Analyzing Germany's Failure at The 2018 World Cup Germany: A Diagnosis

Follow-up analysis:
GERMANY’S
2018 WORLD CUP
PERFORMANCE IN CONTEXT
July 6, 2018
Dr. Ionuț APAHIDEANU
CONTENT: Methodology / instead of introduction:
A Perpetuated / aggravated deficiencies 3 This analysis represents and is meant as a direct follow-up to the
one communicated on June 14 and assesses Germany’s
performance at the 2018 World Cup in context, by continuously
B New deficiencies / new findings 27 making references to the previous one. Readers are therefore
advised to keep both documents at hand.
C Remedied deficiencies. Positives 30
Methodological line: same as explained in the previous analysis,
Appendix 31 with a few exceptions always clarified in the text at the right time.
Data sources: own monitoring of Germany’s matches plus data

posted on fifa.com. All graphs, processed screen captures, and
derived measurements and methodological instruments are the
product of the author’s own creative work.
2
A. PERPETUATED / AGGRAVATED DEFICIENCIES
➢ 1General
sluggishteam,
Initiation
squad and system elements
PWCA
No. Pre-World Cup Analysis – finding: slide
Confirmatory instances at the World Cup:
Prior to the WC, though rather dismissed as media speculation, Germany endured its first World-Cup elimination from the group stage.
1. Germany’s national team seemed to be going through a crisis
3
Further comments redundant.
In an otherwise contextually understandable desperate search for
solutions, coupled with other objective reasons, in three WC matches
Löw has used all the 20 field players of the squad except for Ginter.
Moreover, whereas the pre-WC analysis had identified a stable, nucleus
of 7 players within the squad, for multiple reasons, the manager could /
In general terms of system and personnel, the last two years (since chose to use only two of them in all three matches (Kroos and Kimmich).
after Euro-2016) witnessed a significant degree of instability in both Whether or not there emerged a “conflict of generations” within the
2. regards: in the last 25 games prior to the World Cup, head coach 4 squad, as some media alleged, cannot be assessed here.
Joachim Löw has used no less than 46 players and employed arguably As regards the system stability, in a permanently desperate chase of an
five different playing systems. equalizer / winner, Löw has kept changing the system a number of
times, into shapes the players didn’t seem used to, and in ways that
remain highly questionable in terms of coherence, stability, and fluidity,
let alone success - 4-2-3-1 / 4-1-4-1 / 3-4-2-1 / 3-3-1-3 / etc. (see for
instance the last minutes against SWE, when Germany had two defenders
left on the pitch – Rüdiger and Kimmich).
The main structural problem of the team’s system has been the Judging by multiple available performance indicators (from number of
AMR / right winger position, on which, over a single year before the deliveries per time unit to the on-the-ball-involvement index), this
3. World Cup, Löw had tried no less than nine different players. 4 position remained a significant weakness at the World Cup, despite the
coach using, for entire matches, or brief spells during the games, four
players (Müller, Goretzka, Reus, and Werner).
3
➢ Attack deficiencies
PWCA
Specifically identified as a general and dominant feature of the team’s playing style Vs MEX - 3:54, 4:07, 4:41, 10:14, 10:40, 14:18,
on the initiation of its positional attacks, Kroos frequently drops back in line with 8-9, 26 19:15, 28:56, 29:26, 45:08, 68:41, 88:19, etc.;
the two central defenders. This: vs KOR – 00:26, 6:47, 7:39, 22:00, 31:58, 45:57, etc.
a) not only slows down unnecessarily construction, fracturing the team in two vertical halves
4.
b) but also plants the seeds of Germany’s major vulnerability to counterattacks

(Kroos cannot apply either his passing skills, or, in case of a counter, his defensive midfielder
abilities, being retreated as a DC; the other DMC is left alone to fill the considerable space, being
often surrounded by opposition players who render him useless. If this base diamond or triangle
is pressed, as in the capture to the right…)
4
PWCA
The resultant of the previous shortcoming’s combination with some Vs MEX – 4:08, 4:51, 10:13-26, 14:20, 19:17, 29:25-32, 85:17, 90:21;
players lacking mobility and/or positional awareness is that, during the Vs KOR – 00:30, 8:31, 19:47, 21:56, 31:58, 41:09,46:40, 76:31, etc.
development phase of the attacks, Germany often shapes up in bizarre,
dysfunctional formations. Although (probably) aiming, and sometimes
succeeding at usual, correct, attacking systems such as 3-4-2-1 / 3-3-1-3.
5. all too often, while the full-backs advance too high up the pitch, 12
simultaneously none of AMR/AMC/AML drop back in the centre to collect
the ball and further elaborate construction => sluggish, disjointed, and
dysfunctional 3-1-5-1 / 3-1-0-6 / 3-0-0-7, with the deep-lying ball-holder
having no meaningful passing option:
5
Pre-World Cup PWCA

