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G.R. No.

174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo.
"Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a
female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita
Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice
and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to
413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial
court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name
is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, 16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname
may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could
be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under
RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a
person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to
have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth;
(b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known,
of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the
civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova
or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included
in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-
female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in
the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their
dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an
ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,


- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Promulgated:


Respondent.
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which
granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2)
gender from female to male.

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted
in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male,
and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the
granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first
his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to
make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the
prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and
other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:


I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate
of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH,
and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the
local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally
named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy
of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that
a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks
in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries
in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named
in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings.Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in
the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had. [12] Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too
short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar
and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. [14] Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to
promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before
it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the
local civil registrar.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 [17] in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted
the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have
been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. [23]Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which
is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between
the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female. [25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents
body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous
genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have
undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a
female but he did not.He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the
path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent [27] and in
the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,


vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and
DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.

Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.

ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

The facts are undisputed.

On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco
Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is
hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to:

1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:

a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie Salinas;

b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;

c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and

d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.

2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:

a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and

b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.

3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay
at Malalag, Davao del Sur.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing
an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration
No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and
a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with
a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the
name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the
residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of
this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family
home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land
although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor
by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper
government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by
defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner'
motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of law is involved
in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was
duly constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues
that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family
Code; and that the decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16,
1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code
when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding
that the said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and
that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have been constituted
as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared
that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts
so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4,
one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his
family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152
and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that
all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which
was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance
of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his
actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-
MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely
relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his
first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. [1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven,
they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented
in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. [3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as
claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly,
it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under
Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states,
a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma
del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under
Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8,
which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed
with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in
the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure
to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. [6] It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the
law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 167746
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. Promulgated:


COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. August 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February
2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license.The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license
with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose
Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract [5] and
its entry on file.[6]

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage
to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;


2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.[11]

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had
not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public
document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[13]

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no
marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage
License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence
during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage
contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid
down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April
2000[330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. [14]

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for
them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where
Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to
apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be
given weight because the certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]

Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;


(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. [21]

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held
that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a
marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void abinitio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification
to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25]The certification moreover is precise in that
it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose
or intents it may serve.[26]

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. [27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to
an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly, apart from these,
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent
is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the
10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.[31]

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states
that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals
the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, [32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage
license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated it. [33] Petitioner is an educated
person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and
likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed
to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or
suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a
gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioners testimony as follows

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose
de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I dont remember your honor.

COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it
is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a
Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.[35]

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or
defect attended the civil wedding.[36]

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. [37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. [39] Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,


vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA
Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled
to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On
January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz
St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein
the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas
Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and
that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of
the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract
and copy of the marriage license with that office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother
of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did
not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10,
2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures
as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one
of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is
hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property
was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby
ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF
THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law. 37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. 42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.


As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of
the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by
his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to
not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license
was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave
their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,


vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in
Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts
and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7
March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed
a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total
of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion
for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and
asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally
then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals.
The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from
the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for
decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification
dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License
Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-
07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with
Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of
a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley
who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part
of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the
37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase
"married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to
prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin
and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig,
Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633,
194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo
B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s
money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an
accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for
lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties
shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and
Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of
Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case,
all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence
on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to
present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was
no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by
them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of
bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall
be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common
and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had
waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s
decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28
November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial
court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of
witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally
could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were
at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to
present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her
right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally
was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage
could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked
this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to"
her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth
certificates of his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March
1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed
that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City
did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of
the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by
the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which
also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and
void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages,
it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court
of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin 27 with the descriptive title
"married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited
the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella
practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of
the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 32 In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued
refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing
the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the
case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,


vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child." 4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save
her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to
get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and
wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide
support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing
to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and
reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the
child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant. 8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the
parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented
would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden
of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial
of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their
marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states
that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner
hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court
showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their
affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of
petitioner and thus entitled to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we
held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. 23 In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years
on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim
of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to
"B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2"
and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated
16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,


Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is
the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance
of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four children were born out of that
marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to
marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5]of the late Manzano and
of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation
for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitatedto marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, [8] who, under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that
the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,


vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get
her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that
private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely
and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that
petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent
also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but
reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned
errors:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT


GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS
THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED
BY LAW.7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b)
whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which
supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a
span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same
marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his
defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending
against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a
judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his
expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be
hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in
the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear
of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his
classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s
Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home
province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is
reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant,
what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded
before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that
sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the
defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the
credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off
from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.

