EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G. R. No. 175605
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,*

CARPIO,

CORONA,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,**
 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA ABAD, JJ.

A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY PAMPLONA
A.K.A. NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y
ADORINO,

Accused-Appellants.
Promulgated:

____________________

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR.-HC No. 00765 which affirmed an earlier Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Binan City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No.9440-B, finding accused-
appellants Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. Junior, Joey Pamplona, a.k.a. Nato,
and Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P16,700.00 as
actual damages, P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity and to pay the costs of
the suit.

The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an Information3 dated

January 22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion
of which reads:

That on or about September 22, 1995, in the Municipality of Binan, Province of

Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamba, alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y Adorino,
conspiring, confederating together and mutualy helping each other, with intent to kill,
while conveniently armed with a deadly bladed weapon, with abuse of superior strength,
 did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro
Biay y Almarinez with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of his surviving heirs.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, pleaded

not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce Borero, elder
sister of the victim Mauro Biay and eyewitness to the killing of her brother; Dr.
Rolando Poblete, who conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim and
prepared the post-mortem report; and Amelia Biay, the victims widow. The
evidence for the prosecution, as culled from the CA Decision under review, is as
follows:

In the proceedings before the trial court, witness for the prosecution Dulce
Borero testified that on September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, she
was selling balut at Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna. Her
brother, Mauro Biay, also a balut vendor, was also at the area, about seven (7) arms length
away from her when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia. Borero testified that when
her brother Mauro approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of her brother behind
his back and Jessies companions- accused Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began
stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the
 right side of the victim and was strangling Mauro from behind. Witness saw her brother
Mauro struggling to free himself while being stabbed by the three (3) accused., until her
brother slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold then instructed his two co-accused to
run away. During cross-examination, Borero claims that she wanted to shout for help but
nothing came out from her mouth. When the accused had left after the stabbing incident,
witness claimed that she went home to call her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when
they returned to the scene, the victim was no longer there as he had already been brought
to the Perpetual Help Hospital. They learned from the tricycle driver who brought Mauro
top the hospital that their brother was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro
Biay and prepared the post-mortem report, testified that the victims death was caused
by hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds. Witness specified the eight (8)
stab wounds suffered by the victim one in the neck, two in the chest, one below the
armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the left thigh and also a
laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to the expert witness, the nature of
stab wounds indicate that it may have been caused by more than one bladed instrument.

The victims widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses
amounting to P16,700.00 due to the death of her husband. Also, her husband allegedly
earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a balut vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-
time carpenter.

The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Specifically,

accused-appellant Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of
Mauro Bay, accused-appellant Jessie Garcia interposed the defense of alibi, while
accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena interposed the defense of insanity.
Succinctly, the CA Decision summed up their respective defenses:

On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the
stabbing of Mauro Biay. Joey Pamplona claims that he was seated on a bench when co-
accused Arnold came along. Then the balut vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up,
pull something from the right side of his pocket and stab the balut vendor once before
running away. Joey Pamplona testified that after the stabbing incident, due to fear that
Arnold might also stab him, he also ran away to the store of a certain Mang Tony, a
barangay official and related the incident to Aling Bel, the wife of Mang Tony. Joey
Pamplona said that he stayed at Mang Tonys store until his father arrived and told him to
go home.

Danilo Garados testified that on Septemebr 22, 1995, he was at the store of Mang
Tony to buy cigarettes and saw Arnold and Joey seated on the bench near the artesian
well. Arnold and Joey allegedly called Mauro Biay and he saw Arnold stabbing Mauro.
Jessie Garcia was not there and Joey allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed Mauro.

Clavel Estropegan testified that on September 22, 1995, around 9:00 p.m. Joey
Pamplona entered her store and told her that Junior or Arnold Garchitorena was stabbing
somebody. She did not hear any commotion outside her house which is just four houses
away from the artesian well. However, she closed her store for fear that Arnold will enter
her house.

Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he investigated the stabbing

incident and, although he had no personal knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold
Garchitorena who stabbed Mauro Biay. Upon questioning Arnold, the latter admitted that
he did stab Mauro.

Defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that on September 22, 1995, he was
in his shoe factory at his house located at 186 Sta. Teresita Street, Almeda Subdivision,
Binan when he heard Mauro Biay shouting, and so he went out of his house. He allegedly
saw two persons embracing each other near the artesian well. He recognized these two
persons as Mauro and Arnold. He saw Arnold pulling out a knife from the body of Mauro
and the latter slowly fell down on his side. After Arnold washed his hands at the artesian
well and walked away towards the house of his aunt, this witness approached Mauro and
seeing that the victim was still breathing, went to get a tricycle to bring Mauro to the
hospital. When he got back to the area, there were many people who helped board
Mauro in the tricycle and they brought him to the Perpetual Help Hospital in Binan.

The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed that on September
22, 1995, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a bus from his work in
Blumentritt. He arrived at his home in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September 24, 1995,
he was fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2) Barangay Tanods from his house and
brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning. Thereafter, he was put in jail and
incarcerated for six (6) months without knowing the charges against him. He was only
informed that he was one of the suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his mother.

With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and
resident physician of the National Center for Mental Health, testified that she examined
the accused Arnold and based on the history of the patient, it was found that he had been
using prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2) years prior to the stabbing
incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from schizophrenia, wherein he was
hearing auditory voices, seeing strange things and is delusional. However, Dr. Belen also
testified that the accused Garchitorena had remissions or exaservation and understands
what he was doing and was aware of his murder case in court.4

On May 9, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,5 as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court

finds accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and
Jessie Garcia y Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of MURDER as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act
7659, (Heinous Crimes). Accordingly, all of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.

Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
Amelia Biay, widow of the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums:

a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity

b) 50,000.00 as and for moral damages

 c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages

d) 16,700.00 as and for actual damages

e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and

f) To pay the costs of suit.

Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is hereby
ordered to transfer/commit the three (3) accused to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Considering that death penalty was meted against all of the accused, let the
entire records of the above-entitled case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment pursuant to Rule 122, Sec.10 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.6

Accused-appellants appealed to the CA. Pamplona and Garcia reiterated

their denial of the charge against them. Garchitorena who never denied his
participation in the killing, insisted, however, insisted that he is exempt from
criminal liability because he was suffering from a mental disorder before, during
and after the commission of the crime.
 On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered the Decision7 now under review, affirming
RTCs Decision in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001 Decuision of the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

In arriving at the assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as follows:

After studying the records of this case, we do not find any reason to overturn the
ruling of the trial court.

Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it was only accused-appellant

Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed the victim Mauro Biay, we find reason to uphold the
trial courts giving credence to prosecution witness Dulce Borero who testified as an
eyewitness on the circumstances surrounding the incident and the manner by which the
crime committed.

Defense witness Garados testified that he was at the store and saw both Arnold
and Joey at the vicinity where the stabbing incident happened, seated on a bench near
the artesian well, when they called the victim Mauro. Defense witness Gonzalgo was in
his house when he heard the commotion and went outside to see Arnold and Mauro
embracing near the artesian well and the former pulling a knife from the body of the
latter. On the other hand, prosecution witness Borero was merely seven arms length away
from the incident and could easily see the victim Mauro overpowered and attacked by his
assailants, Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia. She witnessed the
stabbing incident in its entirely and positively identified the accused and their criminal
acts. It is a well-settled rule that the evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by the trial
court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the
truth or not. (People vs. Cardel, 336 SCRA 144)

Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused conspired to

assault the victim Mauro Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called the victim
and prompted the latter to approach their group near the artesian well. When the victim
was near enough, accused Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey Pamplona restrained Mauro
Biay and overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two accused, Jessie Garcia and
Joey Pamplona, together with their co-accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his two
co-accused to run. Conspiracy is apparent in the concerted action of the three accused.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148).
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common
purpose and design, a concerted action and community of interest among the accused
(People vs. Sicad, et al., 391 SCRA 19).

