SECOND DIVISION AMONG HEIRS TO BE IN WRITING AND REGISTERED IN ORDER TO BE VALID.
— We hold
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.]
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
Ernesto M. Andrade for petitioners.
Renato M. Rances for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Jacinto Pada was the owner of a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte
denominated as Cadastral Lot. No. 5581. He died intestate and he left six children, namely:
Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta as his compulsory heirs. During his
lifetime, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son Pastor, continued living
in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's
children, lived in that house since 1960. But then, sometime in 1951, the heirs of Jacinto entered
into an extrajudicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document
which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte, and it was
to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter Marie, that Cadastral Lot 5581 was
allocated. When Ananias died, his daughter Juanita succeeded to his right as co-owner of said
property. On June 14, 1978, Juanita sold to Engr. Ernesto Paredes the right of her father in
Cadastral Lot No. 5881, and on November 17, 1993, Maria Pada also sold the right of her father
to private respondent Silverio Pada. Private respondent then demanded from petitioner spouses
Verona Pada and Ricardo Kilario to vacate the premises, but they refused. On June 26, 1995,
private respondent filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte a complaint for
ejectment against petitioner spouses. However, On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amado Pada
executed a Deed of Donation transferring to Verona their respective shares as co-owners of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which subsequently petitioners used as defense. After trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court
as well as the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision.
The Court ruled that the belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, the heirs of Amador
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having
disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to
Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to
Amador Pada was not the subject property but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the
interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of land in Itum, Sta.
Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by the heirs to petitioners of the subject property, was
void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it was too late in the day for the heirs of
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and
laches had equally set in. Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property
by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated at any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS; NO LAW REQUIRES PARTITION
that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is
valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs
to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to
enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object
the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which
does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY. — Neither does the Statute of
Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not
legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The
1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
Engr. Paredes and private respondent, respectively.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRODUCES LEGAL STATUS. — The extrajudicial partition which the heirs
of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.
When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed
that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive,
unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been
paid. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto
Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF DEED OF DONATION OF PROPERTY OWNED BY
OTHER HEIRS AFTER 44 YEARS PRODUCES NO LEGAL EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — The
belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
donating the subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having disputed
the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and
Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was
not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Niño, Matalom, Leyte, but
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, Matalom,
Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal
effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
5. ID.; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners are estopped from
impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly
admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without
ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their
admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their
possession of the subject property is concerned.
6. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSORS BY SHEER TOLERANCE OF OWNERS, BOUND
BY IMPLIED PROMISE TO VACATE THE SAME UPON DEMAND. — Considering that
petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they
knew that the occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT POSSESSORS OR BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH. — They cannot be
considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 and
Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons
whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good
faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going
to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the
improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even as that
promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not
the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the
value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J p:
The victory 1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court 2 in an ejectment suit 3 filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled
by its reversal 4 by the Regional Trial Court 5 on appeal. They elevated their cause 6 to
respondent Court of Appeals 7 which, however, promulgated a Decision 8 on May 20, 1998,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Cdpr
The following facts are undisputed:
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut
land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area
of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the
subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his
son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his
estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other
brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died
without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented
by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private
respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died,
his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias,
as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father,
Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of
meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all
earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte,
a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses. cdasia
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-
Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation 9 transferring to petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They
contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was
invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano,
Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial
partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered
in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the
following findings:
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court
finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his
ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic]
successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is
still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto
Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and
Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-
described residential property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the
basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how come that since 1951,
the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not
transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and
still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the
part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the
name of his heirs . . . .
"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the
genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as
doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of
attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in
the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.
"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-
described property long before the sale of said property on November 17,
1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the
plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-
described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the
heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of
Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-
described property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as
co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners
became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of .
. . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their possession in the northern portion is
being [sic] lawful." 10
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On
November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:
". . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than
40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors
were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At
any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo
have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias,
nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if
not laches or estoppel.
"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule,
but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the
heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs
claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of
the community property, the question then involved is no longer one for
partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period
of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have,
was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.
"xxx xxx xxx
". . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a
brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the
case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the
extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is
illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft
of any right in donating the very property in question." 11
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment
earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:
"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the
appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;
"2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the
option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of the
New Civil Code has to be applied;
"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their
occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of
P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and until
the termination of the present case;
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00
as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit." 12
Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of the
Regional Trial Court. llcd
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said petition. It
explained:
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the
court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It
cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being
inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
possession . . . .
"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the
land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada
who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee
Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial
partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which
was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject
land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias
Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial
partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action
was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such partition.
"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts
that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally owned
by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of
Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria
Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share . . . .
Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court
that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria
Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita
Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo
and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary shares.
Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been
occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any
rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now
impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in
1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and
her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary
division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is
conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the
respective portions assigned to them . . . .
"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made
by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer
upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest
nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought
to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the
respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of
laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert
their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years . . . .
Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the
vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
petitioners." 13
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
"I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH." 14
There is no merit to the instant petition. LibLex
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made
in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. 15 The requirement in Sec. 1,
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and
registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. 16 The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. 17 Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place,
nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid. 18 The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to
be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. 19 The requirement of Article 1358 of
the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is
only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of
the acts of the parties as among themselves. 20 And neither does the Statute of Frauds
under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property
from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an
heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. 21 The
1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to
Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively. 22
the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and
Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was
not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Niño, Matalom, Leyte, but
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, Matalom,
Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal
effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs
of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality
and tolerance of the Pada family. 25 Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind
them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its
owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons
who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them. 26 Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled
that both Article 448 27 and Article 546 28 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to
a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. 29 Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are
not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito
Pada that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in
good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not
yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be
realized. 30 More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for
Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As
such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on
the said lot. dctai
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
||| (Spouses Kilario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134329, [January 19, 2000], 379 PHIL 515-
530)

Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. 23 When they discussed and agreed on the
division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were
debts existing against the estate which had not been paid. 24 No showing, however, has been
made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why
the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
donating the subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having disputed
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27421. September 12, 1986.]
ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mangoy;
LEONORA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA
TAYNAN, and JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to Salming
Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO,respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDING; ALLOWANCE OF A WILL; RULE. — The settled
principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
2. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; PARTITION INTER-VIVOS MADE BY TESTATOR; ALLOWED
UNDER ART. 1056 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1899. — We find, that the document may be
sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time
the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
"Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs."
3. ID.; ID.; CONTRACT ENTERED BY HEIRS TO CARRY OUT THE TERMS OF THE LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT; BINDING. — While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Article 816
and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their
conformity to the dispositions made by Old Mas Tumpao in his "last will and testament." As the
trial court put it: "The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not
probated. However, when the persons who are named therein as heirs and beneficiaries
voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate, and
furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to
be binding between them.
4. ID.; PRESCRIPTION; RIGHT OF ACTION UPON A WRITTEN CONTRACT; RULE. — "Said
agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the
testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after
the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil
Code. "Art. 1144 — The following actions must be brought ten years from the time the right of
action accrues: "1) Upon a written contract; "2) Upon an obligation created by law; "3) Upon a
judgment. "Any formal defect of the deed," was cured by the lapse of time.
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF MINDANAO AND SULU; NOT
EXTENDED TO THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE. — The agreement entered into by parties in
implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the ADMINISTRATIVE Code of Mindanao and Sulu
was not extended to the Mountain Province.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the Mountain Province, setting of many
legends of adventure and romance among the highlanders of the North. Our story is not as
fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful Igorot maiden but a prosaic
dispute over a piece of land. Even so, as in those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor
of the just and deserving albeit according to the dictates not of the heart but of the law.
The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all began he was still
a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the
private respondents in this case. 1 Upon her death, he took to himself a second wife, by whom
he had no issue but who had two children she had "adopted" according to the practice of the
Igorots then. 2 It is their children who, with some others, are the petitioners in this case.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament" the
dispositive portion of which declared:
"Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after
departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my
Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all what I
have stated, he shall not change what I have already stated in my
Testament so that there is truth in my will, I will affix my right thumbmark
at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and
write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Will this 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who
are present and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad,
Benguet, 4th September, 1937." 3
The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the time
were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation of this
document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an agreement providing as follows:
"We who are named children and who will inherit from our father
TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA, ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and
we also whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-
OT and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town of
La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after swearing
under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father
TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also
acknowledge or recognize the lands as included in the area of said land
as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name of our father TUMPAO here in
La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the Will as told by
him concerning our right to the land which we will inherit and also to those
whose lands which were included in the said Title No. 416 because we
were all called be present and hear his will. We heard and agreed to his
will as appearing in his testament regarding the land which we will inherit.
We also recognized and agree to the appointment of our brother BANDO
to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered and he will also be the one
to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will demand the partition in
accordance with the will of our father TUMPAO as soon in the Testament
which we saw and have heard by all.
"It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our
brother BANDO who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm
in this instrument that will answer for all the expenses when it shall be
surveyed so the share of each will be segregated so also with the
approval of the title, which shall appear the name of each of us and that
we do not dispute the land which we are actually working shall pertain to
us as embodied in the said will of our father TUMPAO.
"We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary
Public here in Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so also
 with the will of our father so that they be one to be followed as regard
upon by all and we affix our right thumbmark at the end of our written
name because we do not know how to read and write this 7th day of
September, 1937 in the City of Baguio." 4
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. Cdpr
The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience to the
wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by the other above quoted
instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty three years later, that brought this
matter to the courts.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided
