Agrarian Reform Law

Case Digests
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CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

FACTS:

On July 17, 1940, the National Traffic Commission issued a resolution recommending to the Director of
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. for one year.
Pursuant to CA 548, the Director of Public Works approved the same.

Maximo Calalang (private citizen & taxpayer in Manila) filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against A.
D. Williams (Chairman of the National Traffic Commission); Vicente Fragante (Director of Public Works);
Sergio Bayan (Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications); Eulogio Rodriguez (Mayor of the
City of Manila); and Juan Dominguez (Acting Chief of Police of Manila).

Calalang contended that CA 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Also, the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference
with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Lastly,
the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

ISSUE:
W/N infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people

RULING: NO

The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of
a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
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GONZALES vs. CA

FACTS:

Sps. Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of 2 parcels of agricultural land (Lot
551-A & C) at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City. Petitioners are their successors-in-interest, children, and
grandchildren while respondents are the Sps’ farmers and tenants who have been cultivating the parcels of
land even before World War II either personally or through their predecessors-in-interest.

In 1969, Marina died intestate. Lilia Gonzales (one of the petitioners) was appointed as administratrix.
Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio donated (unregistered donation) Lot 551-C (his share) to his 14
grandchildren. Thus, when PD 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of Sps. Gonzales were
placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding
Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. In 1974, Lilia filed an application for retention with
the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, requesting for the exclusion of their property from the coverage of
OLT. DENIED – but upon reinvestigation, DAR resolved to recommend that the donated lot be excluded
from OLT coverage.

CA reversed, upholding the CLTs and EPs.

ISSUE:
W/N the lot subject of the unregistered donation should be excluded from the OLT

RULING: NO

Although in writing and duly notarized, the deed of donation was not registered in accordance with law,
hence, shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual
knowledge thereof. While the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed,
however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation.

The unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise would
render ineffectual the rights and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27, especially so because in the case at bar, they have been cultivating the land
even before World War II. Accordingly, the Certificates of Land Transfer and the Emancipation Patents
respectively issued to private respondents over the land in question cannot be cancelled.

It should be noted that one of the recognized modes of acquiring title to land is by emancipation patent
which aims to ameliorate the sad plight of tenants-farmers. By virtue of P.D. No. 27, tenants-farmers are
deemed owners of the land they till. This policy is intended to be given effect by a provision of the law
which declares that, "the tenant-farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be
DEEMED OWNER of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irritated and three
(3) hectares if irrigated" (P.D. No. 27, third paragraph). It may, therefore, be said that with respect to Lot
551-C, private respondents became owners thereof on October 27, 1972, the day P.D. No. 27 took effect.

Our laws on agrarian reform were enacted primarily because of the realization that there is an urgent
need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our country. Yet, despite such laws, the
majority of these farmers still live on a hand-to-mouth existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these
agrarian laws have never really been effectively implemented. Certain individuals have continued to prey
on the disadvantaged, and as a result, the farmers who are intended to be protected and uplifted by the
said laws find themselves back in their previous plight or even in a more distressing situation. This Court
ought to be an instrument in achieving a dignified existence for these farmers free from pernicious
restraints and practices, and there’s no better time to do it than now.
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MODAY vs. CA

FACTS:

In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution
No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare
Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of
Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." The same was approved by the then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo but was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, reasoning
that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center."

The Municipality of Bunawan filed a petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday. The
complaint was later amended to include the registered owners Sps. Zotico and Leonora Moday (Percival’s
parents) as defendants. It later filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the subject land. The
same was granted. RTC ruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid
leaves it effective. CA substantially ruled the same way.

Meanwhile, the municipality had erected 3 buildings on the subject land (the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal
Gymnasium, which is made of concrete).

ISSUE:
W/N the Resolution and the consequent condemnation proceedings are valid

RULING: YES

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action
which does not render said resolution null and void. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
"beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same." Thus, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of
Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution.

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed
by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments,
other public entities and public utilities. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use
must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed.
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EPZA vs. DULAY

FACTS:

In 1979, the President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public
domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export
processing zone (Mactan Export Processing Zone) by EPZA. Not all the reserved area, however, was
public land as it included 4 parcels of land registered in the name of SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION.

EPZA offered to purchase SADC’s land but the parties failed to reach an agreement. EPZA filed a
complaint for expropriation w/ a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against SADC. Judge Dulay
ordered the termination of the pre-trial as the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the
just compensation for the properties. Judge likewise issued an order of condemnation and appointing
certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated.

