BOOK REVIEWS 249

(and unsuccessfully) attempting to impose the alien regime of the 1841 law on to the
informal work arrangements of mills in the Nord. The same nuances, incidentally, could
also be applied to legislation on school attendance. On the one hand, various social
changes in the nineteenth century stimulated the demand for primary education, so that
by the time it was made compulsory in the 1880s, most children were probably receiv-
ing some schooling. But on the other, enforcing longer and more regular periods of
attendance was a long campaign, which continued well into the twentieth century.

Journal of the Hisrory of the Behavioral Sciences

Volume 26, July 1990

Frank J. Hoffman. Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1987. xii + 126 pp.
Richard F. Gombrich. Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares
to Modern Colombo. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.
x + 237 pp. $55.00 (cloth); $15.95 (paper)
(Reviewed by Elizabeth R. Valentine)
Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism is a revised version of a University of
London Ph.D. dissertation. By Early Buddhism is meant the five Nikayas written in
Pali, the earliest source material for the study of Buddhism, although they may in fact
comprise texts of varying dates. Frank Hoffman’s approach is to bring textual (and con-
textual) analysis and insights from the philosophy of religion to elucidate this literature.
He aims to provide both emic and etic accounts, in the belief that these are complemen-
tary and mutually corrective perspectives (a point to which I shall return). Emic descrip-
tions are “internal,” in the language and categories of a system’s adherents; etic descrip-
tions are “external,” involving the imposition of categories from another discipline. On
the other hand, he is at pains to avoid imposing a foreign mold.
Having expounded and attempted to defend his method, he proceeds to a considera-
tion of the charges that Early Buddhism is logically and emotively flawed. Hoffman
defends Early Buddhism against irrationality on the grounds that it contains heuristic
principles for debate rather than formal logical principles (the concern is with utterances
rather than propositions, there being in any case no term for the latter in Early
Buddhism). Thus it is absolved from the charge of self-contradiction.
Hoffman then turns to a consideration of pessimism. Pessimism may be descrip-
tive or evaluative, the important point being that the former need not necessarily imply
the latter. It is argued that Buddhism is optimistic in that it claims that the cause of
suffering can be known and eliminated: liberation is possible given the requisite effort
and the practice of meditation. Thus, the explanation offered, although not a scientific
one, is considered superior to that which Job received; his was dependent on another
world, implying a pessimistic attitude to this one.
The second half of the book is concerned with substantive points about mind. The
first main problem to be tackled is that of the compatibility of the rebirth doctrine, which
claims continuity and moral responsibility across lives, with the doctrine of anatta (in-
substantiality): if there is no soul, what is it that continues? Buddhism rejects the Hindu
concept of atrnan as a metaphysical entity or soul which “transmigrates.” Hoffman holds
250 BOOK REVIEWS

that there is no consistent technical account of the rebirth link in Early Buddhism. On
this view, all that can survive is a stream of consciousness. (Problems of the unity of
consciousness, such as what binds the aggregates of one person together while keeping
them separate from those of another, may be insoluble because based on false presup-
positions of the need for a “mysterious sort of metaphysical rubber band.”) The pro-
posed continuity is ever-changing yet continuous. Analogies used are a flame, a stream,
or the movements of a monkey jumping from branch to branch; Ludwig Wittgenstein
gives the example of a cord consisting of overlapping and criss-crossing fibers.’ Hoffman’s
conclusion is that from an emic perspective the notion of rebirth must be understood
as part of the background against which other beliefs may be seen to fit or not fit, and
does not require justification. I suggest it is perhaps not dissimilar from Thomas Kuhn’s
notion of a paradigm.‘ From an etic perspective, however, the concept of rebirth is not
philosophically justifiable. Conditions for the meaningful ascription of “the same per-
son” across lives cannot be provided: self-awareness, memory and bodily continuity are
all considered and rejected. Therefore there can be no evidential criteria for reidentifica-
tion and rebirth is not an empirical hypothesis.
The relation of verification to the rebirth doctrine is then considered in the general
context of the relation of religious belief to evidence. On both internal textual and ex-
ternal philosophical grounds, Hoffman concludes that Early Buddhism is not a form
of empiricism; it is experiential rather than empirical in the sense of falsifiable. Saddha
(faith, confidence) is not always consequent to checking and abhinna (higher kinds of
knowledge and psychic powers) do not provide an epistemological basis. An examina-
tion of the features of religious belief shows it to be distinct from scientific knowledge
and more akin to practical wisdom. Furthermore, Early Buddhism is not concerned with
the origin of our ideas and does not distinguish sense from intellect in the way that
Western philosophy does.
Finally, an explanation of amata (deathless) is offered, in such a way as not to con-
flict with the anatta doctrine, that is, in the absence of a permanent, unchanging mental
substratum. Two senses of parinibbana are distinguished: in the first it is synonymous
with nibbana (“dying to the world”); in the other, contrastive sense, it implies the death
after the last life span of an arahat (an enlightened being). Applied to nibbana, amata
means merely the destruction of passion, hatred and confusion in the life of a living
Buddhist adept and does not imply death; applied to parinibbana in its contrastive sense,
it implies a limit to the stream of life. Since it applies to death rather than the process
of dying, it cannot be an experience in that stream. In either case Hoffman maintains,
following a distinction between two senses of immortality drawn by Stewart Sutherland,
that amata means eternal in the sense of not limited by death, rather than endless in
the sense of something that never dies.3 From an emic perspective, there is no answer
to the question of existence after death (the primary concern is with the cessation of
suffering). From an etic perspective, since rebirth is conditional, the suggestion is that
extinction finally occurs, but of course one cannot experience it in one’s own case.
This is a specialist and difficult book, but the overviews and summaries are extremely
useful. Although Pali words are generally translated in the text, a glossary might have
been helpful. I think Hoffman succeeds in providing a sympathetic, yet critical treat-
ment. However, 1 have doubts about his claim that emic and etic views are not mutually
exclusive. Was Kuhn not right in suggesting that paradigms are in~omparable?~ If Early
Buddhism is not philosophy, as Hoffman claims, how can philosophy be applied to it?
 BOOK REVIEWS 25 1