the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other
persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5 By virtue of this partition, Old Man
Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents. 6
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance.
They had been sustained by the trial court, 7 which, however, was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old Man Tumpao
was null and void because it had not been probated. The agreement of partition among the
supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not
been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that
the land in dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first marriage although it was
registered during his second marriage and so the petitioners were liable in rentals for the lots
occupied by them, as well as attorney's fees. 8
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling — made both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals — that the will, not having been probated as required by law, was inoperative
as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the
Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or
allowed in court. 9
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil
Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man
Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
"Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs."
On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela vs. Albela, 10 also
decided by the Court of Appeals, with Justice J .B .L. Reyes as the ponente.
In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition dividing two
parcels of land between his daughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their conformity by
signing the instrument. They took possession of their respective shares upon his death, but
fourteen years later, Restituta ejected Eduarda from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a
third party and denying the existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for recovery and was upheld
by the trial court on the basis of the deed of partition. LexLib
Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, take over at
this point:
"In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the
above document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds
summarized in their brief (p. 7), as follows:
'Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee,
Eduarda Albela, rest on a document which defies classification.
If it is a deed of partition, it is null and void because it is not
embodied in a public document; if it is a simple donation of
realty, it is also null and void, because it is not in a public
document and there is no acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis
Causa, certainly it is null and void because it does not follow
the rules governing testamentary succession; and if ever it is to
be classified as a will, more so, it is still null and void because it
does not conform to the requirements of Section 618, Act 190
as amended by Act 2645.'
"None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently fail to
realize that Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and
that this partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but
an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at
any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs
from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only
by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. 'El
testador es libre y sus herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en cuanto
no perjudique la legitima de los forsozos. Inutil es soñar en otras
limitaciones que no existen.' (7 Manresa Commentaries, 6th Ed., p. 639.
That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donations inter
vivos is a consequence of its special nature. Says the learned Manresa
on this point:
'Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el
Articulo 1056, como en el 1057, que despues examinaremos,
alude a las formalidades con que puede practicarse la
particion, no a los efectos de esta, significando que para
ella no es preciso que intervengan las formas solemnes que
todo testamento o acto de ultima voluntad en general
requiere. Ni aun sera preciso guardar las formalidades
especiales de las donaciones, porque no se trata de disponer a
titulo gratuito, sino de dividir aquellos bienes de que ya
anteriormente se dispuso en forma legal' (Emphasis supplied.
Op. Cit., p. 635).
"It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition, Exhibit A, should be in
writing. It does not have to be in a public document except to affect third
persons (Art. 1280), being valid between the parties who signed it in its
present form.
"If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would he in the
absence of a previous testament preceding it (Legasto v. Verzosa, 54
Phil. 766). And even this may not be indispensable in the present case,
for the testator's partition did not depart from the shares allotted to his
heirs by the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior will necessary under Article
1080 of the new Civil Code, which replaced the word 'testator' in Article
1056 of the Code of 1889 with the broader term 'person.'
"Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not alter the
result. There being only two daughters surviving the deceased Agustin,
each one of them would necessarily be entitled to one-half of each of the
two parcels he owned at his death, and Agustin's former ownership is no
longer disputed by the appellants in this instance. In addition, since both
 daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its terms would bind both, and
estop them from asserting a different interest. Appellants' act in
appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in
law or justice."
There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed of partition and Old Man
Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under Article 1056 of the Civil Code,
which was in force at the time they were executed. Even as Agustin Albela's partition was signed
by the two daughters themselves, so was Old Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries
in their agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized the terms of such
"will." While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code,
it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the dispositions made
by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament."
As the trial court put it: LibLex
Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of properties or property
right. 12
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption
is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the respondents
as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to
retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by
the petitioners. llcd
The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the reconveyance to the
petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his decision in toto.
How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during the early days, when right and
wrong were weighed according to the primal code of the ancient hills. Even so, though that past
is gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still for the deserving.

