RULE 39

Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27592 February 14, 1980

ROMANA T. TORRALBA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City), PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, FLORENCIA and
LUIS, both surnamed SAN JUAN and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.

A. V. Velante for petitioner.

Melchor R. Flores for respondents San Juans.

Leopoldo Abellera for respondent Corporation.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, to annul and set aside the order of demolition issued by the respondent Judge in Civil Case
No. Q-3548 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled: "People's Homesite & Housing Corporation,
plaintiff, versus Roman T. Torralba, defendant," as well as the deed of sale executed by the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation in favor of Florencia San Juan, and TCT No. 114516 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City pursuant thereto.

It appears that on January 15, 1948, the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, PHHC for short,
entered into a conditional contract to sell a parcel of land situated at Quezon City, more particularly
known as Lot No. 2, Block K-7 Psd-7365-A of the Diliman Estate Subdivision, containing an area of
507.8 square meters, more or less, with the herein petitioner, Romana T. Torralba, upon the
conditions, among others, that the petitioner shall pay to the PHHC the sum of P431.63, as down
payment, and the sum P41.20 as monthly installment within the first five days of each and every month
commencing on the first day of February, 1948 and ending on January, 1958; and that should the
petitioner violate, refuse or fail to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract, or default in
the payment of three monthly installments, the contract shall be deemed annulled and cancelled and
the PHHC shall be at liberty to dispose of the property to any person, in the same manner as if the
contract has never been made, and, the PHHC shall be entitled to immediate re-possession of the
premises and the payments made thereunder shall be considered as rentals for the use and
occupation of the property. 1

The petitioner paid the PHHC the sum of P1,431.63 on account of the contract, but failed to make
further payments thereon from November, 1949. As a result, the PHHC notified the petitioner in writing
on July 11, 1952 of the cancellation of the conditional contract to sell and gave her 30 days from notice
within which to revive the contract by paying in cash all installments and interests due. The petitioner,
however, failed to make any payment. On February 15, 1954, the PHHC again notified the petitioner
in writing of the definite annulment and cancellation of the conditional contract to sell and required her
to vacate the premises within 15 days from notice. 2 But, the petitioner did not vacate the premises. As
a result, the PHHC filed an action against the petitioner for the recovery of possession of the land with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-3548.3

The petitioner filed her answer thereto on January 16, 1959, 4 but the trial judge ordered it discarded
for having been filed after the expiration of the reglementary period, and declared the petitioner in
default. 5 The PHHC was allowed to present its evidence before the Clerk of Court who was
commissioned to receive it, and on October 28, 1959, the trial court issued a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate the premises in question and to restore possession
thereof to the plaintiff; to pay the plaintiff the sum of Pl,194.80 corresponding to the
installment due from December, 1949 up to and including April 1952, plus interest
thereon at 12% per annum until fully paid; to pay the plaintiff the sum of P42.00 per
month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of the premises in question
from May, 1952 when the contract was cancelled until the possession of the premises
in question is restored to plaintiff; to pay the plaintiff the further sum of P200.00 as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.6

A copy of the decision was received by the PHHC on November 5, 1959, 7 and on March 16, 1960, it
filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. 8 Pursuant thereto, a writ of execution was issued on
June 22, 1960, and served upon the petitioner on August 21, 1960. 9 On November 23, 1960, the
petitioner deposited the amount of P1,000.00 with the PHHC. 10

On January 25, 1967, the Board of Directors of the PHHC adopted Resolution No. 970, awarding the
disputed parcel of land to herein respondent Florencia San Juan, 11 and on February 10, 1967, the
PHHC executed a deed of sale in her favor. 12 Thence, TCT No. 114516 was issued in the name of
Florencia San Juan. 13

On March 21, 1967, the PHHC filed a motion in Civil Case No. Q-3548 praying for the issuance of an
order of demolition to enforce the decision against the petitioner. 14 The motion was granted by the
respondent Judge on the same day, 15 and on April 7, 1967, the premises were turned over to Florencia
San Juan. 16

