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The United States should significantly reduce counter-anti-access/area-
denial strike presence in Northeast Asia, including removal of carrier
strike groups.
Current military policy is defined by fear of Chinese naval
modernization; this has facilitated both discursive and material
securitization against China’s rise through adoption of the Air-Sea Battle
concept and stationing of naval presence in Northeast Asia
- No single root cause of Chinese modernization, and it’s not just a response to the
U.S.
- Securitization huge increases in military spending
Fredrik Nillson 12, graduate student, Department of Political Science @ Lund University,
“Securitizing China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese
Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,”
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=27
43569, paraphrased for ableist language
4.3 Securitizing China’s maritime capabilities
During the 2011 visit by China’s president Hu to Washington, leaders of both countries emphasized the importance of increased cooperation not least in the military sector (Chase
The U.S. has repeatedly stated that it supports a more powerful and prosperous
2011; 133).
China (ibid), and China has since 2002 repeatedly stated its intentions of a ‘peaceful rise’ (Guo 2006;
39). The need for cooperation is often deemed critical. Australian strategist Hugh White has argued that if China continues on
its current trajectory, a new order in the region will need to be established; one that takes into account the new power relativities, and that “if this doesn’t happen, there is no reason to
further significant military cooperation or regional order has yet been on any
significant agenda. The peace has so far been kept, and the urgency of cooperation has been repeatedly
emphasized, but no major change has taken place. Rather, the relationship has during the past four
years rather gone in the opposite direction and become increasingly antagonistic. Some Chinese scholars argue that the bilateral
relations are good on the surface but that the U.S. is increasingly working towards a
containment policy (Chase 2011; 135)
The Obama administration has chosen to take a tougher approach to China’s military
modernization as the cooperation has proven to be difficult (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 53). For example, military cooperation and mutual visits were
suspended by Beijing in a reaction to a U.S.-Taiwan arms deal in 2010 (Pomfret 2010). Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated at the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, that the
increasing Chinese capabilities directed at Taiwan requires the U.S. to supply Taiwan with arms and that disruptions in military-tomilitary relations with China will not change U.S.
policy toward Taiwan (Gates 2010).Many people in China view Washington’s approach as increasingly
worrying and the idea that the U.S. is trying to restrain Chinese power ambitions is
getting stronger (Chase 2011; 133-134). Richard Weitz argued that the good relations established by former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates were largely due to
Gates’ personal commitment and that his retirement might retard [slow] the progress (Weitz 2011). Weitz assertion seems accurate because since Gates retired military-
developments that they seek to achieve. Amongst other things, China has admitted
their intention to deploy an aircraft carrier group in the near future (Wong 2010). They also
have increased submarine capabilities and they operate an underground submarine
base that enables Chinese submarines to reach deep waters rapidly and deploy
submarines to vital sea lanes with great stealth (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010; 2)
Sea power is pursued for two main purposes. The first one is to protect SLOCs (Sea-Lanes of Communication) and seaborne commerce in peacetime, and to ensure protection of these
through sea-denial or sea-control in times of war. The second purpose is for offensive military power and aggression (Howarth 2006; 4). Howarth writes mainly about the intentions
behind Chinese submarine development and states that:
Although originally conceived to play primarily a defensive role in naval operations, the submarine has more often been the instrument of choice for offensive operations by inferior
possession of advanced, offensive weapons has often provided weaker states with
navies. And
the confidence to launch asymmetric wars against stronger opponents (Howarth 2006; 9-10)
This observation is true not only for China in this region, but also for surrounding countries like Vietnam, who, in order to hedge its
bets against China, is developing significant submarine capabilities to defend its interests in the South China Sea.
The supposed reasons behind China’s rapid and extensively developed maritime capabilities are grounded in its issues with Taiwan. Some argue that
China’s naval modernization started with the 1996 incident in which the U.S. carriers
blocked the Taiwan Strait and denied China any possibility of attack (see for example Office of the
Secretary of Defense 2011; 57). In the case of Taiwan trying to declare independence, China would use force to enforce its claims to the territory (Ross 2000; 87). The United
States has a long-standing alignment with Taiwan, something that was illustrated when the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers into the
Taiwan Strait in 1996 to counter Chinese coercive diplomacy against Taiwan (Ross 2000; 88). Even though Taiwan might be the highest priority, it is not the
only reason for China’s modernization efforts. Other goals include protecting
Chinese interest in the South China Sea; preventing piracy; protecting vital energy supply
lines; displacing U.S. power and influence in the Asia Pacific (O’Rourke 2012; 5).
the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced the $5.8 billion arms package to Taiwan. This was not
In September 2011,
well received in Beijing, and the Chinese Ambassador in Washington said there would be consequences (Minnick 2011). China believes it has legitimate
reasons for being outraged about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan because of the 1982 communiqué that outlines the long-term U.S. policy towards Taiwan with a gradual decrease in arms
that China has planned its military development in a way that will enable
enforcements of its claims of Taiwan without outside interference. This suspicion is
visible in several official documents, for example in the following statement in a
Department of Defense report to Congress:
Beijing is
The PLA seeks the capability to deter Taiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit of this objective,
developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for the island
in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor (Office of the Secretary of
Defense 2011; I).
Despite arguments that the PLAN is of little direct threat to the United States, the Obama
administration has chosen to securitize the rise of the Chinese naval capabilities. In the
strategic guidance for the Department of Defense in 2012, Obama writes in a letter that:
we will
As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular,
continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in antiaccess
and
environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber (Obama’s note in Department of Defense 2012).
it officially raises the issue of operating in anti-access
The statement covers a lot of ground but, most significantly,
environment on the military security agenda. The report also makes clear the redirected focus of U.S. military strategy, saying:
“while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region” (Department of Defense 2012; 2). The necessity lies in maintaining competitiveness and regional sea control. In the context of China’s lacking
transparency in military modernization, the report raises the importance of increased U.S.-Sino cooperation but also immediately addresses the inherent difficulties in doing so:
The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we
“
maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with out treaty
obligations and with international law ” (Department of Defense 2012; 2) and that:
China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power
States such as
projection capabilities… Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its
ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will
include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts
to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities (Department of Defense 2012; 4-5).
If China loosely defines a ‘strike’ to encompass some political action, this significantly alters the purportedly ‘defensive’ nature of this strategic construct. This implies that PLA forces
might be employed preemptively in the name of defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 25).
missiles (ASBMs) because they pose the greatest threat to U.S. ships in the event of a
Chinese anti-access operation (Wishik II 2011; 39). The A2/AD concept is not used by China, but their ASCEL (Active Strategic Counterattacks on
Exterior Lines) has many similar features, although Wishik (2011) argues that ASCEL might be seen as more extensive than A2/AD.
According to a New York Times article, the new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta expressed Washington’s worries about
China:
We’re concerned about China… The most important thing we can do is to project our
force into the Pacific – to have our carriers there, to have our fleet there, to be able to make very
clear to China that we are going to protect international rights to be able to move across the oceans freely (Panetta quoted in Bumiller 2011).
This statement bluntly points out China as the perpetrator in the Pacific. With this serious security concern, it
also, without hedging, identifies a strong military presence as the most important thing we can
do and that U.S. interests will be protected using this military presence. The
statement lift the issue to another level of urgency, possibly so as to justify further spending
on new capabilities.
there is an inherent dichotomy in U.S.
It can be observed, by looking at U.S. discourse surrounding China’s military modernization, that
posture towards China. Chinese scholars have called this the ‘two-handed’ China policy, which features
characteristics of both engagement and containment (Chase 2011; 134). Chase argues that the Chinese
misconceptions of U.S. intentions might create a situation that proves difficult to
manage because of the attempt to employ both a firm approach of balancing power
and simultaneously accommodating China’s rise (Chase 2011; 135). The confusion is generated
by ambiguous messages in statements such as the following made by Barack Obama :
And we’ll seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation. We will
do this, even as we continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms (Obama 2011a).
Arguably, the easiest way to determine whether a securitization speech act has been successful or not is by looking at how a perceived threat discourse has shaped policy, and how
extraordinary measures have been adopted to deal with a specific threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; 26). In the two sections dealing with the political and the military sectors,
the extraordinary measures have come in the form of a concerted development in a wider political and strategic development. There are arguably three overarching, cross-sectorial,
deployment is a piece in a much larger puzzle to circle China. Thirdly, and perhaps the
suspicion that the
most extensive measure employed, is the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) developed by the United
States. The central purpose of the JOAC (2012) is stated as follows:
As a global power with global interests, the United States must maintain the credible capability to project military force into any region of the world in support of those interests. This
the ability to project force both into the global commons to ensure their use and
includes
into foreign territory as required. Moreover, the credible ability to do so can serve as a
reassurance to U.S. partners and a powerful deterrent to those contemplating
actions that threaten U.S. interests (JOAC 2012; 2)
the new Air-Sea Battle concept, which aims to bring together the Navy and
The JOAC includes
the Air Force in developing integration between the different forces to deal with a
wider range of threats from cyber to A2/AD threats (JOAC 2012; 4). This concept is central to
U.S. securitizations in the Asia Pacific region and constitutes a wide range of
emergency measures to deal with the growing threat of Chinese military
modernization towards which it is most clearly directed. These developments are but the most significant. They are all arguably
integrated into what might resemble a ‘grand strategy’.
Military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which serve as “the fulcrum for our strategi c turn to
Having adopted an air-sea battle doctrine, the Pentagon has
the Asia-Pacific,” are being revitalized.
committed to deploying 60 percent of its nuclear-armed and high-tech navy to the
Asia-Pacific. According to the New York Times, this includes “six aircraft carriers and a majority of the Navy’s
cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships and submarines , [and] an accelerated pace of naval
exercises and port calls in the Pacific.”
Recognizing that relying on military power alone is not a winning strategy, especially given the near-equal influence of economic power,
the Obama administration has also pressed a diplomatic campaign to negotiate a “Trans-Pacific Partnership.” The goal is to create the
world’s largest and most demanding free-trade area in ways that deepen the economic integration of the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies
while simultaneously reducing their economic dependence on China.
In South Korea, where the U.S. military continues to have authority over all South Korean military operations in wartime, joint military
exercises have been expanded — including in the Yellow Sea, where in defiance of Chinese warnings, the United States recently deployed
the George Washington. To take the naval challenge closer to the Chinese coast, a massive
Korean naval base is being built at a World Heritage site in Jeju Island’s Gangjeon village, which according to
Yonhap News will “accommodate submarines and up to 20 warships, including U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers and their missile defense
systems.” This has sparked intense and disciplined nonviolent resistance in Korea.
In Southeast Asia, the Obama administration upped the military ante by responding to China’s increasingly militarized claims to nearly
all of the mineral-rich South China Sea—through which 40 percent of the world’s commerce passes—by declaring (U.S.-policed) free
navigation of the seas a U.S. strategic priority. Reinforcing Philippine claims to the “West Philippine Sea,” the Pentagon ha s also increased
weapons sales to the Philippines, accelerated joint military exercises, and explored the return of military bases. The pivot also entails
strengthening the U.S. military’s relationships with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam, with the latter eng aging in joint
military exercises and under its “friends with all nations” policies, providing access for U.S. and allied navies at Cam Rahn Bay.
Washington’s renewed ties and military-to-military contacts with Burma, which could restrict China’s access to the Indian Ocean, have
also raised serious concerns in Beijing.
To complete China’s encirclement, the Obama administration has established a new Indian Ocean base in Darwin, Australia, purs ued a
tacit alliance with India, and is expanding its “partnerships” with New Zealand and Mongolia. In April, the Unit ed States even won an
agreement to keep a yet-to-be-determined number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through 2024. Closer to home, Hawaii is to host nearly
3,000 more Marines, Osprey warplanes, and further base expansions.
Meanwhile the Chamorro people of Guam, whose tiny island nation’s strategic location makes it an ideal fallback site for the day when
U.S. troops are finally ejected from Japan, are bearing the brunt of the pivot. Even though U.S. bases already occupy 28 percent of the 500-
square-mile island, 3,000 more U.S. Marines and their families are scheduled to be redeployed to Guam from Okinawa, and there are
plans for massive expansions of existing bases.
In an August 2012 speech in Japan, Cara Flores-Mays of Guam explained what the pivot will mean for her Chamorro grandfather: “He has
not known freedom,” she said, “and it’s likely that he never will.” The same applies to the peoples of many other Asia-Pacific nations, who
have largely been shunted aside in the great-power calculus governing U.S. policy in the region.
The United States and China, joined by other Asian and Pacific nations, are now engaged in a dangerous,
expensive arms race reminiscent of the Cold War.
When great powers compete, the peoples and interests of smaller nations are often
sacrificed. Caught between China’s rising influence and the U.S. pivot, the people of “host” nations and
communities are paying the greatest price. Over two centuries ago, the authors of the U.S. Declaration of
Independence identified the peacetime presence of British troops in their communities as the source of “abuses and usurpation s”
necessitating rebellion. Now it is the
peoples of the Pacific and Asia who are suffering and
increasingly resisting the impacts of the pivot, be they land seizures, harassment by
U.S. soldiers, terrorizing low-altitude flight exercises, assaults on the environment,
distorted national budgets, or the increased dangers of catastrophic warfare.
If catastrophic wars are to be prevented and limited national resources devoted to
ensuring genuine economic and environmental security, the U.S. peace movement
must begin challenging the pivot and its consequences . Already, there are indications that the
movement’s own “pivot” has begun.
exacerbate existing mistrust between Washington and Beijing and reinforce Beijing’s
fears about U.S. intentions in the region. 51 In turn, this could make China more
assertive and difficult to negotiate with in the future and increase the probability of a
crisis or conflict over Taiwan or other disputed territories in the region. More specifically, if a
political crisis arose, the U.S. commitment to a highly offensive ASB concept could
lead Beijing to view a first strike as preferable to allowing the United States to seize
the initiative. Finally, this approach and subsequent envisioned developments may
only exacerbate what may be a nascent arms race in the region, decreasing overall
stability and security and potentially making a conflict more likely.52
a second major concern about
• Escalation: At the same time, while China is not a clear peer competitor (as was the Soviet Union),
the adoption of ASB as a U.S. response to a future conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere
in East Asia is China’s possession of nuclear weapons. The potential escalation
dangers inherent in ASB as it is presented are alarming.53 Considering that the key
objective of ASB seems to be precisely the “blinding” or “dazzling” of the enemy to
attain the ability to launch effective in-depth offensive operations, the United States
would face the danger of possibly targeting the specific capacity to keep a conflict
limited and avoid loss of control of strategic weapons by Beijing. By most estimates, China’s strategic
deterrent remains relatively small, although the opaque nature of China’s military programs has led some analysts to argue that this deterrent may be much
larger. Nonetheless, Beijing’s policy seems focused on maintaining a “guaranteed retaliation” capability, meaning that even if it were to suffer a major attack,
assuming that Beijing could maintain
it would still have the capacity to respond and inflict prohibitive damage. However,
control of its weapons under an ASB attack, any perceived threat to its strategic
deterrent capability could unleash a “use it or lose it” dynamic that could result in
the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, if the regime perceived that U.S. objectives were not
limited and were focused on regime change or if a devastating loss (of Taiwan
perhaps) would make likely the regime’s demise, the pressure to use nuclear
weapons could be significant.
rather than de-escalate some crises. For example, moving U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups
closer to the crisis, previously a strong signal of U.S. resolve, could paradoxically
induce an attack on the carriers and other U.S. forward bases by Chinese missile
forces. In a crisis, Chinese military commanders will have an incentive to strike the
aircraft carriers before the carriers’ aircraft come in range of Chinese targets. Having made
that decision, Chinese commanders may reason that they should attack U.S. forward air
range tactical air power in the U.S. portfolio, based at vulnerable forward bases and
on aircraft carriers, creates a potentially dangerous “use it, or lose it” urgency during
future crises. If more of U.S. striking power had a longer range and was based at more secure sites
farther from crisis flashpoints, U.S. decision-makers and commanders would find
themselves under much less pressure during crises. Similarly, adversaries would not
find an advantage in striking first, nor would they be compelled to assume that U.S.
policy-makers were under that same pressure.
are generating insecurity and military responses on the other side that make both
countries less secure and trigger new rounds of competition. The United States must
avoid being unnecessarily provocative in its strategic moves and rhetoric, more proactively
explaining the comprehensive (not military-specific) nature of its growing focus on the Asia Pacific and linking it explicitly to a stable regional status quo that serves the interests of all.
China's leaders need to appreciate the security dilemma as a concept—and as a security problem that threatens China's own interests—and adopt measures to significantly reduce
widespread uncertainty about Beijing's military capabilities and intentions. China must recognize that its rise is not occurring in a strategic vacuum; while it has the right to develop
military power commensurate with its coveted status, regardless of its true intentions, under anarchy doing so will have consequences as other states adopt measures to enhance their
own security. Yet anarchy is by no means determinative of outcomes; without major changes to its policies and rhetoric, Beijing's military buildup may trigger even more severe, and
unwelcome, defensive responses from the United States and others. Even well-intentioned states whose leaders do not harbor what Beijing often uncritically dismisses as “ulterior
motives” to “contain China's peaceful rise” are likely to respond to its growing capabilities and uncertainty over its future intentions in ways that will leave China less secure. For
leaders on both sides to acknowledge a security dilemma at work is to open up a bargaining space for reciprocal steps to manage and moderate the otherwise potentially dangerous
spirals of competition.¶ Second, each side should do more to candidly share information about its interpretations of the other's policies and rhetoric. To do so effectively necessitates
more active diplomacy—dialogues, exchanges, and ongoing intergovernmental working groups—and this must be a two-way street. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue held
annually among policymakers in Washington and Beijing is a good first step. The goal of these dialogues is to provide more systematic and credible information about the intentions of
the other side. This is particularly important in the area of intermilitary dialogues, where both sides must candidly explain their strategic intentions, operational goals, and doctrines.