Likewise, we affirm the trial courts appreciation of the aggravating circumstance

of abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime into murder. While it is true that
superiority in number does not per se mean superiority in strength, the appellants in this
case did not only enjoy superiority in number, but were armed with a weapon, while the
victim had no means with which to defend himself. Thus, there was obvious physical
disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength attended the killing
when the offenders took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate
the offense. (People of the Phils. vs. Parreno, 433 SCRA 591). In the case at bar, the victim
was rendered helpless when he was assaulted by the three accused. He was restrained
and overpowered by the combined strength and the weapons used by his assailants.

We do not find improbable Boreros failure to act or shout for help upon
witnessing the stabbing of her brother Mauro Biay. It is an accepted maxim that different
people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard
form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling
experience. xxx There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a
shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable. (People of the Philippines vs. Aspuria, 391 SCRA 404)
 Accused-appellant Jessie Garcias denial of any involvement cannot prevail over
Boreros positive identification. As ruled by the trial court, allegations that accused Jessie
Garcia was somewhere else when the crime was committed is not enough. He must
likewise demonstrate that he could not have been present at the crime scene, or in its
vicinity. He also could have sought the help of his co-worker, employer or anyone in the
area to support his defense of alibi. Indeed, we affirm that accused Jessie Garcias
allegation that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed is not substantiated by
evidence. Alibi can easily be fabricated. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently
weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
victim. (People of the Phils. vs. Cadampog, 428 SCRA 336)

Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given merit when the expert witness
herself, Dr. Belen, attested that accused Arnold Garchitorena was experiencing remission
and was even aware of his murder case in court. The trial court had basis to conclude that
during the commission of the crime, Arnold was not totally deprived of reason and
freedom of will. In fact, after the stabbing incident, accused Arnold Garchitorena
instructed his co-accused to run away from the scene. We agree that such action
demonstrates that Arnold possessed the intelligence to be aware of his and his co-
accuseds criminal acts. A defendant in a criminal case who interpose the defense of
mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact that he was insane at the very
moment when the crime was committed. There must be complete deprivation of reason
in the commission of the act, or that the accused acted without discernment, which must
be proven by clear and positive evidence. The mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not preclude imputability. Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does not necessarily
and conclusively prove that he is legally so. (People of the Philippines vs. Galigao, 395
SCRA 195)

Having found the court a quos decision to be supported by the evidence on

record, and for being in accord with prevailing jurisprudence, we find no reason to set it
aside.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its entirely.

SO ORDERED.
 The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The People and
the accused-appellants opted not to file any supplemental brief. The respective
assignments of errors contained in the briefs that they filed with the CA are set
forth hereunder.

For accused-appellant Pamplona:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL AND TOTAL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DULCE BORERO

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLANT

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN
DULY PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

For accused-appellant Garcia:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT GIVEN BY DULCE BORERO, ELDER SISTER OF THE VICTIM AND
PROSECUTION WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED
DESPITE GLARING INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES AND UNRELIABLE
DECLARATION ATTENDING THE SAME; AND, ON THE OTHERHAND, IN DISREGARDING THE
COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE WITNESSES
ALL IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES GOVERNING QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL
CASES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENSE EXISTING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED GARCIA;
 II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT JESSIE GARCIA WHO WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT
THE TIME AS TO RENDER IT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AT THE
SCENE OF THE CRIME AND EVEN IF THE SAME IS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT IS, THE TESTIMONIES OF OITHER DEFENSE WITNESSES
WHO WERE ONE IN SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT PRESENT THEREAT;

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION FOR JESSIE GARCIA
INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL WHEN NONE OF THE OTHER ACCUSED, AFTER HAVING
ADMITTED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME, IMPLICATED HIM;

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THEREFOR.

For accused-appellant Garchitorena:

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE OVER THE TESTIMONY OF AN
EXPERT WITNESS.