However, on that same day, April 7, 1967, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a restraining
order, to restrain the Sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution previously issued.17 The motion was
granted on April 11, 1967. 18 Whereupon, the petitioner filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration
of the order granting the writ of demolition, contending, among others, that the decision cannot be
executed for the reason that she had paid to the PHHC the amount of P1,000.00, which payment
reinstated her as a bona fide awardee of the lot in question; and that the said decision cannot be
enforced by a mere motion, but that a new action based upon said decision should be
instituted. 19 When the respondent Judge denied the motion on April 24, 1967, 20 the petitioner filed the
instant recourse. As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the Court. 21 A notice of
lis pendens was also inscribed in the certificate of title. 22

The petitioner claims that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the order of demolition complained of, contending that the decision upon
which it is based cannot be enforced by mere motion since more than five (5) years had elapsed from
its promulgation. The petitioner invokes Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the judgment can only be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitation, a judgment may be enforced by
action. In this particular case, the judgment was rendered on October 28, 1959, and a copy of the
same was received by the PHHC on November 5, 1959. It being a judgment in default, the judgment
became final and executory thirty (30) days thereafter, or on December 5, 1959. On March 16, 1960,
the PHHC filed a motion for the execution of the judgment which was granted by the trial court on June
22, 1960. But, the ejectment of the petitioner was not carried out because of her representations with
the PHHC. On March 21, 1967, the PHHC filed a motion for the issuance of an order of demolition
which was granted by the trial court the same day. From December 5, 1959, when the judgment sought
to be enforced by motion became final and executory, to the filing of the controversial motion for the
issuance of an order of demolition on March 21, 1967, seven (7) years, three (3) months, and
seventeen (17) days elapsed. Seemingly, the five-year period for the execution of the judgment by
motion has expired. However, the running of the period was interrupted on March 16, 1960, when the
PHHC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and did not run again because the order
for the petitioner's ejectment was not carried out due to her representations with the PHHC to withhold
the execution of the judgement owing to her financial difficulties and that of her family and that said
execution could not be fully satisfied no matter how willing she may be to comply therewith. The
agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of a judgment interrupts the period of
limitations prescribed. 23

The petitioner further claims that with the payment to and acceptance by the PHHC of the amount of
P1,000.00, she should be considered to have been reinstated as a bona fide awardee of the lot in
question, and as there was a renewal of the contract, petitioner could not be dispossessed of the lot;
nor could respondent Florencia San Juan exercise any dominical rights over the property.

There is no merit in the contention. The mere deposit of the amount of P1,000.00 by the petitioner with
the PHHC on November 23, 1960 cannot have the effect of reviving the contract to sell executed by
the PHHC and the petitioner. For the revival of the contract after its annulment and cancellation for
non-payment of the installments due, Clause 12 of said contract provides that "in those cases where
default arose from non-payment of installments due, the APPLICANT may, at any time within ninety
(90) days after this contract has been cancelled and declared forfeited to the CORPORATION, as
herein set forth, redeem the property by paying in cash all the installments and interests due in
accordance with this contract on the date of redemption and this contract shall be considered revived
and the parties subject to its provisions as it had never been cancelled." The contract to sell was
cancelled on July 11, 1952, when the PHHC notified the petitioner, in writing, of the cancellation and
annulment of the contract. To revive the contract, the petitioner should pay to the PHHC all the
installments due and interests thereon within ninety (90) days from notice. But, the petitioner did not
pay the amount of money within the period agreed upon. The deposit of P1,000.00 was made only on
November 23, 1960, after a judgment was rendered against the petitioner to pay the PHHC certain
sums of money, and more than 90 days after the cancellation of the contract. Besides, the amount of
P1,000.00 is less than the credit due the PHHC. For sure, the payment of P1,000.00 cannot be
considered as payment to revive the contract since there was no compliance with the requirements
for the revival of the same. Having been made after the rendition of the judgment, the deposit of
P1,000.00 was apparently made in partial satisfaction of the judgment.

The petitioner also claims that the PHHC should have resorted to a judicial decree rescinding the
contract to sell before awarding the lot in question to Florencia San Juan in order to avoid unnecessary
litigation or conflict.

This contention is untenable. The contract executed by the petitioner and the PHHC expressly
provided that the contract shall be deemed annulled and cancelled and the PHHC shall be at liberty
to take possession of said property and dispose the same to any other person upon default of the
petitioner to pay the installments due. Hence, there was no contract to rescind in court because from
the moment the petitioner defaulted in the timely payment of the installments, the contract between
the parties was deemed ipso facto rescinded.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is hereby lifted and set aside. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Antonio, and Abad Santos, JJ. concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-66478 August 29, 1988

SANCHO R. JACINTO, substituted by his heirs, namely ERNESTO and RUBEN JACINTO, and
DOMINGO C. BASCARA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO and MARIANO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.