Intermilitary dialogues have increased, but remain infrequent, under-institutionalized, and superficial. They must not be conditional on the vicissitudes of political relations.¶ Third,
both sides should increase transparency of their military capabilities, strategic objectives, and military policy decisionmaking. Greater transparency can reduce uncertainty, thereby
decreasing the risks of miscalculations that lead to war. Washington must more effectively explain why exactly China's low transparency harms strategic trust, making clear how the
paucity of reliable information creates strong incentives for defensively oriented worst-case scenario planning. Beijing should understand that if its motives are in fact status quo-
oriented, it does both itself and its neighbors a severe disservice by not being more transparent about the drivers and content of its military policies. Regardless of per capita income
or other developmental metrics, China has the world's second-largest economy and military budget, with both growing rapidly. Under these conditions, and regardless of the Chinese
Communist Party's and PLA's extremely conservative political culture and traditions, for policymaking to remain a closed and opaque system is unnecessarily destabilizing and invites
miscalculation and military competition.¶ Fourth, both sides should establish and strengthen diplomatic mechanisms for bargaining. When the presence of a security dilemma is
recognized by both sides, mechanisms need to be available for leaders to offer reciprocal, and verifiable, gestures of restraint. These sorts of bargains will ultimately need to be
negotiated at the highest levels. Beijing and Washington also have strong incentives to significantly expand routine communications and strengthen personal relationships at all levels,
which help to build confidence generally and, in the event of an unintended clash, can also significantly enhance crisis management.¶ Finally, China, the United States, and other
countries in the region need to continue to shape and improve the wider political and strategic context in which military competition is unfolding. One check on security dilemma–
driven military competition is the diffuse benefits in other domains (e.g., political, economic) put at risk by worsening spirals and strategic rivalry. Even in the military domain,
cooperation in other areas—such as nontraditional security—can facilitate confidence building and expand the aperture beyond an exclusive focus of leaders on areas of friction and
potential threat. The involvement of the PLA Navy in the 2014 RIMPAC multilateral exercises and, since 2008, the multinational antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden have
demonstrated mutually beneficial gains from cooperation. With regard to maritime and territorial sovereignty disputes, until peaceful resolutions are achieved, the likelihood of an
unintended clash can be reduced significantly through concrete and enforceable codes of conduct, shared exploitation of resources in the disputed areas, side payments, enhanced
crisis management mechanisms, and regular investments in active diplomacy.¶ Not all military competition in the Asia Pacific in driven by the security dilemma logic, nor can all
security dilemmas be solved through diplomatic bargains and policies of reassurance. There are no guarantees that any of the above steps will dramatically reverse the worsening
While its
strategic environment in the Asia Pacific, much less end strategic rivalry and military competition. China's rise is ongoing, and its true intentions are unknowable.
restraint are worthwhile. If Washington is to make the first move, it should make the steps delineated above one condition for possible future conferral
upon China of Beijing's coveted recognition as a “great power.” The “new-type great power relations” concept proposed by President Xi remains, at best, vague in specifics, and
Washington's acceptance of it today is ill advised.126 The concept, however, appears to be predicated at least partially on an encouraging, and shared, understanding of one obvious
truth: avoiding a tragic race to military conflict is in the best interests of all states in the Asia Pacific, especially China.
metaphysic” to which the people and government of the United States have fallen
prey is to misconstrue the problem. As the foregoing chapters make plain, the origins of America’s
present-day infatuation with military power are anything but simple. American
militarism is not the invention of a cabal nursing fantasies of global empire and
manipulating an unsuspecting people frightened by the events of 9/11. Further, it is
counterproductive to think in these terms— to assign culpability to a particular president or administration and to
imagine that throwing the bums out will put things right. Yet neither does the present-day status of the United
(mostly on the left) who see in the far-flung doings of today’s U.S. military
establishment substantiation of Major General Smedley Butler’s old chestnut that “war is just a racket” and the
American soldier “a gangster for capitalism” sent abroad to do the bidding of Big Business
or Big Oil.2 Neither the will of God nor the venality of Wall Street suffices to explain how
the United States managed to become stuck in World War IV. Rather, the new American militarism is a little like
Different policies and practices could stanch and even reverse the damage. Purists in
that movement insisted upon the primacy of environmental needs, everywhere and in all cases. Theirs was (and is) a principled position
way that Americans think about military power will require a similarly pragmatic
approach. Undoing all of the negative effects that result from having been seduced by war may lie
beyond reach, but Americans can at least make them more manageable and thereby salvage
their democracy. In explaining the origins of the new American militarism, this account has not sought to assign or to impute blame. None of
the protagonists in this story sat down after Vietnam and consciously plotted to propagate perverse attitudes toward military power any more than Andrew
Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller plotted to despoil the nineteenth-century American landscape. The clamor after Vietnam to rebuild the American arsenal and
to restore American self-confidence, the celebration of soldierly values, the search for ways to make force more usable: all of these came about because
groups of Americans thought that they glimpsed in the realm of military affairs the solution to vexing problems. The soldiers who sought to rehabilitate their
profession, the intellectuals who feared that America might share the fate of Weimar, the strategists wrestling with the implications of nuclear weapons, the
conservative Christians appalled by the apparent collapse of traditional morality: none of these acted out of motives that were inherently dishonorable. To
the extent that we may find fault with the results of their efforts, that fault is more appropriately attributable to human fallibility than to malicious intent.
And yet in the end it is not motive that matters but outcome . Several decades after Vietnam, in the aftermath of a
century filled to overflowing with evidence pointing to the limited utility of armed force and the dangers inherent in relying excessively on military power,
the American people have persuaded themselves that their best prospect for safety
and salvation lies with the sword. Told that despite all of their past martial exertions, treasure expended, and lives sacrificed, the
world they inhabit is today more dangerous than ever and that they must redouble those exertions, they dutifully assent. Much as dumping raw sewage into
today “global power projection”—a phrase whose sharp edges
American lakes and streams was once deemed unremarkable, so
practice, a normal condition, one to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist. All of this Americans
Such a definition of normalcy cries out for a close
have come to take for granted: it’s who we are and what we do.
and critical reexamination. Surely, the surprises, disappointments, painful losses, and woeful, even shameful failures of the Iraq War
make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy. Yet a meaningful reexamination will require first a change of consciousness, seeing
war and America’s relationship to war in a fundamentally different way.
We would argue that there is a future in critical security studies. This future will
ultimately be determined by the extent to which scholars recognize the limits and
tensions of existing approaches (especially ‘Schools’) and take up the challenge of moving
beyond first principles or universalized assumptions about security to engage in
nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security.
Indeed, we make such a case using the critical theoretical tool of immanent critique,
what ways do different cultural, social and historical contexts determine different
security logics, and how do these dynamics look in terms of communities above and
below the state? And can we accept the claim that there is no difference in the logic
or effects of securitization if security is understood as referring to the welfare of the
most vulnerable in global society, for example, rather than the territorial
preservation of the nation-state? Here, the failure to differentiate between logics of security on the basis of what understanding of security
inheres in a particular discourse potentially blinds [obscures] Copenhagen School and poststructural theorists of security to (the possibility of) difference in security dynamics and
logics in different places, for different actors and at different times. In the case of the Copenhagen School, such parsimony might be in part a response to the desire to provide analytical
boundaries around the study of security rather than ‘descend’ into contextual analysis (see Williams, 2010: 213–216), but it nonetheless results in a partial and (we would argue)
Western-centric image of the politics of security.
Ultimately, these points suggest the need for far more nuance than is currently evident in
critical security studies scholarship. As noted earlier, the critical security studies project
appears bifurcated between opposing logics of security that position the logic of
security as inherently pernicious (Copenhagen School, post-structuralism) or inherently progressive (Welsh
School). In a sense, these ‘Schools’ correct the limits and tendencies of each other in important
and pointing to the ways in which the promise of security can be used to justify
illiberal practices. The Welsh School framework, meanwhile, recognizes that this
dominant discourse of security does not necessarily capture the essence of security
across time and space, in the process pointing to possibilities for progressive change in
security dynamics and practices. In a sense, these different approaches to the logic of security broadly reflect structural and agential tendencies
in International Relations more generally. We would argue that they suggest the need to take seriously the political limitations associated with dominant security discourses while
recognizing and exploring the possibility for security to mean and do something different.
The second imperative for the future of the critical security studies project concerns the ethics of security. We advanced the claim that a shared concern with expanding the realm of
dialogue underpins much of the critical security studies project, albeit to different degrees and in different ways. But to the extent that an ethics of security — a conception of the good
or progress regarding security — orients around a concern with such a position, this commitment needs to be acknowledged and defended. A range of pressing questions suggest
themselves here, including the bases for prioritizing open dialogue; the relationship between spheres of deliberation and material conditions of existence; the possibilities for and
limitations to the establishment of open dialogue; and the broader relationship between dialogue and outcomes. Elaborating on these commitments would also entail engaging with
the argument that movements towards greater dialogue could potentially encourage the desire to exclude power, identity, emotion and other central features of global politics (see
Price, 2008).
Where difficult questions emerge about this and other dimensions of an ‘ethical’ engagement with security — such as the role of violence in the Welsh School framework, for example
(Peoples, 2011) — these need to be confronted. If there is a consistency across critical security studies scholarship in this sense, it is that ethical commitments are evident (in
commitments to resistance, desecuritization or emancipation, for example) but are insufficiently developed to provide a genuine account of what constitutes ethical action regarding
security. Indeed, immanent possibilities for the development of the critical security studies project arise from these (often implied) commitments that need drawing out and
examining in the context of difficult dilemmas in world politics. This process of drawing out ethical commitments should be viewed as a reflexive movement towards recognizing the
assumptions and potential implications of one’s own theorizing, a position central to both broader definitions of Critical Theory (see Cox, 1981) and to the compelling critique of
traditional security studies as insufficiently engaged with the ethics and effects of its own theorizing about world politics. And it needs also to be matched up with the preceding
understanding of the politics of security. Is the expansion of deliberation and movement away from violence, for example, always progressive, and does it require the rejection of
security as a political category or its reform?
The example of Australian debates around the arrival by boat of asylum-seekers in 2010 illustrates tensions and ambiguities at work regarding the ethics of security, particularly as
understood in key critical approaches to the study of security. In that context, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s call for ‘a frank, open, honest national conversation’ about asylum
and border security particularly encouraged the articulation of negative and exclusionary views of asylum-seekers, paradoxically rendering the (re)securitization of asylum in the
Australian context more likely (see McDonald, 2011). Particularly striking here was the Prime Minister’s suggestion that this national conversation should take place outside the limits
imposed by political correctness that would otherwise discourage the articulation of right-wing or racist sentiments towards asylum-seekers. In this example, the apparent opening of
dialogic space encouraged by the Prime Minister was intimately related to the movement towards exclusionary security logics and practices orienting around the imperatives of
‘border security’.
The point of this example is not to illustrate the limits of open dialogue per se, but rather to illustrate two broader claims regarding the relationship between security and ethics in the
critical security studies project that we make here. First, while normative preferences are evident, these are often insufficiently developed or robust to enable the ethical adjudication
between different practices or outcomes. The normative preference for deliberation evident in the commitment to desecuritization, for example, is not sufficiently robust to enable us
to engage with difficult questions concerning the forms of deliberation that should be encouraged or even the circumstances in which ‘hate speech’, for example, might be curtailed (on
this, see Gelber, 2010). Second, and to return to the central argument of the article, the Australian example reminds us of the need to explore the implications of security conceptions
and practices in particular contexts, rather than assume that a particular security logic will inhere — or outcomes will follow — from the use of the term ‘security’ or a stated political
commitment to ‘dialogue’.
The core challenge for the critical security studies project is ultimately moving
beyond critique and agenda-setting and towards a contextual analysis of security dynamics and
practices in global politics. There is no question that a focus on the politics of
security and the ethics of security are crucial intellectual endeavours too readily
elided or ignored in traditional approaches to the study of security. For this reason
alone we need a ‘critical security studies project’. However, universalizing claims
concerning the politics of security — found in the securitization framework and
much post-structural engagement with security — must ultimately give way to
nuanced analyses of the ways in which security is constructed and challenged in
particular social, historical and political contexts. A range of theorists have — in different ways — sought to engage with
precisely this question, illustrating the various ways in which security dynamics ‘play out’ in different settings in terms of constructing community (e.g. Bubandt, 2005), challenging
identity binaries (e.g. Avant, 2007) or enabling space for different forms of political response (e.g. Doty, 1998/9). Yet these insights ultimately remain marginal to key ‘Schools’ and
conceptual frameworks of security, and are too often forgotten in our search for the universal in a complex world.
the need to move towards a focus on the particular social, historical and political
contexts in which security is constructed and practised in global politics.
Specifically, the affirmative recognizes that securitization is not a
universal bad. While fear can be used to justify violence, as is being done
in Northeast Asia, it can also be used to justify the opposite – a rejection
of securitized politics. The 1AC engages in a “liberalism of fear” – a fear
of security-based politics itself and the violence it can cause. This
nuanced approach is the most effective means of constraining security’s
excesses both abroad and at home.
- Fear can inhibit securitization, constrain extremity
- Violence is ineradicable
- Fear is an inescapable part of life and can be life-saving in many instances
- Coercive government is not a universal bad – it can provide many useful social
goods
- Fear of fear constrains the worst excesses of fear-based politics
- Fear of fear at the individual/group level can constrain political actors – creates high
costs to extremity
- Post-9/11 proves – despite viewing AQ as an existential threat, fear of overreaction
(e.g. torture) led to political and legal opposition
Michael C. Williams 11, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of
Ottawa, “Securitization and the liberalism of fear,” Security Dialogue 42(4-5), 453-463,
Sage
Introduction
Fear is not a concept (or indeed a word) often found in securitization theory. Instead, the Copenhagen School speaks of security as an existential threat, as
emergency measures or as a ‘breaking free of rules’. Security is not an objective condition, but emerges through particular social processes or ‘speech acts’
that elevate an issue above the normal political logic: ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or will
not be free to handle it in our own way’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Yet, even this formulation indicates an intimate relationship between existential threat and
fear – the fear of annihilation, loss and alienation. Threats imply the loss of or damage to something (physical survival or well-being, an object, a social order,
an identity) that is valued – that is, a fear for its continued possession or existence. People can fear other individuals, other groups, other states (or their
own); they can fear economic calamity or environmental degradation. Even exceptional violence or fearless killing – an existential or heroic self-sacrifice, for
instance – is tied in complex ways to fear: fear for someone or something else that is being defended, fear of failing to achieve glory or salvation. Fear’s
negativity always has positive value.
This article seeks to extend securitization theory conceptually and, to a lesser degree, empirically by further developing the relationship between
securitization and the politics of fear. My suggestion is that by so doing it is possible to enlarge the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School and to
At first glance, fear might seem
expand its application in understanding the politics of security in liberal societies.
focusing on fear also allows us to see how fear can operate in ways that can actually
inhibit processes of securitization, constraining the logic of extremity, making actors
reluctant to use securitizing moves and providing resources for opposing such
moves.
To make this argument, I turn to an examination of the relationship between liberalism and fear. As Jef Huysmans (1998) pointed out in one of the earliest
and most perceptive appraisals of the Copenhagen School, liberalism provides an important backdrop to the theory, with a narrowly technocratic liberalism
and superficial pluralism serving both as a foil for the idea of securitization as radically creative and socially constructed and as a link to theories of enmity,
emergency, and the political identified with Carl Schmitt and with classical political realism more broadly. Fear within liberalism is thus
often closely associated with a politics of extremity and enmity, and is seen as having
close – and perhaps even constitutive – connections to securitization. Liberal societies, such
positions often imply, either need a politics of security and fear in order to overcome the weaknesses of their pluralist foundations or, conversely, are
This understanding of
congenitally ill-equipped to respond effectively to the challenges of a politics of extremity and securitization.
influential expressions of an alternative vision, a vision that Judith Shklar aptly christened the
‘liberalism of fear’.3 Shklar’s conception of liberal politics, I suggest, can help provide a more rounded
appreciation of the politics of security in liberal polities, and of how a better
understanding of the liberalism of fear can extend the reach of securitization theory
both conceptually and empirically, and may – perhaps paradoxically – even provide
support for the Copenhagen School’s political project of desecuritization.
I
version often put forth by both proponents and critics of liberalism in international
relations7 – and in many debates over securitization theory.
Yet, if the liberalism of fear is sceptical, it is not cynical. Nor is it without a place to stand. In place of
essentialist visions of individuals or schemes of indisputable rights, it advocates a
focus on cruelty and fear. It is, in Stanley Hoffmann’s (1998: xxii) nice phrase, a vision based on the ‘existential experience of fear and
cruelty’, concentrating on humanity’s shared capacity to feel fear and to be victims of cruelty.8 Perhaps most importantly in this context, it turns this focus
on fear into a positive principle of liberal politics. As Shklar (1998: 10–11) argues, the liberalism of fear
does not, to be sure, offer a summum bonum toward which all political agents should strive, but it certainly does begin with a summum malum which all of
us know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear that it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself. To that extent, the liberalism of fear
makes a universal and especially a cosmopolitan claim, as it historically has always done.
In this vision, fear is central to liberal politics, but in a way very different from those visions that see fear, emergency and ‘security’ as the defining ‘outside’ of
liberal societies, as the antithesis of normal politics, or, as suggested in other analyses, as the constitutive realm or radical otherness or enmity that stabilizes
For the liberalism of fear, fear cannot and
and/or energizes otherwise decadent or depoliticized liberal orders.9
should not be always and in every way avoided. For one thing, it is an inescapable part of
life, something that often helps preserve us from danger . More complexly, fear can also be a crucial element
in preserving as well as constructing a liberal order, for one of the major things to be feared in social life is the fear of fear itself. As Shklar (1998: 11) puts it
in one of her most evocative phrasings:
To be alive is to be afraid, and much to our advantage in many cases, since alarm
often preserves us from danger. The fear we fear is of pain inflicted by others to kill
and maim us, not the natural and healthy fear that merely warns us of avoidable
pain. And, when we think politically, we are afraid not only for ourselves but for our fellow citizens as well. We fear a society of
fearful people.
This vision of liberal politics fears the politics of fear. It fears above all collective
concentrations of power that make possible ‘institutionalized cruelty’, particularly
when they are abetted or accompanied by a politics of fear. Thus, while the liberalism of fear fears all
concentrations of power, it fears most the concentration of power in that most fearsome of institutions in the modern world – the state; for while cruelty can
A
reflect sadistic urges, ‘public cruelty is not an occasional personal inclination. It is made possible by differences in public power’ (Shklar, 1998: 11).
degree of fear and coercion is doubtless a condition of the operation of all social
orders; but, as its first order of concern, the liberalism of fear focuses on restraining
fear’s excesses. As Shklar (1998: 11) puts it:
A minimal level of fear is implied in any system of law, and the liberalism of fear does
not dream of an end to public, coercive government. The fear it does want to prevent
is that which is created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed acts of
force and by habitual and pervasive acts of cruelty and torture performed by
military, paramilitary and police agents in any regime.
