2011 DEL CASTILLO cases

2011; January
1. G.R. No. 181298 : January 10, 2011 BELLE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
FACTS: Belle Corporation files its ITR for the year 1997. In view of the overpayment, no taxes
were paid for the second and third quarter for the same year. Petitioners taxable ending year
December 31, 997 reflected an overpayment of income taxes, but instead of claiming tax refund,
he decided to apply it as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. In 2000, ITR showed again an
overpayment of its income tax, he then filed with BIR for tax refund of its unutilized excess
income tax payments for the taxable year 1997.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to carry over its excess income tax payment for
the year 1997 to the year beyond next preceding which is 1999.
HELD: No.
RATIO: TAXATION LAW: Section 69 of the NIRC allows unutilized tax credits to be refunded
as long as the claim is filed within the prescriptive period. This, however, no longer holds true
under Section 76 of the NIRC as the option to carry-over excess income tax payments to the
succeeding taxable year is now irrevocable.
In the case at bar, since petitioner already carried over its 1997 excess income tax payments to
the succeeding taxable year 1998, it may no longer file a claim for refund of unutilized tax
credits for taxable year 997. Thus, applications for refund of the unutilized excess income tax
payments may no longer be allowed. KinPearlyFlores

2. G.R. No. 168646 : January 12, 2011 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner, v.
ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 168666 : January 12, 2011
DELTA DEVELOPMENT and MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v.
ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ and LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK,
Respondents.
FACTS: Delta entered into a loan with Luzon (Bank), secured by a Real Estate Mortgage. It
subsequently entered into a contract to sell with Enriquez over one of the subdivision lots. Delta
was unable to pay for the loan it took with the bank, but instead of letting the bank foreclose on
the mortgaged properties, it entered into a dacion en pago where it turned over property to the
bank. Enriquez protested the transaction and asking for a refund of the purchase price pointing
out that, the agreed upon amount exceeded the limit prescribed by PD 957, or The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyer Protective Decree, and that the mortgage Delta entered into was invalid
per PD 957.
ISSUE: Whether the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA has no more
obligations to the BANK.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: CIVIL LAW: DACION EN PAGO;The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the
extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless
the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.
The mortgage entered into by Delta and the Bank is void for violation of PD 957. However, this
does not, in any way, invalidate the dacion en pago. Delta cannot be held liable should Enriquez
gain ownership over the land. The effect of the dacion is that the Bank becomes a party in the
contract to sell with Enriquez, replacing Delta. Enriquez now owes the Bank the balance of the
purchase price of the property. It is the intention of the dacion to extinguish the obligation of
Delta in exchange for properties. There are no other conditions. KinPearlyFlores

3. G.R. No. 172378: January 17, 2011 SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC., (Formerly INTEL
PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC.), Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Silicon Philippines filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue through the
One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance, an
application for credit/refund of unutilized input VAT for the period October 1, 1998 to December 31,
1998 in the amount of P31,902,507.50. Due to the inaction of the respondent, petitioner filed a Petition
for Review with the CTA Division, denied the same because petitioner failed to present an Authority to
Print (ATP) from the BIR, neither did it print on its export sales invoices the ATP and the word zero-
rated.
ISSUE: Whether Silicon entitled to claim from refund of Input VAT attributable to its zero-rated
sales.
HELD: No.
RATIO: TAXATION LAW;
Printing the ATP on the invoices or receipts is not required.:In a case, the SC ruled that ATP
need not be reflected or indicated in the invoices or receipts because there is no law or regulation
requiring it. Thus, failure to print the ATP on the invoices or receipts should not result in the
outright denial of a claim or the invalidation of the invoices or receipts for purposes of claiming
a refund.
Failure to print the word “zero-rated” on the sales invoices is fatal to a claim for refund of
input VAT.In compliance with Sec. 4.108-1 of RR 7-95, requiring the printing of the word
“zero-rated” on the invoice covering zero-rate sales is essential as this regulation proceeds from
the rulemaking authority of the Secretary of Finance under Sec. 244 of the NIRC. In this case,
Silicon failed to present its ATP and to print the word “zero-rated” on its export sales invoices.
Thus, the claim for credit/refund of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales must be denied.
KinPearlyFlores
4.G.R. No. 165423: January 19, 2011 NILO PADRE, Petitioner, v. FRUCTOSA BADILLO,
FEDILA BADILLO, PRESENTACION CABALLES, EDWINA VICARIO (d) represented by
MARY JOY VICARIO-ORBETA and NELSON BADILLO, Respondents.
FACTS:
5.G.R. No. 168757: January 19, 2011 RENATO REAL, Petitioner, v. SANGU
PHILIPPINES, INC. and/ or KIICHI ABE, Respondents.
FACTS: Renato Real was the Manager of respondent corporation Sangu Philippines. Heclaimed
to have been illegaly dismissed through Board Resolution 2001-03adopted by
respondentcorporation’s Board of Directors removing him from his position as manager.
Petitioner complained that he was neither notified of the Board Meeting during which said board
resolution was passed nor formally charged with any infraction. He just received from
respondents a letterdated March 26, 2001 stating that he has been terminated from service
effective March 25, 2001 for the following reasons: (1) continuous absences at his post at Ogino
Philippines Inc. for several months which was detrimental to the corporation’s operation; (2) loss
of trust and confidence; and, (3) to cut down operational expenses to reduce further losses being
experienced by respondent corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal constitutes an intra-corporate
controversy and thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: No.
RATIO: MERCANTILE LAW: INTRA CORPORATE CONTROVERSY;In intra-corporate
controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no
distinction, qualification nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all
kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations. However, the better policy in
determining whether a dispute is intra-corporate or not is to consider concurrent factors such as
the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is subject of their
controversy.
There is no merit in respondents’ contention that the fact alone that petitioner is a stockholder
and director of respondent corporation automatically classifies this case as an intra-corporate
controversy. To reiterate, not all conflicts between the stockholders and the corporation are
classified as intra-corporate. There are other factors to consider in determining whether the
dispute involves corporate matters as to consider them as intra-corporate controversies.
KinPearlyFlores
7. [G.R. No. 169942 : January 24, 2011] BARANGAY DASMARIÑAS THRU
BARANGAY CAPTAIN MA. ENCARNACION R. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v.CREATIVE
PLAY CORNER SCHOOL, DR. AMADO J. PIAMONTE, REGINA PIAMONTE
TAMBUNTING, CELINE CONCEPCION LEBRON AND CECILE CUNA
COLINA, Respondents.
FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolution2 dated July 21, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89723 denying petitioner’s Second Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and consequently dismissing the Petition for
Review for having been filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. Likewise assailed
is the Resolution3 dated September 29, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
ISSUE: Whether The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the Petition For
Review on a mere technicality, without considering the substantive grounds on which the
Petition For Review was based.
HELD: No
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
It is clear that the CA, after it has already allowed petitioner an extension of 15 days within
which to file a petition for review, may only grant a further extension when presented with the
most compelling reason but same is limited only to a period of 15 days. Thus, when the CA
denied petitioner’s Second Motion for Extension of five days, it was merely following the
abovementioned provision of the rules after it found the reason for the second extension as not
compelling. Likewise, the filing of the petition and payment of the corresponding docket fees
prior to petitioner’s receipt of the CA’s resolution denying its Second Motion for Extension does
not, contrary to petitioner’s position, render such belated filing moot. If such would be the case,
the delay in the delivery of court resolutions caused by the limitations of postal service would
serve as a convenient cover up for a pleading or a motion’s belated filing. This would be contrary
to the aim of procedural rules which is to secure an effective and expeditious administration of
justice. KinPearlyFlores
8. [G.R. No. 168501 : January 31, 2011] ISLRIZ TRADING/ VICTOR HUGO LU,
PETITIONER, VS. EFREN CAPADA, LAURO LICUP, NORBERTO NIGOS, RONNIE
ABEL, GODOFREDO MAGNAYE, ARNEL SIBERRE, EDMUNDO CAPADA,
NOMERLITO MAGNAYE AND ALBERTO DELA VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup, Norberto Nigos and Godofredo Magnaye
were drivers while respondents Ronnie Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo Capada, Nomerlito
Magnaye and Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand business
owned and operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed,
respondents filed a Complaint3 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday
pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner on August 9, 2000 before the
Labor Arbiter. On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents.
ISSUE: Whether respondents may collect their wages during the period between the Labor
Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the
Labor Arbiter.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: LABOR LAW: LABOR RELATION;The decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the
Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and
pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever
salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the
period.
It has thus been advanced that there is no point in releasing the wages to petitioners since their
dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust enrichment.
KinPearlyFlores
2011; February
9. [G.R. No. 168240, February 09 : 2011] AURORA B. GO, PETITIONER, VS. ELMER
SUNBANUN,⃰ GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN AND RICHARD SUNBANUN,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang, and
Yiu-Go Employment Agency for breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the
respondents made involving the property rented by petitioner. The RTC rendered judgment
finding only Aurora liable. For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioner. The CA dismissed the
petition for being procedurally flawed, viz: the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping is signed by only one petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s
Certificate authorizing her to represent the two (2) other petitioners;
ISSUE: Whether the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA be relaxed in the interest
of justice?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW;Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004
Decision and copies of the Complaint and Answer is not fatal. Not all pleadings and parts of case
records are required to be attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that they may
provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.

The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary. The signatures may be dispensed with as
these parties are not involved in the petition. Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt
Numbers are not fatal. The failure of petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the
petition before the CA his PTR and IBP numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an
oversight. KinPearlyFlores

10. [G.R. No. 172203, February 14 : 2011] DIONISIO LOPEZ Y ABERASTURI,

PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SALVADOR G.
ESCALANTE, JR., RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner was indicted for libel for deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing
extraordinary attention from the residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be
placed before the word "NEVER". Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname
of the herein private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the
word "NEVER" thus making the billboard appear as follows "CADIZ FOREVER" "BADING
AND SAGAY NEVER" For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously
calculated to induce the readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was
going on, therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador
G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name,
character and reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said
billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of persons.
ISSUE: 1) whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
is libelous; and 2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: POLITICAL LAW: BILL OF RIGHTS;Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place
in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free expression however, "is not absolute for it may be
so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society."[1] Libel stands as an
exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right. KinPearlyFlores

11. [G.R. No. 171328, February 16 : 2011] LYZAH SY FRANCO, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NO. 171335 ] STEVE
BESARIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they
made to said Ma. Lourdes G. Antonio, to the effect that they are employees of FINAL ACCESS
MARKETING, a business entity engaged in the sale and financing of used or repossessed cars,
and as such could process and facilitate the sale of a Mazda car 323 bearing plate number PVB-
999 worth P130,000.00 provided they be given the amount of P80,000.00 as down payment and
by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the said Ma.
Lourdes G. Antonio to give and deliver as in fact she gave and delivered to herein accused the
said amount of P80,000.00, and accused knowing fully well that their manifestations and
representations were false and untrue and were made only to obtain the said amount of
P80,000.00 which amount once in their possession, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the said amount of P80,000.00 to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said MA. LOURDES G. ANTONIO in
the aforesaid amount of P80,000.00 in its equivalent amount to the Philippine Currency.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is liable with estafa
HELD:Yes
RATIO: CRIMINAL LAW:ESTAFA The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing
provision are: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or
property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
This was a clear misrepresentation considering their previous knowledge not only of Erlindas
complaint but also of several others as regards the failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver
the motor vehicles bought. Lourdes relied on their misrepresentations and parted with her
money. If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be, Erlindas complaint to petitioners and
the 12 other similar complaints with Hoy Gising regarding undelivered vehicles should have
dissuaded petitioners from further soliciting customers. As an employee of Final Access
Marketing, Franco was expected to be familiar with its daily activities. It would be unworthy of
belief that she did not know of the complaints for the unexplained failure of Final Access
Marketing to deliver vehicles to its customers. Human nature and experience would compel her
to make queries on her own to discover the reasons for the non-delivery of the vehicles. Her
continued insistence in soliciting Lourdes as a client by introducing herself as an Assistant
Administrative Coordinator of Final Access Marketing with the ability to provide financing for a
vehicle of her choice is therefore indicative of fraudulent misrepresentation. KinPearlyFlores

12. [G.R. No. 166109, February 23 : 2011] EXODUS INTERNATIONAL

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND ANTONIO P. JAVALERA, PETITIONERS,
VS. GUILLERMO BISCOCHO, FERNANDO PEREDA, FERDINAND MARIANO,
GREGORIO BELLITA AND MIGUEL BOBILLO, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Exodus obtained from Dutch Boy Philippines, Inc. (Dutch Boy) a contract for the
painting of the Imperial Sky Garden located at Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila. On July 28,
1999, Dutch Boy awarded another contract to Exodus for the painting of Pacific Plaza Towers in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In the furtherance of its business, Exodus hired respondents as painters.
Guillermo, Fernando, Ferdinand, and Miguel filed a complaint] for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and night-shift differential pay. Petitioners
denied respondents allegations since they did not reported to work.
ISSUE: Whether respondents illegally dismissed
HELD: NO
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from
their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and
convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no
application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.
Hence, as between respondents general allegation of having been orally dismissed from the
service vis-a-vis those of petitioners which were found to be substantiated by the sworn
statement of foreman Wenifredo, we are persuaded by the latter. Absent any showing of an overt
or positive act proving that petitioners had dismissed respondents, the latters claim of illegal
dismissal cannot be sustained. Indeed, a cursory examination of the records reveal no illegal
dismissal to speak of. Clearly therefore, there was no dismissal, much less illegal, and there was
also no abandonment of job to speak of. The Labor Arbiter is therefore correct in ordering that
respondents be reinstated but without any backwages. KinPearlylFores

13. [G.R. No. 169754, February 23 : 2011] LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS

LIMITED, PETITIONER, VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA (KML-
INDEPENDENT), RESPONDENT.
FACTS: KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a
Petition for Certification Election. LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is
not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and
supervisory employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. KML argued that even if
41 of its members are indeed supervisory employees and therefore excluded from its
membership, the certification election could still proceed because the required number of the
total rank and file employees necessary for certification purposes is still sustained.
LEGEND filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals , which found no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE. LEGEND filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. held that the issue on the legitimacy of KML as a labor
organization has already been settled with finality in Case No. RO300-0108-CP-001. The March
26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations upholding the legitimacy of KML as a labor
organization had long become final and executory for failure of LEGEND to appeal the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
RATIO: LABOR LAW: Certification election. Records show that (in the cancellation of
registration case) LEGEND has timely filed on September 6, 2002 a petition forcertiorari before
the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72659 assailing the March 26,
2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
However, a certification election may still be conducted during the pendency of the
cancellation proceedings. This is because at the time the petition for certification was filed, the
petitioning union is presumed to possess the legal personality to file the same. There is therefore
no basis for LEGEND’s assertion that the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration
should retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively nullified all of KML’s activities,
including its filing of the petition for certification election and its demand to collectively bargain.
Also, the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition
for certification election proceeding. KinPearlyFlores
2011; March
14. [G.R. No. 181298, March 02 : 2011] BELLE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
(RESOLUTION)
FACTS: For Resolution is the Motion for Clarification[1] filed by petitioner Belle Corporation.
In the Motion, petitioner prays that our Decision dated January 10, 2011 be modified or clarified
to indicate petitioner's entitlement to a tax credit of unutilized excess income tax payments for
the taxable year 1997.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to refund overpayment of income tax.
HELD: No.
RATIO: TAXATION LAW;In our Decision, we denied petitioner's claim for refund because it
has earlier opted to carry over its 1997 excess income tax payments by marking the tax credit
option box in its 1997 income tax return. We must clarify, however, that while petitioner may no
longer file a claim for refund, it properly carried over its 1997 excess income tax payments by
applying portions thereof to its 1998 and 1999 Minimum Corporate Income Tax in the amounts
of P25,596,210.00 and P14,185,874.00, respectively. Pursuant to our ruling, petitioner may apply
the unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years until
fully utilized. Thus, as of the taxable year 1999, petitioner still has an unutilized excess income
tax payments of P92,261,444.00 which may be carried over to the succeeding taxable years until
fully utilized.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby clarified that although petitioner may no
longer file a claim for refund, it may, however, apply the excess income tax payments for the
taxable year 1997 as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized.
KinPearlyFlores
15. [G.R. No. 167751, March 02 : 2011]
HARPOON MARINE SERVICES, INC. AND JOSE LIDO T. ROSIT, PETITIONERS,
VS. FERNAN H. FRANCISCO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Petitioner Harpoon, a company engaged in ship building and ship repair, with
petitioner Rosit as its President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Respondent averred that he
was unceremoniously dismissed by petitioner Rosit. He was informed that the company could no
longer afford his salary and that he would be paid his separation pay and accrued commissions.
Hence, on October 24, 2001, respondent filed an illegal dismissal complaint praying for the
payment of his backwages, separation pay, unpaid commissions, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally dismissed
HELD: No
RATIO: LABOR LAW;EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; Jurisprudence provides
for two essential requirements for abandonment of work to exist. The "failure to report for work
or absence without valid or justifiable reason" and "clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship x x x manifested by some overt acts" should both concur.[31] Further, the
employee's deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of
returning should be established and proven by the employer,
Petitioners failed to prove that it was respondent who voluntarily refused to report back for work
by his defiance and refusal to accept the memoranda and the notices of absences sent to him.
KinPearlyFlores