Agustin V. Velante for petitioners.

N.J. Quisumbing & Associates for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) which affirmed an Order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
denying a motion for second alias writ of execution dated September 28, 1980 on the ground that it
was filed beyond the five-year period provided in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Dispute arose from an action for forcible entry and detainer filed by herein petitioner Sancho R. Jacinto
(who died during the pendency of the case in the Court of First Instance and was substituted by his
heirs Ernesto Jacinto and Ruben Jacinto) and Domingo Bascara as plaintiffs against herein private
respondents Pilar T. del Rosario and Mariano del Rosario as defendants before the Municipal Trial
Court (changed to City Court, now Metropolitan Trial Court), Branch III of Quezon City with plaintiffs
as the prevailing parties.

Defendants-private respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV in Civil Case No. Q-7613. To abbreviate the proceedings in said appeal, the parties entered
into an amicable settlement concerning the reasonable rental adjudged by the lower court in the
forcible entry case to be paid by defendants for having illegally occupied the lots in question for a
period of six (6) years and one (1) month plus attorney's fees.

Consequently, or on March 17, 1971, a judgment approving the compromise agreement was rendered
by the Court of First Instance. The terms and conditions of the aforesaid agreement read:

1. That the defendants, jointly and severally agreed to pay the plaintiffs thru their
undersigned counsel in the office of the latter the sum of P100,000.00 plus P5,000.00
as and for attorney's fees on installment basis, as follows:

a) Upon signing of this agreement, the sum of Four Thousand Pesos

(P4,000.00) corresponding to the installments for January and
February, 1971;
 b) On or before March, 1971, the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00);

c) On or before April 1, 1971, and every 1st of the month thereafter

until fully paid the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).

2. That in case defendants fail to pay any installment, immediate execution shall follow
without the necessity of separate action and the original amount awarded which is
P117,936.54 plus P5,000.00 for attorney's fees shall automatically be revived and shall
be the basis of the payment with interest at eight percent (8%) per annum on the
effective balance until fully paid. 1

It appears that petitioners first filed their motion for execution in 1972 and this was granted by the trial
court in an order dated August 26, 1972. Subsequently, private respondents entered into an
agreement with petitioners agreeing to continue paying the installments due, thus stalling the
enforcement of the writ of execution secured in 1972. However, when private respondents again
defaulted in the payment of certain installments, petitioners sought anew the issuance of an alias writ
of execution which was granted by the trial court in its Order dated January 2, 1973 . 2

On March 26, 1973, an alias writ of execution was issued for the then balance of P85,180.12 with
interest at 8% plus P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, in respect of which the corresponding Sheriff's Return
dated February 26, 1 974 indicated partial satisfaction. 3

In addition to the foregoing, the record 4 discloses that petitioner sought the issuance of an alias writ
of execution in a motion dated September 20, 1980 stating, among others, that:

7. That on August 10, 1979, the balance due from the defendant was P35,472.45 but
from said date up to the present, the defendants failed to pay further installments
notwithstanding repeated reminders by the plaintiffs, thru, counsel, the last being
August 12, 1980 by registered mail.

This motion was denied by the lower court as was the motion for reconsideration of said denial on the
ground that the judgement based on compromise agreement sought to be enforced by mere motion
had become final and executory for more than five (5) years and plaintiff's recourse would have been
through the filing of a separate action under the second sentence of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.

Petitioners' main contention in elevating the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court and to this Court
is that the five (5) year period provided in Section 6, Rule 39 was suspended by agreement of the
parties under which they desisted from enforcing the alias writ of execution. Petitioners premise their
argument on a statement in the case of Romana Torralba v. Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles, et al. 5 that
"the agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment interrupts the period
of limitations prescribed." Petitioners consequently contend that their motion for second alias writ of
execution was filed within the five-year period.

Decisive, therefore, in this petition for review is the issue of whether or not the motion for alias writ of
execution dated September 20, 1980 was filed within the five (5) year period provided for the execution
of judgment by mere motion.