No. slide Confirmatory instances at the World Cup:
Analysis – finding:
Though adding 3 matches to a pre-WC of ten, the data input didn’t change any of the team’s top-10 passing lanes when
This explains both why selecting the usual starting eleven (more on Reus below). The only notable change has been brought by Kroos playing
i.) Germany’s higher up the pitch during the development phase, but this has been achieved mainly by keeping the full-backs
mathematically (Plattenhardt vs MEX, Hector vs SWE and KOR) in deeper positions
modelled passing
network captures an
exaggerated share of
passes exchanged
superfluously within
the triangle / diamond
of the DCs and Kroos
12,
(and the other DMC)*,
6. who pass short and
23-
26
lateral/ backwards
among them because
they simply have no
meaningful (i.e.
forward) passing
option, since the rest
of the team remains
isolated between
enemy lines (see also
Appendix).
6 * As for Kimmich, ranking high in the table, he does indeed get many passes from the right DC, but then, statistically, immediately passes the ball back to the defender and sprints forward
PWCA
and
ii.) why in most cases, the team simply skips (proper) build-up
altogether, resorting instead to a multitude of shortcuts such as:
a.) direct balls onto the flanks, and from there an immediate 13f.f. Vs MEX – 10:29, 14:23, 19:20, 42:33, 45:12, 46:29, 51:02, 56:53, 58:25,
7. exploration of the possibility of a cross 58:55, 60:34, 62:00, 62:08, 63:51, 64:56, 69:51, 70:01, 74:01, 76:05,
86:43, 89:29; vs KOR - 7:41, 8:36, 9:01, 10:03, 11:32, 11:56, 22:48, 24:34,
30:23, 56:39, 76:47, 79:00 (admittedly, this issue seemed to have been at
least in part remedied in the second half against KOR, when DEU has
tried, and often managed, to construct (also) through the middle)
Vs MEX - 29:15, 36:09, 36:30, 40:25, 56:05, 68:47, 77:20, 91:47, 90:13,
etc.; vs KOR – 21:22, 42:00, 80:07, 83:34, 97:16, etc.
b.) 40m+ long aerial diagonals, and then again a cross into the
8. box (see especially Boateng, but also Kroos and Süle) 16
c.) 25m+ long lifted balls thrown perpendicularly into the box, Vs MEX: Boateng (3x succeeded), Hummels (1x), Kroos (3x), Khedira (2x),
9. 18
especially by Kroos, Boateng, Khedira, and Hummels etc.); vs KOR – minutes 19:51, 22:53, 24:42, 26:04, etc.
7
PWCA
An issue actually aggravated at the World Cup, where in three matches Germany made no less than 170
open-play deliveries into their opponents’ penalty areas (MEX-52, SWE – 52, KOR - 66) meaning an avg. of
56.7/match! This equates 1 O-P delivery for every 45 seconds of actual, effective, possession time, thus
mathematically confirming that DEU doesn’t actually “build-up” (there simply is no time left for it☺), but
keeps on furiously throwing balls into the box. Compare this to ESP,
BRA, or FRA, who all make significantly less deliveries, but register
higher accuracy and efficiency rates in terms of chance-creation.
As a result, Germany registers,

game-by-game and regardless of
the opposition, an abundance of
deliveries into the opposition box
10. (41.4 open-play deliveries on a
31
seven-matches calculated weighted
avg. before the World Cup).
8
PWCA
Of Germany’s 170 open-play deliveries in the three WC matches, 87, meaning

However, most of Germany’s deliveries are aerial (floated) 51%, were aerial (compared to 40.6% grounded and 8.2% solo runs). Moreover,
11. balls thrown into the box, in a manner that strongly 31 there was also a bizarre, if not completely illogical, inadequacy in adapting these
suggests impatience, haste, and lack of creative ideas. crosses to opponents (read: their height and aerial competence): vs SWE, there
were 29 aerial vs only 19 grounded deliveries; vs Korea, 28 aerial vs 31 grounded.
Open-play deliveries (3 WC matches)
vs MEX: 8/10;
vs SWE: 12/16;
This is especially the case of Kimmich (DEU’s main supplier
of deliveries), who in roughly 4/5 of the cases simply runs vs KOR: 7/11;
12. 29, 31
until he reaches the line of the penalty area and then
(total 73%)
robotically lifts the ball into the box.
9
PWCA
Such an inflated share of aerial crosses explains to a high degree Only 20 of the total 67 attempts over the three WC matches have been on
Germany’s generally low shot accuracy (32.9% on avg. before target, equating an accuracy rate of 29.8% (9/25 vs MEX, 5/16 vs SWE, 6/26
the World Cup; players simply shoot, indiscriminately, distance, vs KOR). Moreover, and aggravatingly, at the World Cup Germany managed to
possible blocking, angle, alternative playing options, etc.), score only once out of no less than 60 OP attempts!
33
13. despite the high number of chances created per time unit, 22.3 per match as an avg. of the three group games.
Against Mexico for instance, all players, starters and subs, except for Neuer
and the fact that almost all players in the team take their
and Müller, delivered at least one shot each, same way as against South
chances.
Korea, only Hector and Süle didn’t take a chance from open play.
In another aggravation of prior deficiencies, 41.7% of Germany’s open-play
shots over their 3 matches have been taken from outside of the box.
This happens also because, as yet another sign of impatience and