16.[G.R. No. 181371, March 02 : 2011] CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION,

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Petitioner is a duly registered corporation engaged in the retail of medicines and other
pharmaceutical products. It operates 22 drugstores located in Central Luzon under the business
name and style of "Mercury Drug." petitioner filed with respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) a request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of P32,170,409,
representing the 20% sales discounts allegedly granted to senior citizens for the year 2002.On
April 14, 2005, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a Petition for Review[5]
which was denied due to insufficiency of evidence.
For Resolution is the Motion to Withdraw filed by petitioner Central Luzon Drug Corporation,
praying for the dismissal of the instant case without prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether the Motion be granted
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW;Section 1, Rule 13 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court[24]
provides that "[a] case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum that the Court or its Rules require."
In the instant case, records show that on August 19, 2009,[25] we resolved to require petitioner
to file a reply. Instead of complying, petitioner opted to file a motion to withdraw. Clearly, by
requiring petitioner to file its Reply, the Court has not yet deemed the case submitted for
decision or resolution. Thus, we resolve to grant petitioner's Motion to Withdraw. To reiterate,
"an appellant who withdraws his appeal x x x must face the consequence of his withdrawal,
such as the decision of the court a quo becoming final and executory. KinPearlyFlores

17. [G.R. No. 170071, March 09 : 2011] HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA
NAMELY: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA AND JOMAR B. OCHOA,
PETITIONERS, VS.G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. [G.R. No.
170125]G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF JOSE
MARCIAL K. OCHOA NAMELY: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA AND
JOMAR B. OCHOA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: There existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as the owner and operator of the
Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle G & S is bound to carry Jose
Marcial safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. However, Jose Marcial was not
able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course of the travel. Heirs filed demand
for damages against G&S before the RTC. G&s contended that they should not be liable because
of fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence of the driver of the delivery van that hit the
taxicab.
ISSUE: Whether or not G&S is liable; Whether Taxicab is liable
HELD: Yes
RATIO: CIVIL LAW; TORTS;In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier
is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for
the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.
This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence.
Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this presumption. Both the trial court and
the CA found that the accident which led to Jose Marcial’s death was due to the reckless driving
and gross negligence of G & S’ driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose
Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.
HELD: No
RATIO: CIVIL LAW; When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from
breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil
action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same
incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no
bearing in the resolution of the present case. KinPearlyFlores
18. [G.R. No. 168523, March 09 : 2011] SPOUSES FERNANDO AND ANGELINA
EDRALIN, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses Edralin a loan in the amount of P270,000.00.
The Edralins failed to pay their obligation to Veterans Bank. Upon the Edralins failure to
redeem, Veterans Bank caused the consolidation of ownership of the subject property in its
name. Edralins failed to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to Veterans
Bank. Veterans Bank filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession. The trial
court found no merit in the Veterans Banks application.It explained that, under paragraph (d) of
the REM, the Veterans Bank agreed to take possession of the Edralins property without any
judicial intervention.The court held that granting the writ of possession to the Veterans Bank will
violate the contractual agreement of the parties. Upon denial of a motion for reconsideration,
Veterans Bank to file a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction before the CA, which was granted, thus this petition for review by the
Edralins.
ISSUE: Whether mandamus the proper remedy; Whether Veterans Bank entitled to a writ of
possession?
HELD: Yes;
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW; MADAMUS First issue: According to Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118, during the period of redemption, the mortgagee is entitled to a writ
of possession upon depositing the approved bond.When the redemption period expires without
the mortgagor exercising his right of redemption, the mortgagor is deemed to have lost all
interest over the foreclosed property, and the purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the
property. With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a writ of possession and
the trial court has the ministerial duty to issue such writ of possession. Thus, the remedy of
mandamus lies to compel the performance of this ministerial duty.
CIVIL LAW;Second issue: The elements of pactum commissorium, which enable the
mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged propertywithout the need of any foreclosure
proceedings, are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of
the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the
creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the
stipulated period. The second element is missing here. That Veterans Bank went through all the
stages of extrajudicial foreclosure indicates that there was no pactum commissorium.
KinPearlyFlores
19. [G.R. No. 191388, March 09 : 2011] ASIA UNITED BANK, CHRISTINE T. CHAN,
AND FLORANTE C. DEL MUNDO, PETITIONERS, VS. GOODLAND COMPANY,
INC., RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Respondent (Goodland) executed a (REM) over two parcels of land in favor of
petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured the obligation amounting to ₱250
million of Radiomarine Network, Inc. RMNI. Goodland then filed a for the annulment of the
REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties’ verbal
agreement. While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its
obligation to AUB, prompting the latter to exercise its right under the REM to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage. Goodland filed another complaint against AUB and its officers, herein
petitioners to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of AUB.
Petitioners then filed a Motion to Dismiss, they argued that the two cases both rely on the alleged
falsification of the real estate mortgage as basis for the reliefs sought.
ISSUE: Whether the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum
shopping.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW;NON FORUM SHOPPING; There is forum shopping "when a
party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court." Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing
forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed
for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.
KinPearlyFlores
20. [A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2787-RTJ), March 09 :
2011] LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE VENANCIO J. AMILA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, TAGBILARAN CITY, RESPONDENT
FACTS: Complainant alleges the respondent judge’s conduct smacks of impropriety and
partiality. She further charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion, gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for
issuing the questioned Orders of October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007. The complainant
further observed that the respondent judge revoked his Order of October 2, 2007, without any
motion being filed by any of the parties. Moreover, the Order of October 18, 2007 was based on
an inexistent ground as the respondent judge mentioned in this Order a petition for certiorari
supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet been filed with the Court of Appeals.The respondent
judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her "insatiable greed to have exclusive
control and possession pending trial of the case of all the properties of the Underworld Divers
Panglao, Inc. of respondent Paul John Belot." He added that the "complainant . . . is only a live-
in partner of respondent with no specific address who was branded repeatedly by Belot as a
‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: LEGAL ETHICS; It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or
witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times
be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.
respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to complainant. The former
in effect maliciously besmirched the character of complainant by calling her as "only a live-in
partner of Belot" and presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate
relationship. The judge also called her a prostitute. The judge's accusations that complainant
was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with the contested property are unfair and
unwarranted. His depiction of complainant is also inconsistent with the Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) he issued in her favor as a victim of domestic violence. Verily, we hold that Judge
Amila should be more circumspect in his language. KinPearlyFlores

21. [G.R. No. 169717, March 16 : 2011] SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER

CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO
- UNION PRESIDENT, PETITIONER,VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-
file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the
Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. Respondent company opposed on the ground that
petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of failure to comply with the
documentation requirements set by law the charter certificate was not executed under oath, and
the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union. Petitioner union claims that the
litigation of the issue as to its legal personality to file the subject petition for certification election
is barred by the Decision of the DOLE. In this decision, the DOLE ruled that petitioner union
complied with all the documentation requirements and that there was no independent evidence
presented to prove an illegal mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in petitioner
union.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner union has legal personality to file for a petition for
certification election.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: LABOR LAW; The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a
labor organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for proper registration.
The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization.
Petitioner unions charter certificate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly
acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter
certificate,(2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office,and (3) its
constitution and by-laws the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the
proper union officials as borne out by the records. Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal
personality cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings.
KinPearlyFlores
22. [G.R. No. 174504, March 21 : 2011] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND MANUEL G. BARCENAS,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Respondents were charged for having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(anti- graft and corrupt practices act) before the Sandiganbayan. Accused being enter into
contracts/transactions for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark Spur Road and the Clark
Perimeter Road, without the benefit of public bidding and at the price higher by 60 to 167% than
the typical roadway construction cost, thus, depriving the government of the opportunity of
obtaining the most advantageous construction cost. During the trial, the prosecution presented its
lone witness, Atty. Pagunuran, legal counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently,
instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents filed their respective motions for leave to
file their demurrer to evidence and alleged that the witness had no personal knowledge of the
transaction and thus it’s a hearsay and that the prosecution failed to prove that there was an
overpricing. The demurrer to evidence was however denied. The respondents then filed a MR
and was granted and the case was dismissed. The SB based its ruling on the ground that that
there being want of substantial evidence to support an administrative charge, there could be no
sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that there is probable cause for a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.
HELD: YES
RATIO: REMEDIAL LAW; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; An order of dismissal arising from
the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless the order was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.10 Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11 For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.12 The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence
on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from
private respondent’s non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as
admitted by the prosecution’s witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit
belatedly. KinPearlyFlores

23. [G.R. No. 169260, March 23 : 2011] SANDEN AIRCON PHILIPPINES AND
ANTONIO ANG, PETITIONERS, VS. LORESSA P. ROSALES, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Sanden employed Loressa as Management Information System (MIS) Department
Secretary. She was promoted as Data Custodian and Coordinator. As such, Loressa had access to
all computer programs and marketing computer data, including the Delivery Receipt Transaction
files of Sanden. Sanden discovered that the marketing delivery receipt transactions computer
files were missing. Hence, a technical investigation was conducted. On the basis of the
investigation, Atty. Reynaldo B. sent a letter to Loressa charging her with data sabotage and
absences without leave (AWOL). Loressa denied the allegations. Loressa received a Notice of
Disciplinary Action from Sanden notifying Loressa that management is terminating Loressas
employment effective upon receipt of the said communication. The reason cited by Sanden was
the loss of trust on her capability to continue as its Coordinator and Data Custodian. For this
reason, Loressa filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether Loressa was illegally dismissed.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: "A breach is willful if it is done intentionally and knowingly without any justifiable
excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly or inadvertently." As firmly
entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for termination of
employment is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater
trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly
expected.
As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, nowhere in the records can be found evidence that
directly point to complainant as having committed acts of sabotage. Also, during the
administrative investigation, the guilt of complainant-appellee was based on mere allegations not
supported by documentary evidence nor any factual basis. Even appellants cannot directly
pinpoint appellee as the culprit. They were only thinking of her as the one probably responsible
thereto, considering that when she used the computer, she told the other users to log out and
thereafter, used the computer for 16 minutes, with only 1 minute as usage time. But these
allegations would not suffice termination of employment of appellee. Note that security of tenure
is protected by constitutional mandate. On the other hand, Loressa was able to provide
documentary evidence to show that Sandens computer system was experiencing some problems
even before May 16, 1997. The entries as reported by the System Administrator clearly show
that the problem of missing data already existed as early as 1995, when Loressa was still an MIS
Secretary and was not yet tasked to back up the Marketing Delivery Receipt Transaction files.
KinPearlyFlores
24. [G.R. No. 172678, March 23 : 2011] SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: In response to fishermen’s report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac, Palawan,
a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials conducted search
and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion anchored three nautical miles
northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five boats and a long fishing net already spread over
the water. The team boarded the vessel and apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew
composed of three Filipinos and three Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard
F/V Sea Lion.Various charges were thereafter filed. Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should
be released to it because it is the registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew
members were not among those accused of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and
19422. Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to claim ownership of the F/V Sea Lion.
HELD: No.
RATIO: When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party not liable
to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership over the same.
Petitioner's claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion is not supported by any proof on record. The
only document on record that is relevant in this regard is a request for the release of the F/V Sea
Lion based on petitioner's alleged ownership filed with the Provincial Prosecutor. While the
latter authorized the release of said fishing vessel, this was conditioned upon petitioner's
submission of a proof of ownership and the filing of a bond, with which petitioner failed to
comply. Even when judicial proceedings commenced, nothing was heard from the petitioner. No
motion for intervention or any manifestation came from petitioner's end during the period of
arraignment up to the rendition of sentence. While petitioner later explained before the CA that
its inaction was brought about by its inability to put up the required bond due to financial
difficulties, same is still not a sufficient justification for it to deliberately not act at all.
KinPearlyFlores

25. [G.R. No. 167518, March 23 : 2011] BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
PETITIONER, VS. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA, JR., RESPONDENT.

TOPICS:
Judgments|Res Judicata|Court of Appeals|Principle of Immutability of Final
Judgments|Exceptions|Conflicting Decisions of Court of Appeals Divisions

FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the of the National Labor Relations Commission, holding the dismissal
of respondent Pio Roque S. Coquia, Jr. (respondent Coquia) as illegal and ordering petitioner
Bank of the Philippine Islands (petitioner BPI) to pay him separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.I

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Pio Coquia Jr. is illegal

HELD:
Yes

RATIO:
The petition is GRANTED. The December 14, 2004 Decision and March 16, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230 which affirmed the December 17, 2003
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission finding the dismissal of respondent Pio
Roque S. Coquia, Jr. as illegal and ordering petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay the
former separation pay are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in view of the March 4, 2009 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883.

1. Judgments; Res Judicata; Bar by Prior Judgments; Requisites; In its concept as a bar by prior
judgment under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata dictates that a
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction operates as an absolute bar
to a subsequent action involving the same cause of action since that judgment is conclusive not
only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which
might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.

2. Court of Appeals; Principle of Immutability of Final Judgments; Exceptions; Conflicting

Decisions of Court of Appeals Divisions; As the Decision of the Special Sixteenth Division of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230 completely varies with the final and executory Decision of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883 upholding the legality of an employee’s dismissal, the former has to be
set aside to conform to what has already been finally adjudicated between the parties.
KimJonaP.Castillo

26. [G.R.No. 170195, March 28 : 2011] SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. TERESA G. FAVILA, RESPONDENT.
TOPICS:
Evidence

FACTS:
Respondent Teresita Favila filed a claim with the SSS for pension benefits, averred she was
married to Florante Favila who designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he
submitted before petitioner Social Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30,
1970.When they begot their children her husband likewise designated each one of them as
beneficiaries. Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS were given
to their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age
21.Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florantes pension
benefits.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita is a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as
to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante?

HELD:
No

RATIO:
Teresita and Florante had already been separated for about 17 years prior to the latters death as
Florante was in fact, living with his common law wife when he died.Whoever claims entitlement
to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.
Hence, for Teresas failure to show that despite their separation she was dependent upon Florante
for support at the time of his death, Teresa cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.Hence, she is
not entitled to the death benefits accruing on account of Florantes death.