Respondent appellate court in affirming the decision of the lower court ruled in the negative, stating
thus:
 Even by agreement of the parties, the court cannot legally take cognizance of such
motion for execution filed beyond the five (5) year period. Thus the Supreme Court has
said:

A writ of execution issued after five (5) years is void, and failure to object thereto does
not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law and
not by express or implied will of the parties. (Ramos v. Garciano, L-22341, April 29,
1969, 27 SCRA 1190).

As provided under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action.

According to the foregoing provision, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution of the final
judgment he obtained by filing a motion within five (5) years either from the date the judgment is
entered or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of five years and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment may be enforced by instituting an ordinary civil action
because then the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be enforced as
in all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such action must be
filed within ten (1 0) years from the date the judgment becomes final. 6

Applying Section 6, Rule 39 to the facts of the present case, the reckoning point of the five (5) year
period would basically depend on the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties in the
compromise agreement approved in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City)
dated March 19, 1971.

As a general rule, a judgment based upon a compromise is by its nature, final and immediately
executory. 7 For this reason, prescription tolls not from the date of its entry but from the date of its
rendition. 8

The general rule cannot however be fully applied to the case at bar. The terms and conditions of the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties in this case contain two (2) sections, the
enforceability of which are not Identical. Section 1 stipulating on the manner by which the judgment
obligation is to be paid was immediately executory because upon signing of said agreement, private
respondents obligated themselves to pay the sum of P4,000.00 corresponding to the installments for
January and February 1971; on or before March 1971, the sum of P10,000.00 followed by the monthly
installment of P2,000.00 to commence on April 1971 until the entire obligation shall have been fully
paid. On the other hand, Section 2 constituting an acceleration clause was not immediately executory
because its enforceability was dependent upon the occurrence of default which may or may not
happen. In said section it was provided:

2. That in case defendants fail to pay any installment, immediate execution shall follow
without necessity of separate action and the original amount awarded which is
P117,936.54, plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees shall automatically be revived and shall
be the basis of the payment with interest at eight (8%) percent per annum on the
effective balance until fully paid.

In petitioners' motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution filed on September 20, 1980, it was
precisely this section of the compromise agreement which petitioners sought to enforce in the lower
court the denial of which is presently the subject of the instant controversy. Being so, the issue of
enforceability of the judgment of the lower court in Civil Case No. Q-7613 is thus limited only to the
provisions of Section 2 of the aforesaid agreement.

Petitioners under Section 2 of the compromise agreement were given the right to demand payment of
the entire unpaid obligation upon default of private respondents in the payment of any installment. It
naturally follows that without default, Section 2 remains dormant in the sense that petitioners cannot
demand payment of the entire obligation while private respondents were religiously complying with
their monthly obligation. Having remained dormant, the tolling of the prescriptive period does not
commence unless the activating factor of default occurs.

The question of default in this petition is not so much as to its existence or non-existence but more on
which of the several defaults by private respondents is to be the reckoning period for the tolling of the
period provided in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Admittedly, there were several defaults as
evidenced by previous unsatisfied or partially satisfied writ/alias writs of execution issued by the lower
court.

The Court however finds that previous defaults became immaterial when petitioners, through the pleas
and entreaties of private respondents for a chance to continue paying the obligation by monthly
installments, consequently and compassionately allowed the latter to resume as in fact did resume
paying the unpaid obligation by monthly installments. Having become immaterial, it was as though no
default previously occurred leaving Section 2 of the compromise agreement still dormant and
unenforceable thus having the effect of stalling the running of the five (5) year prescriptive period.

Granting for the sake of argument that the motion for an alias writ of execution filed on September 20,
1980 was beyond the five (5) year limitation within which a judgment may be executed by mere motion,
still under the circumstances prevailing wherein all the delay in the execution of the judgment lasting
for more than eight (8) years was beneficial to private respondents, this Court for reasons of equity is
constrained to treat the motion for execution as having been filed within the reglementary period
required by law. Since the object of the motion in question was merely for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution of a judgment which had been the object of a writ and alias writs of execution within the
five years from supposed enforceability but were not so enforced due perhaps to the poor financial
conditions of private respondents and due to the agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the
enforcement of said writ/alias writs of execution, and because the deferment or suspension was
granted upon the request and for the benefit of private respondents, the counting of said period should
commence to run only after August 10, 1979, allegedly the time when private respondents totally
stopped paying the monthly installments due.