To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy
regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-examination of
the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the
certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard
her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially
when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his argument
that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she could
not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week
period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered
prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light
of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute
the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into
marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the appellee.
During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the seven (7) letters
that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained
expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct
examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters,
claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was
laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with
the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of
the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the
marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on
any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that
attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.

We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in
the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court
of Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the
perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x 10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing
her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.

In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should
have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have
proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear
in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court
may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show
that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the instant case, private respondent
failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with
private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998]

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD,
respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?

The Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals[1] Decision
promulgated on December 1, 1994[2] and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995[3] in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which
reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint [4] for partition and damages against Private
Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. [5] On
October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party.[6]
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision[7] in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:[8]
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad,
plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject
matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share from said land
before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his
share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against
him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:[10]

The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There
are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.

Hence, this petition.[11]

The Facts

The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:[12]
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an
action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of
land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal
shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs
birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in
the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and
Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all
situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage,
Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3)
equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent
portions of the trial courts decision:[13]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay
captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the
position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers
Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from
the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were
already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943
in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was
about 30 meters away from plaintiffs parents[] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both
the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio
because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was
Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That
she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.

When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the
respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad
was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children,
namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes.Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of
Patricio.

A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture as the
defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The
other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio
Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes,
who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.

Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the woman in this picture
as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio
Trinidad. When asked by the court when xxx the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When
asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents. Witness then
identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the
name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The
date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.

On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass by it always. It
was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew]
the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was
not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.

At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who
is his co-defendant in this case.

Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified having known
Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that
their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato
who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name
of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also
owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting
season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed
and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad
was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived
her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the
present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still
small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed
the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose
when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his fathers share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.

Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix
Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the
defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad
Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.

As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had been
previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss
issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother was already
dead. Plaintiffs mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with
defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to
Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and children lived
with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them,
he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs
daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously marked
Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken
when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years after having lived with them, the
defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and
looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an
upland.

Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months
and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-
Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.

Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are : East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad
and South-Gregorio Briones.

Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants
and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.

Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining
owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.

Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.

Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the
subject of litigation.

Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the
owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.

Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of
Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.

Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No.
10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio
Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.

On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the produce of
the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was
Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty.
Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet
born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime.That
after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the
defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the
land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and
nieces. That [petitioners] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:


First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook,
Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.They being his first cousins
because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and
brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already
dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad
was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then
residing with his aunt, Nanay Taya, referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to
this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only 3
months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he answered, That
I do not know, neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he
can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad
had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then
in Manila working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo,
as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if
after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a
son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside
in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there.When asked if he was aware of the
4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he does not
know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the
time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was
around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When
asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness
answered that he was buried in their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the
place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants,
witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad,
and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if
he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75
years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and
he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone
to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from
Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was in
Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon
in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness
answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does
not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if
she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, Yes, but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with
them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his
grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked
by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered,
he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, He did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia
Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio
Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died
without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and
children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or
children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon
because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the
Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March
1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not
answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was
holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the child that she is holding is Clarita
Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad.According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the
church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked
if there was a party, she answered; Maybe there was. When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the
picture carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the
church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child was taken
during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man
with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried by
her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her
eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of
the child held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife,
witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff
if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad
who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad
because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that a few months
after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose names was Eugenia Rufo
Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home
only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 months
after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that
Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes
Trinidad died. According to her she was born in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke
out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese
occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure.She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their
private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be
buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of
Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that xxx she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this
case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that according to
Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15 days and died,
witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad
lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her house. According to the
said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of
Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because
she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good
physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that
according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That
during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also
present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage
contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births,
deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.