1. Social Security System; Death Compensation Benefits; For a spouse to qualify as a primary
beneficiary, he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent, that is, one who is
dependent upon the member for support.-
—For a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not
only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e), that is, one
who is dependent upon the member for support. Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of RA 1161
are very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.
2. Evidence; The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof.-
—“The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.” Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.” Remarkably, the
Memorandum itself stated that there is not enough proof to establish Teresa’s alleged
relationship with another man since they did not live as husband and wife.
3. Statutory Construction; If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.-
—Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animo sermo est (speech is the
index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”
KimJonaP.Castillo
27. [G.R. No. 169575, March 30 : 2011] IMELDA PANTOLLANO (FOR HERSELF AS
SURVIVING SPOUSE AND IN BEHALF OF HER 4 CHILDREN HONEYVETTE, TIERRA
BRYN, KIENNE DIONNES, SHERRA VEDA MAE, THEN ALL MINORS, WITH
DECEASED SEAMAN VEDASTO PANTOLLANO), PETITIONER, VS. KORPHIL
SHIPMANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
TOPICS:
Labor Law|Prescription

FACTS:
Korphil Shipmanagement and Manning Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
recruitment of seafarers for its foreign principals, hired Vedasto C. Pantollano as 4th Engineer on
board the vessel M/V Couper under a Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
approved contractof employment.

Vedasto did not show up for his duty. The Master of the vessel thus ordered all personnel on
standby. The vessel then altered its course to search for Vedasto, but Vedasto was not found. A
Report was issued by the Master of M/V Couper declaring that Vedasto was missing. Since then,
Vedasto was never seen again.

Imelda, wife of Vedasto, filed a complaint before the NLRC where she sought to recover death
benefits, damages and attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Vedasto are entitled to the benefits

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
The instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 78759 dated May 30, 2005, is SET ASIDE and the May 30, 2003 Resolution
of the NLRC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
1. Labor Law; Seafarers; Death Compensation Benefits; The death of a seaman during the term
of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits.-
—In Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda, 630 SCRA 472 (2010), we declared that “in order
to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the
employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer
liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died
during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.”

2. Labor Law; Prescription; After four years, the prescriptive period for filing money claims
under Article 291 of the Labor Code would lapse.-
—If we allow such an argument, then no claim for death compensation benefits under this
circumstance will ever prosper. This is so because the heirs of a missing seaman have to wait for
four years as provided under Article 391 of the Civil Code before the seaman is declared as
legally dead. After four years, the prescriptive period for filing money claims under Article 291
of the Labor Code would, obviously, lapse. This scenario could not have been the intention of the
legislature in enacting a social legislation, such as the Labor Code.

3. Estoppel; Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered

conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.-
—Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. A
party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party
who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act,
or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be
permitted to falsify it. KimJonaP.Castillo

28. [G. R. No. 169766, March 30 : 2011] ESTRELLITA JULIAJVO-LLAVE, PETITIONER,

VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO AND ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, RESPONDENTS.
TOPICS:
Family Code|Marriages

FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita
has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his
widow.In 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
1. Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an independent action which is
not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of.—Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before
this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ailed that the pendency of a
petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. “An application
for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which
resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.”
2. Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.—While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has
been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the
source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has
property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and
his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit.
3. Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at
the time of the celebration of their marriage.-
—Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered
as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda
and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs
their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In
view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
4. Same; Answer; Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics
to the prejudice of the other party.-
—Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to
herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of
the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered
its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story.
KimJonaP.Castillo

April
29. Momongan vs. Sumayo, . 648 SCRA 26, . April 12, 2011

TOPICS:
Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Dishonesty
FACTS:
Primitivo A. Sumayo Clerk III of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, was
charged with Gross Dishonesty and Falsification of Public Document by Antonio Exequiel A.
Momongan by letter of October 11, 2007 which was forwarded by RTC Branch 58 Judge Gabriel
T. Ingles. He was similarly charged, in an undated anonymous letter, which was forwarded by
the Deputy Ombudsman to the Court. Another court employee, Ariel Momongan Process Server
in the RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court Cebu City was also similarly faulted. The complaint
against Ariel was, after submitting his "Counter Affidavit," not given due course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Primitivo sumayo is guilty with Gross Dishonesty and Falsification of Public
Document
HELD:
Yes
RATIO:
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Dishonesty refers to the act of intentionally
making a false statement on any material fact in securing one’s appointment.—Respondent
misrepresented his qualifications as to his educational attainment and eligibility for government
service. This misrepresentation amounts to plain and simple dishonesty which, in this case, refers
to the act of intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing one’s
appointment. It is a serious offense reflective of a person’s character and the moral decay he
suffers from, virtually destroying all honor, virtue and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no
place in the judiciary. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary. KimJonaP.Castillo

30. Romero vs. Villarosa, Jr., . 648 SCRA 32, . April 12, 2011

TOPICS:
Courts|Court Personnel|Sheriffs|Execution of Judgments
FACTS:
Romero was the plaintiff in a claim for damages, which was amicably settled by way of a
Compromise Agreement duly approved by the MTC, where Spouses Valentin Laurente and
Enriqueta Laurente bound themselves to pay Romero a total amount of P30,000.00, P24,000.00
of which would be paid on or before March 2006, and the remaining balance of P6,000.00 on or
before October 2006.On December 6, 2005, Romero received partial compliance with the
obligation. Failing to receive the balance in accordance with the Compromise Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pacifico Villarosa Jr is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official, Grave
abuse of Authority and Dishonesty

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
Pacifico B. Villarosa, Jr., Sheriff IV of Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, is
guilty of Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official, Grave Abuse of Authority, and Dishonesty, and
is dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except leave credits already accrued.
He is further barred from re-employment in any branch or office of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and
who prepare and submit returns on their proceedings. As officers, they must discharge their
duties with great care and diligence, perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon
them.

All court employees, regardless of rank, being public servants in an office dispensing justice,
must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and
court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its
holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness
and honesty to maintain the people’s respect and faith in the judiciary. The conduct of court
personnel therefore, must not only be, but must also be perceived. KimJonaP.Castillo
31. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Board of Directors vs. Lapid, . 648 SCRA 546, .
April 12, 2011

TOPICS:
Civil Service|Security of Tenure
FACTS:
Marie Jean C. Lapid , Casual Clerk of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office appeals the
Decision of the PCSO, which found her guilty of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties
and Grave Misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from the Service.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals gravely err in granting the respondent’s petition, in effect, reversing the
CSC’s resolutions.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Marie Jean C. Lapid is allowed to continue rendering services as Casual Clerk until the end of
the term of her temporary employment unless she is earlier dismissed for cause in another case
and after due process. She is also entitled to payment of backwages from the date of dismissal
until the date of actual reinstatement. However, if the term of her employment has already
expired, backwages shall be computed from the date of dismissal until the end of her period of
employment under the terms of her contract as a casual employee.

1. Civil Service; Casual Employees; The rule is still that casual employment will cease
automatically at the end of the period unless renewed as stated in the Plantilla of Casual
Employment.—The rule is still that casual employment will cease automatically at the end of the
period unless renewed as stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment. Casual employees may
also be terminated anytime though subject to certain conditions or qualifications with reference
to the abovequoted CSC Form No. 001. Thus, they may be laid-off anytime before the expiration
of the employment period provided any of the following occurs: (1) when their services are no
longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been
completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par.
2. Security of Tenure; No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process. —Section 2(3), Article IX-B of
the Constitution provides that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.” Apparently, the Civil Service Law echoes this
constitutional edict of security of tenure of the employees in the civil service. Thus, Section 46 (a)
of the Civil Service Law provides that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.”
KimJonaP.Castillo
32. Cayetano vs. Commission on Elections, . 648 SCRA 561, . April 12, 2011

TOPICS:
Election Law|Commission on Elections|Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City.
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner.The private respondent filed an Election Protest against
petitioner before the COMELEC for allegedly committing election frauds and irregularities
which translated to the latter’s ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. In the petitioner’s
Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, she raised, among others, the affirmative
defense of insufficiency in form and content of the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate
dismissal thereof. However, it was denied by the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content?
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final
resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via
certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. In short, the final order of the
COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be
questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari. Although the rule admits of
exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of
the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same. However, none of the circumstances permitting an
exception to the rule occurs in this instance.

1. Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review an
order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC-
—the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc
in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a rule which admits of exceptions
as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the
absence of jurisdiction to issue the same.—Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no
jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a
division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision,
order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution. Petitioner’s assertion that circumstances prevailing herein are different from the
factual milieu attendant in Repol has no merit. As stated in Soriano, “the general rule is that a
decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through
a special civil action for certiorari.” In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second
Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this Court
even via a petition for certiorari. True, the aforestated rule admits of exceptions as when the
issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of
jurisdiction to issue the same. Unfortunately for petitioner, none of the circumstances permitting
an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.

2.;Appeals; Although it is not the duty of the Court to point to litigants to the appropriate remedy
which they should take from orders of COMELEC Divisions, the aggrieved party can still assign
as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main
case to the COMELEC En Banc.

3. Certiorari; The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and, (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.—The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. KimJonaP.Castillo

Navarro vs. Ermita, . 648 SCRA 400, . April 12, 2011

TOPIC:
Municipal Corporation|Local Government Units|Statutory Construction|Judicial
Review|Operative Fact Doctrine

FACTS:
On Oct 1996 the President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into law. On
Dec 1996 COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of province.
People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Dinagat Islands voted in
affirmative. COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was
declared final and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a non-
province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have to be nullified, and a
special election would have to be conducted for various positions for Surigao del Norte.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Sec.2 Art.9 of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 IRR is valid.

HELD:
No.
RATIO:

1. Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Creation of Local Government Units; It

must be emphasized that Section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code, which provides for
the general rule in the creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that
the land area must be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities
to meet the requirements of its populace.-It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which
provides for the general rule in the creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c)
thereof that the land area must be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services
and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Therefore, there are two requirements for
land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A
sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided
by Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code,
providing the requisites for the creation of a province, specifically states the requirement of “a
contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers.”

2. For as long as there is compliance with the income requirement, the legislative intent is, after
all, to the effect that the land area and population requirements may be overridden by the
established economic viability of the proposed province.-
—In exempting provinces composed of one or more islands from both the contiguity and land
area requirements, Article 9 of the IRR cannot be considered inconsistent with the criteria under
Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Far from being absolute regarding application of
the requirement of “a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the
Land Management Bureau,” Section 461 allows for said exemption by providing, under
paragraph (b) thereof, that “(t)he territory need not be contiguous if (the new province)
comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province.” For as long as there is compliance with the income
requirement, the legislative intent is, after all, to the effect that the land area and population
requirements may be overridden by the established economic viability of the proposed province.

3. Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Creation of Local Government Units;

Unlike Section 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, its counterpart provision in the predecessor of
the present Local Government Code, Section 461 does not give equal premium to the income,
land area and population requirements for the creation of new provinces.-
—When viewed in the light of the legislative intent underlying Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, I respectfully submit that Article 9 of the IRR is not in conflict with the
criteria for the creation of provinces ensconced in said provision of the basic law. Unlike Section
197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, its counterpart provision in the predecessor of the present
Local Government Code, Section 461 does not give equal premium to the income, land area and
population requirements for the creation of new provinces. This is readily evident from the fact
that, after prescribing the P20,000,000.00 income requirement, Section 461 simply mandates
compliance with either the requirement of a contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or a
population of not less than 250,000.

4. Operative Fact Doctrine; The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers,
cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution, and determine whether illegality attached to the
creation of the province in question-to abandon this duty only because a local government unit
has began its existence is to consent to the passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of
the Constitution and the Local Government Code.—In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared
unconstitutional because there was utter failure to comply with either the population or
territorial requirement for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the Local Government
Code. The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on its
duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution, and determine whether illegality attached to the creation of the
province in question. To abandon this duty only because the Province of Dinagat Islands has
began its existence is to consent to the passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, rendering the law and the province created null
and void. The Court cannot tolerate such nullity to be in existence. Where the acts of other
branches of the government go beyond the limit imposed by the Constitution, it is the sacred duty
of the judiciary to nullify the same.

5. Judicial Review; The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law, and where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the
Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.-
—Contrary to the contention of the movants, the evidence on record proved that R.A. No. 9355
failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement prescribed in Section 461
of the Local Government Code for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, the
Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional. In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 417
SCRA 503 (2003), the Court held: Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further
than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is equally well-established,
however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law. And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the
Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.

6. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be
followed in the creation of a province-
—any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.—As the law-making branch of the government,
indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as
contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending
Section 461 of the Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for
the creation of a province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, any derogation of or
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution.

7.Statutory Construction; Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, but only for application.-Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court
may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is provided from considerations of
convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into account questions of
expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance
therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, but only for application.

8. The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000
square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area under para-graph (a) (i)
of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code; Nowhere in paragraph (b) of
Section 461 of the Local Government Code is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a
province is composed of two or more islands, or when the territory of a province is separated by
a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461.—Contrary
to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement
of a land area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land
area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the
requirement of territorial contiguity, thus: (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. Contrary to the contention of the movants, the
exemption above pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that
the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province
comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may
it be implied that when a province is composed of two or more islands, or when the territory of a
province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the land
area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of
Section 461 of the Local Government Code. KimJonaP.Castillo

33. Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, . 647 SCRA 207, . April 05,
2011

TOPICS:
Judgments|Pleadings and Practice|Eminent Domain|Just Compensation|Res Judicata|Words and
Phrases|Just Compensation

FACTS:
Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic Act 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took
petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996. AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount.
Consequently, on instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank
deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, a total of P71,891,256.62.
Upon revaluation of properties, Land Bank eventually made additional deposits.Both petitioners
withdrew the amount. Separate complaints were filed for just compensation with the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC ruled in
favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners’ properties.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the “transcendental importance” does not apply to the present case.
(2) Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance” cannot justify the negation of
the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a vested right in favor of
the Government that respondent LBP represents.
(3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission showing that just compensation for expropriated agricultural property must be
viewed in the context of social justice.
HELD:
No.
No.
Yes.
RATIO:
(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of
public interest – the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the
right of a landowner to receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of
eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent
domain – “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” While
confirming the State’s inherent power and right to take private property for public use, this
provision at the same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes
property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to
pay the owner just compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be considered
“just,” it must not only be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid
to the landowner without delay.

(2) No. The doctrine “transcendental importance,” contrary to the assertion it is applicable only
to legal standing questions, is justified in negating the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It
will be a very myopic reading of the ruling as the context clearly shows that the phrase
“transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize the overriding public interest involved
in this case. The Supreme Court said in their resolution:
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from
these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill
of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain case be “just”
when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably
delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this
case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets,
too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who
carries the burden of showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the
case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave
uncorrected.x x x xMore than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of
transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform,
a societal objective of that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half
century.
From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests of justice are duly served.

(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to give a lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of land, the
Commission never intended to give agricultural landowners less than just compensation in the
expropriation of property for agrarian reform purposes.
[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the right of
landowners to receive just compensation for the expropriation by the State of their properties.
That the petitioners are corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken
against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire
in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called
upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for
poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law. KimJonaP.Castillo

34. Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Ong, . 648 SCRA 1, . April 12, 2011

TOPICS:
Sandiganbayan|Courts

FACTS:
Respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justices sought reconsideration of SC Decision finding
them guilty for simple misconduct. The charge was based on the complaint of Assistant
Prosecutor Rodriguez who alleged that the respondents failed to hear cases as collegial during
scheduled sessions by hearing the cases either alone or only two of the three of them, and for
falsification of public documents grounded on their issuance of orders signed by the three of
them making it appear that they acted as a collegial body. It was also alleged that they have
conducted themselves in gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct for intemperate
and discriminatory utterances during hearings.

ISSUE:
1. Was the collegiality of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan preserved despite separately
conducting hearings?

2. Were the respondent justices liable for improprieties during hearings amounting to gross abuse
of judicial authority and grave misconduct?
HELD:
No.
No.
RATIO:
1. Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit
together as members of the Fourth Division in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto. The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division
would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings.
This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of
the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at
the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.