lack of creative ideas, the players recourse exaggeratedly to
shots from outside of the box (avg. 34% before WC), instead of
14. patiently trying to build an attack and create genuine chances to
32
score.
Three-matches-superimposed map of Germany’s open-play attempts at the World Cup

(circle: attempt; square: goal).
10
PWCA
Indicatively, confronted by tactically disciplined and competent

opponents, who knew both when and how to sit deep and compact, and
how to neutralize the opposition’s best assets, at the World Cup
In what the pre-WC analysis couldn’t stress enough as importance,
Germany could barely make any use of their strongest weapon –
Germany, being impaired by a sluggish, predictable, tilted, and
counterattacks. As for the other weapon, over three matches, only 7 of
Kroos-overdependent “build-up”, is relying exaggeratedly on set- 22-26,
15. Germany’s total 67 attempts (including Kroos’ goal) to score were from
pieces and counterattacks to score (these two categories amounted 33
set-pieces or game developments directly subsequent to set-pieces.
45.5% of their goals in the ten matches prior to the World Cup).
If (read: when) these two don’t work anymore…
➢ In regard to players individually and their effect on the dynamics of attack

Whereas against Sweden and South Korea the data communicated by
FIFA fully confirm the finding, the sole question refers to the game
In terms of individuals, without any reference to players left outside
against Mexico, where, at first glance, the assertion seemed
of the squad, but only focusing on the selected ones, Kroos had been
disconfirmed. Actually, FIFA’s software operating methodology includes
identified as Germany’s key-player in general terms of their attack,
28, set-pieces in the calculation of passes and their accuracy. Once throw-ins,
16. being the most on-the-ball involved player (OBI index 20.1 measured
etc. FKs, and CKs are excluded, Kroos remained the most ball-involved player
over 11 played matches) and also registering the highest passing
even against MEX (143 received + attempted passes, comp. to Özil – 140,
accuracy rate (95.3%), thus playing a fundamental role within the
or Kimmich-134), despite the opposition constantly (and successfully)
team’s game dynamics.
close-marking him in order to hinder DEU’s build-up, and also registered
the highest correspondingly recalculated PAcc (94.7%)
11
Pre-World Cup Analysis – PWCA

finding:
Measured over the ten games prior to the WC, Kroos had been involved (as receiver / sender) in 29.7% of the
team’s total passes. At the WC, the team increased even further its dependence on Kroos: over the three
matches, he participated in 32.97% of the team’s passes (590/1789), meaning basically every third pass went
More generally, and critically
through him! Block him, as Mexico did, closely marking him, and you completely incapacitate Germany. And, if any
so for multiple combined
17. reasons, the team is overly
passim further proof was needed, Kroos:
✓ participated in 43% of the attack initiations in the 3 WC matches;
dependent on Kroos ✓ was involved in 6 of the team’s top ten passing lanes;
✓ has been the preferred passing option for no less than 5 of the other nine field players!
✓ although a DMC, he delivered 14 of Germany’s aggregated 60 open-play shots at the WC (23.3%), and
✓ scored one of Germany’s only two goals in the competition.
12
PWCA
Pre-World Cup
Analysis – finding:
As for other here Over his three WC matches, Gomez

individually- spent 88.1% in the opposition’s half,
approached players 66.1% in their third, and 31.7% in
of Germany, their penalty area. Moreover, he
Gomez (who was for actually covered the smallest 90’
some reason minutes-of-match modelled distance
preferred to among all of Germany’s players except
Wagner), though for the goalkeeper. Not only that, but
taller and more judged by effort structure, he also
physical than spent the biggest amount of time in
Werner, is also the lowest-speed interval (52.6% of
significantly less his playing time), meaning that on
18. 30
mobile in the role of average his movement on the pitch is
a central striker, the lowest both quantitatively and
often remaining qualitatively among all of Germany’s
completely isolated field players. As a direct result, in his
and therefore aggregated 107’58’’ played at the WC,
inaccessible by his he received a mere 10 passes (of a
teammates, being total 15 attempted by his teammates),
used primarily as a and managed to deliver only 5 shots
recipients for those and 1 into-box delivery from open-
aerial balls thrown play (N.B. this has nothing to do with
abundantly into the him not tracking back, quite the
opposition’s box. contrary – see below).
13
PWCA
direction of attack
On the wings, AML Draxler drops back more often than his
counterpart Müller on the right, in order to collect the ball and also
19. 27, 30
track back once the ball is lost, thus being also more involved on the
ball.
Additionally, Draxler registers a high PAcc (93.3%), but mainly