"The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason that it WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial court
was not probated. However, when the persons who were named therein reinstated, with costs against the respondents.
as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its
terms probably to save the expenses of probate, and furthermore, carried SO ORDERED.
out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
to be binding between them.
||| (Mang-oy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27421, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 33-42)
"Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir
before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It
was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.

"Art. 1144 — The following actions must be brought ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:

"1) Upon a written contract;

"2) Upon an obligation created by law;

"3) Upon a judgment.

"Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of time.

"What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the
land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total
area was more than 35,000 square meters. Under the old Civil Code, it
was within the free disposable portion of ones' estate despite the
existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code, Art. 808).

"In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to

execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas
respectively owned and occupied by them and to pay the costs.

"Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a

reasonable amount of his additional share in the expenses of segregating
his lot but they (defendants) are ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance in his favor of the said lot owned by him.

"The expenses of survey and segregation must be borne by the

plaintiffs."

We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man
Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian
Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 68282. November 8, 1990.]
RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA
BUENAVISTA VDA. DE CHAVEZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division),
ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION
CHAVEZ, respondents.
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners.
Jose L. Lapak for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PARTITION OF ESTATE EITHER BY ACT INTER
VIVOS OR BY WILL, RESPECTED FOR AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE
LEGITIMATE OF COMPULSORY HEIRS. — Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person
to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be
respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law
prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080,
is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987
Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a
partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition
by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of
the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
2. ID.; ID.; PAROL PARTITION, MAY BE SUSTAINED ON TWO GROUNDS. — "In numerous
cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel
of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold
their respective parts in severalty. "A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that
the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition." (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
3. ID.; ID.; PARTITION INTER VIVOS, VALID WHEN EXECUTED BY THE PROPERTY
OWNER. — In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in
favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and
between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but
also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with
respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of
Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter
vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela
Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh.
2) and the subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2)
declared that the earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by Manuela and her children
constituted a valid partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals
thereby reversed the decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch 1.
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in
Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children,
named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were
the plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.
On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista,
executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her
sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P450.
Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, also
sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same price of
P450. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided
1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total
undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining
2/6 shares. LexLib
In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:
"Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina,
ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay hatiin naming anim
(6) na mga magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang
paghihiwatig o particion; ako bilang isa sa anim na magkakapatid ay may
karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa
man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana namin ay samantalang
nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at makikinabang sa
nasabing pag-aari." (p 14, Rollo.)
meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children,
in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio
Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or
less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however,
reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her
lifetime.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years
earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the
entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On
October 7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their
mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito
Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an
additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The
court did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
64708-R).
On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and
render another one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez
and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee
Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio, and declaring further that the
documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are evidence of a valid partition of the
land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children,
subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime, without pronouncement
as to damages and costs." (p. 17, Rollo.)
On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others: prLL
"3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of the
defendants-appellees, was found lately to have executed during her
lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT . . . and there is now a pending
petition for probate of said last will and testament before the Municipal
Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;
"xxx xxx xxx
"6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's
execution of the documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C and D are
valid, nevertheless its validity ceases from the time that she executed the
Last Will and Testament . . . because the execution of the Last Will
invalidates the former act of the said Manuela Buenavista;
"7. That the Last Will and Testament . . . which is now pending probate in
the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally affect
the property — hence, there is a ground for this motion for
reconsideration and/or to suspend the decision — pending final outcome
of the probate of the last will and testament of the late Manuela
Buenavista." (pp 88-89, Rollo.)
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition inter
vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and
Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the supposed Last Will and
Testament was executed on December 11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the
complaint for annulment on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was already senile
and not of disposing mind; that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand
the several Deeds of Sale, the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her thumbmark only;
that Manuela Buenavista had no more property to dispose of by will on December 11, 1969,
when she supposedly executed her Last Will and Testament.
On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allege: prcd
"(1) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred
in declaring valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as a partition by
an act inter vivosconsidering that examining the said exhibits will reveal
that it is not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista;
"(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article
1347 of the New Civil Code." (p. 126, Rollo.)
We find those contentions not well-taken.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art.
1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code
clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter
vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition
must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written,
and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
"In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree
it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
"A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession
in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition." (Hernandez vs.
Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of
Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between
Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed
the sales. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to
future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela
Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter
vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid. LexLib
". . . As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now
estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of their own
voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one may be
permitted to disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed
contrary thereto." (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine, 34 Phil. 858.)
"Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no
allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or
without the petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control
and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of
the partition. . . . They cannot attack the partition collaterally . . ." (Ralla
vs. Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs.
Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)
As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and
inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself
authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a
simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made
of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine
that "no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. No.
CV-64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioners. cdphil

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa , Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