In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time during which execution is stayed
should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. 9 There has
been no indication that petitioners had ever slept on their rights to have the judgment executed by
mere motions within the reglementary period based on the circumstances earlier discussed. The
statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so for causes
beyond their control. 10

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one is hereby entered ordering the proper Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
where Civil Case No. Q-7613 is now assigned to issue an alias writ of execution to enforce the
judgment in said civil case.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Compromise Agreement, Annex "F," Petition, Rollo, pp. 70-71.

2 Order, Annex "H," Petition, Rollo, p. 74.

3 Court of Appeals decision, Rollo, pp. 8-9.

4 Order, September 14, 1981.

5 96 SCRA 69, 74.

6 Articles 1144 and 1152, Civil Code of the Philippines.

7 Republic v. Estenzo, 25 SCRA 122.

8 Dirige v. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840.

9 Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, 96 SCRA 463,1980.

10 Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, 117 Phil. 39,1963.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15467 January 31, 1963

JESUS LANCITA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
GONZALO MAGBANUA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Aportadera & Palabrica for petitioners-appellants.

Matias G. Basco for respondents-appellees.

PAREDES, J.:

On March 21, 1951, respondents Gonzalo Magbanua and Alfredo Magbanua filed with the Justice of
the Peace Court of Buluan, Cotabato, a complaint (Civil Case No. 7), for Forcible Entry, against Jesus
Lancita, et al., now the petitioners. On July 17, 1951, said Court rendered judgment, to wit:

This case having been called to trial after several postponements made by the defendants,
the court after meting out justice to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs took basis for the continuation
of the trial or the postponement of the trial not well grounded. The Court under Rule 4, Section
13, of the Rules of Court declared the defendants in default and proceeded to hear the
testimonies of the plaintiffs and their witnesses.

The Court found in accordance with the facts alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs had
prior physical possession over the land in question. The defendants are hereby ordered to
vacate the land in question and deliver upon the plaintiffs the possession of the land. The
Defendants are also hereby ordered to pay damages jointly and severally in the amount of
TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS, and also to pay the costs.

On August 21, 1951, the Lancitas presented a Motion for Reconsideration of the above judgment. On
the same date also, without waiting for the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, they filed a
Notice of Appeal, which was abandoned, for failure to file the requisite bond. Under date of October
24, 1951, the JP Court granted the motion for reconsideration and notified the parties to appear on
November 15, 1951, for trial of the case and ordered the stay of the decision. On November 27, 1951,
the JP Court promulgated the following Order, stating —

.... Considering the fact that this case has been dragging for almost a year already, and five to
six postponements having already granted to the Defendants, delay of Justice have already
been tremendously felt by the parties.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the DECISION dated July 17, 1951, is hereby revived and to
take effect immediately.

On November 26, 1956, counsel for respondent Magbanua presented with the Justice of the Peace
Court a Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution, pointing out the fact that the Provincial Sheriff repeatedly
failed to eject the defendants (now petitioners), from the premises in question. A written opposition
thereto, was filed claiming that (1) the judgment of July 17, 1951 cannot be executed now by merely
filing a motion, as the period of five (5) years within which to execute said judgment by motion, had
already expired; and (2) admitting for the sake of argument that the aforesaid judgment can be
executed by mere motion, the issuance of the writ, will cause irreparable damage to the defendants
and to others who were not parties to the case. The JP Court issued the alias writ of execution on
March 27, 1957.

Defendants therein, now Petitioners, presented with the CFI of Cotabato on April 22, 1957, a Petition
for Certiorari with Injunction Ex-Parte and Damages in the sum of P2,000.00 alleging that the
respondent JP acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in the
motion for Execution.

Petitioners maintained that the period of five years had already lapsed, since the judgement in the
Forcible Entry case became final and executory immediately on July 17, 1951, and the same judgment
was being executed only on November 26, 1956. Respondents contended that the judgement in the
Forcible Entry case became final only on November 27, 1951, or thereabouts, because the effects of
the July 17, 1951 judgment was stayed by the JP Court upon motion for reconsideration by petitioners.
On July 12, 1951 the trial court rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which recite —

It appears on record that under the date of October 24, 1951, the Justice of Peace of Buluan,
Cotabato, under whose court was then pending Civil Case No. 7, issued a directive ordering
the stay of the decision of the Court of July 17, 1951; it appears further that under date of
November 27, 1951, the court in its order affirmed its decision of July 17, 1951.