2. The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no
evidence supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had
uttered the improper and intemperate statements amounting to gross abuse of judicial
authority and grave misconduct. The Court found the respondent justices’ conduct only
unbecoming.

1. Sandiganbayan; Courts; The Sandiganbayan is a collegial court; Collegial Defined;

Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606, as amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of
Sandiganbayan call for the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to
constitute a quorum to conduct business and to hold trial proceedings.-—Under the
foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court. Collegial is defined as relating
to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium is “an executive body with each
member having approximately equal power and authority.” In a collegial court, therefore,
the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as amended, and
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra, call for the actual presence of the
three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum to conduct business and to hold
trial proceedings. Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of a Division from
the conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings negates the existence of a quorum
and precludes collegiality.

ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion:; All Division members share any decision on what
proceedings to adopt in the conduct of its business.-As the majority decision noted, the
Sandiganbayan being a collegial court, each member has approximately equal power and
authority. The members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, while the
Chairman supervises and directs the proceedings of the Division, his authority is limited to
that extent. All Division members share any decision on what proceedings to adopt in the
conduct of its business. They act by consensus or majority rule. In fact, respondent Justices
pointed out in their respective comments that they adopted the challenged procedure in the
best interest of the service. This admission negates any impression that Chairman Ong
imposed his will on Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada or that the latter two merely relied
on their Chairman’s judgment.
3. Misconduct, simple or gross, cannot be imputed to respondent Justices as they were of the
honest belief that the procedure undertaken was designed to facilitate and serve the best
interest of the service.-In all, misconduct, simple or gross, cannot be imputed to respondent
Justices as they were of the honest belief that the procedure undertaken was designed to
facilitate and serve the best interest of the service. Even the ponencia concedes that
respondent Justices “had not been ill-motivated in adopting the erroneous procedure, for all
they had sought to accomplish thereby was to expedite their disposition of cases in the
provinces.”
4. NACHURA, J., Dissenting Opinion:; Respondent Justices’ adoption of a different
procedure in the conduct of provincial hearings of cases assigned to their Division does not
constitute simple misconduct.—Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of
a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to
the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper, or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. Respondent Justices’
adoption of a different procedure in the conduct of provincial hearings of cases assigned to
their Division does not constitute simple misconduct. Although it diverged from the regular
procedure where cases are heard by all members of the Division, the arrangement was
undertaken without malice or bad faith, nor to favour a party. It was pursued in the best
interest of the service.
5. Same; Administrative Law; A judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an
unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar motive.
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence
of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court
upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G.R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have “failed to sufficiently
show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment
to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.” At any rate,
it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust
judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar motive.
6. Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Conduct unbecoming applies to a broader range
of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical
procedure or prescribed method.-In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.”
7. Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech.-Judges should be dignified
in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not
manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant
grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble position
on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with
appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff,
and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties.
8. Judges; Judicial Decorum; Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and
act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.-Even so, Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which
law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual
conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional
qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public
magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking
their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes
should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not
exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no
matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all
who appear before their court.
9. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of
provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or
corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure.—It remains that the respondent
Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and
procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing
of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or
corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their
procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious
disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of
the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended,
was not the chief objective of judicial trials.
10. Respondent Justices’ adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere
deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as
simple misconduct.—Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and
time forgets. They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices’ adoption of the
irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in
judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be
distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent
 Justices were not liable for gross misconduct—defined as the transgression of some
established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal
rules—considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did
not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate
hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross
ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act
complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances
was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not
been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the
erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of
cases in the provinces.
3. 11. Court Personnel; As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware
of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.—The
foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices
as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or
corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As
responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of
collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
12. Same; Same; It is simply not enough that the three members of the Fourth Division were
within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question.—
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as
members of the Fourth Division “in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned
thereto.” The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any
decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to
each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full
participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough,
therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even
in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. KimJonaP.Castillo

35. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, if citation
present 648 SCRA 586, if promulgation date present April 13, 2011

TOPIC:
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)

FACTS:
 MINCOCO, a domestic corporation established in 1974.When MINCOCO’s mortgage
liens were about to be foreclosed by the government banks due its outstanding obligations,
Eduardo Cojuangco issued a memorandum bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos’
marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO’s properties. The government
banks were not able to recover any amount from MINCOCO and President Marcos’
marginal note was construed by the NIDC to have effectively released MINCOCO,
including its owners, from all of its financial liabilities.
The above mentioned transactions, were, however, discovered only in 1992 after then
President Fidel V. Ramos President Ramos, in an effort to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
the late President Marcos, his family, and cronies, issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (the
Committee), with the Chairman of the Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) as the Committee’s head.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is probable cause in finding MINCOCO in gross violation of RA
3019

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
The waiver of MINCOCO’s multi-peso loan should have been enough basis in finding that
probably Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was violated and the fact that NIDC
extended a loan guarantee to MINCOCO, despite its being undercapitalized and under-
collateralized, should have also been enough ground in finding probable cause for
violation of Section 3(g) of the above-cited law.

1. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019); Prescription; Constitutional Law;
The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution that “the right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppels” applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases.-The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution that
“the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppels,” has already been settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130140), where the Court held
that the above cited constitutional provision “applies only to civil actions for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases.”

2. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019); Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
 advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers.-
—Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 requires that there be injury caused
by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire
with public officers. In contrast, Section 3(g) does not require the giving of unwarranted
benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties, its core element being the
engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government. The waiver of MINCOCO’s multi-peso loan should have been enough
basis in finding that probably Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was violated and the
fact that NIDC extended a loan guarantee to MINCOCO, despite its being
undercapitalized and under-collateralized, should have also been enough ground in
finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(g) of the above-cited law.

3. Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; The Ombudsman comes within the purview of the
Court’s power of judicial review.-
—True, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally mandated
independence. Despite this, however, the Ombudsman comes within the purview of the
Court’s power of judicial review—a peculiar concept of Philippine Ombudsman,
embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution—which serves as a safety net
against its capricious and arbitrary acts.

4. Criminal Law; Prescription; Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
on the day the crime is committed.-
—The prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an
aggrieved person “entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of
which his right arises,” does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to
this rule is the “blameless ignorance” doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, “the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the
invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline
to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means
of knowing the existence of a cause of action.” KimJonaP.Castillo

36. People vs. Marquez, . 648 SCRA 694, . April 13, 2011

TOPIC:
Criminal Law|Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor|Moral Damages

FACTS:
Aida Marquez also known as Aida Pulido, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18; was
sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and was ordered to pay the offended
party Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) as exemplary damages.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court erred in convicting the accused of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor when the latters guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No.

RATIO:
1. Criminal Law; Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor; Kidnapping and failure
to return a minor has two essential elements: (1) The offender is entrusted with the
custody of a minor person; and (2) The offender deliberately fails to restore the said
minor to his parents or guardians.-The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a
person who has been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to
return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may be found in Article 270, which
reads: “Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor.—The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a
minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.”
This crime has two essential elements: 1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a
minor person; and 2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his
parents or guardians.

2. Moral Damages; The crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is analogous to
illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages.-In
People v. Bernardo, 378 SCRA 708 (2002), we held that the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to illegal and
arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. KimJonaP.Castillo

37. People vs. Alcuizar, . 647 SCRA 431, . April 06, 2011

TOPIC:
Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs

FACTS:
Appellant Alcuizar was charged with violation of Sections 5 for illegal sale, Section 6 for
maintaining a drug den, Section11 for illegal possession and Section 12 for illegal possession of
dangerous drug paraphernalia of Republic Act No. 9165 a buy bust operation and a search on his
home by virtue of a warrant led by a SPO1 Agadier.In the RTC, appellant was acquitted in all
charges except for his violation of Section 11 or illegal possession of dangerous drug as
evidenced by the stick packs of shabu found in his room.Appellant questions the veracity of the
seized item by virtue of the Chain of Custody rule. Appellant cites the failure of the police in
marking the evidence immediately after purportedly taking it from him as well as the failure of
the police officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory receipt upon the accused or any of his
family members.CA finds the appellant’s contention meritorious.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted because there is failure to mark the evidence
immediately thus braking the Chain of Custody Rule.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
1. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this
case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under
Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely show that
the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-
appellant.

2. Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements to Successfully Prosecute a Case of Illegal

Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

3. Non-compliance with the prescribed procedures does not necessarily result in the conclusion
that the identity of the seized drugs has been compromised so that an acquittal should follow as
long as the prosecution can demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized have been preserved.

4. While the rule allows marking of evidence to be done in the nearest police station, this
contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures; Failure to comply with the marking
of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes a first gap in the chain of custody.

5. The marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator
and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain
and are eventually the ones offered in evidence. KimJonaP.Castillo

June

No. 69
Title: Aliviado vs. Procter and Gamble
G.R. No. 160506 June 6, 2011
Labor law: Labor-Only Contractor; Employer-employee relationship
Facts: Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. They all individually signed employment
contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS. They were assigned at different outlets,
supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. They received their wages
from Promm-Gem or SAPS. SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring
merchandisers for reasons such as habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without
prior notice. Petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave
pay and other benefits with damages.
Issue: WON Procter & Gamble is the employer of the petitioners
Held: Yes. Ratio: Under the Labor Code and its implementing rules allow contracting
arrangements for the performance of specific jobs, works or services. However, in order for such
outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to an independent contractor because the current labor
rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting. To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting
when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a
job, work or service for a principal and any of the following elements are present:
1. i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates
to the job, work or service to be performed andthe employees recruited, supplied or placed by
such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main
business of the principal; or
2. ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of
the contractual Where labor-only contracting exists, the Labor Code itself establishes an
employer-employee relationship between the employer and the employees of the labor-only
contractor.
The statute establishes this relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention
of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the
latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been
directly employed by the principal employer. KristineJoyJimenez

No. 70
Title: AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC.
G.R. No. 168382, June 06 : 2011 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
LABOR LAW: Finality and immutability of judgment
Facts: The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining
agent of all commercial pilots of PAL.Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice,
ALPAP a notice of strike against PAL with the DOLE. The DOLE Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ruled that all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., whether actual or impending, are hereby strictly prohibited. Despite such reminder
to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike. This constrained the DOLE, through then
Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order which ALPAP did not
immediately follow. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their
failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order. ALPAP filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept
unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to
pay whatever salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.
Through then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, a Resolution was rendered declaring
the strike conducted by ALPAP illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of its
officers and members who participated in the strike in defiance of the return-to-work order.
Issue: Whether the decision of the DOLE is final and immutable.
Held: Yes. Ratio: In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine
who among its members and officers actually participated in the illegal strike because, it insists,
the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not make such determination.However, as correctly ruled
by Sto. Tomas and Imson and affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening of a
final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court.Settled in law is that once a decision
has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in
any respect. Subject to certain recognized exceptions, the principle of immutability leaves the
judgment undisturbed as "nothing further can be done except to execute it." True, the dispositive
portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually
participated in the strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-
work order are deemed to have lost their employment. This omission, however, cannot prevent
an effective execution of the decision.As was held in Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, any ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the
decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed in the case. In any case,specially
when there is an ambiguity,"a judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and
construed accordingly." KristineJoyJimenez

No. 71
Title: People of the Philippines v. RosauroAsetre y Duran,
G.R. No. 175834, June 8, 2011.
Evidence; reasonable doubt.
Facts: Four Informationswere filed charging appellant with four counts of rape. The Informations
charged appellant with having raped “AAA” on the first week, second week, and third week, of
March 2001, and on March 23, 2001. However, as argued by the defense, the testimony of
“AAA” with regard to the first three incidents particularly on the dates when and the places
where the offenses were supposedly committed contains disturbing discrepancies. “AAA”
testified that she was raped inside their tent in “BBB”. However, in her re-direct examination,
“AAA” testified that she was raped elsewhere.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Held: Yes.
Ratio: The evidence presented by the prosecution showed that appellant is guilty of only one
count of rape, and not four counts. The inconsistencies in the testimony of “AAA” regarding the
first three rape incidents are not inconsequential. These inconsistencies create a reasonable doubt
as to whether appellant did in fact rape “AAA” during those occasions. Consequently, appellant
must be acquitted of the charges of rape allegedly committed during the first week, second week,
and third week, of March 2001 based on reasonable doubt. KristineJoyJimenez

LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, - versus- TERESITA V.

SALVADOR,
G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011

Facts: Salvador claimed that she is the owner of a parcel of land in Dalaguete, Cebu covered by
a free patent granted to the heirs of Cristino Salvador.She said that the petitioner came upon the
land only upon the tolerance of the predecessors-in-interest. Respondent filed a case of Unlawful
Detainer against the petitioner while the latter interposed he defense of agricultural tenancy.
They claimed that they have an agreement with the respondent’s siblings that they will engage in
agricultural production and share the produce to the siblings. They argued that the DARAB has
the proper jurisdiction in the case.

Issue: Whether he Petitioners are tenants of the respondent.

Ruling: No. Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.

Civil Law; Agrarian Reform Law; Agricultural Tenancy: Agricultural tenancy exists when all
the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.

Civil Law; Agrarian Reform Law; Proof of Sharing of Harvest: Petitioners should have
presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there
was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. Mere occupation or
cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is
incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial
evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.

Civil Law: Damages in Ejection Cases: We must, however, clarify that the only damage that can
be recovered [by respondent] is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that [in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases], the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the
damages which could be recovered are those which the [respondent] could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the
damages which [she] may have suffered but which have no direct relation to [her] loss of
material possession. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

SPOUSES MANUEL AND FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO-versus-GERRY ROXAS

FOUNDATION, INC., G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011

Facts: Del Rosario appears to be the registered owner a lot in Roxas City. Respondent, as a
legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum
of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy
of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof. Case for unlawful detainer was filed in
court against the respondent. The Petitioner said that their possession was only by mere tolerance
which lasted for 22 years. Respondent averred that the Petitioners were not the owner of the
property since they sold the lot to the Government to whom they have a contract.

Issues: Whether the foundation is an Unlawful Detainer.

Ruling: No. Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for
forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.

Remedial Law; Judicial Admissions: Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x A judicial admission is one so made
in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence
otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and
complied with. Correspondingly, facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the
plaintiff and binding upon him. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader.

Remedial Law; Difference between Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer: Forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer,
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of
the defendant's right to continue in possession.
Remedial Law; Remedy for Recovery of Possession: [W]here the defendants possession of the
property is illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to
recover possession. Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in
petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court
finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not
the instant suit for unlawful detainer. Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible
Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

ARMANDO V. ALANO [Deceased], Substituted by Elena Alano- Torres- versus-

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, as Successor-in-Interest of MAUNLAD SAVINGS
and LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC G.R. No. 171628
June 13, 2011

Facts: Petitioner and his brother inherited from their father a parcel of land located in Manila.
Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing his brother to sell their
property. From the proceeds of the sale, the brothers purchased a residential house located at BF
Homes, Quezon City, however, it was not immediately transferred because original copies of the
title were destroyed by a fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. When Agapito died, his
wife and children adjudicated the properties among themselves. An affidavit of Adverse claim
was annotated by petitioner on the title. But because of the assurance of his nieces that they
would put things right, petitioner agreed to delay the filing of a case in court. Later it was
cancelled and the title was registered solely on the name of Lydia. Later, Slumberworld, Inc.,
represented by Treasurer, Lydia, obtained from Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. a
loan of P2.3 million, secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the property. A complaint was filed
praying that a new for petitioner’s one-half share of the Quezon City property, and the
nullification of real estate mortgage insofar as his one-half share is concerned.

Issue: Whether the mortgage is valid.