The three commissioners recommended the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. EPZA objected on the grounds that P.D. No.
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just
compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount
set by P.D. No. 1533. EPZA maintains that the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Hence, there is no need for the appointment of
commissioners. DENIED

ISSUE:
W/N the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 is valid
and constitutional

PERTINENT LAWS/CASES CITED:

Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals: Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the
indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals: In estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the
uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition
it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in
estimating its value.
Republic vs. Santos: According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report.
xxx

However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically set aside the above and many other
precedents hammered out in the course of evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously deliberated,
and judiciously considered court proceedings. The decrees categorically and peremptorily limited the
definition of just compensation thus:

PD 76: For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for
public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or
such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower.

PD 464: Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. — In
determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the
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basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in
the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

PD 794: Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. — In
determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the
same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

PD 1533: Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent
domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the
appropriate Government office to acquire the property.

RULING: NO

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor.
As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking.
However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere
formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the
assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge
insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of
the decreed compensation.
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RP vs. VDA. DE CASTELLVI

FACTS:

In 1959, RP filed a complaint for eminent domain against Carmen Vda. de Castellvi (judicial
administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi) over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over two parcels of land. It alleged,
among others, that the FMV of the subject lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province
of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed,
that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take
immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;
that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

Vda. de Castellvi filed a motion to dismiss and alleged that the land under her administration, being a
residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of
P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine
Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956,
thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized
profits.

Toledo-Gozun likewise filed a motion to dismiss and alleged, among other things, that her two parcels
of land were residential lands, in fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been
subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had already been set
aside for expansion sites of the already completed subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands was
P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the
complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon at the rate
of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

The appointed commissioners recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid
was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional
P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land. All the parties objected: Castellvi
and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per
square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at
P0.20 per square meter.

The lower court found the commissioner’s recommended price just and fair. RP appealed. Vda and
Toledo-Gozun filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. DENIED. Vda. moved to increase her land’s provisional
value. RP opposed.

Before SC, RP contends that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a
special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right
and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of
such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the
permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve
years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability
of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security.

On the other hand, Vda maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain
requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private
property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the
instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year
to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a
monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and
privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy”.
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BACKGROUND:

The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of
lease. Before its expiration on June 30, 1956, RP sought to renew the same but Vda. refused. Despite two
demand letters, AFP refused to vacate. Vda instituted an ejectment case against PAF. Pending this case,
RP instituted the expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE:
W/N the “taking” of the property should be reckoned from 1947

RULING: NO

Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private
property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to
a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. - American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd
edition, Section 157

ELEMENTS:

1) the expropriator must enter a private property

2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period
3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority
4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected
5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property

AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE:

1) PRESENT: by virtue of the lease agreement, RP, through AFP took possession of the land
2) ABSENT: the contract was for a year, renewable from year to year, hence, temporary and
transitory
3) PRESENT: RP entered the property as lessee
4) PRESENT: the property was used by AFP PAF
5) ABSENT: Castellvi remained as the owner & was continuously recognized by RP as such as
shown by the yearly renewal of the lease contract

It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must
be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered
and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the property under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
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In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi
property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the
purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959
when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had never
been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of
the court, on August 10, 1959, The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26,
1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.

** the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square meter
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US vs. POMPEYA

FACTS:

In 1914, Iloilo’s acting prosecuting attorney filed a complaint against Silvestre Pompeya for violating a
municipal ordinance (failure to render service on patrol duty). Pompeya filed a demurrer as the acts
charged did not constitute a crime. Further, the municipal ordinance allegedly violated is unconstitutional as
it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

The judge dismissed the complaint. The prosecuting attorney appealed to SC.

ISSUE:

W/N the municipal ordinance upon w/c the complaint was based is constitutional

RULING: YES

The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of
the state. Police power of the state has been variously defined. It has been defined as the power of the
government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited

The police power of the state includes not only the public health and safety, but also the public
welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best best interest. It so extensive and all
pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its
merits. The power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state
and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the
Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon persons,
imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) The person called upon to render such services must be an
able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55, and (3)
certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons.

***
Section 40 of Act No. 82 (the Municipal Code) relates to the power of municipal councils. Act No.
1309 amends said section (section 40, paragraph "m") which reads as follows: "(m)With the approval of the
provincial governor, when a province or municipality is infested with ladrones or outlaws (the municipal
council is empowered):

"1. To authorize the municipal president to require able-bodied male residents of the municipality,
between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any one
month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as
patrols for the protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day in each week. The failure, refusal, or
neglect of any such able-bodied man to render promptly the service thus required shall be punishable by a
fine not exceeding one hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
authorize the municipal president to require such service of officers or men of the Army of Navy of the
United States, civil employees of the United States Government, officers and employees of the Insular
Government, or the officers or servants of companies or individuals engaged in the business of common
carriers on sea or land, or priests, ministers of the gospel, physicians, practicantes, druggists or
practicantes de farmacia, actually engaged in business, or lawyers when actually engaged in court
proceedings.".