The liberalism of fear is far from rejecting the state’s role in the provision of social
goods, including security. Indeed, these may be essential in overcoming socially derived
cruelties of many kinds.10 But, it is continually alert to the state’s potential to do the
opposite.11
Here, then, is a vision of politics where fear is not confined to the realm of security; nor is fear wholly
negative. Such a vision shares with the Copenhagen School the fear that fear in politics is dangerous. But, Shklar’s
multidimensional analysis of fear allows us to see how fear can work as a counter-practice against processes
of securitization. Fear operates in normal politics, and the fear of fear – that is, the fear of the power of
the politics of security and its consequences – is a core part of liberal theory and
practice. Fear is not a one-way street to extremity, nor does it operate only in
emergency situations. Instead, the fear of fear can act as a bulwark against such
processes. In other words, the fear of fear can within ‘normal’ or even ‘securitized’ politics act to prevent or
oppose a movement toward a more intense politics of fear – countering a shift
toward ‘security’ in its more extreme manifestations.12
II
The liberalism of fear is not a comprehensive description of ‘actually existing’ liberal societies. It is at one and the same time an attempt to
elucidate a liberal philosophy – a critical political philosophy with the practical intent of fostering and supporting an understanding of agency and judgement
– and an exposition of social and political dynamics that can characterize liberal polities. It is part of a liberal tradition of thought that has had important
effects can often be seen in the security politics of
impacts on the development of liberal political orders, and its
liberal societies. Accordingly, the liberalism of fear can help us discern some of the dynamics of security within those polities, while at the
same time suggesting principles for a politics of security.
In practice, as I have suggested above, the liberalism of fear links the domains of ‘normal’ and ‘security’ politics that the Copenhagen School tends to
the fear of fear can counter or restrain securitizing
separate. Viewing the two as part of a continuum reveals how
moves in liberal societies. This practical continuity operates at the level of individual
mores, social norms, and political and legal institutions. Indeed, it is the relationship between these three –
and particularly the ways in which rules and norms operate at the individual and social levels (what the Copenhagen School would call ‘securitizing actors’
and the ‘audience’) as well as in formal institutions – that is crucial for analysing important dimensions of security politics in liberal societies. As Nomi Lazar
(2009: 51, 114–33) has argued, if we restrict our understanding of rules – and the breaking free of them – solely to the legal domain, we risk missing the
to the degree that individual
multiple social and institutional practices that may inhibit the politics of emergency. For instance,
and social groups recognize the fear of fear as a key part of their political visions and
values, they will exercise a degree of suspicion toward securitizing acts, and can even
act to restrain successful securitizations. Similarly, the structure of liberal societies and
governments, with plural centres of political and social power, provides potential
institutional and societal sites of resistance to securitization.
Consider in this light Mark Salter’s recent and revealing analysis of ‘failed securitizations’ in
US counter-terrorism policies. Examining the rejection of the Total Information
Awareness (TIA) programme that ‘sought to data-mine library records to create profiles of
potential terror suspects’, he notes that ‘this limitation on the freedom of speech and invasion of privacy was rejected by librarians,
civil libertarians, and others outside the authority of the state. The existential threat of terrorism to the US was accepted by the protestors, but the
In this case, the
colonization of this sector of private life was rejected as being outside of the security purview of the state’ (Salter, 2011: 125).13
fear of terrorism, and its successful securitization within the technified language and logic of certain specialist
institutions, was outweighed by the fear of the threat that policies like the TIA could pose
Consider in this light the Copenhagen School’s account of securitization. As Buzan et al. (1998: 24) put it:
If one can argue that something overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against each other, this must be because it can upset the entire
process of weighing as such: ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or will not be free to handle it in
our own way’. Thereby, the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the political rules of the game.
This is more than simply the description of a process. Viewed politically, and especially within a context (and context is clearly vital here)
influenced by the liberalism of fear, the recourse to securitizing speech acts is not
straightforward, cost-free or beyond reflection. It is a political act, the potential
consequences of which need to be weighed by any actor. Consequently, attempted
securitizations can be constrained by an actor’s own reluctance to mobilize fear in
light of the potential consequences for other values, such as those of a liberal political order. Potentially securitizing actors can
also be constrained by their knowledge that a decision to attempt to securitize an issue will be judged (both at the time and, possibly, retrospectively).
Declarations of the need for a politics of emergency are rarely taken lightly by other
actors, and making them can come with significant risks to one’s political credibility
and sense of judgement – something that is heightened when the political context is at least
partly informed by the fear of fear. In both cases, the politics of fear and the fear of
fear co-mingle, cross-cut and even compete with each other, with the result that the fear of fear as a political principle and a mode of
judgment plays an important part in the security politics of liberal societies.
These dynamics point to a second area where the liberalism of fear can play a restraining role in securitization. Since it sees the abuse of power as a
continual possibility, the liberalism of fear seeks its controlled dispersal and stresses the importance of pluralism in combating its potential excesses.
Socially, multiple centres of power provide sites from which securitizations can be
contested and resisted. Importantly, however, this is a pluralism that is conscious of the limits of the facile political rationalism that so
exercised critics of liberalism throughout the first half of the 20th century, and that has had such an important influence on the development of the discipline
of international relations as a whole and parts of securitization theory in particular.14 Both in its philosophic foundations and in its historical awareness of
past liberal failings, the pluralism of the liberalism of fear is markedly distant from that of its ‘depoliticized’ predecessors.
This alternative vision of liberalism provides an intriguingly different connection between the Copenhagen School and classical realism, for while the lion’s
share of attention in this area has been devoted to their shared concerns with the nature of ‘the political’ and the role of enmity in countering the potentially
debilitating effects of liberal pluralism, this has tended to obscure the ways in which classical realists such as Morgenthau sought to counter and restrain the
role of fear and enmity in political life rather than embracing it. And, intriguingly, one of the chief instruments that they advocated in this battle was
pluralism. In contrast to the idea (all too automatically accepted in some discussions of
securitization theory) that liberal pluralism was inescapably atomizing and socially
debilitating, and that liberal societies were inevitably forced to call upon a politics of
enmity in order to recover and secure their properly ‘political’ foundations, classical realists presented a much more
subtle and sophisticated vision of the merits of pluralism and its role in supporting
solidarity within a liberal society (Tjalve, 2007). As William Scheuerman has shown in his revealing recovery of this
‘progressive’ dimension of realism, pluralism could help offset the politics of fear and could be valued
potentially civilized conflict: social actors could learn that a rival in one social arena
might be an ally or even a friend in another (Scheuerman, 2011: 174–5).
This concern with the merits of pluralism as a mechanism for limiting fearful power, as well as for restraining the politics of fear, also finds clear expression
in liberalism’s stress on institutional pluralism. Here, the rule of law, the division of power between different institutions of government, the desire that they
the dispersal of power among a wide range of civil society actors
check and balance each other, and
also provide important bulwarks against securitization in a liberal society. Consider again in
this context Salter’s (2011: 128) treatment of the fate of TIA when, despite the endeavours of George W. Bush’s administration, as a result of initiatives
‘spearheaded by library, privacy, and libertarian groups, funding for the TIA (whether terrorist or total) was halted by the US Senate in July 2003’. Here,
social and institutional pluralism combine to render difficult, and potentially even to
reverse, emergency decisions characteristic of securitization .15 As Jef Huysmans (2004) has articulately
demonstrated, the admonition to ‘mind the gap’, to prevent any of the institutions of a liberal-democratic polity from usurping the roles of the others –
something particularly worrisome when the politics of security is involved – is a vital component of a liberal-democratic polity. The importance of the fear
that this might happen, the institutional positions, principled resources and public perceptions that actors may be able to draw on, or be constrained by, as a
consequence of this fear, and the combined role of these elements in countering the logics of extremity and emergency in liberal societies should not be
underestimated.
and much of the population of the USA that Al-Qaeda was indeed an existential threat, the use of all
extraordinary means was not accepted, nor did the situation resemble a ‘generalized
exception’ brought about through the claims of security. Take the use of torture as a
policy, for instance. As Salter (2011: 126) points out, and numerous political and legal
analyses have gone to great lengths to assess, in the USA ‘the courts and the populace
rejected the use of torture for interrogation – even if it was accepted by some part of
the military and bureaucratic establishment’. Salter sees this as calling for a new
category in securitization theory: the acceptance of existential threat, but the failure
to authorize extraordinary powers. I speculate that it might also be assessed in terms of a struggle within and over the politics
of fear, and the existence and operation of countervailing practices and powers. The liberalism of fear may thus help
explain how these practices function, with both the attitudes of individuals and the
institutional pluralism with which they are entwined providing restraints upon the
logic of security and significant points of resistance against the powerful (but not
allpowerful) actors who attempted to mobilize it.
III
Debates over securitization have often centred on the politics of security: on whether to securitize or desecuritize, and on analysis of the sociological,
institutional or political conditions and contexts that facilitate or inhibit acts of securitization. For the Copenhagen School, ‘security’ is a highly political act. It
is also a potentially dangerous one. As extremity, a breaking free from the rules of normal politics, security is something we are advised to be careful about.
Security is not only about identifying threats or dangers, or articulating fears; it is also a political act that we need to approach with caution for fear of the
possibility of a politics of extremity, with the unforeseeable and potentially dangerous consequences that it brings. I have tried to suggest here that in order
to comprehend more fully the politics of security in liberal societies, securitization theory must come to terms with the role of fear in politics. Too sharp a
distinction between the sphere of normal politics and the sphere of security not only risks limiting our understanding of how issues move along a continuum
the fear of fear is a part of normal politics, and part of the
between the two: it may also blind us to how
relationship defined by threats and dangers while staying within its logics: to argue that
something is not a threat is still likely to be caught within representations defined by
threats. However, the liberalism of fear calls attention to an important alternative
dynamic: that the fear of fear can in a specific sense be seen as a desecuritizing move
– a countervailing logic against processes of intensification within ‘normal’ politics
as well as within ‘security’ politics. At the risk of becoming overly baroque, this strategy might
accurately be termed ‘the securitization of securitization’, and its impact on
desecuritization deserves greater exploration.
Fear is
In this regard, a focus on security as practice, and particularly on the relationship between securitizing acts and their reception, is crucial.18
not synonymous with security (or insecurity);19 nor is fear a quantitatively defined process of intensification operating within a
single modality – it is more than just a temperature gauge of degrees of security logics in both normal and emergency politics. Fear is part of
the practice of security, and it is thus susceptible to reversal within its own logics.
Indeed, one of the most important consequences of viewing security as part of
practices of fear concerns how, paradoxically, fear can itself be mobilized to counter
processes of securitization without merely adding to the quantum of fear in a society,
as though all of fear’s modalities and the strategies they enable could be reduced to a
single logic.
None of this is to deny the power of security, the permanent possibility of enmity in politics, its seductions and its dangers, and the worrying place and
pervasiveness of security and attempted securitizations in liberal (and almost all other) societies around the globe (Abrahamsen, 2005). What the liberalism
of fear does deny, however, is the necessity of such a situation. It is a deeply political endeavour, one that can enrich our understanding of securitization at
This is not to say that the
the same time that securitization theory might provide analytic tools supporting its endeavours.
liberalism of fear does not itself pose challenges for the politics of security that require
critical attention;20 however, putting the nature of liberalism into question within
securitization theory, instead of allowing a particular vision of it to operate as a
background assumption licensing a raft of further assertions about the supposedly
necessary nature of the relationship between liberalism, security and ‘the political’,
allows us to undertake a more subtle and hopefully revealing examination of the
politics of securitization. In the name of not being naive about liberalism and its
limits, debates over securitization may well have developed a paradoxical naivety
about liberal politics. Too easily adopting Schmittian or other critiques as a basis
risks reifying securitization theory’s insights into taken-for-granted assumptions
about the necessary relationship between liberalism and security. As I have tried to
suggest, the liberalism of fear provides a powerful and potentially fruitful counter to
this tendency.
The liberalism of fear does not advocate a wider politics of fear. A critically aware
fear of fear and its possibility for strategic manipulation in either direction does not
equal a further deepening of the politics of fear. It is instead a political stance that
constantly questions the claims and decisions that are made in the name of
countering fears, and that is constantly cautious about the possibilities created by
the politics of fear. In both cases, it seeks to force discussion concerning whether and
to what extent such policies or practices can be justified. It is pessimistic in the sense
of a hyper-active concern with the potential for cruelty in all human affairs –
including, and perhaps especially, in the domain of security. But, it is neither cynical
nor despairing. Accordingly, it may also provide a set of previously untapped
political and ethical resources that would further increase the salience of
securitization theory.
Incorporating critique into the advocacy of specific policy proposals is
key to maintain the continued relevance of IR studies. Like it or not,
those in positions of power ascribe to a pragmatic framework and will
only take a course of action based upon its likely consequences. The 1AC
gives policymakers a broader toolkit with which to assess those
consequences.
Robert L. Gallucci 12 is president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
He is a former dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service, “How Scholars Can Improve International Relations”, The Chronicle of Higher
Education, 11-26, http://chronicle.com/article/How-Scholars-Can-Improve/135898/
Something is seriously wrong in the relationship between universities and the policy
community in the field of international relations. The worlds of policy making and academic research should be in
constant, productive conversation, and scholars and researchers should be an invaluable resource for
policy makers, but they are not.¶ One hears perennial laments from those in academe that their valuable work is
being ignored by policy makers. And, on the other hand, policy makers complain they can get nothing useful from the academy.
They may all be right.¶ Now would be a good time for policy makers and scholars to be deeply engaged on some of the highest-priority issues for the United
States and international security. Consider, for example: ¶ The causes and implications—immediate and long term—of the Arab Spring for that region and for
its relevance to future social and political change elsewhere. ¶ The real consequences of an Iranian nuclear-weapons program for the political dynamics of
the Middle East, as well as for the durability of the global norm against nuclear-weapons proliferation.¶ The complicated internal politics of Pakistan, how
Why are scholars
they relate to that country's political and economic development, and their importance to America's policies in South Asia.¶
and policy makers not engaging in the kind of interaction we all need—and we all say we want?¶
There has been a theoretical turn across the social sciences and humanities that has
cut off academic discourse from the way ordinary people and working professionals
speak and think. The validity and elegance of the models have become the focus,
rather than whether those models can be used to understand real-world situations.
Conferences and symposia are devoted to differences in theoretical constructs;
topics are chosen for research based not on their importance but on their
accessibility to a particular methodology. Articles and books are published to be
read, if at all, only by colleagues who have the same high regard for methodology and
theory and the same disregard for practice.¶ That has created a profession that is
inward-looking and concerned with arcane debate—a result that provokes and
deserves all the insults thrown at the ivory tower from the world of policy and
practice.¶ Further, the incentive structure in universities and in disciplines has endorsed this emphasis on theory and methodology. When it comes to
promotions and awarding tenure, departments are largely allowed to set their own standards. And, of course, departments are made up of people who have
succeeded in the profession and will perpetuate its values. Thus, the university department can turn into a guild, favoring credentialing over relevance and
orthodoxy over impact.¶ My concern is for the larger effects. Tenured professors construct courses and train the next generation of scholars. The best young
minds and young researchers are encouraged to replicate what their mentors think is important, but what if those who work in the world of policy and
practice do not agree with that choice?Students are then being prepared for careers that do not exist
outside of academe and given tools that are not useful except to their academic
discipline.¶ I would care much less if we were talking about literary theory or art history, important and rewarding though they may be. I care very
much when we are talking about international relations, a discipline that is involved with
policies that could get people killed, in the real world, here and now. ¶ Policy makers,
most of whom are trying to save lives and keep the peace, need all the help they can get in order to make better
decisions. They are faced with irreducible complexity and radical uncertainty—and
they must often rely on inadequate information. Unsurprisingly, they think
practically, are prepared to do anything that looks as if it might succeed, and are
reluctant to take big bets if not forced to do so. If they fail, dire consequences are
likely, both for themselves and others.¶ So how can academic experts be more helpful?¶ Twenty years ago, Alexander George, in Bridging the Gap:
Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, made some good suggestions. First, he proposed interdisciplinary approaches—a common refrain in academe. But
they are, in fact, hardly ever done. We talk the talk but don't walk the walk. Being really interdisciplinary is hard and requires deep engagement. The rub is
that most academic experts are more interested in their theories than they are in interdisciplinary conversations or working together on problems.¶
Policy makers, by contrast, have to deal with actual problems. They would benefit from
having multiple views of the same issue—and more so from seeing these views
integrated—in order to see all the consequences and the likely interdependencies of
a line of action.¶ Second, George suggests that researchers embrace what he calls second-best theory. Rather than
concentrating on a grand theory that explains everything, scholars could help policy
makers by providing ways to assess whether their policies are working in real time. Policy makers in
the throes of a crisis do not much care whether a theory is being proved true or false,
but they badly need evidence of progress on emerging problems . In simpler terms, they need
management tools, and they need help connecting cause and effect. Scholars, who
struggle with precisely that, could be of real help. ¶ Lastly, George calls for mutual accountability. If
academics are invited into the policy environment, decision makers need to be
invited back into the academy, and their views on curriculum and research should be
taken seriously.¶ To these recommendations, I would add two more: first, a robust embrace of regional studies. Nothing can replace the value
of insights that emerge from the integration of knowledge and research on the history, economics, politics, culture, religion, and geography of a region.
Second, consideration of rigorous, policy-relevant theory and analysis should be among
the requirements for hiring, tenure, and promotion.¶ My organization, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, supports efforts in
this regard, but it is incumbent upon all who teach and study international relations to think
about the problems we face as a nation, and those humankind faces across the planet.
Think about the needs of governments, and of the vast range of organizations at
work in the world. Find practical ways to prepare people to be useful and effective.
Our universities have the country's intellectual firepower, trained expertise, and the
careers of the most promising young people in their hands. I am asking that they
please do something useful with them.
2AC
Case
Speaking for others is necessary for collective action and political
reform – the neg commits ontological violence by retreating to false
individual locations of experience
Laura Sells 97, Instructor of Speech Communication at Louisiana State University, “On
Feminist Civility: Retrieving the Political in the Feminist Public Forum”, this paper was
presented at a Roundtable on "Public Speaking and the Feminist Public Sphere: Doing
Difference Differently," at the Western States Communication Association conference
retreat rhetoric has actually
In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this
become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one
implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others politically dangerous
because it erodes public discourse. First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make
singular claims that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological
configuration" in which we ignore how our social locations are always already implicated
in the locations of others. The position of "not speaking for others" thus becomes an alibi
that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others.
The retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces
an individualist ideology and privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a
protected form of speech in which the individual is above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also
gives the speaker immunity from having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of
others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing
critique and avoiding responsibility to the other. Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a
list of people--Steven Biko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it ,
both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.
a widespread physiological disease. For the sake of the species' health, he argues, we should eliminate the physiological disorders
that underpin and explain the emergence of ressentiment If ressentiment is not eliminated, he claims, the species will continue its evolutionary
degeneration. From our vantage-point Smith's Enlightenment faith in the ultimate compatibility between humanity's natural constitution and its moral and
political progress may seem to carry too many traces of a now discredited faith in nature's purposiveness or teleology.24 Nietzsche famously identified
himself as the first European thinker to properly de-deify nature, eliminating from his account of nature all teleological assumptions or explanations as
metaphysical hangovers.He aimed to conceive humanity in strictly naturalistic terms. However, his
alternative naturalism is bound to an idiosyncratic version of nineteenth century
Social Darwinism. In the past decade there has been a renaissance of scholarly interest in Nietzsche's relationship to Darwinism and other
contemporary evolutionary theories.25 This research has successfully challenged Heidegger's attempt to
purge Nietzsche's philosophy of its "alleged biologism".26 In the recent debate most scholars agree
that Nietzsche is a naturalist of one stripe or another, and the main interest lies in identifying his particular shading of nineteenth
century naturalism.27 In this context Nietzsche's concept of the will to power has been conceived as neo Darwinian or as
anti-Darwinian.2* I share the latter view that Nietzsche explicitly targeted Darwin with his own purely
speculative, if not blatantly fanciful biology. Against Darwin Nietzsche held first that
healthy biological types seek to maximize or expand their power even at the cost of
self-preservation and that only sick biological types seek to preserve themselves; and
secondly that the weak and sick preserve themselves far more effectively than the powerful
largely because they emasculate or moralise the latter and in doing so prevent them from
threatening their existence. Through the morality of ressentiment the weak become
parasites sapping the vitality of the strong. If Nietzsche's view is true, then Darwin's notion of nature as a struggle for existence
is merely a symptom of distressed life rather than a scientific account of nature.29 The point I wish to draw attention to here is that this anti-
require an account of reactive emotions that does not hinge on Smith's natural theological faith in the moral
sentiments or fall into Nietzsche's idiosyncratic and insupportable theory of evolutionary
distinct phenomena: a physiological disease that finds alleviation through the mechanism of
blaming others and a form of radical envy or envious hatred that deploys moral
concepts and judgments in order to spoil others' good fortune and happiness.35 Nietzsche's
physiology of ressentiment rests on untenable speculations and assumptions he
draws from his interpretation of contemporary theories of evolution . For the purposes of this
essay Nietzsche's second concept of envious hatred is more promising for understanding of how resentment can become politically toxic.
Defensive strategy key to tailored deterrence which solves better --- ASB
too escalatory
Michael Johnson 14, a Senior Defense Research Analyst at the RAND Corporation, and
Terrence K. Kelly, Tailored Deterrence: Strategic Context to Guide Joint Force 2020,
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-74/jfq-74_22-29_Johnson-
Kelly.pdf
the United States should develop a defense strategy based on tailored
To guide strategic choices driven by reduced resources,
approaches to deter the principal threats to national security while preserving flexibility to account for their
uncertain trajectories and potential shocks. This hybrid approach would provide a strategic framework to ensure that defense planning scenarios are realistic and necessary, indicate the missions and forces required to
necessary and prudent to deter China from attacking U.S. allies, but underinvesting in the balanced joint force
necessary to deter rogue states from conducting an expanded range of hostile acts and to secure
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in failing states .
A deterrence strategy seeks to prevent or discourage a specific hostile actor from performing specific undesirable acts by introducing doubt in its ability to succeed or fear of retaliation. As the DSG states, “Credible
deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.”3 Linking deterrence
with capability, the DSG describes a decisive joint campaign to defeat aggression that includes the ability to “secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance.”4 The DSG implies some
measure of continuity with the two-war construct by stating, “our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-
scale operation elsewhere.”5 While consistent with deterrence theory and joint doctrine, the DSG does not take the next steps to specify whom and what to deter, or how, which is necessary to guide development of Joint
Force 2020 given declining defense resources.
As a result, there is disagreement among defense leaders about the types of forces required to deny objectives and impose costs when it comes to force-sizing. For example, to deter a wide range of threats, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey considers that the essential task of a flexible joint force is to prevail in simultaneous contingencies wherever and whenever they occur:
Now, there’s been much made . . . about whether this strategy moves away from a force structure explicitly designed to fight and win two wars simultaneously. Fundamentally, our strategy has always been about our
ability to respond to contingencies wherever and whenever they occur. This won’t change. . . . We can and will always be able to do more than one thing at a time. More importantly, wherever we are confronted, and in
whatever sequence, we will win.6
Yet others contend that the DSG represents a significant change that would use air and naval forces in lieu of ground forces to deter and defeat aggression. For example, retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary
Roughead suggests that fighting “two land wars simultaneously is not the Obama strategy.”7 His interpretation of a significantly different force-planning construct would use air and naval power to deny objectives or
impose costs in emergent challenges:
The defense strategy set forth by Defense Secretary Panetta in January 2012—a significant departure from prior Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ focus on winning our current land wars—seeks to rebalance our force
toward facing emergent challenges, which will be predominantly air and maritime in nature. . . . The structure of a force to meet these needs would maintain the Navy and Air Force at current objectives. . . . The active
duty Army would be reduced by [an additional] 200,000 soldiers from the 490,000 planned in the FY 2013 budget.8
Military leaders have different views about the requirements to deter and defeat aggression because the DSG never moves beyond the doctrinal template for deterrence to provide specific strategic guidance. It does not
define the adversary and hostile acts the United States seeks to deter or the military missions and forces to deny the (unknown) objective or impose the (unspecified) cost. Deny and defeat are ambiguous terms that vary
with the strategic objective in different cases. For example, the joint force could be required to:
• Deny the aggressor’s ability to attain the objective (that is, successful defense). Examples include preventing Iraq from seizing oilfields in Saudi Arabia and preventing North Korea from striking the United States with a
ballistic missile.
• Deny the aggressor’s ability to retain the objective (that is, successful offensive to restore the status quo ante bellum). Examples include restoring the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950 and reversing Iraqi aggression by
liberating Kuwait in 1991. This would also include a limited offensive to deny North Korea’s ability to strike Seoul with long-range artillery.
• Defeat the aggressor to prevent future attacks (that is, a successful offensive to defeat military forces and remove the regime as punishment for crimes against humanity). Examples include defeating Germany and Japan
in World War II and the Taliban in 2001.
• Threaten to punish the aggressor with nuclear weapons (that is, in extreme cases, threaten to retaliate in kind or overcome a conventional imbalance). During the Cold War, the strategy of flexible response incorporated
direct defense by conventional forces to resist an attack and gain time for a diplomatic resolution. If defense became untenable, deliberate escalation included the limited use of nuclear weapons to blunt an attack and
signal the will to proceed to the next stage—a general nuclear response against the enemy’s homeland.
the missions and forces required to deter and defeat aggression are highly
These examples reveal that
dependent on the circumstances in specific cases. Rather than assuming that air and
naval power are sufficient to deny objectives in all second contingencies, DOD should
develop tailored approaches to deter the principal future challenges to U.S. national
security interests as the basis for deriving realistic force-planning scenarios, military
missions, and joint forces.
Deter Aggression by China
There is inherent tension within the U.S. strategy to engage China while simultaneously deterring aggression and assuring allies. The National Security Strategy states that the United States is “working to build deeper and
more effective partnerships” with countries, including China, “on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect.”9 However, the underlying defense strategy since 1991 has been to sustain U.S. military dominance to
security dilemma by increasing fear of containment in China .11 Furthermore, the high financial
cost and risk of escalation associated with defeating China’s antiaccess/ area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities suggest that policymakers should weigh this approach against a
defensive form of flexible response that would provide more time to reach a political
resolution in future crises.12
The current approach is apparently to deter China with the Air-Sea Battle concept—at least that is how
Beijing sees it.13 China’s land-based missiles, which can strike aircraft carriers and air
bases at extended range, create a military-technical problem. The fear is that if the U.S. Navy and Air Force could be
denied access to the East and South China seas, then China could dominate Asia because the United States would be unable to deter its aggression. The proposed military-
technical solution is to develop the offensive strike and cyber capabilities to destroy
China’s sensor, command, and missile systems to “break the kill chain” by striking hundreds
of targets on the mainland.14
The advantage of sustaining military dominance (if possible) is the ability to preserve freedom of navigation by protecting aircraft carriers and tactical aircraft operating close to China. The capability to project power
the second largest economy is another matte r. Yet the lack of clearly articulated defense
policy to deter China is resulting in a force planning process that presumes that
breaking the kill chain in China is militarily necessary and politically realistic
despite obvious questions and considerations .15
The political and strategic disadvantages of offensive Air-Sea Battle become clear when
policymakers consider likely Chinese reactions to destroying hundreds of targets on the
mainland they deem essential for self-defense. China is no more likely to accept the loss of
its A2/AD system than the United States would be willing to accept the loss of its Pacific fleet
without escalating and making nuclear threats. An offensive doctrine to destroy
China’s A2/ AD system is destabilizing because each side would have a military incentive to
strike first based on a use-it-or-lose-it calculus. This incurs high risk of immediate
vertical escalation, leaving policymakers with little or no room for developing
political solutions to defuse a crisis.
In other words, recommending the use of Air-Sea Battle to break the kill chain in China would offer the President an escalatory option in the same vein that Helmuth von Moltke the Younger offered Kaiser Wilhelm II in
1914 (execute the Schlieffen Plan), Douglas MacArthur offered Harry Truman in 1951 (bomb mainland China), and Curtis LeMay offered John F. Kennedy in 1962 (bomb Cuban missile sites). American policymakers today
should realize that their predecessors rejected similar options because there is no credible theory to “defeat” a great power with nuclear weapons at acceptable risk, especially when the Chinese threaten “unrestricted
warfare” to defend their core interests. Policymakers should therefore drive the creation of more acceptable military options to defend U.S. interests while minimizing the incentives to strike first and escalate attacks.
To provide survivable and reinforcing joint fires, the Army could develop land-based antiship missiles for its existing rocket artillery systems, consider investing in antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, and increase the
Partners would
number of Patriot batteries in a new theater A2/AD brigade. It could then train with partners to develop A2/AD capabilities and tie them into U.S. systems if mutually beneficial.
become more capable of deterring China while the close relationship would
demonstrate U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. Even if China invests billions
to project power despite our A2/AD defenses, the risk of escalation, including the use
of nuclear weapons, would be sufficient to deter aggression. 18
This part of a deterrence strategy in Asia based on flexible response is similar to the
defensive posture that deterred the Soviet Union from attacking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.19
U.S. conventional forces were never built to attack and defeat the Soviets in a decisive joint campaign;
on the contrary, the United States recognized its ground forces in Europe were vulnerable to
attack. Their strategic purpose was to prevent a rapid fait accompli and trigger the
uncertain process of escalation at a local conventional level . Thomas Schelling explains why the “manipulation of risk”
succeeded in deterring the Soviets from attacking the isolated garrison in Berlin, which was surrounded by overwhelming force in multiple crises:
It has often been said, and correctly, that a general nuclear war would not liberate Berlin. . . . But that is not all there is to say. What local military forces can do, even against very superior forces, is to initiate the uncertain
process of escalation. One does not have to be able to win a local military engagement to make the threat of it effective. Being able to lose a local war in a dangerous and provocative manner may make the risk . . .
outweigh the apparent gains.20
ASB useless --- strikes fail and leave key assets vulnerable
T.X. Hammes 14, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University, and R.D. Hooker, Director of the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, “America's Ultimate Strategy in a Clash
with China,” June 10, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-ultimate-strategy-
clash-china-10633?page=3
*Modified for ableist language
We believe the CSBA concept is both provocative and ineffective. While “blinding” Chinese space-based and
ground surveillance systems may make sense in the event the People’s Republic of China initiates hostilities, it is dangerous to assume such a campaign will
a weighted air and naval campaign that
be successful in a time of aerostats, cheap drones and cube satellites. Further,
attacks China’s integrated air-defense and land-based missile systems is flawed from
multiple perspectives. First, it is dangerously provocative. China’s Second Rocket
Artillery Corps, which controls its conventional land-based missiles, also controls its
land-based nuclear arsenal. A direct attack on the organization that controls China’s
strategic nuclear forces in a scenario where U.S. territory and nuclear forces have
not been attacked could escalate the conflict uncontrollably. In this regard, though touted as an
“operational concept,” AirSea Battle, as expressed in the CSBA concept paper, intrudes forcefully and directly into
large rockets from relatively open desert terrain. In addition, allied forces had
absolute air supremacy as well as hundreds of aircraft that could range freely over
the entire country. Despite all these advantages, the Survey concluded, “There is no
indisputable proof that Scud mobile launchers—as opposed to high-fidelity decoys,
trucks or other objects with Scud-like signature—were destroyed by fixed-wing
aircraft.” Despite a massive effort involving thousands of air sorties, ground and
national intelligence assets, the allies failed to get a single confirmed kill against a
system that took the Iraqis at least thirty minutes to erect, fuel and launch. It is
extremely unlikely that air power will fare better against the much more numerous
Chinese systems in the complex, heavily defended environment of coastal China.
These mobile systems can be hidden in garages, buildings under construction, caves
and tunnels. There are tens of thousands of places to hide. The launch vehicles can
also be camouflaged as commercial vehicles for the periods when they move
between hiding places. Finally, solid-fueled systems can launch in much less time
than the old liquid-fueled Scuds. To even have a chance of success, the United States would have to maintain enough aircraft in
the contested airspace of China to detect the missile moving into firing position and place a weapon on it in a matter of minutes.
AirSea Battle Concept has very little chance of success in any of the three
In short, the CSBA
[undermine] ASB capabilities. Further, China may well believe the United States cannot afford ASB or at the very least, will not field
the capabilities for a decade or more. A military concept that is vulnerable to a relatively inexpensive defeat mechanism or has a window of vulnerability has
little deterrent value.
carriers, a war of nerves would begin. The longer the confrontation and the
maneuvering, the greater the possibility for a mistake that would lead to a strike on
a carrier with perhaps irreversible consequences for the relationship between the two superpowers and for
world stability. As China would enjoy the advantage of playing on its own doorstep with Chinese public opinion
fiercely opposing any retreat, and is it would be willing to dance with the U.S. closer to
the edge, the U.S. would have to deescalate and take the conflict to the UN or risk a nuclear
confrontation. Thus the “predictable unpredictability” of escalation and Mutually Assured Destruction ensures, according to
experts, that a U.S.-China aircraft carrier face-off would not be a prolonged confrontation and, most importantly, that it would end
peacefully as both sides’ rational strategy would follow the norms of nuclear deterrence.¶
However, as Donald Kagan – one of Yale’s most distinguished professors – once put it,
miscalculations and irrational decisions have been the norm in history, as old hatreds and
wounded honor inspire dangerous and irrational actions. Even though experts and war simulation models
confirm that a potential aircraft carrier face-off would end peacefully, Kagan’s observation stands as a clear
reminder that preempting a clash by dialogue and demilitarizing a conflict zone is the
safest and perhaps the sole path for sustained peace. After all, even a U.S. strategic retreat in case of a cross-strait
crisis would leave an irreversible mark on the China-U.S. relationship, increase U.S. embitterment against China, encouraging militarization and an ever
accelerating arms race.¶ In their post-1991 engagement, China and the United States have shown that their commitment to a peaceful resolution of disputes
remains at the forefront of their strategic relationship. From the 1996 strait crisis to the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to
the U.S. and China have been optimistic about each other’s
the 2001 U.S. spy plane collision,
afford to take.¶ As Stephen Hadley, a former U.S. national security advisor, once noted, in the most pivotal relationship for peace in our time – the
US-China Relationship – seeing the glass half full instead of half empty is an important forma mentis in crisis management. The U.S. and
China have shown in their communiqués that the glass over the question of Taiwan is
half full and thus the solution should be political and not military. Managing renewed cross-strait
tensions peacefully will be another significant brick in constructing a “new major powers” relationship and promoting long-term global prosperity.
the seizure of foreign territories undisputedly controlled by others, a notion of inherent superiority over
other peoples, or other basic beliefs that could generate aggressive or militaristic conduct toward outsiders. Although plagued by some
historical animosities, contests over relatively small, disputed territories, and differences in development levels and
political systems, nations (other than North and South Korea) are not locked into mutually hostile, zero-sum
sets of national objectives or military doctrines. Most nations would prefer to further
peaceful contacts with the outside world and peacefully manage difference s over resource
and sovereignty claims. Moreover, although the military doctrines of some important states (notably China and the United States) involve notions of
offensive and (sometimes) preemptive power projection, such operational concepts do not imply that national security policies also exhibit a preference for
However contentious individual disputes may be, all
aggressive military actions, especially against major powers.
major Asian states recognize the presence of regional and global trends in favor of
cooperation and the peaceful resolution of issues. Unfortunately, the aforementioned positive
trends coexist with several negative—at best neutral—factors influencing national objectives,
military doctrines, and approaches to the use of force.
The most significant
Differences in Chinese and American approaches to preserving regional stability in Asia will continue to increase.
negative trend derives from conflicting views held by the United States and China regarding
the best means of preserving national and regional stability and prosperity over the long term. Washington continues to
believe that only American maritime military predominance can provide the regional
security required to achieve stability and prosperity. Beijing increasingly believes that it must acquire the
means to limit or possibly even eliminate American maritime predominance in the Western Pacific
in order to preserve its own security and attain its national objectives. This difference is playing out
primarily along China’s maritime periphery, where China’s acquisition of socalled counterintervention or A2/AD-type
capabilities challenges the freedom of action of the U.S. military. Such capabilities also have significant implications for
China’s handling of a variety of sensitive regional security issues (for example, maritime territorial disputes,
the Taiwan issue, and the activities of foreign militaries operating in Beijing’s EEZ and air defense identification zone).