because roughly ¼ of his passes are short-medium and backwards, Against Mexico for instance, 24.5% of his passes went, mostly backwards
20. 30
mainly (back) to Kroos, so that this indicator does by no means and lateral, to Kroos, against Sweden 22.2%.
suggest him bringing on some attacking added value.
Mobile indeed (see his heatmaps), he scored DEU’s only open-play goal
The pre-WC sole question regarding him being his fitness, Reus brings and contributed, albeit rather irrelevantly, to Kroos’ goal. However, his
21. creativity and mobility on the pitch, being a complete, attacking, all- 30 performance indicators dropped generally after the 65th minute and
rounder. dramatically so against KOR, thus referring back to his fitness levels after
his prolonged injury-caused pause during the season (+ see his DTC!).
14
PWCA
Over a cumulated 230 minutes played at the World Cup, Müller remained the
player least involved on the ball per time unit among all squad players except for
Werner & Gomez (see above). He completed 72 out of 94 open-play attempted
passes (76.6%), which places him only above Gomez (50%), and, additionally, he
lost 5 balls against MEX, 3 vs SWE, and 2-3 (dep. 0n calculation) vs KOR.
As the usual starter in the AMR position, Müller is not
N.B. this is not because he would be immobile, like Gomez – he is actually
only Germany’s least on-the-ball involved player (except
22. 23, 30 covering 10.75km per the conventional 90 minutes match duration, above DEU’s
for the centre-forwards), but also registers the lowest
average, and ranks fifth in terms of the distance covered on the attack phase.
PAcc (74.4%) among the regular eleven starters.
Although spending 77% of his playing time in the opposition’s half, he simply
seems to have lost his “Raumdeutung” ability, not knowing anymore when and
where to run, collect the ball, create a space or deliver a pass (see also the fact
that in his 230 minutes of play, he managed to deliver only one shot from open-
play).
Germany’s offensive set-pieces routines have become E.g. vs MEX – 15:23, 25:36, 38:00, 68:10, vs KOR – 10:58, 29:12, 94:25, etc., all
23. simple and predictable (e.g. the Kroos-Hummels lane, 18-20 easily neutralized by opponents except for Kroos’ goal against Sweden, which
Kimmich’s throw-ins, etc.) some may consider unrepeatable.
In terms of defensive transition, Germany employs a Related to the visible drop in fitness over the three matches and/or to a tactical
uniquely intense form of high-pressing, that ensures indication, this has been the case rather against (only) MEX – 6:54, 11:24, 27:59,
a.) a high ball-recovery rate, but also an increased risk of 31:23, 42:54, 43:38, 49:55, 52:39, 63:03, etc.
counters
24. b.) explains why the biggest chunk of the defensive 37-38, 39 Vs Mex -16:29, 39:20, 52:43, 64:36, 67:32, 73:19, 75:54, 84:39, 89:14, 90:05, etc.
players’ otherwise staggering def. perf. Indicators is due to E.g. Hummels: against MEX, 9 of his 14 recoveries and clearances were on long
simply forcing the opposition, through high-pressing, to aerial balls, against KOR 13/20 (7 of them headed). Same for 5 of Kimmich’s RCB’s
kick long balls, only for the German players to against KOR, 7 of Hector’s RCB’s against SWE, 8 of Rüdiger’s 14 in the same
authoritatively win the aerial duels. match, 4 of Khedira’s 6 against KOR, etc.
15
➢ Defensive vulnerabilities
PWCA
For multiple, often interrelated reasons, caused mainly by tactics, Of the WC’s 32 teams of the group stage, only Egypt (16) and South
41f.f.
Germany’s biggest weakness is their defence Korea (15) have conceded more shots on goal than Germany (14)!
Germany has been conceding roughly one goal per match, being In 3 matches, Germany conceded 4 goals. A clear-cut trend.
able to keep a clean sheet in only two of their last ten matches prior
to the World Cup.
25.
3, 41
Aside from multiple

dangerous occasions
For various reasons explained in the PWCA, of Germany’s two major, On defensive set-
26. critical, defensive vulnerability categories, one refers to defending 53-54 pieces in all three
set-pieces. matches, KOR’s first
goal was scored from
a corner kick.
16
PWCA
Germany’s extreme, sometimes reckless, offensive mindset and