***
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Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to
impose the punishment provided for by law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant was a male
citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age
nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
him for the services mentioned in the law.
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ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ

FACTS:

RA 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business) was enacted to nationalize retail trade business. Its
main provisions are:

(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to
engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until
the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and
juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the
retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among
other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail
business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf & of other aliens brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional (equal protection & due process among, others) and to prevent
its enforcement. SolGen & Fiscal of the City of Manila contended that RA 1180 was passed in the valid
exercise of the State’s police power.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 1180 is constitutional & is passed in the valid exercise of police power

RULING: YES

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such
it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or
achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power
of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due
process clause and the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not
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demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power.

The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of
the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the
nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence
and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
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DECS vs. SAN DIEGO

FACTS:

Private respondent is a graduate of UE w/ a degree of BS Zoology. He took the National Medical

Admission Test (NMAT) thrice and flunked it many times. When he applied to take it again, DECS rejected
the application on the basis of its rule that A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the
NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.

Roberto Rey San Diego (Private respondent) then filed a petition for mandamus before RTC to
compel his admission to the test, invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement, he was allowed to take the test subject to the outcome of the petition. In an
amended petition, he assailed the constitutionality of the MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing
the above-cited rule (and due process & equal protection). RTC granted – arbitrary exercise of police
power.

ISSUE:

W/N NMAT’s constitutionality should be upheld for being a valid exercise of police power

RULING: YES

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.

Lawful subj: . It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

Lawful method: not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk
rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved. The right to quality education
invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. There
can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who
are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very
lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The
Agrarian Reform Law
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accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and
others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is
equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
Agrarian Reform Law
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YNOT vs. IAC

FACTS:

In 1980, then Pres Marcos issued EO 626-A, prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly
with respect to age.

Restituto Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
the above measure. He sued for recovery. RTC issued writ of replevin in his favor upon filing of
supersedeas bond, but later on the court sustained the confiscation of carabaos & since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. RTC declined to rule on EO’s constitutionality.
IAC upheld RTC.

Ynot maintains that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed w/o a right to be heard before a
competent & impartial court as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE:

W/N the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries

RULING:

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

Police power is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the
basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small
farmers who rely on them for energy needs.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement,
viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No.
626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that
"no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Agrarian Reform Law
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ASSOC OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SEC OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS: (consolidation of 4 cases)

1. G.R. No. 79777 MANAAY & HERMANO, JR. vs. HON JUICO (Sec of AR)

Involved in this case are a 9 ha-riceland worked by 4 tenants and owned by Nicolas Manaay & his wife
and a 5-ha riceland worked by 4 tenants and owned by Augustin Hermano, Jr. These tenants were
declared full owners of these lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27.

Manaay & Hermano are assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and
RA 6657 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

2. G.R. No. 79310 ACUNA vs. ARROYO

Petitioners are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental. They sought to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O.
No. 229. The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to
make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas
that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems
exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

3. G.R. No. 79744 PABICO vs. HON. JUICO

Petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process
and the requirement for just compensation, placed his small landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. He asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents.

He assails the constitutionality of EO Nos. 228 and 229 for being violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

4. G.R. No. 78742 ASSOC OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SAR

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same.
Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.

ISSUE:

W/N the questioned laws are constitutional

RULING: YES – valid exercise of police power and eminent domain

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Test for validity of police power exercise: lawful subject and lawful method. First requirement is met
because Constitution itself provides for agrarian reform. Second requirement: the means used is an
exercise of eminent domain (taking of agricultural land for public use for just compensation).

The public use here is the just distribution of agricultural lands to farmers who till them. As for just
compensation, CARP law provides that DAR determines the amount to be paid, subject to court decision if
a party protests. However, payment as provided in Sec. 18 of CARP LAW, is made partially through cash
and partially thru negotiable instruments (or Landbank bonds, tax credits/shares of stock). Jurisprudence is
clear that compensation in eminent domain must be in equivalent money. However, this is not an ordinary
expropriation—this is revolutionary. Cost will be tremendous. Even the 50B pesos Pres. Aquino
appropriated would be insufficient. Although not clearly expressed by Con Comm that unorthodox method
should be implemented, pragmatism dictates so. The manner of just compensation is not unconstitutional.
Let it be. The court further expressed the need to implement agrarian reform already.

Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will
require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then
the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks,
may be used for just compensation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they
too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to
share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they
belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted
to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners
of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There
is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
Agrarian Reform Law
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DE CHAVEZ vs. ZOBEL

FACTS:

Enrique Zobel was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Batangas, known as Hacienda Bigaña
(more than 500 ha). He filed a petition & sought to eject Zoila de Chavez et al who were his tenants tilling a
portion of his land. Zobel relied on RA 1199 w/c justify such a move where the land is suited for
mechanization (TO CHANGE A PROCESS/ACTIVITY SO THAT IT IS DONE W/ MACHINES INSTEAD OF
BY PEOPLE/ANIMALS).

The tenants opposed, arguing that the land is not suitable for mechanization & that Zobel’s true
intention as landholder was to utilize the same for pasture and for the raising of sorghum. The Court of
Agrarian Relations dismissed the petition, doubting such an intent to mechanize as it is impracticable
during rainy season.

CA reversed. There was no dispute as to the tenancy relationship and the areas occupied by the
tenants. So PD 27, decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil & transferring them
the ownership pf the land they till & providing instruments & mechanisms - is applicable. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE:

W/N the tenants should be rejected from Zobel’s land

RULING: NO

PD 27’s goal, as overwhelmingly approved by the Constitutional Convention, is emancipation. It is

now part of the law of the land accdg. to the revised Constitution itself.

Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an
express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, the Court’s duty is clear; obedience is
unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of
the fundamental law.

To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified
by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory
to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems
thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical
norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental
policy goals.

NOTE: Under sya ng “constitutionality”, kaso di naman nabanggit sa case na ni-question yung
constitutionality ni PD 27. Sabi lang, it was enacted as a result of the history of land tenancy, it being a dark
spot in the social life & history of the people. And so seeing the gravity of the problem, the 1935 delegates
to the Constitutional Convention tried to enact a legislation. But a corrective one is necessary, that which
goes at the root daw - then PD 27 was conceived.
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DE JESUS vs. IAC

FACTS:

Calimbas Miaco, Calimbas-Rodriguez & Calimbas are owners of some 7.162 ha of land in Bataan.
About 4 ha of it is a fishpond w/c Anacleto de Jesus possessed, as a lessee, since 1962. In 1972, Sps.
Eustacio Calimbas & Modesta Paguio entered into a civil law contract of lease w/ de Jesus & Felicisima
Rodriguez. It was to be effective for 2 1/2 years (Jan 1972 until July 1974).

De Jesus (industrial partner) & Felicisima (capitalist) formed a partnership over the fishpond. When
the civil lease contract expired, Felicisima gave up the lease, but De Jesus refused to vacate despite
repeated demands.

In 1975, the Calimbases filed a complaint for “Recovery of Possession w/ Damages” v. De Jesus. CFI
ruled in favor of De Jesus & dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. CFI held that the land is
agriculture & De Jesus is an agricultural lessee & not a civil law lessee. Jurisdiction belongs to the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

1. The land is agricultural

2. Felicisima testified that she left the lease after the expiration in 1974 and it was petitioner who
managed the fishpond alone, thereby qualifying as an agricultural lessee

3. CFI Judge, motu propio, visited the fishpond and saw no one but the petitioner working on the
fishpond, thereby further strengthening the contention that the land is subject to a one man cultivation

The Calimbases’ MR - denied. They appealed to IAC w/c affirmed RTC. Upon MR, IAC reversed itself
& ruled that De Jesus was a civil law lessee & that he must vacate the land. Having admitted that he hired
other persons, aside from his family members, to cultivate the land, he was not qualified as an agricultural
lessee. He was more correctly categorized as a business entrepreneur engaged in the fishpond industry.

De Jesus’ MR - denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

W/N De Jesus is an agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee

RULING: CIVIL LAW LESSEE

The Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted by Congress to institute land reforms in the
Philippines. It was passed to establish owner-cultivatorship and the family size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial
restraints and practices; to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens
and a source of a genuine strength in our democratic society.

In other words, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to help the small farmers and to uplift
their economic status by providing them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet a farm family's needs
for food, clothing, shelter, education and other basic necessities. The law further protects the small farmer
by conferring upon him security of tenure over the landholding he is working on. The leasehold relation
cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract or by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected by the Court for
cause.
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The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make him an agricultural lessee.
The law provides conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is
only one of them. Among others, the law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work
the land. It was also proved that De Jesus is cultivating an adjacent fishpond with a size of 11-1/2 hectares
which further proves that he is not a small farmer but a businessman.