Respondent Courts Ruling

In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court
ruled:[14]
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son
of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the
record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad
never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that
Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor
of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there
was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was
born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested
parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova,
L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of
the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if possession be
counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than
ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines).

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:[15]


1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial Court
having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in
question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Courts Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof
that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents estate.[16] His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on
whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the
reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral


Attack on Filiation

At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a
rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the
appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the
evidence adduced in this case.[17]
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was
born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted
arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union,
and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.[19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification[20] from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of
births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of
relevant evidence may take its place.[21]
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was
present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who
testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay
captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers association, used to visit Inocentes and
Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. [22] On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by
Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners baptismal party held at the same
house.[23] Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. [24] It further gives rise to the
disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[25]Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad
were named as the childs father and mother.[26]
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by
an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[27]
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification[28] that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last
world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented
in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-
4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-
1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child (Exhibit B-2). These
pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove petitioners filiation to Inocentes,
they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding
Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child
before she was baptized.[29] When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the
couples children -- slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. [30]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed under
the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed
to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to
the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or
affinity,[32] her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree.Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to
establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents self-
serving negations. In sum, private respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941.
Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the
Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the
Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months,
and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive: [33]
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children before
1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited with
anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he has lived as
husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the defendants who
claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941,
her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick.Inocentes stayed with their grandmother,
Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to
Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to
Inocentes.[34]
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941. [35] TheJapanese forces occupied Manila only
on January 2, 1942;[36] thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming
around the area.[37]
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents --
a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child.[38]
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse
party.[39] Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that
petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of
evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal
credibility.[40] Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in
petitioners favor. It declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew
xxx before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he started demanding for the
partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx is shown
by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B.These family pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not
broached the idea of getting his fathers share. xxxx His demand for the partition of the share of his father
provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff
enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
defendants themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition xxx as he was
already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner
herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness,
Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she testified. Said
witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic
minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are
either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad,
being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.[41]
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted.[42] Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to
present evidence of his filiation and of his parents marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this
doctrine to petitioners cause.

Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in
possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired
ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
ownership.[43] Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long
as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner,
was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the
co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the
co-ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their
fathers name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with
petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-
ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held:[44]
x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated
the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55
[1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco
vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioners claim over the
land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial courts decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,


vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and
that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the
arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt,
she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally
and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have
the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section
4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed,
he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not
such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we
are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that
her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff
be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which
is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would
no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380
Petitioner,

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,


- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and

Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and

obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under

Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel

question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial

Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for

reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.

The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:


WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by
reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the

Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.

Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano

discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.


Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a

certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,

California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein

petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:


WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only

applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper

remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the OSG argues

there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial

determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized

alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law

pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for

declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must

be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the

controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where

one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while

respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal

interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent

remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?

Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the

legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as

the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise

signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so

amended, it now provides:


ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It

seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,

but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to

remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the

Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:


1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,

according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the

Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van

Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree

validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to

remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were

Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were,

as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and

obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his

naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were

Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The

Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the

solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of

a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the

legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.

A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its

spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant

case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their

citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has

been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid

divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both

present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a

petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this

particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.

On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the

legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce

decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it

and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an

American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it

must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law must

also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged

and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as

specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to

enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as

amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had

acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no

sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his

wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of

the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002,

and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET

ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, G.R. No. 155635
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARPIO MORALES,
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, TINGA,
Respondents. VELASCO, JR., and
x-------------------------------------------x BRION, JJ.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 163979
- versus -

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,


Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 7, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks
to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, [3] granting a
writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial courts grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit fordeclaration of absolute nullity of marriage with
application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City;
and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen [7] born in
Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo
Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage and leaving them to
remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year
later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the couples property relations pursuant to an
Agreement[10] they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the conjugal property which
they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed
with the Makati City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the motion to
withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment [15] stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of
Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-
094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to
Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss [17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the
allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss


and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
granting Rebeccas application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is


DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED.Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude
her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to
the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA


On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a
Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the
assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this
issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebeccas
petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil
Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently
assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. [27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the
union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicentes
capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce
decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not
shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality
status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage
(Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which
follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured
her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the
equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed
under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition,
all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders which
would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONERS FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION
IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS


ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of
the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married
to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the
time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce
secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22,
1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Courts Ruling


The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente,
was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following
are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3)
she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No.
RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars
are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953


Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3
of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B.
Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his
1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA


ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988


issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8,
2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly
issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October
11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for
this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1 st Indorsement by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January
22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the
DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to provide immigration
and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of
aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval
by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive
Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of
Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice.(Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days
after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much
to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply
that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002
mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen through the
1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a


Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it
is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
A) and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued
on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition
(To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument
that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her
marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the
Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by
reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia
Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS,
attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 th of February of 1996, signed before
the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe
all the acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through
their Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996,
and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca
was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. [39] Be this as
it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,[40] the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both
parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on
the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The
same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.[41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was
duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and
Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as
we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
countrys policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.[42]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x xleaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements.[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husbands obligation under
the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.[44]

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art.
26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December
14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couples
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7,
1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M.
Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second
divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce
by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision of said agreement.[47]

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises,
cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and
Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. [50] With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of
their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached
the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by
Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix
can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what
Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635,
that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability
of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by
the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness,
while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between
respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the ground that
the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.

Antecedents

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. 3

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, 4 citing Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but
prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. 5 After conducting
an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. 6

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him;
that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors
instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his
remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with
Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist.
Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality
Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. 9

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted
that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she
intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.11

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is
hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the parties from the
Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant
gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It
held that considering that the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to
experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity.13

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:


THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA
DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.

On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo
proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr.
Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital
obligations;" and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in
the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.

Issue

In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF


PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY
OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF


PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

III

ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.

IV

GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL


INCAPACITY.

THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO


ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION
OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.14

The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by
the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);15 and that Catalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to
take care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her marital
obligations.

The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not
grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to
the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code;
that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological incapacity; that
Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be
able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged
psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted
during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.

The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment that had required him to be
away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship and forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support
and company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear
children of her own.

Issue

The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to
Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling

We grant the petition for review.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must
refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. 16

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code
and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may
arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the
following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, 18 viz:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. x x x.19

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, 21making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 22

Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and severity of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage. 23

We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the
gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their
appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without
Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were
not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his
testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted
to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes
despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In particular, they
relied on the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of the
personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is
expected in a relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have
the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to as they might end up
doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They
do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own
lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be expected to
have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things
will not work out.

Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the background of the
developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such.

xxxx

With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being concluded
that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after
the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live
up and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife
and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be
expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will still change because her traits have developed through the years
and already ingrained within her.24

Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological
incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the report missed out on.
Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report
and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior
on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person
with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform
her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness
and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity."25

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to
make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 26 We have explained
this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating:

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by
separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on
what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis
for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.28

But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside
from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage.
For that reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the
conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital duties.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline
personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29

What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. 30 To rule that
such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.31

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz:

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due
to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home
to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code.
It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the
Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a
disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. 33 Needless to
state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on
his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to
convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, 34 to wit:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG

Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de
Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer attending and represented by
counsel, did you talk to your wife?

A No, sir.

Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case you
filed against her, is it not?

A No, sir. I did not.

Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case?

A None, sir.

Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell us,
what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?

A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.

Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?

A Yes, sir.

Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?

A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which you filed
against her?

A She does not opposed [sic], sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal properties?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not pursue
whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer around here?

A Yes sir, it could be.35


Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall,
she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she
nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that
Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her
unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to
stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of
any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of
the Family Code for lack of merit.

Costs to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
MARIETA C. AZCUETA, G.R. No. 180668
Petitioner,

Present:
versus
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CORONA,
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
Respondents. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
May 26, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,[1] and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007.[2]

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting,
they got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church,Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner
was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of
this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was collusion between the
parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the
parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines
and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the States behalf under the supervision
and control of the Solicitor General.