Ruling: No. A person cannot own what he does not have. Since Maunlad Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. was remiss in its duty in ascertaining the status of the property to be mortgaged
and verifying the ownership thereof, it is deemed a mortgagee in bad faith. Consequently, the
real estate mortgage executed in its favor is valid only insofar as the share of the
mortgagor Lydia in the subject property.

Remedial Law; Rule 45: The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not without exception. A review of
factual issues is allowed when there is a misapprehension of facts or when the inference drawn
from the facts is manifestly mistaken. This case falls under exception.

Civil Law; Mortgagee in Good Faith; Diligence required in banks: The general rule that a
mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions
as greater care and due diligence is required of them. Imbued with public interest, they are
expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals. Thus, before approving a loan, the
standard practice for banks and other financial institutions is to conduct an ocular inspection of
the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real
owner or owners thereof. Failure to do so makes them mortgagees in bad faith.

Civil Law; Co-Ownership: We need not belabor that under Article 493of the Civil Code, a co-
owner can alienate only his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property, and not the share of his
co-owners. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

JOHN ANTHONY B. ESPIRITU, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact for Westmont

Investment Corporation, STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, GOLDEN ERA HOLDINGS, INC., ANDEXCHANGE EQUITY
CORPORATION- versus - MANUEL N. TANKIANSEE AND JUANITA U. TAN
G.R. No. 164153 June 13, 2011

Facts: A Petition for Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management and Control
against United Overseas Bank Limited and others. The intervenors filed a Motion for Production,
Inspection and Copying of Documents against the UOBP Group.They also filed a Notice to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of John Anthony B. Espiritu, Tony Tan Caktiong and Chua
Teng Hui. A similar notice was sent to Wee Cho Yaw. All the aforementioned parties opposed
the taking of their depositions via separate Motions for Protective Order and/or Objection to
Resort to Discoveries on the ground that resort to discovery procedure was already time-barred.
The trial court denied the motion for production of documents and notice to take depositions
because, as modes of discovery, the same were filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
which it later reversed. Thereafter, the Espiritu, Tan and UOBP Groups sought reconsideration of
this order. However, the trial court denied the same and maintained that resort to discovery is
permissible under the premises. Following suit, the Espiritu and Tan Groups attempted to resort
to discovery procedure. They filed a Notice to Take Depositions Upon Oral Examination of
Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan.

Issue: Whether the Ceritorari via Rule 655 is the proper remedy.

Ruling: Yes. The instant petition should be denied because (1) petitioners appeal before the
appellate court is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and (2) the certioraripetition, subject
matter of this case, constitutes forum shopping.

Remedial Law; Forum Shopping: There is forum shopping when two or more actions or
proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. Where a partys petition for certiorari and
subsequent appeal seek to achieve one and the same purpose, there is forum shopping which is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the certiorari petition.

Remedial Law; Certiorari under Rule 65: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that a petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari cannot co-
exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and the availability of the right
to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. As the Court
has held, these two remedies are mutually exclusive. In this case, the subsequent appeal
constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact it is the appropriate remedy because it assails not only the
Resolution but also the two Orders. A certiorari petition may only be availed of if there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

LEONARDO S. UMALE, [deceased] represented by CLARISSA VICTORIA, JOHN LEO,

GEORGE LEONARD, KRISTINE, MARGUERITA ISABEL, AND MICHELLE
ANGELIQUE, ALL SURNAMED UMALE, - versus - ASB REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181126 June 15, 2011

Facts: Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in
favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearls outstanding
capital stock from ASB Realty. Thus, ASB Realty became the owner of the subject premises and
a title registered in Pasig City. ASB filed a complaint against Umale for Unlawful Detainer.
They averred that, originally. The premises were leased under a pay-parking agreement which
later expired though Umale continued to pay rentals. ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of
Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. Umale admitted occupying the property
since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his
lessor. He was adamant that his lessor was the original owner, Amethyst Pearl. Since there was
no contract between himself and ASB Realty, the latter had no cause of action to file the
unlawful detainer complaint against him. He also challenged ASB Realtys personality to recover
the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly
appointed. Under Section 14(s), Rule 4 of the Administrative Memorandum No. 00-8-10SC,
otherwise known as the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules),
it is the rehabilitation receiver that has the power to take possession, control and custody of the
debtors assets. Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed
receiver that should sue to recover possession of the same.

Issue: Whether a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors)
may file suit a to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the
corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?

Ruling: Yes. The right to sue remains with the corporaion despite being placed under
rehabilitation. Being placed under corporate rehabilitation and having a receiver appointed to
carry out the rehabilitation plan do not ipso facto deprive a corporation and its corporate officers
of the power to recover its unlawfully detained property.

Mercantile Law; Corporation law; Corporate Rehabilitation;: Corporate rehabilitation is

defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is
shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by
way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a
going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. It was first introduced in the Philippine legal
system through PD 902-A, as amended. The intention of the law is to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation by preserving a floundering business as a going concern, because the assets of a
business are often more valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated.

Mercantile Law; Corporation law; Concept of Debtor-in-possession or Debtor-in-place: This

concept of preserving the corporations business as a going concern while it is undergoing
rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor
corporation (the corporation undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and
corporate officers, remains in control of its business and properties, subject only to the
monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver. The concept of debtor-in-possession, is
carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules, the rule that is relevant to the instant case. It
states therein that the interim rehabilitation receiver of the debtor corporation does not take over
the control and management of the debtor corporation. Likewise, the rehabilitation receiver that
will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the
rehabilitation plan. There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation that would ipso
facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation, such as ASB
Realty, of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to recover its property from an
errant lessee.

Mercantile Law; Right to sue is not barred by Corporate Rehabilitation: To be sure, corporate
rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. The rules enumerate the
prohibited corporate actions and transactions (most of which involve some kind of disposition or
encumbrance of the corporations assets) during the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings
but none of which touch on the debtor corporations right to sue. The implication therefore is that
our concept of rehabilitation does not restrict this particular power, save for the caveat that all its
actions are monitored closely by the receiver, who can seek an annulment of any prohibited or
anomalous transaction or agreement entered into by the officers of the debtor corporation.

Mercantile Law; Authority to exercise the power by the SEC, not presumed: Indeed, PD 902-A,
as amended, provides that the receiver shall have the powers enumerated under Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. But Rule 59 is a rule of general application. It applies to different kinds of
receivers rehabilitation receivers, receivers of entities under management, ordinary receivers,
receivers in liquidation and for different kinds of situations. While the SEC has the discretion to
authorize the rehabilitation receiver, as the case may warrant, to exercise the powers in Rule 59,
the SECs exercise of such discretion cannot simply be assumed. There is no allegation
whatsoever in this case that the SEC gave ASB Realtys rehabilitation receiver the exclusive right
to sue.

Civil Law; Article 1687 Limitations: In arguing for an extension of lease under Article 1687,
petitioners lost sight of the restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code. It states that a
lessee that commits any of the grounds for ejectment cited in Article 1673, including non-
payment of lease rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated,
cannot avail of the periods established in Article 1687. Moreover, the extension in Article 1687
is granted only as a matter of equity. The law simply recognizes that there are instances when it
would be unfair to abruptly end the lease contract causing the eviction of the lessee. It is only for
these clearly unjust situations that Article 1687 grants the court the discretion to extend the lease.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, -versus-CARLO DUMADAG y ROMIO,

G.R. No. 176740 June 22, 2011

Facts: Dumadag was charged for raping a AAA, a barrio lass, 16 years of age, who at the time
has just attended mass. The accused, on his defense, stated that there was really a sexual
intercourse but that it was not forced as he was her boyfriend.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of Rape.

Ruling: Yes.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of witness: When credibility is the issue that comes to
fore, this Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court which had the first hand
opportunity to hear the testimonies of witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct and
attitude during their presentation. Hence, the trial courts factual findings especially when
affirmed by the appellate court are accorded the highest degree of respect and are conclusive and
binding on this Court. A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted save upon a
showing of highly meritorious circumstances such as when the courts evaluation was reached
arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which[, if considered, would] affect the result of the case.
Criminal Law; Rape; Credibility of Child Victims: The gravamen of the offense of rape is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. It bears to stress that
[a]s a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit for youth and
immaturity are badges of truth.

Criminal Law; Intimidation: Well-settled is the rule that where the victim is threatened with
bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a pistol, knife, ice pick
or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful
desires of the rapist.

Criminal Law; Sweetheart Defense: Intimacies such as loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles,
sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that one bestows upon his or her lover would
have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of the relationship. Definitely, a man
cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the
pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust. But what destroyed the veracity of appellants
sweetheart defense were the credible declaration of AAA that she does not love him and her
categorical denial that he is her boyfriend.

Criminal Law; Penalty for Rape; Qualifying Circumstance: Under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. At the time of the commission
of the offense on December 25, 1998, Republic Act No. 8353 (otherwise known as the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997) was already in effect. The amendatory law, particularly Article 266-B
thereof, provides an identical provision and imposes the same penalty when the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, such
circumstance was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established during the trial. In
People v. Macapanas, the Court ruled that [b]eing in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, use
of a deadly weapon increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified
form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

ANICETO CALUBAQUIB,WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB,

ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB, - versus -
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170658
June 22, 2011

Facts: President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80 declaring hectares of

landholding located in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. Respondent filed before
a complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners alleging that petitioners unlawfully
entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare
portion (subject property) thereof. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that their
predecessessor-n-interest has been in open and continuous possession of the propert since 1990.
The heirs applied for Homested patent but was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands.
Nevertheless, the continued to cultivate the land. Given the trial courts opinion that the basic
facts of the case were undisputed, it advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment.
Neither party filed the motion. In fact, respondent expressed on two occasions its objection to a
summary judgment. It explained that summary judgment is improper given the existence of a
genuine and vital factual issue, which is the petitioners claim of ownership over the subject
property. It argued that the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.
Regardless, the summary judgment was ordered.

Issue: Whether the rendering of the summary judgment is proper.

Ruling: No. The trial court did not comply with the minimum standard to order a summary
judgment. Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary judgment.

Remedial Law; Summary Judgment: Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the
plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a
genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the
facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits.
But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the
parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a
trial.
Remedial Law; Minimum Requirement of Vigilance for Summary Judgment: It assumes a
scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one
party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the
adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions,
or other documents x x x. In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can
only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial
of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt
as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Thus, it is held that, even if
the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are
not genuine. The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and
conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.

Remedial Law; Test of Propriety for Summary Judgment: A summary judgment is permitted
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the
existence of a genuine issue of fact, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. [A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is evident
that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere
intention nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants
merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact
that their answers are not under oath anyway. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

MA. LIGAYA B. SANTOS, - versus - LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED and/or ATTY.

RODOLFO MARIO G.R. No. 170646
June 22, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is an employee of Litton Mills, a company engaged in the business of

manufacturing textile materials. She was put under suspension pending investigation of her
alleged unauthorized arrangement with Concepcion and threatening to withhold release of
purchased materials by the same. In her defense, she said that the amount she received from
Concepcion’s wife was for a loan. A Criminal case was later filed against her for
robbery/extortion and was later on fired by the company. When the case reached the Court of
Appeals, it found errors in the petitioner’s pleadings as well as the Verification and Certification
for Non- Forum shopping which she corrected later on. Nevertheless, the court ruled in favour of
Litton Mills.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the case for lack of formality.

Ruling: The court partly grants the petition.

Remedial Law; Substantial Compliance in Petition for Certiorari: Rules of procedure should be
relaxed when there is substantial and subsequent compliance. Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari shall contain, among others, the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. The petitioner should also submit together with
the petition a sworn certification that (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, he must state the status of the same; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall promptly inform the court
within five days therefrom. The Rule explicitly provides that failure to comply with these
requirements shall be sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.

Remedial Law; Notice to Counsel: To us, the mention of the parties respective counsels
addresses constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court which provides in part that [t]he petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. Our observation further finds support in Section
2, Rule 13 which pertinently provides that [i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon
him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the Court. As we held in Garrucho v. Court of Appeals,[27] [n]otice or service made
upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel
of record is not notice in law. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

UNIVERSITY PLANS INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, VS. BELINDA P. SOLANO,

TERRY A. LAMUG, GLENDA S. BELGA, MELBA S. ALVAREZ, WELMA R.
NAMATA, MARIETTA D. BACHO AND MANOLO L. CENIDO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 170416 : June 22, 2011]

Facts: Respondents filed before the Labor Arbiter complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal
deductions, overriding commissions, unfair labor practice, moral and exemplary damages, and
actual damages against petitioner University Plans Incorporated. In the NLRC, the petitioner
filed a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond because it was under receivership and cannot dispose its
assets under a short notice. The NLRC denied the Motion contending that while it has the
discretion to reduce the appeal bond, it is nevertheless not persuaded that petitioner was
incapable of posting the required bond.

Issue: Whether the contention of the NLRC is correct.

Ruling: No. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is not precluded from
conducting a preliminary determination of the merit or lack of merit of a motion to reduce bond.
However. It erred in considering that the Petitioner has adequately proven that it is under no
means to provide the bond as it is under receivership.
Labor Law; Posting of Bond in Appeal to NLRC: Posting of bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides in part: Decisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x In case of a
judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
(Emphasis supplied.)x x x x.

Labor Law; Perfection of Appeal: Under the Rules, appeals involving monetary awards are
perfected only upon compliance with the following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment
of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the memorandum of appeal; and (3) payment of the required cash
or surety bond.While pertinent portions of Sections 4 and 6, Rule VI of the Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC read: SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL - a)
The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2)
verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon
and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the
appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten
or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii)
posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-
forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.

Labor Law; Reduction of Bond: No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to
the monetary award. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) Notably, however, under Section 6, Rule VI of
the NLRC's Revised Rules of Procedure, the bond may be reduced albeit only on meritorious
grounds and upon posting of a partial bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award. Suffice it to state that while said Rules "allows the Commission to reduce the amount of
the bond, the exercise of the authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant, but lies
within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds." [26]
Conversely the reduction of the bond is not warranted when no meritorious ground is shown to
justify the same; the appellant absolutely failed to comply with the requirement of posting a
bond, even if partial; or when the circumstances show the employer's unwillingness to ensure the
satisfaction of its workers' valid claims.

Labor Law; Meritotous Grounds on relaxation of Bond Requirement: The NLRC is not
precluded from conducting a preliminary determination of the merit or lack of merit of a motion
to reduce bond. [T]he bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been and
may be relaxed in meritorious cases. These cases include instances in which (1) there was
substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute
meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an
appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the
appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial
bond during the reglementary period. RuthCharmaineBPiedad
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), - versus -SPOUSES FIDEL and
FLORINDA R. SEE and SHERIFF MANUEL L. ARIMADO G.R. No. 170292
June 22, 2011

Facts: Respondent-spouses were the highest bidders in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a
property that was mortgaged to petitioner Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-ibig Fund
(Pag-ibig). They paid the bid price of P272,000.00 in cash to respondent Sheriff. Despite the
expiration of the redemption period, Pag-ibig refused to surrender its certificate of title because
the spouses haven’t paid yet. It was found out that the sheriff withdrew the money and used it
personally. The spouses filed a case against the Petitioners saying that Pag-IBIG must be liable
for the acts of Arimado as its agent. When the case was called for pre-trial conference, the parties
submitted their Compromise Agreement for the courts approval. It contains that Arimado
commits himself to pay the HDM and upon payment, the latter will release the title to the
spouses while the spouses shall withdraw all their claims. However, if the Sheriff escapes
liability, the HDMF must release the title nevertheless upon a writ of execution. Upon Failure of
Arimando to remit, the court granted the spouses prayer that the title of the property be delivered
to them. HDMF filed a motion but it was denied by the trial court and took no further action.
Pag-ibig filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. It contended that the
Decision was null and void because it was issued without affording petitioner the right to trial.

Issue: Whether certiorari was the proper remedy.

Ruling: A party that loses its right to appeal by its own negligence cannot seek refuge in the
remedy of a writ of certiorari.