II

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED ARNOLD GARCHITORENA TO HAVE WILLFULLY

EXECUTED THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF.
 Accused-appellant Pamplona capitalized on Dulce Boreros inaction at the
time when she had supposedly witnessed the slaying of her younger brother. He
argued that if she really witnessed the crime, she would have had readily helped
her brother Mauro instead of fleeing. Accused-appellant Garcia anchored his
acquittal on his defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Garchitorena used his
alleged mental disorder, specifically, schizophrenia, as a ground to free himself
from criminal liability.

The core issues raised by the both accused-appellants Pamplona and Garcia
are factual in nature and delve on the credibility of the witnesses.

Since the accused-appellants raise factual issues, they must use cogent and
convincing arguments to show that the trial court erred in appreciating the
evidence. They, however, have failed to do so.

Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial courts decision was

rendered by a judge other than the one who conducted trial. Hence, the judge who
decided the case failed to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand so
as to gauge their credibility. This argument does not convince the Court for the
reason it has consistently maintained, to wit:
 We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No. 87214, March 30, 1993,
220 SCRA 551), that the circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision
had not heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his
decision. After all, he had the full record before him, including the transcript of
stenographic notes which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who
had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion in the factual findings reached by him.8

A perusal of the trial courts decision readily shows that it was duly based on
the evidence presented during the trial. It is evident that he thoroughly examined
the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed the
credibility of the witnesses. This Court finds no plausible ground to set aside the
factual findings of the trial court, which were sustained by the CA.

The eyewitness Dulce Boreros testimony clearly established Pamplona and

Garcias participation and, consequently, their culpability in the appalling murder of
Mauro Biay:9

Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness)

Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay?

A: Yes sir.

xxx

Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his death?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What was the cause of his death?

A: He was repeatedly stabbed sir.

Q: You said that Mauro Biay was repeatedly stabbed, who stabbed Mauro Biay
repeatedly?

A: Arnold Gatchitorena, was stabbing repeatedly the victim sir.

Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he stabbed Mauro Biay?

A: They were three (3) who were stabbing Mauro Biay, sir.

Q: You said that they were three who were stabbing Mauro Biay, who are the other
two?

A: Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.

Q: So that when you said three, you are referring to Arnold Gatchitorena, Joey
Pamplona and Jessie Garcia?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident [happen]?

A: On September 22, 1995 sir.

Q: Do you know what was [the] time when this incident happened on September 22,
1995?

A: 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.

Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?

A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Bian, Laguna sir.

Q: Could you tell Madam Witness, where in particular place in Sta. Inez, Almeda
Subdivision this stabbing incident happened?

A: In the street near the artesian well sir.

Q: Do you know where is that street?

A: Sta Inez St., Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Bian, Laguna sir.

Q: You said a while ago that accused Arnold Gatchitorena, Jessie Garcia, Joey
Pamplona repeatedly [stabbed] Mauro Biay, do you know these three accused?

A: Yes sir.

xxx

Q: Will you kindly step down from your seat and tap the three accused that you have
pointed to us to be the persons who stabbed and killed your brother Mauro Biay?

Court: Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly accompany the witness.

P02 Dionisio: Yes sir.

Fiscal: I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the witness was crying when she was
pointing to the three accused, uttering that Sila ang pumatay sa aking kapatid!.

xxx

Q: What is the name of that person wearing that blue t-shirts?

A: Arnold Gatchitorena sir.

Q: We would like to confirm if he is really Arnold Gatchitorena pointed to by the
witness?

Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness wearing blue t-shirts identified
himself as Arnold Gatchitorena.

Fiscal: Do you know the name of second person whom you tapped on his side wearing
white t-shirts?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What is his name?

A: Jessie Garcia sir.

Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness identified himself as certain Jessie
Garcia.

Fiscal: Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name of a person in longsleeves polo
shirts-checkered?

A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.

Interpreter: The person pointed by the witness identified himself as certain Joey
Pamplona.

xxx

Q: How far were you from Mauro Biay when he was being stabbed by the three
accused Joey Pamplona, Jessie Garcia, and Arnold Gatchitorena?

A: Seven (7) arms length sir.

Q: You said that your brother was stabbed successively by the three accused, how
did it [happen] Madam Witness?
A: They called him sir.