||| (Chavez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68282, [November 8, 1990], 269 PHIL 218-
225)
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 78778. December 3, 1990.]
LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS,
BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA
MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, respondents.
Rogelio V. Fernandez for petitioners.
Siruelo, Muyco & Associates for B. Buenaseda.
Eduardo A. Cagandahan for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER COURT OF
APPEALS CASES; RULE. — Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function
of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing
that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the
Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturing Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R.
82670, September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from
this rule.
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; WHEN THE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT. —
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory
character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en
concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start
the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989). In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent
appellate court and the lower court, never categorically claimed ownership over the property in
question, much less his possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not
have acquired said property by acquisitive prescription.
3. ID.; SUCCESSION; PROBATE OF WILL; NECESSARY FOR THE TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY BY SUCCESSION; EXCEPTION IN CASE AT BAR. — While it is true that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court
(Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by
Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows: "Article 1056. If the testator should
make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so
far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144
SCRA 33 [1986]). In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is
entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any
showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT LOOK UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. —
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning the ownership of the
property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed by
Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT;
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE APPELLATE COURT. — The fact that JUANA failed to identify the
property in question and to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming
they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the
property in question. Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the property in question is the same property adjudicated to JUANA under the
will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right whatsoever to said property. Such
findings are conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision * of the respondent
appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno) Albovias et
al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower court, the decretal portion of
which reads: LLphil
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the
property in question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in
favor of her co-defendants;
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent
transactions involving the same property null and void ab initio;
3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject
parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to
surrender possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel of land
situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularly described as
follows: prcd
 "A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan,
province of Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania
Irlandez (formerly Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio
Lopez; on the South, by that of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo
Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street. Containing an area of two
hundred seventy seven (277) square meters, more or less. Assessed at
P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on the one
hand, and Leonida Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita
Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of a bigger
lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga,
grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother
Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo, both
surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows:
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang
bahagi naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng
Calle Avenida Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari
cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay Enrique Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa
namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa Canloran, tubig na
pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by the
Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, one on
the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided by the heirs
in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern portion of which was
adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion was given to JUANA and
Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and Domingo
Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the Formenteras, and the latter
the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio Monterola).
The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him to Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the
adjoining property (Ibid.). LLjur
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land
owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida
Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in
turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino
Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof, sometime in 1974
(Ibid., pp. 16-17).
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity) claim
that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr.
Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak of World
War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate Estate of
the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together with
her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however, the Will was allowed
by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled "Leonida F.
Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.).
It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or not said decision has already become
final and executory.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for
quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional Trial Court
of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 7345
(Ibid., p. 4).
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this petition. prLL
CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID
DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN
QUESTION CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME
PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF
THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE
TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid.,
p. 119)
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT
THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p.
121)
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p. 105);
while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139). LLpr
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's finding that
Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive prescription.
Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right or legal title she had
over the property in question, the reason being that Monterola's continued possession of the
said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full and absolute ownership (Ibid., p.
112).
The argument has no factual basis.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to
it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh
such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record, so that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required
to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no
convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule.
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over the
property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by Monterola in
favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the property conveyed to
her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio
Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or produce of the
said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in 1970 that Leonida Coronado
prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18). LexLib
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory
character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en
concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start
the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court, never
categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his possession
thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said property by
acquisitive prescription.
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession to that
of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property, even against the
petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good faith, is a foregone or
settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in this wise:
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the
land in question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola,
whether by prescription or by some other title. Neither can she claim
acquisitive prescription in her own name. It was only in 1970 after the
death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted her claim of ownership
adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no