Remedial Law; Certiorari: [C]ertiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last
recourse. It is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party. Pag-ibig belatedly
resorted to a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. Clearly, Pag-ibig lost its right to appeal and tried to
remedy the situation by resorting to certiorari. It is settled, however, that certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the [partys] own negligence or error in [the] choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a Rule 65
certiorari could still be resorted to, Pag-ibigs petition would still have to be dismissed for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Rule 65, Section 4 is very clear that the reglementary 60-day period is counted
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution being assailed, or from notice of the denial of
the motion [for reconsideration], and not from receipt of the writ of execution which seeks to
enforce the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The date of Pag-ibigs receipt of the copy of
the writ of execution is therefore immaterial for purposes of computing the timeliness of the
filing of the petition for certiorari. RuthCharmaineBPiedad
WILLIAM ENDELISEO BARROGA, - versus - DATA CENTER COLLEGE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and WILFRED BACTAD G.R. No. 174158
June 27, 2011

Facts: Petitioner was an Instructor in Data Center College Laoag City branch in Ilocos Norte. He
was transferred to the University of Northern Philippines (UNP) in Vigan, Ilocos Sur where the
school had a tie-up program. He received a P1,200.00 allowance for board and lodging during
his stint as instructor in UNP-Vigan. He was then transferred back to Data College. However,
petitioner declined the transfer due to the poor health condition of his father and the absence of
additional remuneration to defray expenses for board and lodging which constitutes implicit
diminution of his salary. He then filed for Constructive Dismissal alleging that the transfer is a
diminution in rank and pay. Respondents contended that they were only exercising management
prerogative for advancing the school’s interest.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is constructively dismissed.

Ruling: Petitioners transfer is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. Petitioners substantial

compliance calls
for the relaxation of the rules. Therefore, the CA should have given due course to the petition.

Remedial Law; Application of Rules of Procedure: The Court has time and again upheld the
theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure and not to override substantial justice.
These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided. The CA thus should not have outrightly dismissed petitioners
petition based on these procedural lapses.

Labor Law; Constructive Dismissal: Constructive dismissal is quitting because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or because of a demotion in rank
or a diminution of pay. It exists when there is a clear act of discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer which becomes unbearable for the employee to continue his
employment.

Labor Law; Diminution of benefits: But the rule against diminution of benefits is applicable
only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a
long period which is consistent and deliberate.. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

SPOUSES WILFREDO PALADA and BRIGIDA PALADA,* Petitioners, vs.

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and SHERIFF MAYO DELA CRUZ, Respondents. G.R.
No. 172227 June 29, 2011

Facts: Spouses Wilfredo and Brigida Palada, applied for a ₱3 million loan with the time loan
from respondent Solidbank Corporation (bank). Petitioners received from the bank the amount of
₱1 million as additional working capital evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a real
estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering several real properties situated in Santiago City.
Petitioners failed to pay the obligation so the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the
properties at public auction. Petitioners filed a Complaint for nullity of real estate mortgage
against the bank and respondent Sheriff Mayo dela Cruz. Petitioners alleged that the property
was included in the real estate without their consent. The bank contended that the collateral was
deficient.

Issue: Whether the real estate mortgage and the auction sale is valid.

Ruling: Yes. Claims of fraud and bad faith are unsubstantiated. There is nothing on the face of
the real estate mortgage contract to arouse any suspicion of insertion or forgery.

Civil Law; Perfection of Loan: A loan contract is perfected only upon the delivery of the object
of the contract.

Civil Law; Second Mortgage: Under our laws, a mortgagor is allowed to take a second or
subsequent mortgage on a property already mortgaged, subject to the prior rights of the previous
mortgages.

Remedial Law; Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Document: Besides, any irregularity in

the notarization or even the lack of notarization does not affect the validity of the document.
Absent any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, a notarized document enjoys the
presumption of regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

July

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES- versus - BINGKY CAMPOS and DANNY BOY

ACABO
G.R. No. 176061 July 4, 2011

Facts: The accused were charged with the murder ROMEO F. ABAD, 64 years of age. They
claimed self defense.

Issue: Whether the contention of self defense is tenable.

Ruling: No. We reiterate in this case the time-honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal
principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused,
the rule is reversed where the accused admits the commission of the crime and invokes self-
defense.

Criminal Law; Burden of Proof in Criminal cases: Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases
that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. However, once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but
raises a justifying circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot
rely on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be
doubted especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order.

Criminal Law; Self-Defense: The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, which the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the
accused to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the accused defending himself. The first element of unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression from
the person injured or killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel. As
has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim
disprove a plea of self-defense.

Criminal Law; Treachery: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur:
(a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and, (b) that
the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy: Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy [for] it may be deduced [from] the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there
is a common purpose to commit the crime. Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the incident, by
itself, is not a sufficient ground to hold a person liable as a conspirator. However, conspiracy
may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which when taken together indicate that
they are parts of the scheme to commit the crime. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

THE ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANINANG AND THE LAW FIRM OF QUISUMBING

TORRES, - versus -THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SALVACION
SERRANO LADANGA⃰ and AGUSTIN LADANGA,⃰ ⃰ AND BERNARDO ASENETA
G.R. No. 167284 July 6, 2011

Facts: Clemencia Aseneta, through her adopted son and judicially-appointed guardian,
respondent Bernardo Aseneta (Bernardo), filed a reconveyance case (Reconveyance Case)
against respondent-spouses Salvacion and Agustin Ladanga (spouses Ladanga). The complaint
sought to annul the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by Clemencia in favor of the spouses
Ladanga over a Diliman property and a Cubao property on grounds of lack of intent to convey
and lack of consideration. Clemencia died and was substituted by Bernardo. A Probation case
was in order. Maninang claimed that the entire estate was bequeathed to her by the deceased in
her last will and testament. Bernardo countered that the will is void on the ground of preterition.
A compromise agreement was executed by Bernardo, Maninang, and their respective counsels.
The compromise agreement identified certain properties of the estate and provided for their
distribution among the parties. According to Bernardo, the parties to the Reconveyance Case
entered into a Compromise Agreement with respect to the Cubao property to sell to an
unmentioned third party. After 20 years, it was finally decided in favor of Clemencias estate.

Issue: Whether petitioners have a right to adjudicate their claims to the Cubao property in the
appeal in the Reconveyance Case, such that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in
denying them the opportunity to participate therein.

Ruling: Respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not allow petitioners to
join and participate in the appeal in the Reconveyance Case. Petitioners cause of action is
independent of the cause of action in the Reconveyance Case and cannot possibly be litigated
without causing undue delay and prejudice to the respondents, who have already endured more
than two decades only to resolve the issues in the Reconveyance Case.

Remedial Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion: An act will be struck down for having been done
with grave abuse of discretion only when the abuse of discretion is patent and gross. Grave abuse
of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, - versus - F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC.

G.R. No. 173259 July 25, 2011

Facts: FFCCI opened savings/current or so-called combo account and dollar savings account
PNB. Its President Felipe Cruz and Secretary-Treasurer Angelita A. Cruz were the named
signatories for the said accounts. The said signatories on separate but coeval dates left for and
returned from the Unites States of America. While they were thus out of the country,
applications for cashiers and managers [checks] bearing Felipes [signature] were presented to
and both approved by the PNB. When Angelita returned to the country, she had occasion to
examine the PNB statements of account of [FFCCI] for the months of February to August and
she noticed the deductions. Claiming that these were unauthorized and fraudulently made,
[FFCCI] requested PNB to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks. PNB
refused, and thus constrained [FFCCI] filed the instant suit for damages against the PNB and its
own accountant Aurea Caparas (or Caparas). PNB contended that they exercised due diligence.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it found PNB guilty of negligence.

Ruling: No. As between a bank and its depositor, where the banks negligence is the proximate
cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, the greater proportion of
the loss shall be borne by the bank. PNB is guilty of negligence, specifically, with respect to
PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in the subject applications for managers check which could
have prevented the loss.

Mercantile Law; Degree of Responsibility by Banks: As we have often ruled, the banking
business is impressed with public trust. A higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative
to the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary business enterprise. Thus, the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and employees is far greater
than those of ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises. In the case at bar, PNB failed
to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent the fraud. Where
the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory
negligence, we allocated the damages between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

PRUDENTIAL BANK, - versus - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

G.R. No. 180390 July 27, 2011

Facts: Petitioner received from the respondent a Final Assessment Notice and a Demand Letter
for deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) for the taxable year 1995 on its Repurchase
Agreement with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas [BSP], Purchase of Treasury Bills from the
BSP, and on its Savings Account Plus [SAP] product. Petitioner protested the assessment on the
ground that the documents subject matter of the assessment are not subject to DST. However,
respondent denied the protest. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA.

Issue: Whether the CTA en banc erred in not allowing the withdrawal of the petition and/or
cancellation of the assessment on petitioners [sap] on the ground that petitioner had already paid
and substantially complied.

Ruling: No. To avail of the IVAP, a taxpayer must pay the 100% basic tax of the original
assessment of the BIR or the CTA Decision, whichever is higher and submit the letter of
termination and authority to cancel assessment signed by the respondent. This was not complied
with by the bank.

Taxation Law; Certificate of Deposit: A certificate of deposit is defined as a written

acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the
bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other
person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the
depositor is created. A certificate of deposit need not be in a specific form; thus, a passbook of an
interest-earning deposit account issued by a bank is a certificate of deposit drawing interest
because it is considered a written acknowledgement by a bank that it has accepted a deposit of a
sum of money from a depositor.[

Taxation Law; Savings Bank Deposit is subject to Documentary Stamp Tax: Savings Plus
Deposit Account, which has the following features: 1. Amount deposited is withdrawable
anytime; 2. The same is evidenced by a passbook; and 3. The rate of interest offered is the
prevailing market rate, provided the depositor would maintain his minimum balance in thirty
(30) days at the minimum, and should he withdraw before the period, his deposit would earn the
regular savings deposit rate; is subject to DST as it is essentially the same as the Special/Super
Savings Deposit Account and the Savings Account-Fixed Savings Deposit which are considered
certificates of deposit drawing interests. Similarly, in this case, although the money deposited in
a SAP is payable anytime, the withdrawal of the money before the expiration of 30 days results
in the reduction of the interest rate. In the same way, a time deposit withdrawn before its
maturity results to a lower interest rate and payment of bank charges or penalties.
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

JERRY MAPILI, - versus - PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC./NATIVIDAD

NISCE,
G.R. No. 172506 July 27, 2011

Facts: Petitioner was hired as a bus conductor of the respondent bus lines. He was caught by
PRBLIs field inspector extending a free ride to a lady passenger. The passenger is the wife of his
co-employee. Notably, that was already the third time that petitioner committed said violation.
After an investigation and preventive suspension, he was finally terminated. Petitioner filed with
the NLRC a Complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue: Whether petitioner was correctly dismissed.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner’s violation of company rules was intentional, wilful, serious and a just
cause for dismissal. Petitioners series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious
misconduct. His record of offenses of the same nature as his present infraction justifies his
dismissal.

Labor Law; Previous sanctions does not bar appropriate actions on subsequent infractions:
Nor can it be plausibly argued that because the offenses were already given the appropriate
sanctions, they cannot be taken against him. They are relevant in assessing private respondents
liability for the present violation for the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty. To
sustain private respondents argument that the past violation should not be considered is to
disregard the warnings previously issued to him. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

JESUS M. MONTEMAYOR, vs. VICENTE D. MILLORA.

G.R. No. 168251 July 27, 2011

Facts: Respondent Atty. Vicente D. Millora (Vicente) obtained a loan of ₱400,000.00 from
petitioner Dr. Jesus M. Montemayor (Jesus) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by
Vicente. The parties executed a loan contract with monthly interest and that Vicente had already
paid the amount of ₱100,000.00 as well as the ₱8,000.00 representing the interest. The interest
was increased with Vicente’s consent. The latter was only able to pay a deficient amount- his last
payment. After several demands unheeded, Montemayor filed a case against him. The case has
attained finality in the trial court.

Issue: Whether an appeal is still proper.

Ruling: No. When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal, it must be
executed strictly according to its tenor.

Remedial Law; Finality of Judgment: Well-settled is the rule that a decision that has attained
finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains
finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded
on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time
fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role
of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of
peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

Remedial law;Principle of Immutability of Final Judgment; Exceptions: Upon finality of the

judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for
correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after
it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment."

Civil Law; Compensation: ARTICLE 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in
their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other. ARTICLE 1279. In order that
compensation may be proper, it is necessary: (1) That each one of the obligors be bound
principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts
consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and
also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be due; (4) That they
be liquidated and demandable; (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. When the
defendant, who has an unliquidated claim, sets it up by way of counterclaim, and a judgment is
rendered liquidating such claim, it can be compensated against the plaintiff’s claim from the
moment it is liquidated by judgment. We have restated this in Solinap v. Hon. Del Rosario35
where we held that compensation takes place only if both obligations are liquidated.

Civil Law; When debt is liquidated: "A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are
determined. It is not necessary that it be admitted by the debtor. Nor is it necessary that the credit
appear in a final judgment in order that it can be considered as liquidated; it is enough that its
exact amount is known. And a debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed
already in definite figures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of
the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation x x x."
RuthCharmaineBPiedad

August

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, - versus- ALAIN⃰ JUNIAT, WINWOOD

APPAREL, INC., WINGYAN APPAREL, INC., NONWOVEN FABRIC PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 171569 August 1, 2011

Facts: Petitioner alleged that Juniat, acting for and in behalf of Winwood and Wingyan,
executed a promissory note over several motorized sewing machines and other allied equipment
to secure their obligation arising from export bills transactions and that as additional security for
the obligation, Juniat executed a Continuing Surety Agreement in favor of petitioner. It remained
unpaid and the mortgaged motorized sewing machines are insufficient to answer for the
obligation. The RTC issued writs of preliminary attachment and replevin in favor of petitioner.
Nonwoven was served writs. They contended that the unnotarized Chattel Mortgage executed in
favor of petitioner has no binding effect on Nonwoven and that it has a better title over the
motorized sewing machines and equipment because these were assigned to it by Juniat pursuant
to their Agreement. Petitioner sold the attached properties. Nonwowen moved to cite the officers
of petitioner in contempt for selling the attached properties, but the RTC denied the same on the
ground that Union Bank acted in good faith.

Issue: Whether the Union Bank of the Philippines had a better right over the machineries
seized/levied upon in the proceedings before the trial court and/or the proceeds of the sale
thereof.

Ruling: Nonwoven had to prove that it has a better right of possession or ownership over the
attached properties. This it failed to do.

Civil Law; Pledge: Under Article 2096 of the Civil Code, [a] pledge shall not take effect against
third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a
public instrument. Hence, just like the chattel mortgage executed in favor of petitioner, the
pledge executed by Juniat in favor of Nonwoven cannot bind petitioner.

Civil Law; Dacion en pago: It bears stressing that there can be no transfer of ownership if the
delivery of the property to the creditor is by way of security. In fact, in case of doubt as to
whether a transaction is one of pledge or dacion en pago, the presumption is that it is a pledge as
this involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, - versus -CIRIACO JUMAMOY and HEIRS OF

ANTONIO GO PACE, G.R. No. 169901
August 3, 2011
Facts: A case for Reconveyance was decided by the RTC of Digos City ordering the exclusion of
a parcel of land covered registered in the name of Antonio Go Pace (Antonio) pertaining to
Sesinando Jumamoy (Sesinando), Ciriacos predecessor-in-interest. The RTC found that the lot
was erroneously included in Antonios free patent application which became the basis for the
issuance of his OCT. It then ordered the heirs of Antonio to reconvey said portion to Ciriaco.
The RTC Decision became final and executory but the Deed of Conveyance issued in favor of
Ciriaco could not be annotated since said title was already cancelled. Apparently, Antonio and
his wife Rosalia mortgaged the lot to PNB as security for a series of loans and thereafter, they
failed to pay their obligation. PNB foreclosed the mortgage , thus the complaint.