Washington and Beijing apparently believe that attaining such security objectives in the Asia-
Both
Pacific region requires an array of power projection-oriented capabilities and a military doctrine
that places a premium on taking the initiative, showing resolve, and acting decisively in a crisis. In past crises
both Washington and Beijing displayed a tendency to use the military to
(particularly in the 1950s and 1960s),
demonstrate their resolve and ability to control crisis escalation. For China, the need to show resolve and act decisively often seemed to
derive from the perceived need to deter further escalation by the adversary; strengthen support for the leadership domestically; and, in some cases,
U.S. decisionmakers were often
compensate for relative material weakness when confronting a more powerful adversary. Similarly,
motivated by a need to deter further escalation and strengthen support for the political
leadership domestically. However, such actions also frequently reflected a long-standing belief
that the United States, owing to its superior military power, enjoys escalation dominance in any
confrontation.
This volatile mix of conflicting military approaches to regional order, combined with a common
offensive orientation toward crises, the use of force, and growing military
capabilities, could eventually result in significant adverse changes in China’s stance
toward foreign military activities in Asia (for example, surveillance along the Chinese coast), especially activities conducted by the
United States. Equally worrisome is that a sense of declining relative military capabilities,
coupled with a continued desire to maintain U.S. military supremacy, reassure allies, and
deter adversaries could induce Washington to adopt a more assertive, even aggressive,
approach in managing a crisis. However unlikely it may seem at this point, if strategic rivalry became
sufficiently intense, U.S. efforts to sustain maritime predominance and overall strategic leverage in Asia
could result in fundamental changes in specific national policies and objectives. This
could include efforts to prevent movement toward the peaceful reunification of mainland China with Taiwan; include Taiwan in a larger, alliance-centered
security structure designed to contain China; or overtly support rival claimants to China in maritime sovereignty disputes.60
Getting beyond the little child’s observation that the emperor had no clothes, we should make some other candid statements. First, the
Navy will not return to the days when it had 15 aircraft carriers on its rolls. In fact, it will be lucky to maintain 11. The number 15 w as
underpinned by the
assumption that the aircraft carrier is the centerpiece of U.S. naval force
projection at sea, over the littorals, and ashore. This assumption is increasingly invalid. There are now large areas of
the Eurasian littoral that are simply too dangerous for carriers to operate in the mode of “gunboat diplomacy” or engaging in
conventional warfare. Moreover, even setting aside the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier itself, modern
anti-aircraft
systems are making the skies more threatening for the air wings that comprise the
carriers’ power (stealth or no stealth). Since Desert Storm, Tomahawk cruise missiles have taken over much of the deep strike
mission from carrier-based aircraft, and new technologies such as the rail gun may encroach even further into their mission portfolio.
Thus, the question becomes: how many carriers are really needed forward in order to support U.S. strategic interests? Sequestration
forces the Navy to make a hard choice because the increasing cost of carriers and their aircraft represents an increasingly s evere tradeoff
with other kinds of forces. So, just when
the strategic utility of carriers is starting to fray at the
edges, they require increasing commitment in terms of budget share .
Second, there is no magic shortcut to ship maintenance. The sea is a harsh environment for machinery, and while strides have been made
in design and materials to improve maintainability, maintenance must still be done and it takes time to do properly. Quality crew training
takes time as well. Some efficiencies might be found on the margins, but especially for the complex operations of a carrier battle group,
time is needed for progressive and iterative training drills to generate a battle group that is “on the step.” Thus maintenan ce and training
ought to be considered constants in the deployment equation, not variables. This leaves as the only variables the number of carriers
forward, duration of cruises, and number of carriers ready for surge. There are no magical clothes that can cover over this bare fact.
So, how might the mantle of naval power actually be measured and sewn? First, we ought to acknowledge that extending cruises beyond
six or seven months or increasing the number of cruises per tour risks having sailors walk out the door after their first or second
enlistments. The same goes for aircrew, especially as the airlines replace the corps of Baby Boomer pilots. This forces cruise length and
frequency to be set constant as a matter of policy. The number of available surge carriers can vary, but a world that contain s rising, well-
armed competitors in multiple regions as well as a highly unstable Middle East suggests that the United States might have to fight in two
places at once, and possibly more, while still being able to deter adversaries elsewhere. This increases the strategic value of surge-ready
carriers in port. In the end, this leaves only the number of carriers forward as the relevant variable.
Robert C. Rubel 14, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, “Navies and
Economic Prosperity: The New Logic of Sea Power,” in “Writing to Think: The Intellectual
Journey of a Naval Career,” p.60-68
The challenge becomes how to use command of the sea to manage or influence the
emergence of other navies such that true naval arms races do not occur. The right way to do this is not
completely clear but there appear to be several sure-fire losing strategies. The first is for the United
States to start the arms race itself by reflexively viewing the emergence of the Chinese
Navy or others as a threat. Policies and patterns of building and deployment based on alarm and fear
will generate reciprocal responses in China and elsewhere. This is why CS21 does not mention China or any other nation by
name, something often criticized by those with an alarmist bent. Among the ways the U.S. Navy can stimulate Chinese alarm is to openly consider interdiction of their seaborne commerce in exercises, war games or
invoke this kind of reciprocal security dilemma is to link sea control and power
projection. After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy focused so narrowly on power projection that it and some of its allied navies forgot how to talk about sea control.12 While progress has been made in this
area, there is still a sense in the doctrine that U.S. forces will use land strikes to
neutralize shore based antiaccess systems with sea control being an exercise in access
generation that is prerequisite to projecting power ashore.13 One can imagine the effect such talk has on a nation
like China that has suffered humiliation and exploitation from the sea at the hands of
western nations. Already, the Chinese are reacting to the most recent U.S. concept of this ilk, Air-Sea Battle: “If the
U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop
anti-Air-Sea Battle.”14¶ A second way to increase the odds that navy building will lead
to war is for the leading navies to allow vulnerabilities to emerge. The U.S. Navy did this in two ways during the
1930s and up to 1941. First, it was slow to recognize and accept that the bomb-carrying aircraft had replaced the major calibre gun as the dominant naval weapon. Although war games at the Naval War College and
demonstrations by Billy Mitchell provided clear indicators, it took the December 1941 disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales to force the new reality on the admirals.
Today, the new reality is that the anti-ship missile is the arbiter of what floats and
what does not. This is a condition that has existed since the early 1970s but has not been compellingly revealed due to the lack of an all-out naval battle, just as there was no all-out naval battle
between 1922 and 1941 to reveal the bomb’s superiority. Vulnerability can also be generated by concentration. In 1941 the bulk of the U.S. fleet was concentrated at Pearl Harbor, leading Admiral Yamamoto to think that
a single knock-out blow was possible. Although today the U.S. Navy is strategically dispersed around the
world, its principal combat power is concentrated into eleven aircraft carriers. Taking
several of these out would seriously compromise the strategic capabilities of the U.S.
Navy, not to mention the potential adverse effects of derailing U.S. policy as happened via the loss of
eighteen Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, or conversely stimulating escalation, possibly to the nuclear level.
Moreover, a hit on a nuclear carrier that killed hundreds, if not thousands, of U.S. sailors in a single blow might easily generate national
outrage and serve to escalate the conflict far above initial intentions. In naval warfare, history has shown that
the tactical offense has most often trumped the tactical defence, and thinking that aircraft carriers can be defended against the
array of existing and potential anti-ship missiles is not much different than the outlook of
battleship admirals in the fall of 1941.15¶
K
‘Wars for humanity’ are an ahistorical myth
Benno Gerhard Teschke 11, IR prof at the University of Sussex, “Fatal attraction: a critique
of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory”, International Theory (2011), 3 :
pp 179-227
For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a
structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-
cosmopolitan programme of ‘perpetual peace’, the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization
of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals.
Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's ‘spaceless
universalism’. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify
Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of ‘neutralizations and de-
politicizations’ (Schmitt 1993). But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international
relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal
modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins seems unable to comprehend
the complexities and specificities of ‘liberal’ world-ordering, then and now. For in the
cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-
capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual
lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already
substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the
capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the
survival of ‘re-feudalized’ elites in the German state classes and the marriage between ‘rye and iron’ (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and
early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international
ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the
early 20th century conflicts between ‘the liberal West’ and Germany as ‘wars for humanity’ between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior,
there is more evidence to suggest that theseconfrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden
and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between
the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain
that the ‘liberal West’ coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant
authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even
Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by
the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal
subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and
geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea
that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project
and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories
as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by
long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the
And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a
conventional policy expression is ‘blowback’.
conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and
collective political entities governed by executive decision – it also lacks the categories of
analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign
power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of
emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic
idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually
explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria)
and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies
of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once
These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term
they step out of line.
liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal
‘spaceless universalism’ sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-
supervised ‘informal empire’, which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse
and case-specific ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders
challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.
receiving funding have frequently changed, moving within a few years from CTM to HTV-2 to AHW. This
instability, which can be explained both by political motives (nuclear ambiguity of the
CTM) and by the disappointing results of HTV-2 tests44, has reduced the ability of the project teams to
consolidate know-how and overcome technical obstacles they face.
In addition, the constraints weighing on the U.S. defense budget since 2011 have constituted a severe test for a nascent program relying on immature
technologies. The absolute necessity for the administration to reduce federal spending on a long-term
basis meant that budgetary priorities had to be established in the defense sector. Although it has not been publicly
acknowledged, the choices were detrimental to CPGS programs. Due to the modest investments and sunk costs to
date, the local economic impact of these programs was practically zero. In fact, conventional strategic strike programs
seem not to have enjoyed sufficient support from either Congress, the armed forces
or the OSD. At the very least, these capabilities have not been considered important enough
to be exempted from budgetary cuts. The administration, which had planned in spring 2011 to allocate almost 1.8 billion
dollars to CPGS programs over the next five years, found itself forced to drastically scale back its ambitions: in early 2014, the projected credit envelope for
CPGS programs through 2018 was divided by almost three, to 673 million dollars (see Figures 2 and 3), which approximately equ als the actual spending
levels from FY2010 to FY2014. Figure 2 shows the extent to which credits projected on an annual basis dropped sharply after the Budget Control Act was
voted in summer 2011, forcing the administration to find more than 1,000 billion dollars in savings over a decade, heavily impacting the Pentagon’s
budget45 .
Thus the Pentagon’s ambitions in terms of conventional strategic strike fell hostage to a
dynamic that combined budgetary uncertainties, technical difficulties and lack of
sufficient support from any constituency (see Figure 3). The interaction between these three types of
constraints, already unfavorable to the development of new capabilities when budgets were not yet under heavy pressure, became a key handicap
once the Pentagon entered a period of budget austerity, and appears to have sealed the fate of the most ambitious goals
carrier in the area west of Hawaii stretching all the way to the coast of East Africa.
Second, the Yokosuka base is in a key location with regard to projection power in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It takes a US aircraft carrier seven days to sail from Hawaii
to Japan, whereas it takes 14 days to sail from the west coast of the continental United States to Japan. Whether carriers are being deployed to East Asia or the Persian Gulf, they can
reach there from Yokosuka much quicker than from the US. Third, military ports are expensive, so having a base established already is preferable to building one from scratch.
The U.S. has repeatedly stated that it supports a more powerful and prosperous
2011; 133).
China (ibid), and China has since 2002 repeatedly stated its intentions of a ‘peaceful rise’ (Guo 2006;
39). The need for cooperation is often deemed critical. Australian strategist Hugh White has argued that if China continues on
its current trajectory, a new order in the region will need to be established; one that takes into account the new power relativities, and that “if this doesn’t happen, there is no reason to
further significant military cooperation or regional order has yet been on any
significant agenda. The peace has so far been kept, and the urgency of cooperation has been repeatedly
emphasized, but no major change has taken place. Rather, the relationship has during the past four
years rather gone in the opposite direction and become increasingly antagonistic. Some Chinese scholars argue that the bilateral
relations are good on the surface but that the U.S. is increasingly working towards a
containment policy (Chase 2011; 135)
The Obama administration has chosen to take a tougher approach to China’s military
modernization as the cooperation has proven to be difficult (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 53). For example, military cooperation and mutual visits were
suspended by Beijing in a reaction to a U.S.-Taiwan arms deal in 2010 (Pomfret 2010). Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated at the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, that the
increasing Chinese capabilities directed at Taiwan requires the U.S. to supply Taiwan with arms and that disruptions in military-tomilitary relations with China will not change U.S.
policy toward Taiwan (Gates 2010).Many people in China view Washington’s approach as increasingly
worrying and the idea that the U.S. is trying to restrain Chinese power ambitions is
getting stronger (Chase 2011; 133-134). Richard Weitz argued that the good relations established by former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates were largely due to
Gates’ personal commitment and that his retirement might retard [slow] the progress (Weitz 2011). Weitz assertion seems accurate because since Gates retired military-
developments that they seek to achieve. Amongst other things, China has admitted
their intention to deploy an aircraft carrier group in the near future (Wong 2010). They also
have increased submarine capabilities and they operate an underground submarine
base that enables Chinese submarines to reach deep waters rapidly and deploy
submarines to vital sea lanes with great stealth (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2010; 2)
Sea power is pursued for two main purposes. The first one is to protect SLOCs (Sea-Lanes of Communication) and seaborne commerce in peacetime, and to ensure protection of these
through sea-denial or sea-control in times of war. The second purpose is for offensive military power and aggression (Howarth 2006; 4). Howarth writes mainly about the intentions
behind Chinese submarine development and states that:
Although originally conceived to play primarily a defensive role in naval operations, the submarine has more often been the instrument of choice for offensive operations by inferior
possession of advanced, offensive weapons has often provided weaker states with
navies. And
the confidence to launch asymmetric wars against stronger opponents (Howarth 2006; 9-10)
This observation is true not only for China in this region, but also for surrounding countries like Vietnam, who, in order to hedge its
bets against China, is developing significant submarine capabilities to defend its interests in the South China Sea.
The supposed reasons behind China’s rapid and extensively developed maritime capabilities are grounded in its issues with Taiwan. Some argue that
China’s naval modernization started with the 1996 incident in which the U.S. carriers
blocked the Taiwan Strait and denied China any possibility of attack (see for example Office of the
Secretary of Defense 2011; 57). In the case of Taiwan trying to declare independence, China would use force to enforce its claims to the territory (Ross 2000; 87). The United
States has a long-standing alignment with Taiwan, something that was illustrated when the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers into the
Taiwan Strait in 1996 to counter Chinese coercive diplomacy against Taiwan (Ross 2000; 88). Even though Taiwan might be the highest priority, it is not the
only reason for China’s modernization efforts. Other goals include protecting
Chinese interest in the South China Sea; preventing piracy; protecting vital energy supply
lines; displacing U.S. power and influence in the Asia Pacific (O’Rourke 2012; 5).
the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced the $5.8 billion arms package to Taiwan. This was not
In September 2011,
well received in Beijing, and the Chinese Ambassador in Washington said there would be consequences (Minnick 2011). China believes it has legitimate
reasons for being outraged about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan because of the 1982 communiqué that outlines the long-term U.S. policy towards Taiwan with a gradual decrease in arms
that China has planned its military development in a way that will enable
enforcements of its claims of Taiwan without outside interference. This suspicion is
visible in several official documents, for example in the following statement in a
Department of Defense report to Congress:
Beijing is
The PLA seeks the capability to deter Taiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit of this objective,
developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for the island
in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor (Office of the Secretary of
Defense 2011; I).
Despite arguments that the PLAN is of little direct threat to the United States, the Obama
administration has chosen to securitize the rise of the Chinese naval capabilities. In the
strategic guidance for the Department of Defense in 2012, Obama writes in a letter that:
we will
As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular,
continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in antiaccess
and
environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber (Obama’s note in Department of Defense 2012).
it officially raises the issue of operating in anti-access
The statement covers a lot of ground but, most significantly,
environment on the military security agenda. The report also makes clear the redirected focus of U.S. military strategy, saying:
“while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region” (Department of Defense 2012; 2). The necessity lies in maintaining competitiveness and regional sea control. In the context of China’s lacking
transparency in military modernization, the report raises the importance of increased U.S.-Sino cooperation but also immediately addresses the inherent difficulties in doing so:
The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we
“
maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with out treaty
obligations and with international law ” (Department of Defense 2012; 2) and that:
China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power
States such as
projection capabilities… Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its
ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will
include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts
to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities (Department of Defense 2012; 4-5).
If China loosely defines a ‘strike’ to encompass some political action, this significantly alters the purportedly ‘defensive’ nature of this strategic construct. This implies that PLA forces
might be employed preemptively in the name of defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2011; 25).
missiles (ASBMs) because they pose the greatest threat to U.S. ships in the event of a
Chinese anti-access operation (Wishik II 2011; 39). The A2/AD concept is not used by China, but their ASCEL (Active Strategic Counterattacks on
Exterior Lines) has many similar features, although Wishik (2011) argues that ASCEL might be seen as more extensive than A2/AD.
According to a New York Times article, the new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta expressed Washington’s worries about
China:
We’re concerned about China… The most important thing we can do is to project our
force into the Pacific – to have our carriers there, to have our fleet there, to be able to make very
clear to China that we are going to protect international rights to be able to move across the oceans freely (Panetta quoted in Bumiller 2011).
This statement bluntly points out China as the perpetrator in the Pacific. With this serious security concern, it
also, without hedging, identifies a strong military presence as the most important thing we can
do and that U.S. interests will be protected using this military presence. The
statement lift the issue to another level of urgency, possibly so as to justify further spending
on new capabilities.
there is an inherent dichotomy in U.S.
It can be observed, by looking at U.S. discourse surrounding China’s military modernization, that
posture towards China. Chinese scholars have called this the ‘two-handed’ China policy, which features
characteristics of both engagement and containment (Chase 2011; 134). Chase argues that the Chinese
misconceptions of U.S. intentions might create a situation that proves difficult to
manage because of the attempt to employ both a firm approach of balancing power
and simultaneously accommodating China’s rise (Chase 2011; 135). The confusion is generated
by ambiguous messages in statements such as the following made by Barack Obama :
And we’ll seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation. We will
do this, even as we continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms (Obama 2011a).