In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally
immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities
and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for
financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and
it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a
newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no
clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him
money. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However,
some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was
supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money he gave her (which
was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like
a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for a job. He
also told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother
and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically
violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory.They only had sex once a month and petitioner
never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be
enjoyed nor abused.He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when
petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did
not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993,
Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo
was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his
mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the room where the
couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mothers house in business attire. She
learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that respondent was
still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining
petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible, focused and
has direction and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based
on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to
ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to
make his own decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem
was a cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father
was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but
manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe
because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable
because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage

between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent
totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship
since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his
own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata
is hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.

The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.[3]

On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision [4] to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was
erroneously typewritten as Gerardo in the caption of the original Decision.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was

based solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was

no showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were

grave, permanent and incurable.

Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the

psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was grave

and incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:

The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility


and over-dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above
explained.

xxx xxx xxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed


psychological malady existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties
were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on their own in a
rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial support may be brought
about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers,
considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that
respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have
one. However this is not at all a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has
shown that he has a full grasp of reality and completely understands the implication of having a
child especially that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting the union is respondents
alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this
case to be psychological-rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional
immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of
Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356
SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in


the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13,
2007).

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B.
Azcueta remains VALID.[5] (emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to

sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the totality

of evidence presented by petitioner failed to prove her spouses psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the

Family Code and settled jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the

basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [6] Our family law is based on the policy

that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no

stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric

and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. [7]

Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina [8] stringent guidelines in

the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or


incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.[9](Emphasis supplied)

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. [11] It should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity

that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and

discharged by the parties to the marriage.[12] The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological

incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to

give meaning and significance to the marriage.[13]

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down

in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for

declaration of nullity under Article 36.[14] Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections

or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of

marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the

factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial

court.[15] With the advent of Te v. Te,[16] the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the

interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molinadoctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to

warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.

First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of

Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,[17] it was held that

there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or

psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What

matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon

which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-

examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. [18] Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was

corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to
elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the

psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the

credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to

observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. [19] Since the

trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of

psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witness. [20]

Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in

the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite

pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the family

abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations

and Rodolfos refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.

These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical

causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general and

psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the

psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:

Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest,
she is expected to be the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and
physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments
towards her father and promised herself that with the first opportunity, shell get out of the family. When
Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 months after they met, without really knowing anything about
him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that time and she did not exercise good
judgment in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to realize
that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection,
financial support and sex.

On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak,
and his two elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mothers
needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic, that
led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and
dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked up to his
complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically,
Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt
feelings of defying the mothers love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the
mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is
unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the
opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous
personal problems she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong
clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with
a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled
his psychological functioning related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It
existed prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and
demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and
therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe or grave in degree,
because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment. [21]
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which we

quote below:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?

A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very responsible,
focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she wanted, maam,
and therefore, I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage, maam.

Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards to
the respondent?

A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric
classification as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to
masculine strivings, maam.

Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by
Dependent Personality Disorder?

A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of life
are ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself
and inability to make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his
mother, maam.

Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo
Azcueta?

A: Very much, maam.

Q: Why?

A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband
and as a father, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?

A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the
dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family while the
father was a seaman and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself
has been very submissive and passive to the authority of the wife, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological
problem manifested?

A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life,
maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the
respondent in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethat the manifestation came
too late?

A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no
stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college
degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the
mother always would make the decision for him, maam.

Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?

A: Yes maam.

Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?


A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married
person, maam.

Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?

A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained into
his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?

A: It is permanent in nature, sir.

Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the
marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?

A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the
husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual
duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they had only according
to the wife, experienced once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that
because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt
feeling of the husband in defying the mothers love when they will be having heterosexual
relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish between the mother and
the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory according to expectation, maam. [22]

In Te v. Te, we held that [b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-

making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the

psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[23]

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we

reproduce here for emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent
totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship
since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make
his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before

the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first

few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility,

overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of

Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early

development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to

assume the essential obligations of marriage.