crucially their specific style and system of play (both factors being Over the last 13 matches (KOR included), 4 of the 14 goals conceded by
27 47f.f.
aggravated by some individual shortcomings within the team) make Germany have been scored on counterattacks (same as on set-pieces).
them critically vulnerable to counterattacks that exploit mainly:
As mentioned previously, the seeds of this vulnerability are planted Vs MEX – 2:02, 14:30, 17:08, 24:22, 35:58, 36:23, etc.; vs KOR – 2:36,
already during the development phase of Germany’s attack, the 25:03, 27:02, etc.
team’s general positioning on the pitch leaving considerable spaces
behind when they take up shapes such as (aside from the already
shown 3-1-0-6 / 3-0-0-7 with considerable pressure on the DMCs)
Example:
• An extremely elongated and vulnerable 2-2-3-3
28. 10, 51
Vs MEX – 26:25, 30:32, 31:10, 34:11; vs KOR – 3:48, 11:38, 45:32, 59:02,
62:28, 65:18, etc.
• An undefined, disjointed 2-2-all the rest

Example:
17
PWCA
Vs MEX – 9:16, 17:18, 27:02, vs KOR – 4:01, 43:47, 65:29, 76:14, 77:30, 88:58, etc.
KOR interception
Such counterattacks exploit:
a.) the space behind the (too offensive) full-

backs
Assist to SWE’s goal

51
Vs MEX – 00:18, 00:29, 7:19, 9:50, 17:18, etc.; vs KOR – 39:49, etc
SWE counter MEX intercepts the ball
29.
(especially behind Kimmich, sometimes
reckless positionally)
Indicative of Germany’s often imprudent Whereas both left-backs used stayed deeper throughout the group matches (as part of a clear
attacking set-up, which exposes them to tactical indication of Löw, see below), Kimmich continued to plough his right flank. Suggestively, in
10,
counterattacks, the full-backs advance on terms of weighted avg. values, only Werner, Gomez, Müller, and Reus spent more time in the
29, 31
average higher and wider than the wingers opposition’s third than Kimmich (who, when standardizing values per time unit, also remained
(e.g. Kimmich + Werner’s top supplier) Germany’s top supplier of O-P deliveries into the opposition’s box (11 / conventional 90’ of play).
18
PWCA
Vs MEX – 5:40, 9:03, 9:29, 11:54, 12:26, 16:40, 18:41, 49:29, 60:24,
66:24, etc.; vs KOR – 4:22, 4:37, 59:42, 61:4 62:50, 84:45, etc.
Among multiple other factors that combinedly increase Germany’s