As he frequently acknowledges, Buddhism shuns such “wordy warfare,” viewing it as

a source of attachment. He writes:
What counts as “clear” or “obscure” etc. depends in part on the sort of system
(science, philosophy, religion), so it may be that what counts as an explanation
or difficulty in one area is not so in another. More needs to be said about permeability
of these “systems” if they are not to be regarded as completely isolated from one
another, but I have no time for that here (n., p. 45).
This to be regretted since a solution to this problem is crucial if he is to achieve his
avowed aim of getting philosophers and orientalists to talk with one another. This book
will be controversial, partly because the author is critical of many other scholars and
partly because he makes a number of provocative statements, but it is an important
contribution to its field or, as I prefer to think, fields.
Richard Gombrich was Frank Hoffman’s external examiner. His volume Theruvudu
Buddhism belongs to a series aimed at providing scholarly and readable introductions
to different religious beliefs and practices in their social, cultural, and historical setting
and is thus directed to a wider audience than the preceding volume. Theravada Buddhism
is the more conservative of the two main forms of Buddhism. It originated in India
in the fifth century B.C. but became a world religion as a result of the patronage of Asoka,
who sent missions to various courts. It was introduced into Ceylon about 250 B.c., from
where it spread to Burma, Thailand, and other parts of South East Asia. However, little
is heard about these latter in this book, which focuses on Ceylon, of which the author
has first-hand experience.
In contrast to Hoffman, Gombrich deals at the outset with the problem of attempting
to write a social history of religion. His answer is that a social and historical account
of a religion is independent of its truth; and that ethical and metaphysical propositions,
although not empirical, are not therefore meaningless or without value. He discusses
the limitations of Marxist and Weberian accounts, and indicates that his own view has
been influenced by that of Karl Popper.
Gombrich claims originality only for his treatment of Buddhist identity. His view
is that, as originally conceived, Buddhism is purely a soteriology, concerned with the
quest for salvation or “liberation,” a personal and doctrinal matter, as distinct from
a “communal religion,” concerned with social rules and ritual. This doctrine is well sum-
marized in chapter 3. Furthermore, its higher practice was confined to the Sangha, the
world’s oldest monastic order, discussed in detail in chapter 4. Part of the reason for
this was that only its members had access to the scriptures, in what was initially an oral
tradition (indeed, the primary goal of the Sangha was the preservation of the scriptures).
There is no record of their being written down until late in the first century BC and they
were not printed in Ceylon until the nineteenth century. Most of the Canon is in Pali
and only now is there a government project in Sri Lanka for a translation into the ver-
nacular (Sinhala).
Gombrich begins his historical treatment with an account of the social conditions
and ideas in the period of the Vedic literature in India in the first two millenia B.C. He
is thus able to show that the Buddha inherited, for example, a belief in the unity underly-
ing all phenomena and that only understanding will enable escape from the cycle of
rebirth; and what he overturned, notably the doctrine of karman (inevitable causal con-
sequences of actions), which he “internalized”: his most radical innovation was to sug-
gest that the moral quality of an act lay in its intention rather than its ritual perfor-
25 2 BOOK REVIEWS