title over the land in question, she must be deemed to have claimed it in
bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and other real
rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And
even granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was,
therefore, in good faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary
for her to acquire the land by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil
Code). But she can claim to have possessed the land only in 1968, the
year the Monterola lots were donated to her. The period, however, was
interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint below was filed."
(Rollo, pp. 18-19)
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA inherited
the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never probated; hence, said
transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of
Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190), no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
The contention is without merit. LibLex
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be
sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time
said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of
Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime from
Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida
Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from questioning
the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having failed to raise the same in
the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p. 119).
The contention is likewise without merit.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning the ownership of the
property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed by
Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property. Cdpr
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's petition is weak for
want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact that she did
not only fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the discrepancy in the boundary
of the property she is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the discrepancy in
the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of
the lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover, the lower court found
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the property in question is the same property
adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right
whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are conclusive upon this Court
(Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
||| (Coronado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78778, [December 3, 1990], 270 PHIL 36-46)
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000.]
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and
DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO,
CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents.
Imelda A. Herrera for petitioner.
Abundio J. Macaranas for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977 a common residence at the Isarog property.
Soon, tension appeared to have escalated between petitioner RebeccaViado and respondent
Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two
families to make room for the growing children. Respondents claimed absolute ownership over
the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On
February 1, 1988 petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a
case of partition before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents predicated their claim ofabsolute
ownership over the subject property on the deed of donation executed by the late
Julian Viado covering his 1/2 share in favor of respondent's husband, NiloViado, and a
deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs and petitioner
Rebecca Viado waived their rights and interests in favor of NiloViado. The trial court found for
respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but
ordered the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine the value ofthe property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner
Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Dissatisfied
therewith, petitioners filed the petition seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. cHDEaC
The Supreme Court found the appellate court to have ruled correctly. The evidence submitted by
petitioners were utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deed of donation andof the extrajudicial settlement, petitioners
are vague on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. With regard to the
issue of preterition, the Court ruled that the exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a
retardate, from the deed of the extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition.
Thus, the appellate court acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further
proceedings to make the proper valuation of the property and determination of the amount due
to petitioner Delia Viado.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; FRAUD, FORGERY AND UNDUE
INFLUENCE; NOT PROVEN IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court of Appeals, in sustaining
thecourt a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting,
consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viadoemployed
fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the
deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in
what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why
Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and
interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she
has signed the deed ofextrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to
believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the
assailed document.
2. ID.; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS WAS A MINISTERIAL
ACT WHICH MERELY CREATED A CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ITS CONTENTS AGAINST
ALL THIRD PERSONS. — The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the
date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone
be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely
created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the
instruments remained completely valid and binding.
3. ID.; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; WHERE THE PRETERITION IS NOT
ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH AND FRAUD, THE PARTITION SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED BUT
THE PRETERITED HEIR SHALL BE PAID THE VALUE OF THE SHARE PERTAINING TO
HER. — The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the
preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value ofthe share pertaining to her. Again, the
appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further
proceedings to make the proper valuationof the Isarog property and ascertainment of the
amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek a
reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered
on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating the
property subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual settings found
by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the
trial court. LibLex
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several
pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October
1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their
children — Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to
Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987.
Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents — his wife Alicia Viado and their
two children Cherri Viadoand Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property.
Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and
respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between
the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed
absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion
occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the
property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93).
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents — a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half
conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement
in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a powerof attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and
petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their
share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26
August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the
heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments,
contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce
Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case,
averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the
deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister,
Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant
its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments, although executed
on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three
parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. prcd
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and adjudged
Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification by
ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner
Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed ofextrajudicial settlement.
too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by
profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did
not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act 5 and merely created a constructive
notice of its contents against all third persons. 6 Among the parties, the instruments remained
completely valid and binding. LLphil
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind ofpreterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall
be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper
valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29 May 1996, in CA-G.R.
No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs. cdrep
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Non v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137287, [February 15, 2000], 382 PHIL 538-544)

Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ruled correctly. LLpr

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog
property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their
children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested
from the moment of death of the decedent, 1 remained under a co-ownership regime 2 among
the heirs until partition. 3 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement. 4

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents
rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title
solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the documents on the grounds
heretofore expressed.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the
evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by
petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deeds ofdonation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are
vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have
petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient
judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The
asseveration ofpetitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement
on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration ofthe property is
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.]
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de
Roma, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; DONATION; THE FACT OF ITS IRREVOCABLE CHARACTER
DOES NOT EXEMPT PROPERTY FROM COLLATION. — We agree with the respondent court
that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na
di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable
does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATION; INTENTION TO EXEMPT PROPERTY FROM COLLATION
SHOULD BE EXPRESSED PLAINLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY. — Anything less than
such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion
that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here,
nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there
was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none. The intention to exempt from collation
should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in
Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; MAXIMUM PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO DECIDE A
CASE, MERELY DIRECTORY. — There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by
the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in
Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would
not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It is worth
stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of
the1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater
urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets
these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that
need.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay
was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed
by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and
the fruits thereof, had not been included. 1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon
is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent vigorously argues that it
is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims
she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation
was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
"Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of
the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition."
"Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should
repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious."
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, * which held that the
decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.
Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court ** holding that the
deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062.
Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the
fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. 4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows: llcd
"IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi
sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella
Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusangloob kong ibinibigay,
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa
kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay
na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi
sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat
ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan,
datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang
sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
"IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari
sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira
ang legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagi ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion." 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation. 6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation
that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise
language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate
if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were
imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not
the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is
whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the
decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed
by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, 7 the said
provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding
courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII,
Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed
with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging
their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to
meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It
is so ordered.

Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

||| (De Roma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46903, [July 23, 1987], 236 PHIL 220-225)