Q: Who was called?

A: Mauro Biay sir.

Q: Who called Mauro Biay?

A: It was Jessie who called sir.

Q: When you said Jessie, are you referring to Jessie Garcia, one of the accused in this
case?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When Mauro Biay was called by Jessie Garcia, what was [M]auro Biay doing
there?

A: Mauro Biay approached sir.

Q: By the way Madam Witness, do you know why Mauro Biay was in that place
where the incident happened?

A: Yes sir.

Atty. Pajares: Witness would be incompetent Your Honor.

Court: Witness may answer.

Fiscal: Why was he there?

A: He was selling balot sir.

xxx

Fiscal: When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what [did] Mauro Biay do, if any?
A: Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my brother and placed the hand at his back
sir.

Q: Who were the companions of Jessie Garcia when he called [M]auro Biay?

A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.

Q: When you said Jr. Gatchitorena are you referring to Arnold Gatchitorena?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay, he was together with Arnold
Gatchitorena and Joey Pamplona?

A: Yes sir.

Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey Pamplona and Arnold Gatchitorena
do after Jessie Garcia twisted the arm of Mauro Biay on his back?

A: Arnold Gatchitorena repeatedly stabbed [M]auro Biay at his back and also
Jessie Garcia also stabbed my brother sir.

xxx

Q: Were you able to know the weapon used to stab Mauro Biay?

A: It was like a shiny bladed instrument sir.

Q: Now, what was the position of Mauro Biay when being stabbed by the three
accused?

A: He was struggling to free himself sir.

Q: You said that he was struggling to free himself, why did you say that he was
struggling to free himself?

A: Because I could see sir.

Q: You see what?

A: Because that three were repeatedly stabbing Mauro Biay sir.

Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was Joey Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay,
if you can still remember?

A: He was also repeatedly stabbing my brother sir.

Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if any Joey Pamplona was doing to Mauro
Biay?

A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey Pamplona was also struggling [strangling]
the neck of Mauro Biay sir.

Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by the three accused successively, was
Mauro Biay hit by these stabbing?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Why do you know that he was hit by stabbing of the three?

A: Because I saw the blood oozing from the part of his body sir.

Q: Now, what happened to Mauro Biay, when he was stabbed and hit by the
successive stabbing of the three accused?

A: The victim Mauro Biay was suddenly slumped face down on the ground sir.

xxx

Q: What did you learn if any when you went to the hospital to see your brother
[M]auro Biay?

A: He was already dead sir.

 Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering,
straightforward, categorical and spontaneous in her narration of how the killing of
her brother Mauro took place.10 Notably, her testimony as to the identification of
Garchitorena as the one who stabbed Mauro Biay was even corroborated by
defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo,11 thus:

Q: From the time you saw these two persons near the artesian well, what happened
after that, mr. witness?

A: Mauro Biay slumped on the floor and I saw Junior stabbed once more the victim
but I am not sure if the victim was hit at the back, maam.

Q: How far were you from the two when you saw the incident, mr. witness?

A: More or less 7 to 8 meters, maam.

Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from the place where you were standing
to the place of incident, mr. witness?

A: None, maam.

Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain the lower
court in giving her testimony full faith and credence. Moreover, the prosecutions
version is supported by the physical evidence.12 Boreros testimony that the victim
was successively stabbed several times conforms with the autopsy report that the
latter suffered multiple stab wounds.13

Accused-appellant Pamplonas argument that there were inconsistencies in

the testimony of prosecution witnesses Borero is not convincing. He specifically
points out that in the direct examination of Borero, she stated that it was Jessie
Garcia who twisted the hand of Mauro Biay backwards when the latter approached
the former.14 In the cross-examination, she stated that it was Joey Pamplona who
strangled the victim when the latter approached Jessie Garcia.

The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and her cross-
examination testimonies are not sufficient ground to disregard them. In People v.
Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz,15 we
ruled that:
 minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against
memorized falsities.

Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of Borero

or her narration of the incident. On the contrary, they showed that her account was
the entire truth. In fact, her narration was in harmony with the account of defense
witness Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn Statement16 of Borero and
her testimony before the lower court17 were in complete congruence.

Undoubtedly, accused-appellants identities as the perpetrators were

established by the prosecution. The prosecution witness was able to observe the
entire incident, because she was there. Thus, we find no reason to differ with the
trial courts appreciation of her testimony. Positive identification, where categorical
and consistent, and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.18

Accused-appellant Garcias alibi has no leg to stand on. In People v. Desalisa,19

this Court ruled that:

for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing
evidence.

Here, the crime was committed at Binan, Laguna. Although Garcia testified
that he was still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt and arrived in Binan only
at 11:00 P.M. or two hours after the killing incident, still, he failed to prove that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity. His alibi must fail.

Accused-appellant Garchitorenas defense of insanity has also no merit.

Unlike other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent
criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting circumstance.20 As aptly
argued by the Solicitor General, insanity is a defense in the nature of confession
and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved, and accused-appellant
Garchitorena utterly failed to do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial court
that he was not totally deprived of reason and freedom of will during and after the
stabbing incident, as he even instructed his co-accused-appellants to run away
from the scene of the crime.

Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as there

was no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or
that he participated in their criminal designs.21 We are not persuaded. In People v.
Maldo,22 we stated:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for
conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to
the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of
interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act
 of one of them is deemed the act of all. (citations omitted, emphasis ours)

In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were

together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective.
Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together
with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed
him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All
means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to
the ground and expired. The three accused-appellants prior act of waiting for the
victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design
and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused

rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of
one is the act of all.23

The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated

against the accused-appellants. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever
there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, considering that
a situation of superiority of strength is notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.24 This
circumstance was alleged in the Information and was proved during the trial. In the
case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend himself in any way. The accused-
appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him
successively using the same deadly weapon.

All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-appellants of murder,
considering the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission
of the crime, each of the accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death in accordance with Article 6325 of the Revised Penal Code. Murder,
under Article 24826 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. Following Article 63 of the same code, the higher penalty of death shall
be applied.
 In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,27 otherwise known as the
Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.
Accordingly, accused-appellants shall be sentenced to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of death.

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous.28 Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00. In
People v. Quiachon,29 we explained that even if the penalty of death was not to be
imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v.
Victor,30 the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.
 Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of
the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise
the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is modified and increased to
P75,000.00, consistent with recent jurisprudence31 on heinous crimes where the
imposable penalty is death, it is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A.
9346. The award of moral damages does not require allegation and proof of the
emotional suffering of the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious
killing of the victim cannot be denied.32 The trial courts award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall, however, be reduced to P30,000.00,
also pursuant to the latest jurisprudence on the matter.33

As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we modify the

same. In People v. Villanueva,34 this Court declared that when actual damages
proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case,
the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. In the light of such ruling, the victims heirs in the
present case should, therefore, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00.

The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified. As a rule,

documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1)
the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased
is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.35 It cannot be disputed that the victim, at the time of his death,
was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws. The computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with the
formula for computing the award for loss of earning capacity.36 Thus,
Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income 50% (GAI)]

lost earnings

= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 P12,000.00

= (34) x (P12,000.00)

= P408,000.00

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00765,

finding the three-accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death
imposed on accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION PERPETUA without
eligibility for parole pursuant to RA 9346; (2) the monetary awards to be paid jointly
and severally by the accused-appellants to the heirs of the victim are as follows:
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages; (3) P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (4) interest is imposed
on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid.37

No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 168694. March 27, 2006]

(FORMERLY G.R. NO. 150123) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SAIDAMIN MACABALANG Y
MALAMAMA

Third Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR. 27, 2006

G.R. No. 168694 (Formerly G.R. No. 150123) The People of the Philippines v. Saidamin Macabalang y
Malamama)