Issue: Whether the PNB is an innocent mortgagee/purchaser, thus entitled to the lot in question.

Ruling: No. PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith from the time the land
was offered as collateral. However, PNB miserably failed to overcome this burden. There was no
showing at all that it conducted an investigation; that it observed due diligence and prudence by
checking for flaws in the title; that it verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the
land; and, that it visited subject premises to determine its actual condition before accepting the
same as collateral.

Civil Law; Innocent purchaser: Undoubtedly, our land registration statute extends its protection
to an innocent purchaser for value, defined as one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for
the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property. An innocent purchaser for value includes an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value .

Commercial Law; Diligence required of Banking Institutions: A banking institution is

expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of
the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Incontrovertibility of Title: Also, the incontrovertibility of a title
does not preclude a rightful claimant to a property from seeking other remedies because it was
never the intention of the Torrens system to perpetuate fraud. As explained in Vda. de Recinto v.
Inciong: The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he does not
by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. It is evident
from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question and therefore the area should be
conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set
aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
Civil Law; Action for Reconveyance: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes. An action for reconveyance based on implied trust
prescribes in 10 years as it is an obligation created by law, to be counted from the date of
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. This rule, however, applies only when the plaintiff
or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court
of Appeals, we said that there is no prescription when in an action for reconveyance, the claimant
is in actual possession of the property because this in effect is an action for quieting of title.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Quieting of title: [S]ince if a person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right
to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The
reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses

SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, G.R. No. 174654
August 17, 2011

Facts: Petitioner extended a loan to private respondent spouses Alonto secured by a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over lots located in Cebu City. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by
spouses Alonto in Manila but was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto
appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his
name and sold the lots to third persons. He was charged with Estafa through falsification of
public document. The trial court found that the Petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses.
Nevertheless, he was also found Guilty by the said court. The CA opined that the conviction of
the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the
offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial courts finding with respect to
petitioners civil liability.

Issue: Whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal.

Ruling: No. Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the
petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.

Criminal Law; Judgment of Acquittal: It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a

judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the
offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.

Criminal Law; Civil Liability: In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,[26] we elucidated on the civil liability of
the accused despite his exoneration in this wise: While an act or omission is felonious because it
is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x Simply stated, civil liability
arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes
damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven
that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

ATIKO TRANS, INC. And CHENG LIE NAVIGATION CO., LTD., - versus -
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., G.R. No. 167545
August 17, 2011

Where service of summons upon the defendant principal is coursed thru its co-defendant agent,
and the latter happens to be a domestic corporation, the rules on service of summons upon a
domestic private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be
said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of both defendants. And insofar as the principal
is concerned, such jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by the agents subsequent voluntary
appearance.

40 coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board M/S Katjana in Kaohsiung, Taiwan for
shipment to Manila. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading issued by petitioner Cheng Lie
Navigation Co., Ltd. (Cheng Lie) with Oriental Tin Can & Metal Sheet Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(Oriental) as the notify party. The cargoes were insured against all risks per Marine Insurance
Policy issued by respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential). M/S Katjana
arrived in the port of Manila. Upon discharge of the cargoes, it was found that one of the
tinplates was damaged, crumpled and dented on the edges. The sea van in which it was kept
during the voyage was also damaged, presumably while still on board the vessel and during the
course of the voyage. Oriental then filed its claim against the policy. Satisfied that Orientals
claim was compensable, Prudential paid Oriental. Prudential filed a Complaint for sum of money
against Cheng Lie and Atiko Trans, Inc. (Atiko). Later, Prudential filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default,alleging among others that summons was served upon petitioners thru
cashier Cristina Figueroa but a responsive pleding was not filed. Although assisted by the same
counsel, Cheng Lie filed its own Memorandum of Appeal maintaining that the MeTC never
acquired jurisdiction over its person.

Issue: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction of Atiko .

Ruling: Yes. When Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for
Reconsideration, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over
its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary
appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot.

Remedial Law; Review on Certiorari under Rule 45: Well-settled is the rule that in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law can be raised. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, none is present in this case. [A]s a matter of x x x procedure,
[this] Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, [especially] when
such findings were [affirmed by the RTC and the CA. These] factual determination[s], as a
matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserve great weight and shall not be disturbed on
appeal x x x. [I]t is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
or premises supportive of the factual holding of the lower courts.

Remedial Law; Summons; Voluntary Appearance: True, when the defendant is a domestic
corporation, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendants voluntary appearance
without expressly objecting to the courts jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, viz: SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.

Remedial Law; Actions considered Voluntary Appearance: In Palma v. Galvez, this Court
reiterated the oft-repeated rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. The issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be
seasonably raised. Failing to do so, a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an
affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying to
obtain such relief.

Remedial Law; Service of Summons; Foreign Private Juridical Entity: SEC. 12. Service upon
foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has
transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official
designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Elucidating on the above provision of the Rules of Court, this Court declared in Pioneer
International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.[31] that when the defendant is a foreign juridical entity, service
of summons may be made upon: 1. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose; 2. The government official designated by law to receive summons if the
corporation does not have a resident agent; or, 3. Any of the corporations officers or agents
within the Philippines.

Remedial Law; Service to agent of Co-defendant: To rule otherwise would create an absurd
situation where service of summons is valid upon the purported principal but not on the latters
co-defendant cum putative agent despite the fact that service was coursed thru said agent. Indeed,
in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant foreign private
juridical entity under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there must be prior valid service
of summons upon the agent of such defendant. RuthCharmaineBPiedad

EUGENIO BASBAS, TEOFILO ARAS, RUFINO ARAS, GERVACIO BASBAS, ISMAEL

ARAS, EUGENIO ARAS, SIMFRONIO ARAS, FELICIANO ARAS, ROSITA ARAS,
EUGENIO BASBAS, JR. and SPOUSES PABLITO BASARTE and MARCELINA
BASBAS BASARTE, vs. BEATA SAYSON and ROBERTO SAYSON, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 172660 August 24, 2011

Facts: Respondent spouses filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in
Leyte. The said application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and herein
petitioners. The court adjudicated to the spouses Sayson said agricultural land and approving its
registration under their names.The oppositors filed their appeal. The following year a Title was
issued to the spouses Sayson. An Alias Writ of Possession was issued but cannot be implemented
in view of the refusal of Eugenio Sr. and his son Eugenio Basbas, Jr. (Eugenio Jr.). A relocation
survey was conducted. The RTC petitioners to vacate the subject property.

Issue: Whether the grant of respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary
judgment is proper.

Ruling: Yes.

Remedial Law; Difference between Summary Judgment and Judgment of the Pleadings: The
existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or
fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from
one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On
the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist – i.e. facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer – but
the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by
affidavits, depositions, or admissions. x x x.

Remedial Law; Genuine Issue: Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings
from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the
Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of
the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary
judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A ‘genuine issue’ means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."

Remedial Law; Enforcement of Judgment: The Rules of Court referring to the execution of
judgment, particularly Rule 39, Sec. 6, provides a mechanism by which the judgment that had
not been enforced within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date the said
judgment has become final and executory could be enforced. In fact, the rule states: "…judgment
may be enforced by action."

Civil Law; Co-owners my bring actions: As a co-owner, he may, by himself alone, bring an
action for the recovery of the co-owned property pursuant to the well-settled principle that "in a
co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of his co-owners." RuthCharmaineBPiedad

CATACUTAN VS. PEOPLE 656 SCRA 524, AUGUST 31, 2011

Topics: Due Process; Evidence
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 in defying the
orders of the CHED and CSC to implement the promotional appointments of private
complainant. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since
he was not able to present the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795
which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing
to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
Issue:
WON petitioner was deprived of the right to due process
Held:
No
Ruling:
Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,
argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. There is also no denial of due
process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of
evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This
is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this
case, concerns an administrative matter.
As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked, the findings in administrative cases are not binding upon
the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and
incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. As observed by the appellate court, if the
petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s Decision for whatever it may be worth, he
could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. As things stand, the CA Decision does not
form part of the records of the case, thus it has no probative weight. Jose”Kit”Cruz

VILLARIN VS. PEOPLE 656 SCRA 500 , AUGUST 31, 2011

Topics: Criminal Law|ForestryCode|Qualified Theft
Facts:
Villarin was convicted for violation of Sec. 68 of PD No. 705, for obtaining forest products
(flitches) without the necessary authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations. Petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal
gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the
timber, which were the object of the offense.
Issue:
WON the prosecution had discharged the burden of proving all the elements of the offense
charged.
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. The
Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents. The evidence of the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary
legal documents.
Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the timber for the
repair of the Batinaybridge. However, he could not present any document to show that his
possession thereof was legal and pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations. There is no
dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal
documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and
storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Jose”Kit”Cruz
AURELIO VS. PEOPLE 656 SCRA 464, AUGUST 31, 2011
Topics: Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Presumption of Regularity
Facts:
As a result of a buy-bust operation, petitioner was convicted of violation of Sections 5 and 11
(Illicit sale and possession), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. Petitioner
assigns as error the trial court relying on the presumption that the police officers regularly
performed their duties in conducting the entrapment operation. He insists that the shabu was
planted by the police officers and that they attempted to extort money from him in exchange for
his freedom.
Issue:
WON the apprehending officers acted with regularity in the performance of official duty
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
There is simply no evidence to bolster his defenses other than his self-serving assertions.
Moreover, we note that the petitioner did not file any complaint for frame-up or extortion against
the buy-bust team. Such inaction belies his claim of frame-up and that the police officers were
extorting money from him. His allegations therefore are simply implausible.
In the absence of evidence of any ill-motive on the part of the police officers who apprehended
the petitioner, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed was not overcome since there was
no proof showing that SPO2 Bacero and PO1 Jacuba were impelled by improper motive. There
is, therefore, no basis to suspect the veracity of their testimonies.
Notes.—No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when
he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. Jose”Kit”Cruz

ROM VS. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC. 656 SCRA 691 , SEPTEMBER 05, 2011
Topics: Civil Procedure|Appeals
Facts:
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted exemption from CARP coverage to
respondent’s 27 parcels of land. Petitioners farmer-beneficiaries claim grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the CA which upheld the grant of exemption. Petitioners assert that a certiorari
petition is the proper mode since what they principally questioned before the CA was the
jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of respondent’s application for exemption.
Issue:
WON petitioners availed of the proper remedy
Held:
No
Ruling:
By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition
for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal.
It bears stressing that it is the law which confers upon the DAR the jurisdiction over applications
for exemption. And, “[w]hen a court, tribunal or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise
of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of
judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners posit that an exceptional circumstance in this case calls for the issuance of the writ,
i.e., they stand to lose the land they till without receiving the appropriate disturbance
compensation. Petitioners’ fear that they will be deprived of the land they till without payment of
disturbance compensation is totally without basis. There being no substantial wrong or
substantial injustice to be prevented here, petitioners cannot therefore invoke the exception to the
general rule that a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy.
Jose”Kit”Cruz

SWIFT FOODS, INC. VS. MATEO, JR. 657 SCRA 394 , SEPTEMBER 12, 2011
Topics: Civil Law|Contracts|Damages
Facts:
This case involves respondents’ complaint against Swift to surrender their land titles. Swift
refused to return the titles on the ground that they were being held as security for respondents’
liabilities for their breach of the warehousing agreement. Respondents denied incurring any
liability under the agreement.
Issue:
WON respondents committed a breach of the warehousing agreement for which they may be
held liable to Swift
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
The Warehousing Agreement states that the warehouseman should only release stocks to Swift’s
sales personnel who present a clearance to withdraw stocks. The records reveal that, contrary to
this provision, respondents released stocks without the necessary clearance. When asked to
explain his actions which were in contrast to his contractual undertakings, respondent Jose
admitted not reading, much less understanding, the warehouse agreement. Thus, respondents’
breach of the Warehousing Agreement is clear. A contract is the law between the parties and
those who are guilty of negligence in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.
Unless a contracting party cannot read or does not under-stand the language in which the
agreement was written, he is presumed to know the import of his contract and is bound thereby.
Not having alleged any of the foregoing, respondent Jose has no excuse for his actions.
Jose”Kit”Cruz

DUARTE VS. DURAN 657 SCRA 607, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

Topics: Civil Law|Sales|Perfection of the Contract of Sale
Facts:
Respondent offered to sell a laptop computer to petitioner for P15,000 on installment. Petitioner
gave P5,000 as initial payment. Petitioner gave her second installment of P3,000 to Dy, a
common friend, who signed the handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner as proof of
payment. But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance petitioner offered to pay only
P2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth P10,000.00. Respondent sent petitioner a
demand letter. Petitioner however denied writing the receipt, and claimed that there was no
contract of sale.
Issue:
WON there exists a contract of sale
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
There was a contract of sale between the parties, and the absence of a written contract of sale
does not mean otherwise. A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the
object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment. Once perfected, the parties are bound by it
whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required.
Respondent only needed to show by a preponderance of evidence that there was an oral contract
of sale, which he did by submitting in evidence his own affidavit, the affidavit of his witness Dy,
the receipt and the demand letter. As we see it then, the evidence submitted by respondent weigh
more than petitioner’s bare denials. Other than her denials, no other evidence was submitted by
petitioner to prove that the laptop was not sold but was only given as security for respondent’s
loan. Jose”Kit”Cruz

KALAW VS. FERNANDEZ 657 SCRA 822 , SEPTEMBER 19, 2011

Topics: Family Code|Annulment of Marriage|Psychological Incapacity
Facts:
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity
of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD).
Issue:
WON petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Held:
No
Ruling:
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described
as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. What transpired between the parties
is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best
of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage. Jose”Kit”Cruz

BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-METRO MANILA VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS 658 SCRA 127 , SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
Topics: Remedial Law|Appeals|Labor Law
Facts:
The Court rendered a decision ordering respondent BPI to pay petitioner Uybackwages for her
illegal dismissal. In Uy’s computation, she based the amount of her back wages on the current
wage level and included all the increases in wages and benefits under the CBA that were granted
during the entire period of her illegal dismissal. These include the following: Cost of Living
Allowance (COLA), Financial Assistance, Quarterly Bonus, CBA Signing Bonus, Uniform
Allowance, Medicine Allowance, Dental Care, Medical and Doctor’s Allowance, Teller’s
Functional Allowance, Vacation Leave, Sick Leave, Holiday Pay, Anniversary Bonus, Burial
Assistance and Omega watch
Issue:
WON the computation of backwages is correct
Held:
No
Ruling:
Jurisprudence dictates that such award of back wages is without qualifications and deductions,
that is, “unqualified by any wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by co-
workers who were not dismissed.” It is likewise settled that the base figure to be used in the
computation of back wages is pegged at the wage rate at the time of the employee’s dismissal
unqualified by deductions, increases and/or modifications.
Thus, we find that the CA properly disregarded the salary increases and correctly computed Uy’s
back wages based on the salary rate at the time of Uy’s dismissal plus the regular allowances that
she had been receiving likewise at the time of her dismissal. The CA also correctly deleted the
signing bonus, medicine allowance, medical and doctor’s allowance and dental care allowance,
as they were all not proven to have been granted to Uy at the time of her dismissal from service.
Jose”Kit”Cruz

CRUZ VS. GINGOYON 658 SCRA 254 , SEPTEMBER 28, 2011

Topics: Courts|Hierarchy of Courts
Facts:
Petitioner was found guilty of direct contempt by respondent judge for statements made in the
former’s pleading. Petitioner filed an urgent ex parte motion to post bond and quash warrant of
arrest with the respondent court. In said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred that he already filed
a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The respondent court denied the ex parte
motion based on petitioner’s failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court
Issue:
WON abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent court in denying the ex parte motion
Held:
No
Ruling:
In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion there
being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. It is therefore clear that at the time
that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court, he has not yet availed of the
remedy of certiorari. In fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court
that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. “A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against first level (‘inferior’) courts should be filed with the [RTC], and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In
consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of
any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. Jose”Kit”Cruz

