertion that
pragmatic thinking is not the exclusive concern of "modern" science. And this book will clearly be of
great interest and use to scholars and students of comparative rationality. At the same time, there are a
whole host of objections to Horton's theory and method that are worth raising. To begin with, there are
serious editorial problems with this volume. It is understandable in a collection of essays over 400
pages in length that there should be some overlap in certain areas of discussion and commentary. But
most of the essays in any given section address the same concerns, present the identical structure of
argumentation, and reproduce stock phrase, examples, and entire sentences. As a group of papers this
compilation allows the reader judiciously to select an insightful essay or two; as a synthetic volume it is
There are more substantial points of contention, as well. While many of Horton's criticisms are
well-founded (aside from being unabashedly polemical and ill-mannered- e.g., some theories are
the "palpably inadequate" products of "the narrowly educated man" [185-187]), these critiques
contemporary accounts that do address the explanatory dimensions of ritual practice "feel compelled to
'dress up' the subjects of these reports in the latest Parisian semeiological/ semantic fashions in order to
make them respectable" (441) suggests that Horton not only fails to see the relevance, but perhaps fails
simply to understand these theoretical alternatives. It may be glib to dismiss others' analyses as pret-a-
porter theorizing, but these "fashionable" arguments are never actually engaged by Horton.
It should also be clear that Horton's developmental framework is inherently teleological. Western
rationality may not be superior to traditional thought, because, in fact, it is no different from it. But,
there can equally be no denying that "cognitive 'modernism'" yields superior explanatory results (343-4;
382-3). The West may not think any differently from the Rest, but its way of theorizing does bring it
closer to "the truth". Horton goes to great lengths to point out that he is not a positivist on such matters.
And with respect to logical positivism, as it developed in the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of
Russell and Ayer, this is certainly the case. That is, Horton does not argue that true knowledge can only
be the product of induction from empirical observation; rather, he insists that theoretical models, and
unobservable principals are essential for any rational act of cognition. But positivism also has a
complementary intellectual legacy derived from the social theory of St. Simon and Comte. This legacy
presumes a reality that exists prior to and independent of our efforts to understand it, a reality which ever
advancing theory will come closer and closer to revealing. Cognitive yields therefore increase, goes the
saying, as theory becomes more and more "value-free." It is this version of positivism and its attendant
teleology that Horton's intellectual and sociological models most clearly describe.
I would suggest that this teleology also lends insights into Horton's counter-reading of Durkheim.
The core of Horton's discussion of Durkheim which argues that religion and science are both forms of
explanatory theory is insightful and productive. But, while Durkheim's intellectual heirs may have
"stood his actual teaching on its head," Horton misses his point. For Durkheim,
both science and religion are conceptual systems grounded in collective life. They are not merely
alternative intellectual theories, nor cognitive mechanisms, they are collective representations generated
by distinct kinds of social experience. Thus, in recent years scholars interested, as Horton is, in these
continuities see less of a divide between science and ritual, but begin by looking at both science and
ritual (to say nothing of the rituals of science) as historically constructed forms of social practice and
knowledge. This is clearly not the way in which Horton combines the cognitive and sociological
dimensions of theory building. Rather, he see cognitive efforts "underpinned" by "technology, economy
and social organization." That is, social life provides a set of material conditions that constrain (or even
distort) cognitive processes, but the emerging recognition and promotion of alternative theories, made
possible by modern social experience, allows for the increasingly untrammeled exercise of reason.
Most of these difficulties emerge from Horton's failure to develop or address issues of culture,
the means by and through which people understand and act on (or "explain/predict /control") themselves
and the world they inhabit. It is probably the case, as Horton ceaselessly insists, that all peoples are
interested in explaining illness, misfortune, and other problematic events. But how far does that insight
alone get us into understanding just how different peoples, at different times and places propose
radically different means of doing just that? Horton's inattention to culture makes it impossible for him
to address anything beyond a common underlying cognitive faculty that social conditions progressively
permit to expand its horizons; surely this leaves unanswered essential anthropological questions of how
people define their world and its constituents, and what specific practices and authorities make