This treats the following incidents: (1) Notice of Appearance dated 22 August 2005 filed by Atty. Zahrain M.
Bantao, with address at Macauyag, Mijares, Dimaporo, Bantao and Associates Law Office, Suite 211 The One
Executive Office, West Avenue, Quezon City, with the conformity of appellant Saidamin M. Macabalang; (2)
Notice of Appearance dated 7 October 2005 filed by Atty. Alan D. Mijares, with address also at at Macauyag,
Mijares, Dimaporo, Bantao and Associates Law Office, Suite 211 The One Executive Office, West Avenue,
Quezon City, again with the conformity of appellant; (3) the Motion for Extension of forty-five (45) days from
7 October 2005 to submit supplemental brief filed by Atty. Mijares for appellant; and (4) the Notice of
Termination of Service of Counsel dated 7 October 2005 filed by appellant, terminating the services of his
counsel, Atty. Manuel D. Ballelos. Action on these incidents were deferred by the Court in its Resolution dated
5 December 2005, pending comment thereon by Atty. Ballelos.

Atty. Ballelos filed his Comment dated 11 January 2006, wherein he manifested his conformity to the Notice
of Termination of his services, and prayed that all decisions, orders and resolutions of this Court be forwarded
to Attys. Bantao and Mijares at their common office. Atty. Mijares, in behalf of appellant, has likewise filed the
Appellant's Supplemental Brief.

While it is clear that appellant has disengaged the services of his previous counsel, Atty. Ballelos, there is still
some confusion as to who exactly stands as appellant's present counsel. Two lawyers, Attys. Bantao and
Mijares have entered their respective appearances for the appellant, and they both apparently belong to the
same law firm. If it is appellant's intention to have as his legal representation either Atty. Bantao or Mijares,
or both of them, or the firm to which both these lawyers belong, then the appropriate pleadings or
manifestations should be filed to such effect, for the sake of clarification.

Nonetheless, appellant, through Atty. Mijares, has already filed his Supplemental Brief, and the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has declined to file its own brief. Accordingly, there
should be no more impediment in considering this case as submitted for resolution.

WHEREFORE, the case is hereby SUBMITTED for RESOLUTION.

Very truly yours,

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of
his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged
in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While
he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This
was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be
dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they
were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was
around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real
efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites
the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did
not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported
by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not
both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital
obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
I

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage
that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the
term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from
the Canon Law.5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71

of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
 "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve
such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same
goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article
36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some
resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of
the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting
its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16
The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr.
Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on
her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that
basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the
respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The
Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important
is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence,
"if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any
ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’
upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be considered not
in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and
those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive
and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult
for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To
others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when
opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person.
At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit
lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26
conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency,
narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will
be considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to
the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as
with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So,
more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that
the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her
fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to
look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal
grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable
to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings
considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez
on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother
because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there
is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular
script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of
care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life
when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I
gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen
already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the
part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still
insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife
and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29
Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-
à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee.
Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars
of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.30
It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article
36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On
the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her
own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led
to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and
toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody
takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would
be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman
history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the
top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with
you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling
them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic]
upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that
you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background
situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation
for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and
therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and
putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could
thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric
to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and
findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the
cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about
a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia
of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in
the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the
OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that
the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that
two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted
on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son
confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity
or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get
there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You,
you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point
to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy
himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state
of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing
of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to
the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and
thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it
was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short
temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the
time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological
deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she
had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her.
And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I
think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that
in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He
also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these
admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into
marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it
possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of
husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that
question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in
the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only
to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice
should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. It is 1âw phi 1

not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster"
or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but
I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not
hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society
does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state
that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the
Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their
will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42
(Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CASE DIGEST:

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no
factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez
was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth
guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much
respect in this case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

 The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned
out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to
enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue
of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours”
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground

for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth
diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be

considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State
to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to

be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If
other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as

conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and
emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence
because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses
while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of
the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should
be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert

opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their
value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we
hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity
of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from
the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself
had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on
the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity
of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited
our determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along
her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture
of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-
term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family
life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong
sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her
tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to
the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and
serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and
mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect
her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due
to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.