Arguably, the easiest way to determine whether a securitization speech act has been successful or not is by looking at how a perceived threat discourse has shaped policy, and how
extraordinary measures have been adopted to deal with a specific threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; 26). In the two sections dealing with the political and the military sectors,
the extraordinary measures have come in the form of a concerted development in a wider political and strategic development. There are arguably three overarching, cross-sectorial,
deployment is a piece in a much larger puzzle to circle China. Thirdly, and perhaps the
suspicion that the
most extensive measure employed, is the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) developed by the United
States. The central purpose of the JOAC (2012) is stated as follows:
As a global power with global interests, the United States must maintain the credible capability to project military force into any region of the world in support of those interests. This
the ability to project force both into the global commons to ensure their use and
includes
into foreign territory as required. Moreover, the credible ability to do so can serve as a
reassurance to U.S. partners and a powerful deterrent to those contemplating
actions that threaten U.S. interests (JOAC 2012; 2)
the new Air-Sea Battle concept, which aims to bring together the Navy and
The JOAC includes
the Air Force in developing integration between the different forces to deal with a
wider range of threats from cyber to A2/AD threats (JOAC 2012; 4). This concept is central to
U.S. securitizations in the Asia Pacific region and constitutes a wide range of
emergency measures to deal with the growing threat of Chinese military
modernization towards which it is most clearly directed. These developments are but the most significant. They are all arguably
integrated into what might resemble a ‘grand strategy’.
Military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which serve as “the fulcrum for our str ategic turn to
Having adopted an air-sea battle doctrine, the Pentagon has
the Asia-Pacific,” are being revitalized.
committed to deploying 60 percent of its nuclear-armed and high-tech navy to the
Asia-Pacific. According to the New York Times, this includes “six aircraft carriers and a majority of the Navy’s
cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships and submarines , [and] an accelerated pace of naval
exercises and port calls in the Pacific.”
Recognizing that relying on military power alone is not a winning strategy, especially given the near-equal influence of economic power,
the Obama administration has also pressed a diplomatic campaign to negotiate a “Trans-Pacific Partnership.” The goal is to create the
world’s largest and most demanding free-trade area in ways that deepen the economic integration of the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies
while simultaneously reducing their economic dependence on China.
In South Korea, where the U.S. military continues to have authority over all South Korean military operations in wartime, joint military
exercises have been expanded — including in the Yellow Sea, where in defiance of Chinese warnings, the United States recently deployed
the George Washington. To take the naval challenge closer to the Chinese coast, a massive
Korean naval base is being built at a World Heritage site in Jeju Island’s Gangjeon village, which according to
Yonhap News will “accommodate submarines and up to 20 warships, including U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers and their missile defense
systems.” This has sparked intense and disciplined nonviolent resistance in Korea.
In Southeast Asia, the Obama administration upped the military ante by responding to China’s increasingly militarized claims to nearly
all of the mineral-rich South China Sea—through which 40 percent of the world’s commerce passes—by declaring (U.S.-policed) free
navigation of the seas a U.S. strategic priority. Reinforcing Philippine claims to the “West Philippine Sea,” the Pentago n has also increased
weapons sales to the Philippines, accelerated joint military exercises, and explored the return of military bases. The pivot also entails
strengthening the U.S. military’s relationships with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam, with the latter engaging in joint
military exercises and under its “friends with all nations” policies, providing access for U.S. and allied navies at Cam Rahn Bay.
Washington’s renewed ties and military-to-military contacts with Burma, which could restrict China’s access to the Indian Ocean, have
also raised serious concerns in Beijing.
To complete China’s encirclement, the Obama administration has established a new Indian Ocean base in Darwin, Australia, purs ued a
tacit alliance with India, and is expanding its “partnerships” with New Zealand and Mongolia. In April, the United States even won an
agreement to keep a yet-to-be-determined number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through 2024. Closer to home, Hawaii is to host nearly
3,000 more Marines, Osprey warplanes, and further base expansions.
Meanwhile the Chamorro people of Guam, whose tiny island nation’s strategic location makes it an ideal fallback site for the day when
U.S. troops are finally ejected from Japan, are bearing the brunt of the pivot. Even though U.S. bases already occupy 28 percent of the 500-
square-mile island, 3,000 more U.S. Marines and their families are scheduled to be redeployed to Guam from Okinawa, and there are
plans for massive expansions of existing bases.
In an August 2012 speech in Japan, Cara Flores-Mays of Guam explained what the pivot will mean for her Chamorro grandfather: “He has
not known freedom,” she said, “and it’s likely that he never will.” The same applies to the peoples of many other Asia-Pacific nations, who
have largely been shunted aside in the great-power calculus governing U.S. policy in the region.
The United States and China, joined by other Asian and Pacific nations, are now engaged in a dangerous,
expensive arms race reminiscent of the Cold War.
When great powers compete, the peoples and interests of smaller nations are often
sacrificed. Caught between China’s rising influence and the U.S. pivot, the people of “host” nations and
communities are paying the greatest price. Over two centuries ago, the authors of the U.S. Declaration of
Independence identified the peacetime presence of British troops in their communities as the source of “abuses and usurpation s”
necessitating rebellion. Now it is the
peoples of the Pacific and Asia who are suffering and
increasingly resisting the impacts of the pivot, be they land seizures, harassment by
U.S. soldiers, terrorizing low-altitude flight exercises, assaults on the environment,
distorted national budgets, or the increased dangers of catastrophic warfare.
If catastrophic wars are to be prevented and limited national resources devoted to
ensuring genuine economic and environmental security, the U.S. peace movement
must begin challenging the pivot and its consequences . Already, there are indications that the
movement’s own “pivot” has begun.
exacerbate existing mistrust between Washington and Beijing and reinforce Beijing’s
fears about U.S. intentions in the region. 51 In turn, this could make China more
assertive and difficult to negotiate with in the future and increase the probability of a
crisis or conflict over Taiwan or other disputed territories in the region. More specifically, if a
political crisis arose, the U.S. commitment to a highly offensive ASB concept could
lead Beijing to view a first strike as preferable to allowing the United States to seize
the initiative. Finally, this approach and subsequent envisioned developments may
only exacerbate what may be a nascent arms race in the region, decreasing overall
stability and security and potentially making a conflict more likely.52
a second major concern about
• Escalation: At the same time, while China is not a clear peer competitor (as was the Soviet Union),
the adoption of ASB as a U.S. response to a future conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere
in East Asia is China’s possession of nuclear weapons. The potential escalation
dangers inherent in ASB as it is presented are alarming.53 Considering that the key
objective of ASB seems to be precisely the “blinding” or “dazzling” of the enemy to
attain the ability to launch effective in-depth offensive operations, the United States
would face the danger of possibly targeting the specific capacity to keep a conflict
limited and avoid loss of control of strategic weapons by Beijing. By most estimates, China’s strategic
deterrent remains relatively small, although the opaque nature of China’s military programs has led some analysts to argue that this deterrent may be much
larger. Nonetheless, Beijing’s policy seems focused on maintaining a “guaranteed retaliation” capability, meaning that even if it were to suffer a major attack,
assuming that Beijing could maintain
it would still have the capacity to respond and inflict prohibitive damage. However,
control of its weapons under an ASB attack, any perceived threat to its strategic
deterrent capability could unleash a “use it or lose it” dynamic that could result in
the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, if the regime perceived that U.S. objectives were not
limited and were focused on regime change or if a devastating loss (of Taiwan
perhaps) would make likely the regime’s demise, the pressure to use nuclear
weapons could be significant.
rather than de-escalate some crises. For example, moving U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups
closer to the crisis, previously a strong signal of U.S. resolve, could paradoxically
induce an attack on the carriers and other U.S. forward bases by Chinese missile
forces. In a crisis, Chinese military commanders will have an incentive to strike the
aircraft carriers before the carriers’ aircraft come in range of Chinese targets. Having made
that decision, Chinese commanders may reason that they should attack U.S. forward air
range tactical air power in the U.S. portfolio, based at vulnerable forward bases and
on aircraft carriers, creates a potentially dangerous “use it, or lose it” urgency during
future crises. If more of U.S. striking power had a longer range and was based at more secure sites
farther from crisis flashpoints, U.S. decision-makers and commanders would find
themselves under much less pressure during crises. Similarly, adversaries would not
find an advantage in striking first, nor would they be compelled to assume that U.S.
policy-makers were under that same pressure.
are generating insecurity and military responses on the other side that make both
countries less secure and trigger new rounds of competition. The United States must
avoid being unnecessarily provocative in its strategic moves and rhetoric, more proactively
explaining the comprehensive (not military-specific) nature of its growing focus on the Asia Pacific and linking it explicitly to a stable regional status quo that serves the interests of all.
China's leaders need to appreciate the security dilemma as a concept—and as a security problem that threatens China's own interests—and adopt measures to significantly reduce
widespread uncertainty about Beijing's military capabilities and intentions. China must recognize that its rise is not occurring in a strategic vacuum; while it has the right to develop
military power commensurate with its coveted status, regardless of its true intentions, under anarchy doing so will have consequences as other states adopt measures to enhance their
own security. Yet anarchy is by no means determinative of outcomes; without major changes to its policies and rhetoric, Beijing's military buildup may trigger even more severe, and
unwelcome, defensive responses from the United States and others. Even well-intentioned states whose leaders do not harbor what Beijing often uncritically dismisses as “ulterior
motives” to “contain China's peaceful rise” are likely to respond to its growing capabilities and uncertainty over its future intentions in ways that will leave China less secure. For
leaders on both sides to acknowledge a security dilemma at work is to open up a bargaining space for reciprocal steps to manage and moderate the otherwise potentially dangerous
spirals of competition.¶ Second, each side should do more to candidly share information about its interpretations of the other's policies and rhetoric. To do so effectively necessitates
more active diplomacy—dialogues, exchanges, and ongoing intergovernmental working groups—and this must be a two-way street. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue held
annually among policymakers in Washington and Beijing is a good first step. The goal of these dialogues is to provide more systematic and credible information about the intentions of
the other side. This is particularly important in the area of intermilitary dialogues, where both sides must candidly explain their strategic intentions, operational goals, and doctrines.
Intermilitary dialogues have increased, but remain infrequent, under-institutionalized, and superficial. They must not be conditional on the vicissitudes of political relations.¶ Third,
both sides should increase transparency of their military capabilities, strategic objectives, and military policy decisionmaking. Greater transparency can reduce uncertainty, thereby
decreasing the risks of miscalculations that lead to war. Washington must more effectively explain why exactly China's low transparency harms strategic trust, making clear how the
paucity of reliable information creates strong incentives for defensively oriented worst-case scenario planning. Beijing should understand that if its motives are in fact status quo-
oriented, it does both itself and its neighbors a severe disservice by not being more transparent about the drivers and content of its military policies. Regardless of per capita income
or other developmental metrics, China has the world's second-largest economy and military budget, with both growing rapidly. Under these conditions, and regardless of the Chinese
Communist Party's and PLA's extremely conservative political culture and traditions, for policymaking to remain a closed and opaque system is unnecessarily destabilizing and invites
miscalculation and military competition.¶ Fourth, both sides should establish and strengthen diplomatic mechanisms for bargaining. When the presence of a security dilemma is
recognized by both sides, mechanisms need to be available for leaders to offer reciprocal, and verifiable, gestures of restraint. These sorts of bargains will ultimately need to be
negotiated at the highest levels. Beijing and Washington also have strong incentives to significantly expand routine communications and strengthen personal relationships at all levels,
which help to build confidence generally and, in the event of an unintended clash, can also significantly enhance crisis management.¶ Finally, China, the United States, and other
countries in the region need to continue to shape and improve the wider political and strategic context in which military competition is unfolding. One check on security dilemma–
driven military competition is the diffuse benefits in other domains (e.g., political, economic) put at risk by worsening spirals and strategic rivalry. Even in the military domain,
cooperation in other areas—such as nontraditional security—can facilitate confidence building and expand the aperture beyond an exclusive focus of leaders on areas of friction and
potential threat. The involvement of the PLA Navy in the 2014 RIMPAC multilateral exercises and, since 2008, the multinational antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden have
demonstrated mutually beneficial gains from cooperation. With regard to maritime and territorial sovereignty disputes, until peaceful resolutions are achieved, the likelihood of an
unintended clash can be reduced significantly through concrete and enforceable codes of conduct, shared exploitation of resources in the disputed areas, side payments, enhanced
crisis management mechanisms, and regular investments in active diplomacy.¶ Not all military competition in the Asia Pacific in driven by the security dilemma logic, nor can all
security dilemmas be solved through diplomatic bargains and policies of reassurance. There are no guarantees that any of the above steps will dramatically reverse the worsening
While its
strategic environment in the Asia Pacific, much less end strategic rivalry and military competition. China's rise is ongoing, and its true intentions are unknowable.
restraint are worthwhile. If Washington is to make the first move, it should make the steps delineated above one condition for possible future conferral
upon China of Beijing's coveted recognition as a “great power.” The “new-type great power relations” concept proposed by President Xi remains, at best, vague in specifics, and
Washington's acceptance of it today is ill advised.126 The concept, however, appears to be predicated at least partially on an encouraging, and shared, understanding of one obvious
truth: avoiding a tragic race to military conflict is in the best interests of all states in the Asia Pacific, especially China.
metaphysic” to which the people and government of the United States have fallen
prey is to misconstrue the problem. As the foregoing chapters make plain, the origins of America’s
present-day infatuation with military power are anything but simple. American
militarism is not the invention of a cabal nursing fantasies of global empire and
manipulating an unsuspecting people frightened by the events of 9/11. Further, it is
counterproductive to think in these terms— to assign culpability to a particular president or administration and to
imagine that throwing the bums out will put things right. Yet neither does the present-day status of the United
(mostly on the left) who see in the far-flung doings of today’s U.S. military
establishment substantiation of Major General Smedley Butler’s old chestnut that “war is just a racket” and the
American soldier “a gangster for capitalism” sent abroad to do the bidding of Big Business
or Big Oil.2 Neither the will of God nor the venality of Wall Street suffices to explain how
the United States managed to become stuck in World War IV. Rather, the new American militarism is a little like
Different policies and practices could stanch and even reverse the damage. Purists in
that movement insisted upon the primacy of environmental needs, everywhere and in all cases. Theirs was (and is) a principled position
way that Americans think about military power will require a similarly pragmatic
approach. Undoing all of the negative effects that result from having been seduced by war may lie
beyond reach, but Americans can at least make them more manageable and thereby salvage
their democracy. In explaining the origins of the new American militarism, this account has not sought to assign or to impute blame. None of
the protagonists in this story sat down after Vietnam and consciously plotted to propagate perverse attitudes toward military power any more than Andrew
Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller plotted to despoil the nineteenth-century American landscape. The clamor after Vietnam to rebuild the American arsenal and
to restore American self-confidence, the celebration of soldierly values, the search for ways to make force more usable: all of these came about because
groups of Americans thought that they glimpsed in the realm of military affairs the solution to vexing problems. The soldiers who sought to rehabilitate their
profession, the intellectuals who feared that America might share the fate of Weimar, the strategists wrestling with the implications of nuclear weapons, the
conservative Christians appalled by the apparent collapse of traditional morality: none of these acted out of motives that were inherently dishonorable. To
the extent that we may find fault with the results of their efforts, that fault is more appropriately attributable to human fallibility than to malicious intent.
And yet in the end it is not motive that matters but outcome . Several decades after Vietnam, in the aftermath of a
century filled to overflowing with evidence pointing to the limited utility of armed force and the dangers inherent in relying excessively on military power,
the American people have persuaded themselves that their best prospect for safety
and salvation lies with the sword. Told that despite all of their past martial exertions, treasure expended, and lives sacrificed, the
world they inhabit is today more dangerous than ever and that they must redouble those exertions, they dutifully assent. Much as dumping raw sewage into
today “global power projection”—a phrase whose sharp edges
American lakes and streams was once deemed unremarkable, so
practice, a normal condition, one to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist. All of this Americans
Such a definition of normalcy cries out for a close
have come to take for granted: it’s who we are and what we do.
and critical reexamination. Surely, the surprises, disappointments, painful losses, and woeful, even shameful failures of the Iraq War
make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy. Yet a meaningful reexamination will require first a change of consciousness, seeing
war and America’s relationship to war in a fundamentally different way.
We would argue that there is a future in critical security studies. This future will
ultimately be determined by the extent to which scholars recognize the limits and
tensions of existing approaches (especially ‘Schools’) and take up the challenge of moving
beyond first principles or universalized assumptions about security to engage in
nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security.
Indeed, we make such a case using the critical theoretical tool of immanent critique,
what ways do different cultural, social and historical contexts determine different
security logics, and how do these dynamics look in terms of communities above and
below the state? And can we accept the claim that there is no difference in the logic
or effects of securitization if security is understood as referring to the welfare of the
most vulnerable in global society, for example, rather than the territorial
preservation of the nation-state? Here, the failure to differentiate between logics of security on the basis of what understanding of security
inheres in a particular discourse potentially blinds [obscures] Copenhagen School and poststructural theorists of security to (the possibility of) difference in security dynamics and
logics in different places, for different actors and at different times. In the case of the Copenhagen School, such parsimony might be in part a response to the desire to provide analytical
boundaries around the study of security rather than ‘descend’ into contextual analysis (see Williams, 2010: 213–216), but it nonetheless results in a partial and (we would argue)
Western-centric image of the politics of security.
Ultimately, these points suggest the need for far more nuance than is currently evident in
critical security studies scholarship. As noted earlier, the critical security studies project
appears bifurcated between opposing logics of security that position the logic of
security as inherently pernicious (Copenhagen School, post-structuralism) or inherently progressive (Welsh
School). In a sense, these ‘Schools’ correct the limits and tendencies of each other in important
and pointing to the ways in which the promise of security can be used to justify
illiberal practices. The Welsh School framework, meanwhile, recognizes that this
dominant discourse of security does not necessarily capture the essence of security
across time and space, in the process pointing to possibilities for progressive change in
security dynamics and practices. In a sense, these different approaches to the logic of security broadly reflect structural and agential tendencies
in International Relations more generally. We would argue that they suggest the need to take seriously the political limitations associated with dominant security discourses while
recognizing and exploring the possibility for security to mean and do something different.
The second imperative for the future of the critical security studies project concerns the ethics of security. We advanced the claim that a shared concern with expanding the realm of
dialogue underpins much of the critical security studies project, albeit to different degrees and in different ways. But to the extent that an ethics of security — a conception of the good
or progress regarding security — orients around a concern with such a position, this commitment needs to be acknowledged and defended. A range of pressing questions suggest
themselves here, including the bases for prioritizing open dialogue; the relationship between spheres of deliberation and material conditions of existence; the possibilities for and
limitations to the establishment of open dialogue; and the broader relationship between dialogue and outcomes. Elaborating on these commitments would also entail engaging with
the argument that movements towards greater dialogue could potentially encourage the desire to exclude power, identity, emotion and other central features of global politics (see
Price, 2008).