PEOPLE VS. SALES, 658 SCRA 367, OCTOBER 03, 2011

Topics: Criminal Law|MitigatingCircumstance|Lack of Intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong
Facts:
The accused is charged with parricide for inflicting physical injuries on his son which led to the
latter’s death. Appellant admits beating his sons as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering
Noemar to death. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting
of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth.
Issue:
WON accused is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant
killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of (the mother)
Maria and (Noemar’s younger brother) Junior. As to the third element, appellant himself
admitted that the deceased is his child.
It is clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their
misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the
injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart
ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and
uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant
committed the crime of parricide. Jose”Kit”Cruz

PEOPLE VS. YANSON, 658 SCRA 385, OCTOBER 03, 2011

Topics: Criminal Law|Murder|Damages|CivilIndemnity|Death of a Party
Facts:
Appellant was found guilty of murder for stabbing one CarlitoMagan several times which caused
his death. The trial court found the testimony of Galfo that he personally saw appellant stab
Magan at the back as credible because he was positioned only five arm’s length away from the
victim. Appellant asserts that in Galfo’s sworn statement before the police officers, he did not
identify him as the assailant; notwithstanding that he (Galfo) was familiar with him. Appellant
thus concludes that all these circumstances create doubt as to whether he was indeed the
assailant.
Issue:
WON alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn
statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment
Held:
No
Ruling:
The failure to specifically mention his name does not foreclose the fact that Yanson was the
assailant. It must be recalled that during his testimony in court, Galfo positively and categorically
identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As such, any alleged inconsistency in the
sworn statement of Galfo vis-à-vis his testimony in open court is more apparent that real.
[T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a
witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to
justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since
ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jose”Kit”Cruz

CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION VS. ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC., 659

SCRA 137, OCTOBER 17, 2011
Topics: Corporation Law
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent ABB entered into a contract for the repair of petitioner’s Kiln Drive
Motor. Petitioner suffered a loss of production, labor costs and rental of crane as a result of
unsuccessful repair. Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
respondent corporation and respondent Erikson, as Vice-President of the Service Division of
respondent ABB.
Issue:
WON respondent Erikson can be sued in his personal capacity
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Petitioner is entitled to penalties but is not entitled to recover production loss, labor cost, and the
rental of the crane.
Respondent Eriksson, however, cannot be made jointly and severally liable for the penalties.
There is no showing that respondent Eriksson directed or participated in the repair of the Kiln
Drive Motor or that he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing the affairs of
respondent ABB. It is a basic principle that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from the persons composing or representing it; hence, personal liability attaches only in
exceptional cases, such as when the director, trustee, or officer is guilty of bad faith or gross
negligence in directing the affairs of the corporation. Jose”Kit”Cruz

HO WAI PANG VS. PEOPLE, 659 SCRA 624, OCTOBER 19, 2011
Topics: Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Conspiracy|Witnesses
Facts:
Petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for
carrying and transporting shabu into the country.
Petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer
during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not
excluding evidence taken during such investigation.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in not excluding evidence taken during investigation
Held:
No
Ruling:
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning
by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 1231
of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said
constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused
as against himself. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in
the course of custodial investigation.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and
subsequently used in evidence against him. Petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the
strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and
not on the basis of any confession or admission. Jose”Kit”Cruz

VALENZONA VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION, 659 SCRA 642, OCTOBER 19,
2011
Topics: Labor Law|Employees’ Compensation
Facts:
Petitioner complained of chest pains while working on board respondent’s vessel. He was
diagnosed with Hypertensive cardiovascular disease and congestive heart failure” and declared
as unfit to work. His claim for disability benefits was denied because the CBA provision
awarding the same refers to permanent disability suffered by the seafarer resulting from an
accident and not from an illness.
Issue:
WON petitioner is entitled to receive permanent disability benefits
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he lose[s] the use of any part of his body. Total disability, on the
other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of
similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In
disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity
to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.
Petitioner herein was medically repatriated to the Philippines on October 8, 2001. However, it
was only on April 25, 2002 or after a lapse of 199 days that Dr. Cruz issued a certification
declaring him fit to work. Thus, we declare herein, that petitioner’s disability is considered
permanent and total because the “fit to work” certification was issued by Dr. Cruz only on April
25, 2002, or more than 120 days after he was medically repatriated on October 8, 2001.
Jose”Kit”Cruz

DELA MERCED VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), 661

SCRA 83, NOVEMBER 23, 2011
Topics: Remedial Law|CivilProcedure|Notice of Lis Pendens
Facts:
The GSIS foreclosed on several mortgaged parcels of land that were the subject of litigation. The
lots were conveyed by GSIS to respondent spouses Manlongat. Petitioner caused the annotation
of lispendenson the title and the Court ordered the nullification of the foreclosure and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of petitioners as co-owners thereof.
Issue:
WON a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat can be enforced against their
successors-in-interest or holders of derivative titles
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
It is not disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lispendens on TCT No. 23554, which
covers Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, as early as September 21, 1984. On July 29, 1985 and August 24,
1998, TCT No. 23554 was cancelled with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 and new individual
titles were issued to Victorino and Dimaguila. Both titles had the notice of lispendens which was
carried over from TCT No. 23554. Ineluctably, both Victorino and Dimaguila had notice of the
litigation involving GSIS’s ownership over the subject properties, and were bound by the
outcome of the litigation. When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of
lispendens, such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of the litigation.
The existence of these entries on Dimaguila’s and Victorino’s titles bars any defense of good
faith against petitioners and effectively makes Dimaguila and Victorino mere privies of GSIS
and subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the subject properties, which (as it turns out)
is none at all. Jose”Kit”Cruz

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM VS. BESITAN, 661 SCRA 186,

NOVEMBER 23, 2011
Topics: Employees’ Compensation|Evidence
Facts:
Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines as a Bank Examiner.
He was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and
thus, had to undergo a kidney transplant. Believing that his working condition increased his risk
of contracting the disease, Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits which
was denied as Besitan’s ailment is not as an occupational disease.
Issue:
WON Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
When Besitan entered the government service in 1976, he was given a clean bill of health. In
2005, he was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis.
It would appear therefore that the nature of his work could have increased his risk of contracting
the disease. His frequent travels to remote areas in the country could have exposed him to certain
bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection, which in turn could have caused his disease. Delaying his
urination during his long trips to the provinces could have also increased his risk of contracting
his disease.
Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the employee’s working
condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a connection between his
work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal
relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease.
Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation proceedings; thus, any doubt
should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social legislations, like PD No. 626,
were enacted. Jose”Kit”Cruz
MAHINAY VS. GAKO, JR., 661 SCRA 274, NOVEMBER 28, 2011
Topics: Civil Law|Mortgages|LisPendens
Facts:
Several parcels of land were subject of a complaint initiated by petitioner; during the pendency
of which, he caused the annotation of an adverse claim and then a Notice of Lis Pendenson the
title thereof. One of the parcels of land is in the possession of respondent Sorensen by virtue of a
Real Estate Mortgage executed by the owners subsequent to the filing of Mahinay’s complaint.
Sorensen insists that she merely relied on the four corners of said TCT which at the time of the
transaction did not contain any annotation of lispendens.
Issue:
WON Sorensen is an innocent mortgagee for value, and thus has the superior right
Held:
No
Ruling:
True, when a mortgagee relies upon what appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money
in all good faith on the basis of the title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that
the latter’s title was defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien
upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected.
As borne out by the records, Mahinay’s Notice of Lis Pendens was duly annotated on the
original copy of TCT No. 117531 as early as August 17, 1994. On the other hand, the Real Estate
Mortgage upon which Sorensen based her alleged superior right was executed only on October
27, 1994 and inscribed at the back of said title only on the following day, October 28, 1994. The
prior registration of Mahinay’s Notice of Lis Pendens bound the whole world, including
Sorensen. It charged her with notice that the land being offered to her as security for the loan is
under litigation and that whatever rights she may acquire by virtue of the Real Estate Mortgage
are subject to the outcome of the case. Having registered his instrument ahead of Sorensen’s Real
Estate Mortgage, Mahinay’s Notice of Lis Pendens takes precedence over the said Real Estate
Mortgage. Jose”Kit”Cruz

HIPOLITO VS. CINCO, 661 SCRA 312, NOVEMBER 28, 2011

Topics: Administrative Law|National Building Code
Facts:
A building owned by petitioner-spouses was declared by the Office of the Building Official
(OBO) to be dangerous and ruinous and ordered to be demolished. The resolution of the OBO
and issuance of the demolition order was affirmed by the DPWH and the Office of the President
(OP).
Issue:
WON the issuance of the OBO Resolution and Demolition Order was proper and whether the
CA erred when it affirmed the resolutions of the OP and the Secretary of the DPWH
Held:
Yes, No
Ruling:
[I]t is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and
demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.”33 This
authority emanates from Sections 214 and 215 of the National Building Code. There is,
therefore, no question as to the authority of the OBO to render the challenged issuances.
Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which the resolution and demolition order were
issued is evident. In the case at bench, the OBO, based on its assessment of the buildings,
deemed it necessary to recommend and order the demolition of the said buildings, having found
them dilapidated and deteriorated by up to 80%.
Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of
the OBO performed their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. The
conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved after thoroughly conducting their
ocular inspections and hearings and considering all pieces of evidence presented before them,
which finding was affirmed by the CA, must now be regarded with great respect and finality by
this Court. Jose”Kit”Cruz

PEOPLE VS. CONCILLADO 661 SCRA 363, NOVEMBER 28, 2011

Topics: Criminal Law|Murder|Actual Damages
Facts:
Appellant admitted that he was the one who inflicted all the 26 wounds on the victim, although
he claimed that he was only acting in self-defense. Appellant was charged with murder. Neither
was the CA convinced of his self-defense theory However, for lack of evidence to establish the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA convicted Edgar only
of the crime of homicide.
Issue:
WON the crime committed was homicide only
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
We agree with the CA that Edgar could be held liable only for the crime of homicide and not
murder.
In the instant case, the testimony of Lorenzo having been properly discredited by the CA, the
prosecution has no evidence to show how the attack was commenced or how it was perpetrated.
There is also no evidence to show that Edgar decided to kill Diosdado and has clung to such
determination even after a sufficient time has elapsed. Consequently, there is no basis for us to
appreciate the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Jose”Kit”Cruz
POLSOTIN, JR. VS. DE GUIA ENTERPRISES, INC. 661 SCRA 523 , DECEMBER 05,
2011
Topics: Remedial Law|LaborLaw|Due Process
Facts:
Petitioners allege that they were dismissed without cause and due process by respondents. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint for lack of merit. Without the assistance of counsel,
petitioners an appeal with the NLRC which was denied for their failure to append thereto a
certificate of non-forum shopping and proof of service upon the other party.
Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to due consideration of their petition
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
As held in a case, a non-lawyer litigant cannot be expected to be well-versed on the rules of
procedure as even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. Aware that
petitioners are not represented by counsel, the CA could have been more prudent by giving
petitioners time to engage the services of a lawyer or at least by reminding them of the
importance of retaining one. It is worthy to mention at this point that the right to counsel, being
intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the Constitution to any person whether
the proceeding is administrative, civil or criminal. The CA should have extended some degree of
liberality so as to give the party a chance to prove their cause with a lawyer to represent or to
assist them.
A careful consideration of the facts of the case convinces us that petitioners’ appeal should have
been given due course. Petitioners were never really afforded an opportunity to rebut
respondent’s allegations and charges against them or to introduce evidence to refute them.
Petitioners’ right to due process was thus clearly violated. We, therefore, remand the case to the
Labor Arbiter to afford petitioners the opportunity to refute the allegations advanced by
respondent, with the assistance of their counsel de oficio. Jose”Kit”Cruz

JULIAN VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES 661 SCRA 745 ,

DECEMBER 07, 2011
Topics: Remedial Law|Appeals|Docket Fees
Facts:
Petitioner’s appeal from the order of dismissal by the lower court was dismissed by the CA for
non-payment of the required docket and other lawful fees. Seeking reconsideration, petitioner
attached to his motion a postal money order in the amount of the docket fees. He explained that
his failure to pay the required fees was due to oversight and non-cognizance of the necessity to
pay the said fees since his counsel did not inform him of such requirement to pay. The motion
for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in applying strictly the rules on docket fees
Held:
No
Ruling:
It is well-established that “[t]he right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. “Thus, one who seeks to avail of
the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so
leads to the loss of the right to appeal.” The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases
that the payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory
and jurisdictional. It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a
court acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. In the case at bench, the
justifications presented by petitioner for the non-payment of the docket fees are oversight and the
lack of advice from his counsel. Unfortunately, the reasons presented are neither convincing nor
adequate to merit leniency. It is unusual for petitioner’s counsel not to advice him of the
required docket fees. Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s counsel did not inform him of the
requirement to pay the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find incredible is that petitioner
apparently failed to communicate with his counsel after the filing of said appeal. Jose”Kit”Cruz

SY VS. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC. 662 SCRA 67 , DECEMBER 12, 2011
Topics: Remedial Law|Parties|Attorneys
Facts:
Petitioner-workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Weesan Garments. Atty.
Geronimo entered his appearance as counsel for Weesan. On the next hearing, Atty. Geronimo
also entered his appearance for Fairland. NLRC ruled that the workers were illegally dismissed
and that Weesan and Fairland are solidarily liable to them as labor-only contractor and principal,
respectively. Fairland assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC over it,
claiming that it was never summoned to appear, attend or participate in all the proceedings
conducted therein. It also denied that it engaged the services of Atty. Geronimo.
Issue:
WON jurisdiction was acquired over Fairland
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
True to their claim, Fairland was indeed never summoned by the Labor Arbiter. The fact that
Atty. Geronimo entered his appearance for Fairland and that he actively defended them before
the Labor Arbiter raised the presumption that he is authorized to appear for them. As held in
Santos, it is unlikely that Atty. Geronimo would have been so irresponsible as to represent
Fairland if he were not in fact authorized. As Atty. Geronimo consistently indicated his PTR and
IBP numbers in the pleadings he filed, there is no reason for the Labor Arbiter not to extend to
Atty. Geronimo the presumption that he is authorized to represent Fairland.
Suffice it to say that an attorney’s presumption of authority is a strong one. “A mere denial by a
party that he authorized an attorney to appear for him, in the absence of a compelling reason, is
insufficient to overcome the presumption, especially when the denial comes after the rendition of
an adverse judgment,” such as in the present case. Jose”Kit”Cruz

PEOPLE VS. AGACER 662 SCRA 461 , DECEMBER 14, 2011

Topics: Criminal Law|Murder|Civil Liabilities
Facts:
The trial court found appellants guilty of murder for acting in conspiracy, in a treacherous
manner, multiple gunshot wounds. Appellants posit that they cannot be held guilty of murder
since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not alleged with clarity nor specified in the
Information.
Issue:
WON appellants are guilty of murder
Held:
Yes
Ruling:
We are also unimpressed with appellants’ contention that both the trial and appellate courts erred
in ruling that treachery qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that since the
attack on Cesario was frontal, there was therefore no element of surprise on the victim or
suddenness of the assault that characterizes treachery. From the facts, Cesario could not have
been aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and killed by the appellants who were all
related to him. Evidently, the crime was committed in a manner that there was no opportunity for
Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the unexpected turn of
events but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer matters that the assault
was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it or
offer any resistance in defense of his person.
Appellants’ contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the Information is also
devoid of merit. “Well-settled is the rule that when x xx treachery x xx is present and alleged in
the Information, it qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder. Jose”Kit”Cruz