mance. This constituted a shift from ritual to soteriology and from the communal to
the individual. However, Gombrich is also at pains to point out the way in which social
consequences are often independent of the intentions of individuals.
His answer to the question of why Buddhism was accepted when it was is not novel.
Buddhism arose in a time of urbanization and the beginnings of organized trade, of
a spiritual malaise resulting from the loosening of social structures and an increase in
individual freedom. (Many have drawn parallels with the situation in our own time.)
It appealed to businessmen of the new middle classes. Its affinity to trade is traced in
a commercial analogy, in which it is suggested that Buddhism is an ideological parallel
to monetization, that kamma serves as ethical currency in a social contract. The virtues
of diligence, honesty, and thrift are extolled, offering a universal moral law, that is readily
transportable.
However, its successful transportation to the peasant society of Ceylon, where
radically different social conditions prevailed, has also to be explained. Here it became
the national religion and survived the vicissitudes of decline (legal fictions enabled the
Sangha to acquire vast amounts of property, financial transactions being “laundered”
through lay administrators) and revivals, notably in the twelfth and sixteenth centuries.
Gombrich considers that important factors in the survival of the Theravada tradition
were royal patronage (on which the Sangha were dependent), its international character
(at several points in its history, Ceylon was able to reimport monks from abroad, notably
Burma and Thailand), and its scriptural foundation.
In the nineteenthcentury confrontation with Christianity under British colonial rule,
the character of Buddhism in Ceylon changed radically by assigning importance to the
laity. This was the result of British influences (Protestant missionaries and Theosophists)
and socio-economic changes (the rise of a professional middle class, schools, printing,
and a lay reading public). This emphasis on lay religiosity led to the formation of sects.
Since the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948, there has been rapid urbanization and
a population explosion, which has produced tensions and disruption, resulting in
undesirable effects ranging from occult practices to riots. Although this breakdown of
society and ensuing anomie is similar to that in which Buddhism first took root, doubts
are expressed as to whether the Sangha will be able to adapt to this challenge.
Although intended as a social history, Gombrich refuses to be restricted to social
explanations. He believes that the major factor accounting for the successful spread
of Buddhism is “the power and beauty of its thought”: its strength lies in its ethos and
the cogency of its ideas. Although he sets Buddhism in its social context and mutual
influences are commented on, the overall tone of the book is narrative rather than ex-
planatory. This is in no way to denigrate it. It is well-written in a direct and authoritative
style and succeeds admirably in achieving the general aims of the series. It is interesting
and informative throughout and I recommend it strongly to anyone interested in the
subject .

NOTES
1 . Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 32.
2. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
3. Stewart R . Sutherland. “What Happens After Death?” Scottish Journul of Theology 22 (1969): 410.
4. Ibid., p. 103.
 BOOK REVIEWS 253

Dr. Hoflman Responds:

I am grateful to Elizabeth R. Valentine for her diligent review of my book, but
am surprised by some assertions about it and by the way in which it is juxtaposed with
Professor Gombrich’s masterful work. Surely it is an accidental rather than essential
feature of his distinguished academic career that “Richard Gombrich was Frank
Hoffman’s external examiner,” while the fact that Gombrich is Boden Professor of
Sanskrit at Balliol College, Oxford University, goes entirely unmentioned.
In the second paragraph of Valentine’s review my argument is misrepresented. The
point is not that early Buddhism is absolved from self-contradiction on the grounds
that it contains heuristic principles for debate instead of formal logical ones. My point
is that the fourfold logic (which includes a merely apparent self-contradiction in its third
part) has a natural interpretation, namely, “there exists x such that y obtains (in part)
and z obtains (in part)” such that there is in fact no self-contradiction (p. 22).
In criticizing the book Valentine says: “Was Kuhn not right in suggesting that
paradigms are incompatible? If Early Buddhism is not philosophy, how can philosophy
be applied to it?” First, Kuhn is not even mentioned in my bibliography, so I fail to
see why a critic might think I am obliged to seriously consider an objection put in Kuhn’s
terms. (In his postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn himself observes that Masterman has discovered no less than twenty-two uses of
the word “paradigm.”) Secondly, just how philosophy can apply to the religion of early
Buddhism is exemplified in the work: “In this study it is not that philosophy has only
an external (etic) and critical function here. It may function in this way (e.g., a difficulty
in reidentification of persons is shown), and yet also philosophy may be useful for in-
ternal (emic) understanding (e.g., the endless lifdeternal life distinction is shown ap-
plicable) in a way which elucidates the tests.” (pp. 7-8). From this passage it is clear
that I am not thinking of emic and etic as hermetically sealed: they are permeable mem-
branes, and my own work occurs on the interface between them. Thirdly, the objection
that emic and etic are mutually exclusive is not just theoretically dubious but is refuted
in pedagogical practice. As one of the most successful, detailed textbooks for the study
of Eastern religions currently available, Religions of Asia states emic and etic approaches
can be “complimentary and mutually corrective” (p. 2).’
NOTE
I. See Niels Nielson, Religions of Asia, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988).

Journol of the Hisfory of the Behoviorol Sciences

Volume 26, July 1990

Robert Ackerman. J . G. Frazer: His Life and Work. Cambridge and New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1987. 380 pp. $39.50 (cloth) (Reviewed by Milton Jacobs)
Robert Ackerman, an intellectual historian, spent seven years researching and writing
John G . Frazer’s life and works. He accomplished his long and difficult task by reading
hundreds of letters, diaries, and manuscripts and by speaking to those individuals still
alive who had known Frazer. He begins his book by calling Frazer “an embarrassment”
(P. 1).