Where difficult questions emerge about this and other dimensions of an ‘ethical’ engagement with security — such as the role of violence in the Welsh School framework, for example
(Peoples, 2011) — these need to be confronted. If there is a consistency across critical security studies scholarship in this sense, it is that ethical commitments are evident (in
commitments to resistance, desecuritization or emancipation, for example) but are insufficiently developed to provide a genuine account of what constitutes ethical action regarding
security. Indeed, immanent possibilities for the development of the critical security studies project arise from these (often implied) commitments that need drawing out and
examining in the context of difficult dilemmas in world politics. This process of drawing out ethical commitments should be viewed as a reflexive movement towards recognizing the
assumptions and potential implications of one’s own theorizing, a position central to both broader definitions of Critical Theory (see Cox, 1981) and to the compelling critique of
traditional security studies as insufficiently engaged with the ethics and effects of its own theorizing about world politics. And it needs also to be matched up with the preceding
understanding of the politics of security. Is the expansion of deliberation and movement away from violence, for example, always progressive, and does it require the rejection of
security as a political category or its reform?
The example of Australian debates around the arrival by boat of asylum-seekers in 2010 illustrates tensions and ambiguities at work regarding the ethics of security, particularly as
understood in key critical approaches to the study of security. In that context, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s call for ‘a frank, open, honest national conversation’ about asylum
and border security particularly encouraged the articulation of negative and exclusionary views of asylum-seekers, paradoxically rendering the (re)securitization of asylum in the
Australian context more likely (see McDonald, 2011). Particularly striking here was the Prime Minister’s suggestion that this national conversation should take place outside the limits
imposed by political correctness that would otherwise discourage the articulation of right-wing or racist sentiments towards asylum-seekers. In this example, the apparent opening of
dialogic space encouraged by the Prime Minister was intimately related to the movement towards exclusionary security logics and practices orienting around the imperatives of
‘border security’.
The point of this example is not to illustrate the limits of open dialogue per se, but rather to illustrate two broader claims regarding the relationship between security and ethics in the
critical security studies project that we make here. First, while normative preferences are evident, these are often insufficiently developed or robust to enable the ethical adjudication
between different practices or outcomes. The normative preference for deliberation evident in the commitment to desecuritization, for example, is not sufficiently robust to enable us
to engage with difficult questions concerning the forms of deliberation that should be encouraged or even the circumstances in which ‘hate speech’, for example, might be curtailed (on
this, see Gelber, 2010). Second, and to return to the central argument of the article, the Australian example reminds us of the need to explore the implications of security conceptions
and practices in particular contexts, rather than assume that a particular security logic will inhere — or outcomes will follow — from the use of the term ‘security’ or a stated political
commitment to ‘dialogue’.
The core challenge for the critical security studies project is ultimately moving
beyond critique and agenda-setting and towards a contextual analysis of security dynamics and
practices in global politics. There is no question that a focus on the politics of
security and the ethics of security are crucial intellectual endeavours too readily
elided or ignored in traditional approaches to the study of security. For this reason
alone we need a ‘critical security studies project’. However, universalizing claims
concerning the politics of security — found in the securitization framework and
much post-structural engagement with security — must ultimately give way to
nuanced analyses of the ways in which security is constructed and challenged in
particular social, historical and political contexts. A range of theorists have — in different ways — sought to engage with
precisely this question, illustrating the various ways in which security dynamics ‘play out’ in different settings in terms of constructing community (e.g. Bubandt, 2005), challenging
identity binaries (e.g. Avant, 2007) or enabling space for different forms of political response (e.g. Doty, 1998/9). Yet these insights ultimately remain marginal to key ‘Schools’ and
conceptual frameworks of security, and are too often forgotten in our search for the universal in a complex world.
the need to move towards a focus on the particular social, historical and political
contexts in which security is constructed and practised in global politics.
Specifically, the affirmative recognizes that securitization is not a
universal bad. While fear can be used to justify violence, as is being done
in Northeast Asia, it can also be used to justify the opposite – a rejection
of securitized politics. The 1AC engages in a “liberalism of fear” – a fear
of security-based politics itself and the violence it can cause. This
nuanced approach is the most effective means of constraining security’s
excesses both abroad and at home.
- Fear can inhibit securitization, constrain extremity
- Violence is ineradicable
- Fear is an inescapable part of life and can be life-saving in many instances
- Coercive government is not a universal bad – it can provide many useful social
goods
- Fear of fear constrains the worst excesses of fear-based politics
- Fear of fear at the individual/group level can constrain political actors – creates high
costs to extremity
- Post-9/11 proves – despite viewing AQ as an existential threat, fear of overreaction
(e.g. torture) led to political and legal opposition
Michael C. Williams 11, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of
Ottawa, “Securitization and the liberalism of fear,” Security Dialogue 42(4-5), 453-463,
Sage
Introduction
Fear is not a concept (or indeed a word) often found in securitization theory. Instead, the Copenhagen School speaks of security as an existential threat, as
emergency measures or as a ‘breaking free of rules’. Security is not an objective condition, but emerges through particular social processes or ‘speech acts’
that elevate an issue above the normal political logic: ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or will
not be free to handle it in our own way’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Yet, even this formulation indicates an intimate relationship between existential threat and
fear – the fear of annihilation, loss and alienation. Threats imply the loss of or damage to something (physical survival or well-being, an object, a social order,
an identity) that is valued – that is, a fear for its continued possession or existence. People can fear other individuals, other groups, other states (or their
own); they can fear economic calamity or environmental degradation. Even exceptional violence or fearless killing – an existential or heroic self-sacrifice, for
instance – is tied in complex ways to fear: fear for someone or something else that is being defended, fear of failing to achieve glory or salvation. Fear’s
negativity always has positive value.
This article seeks to extend securitization theory conceptually and, to a lesser degree, empirically by further developing the relationship between
securitization and the politics of fear. My suggestion is that by so doing it is possible to enlarge the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School and to
At first glance, fear might seem
expand its application in understanding the politics of security in liberal societies.
focusing on fear also allows us to see how fear can operate in ways that can actually
inhibit processes of securitization, constraining the logic of extremity, making actors
reluctant to use securitizing moves and providing resources for opposing such
moves.
To make this argument, I turn to an examination of the relationship between liberalism and fear. As Jef Huysmans (1998) pointed out in one of the earliest
and most perceptive appraisals of the Copenhagen School, liberalism provides an important backdrop to the theory, with a narrowly technocratic liberalism
and superficial pluralism serving both as a foil for the idea of securitization as radically creative and socially constructed and as a link to theories of enmity,
emergency, and the political identified with Carl Schmitt and with classical political realism more broadly. Fear within liberalism is thus
often closely associated with a politics of extremity and enmity, and is seen as having
close – and perhaps even constitutive – connections to securitization. Liberal societies, such
positions often imply, either need a politics of security and fear in order to overcome the weaknesses of their pluralist foundations or, conversely, are
This understanding of
congenitally ill-equipped to respond effectively to the challenges of a politics of extremity and securitization.
influential expressions of an alternative vision, a vision that Judith Shklar aptly christened the
‘liberalism of fear’.3 Shklar’s conception of liberal politics, I suggest, can help provide a more rounded
appreciation of the politics of security in liberal polities, and of how a better
understanding of the liberalism of fear can extend the reach of securitization theory
both conceptually and empirically, and may – perhaps paradoxically – even provide
support for the Copenhagen School’s political project of desecuritization.
I
version often put forth by both proponents and critics of liberalism in international
relations7 – and in many debates over securitization theory.
Yet, if the liberalism of fear is sceptical, it is not cynical. Nor is it without a place to stand. In place of
essentialist visions of individuals or schemes of indisputable rights, it advocates a
focus on cruelty and fear. It is, in Stanley Hoffmann’s (1998: xxii) nice phrase, a vision based on the ‘existential experience of fear and
cruelty’, concentrating on humanity’s shared capacity to feel fear and to be victims of cruelty.8 Perhaps most importantly in this context, it turns this focus
on fear into a positive principle of liberal politics. As Shklar (1998: 10–11) argues, the liberalism of fear
does not, to be sure, offer a summum bonum toward which all political agents should strive, but it certainly does begin with a summum malum which all of
us know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear that it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself. To that extent, the liberalism of fear
makes a universal and especially a cosmopolitan claim, as it historically has always done.
In this vision, fear is central to liberal politics, but in a way very different from those visions that see fear, emergency and ‘security’ as the defining ‘outside’ of
liberal societies, as the antithesis of normal politics, or, as suggested in other analyses, as the constitutive realm or radical otherness or enmity that stabilizes
For the liberalism of fear, fear cannot and
and/or energizes otherwise decadent or depoliticized liberal orders.9
should not be always and in every way avoided. For one thing, it is an inescapable part of
life, something that often helps preserve us from danger . More complexly, fear can also be a crucial element
in preserving as well as constructing a liberal order, for one of the major things to be feared in social life is the fear of fear itself. As Shklar (1998: 11) puts it
in one of her most evocative phrasings:
To be alive is to be afraid, and much to our advantage in many cases, since alarm
often preserves us from danger. The fear we fear is of pain inflicted by others to kill
and maim us, not the natural and healthy fear that merely warns us of avoidable
pain. And, when we think politically, we are afraid not only for ourselves but for our fellow citizens as well. We fear a society of
fearful people.
This vision of liberal politics fears the politics of fear. It fears above all collective
concentrations of power that make possible ‘institutionalized cruelty’, particularly
when they are abetted or accompanied by a politics of fear. Thus, while the liberalism of fear fears all
concentrations of power, it fears most the concentration of power in that most fearsome of institutions in the modern world – the state; for while cruelty can
A
reflect sadistic urges, ‘public cruelty is not an occasional personal inclination. It is made possible by differences in public power’ (Shklar, 1998: 11).
degree of fear and coercion is doubtless a condition of the operation of all social
orders; but, as its first order of concern, the liberalism of fear focuses on restraining
fear’s excesses. As Shklar (1998: 11) puts it:
A minimal level of fear is implied in any system of law, and the liberalism of fear does
not dream of an end to public, coercive government. The fear it does want to prevent
is that which is created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed acts of
force and by habitual and pervasive acts of cruelty and torture performed by
military, paramilitary and police agents in any regime.
The liberalism of fear is far from rejecting the state’s role in the provision of social
goods, including security. Indeed, these may be essential in overcoming socially derived
cruelties of many kinds.10 But, it is continually alert to the state’s potential to do the
opposite.11
Here, then, is a vision of politics where fear is not confined to the realm of security; nor is fear wholly
negative. Such a vision shares with the Copenhagen School the fear that fear in politics is dangerous. But, Shklar’s
multidimensional analysis of fear allows us to see how fear can work as a counter-practice against processes
of securitization. Fear operates in normal politics, and the fear of fear – that is, the fear of the power of
the politics of security and its consequences – is a core part of liberal theory and
practice. Fear is not a one-way street to extremity, nor does it operate only in
emergency situations. Instead, the fear of fear can act as a bulwark against such
processes. In other words, the fear of fear can within ‘normal’ or even ‘securitized’ politics act to prevent or
oppose a movement toward a more intense politics of fear – countering a shift
toward ‘security’ in its more extreme manifestations.12
II
The liberalism of fear is not a comprehensive description of ‘actually existing’ liberal societies. It is at one and the same time an attempt to
elucidate a liberal philosophy – a critical political philosophy with the practical intent of fostering and supporting an understanding of agency and judgement
– and an exposition of social and political dynamics that can characterize liberal polities. It is part of a liberal tradition of thought that has had important
effects can often be seen in the security politics of
impacts on the development of liberal political orders, and its
liberal societies. Accordingly, the liberalism of fear can help us discern some of the dynamics of security within those polities, while at the
same time suggesting principles for a politics of security.
In practice, as I have suggested above, the liberalism of fear links the domains of ‘normal’ and ‘security’ politics that the Copenhagen School tends to
the fear of fear can counter or restrain securitizing
separate. Viewing the two as part of a continuum reveals how
moves in liberal societies. This practical continuity operates at the level of individual
mores, social norms, and political and legal institutions. Indeed, it is the relationship between these three –
and particularly the ways in which rules and norms operate at the individual and social levels (what the Copenhagen School would call ‘securitizing actors’
and the ‘audience’) as well as in formal institutions – that is crucial for analysing important dimensions of security politics in liberal societies. As Nomi Lazar
(2009: 51, 114–33) has argued, if we restrict our understanding of rules – and the breaking free of them – solely to the legal domain, we risk missing the
to the degree that individual
multiple social and institutional practices that may inhibit the politics of emergency. For instance,
and social groups recognize the fear of fear as a key part of their political visions and
values, they will exercise a degree of suspicion toward securitizing acts, and can even
act to restrain successful securitizations. Similarly, the structure of liberal societies and
governments, with plural centres of political and social power, provides potential
institutional and societal sites of resistance to securitization.
Consider in this light Mark Salter’s recent and revealing analysis of ‘failed securitizations’ in
US counter-terrorism policies. Examining the rejection of the Total Information
Awareness (TIA) programme that ‘sought to data-mine library records to create profiles of
potential terror suspects’, he notes that ‘this limitation on the freedom of speech and invasion of privacy was rejected by librarians,
civil libertarians, and others outside the authority of the state. The existential threat of terrorism to the US was accepted by the protestors, but the
In this case, the
colonization of this sector of private life was rejected as being outside of the security purview of the state’ (Salter, 2011: 125).13
fear of terrorism, and its successful securitization within the technified language and logic of certain specialist
institutions, was outweighed by the fear of the threat that policies like the TIA could pose
Consider in this light the Copenhagen School’s account of securitization. As Buzan et al. (1998: 24) put it:
If one can argue that something overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against each other, this must be because it can upset the entire
process of weighing as such: ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or will not be free to handle it in
our own way’. Thereby, the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the political rules of the game.
This is more than simply the description of a process. Viewed politically, and especially within a context (and context is clearly vital here)
influenced by the liberalism of fear, the recourse to securitizing speech acts is not
straightforward, cost-free or beyond reflection. It is a political act, the potential
consequences of which need to be weighed by any actor. Consequently, attempted
securitizations can be constrained by an actor’s own reluctance to mobilize fear in
light of the potential consequences for other values, such as those of a liberal political order. Potentially securitizing actors can
also be constrained by their knowledge that a decision to attempt to securitize an issue will be judged (both at the time and, possibly, retrospectively).
Declarations of the need for a politics of emergency are rarely taken lightly by other
actors, and making them can come with significant risks to one’s political credibility
and sense of judgement – something that is heightened when the political context is at least
partly informed by the fear of fear. In both cases, the politics of fear and the fear of
fear co-mingle, cross-cut and even compete with each other, with the result that the fear of fear as a political principle and a mode of
judgment plays an important part in the security politics of liberal societies.
These dynamics point to a second area where the liberalism of fear can play a restraining role in securitization. Since it sees the abuse of power as a
continual possibility, the liberalism of fear seeks its controlled dispersal and stresses the importance of pluralism in combating its potential excesses.
Socially, multiple centres of power provide sites from which securitizations can be
contested and resisted. Importantly, however, this is a pluralism that is conscious of the limits of the facile political rationalism that so
exercised critics of liberalism throughout the first half of the 20th century, and that has had such an important influence on the development of the discipline
of international relations as a whole and parts of securitization theory in particular.14 Both in its philosophic foundations and in its historical awareness of
past liberal failings, the pluralism of the liberalism of fear is markedly distant from that of its ‘depoliticized’ predecessors.
This alternative vision of liberalism provides an intriguingly different connection between the Copenhagen School and classical realism, for while the lion’s
share of attention in this area has been devoted to their shared concerns with the nature of ‘the political’ and the role of enmity in countering the potentially
debilitating effects of liberal pluralism, this has tended to obscure the ways in which classical realists such as Morgenthau sought to counter and restrain the
role of fear and enmity in political life rather than embracing it. And, intriguingly, one of the chief instruments that they advocated in this battle was
pluralism. In contrast to the idea (all too automatically accepted in some discussions of
securitization theory) that liberal pluralism was inescapably atomizing and socially
debilitating, and that liberal societies were inevitably forced to call upon a politics of
enmity in order to recover and secure their properly ‘political’ foundations, classical realists presented a much more
subtle and sophisticated vision of the merits of pluralism and its role in supporting
solidarity within a liberal society (Tjalve, 2007). As William Scheuerman has shown in his revealing recovery of this
‘progressive’ dimension of realism, pluralism could help offset the politics of fear and could be valued
potentially civilized conflict: social actors could learn that a rival in one social arena
might be an ally or even a friend in another (Scheuerman, 2011: 174–5).
This concern with the merits of pluralism as a mechanism for limiting fearful power, as well as for restraining the politics of fear, also finds clear expression
in liberalism’s stress on institutional pluralism. Here, the rule of law, the division of power between different institutions of government, the desire that they
the dispersal of power among a wide range of civil society actors
check and balance each other, and
also provide important bulwarks against securitization in a liberal society. Consider again in
this context Salter’s (2011: 128) treatment of the fate of TIA when, despite the endeavours of George W. Bush’s administration, as a result of initiatives
‘spearheaded by library, privacy, and libertarian groups, funding for the TIA (whether terrorist or total) was halted by the US Senate in July 2003’. Here,
social and institutional pluralism combine to render difficult, and potentially even to
reverse, emergency decisions characteristic of securitization .15 As Jef Huysmans (2004) has articulately
demonstrated, the admonition to ‘mind the gap’, to prevent any of the institutions of a liberal-democratic polity from usurping the roles of the others –
something particularly worrisome when the politics of security is involved – is a vital component of a liberal-democratic polity. The importance of the fear
that this might happen, the institutional positions, principled resources and public perceptions that actors may be able to draw on, or be constrained by, as a
consequence of this fear, and the combined role of these elements in countering the logics of extremity and emergency in liberal societies should not be
underestimated.
and much of the population of the USA that Al-Qaeda was indeed an existential threat, the use of all
extraordinary means was not accepted, nor did the situation resemble a ‘generalized
exception’ brought about through the claims of security. Take the use of torture as a
policy, for instance. As Salter (2011: 126) points out, and numerous political and legal
analyses have gone to great lengths to assess, in the USA ‘the courts and the populace
rejected the use of torture for interrogation – even if it was accepted by some part of
the military and bureaucratic establishment’. Salter sees this as calling for a new
category in securitization theory: the acceptance of existential threat, but the failure
to authorize extraordinary powers. I speculate that it might also be assessed in terms of a struggle within and over the politics
of fear, and the existence and operation of countervailing practices and powers. The liberalism of fear may thus help
explain how these practices function, with both the attitudes of individuals and the
institutional pluralism with which they are entwined providing restraints upon the
logic of security and significant points of resistance against the powerful (but not
allpowerful) actors who attempted to mobilize it.