The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CAs

reasoning that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his embarrassment for

failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his responsible realization that he

should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support

these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court

or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by

evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be

attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was

nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal

behavior.

In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one

afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, to wit:

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has
no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. [24]

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an

exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their

symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided

by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a

marriage under Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of

the Family Code.[25] As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make

his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations

to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself,

much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that

spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years

was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.


At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances

when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people

in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only

developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional

gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material support

of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an autonomous social institution,

wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In the case at

bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect

and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to
a stillborn marriage.[26] (emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage pursuant to Article 36 of

the Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 isREINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, G.R. No. 185286
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
RAMON REYES,
Respondent. August 18, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.

In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind
adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution[1] and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social

institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on
the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners
for life.

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761[2] which
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.[3]

First, we unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject
when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and
bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. [4] Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each
other every day and drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their
age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974,
respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent got
married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by
respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent
gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year
into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed
his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that
he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading
seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new
business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply
endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change.

To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws.
However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet
as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business,
a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the
familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his
family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to
remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioners mother. But
the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to
carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was
in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent
arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills
were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to
support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another
business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not
succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent
talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner
soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly,
remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal
of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply
read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the
operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked her
mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of final attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached
respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even
respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent.

Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to determine benchmarks
of current psychological functioning. As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with
the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001,[5] petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent
maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to
their children.

After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties
null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent
RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel
Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth,
their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.

Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO
REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves
having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.

The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties.
Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the
parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21
of AM 02-11-10 SC.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC)
shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM
02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent,
affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to


the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division
of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and
Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.[7]

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY


INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE


PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE BINDING ON IT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF
THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE
ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH IS
UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER
THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT
COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.

VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY
AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.[8]

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the
ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.

In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained
from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.

and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and
Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.

Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely
to the Court on a case to case basis.

xxxx

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in
conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors
of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra.
Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the
marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed psychological incapacity
which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially
towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well
as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in
the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason
to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is
suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the
marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the
respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or
powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same
as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to
counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he
was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her
sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the
respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of
the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the
parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.

xxxx

The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It
also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be
observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of
marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the
personality disorder of the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic
duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his
belief that there is nothing wrong with them.

The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be
blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality
cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-
organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the
weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.

Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on
their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a
pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological
incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a
peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code
provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled
matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very
inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for
it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously
sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose
marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.[9]
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged
from the findings of the RTC in this wise:

On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the
nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated.
Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality
Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno
found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-
social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features.

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court
may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they
are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither
clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the
[respondent].

Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are
unscientific and unreliable as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.

xxxx

[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of
[respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that
[respondent] was referred to Dayan for psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning. The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information
gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help
the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions.

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to
give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and come and go attitude are true, the totality of the
evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

xxxx

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed
personality disorder, his come and go attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial
support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to
consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with
his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] defects were not present at the inception of marriage.
They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two
children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and
[respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the
situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and
thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been
gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the
[petitioner].

xxxx

As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report states
that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts
showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only
after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment
be rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04
December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.

xxxx

What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is
jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the State.

Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction
with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36
should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. x x x

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[10]

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the
marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

Santos v. Court of Appeals[11] solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability. We explained:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. [12]

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas


PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his
handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.

Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and
community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love
and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the
caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home
environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to
help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.

Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is
organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong
sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of
objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and
reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a
heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner]
remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would
make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to
compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms
(sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage
as very much lacking in relationship (sic).

On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic),
where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was
acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At
an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite
his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a push to keep him going. His being a
free spirit, attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being
bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no
guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too
much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual
resources (sic).

His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his
family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses
failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and
consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults,
his spitting at her face which impliedly meant you are nothing as compared to me were in reality, his
defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with
emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his
decision to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to
suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense
of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of
rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his
hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He
seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is
centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency
needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship
with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital
relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.