In the light of the above stated facts, and in the light of the facts stated in the pleadings of the
parties, the Court has formed the opinion and so holds that for the present there exist no
reasons why the writ of execution issued by the Justice of the Peace Court of Tacurong, one
of the respondents in this petition, of November 26, 1956, should be disturbed. Plainly
expressed, the writ of execution issued by the respondent Justice of the Peace of Tacurong
petitioned on November 26, 1956 remain in full force and should be implemented by the
respondent Provincial Sheriff of Cotabato, without delay.

Petitioners therein presented a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order, alleging that (1) the
same is not in accordance with the law and the evidence of record; and that (2) they have denied their
day in court. This motion having been denied, the respondents therein interposed the present appeal
direct to Us.

The appeal presents the singular issue as to "whether or not the alias writ of execution given on March
21, 1957, pursuant to a Motion presented on November 26, 1956, was issued within the five (5) year
prescriptive period for execution of judgment by mere motion."

It is the theory of the petitioners-appellants that since the judgment arose from a forcible entry case,
execution thereof shall issue immediately (Sec. 8, Rule 72), and that the failure of respondents-
appellees to have an immediate execution thereon constituted a waiver, which did not suspend the
period for the finality of the said judgment. Petitioners also claim that having been declared in default,
the said judgment of July 17, 1951 became final immediately, so that the motion for a writ of execution
presented on November 26, 1956, was outside the period provided for the execution of judgment by
mere motion.

The contention of petitioners is not sustained by the facts duly established and is contrary to the well
entrenched rulings and doctrines on the finality and execution of judgments. The records of the case
clearly show that while the judgment in the Forcible Entry case was promulgated on July 17, 1951,
and could have been executed at the instance of the plaintiffs therein (now respondents), the effects
of the same were delayed due to the motion for reconsideration presented by herein petitioners. As a
matter of fact said motion was set for hearing and it was only on November 27, 1951, that an Order
reviving the judgment of July 17, 1951 was promulgated, after the petitioners had failed to appear on
the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss presented by them and which was denied by the JP Court. It can
not be successfully disputed, therefore, that it was only on November 27, 1951, that the judgment in
the forcible entry case became final. The records reveal that the execution of the judgment had been
asked several times after the rendition of the decision and before the filing of the motion for a writ of
execution in question, but the provincial sheriff invariably failed to carry out or enforce the orders of
the JP court.

The trial court in its order of November 25, 1958, said:

It appears also from the said order (page 12 of the record) that the said alias writ of execution
was issued because the previous orders for execution issued by the Justice of the Peace have
not been properly executed because the Provincial Sheriff has repeatedly failed to eject the
defendants from the litigated premises. The existence of a previous writ of execution was also
confirmed by the Provincial Sheriff's return, copy of which appears on pages 101, 102 and 103
of the record herein. It is stated therein, among other things, that the defendants were
furnished copies of the alias order of execution on June 1, 1956 by Deputy Sheriff Silvestre L.
Roda.

If the method of computation is, as it should be, to start from November 27, 1951, the date of the
finality of the judgment to November 26, 1956, the filing of the motion for an alias writ of execution, 4
years, 11 months and 29 days had elapsed. The motion, under consideration, therefore, is well within
the prescribed period. If the computation should commence from July 17, 1951, the date of the original
decision in the justice of the peace court, the alias order of execution on June 1, 1956 (of the several
already issued) the corresponding motion of which must have been filed on or before said date, such
filing was likewise within the prescribed period. Moreover, these orders of execution which could not
be enforced because of the contumacy or failure of the obligor to comply, had deferred or suspended
the running of the period. It is to be noted that as late as April 20, 1957, the defendants had presented
in the JP Court a petition asking extension of time within which to vacate the premises (Annex 3,
Answer).

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët

Where judgments are for money only and are wholly unpaid, and execution has been
previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the
court has no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than five years after
the judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. vs. Long Is. Amusement
Corp., I N.Y.S. 2d 866).

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the
contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an
appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise.
Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ
may be issued without scire facias. (23 C.J. 378)
There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to have the
judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The statute of limitations has not
been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their control.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the appeal is hereby dismissed and the orders subject thereof, being in conformity
with the evidence and the law on the matter, are affirmed. Costs taxed against herein petitioners.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Concepcion and Barrera, JJ.,
concur.