vulnerability to counterattacks, one is their exaggerated pressing on
30. 53
the flanks on defensive throw-ins, which leaves exploitable space in
the centre
19
PWCA
b.) the space behind the DMCs, who may be positionally intelligent, Vs MEX – 22:25, 32:22, 33:40, 63:10, 69:25, 81:02; vs KOR – 43:08, 53:38,
31. but also slow;
48-49
61:50, 62:53, 66:10, 71:04, 87:55, etc.
Vs MEX – 34:22 (the goal), 41:50, 56:22, 76:56, 80:08, etc.; vs KOR –
32. c.) when both these spaces co-exist, disaster is almost guaranteed, 52
47:31, 56:53, 66:43, 71:43, 72:14, 90+6 (2nd goal), etc.;
many times, Germany’s players being forced to commit fouls and Vs MEX – 38:28, 82:15, 83:50, 85:58, Boateng’s yellow card in the match
33. risk disciplinary sanctions, respectively
50
against SWE
one of the DCs to often sprint out of the defence to fill the void,
50 Vs MEX – 00:32 (!), 12:39, 12:52, 19:39 (!), 31:32, 32:30, etc.
which however leaves considerable space behind
34.
20
PWCA
Even leaving aside the central defenders (see above, the issue of their
Germany’s significant and often exploited vulnerability to interceptions on long aerial balls, that distorts the relevance of employable
counterattacks is almost entirely a problem of their tactical set-up, statistics), both the defensive midfielders’ and full-backs’ personal
of their style-and-system of play, rather than of some individual 48-51 performance indicators remain more than satisfactory, highlighting the
shortcomings of one player or another (aside from the mentioned individual value of the players (e.g. Kimmich – 7.2 recoveries + 1.9 clearances per
relative slowness of the DCs and DMCs). match, Plattenhardt – 3.9+1.8, Hector – 7.6+2.1, Gündogan – 12.1+1.3, Kroos –
7.0+0.3, Khedira – 6.1+4.1, etc.).
Moreover, it’s not that the players in these positions wouldn’t run
in general or track back once Germany loses the ball in particular.
Quite the contrary: it is exactly these players that run the most
within the squad, both overall and during the (proper) defensive
phase. Plus, the structure of their effort is also beyond criticism.
35. And this, actually, shows the true problem - the tactics employed;
to the best of our knowledge, it is very uncommon for a modern
and top-level football team to for instance
- have their full-backs make a combined 2.4 times more open-play
deliveries than the wingers (10 pre-WC matches avg.);
- have as the top-runner within the team a full-back (Kimmich –
11.65km/match at the World Cup, more than all the central
midfielders);
- have the same full-back as the main passing partner of the
central striker;
- have the wingers (regardless who exactly played on this
positions) track back the least (except for, again, Gomez) –
Effort volume & structure of DEU players at the WC (w. avg. /90’ match) which only aggravates DEU’s vulnerability on the flanks; etc.
21
Directly stimulated by this intriguing findings, a deeper analysis of the German players’ effort both in comparison to other four teams and in relation to the two
phases of the actual playing time leads to a harsh, but unavoidable conclusion: on average, German players run a lot, more than most teams actually, but they do
it very inefficiently so.
A standardization of FIFA distance data for five WC teams into a mathematically-modelled match of 60-
minutes actual, effective, playing time, of which 30 in possession & 30 out of possession (meters)
Preliminary findings:
✓ Of the 5 squads analysed, only ESP, respectively CRO, run more on avg. than DEU (N.B. CRO’s insignificant plus 120m is almost lost once Gomez is filtered out.)
✓ Interestingly à propos of the sluggishness of DEU’s build-up, in terms of offensive effort, only BRA run less than Germany (an insignificant 43.3m/avg.)!
✓ However, on the defensive phase, only ESP’s players have run more than Germany’s!
These findings raise serious questions regarding Germany’s tactical set-up, specifically the players’ positions and (im)mobility on the pitch during the attack,
which force them to track back the most among the teams compared except for the other eliminated team – Spain.
22
A reprocessing of the above data in a graphic form and adding new differentiating analytical criteria sheds further light on how the recorded physical parameters
of the players illustrate the shortcoming of the tactics employed / applied. Thus,
- although Germany conceded the third highest
number of attempts on target during the group
stage, it has 2 of the first 4 on-defence—most
running DCs, respectively 4 of the top 8, three of
them significantly above average.
- In the same terms of the defensive effort made,
the team has the second best player out of a 89-
men sample, two of the four most running full-
backs, and all DMCs placed above avg.
Aside from the logical questions “Why are they running
that much on defence? Where were they when the
opponent intercepted the ball? What was the team’s
attacking set-up?”, one first possible explanation for
this otherwise remarkable effort not being enough for
Germany to advance out of the groups (or at least
show some defensive stability) might have to do with
the two front compartments of the team: as visible in
the graph, all the advanced midfielders and strikers
(except for the 65-minutes played Goretzka) score
below average in terms of the defensive physical
effort made.
This discrepancy suggests both an imprudent attacking set-up (the FBs and DMCs run the most on defence, although, as extensively shown, it is exactly behind
them that DEU’s most vulnerable spaces emerge) and a “fracture” between two vertical halves that should benefit from a deeper investigation.
23
In this direction, a “defensive track coefficient” (DTC) is employed in the following. It represents an instrument that integrates in a standardized manner player, match
duration and minutes played, possession, effective playing time, and distance-related data in order to assess a player’s physical effort during the defensive phase, once
possession is lost, in relation to his effort during the offensive phase. Its main merit relies in offering a single integrated and simple mathematical expression as an answer to a
classic question in the football world: “How much does player X track back on the defence in comparison to the attack?”
The coefficient’s formula remaining for now confidential, its applicability is universal and both
absolute and relative, meaning it serves both transversal (player-to-player) and longitudinal Observations and comments:
(one player in time) comparisons. As for variation scale and interpretation: non-linear; The data fully confirm the partial conclusions formulated previously while
theoretically from 0* to + ∞**, realistically from 0.75 to 1.5; the higher the value, the greater also capturing new shortcomings. Thus,
the defensive track effort made by the player in relation to his effort on the offensive; below - there is a clear and deep fracture within the team in regard to defence-
1.0 = low defensive track effort; above 1.25 = considerable effort. offence physical effort, with some players running significantly more than
others, and variations directly dependent also on game phase. This lack of
uniformity, captured in a simple form by standard deviation and min-max
difference, suggests (read: confirms the previous findings) both
a.) the existence of spaces that make Germany particularly vulnerable to
counterattacks once the ball is lost, because of their attacking set-up;
b.) the uselessness of an otherwise laudable effort, i.e. the fact that Germany
is surpassed only by Spain (also eliminated from the WC) in terms of DTC
(see avg. and Me).
Moreover, it definitively and fully explains in mathematical terms Germany’s
vulnerability on the flanks: it is in these areas that
- firstly, the full-backs, although covering impressive distances on attacks,
nevertheless do not track back comparably, while, directly aggravating,
- secondly, the wingers (alongside the two all-rounders), while scoring
decently on the offensive physical effort, actually track back the least among
all of the team’s positions proportionally, all of them except for Goretzka
being placed below the DTC critical threshold value.
It is exactly this simultaneity, overlapping the clear tactical indications of the
technical staff (FBs higher and wider on the pitch) that directly generates
Germany’s so significant, and often exploited, vulnerability on the flank.
Defensive track coefficient’s values for the players of five teams *The mathematically ideal case in which the team has 100% possession.
24 participating in the 2018 World Cup. **The mathematically ideal case in which the team had 0% possession.
➢ Psychological and fitness-related issues