For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties
and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he
was unable to do so.

Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested
strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial
type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic
features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily
govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a free spirit associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged
drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or
the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed
attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy
specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority,
assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to
antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands
and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as
severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)[13]

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan


Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them,
respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in
life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish
anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times
when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home
doing nothing. They wish that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,]
his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned
from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he
always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993.
His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he
had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at
the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He
feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with
this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is
very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict
so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain.
He wants to make other people happy.

xxxx

Interpretation of Psychological Data

A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

xxxx

B. Vocational Preference

xxxx

C. Socio Emotional Functioning

xxxx

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-
esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is
different and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these
feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with
himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to
be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A
self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able
to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very
angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval,
which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over
[compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts.
Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and
anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of
hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged
and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has
many plans but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling
of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.

Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder


[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:


Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to
accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in
social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)[14]


3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he
suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that
renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. As
for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide
for the needs of her children. Her achievements in

this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human
situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains
why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do
something about her situation.

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)


Severity: 4 (severe)

xxxx
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his
antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings
were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent]
was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her
mothers favorite child, so she felt api, treated like poor relations. [Respondents] mothers reaction to her
perceived rejection was to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like
water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.

However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good
looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say
what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings
from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was
impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in
a marriage.

[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved
to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-
importance (e.g. he would just come and go, without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of
entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.);
interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and
lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think
about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically,
emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features
were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his
difficulty in doing things on his own.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features
and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children.
A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)[15]

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition,[16] necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of
one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case,
the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one
of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law
(sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the
period of time they knew him.[17] These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[18] citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV),[19] instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following
areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning


(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social
situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,


occupational or other important areas of functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of


another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since
age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal
profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior
or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another

B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or
a manic episode.[20]

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have
personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior,
self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy
are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled
Synopsis of Psychiatry,[21] treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of
personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy
does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.

Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. [22] As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in
the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:[23]

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and
they were asked to give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.

[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors
Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or
psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not
beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological
incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[25] we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found
in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[26] the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals[27] must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link
drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological
incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from
the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and
their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported
by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use
and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses
were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed
to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

xxxx

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview,
and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it
from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of
an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon
which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and
ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy,
running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that
patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it
seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress
observers as having good verbal intelligence.

x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to
any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that
is, they appear to lack a conscience.[28]

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon:

A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital

obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest
only after its celebration x x x. In fact,

what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initioon the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration
of the marriage x x x

At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to
conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding
that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional
area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged
condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a good, sincere,
and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that
[petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship. With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.[29]

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:[30]

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his
marriage to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,


vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and
breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the
guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his
petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet,
not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to
that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had
taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she
admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments
of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned
a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent
and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School
for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she
reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to
her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him
to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the
one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency
of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of
the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the
RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s
1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court
has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court
definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a
set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a
decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for
nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground
for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds
for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the
Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological
incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under
Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the
same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital
obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were
answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to
a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36,
with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court
that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by
avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was
not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a
unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need
though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon
law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as
one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still
existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in
the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the
Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought
on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of
course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial
of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity
under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein
operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings
before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his
own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest
with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the
cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of
the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged
that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that
[are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on
assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards
the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is
going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories,
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him
on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what
can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That
is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out
in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and]
she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede
and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of
petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert
witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in
its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for
telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has
this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when
the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave
in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner
into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and
the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had
amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is
impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to
draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of
the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question
in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90Such decree of
nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence
of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment
faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious
impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage
option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was
impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however
to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway
since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial
court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr.
Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem,
at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been
easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent
on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995.
These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not
expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of
the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the
Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s
decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of
the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the
expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molinaor Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses
would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability,
since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by
the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability
of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled
by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in
the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited
by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s
avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL
& PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis

DECISION

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law. Scnc m

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true
and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." [10] Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article
76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. [17] The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to
his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law
sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
after his death?

Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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