PWCA
- the pre-WC analysis has identified a clearly manifested, relatively All of Germany’s four goals conceded at the World Cup have been scored
bizarre, issue that might indicate a focusing problem among within these two critical time intervals: MEX – 35; SWE – 32; KOR: both in
Germany’s players – the fact that 58.8% of the goals conceded in the extra-time.
25 matches prior to the WC had been scored in two ¼-hour intervals,
before the break and before the final whistle (instead of a
mathematically normal, expectable frequency of 37.2%);
36. 60
- the politicized issue regarding Özil and Gündogan’s pre-WC pro- German media and social platforms during Germany’s WC presence make
37. 60
Erdogan gesture any comment superfluous.
25
B. NEW DEFICIENCIES / NEW FINDINGS
Aside from multiple individual performances below expectations and for the sake of parsimony not analysed here, (see Müller in his last two matches, Khedira
vs. Mexico, Reus’ drop of performance in the second half against South Korea, etc.), this report may identify another series of new deficiencies manifested in
Germany’s game at the World Cup.
No. Deficiency / finding:
Whereas before the World-Cup, Germany’s counterattacks and set-pieces represented their two best scoring weapons (covering a combined 45% of
1. their total goals), over the three World Cup matches, for multiple reasons already mentioned (from their opponent’s almost permanently keeping 5 men
at the back to the predictability of routines), Germany hasn’t been able to rely anymore on them, except for Kroos’ goal.
For reasons having to do with both (probably) fitness levels and (definitely) a tactical indication meant to reduce the risk of counterattacks, at the World
2. Cup, especially during their last two games, Germany haven’t employed their unparalleled, extremely intense, forms of Gegenpressing and high-
pressing anymore, which had previously granted them a very high ratio of ball recoveries directly converted into creation of chances.
Whereas in the pre-WC matches analysed, Germany’s players resorted significantly to open-play shots from outside of the box (roughly every third of the
total shots), having however a reasonable efficacy rate (i.e. more than every tenth being converted into a goal, or roughly every fifth of Germany’s O-P
3.
goals), over the three matches at the World Cup, the players increased the share of O-P shots from outside of the box to a spectacular 41.7%, but this
time none of total 25 delivered transformed into a goal.
Whereas before the World Cup, Müller was German’s both most prolific taker of O-P shots from outside of the box (alongside Draxler) and the most
4. successful in terms of conversion, throughout his 230 minutes played at the World Cup, he managed to deliver one single shot from outside of the box
(the main reason for this drop being his inability to move out of his marker’s reach into free spaces).
Though tested pre-WC for only 7 minutes, against both Sweden and South Korea, Löw has retreated Werner as a winger once Gomez was subbed on,
who took his place as a centre forward. This analysis hasn’t identified a single performance indicator over the two games, not even his pseudo-assist
5.
against SWE, that might deem this solution as a minimally satisfactory one (from the ratio of lost balls during his usual solo runs into the box to the
number of passes (at least attempted) between him and Gomez), or from the number of chances created as a winger to the number of deliveries)
Possibly explainable through a series of contextual factors that the German staff knows best (from hotel accommodation to temperature and humidity at
the match or season’s physical burden on players at club level), Germany displayed in their three WC matches an easily recognizable (and also
6.
measurable) and quasi-generalized fatigue manifested as a drop in physical performance in comparison, for instance, to both pre-WC matches and to
individual player’s indicators across club matches (see next slide).
26
This has been especially the case of Özil (who covered an average distance worryingly low for his position(s) on the pitch, Gomez (approached extensively above
in this analysis), Draxler (in comparison to club parameters) and Reus (who in his last two games didn’t adequately dosage his effort across the matches’ halves).
Unexplainable at least from outside of the squad and in the absence of physio data, there appears to be absolutely no correlation between distance covered at
the WC and prior effort made at club level (N.B.. keep in mind the previous obs. – it’s on the def. phase that they ran noteworthy less).
Avg. distance covered per 90 conventional minutes at the World Cup

(km; comparison to Champions League, if available; calculations adjusted to extra-
time and standardized; filter (parentheses) 60+ minutes played)
Germany’s players at the World Cup: volume & structure of effort.

27 (Three-matches weighted avg. / conventional 90’ distances (m) and components)

Finally, as a generalized structural-functional element that characterized Germany’s play at the World Cup, the team’s attack was extremely tilted to
their right, in a pattern opposite to their pre-WC matches (which might be interpreted at first glance as an attempt by Löw to rectify a pre-WC
shortcoming (see PWCA 22-24, 27), only to create a new and bigger one in the opposite direction)
before the World Cup (7g): at the the World Cup (3g):
(tilt coeff. of attack: -0.35) (tilt coeff. of attack: +0.47)
7.
(flanks widened artificially for greater visibility; filter: open-play)
28

This generalized (i.e. in all three matches) and pronounced (tilt: positive (rightwards) +0.47, the highest among WC’s top 6 favourites at the start
of the competition) was the resultant of multiple factors:
✓ Kroos, who normally patrols Germany’s left half-space, has been closely, and successfully so, man-marked by Mexico in the first match (see
minutes 1:37, 2:04, 4:42, 4:51, 5:54, 7:06, 20:47, etc.);
✓ possibly also at the beginning of the first match, but most clearly throughout the last two games, after what happened against Mexico, both
left-backs (Plattenhardt and Hector) have been instructed to stay back more than usual in order to allow Kroos more liberty to advance
higher up the pitch and nevertheless keep a third man at the back (Löw seems to be an ardent supporter of this idea) - Kimmich made 3.7x
more open-play deliveries than Plattenhardt, Hector and Brandt (when subbed on as a, theoretically, left-back) combined, while also
7.
spending on average significantly more time then them in the opposition’s half, respectively third;
✓ Müller, the right advanced midfielder, was – among his few merits – considerably more active against Mexico than his usual;
✓ against both Mexico and South Korea, after Khedira’s replacements, Özil, who as an AMC normally tends to drift leftwards into the half-
space, was retreated as a second, more advanced, defensive midfielder on the right of Kroos;
✓ AML Draxler, who often changed positions with Özil in the pre-WC matches, and increased activity in the left third, wasn’t fielded against
Korea, being replaced by
✓ Reus, a rather offensive all-rounder during his WC presence, who drifted mainly rightwards and entered more combinations with Özil in the
same lateral third;
29
C. REMEDIED DEFICIENCIES. POSITIVES

The tactical adjustment meant to free up Kroos, who, subsequently, was given enough freedom to advance higher than in the pre-WC matches and thus
1. became involved to a significantly higher degree in the creation of chances (especially in the last two games). Downside: this was achieved at the cost of
considerably denying the left-backs a participation in the attack.
The starting eleven fielded against Sweden.

Coincidentally or not, when measured over the last
thirteen matches (WC included), out of hundreds of
formations combinable from within Germany’s
squad, the best one possible attack-wise and in
a 4-2-3-1 formation is exactly the one fielded
2. against Sweden with one exception – Özil instead
of Müller: it offers mathematically at least* 784.6
attempted open-play per 93’), highest dispersion
coeff. (0.927), highest degree of verticalization
(0.35), most shots, most into-box deliveries, most
supplies for Werner, etc.
Even before his re-positionings as a second, more advanced DMC, Özil made a few noteworthy attempts at dropping back to collect the ball during build-
3.
up and further elaborate the attack, thus preventing the all too common 3-1-0-6 and similar elongated, dysfunctional shape.
* For Rudy’s passes exchanged with Reus and Rüdiger, there are insufficient data – the minimum values have been taken into calculation. N.B. The best mathematical eleven would actually include Brandt instead of
30 Draxler, but the amount of data regarding him is also below the threshold of reliable conclusions. Brandt, Özil, and Reus are considered here as all-rounders frequently swapping positions.
APPENDIX
sent received
Methodology
exemplification:
Germany’s passing matrix over the last 13 matches (KOR included) re-modelled into a 93-minutes match
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Follow-up analysis:

Data sources: own monitoring of Germany’s matches plus data

b) but also plants the seeds of Germany’s major vulnerability to counterattacks

Pre-World Cup PWCA

As a result, Germany registers,

Of Germany’s 170 open-play deliveries in the three WC matches, 87, meaning

This happens also because, as yet another sign of impatience and

Three-matches-superimposed map of Germany’s open-play attempts at the World Cup

Indicatively, confronted by tactically disciplined and competent

➢ In regard to players individually and their effect on the dynamics of attack

Pre-World Cup Analysis – PWCA

As for other here Over his three WC matches, Gomez

Additionally, Draxler registers a high PAcc (93.3%), but mainly

Aside from multiple

Germany’s extreme, sometimes reckless, offensive mindset and

• An undefined, disjointed 2-2-all the rest

a.) the space behind the (too offensive) full-

Assist to SWE’s goal

Among multiple other factors that combinedly increase Germany’s

➢ Psychological and fitness-related issues

Avg. distance covered per 90 conventional minutes at the World Cup

Germany’s players at the World Cup: volume & structure of effort.

No. Deficiency / finding:

(flanks widened artificially for greater visibility; filter: open-play)

No. Deficiency / finding:

No. Deficiency / finding:

The starting eleven fielded against Sweden.

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