III
Debates over securitization have often centred on the politics of security: on whether to securitize or desecuritize, and on analysis of the sociological,
institutional or political conditions and contexts that facilitate or inhibit acts of securitization. For the Copenhagen School, ‘security’ is a highly political act. It
is also a potentially dangerous one. As extremity, a breaking free from the rules of normal politics, security is something we are advised to be careful about.
Security is not only about identifying threats or dangers, or articulating fears; it is also a political act that we need to approach with caution for fear of the
possibility of a politics of extremity, with the unforeseeable and potentially dangerous consequences that it brings. I have tried to suggest here that in order
to comprehend more fully the politics of security in liberal societies, securitization theory must come to terms with the role of fear in politics. Too sharp a
distinction between the sphere of normal politics and the sphere of security not only risks limiting our understanding of how issues move along a continuum
the fear of fear is a part of normal politics, and part of the
between the two: it may also blind us to how
relationship defined by threats and dangers while staying within its logics: to argue that
something is not a threat is still likely to be caught within representations defined by
threats. However, the liberalism of fear calls attention to an important alternative
dynamic: that the fear of fear can in a specific sense be seen as a desecuritizing move
– a countervailing logic against processes of intensification within ‘normal’ politics
as well as within ‘security’ politics. At the risk of becoming overly baroque, this strategy might
accurately be termed ‘the securitization of securitization’, and its impact on
desecuritization deserves greater exploration.
Fear is
In this regard, a focus on security as practice, and particularly on the relationship between securitizing acts and their reception, is crucial.18
not synonymous with security (or insecurity);19 nor is fear a quantitatively defined process of intensification operating within a
single modality – it is more than just a temperature gauge of degrees of security logics in both normal and emergency politics. Fear is part of
the practice of security, and it is thus susceptible to reversal within its own logics.
Indeed, one of the most important consequences of viewing security as part of
practices of fear concerns how, paradoxically, fear can itself be mobilized to counter
processes of securitization without merely adding to the quantum of fear in a society,
as though all of fear’s modalities and the strategies they enable could be reduced to a
single logic.
None of this is to deny the power of security, the permanent possibility of enmity in politics, its seductions and its dangers, and the worrying place and
pervasiveness of security and attempted securitizations in liberal (and almost all other) societies around the globe (Abrahamsen, 2005). What the liberalism
of fear does deny, however, is the necessity of such a situation. It is a deeply political endeavour, one that can enrich our understanding of securitization at
This is not to say that the
the same time that securitization theory might provide analytic tools supporting its endeavours.
liberalism of fear does not itself pose challenges for the politics of security that require
critical attention;20 however, putting the nature of liberalism into question within
securitization theory, instead of allowing a particular vision of it to operate as a
background assumption licensing a raft of further assertions about the supposedly
necessary nature of the relationship between liberalism, security and ‘the political’,
allows us to undertake a more subtle and hopefully revealing examination of the
politics of securitization. In the name of not being naive about liberalism and its
limits, debates over securitization may well have developed a paradoxical naivety
about liberal politics. Too easily adopting Schmittian or other critiques as a basis
risks reifying securitization theory’s insights into taken-for-granted assumptions
about the necessary relationship between liberalism and security. As I have tried to
suggest, the liberalism of fear provides a powerful and potentially fruitful counter to
this tendency.
The liberalism of fear does not advocate a wider politics of fear. A critically aware
fear of fear and its possibility for strategic manipulation in either direction does not
equal a further deepening of the politics of fear. It is instead a political stance that
constantly questions the claims and decisions that are made in the name of
countering fears, and that is constantly cautious about the possibilities created by
the politics of fear. In both cases, it seeks to force discussion concerning whether and
to what extent such policies or practices can be justified. It is pessimistic in the sense
of a hyper-active concern with the potential for cruelty in all human affairs –
including, and perhaps especially, in the domain of security. But, it is neither cynical
nor despairing. Accordingly, it may also provide a set of previously untapped
political and ethical resources that would further increase the salience of
securitization theory.
Incorporating critique into the advocacy of specific policy proposals is
key to maintain the continued relevance of IR studies. Like it or not,
those in positions of power ascribe to a pragmatic framework and will
only take a course of action based upon its likely consequences. The 1AC
gives policymakers a broader toolkit with which to assess those
consequences.
Robert L. Gallucci 12 is president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
He is a former dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service, “How Scholars Can Improve International Relations”, The Chronicle of Higher
Education, 11-26, http://chronicle.com/article/How-Scholars-Can-Improve/135898/
Something is seriously wrong in the relationship between universities and the policy
community in the field of international relations. The worlds of policy making and academic research should be in
constant, productive conversation, and scholars and researchers should be an invaluable resource for
policy makers, but they are not.¶ One hears perennial laments from those in academe that their valuable work is
being ignored by policy makers. And, on the other hand, policy makers complain they can get nothing useful from the academy.
They may all be right.¶ Now would be a good time for policy makers and scholars to be deeply engaged on some of the highest-priority issues for the United
States and international security. Consider, for example: ¶ The causes and implications—immediate and long term—of the Arab Spring for that region and for
its relevance to future social and political change elsewhere. ¶ The real consequences of an Iranian nuclear-weapons program for the political dynamics of
the Middle East, as well as for the durability of the global norm against nuclear-weapons proliferation.¶ The complicated internal politics of Pakistan, how
Why are scholars
they relate to that country's political and economic development, and their importance to America's policies in South Asia.¶
and policy makers not engaging in the kind of interaction we all need—and we all say we want?¶
There has been a theoretical turn across the social sciences and humanities that has
cut off academic discourse from the way ordinary people and working professionals
speak and think. The validity and elegance of the models have become the focus,
rather than whether those models can be used to understand real-world situations.
Conferences and symposia are devoted to differences in theoretical constructs;
topics are chosen for research based not on their importance but on their
accessibility to a particular methodology. Articles and books are published to be
read, if at all, only by colleagues who have the same high regard for methodology and
theory and the same disregard for practice.¶ That has created a profession that is
inward-looking and concerned with arcane debate—a result that provokes and
deserves all the insults thrown at the ivory tower from the world of policy and
practice.¶ Further, the incentive structure in universities and in disciplines has endorsed this emphasis on theory and methodology. When it comes to
promotions and awarding tenure, departments are largely allowed to set their own standards. And, of course, departments are made up of people who have
succeeded in the profession and will perpetuate its values. Thus, the university department can turn into a guild, favoring credentialing over relevance and
orthodoxy over impact.¶ My concern is for the larger effects. Tenured professors construct courses and train the next generation of scholars. The best young
minds and young researchers are encouraged to replicate what their mentors think is important, but what if those who work in the world of policy and
practice do not agree with that choice?Students are then being prepared for careers that do not exist
outside of academe and given tools that are not useful except to their academic
discipline.¶ I would care much less if we were talking about literary theory or art history, important and rewarding though they may be. I care very
much when we are talking about international relations, a discipline that is involved with
policies that could get people killed, in the real world, here and now. ¶ Policy makers,
most of whom are trying to save lives and keep the peace, need all the help they can get in order to make better
decisions. They are faced with irreducible complexity and radical uncertainty—and
they must often rely on inadequate information. Unsurprisingly, they think
practically, are prepared to do anything that looks as if it might succeed, and are
reluctant to take big bets if not forced to do so. If they fail, dire consequences are
likely, both for themselves and others.¶ So how can academic experts be more helpful?¶ Twenty years ago, Alexander George, in Bridging the Gap:
Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, made some good suggestions. First, he proposed interdisciplinary approaches—a common refrain in academe. But
they are, in fact, hardly ever done. We talk the talk but don't walk the walk. Being really interdisciplinary is hard and requires deep engagement. The rub is
that most academic experts are more interested in their theories than they are in interdisciplinary conversations or working together on problems.¶
Policy makers, by contrast, have to deal with actual problems. They would benefit from
having multiple views of the same issue—and more so from seeing these views
integrated—in order to see all the consequences and the likely interdependencies of
a line of action.¶ Second, George suggests that researchers embrace what he calls second-best theory. Rather than
concentrating on a grand theory that explains everything, scholars could help policy
makers by providing ways to assess whether their policies are working in real time. Policy makers in
the throes of a crisis do not much care whether a theory is being proved true or false,
but they badly need evidence of progress on emerging problems . In simpler terms, they need
management tools, and they need help connecting cause and effect. Scholars, who
struggle with precisely that, could be of real help. ¶ Lastly, George calls for mutual accountability. If
academics are invited into the policy environment, decision makers need to be
invited back into the academy, and their views on curriculum and research should be
taken seriously.¶ To these recommendations, I would add two more: first, a robust embrace of regional studies. Nothing can replace the value
of insights that emerge from the integration of knowledge and research on the history, economics, politics, culture, religion, and geography of a region.
Second, consideration of rigorous, policy-relevant theory and analysis should be among
the requirements for hiring, tenure, and promotion.¶ My organization, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, supports efforts in
this regard, but it is incumbent upon all who teach and study international relations to think
about the problems we face as a nation, and those humankind faces across the planet.
Think about the needs of governments, and of the vast range of organizations at
work in the world. Find practical ways to prepare people to be useful and effective.
Our universities have the country's intellectual firepower, trained expertise, and the
careers of the most promising young people in their hands. I am asking that they
please do something useful with them.
Now is the key time for public intellectuals to investigate the nitty-gritty
consequences of ASB – ambiguous discussion fails to reign in the
Pentagon
Amitai Etzioni 13, University Professor and Professor of International Affairs at The
George Washington University, Summer 2013, “Who Authorized Preparations for War with
China?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2013/06/Who-
Authorized-Preparations-for-War-With-China.pdf
To judge by several published reports which will be discussed in greater detail below, including those by government “insider s,” there is
no indication—not a passing hint— that the White House has ever considered earnestly preparing the nation for a war with China. Nor is
there any evidence that the White House has compared such a strategy to alternatives, and—having concluded that the hegemonic
intervention implied by ASB is the course the United States should follow—then instructed the Pentagon to prepare for such a military
showdown. Indeed, as far as one can determine at this stage ,
the White House and State Department have
engaged in largely ad hoc debates over particular tactical maneuvers, never giving
much attention to the development of a clear underlying China strategy. True, some
individuals in the State Department and White House pursued engagement and
cooperation, and others advocated ‘tougher’ moves that seem to reflect a vague
preference for containment. However, neither approach was embraced as an
overarching strategy. The November 2011 presidential announcement that the United States was beginning a “pivot”
from the Near to the Far East may at first seem to suggest that a coherent stance on China had
coalesced within the administration. We will see shortly that this is not the case.¶ One major
source of information regarding the development of China policy in the Obama White House is an insider’s report fully dedicated to the
subject at hand, Obama and China’s Rise by Jeffrey A. Bader. Having served as senior director for East Asian affairs on the N ational
Security Council from January 2009 to April 2011, Bader reports in great detail on how the Obama administration approached China
policy. When Obama was still a Senator campaigning in the 2008 election—the same time the Pentagon was launching the ASB mission—
his philosophy was to engage the nations of the world rather than confront them; to rely on diplomacy rather than on aggressive, let
alone coercive, measures; and to draw on multilateralism rather than on unilateral moves. Following his election, the Preside nt’s key
staffers report that, with regard to China, containment was “not an option,” nor was the realpolitik of power balancing embraced. Instead,
the administration pursued a vague three-pronged policy based on: “(1) a welcoming approach to China’s emergence, influence, and
legitimate expanded role; (2) a resolve that a coherent stance on China eventually coalesced to see that its rise is consistent with
international norms and law; and (3) an endeavor to shape the Asia-Pacific environment to ensure that China’s rise is stabilizing rather
than disruptive.” 32¶ Once in office, the administration’s main China-related policy questions involved economic concerns (especially the
trade imbalance, currency manipulation, and the dependence on China for the financing of U.S. debt), North Korea’s developmen t of
nuclear arms and missiles, sanctions on Iran, Tibet and human rights, and counterterrorism. The fact that China was somewhat
modernizing its very-backward military is barely mentioned in the book-length report. There is no reference to ASB or to the strategy it
implies as being considered, questioned, embraced, or rejected—let alone how it fits into an overarching China strategy, which the
Obama administration did not formulate in the first term. ¶ Moreover, Bader’s account leaves little doubt that
neither the
Obama White House nor State Department ever developed a coherent China strategy.
In effect, key staff members scoffed at the very idea that such overarching conceptions
were of merit or possible (as opposed to reactive responses to ongoing
developments). The Obama team, Bader notes, “finetun[ed] an approach” that avoided the extremes of, on the one hand, relying
“solely on military muscle, economic blandishments, and pressure and sanctions of human rights,” and on the other, pursuing “a policy of
indulgence and accommodation of assertive Chinese conduct.” 33 Not
too hot, not too cold makes for good
porridge, but is not a clear guideline for foreign policy. In May 2013, The Economist summarized the
administration’s China policy, or lack thereof, reporting, “First dubbed a ‘Pacific pivot,’ the strategy was later rebranded as a
‘rebalancing.’ Vague references in speeches by Mr. Obama’s administration have not been
fleshed out by any document (indeed [ . . . ] the Pentagon has more detail on China’s
strategy than its own).Ӧ A closer reading of these lines, as well as similar statements issued by the
administration that were often fashioned as strategic positions, reveals them to be vague and open to rather
different interpretations. They seem more like public rationales than guidelines
capable of coordinating policies across the various government agencies, let alone
reigning in the Pentagon . The overarching ambiguity is captured by Bader, who first reports that, “[f]or China to directly
challenge America’s security interest, it would have to acquire ambitions and habits that it does not at present display. The Unites States
should not behave in a way that encourages the Chinese to move in that direction.” Then, just pages later, he concludes that “the United
States needs to maintain its forward deployment, superior military forces and technological edge, its economic strength and engagement
with the region, its alliances, and its enhanced relationships with other emerging powers. Chinese analysts are likely to con sider all these
traits to be hostile to China.” 34¶ Another book describing the same period, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Refine
American Power, by James Mann, reveals that although President Obama sought to engage China, his administration was increasin gly
‘irked’ by various Chinese moves, from its assertive declarations about the South China Sea to the cyber-attacks assumed to originate
from within its borders. In response, the Obama Administration is reported to have ‘stiffened’ both its rhetoric and diplomat ic stance
towards China. For example, in response to Beijing’s pronouncement that the South China Sea represented one of China’s ‘core interests,’
Secretary of State Clinton told an audience at the 2010 ASEAN meeting that freedom of navigation in the seas wa s a ‘national interest’ of
the United States. She also delivered a speech criticizing China’s abuse of Internet freedom and argued that such nations “sh ould face
consequences and international condemnation.” It is reported that State Department officials, who generally sought to avoid conflict with
China, “absolutely hated” the speech.35 If such a speech caused tensions to flare up in the department, it is not hard to ima gine the outcry
that would have followed had the administration approved ASB—that is, if it was considered in the first place. Yet in Mann’s account of
the period under
study there is no reference to either ASB or the strategy it implies—or
to what a former Pentagon official called a White House “buy in.” 36 ¶ A third book covering the
same era, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy, confirms with much nuance what the other two books report. It discusses the
White House ‘toughening,’ its reaction to what were viewed by many as assertive moves by the Chinese, such as its aggressive action in
the South China Sea in 2010, and President Hu Jintao’s refusal to condemn North Korea’s torpedo attack on a South Korean wars hip.37
Here again, it is reported that the White House and State Department reacted by changing the tone of the speeches. Fo r instance, in a
thinly veiled criticism of China, Obama stated in 2011 that “prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty.” 38 The
administration also intensified the United States’ participation in ASEAN and the East Asia Summit (EAS) and e ncouraged—but only
indirectly and cautiously—countries in the region to deal with China on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis in resolving territorial
disputes. The Obama administration also ramped up U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, a free trade
agreement that at least initially would exclude China, and is thought by many to be a counterbalance to China’s extensive bil ateral trade
relationships in the region. Furthermore, the president paid official visits to both Burma and Cambodia—two nations that have distanced
themselves from China in recent years. All these are typical diplomatic moves, some of which have economic implications, but not part of
a preparation of the kinds of confrontational relationship ASB presumes.¶ In his book Confront and Conceal, David E. Sanger confirms
what these three accounts suggest: the Obama administration never formulated a coherent, consistent, proactive China strategy and its
policies were primarily reactive.39 And, this well-placed source also lacks any mention of a review of AirSea Battle and the military
strategy it implies.¶ Congress held a considerable number of hearings about China in 2008 and in the years that followed. However, the
main focus of these hearings was on economic issues such as trade, job losses due to companies moving them overseas, the U.S.
dependency on China for financing the debt, Chinese currency controls, and Chinese violations of intellectual property and hu man rights.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2012, Admiral Robert F. Willard spoke of the potential
challenges posed by China’s A2/AD capabilities, but made no sional China Caucus, wrote to Secretary of Defense Panetta in November
2011 that “[d]espite reports throughout 2011 AirSea Battle had been completed in an
executive summary form, to my knowledge Members of Congress have yet to be
briefed on its conclusions or in any way made a part of the process .” 40 In the same month, Sen.
Lieberman (I–CT) co-sponsored an amendment to the Fiscal 2012 Defense
Authorization Bill that required a report on the implementation of and costs
associated with the AirSea Battle Concept. It passed unanimously , but as of April 2013, such a
report has yet to be released.41¶ In the public sphere there was no debate—led by either think
tanks or public intellectuals—like that which is ongoing over whether or not to use
the military option against Iran’s nuclear program, or the debate surrounding the
2009 surge of troops in Afghanistan. ASB did receive a modicum of critical
examination from a small number of military analysts. However, most observers
who can spell the ins-and-outs of using drones
political and socio-economic arrangements that would best institutionalize democratic principles.
But such arguments will be political and not metaphysical. The retreat of much of contemporary political
theory into epistemological concerns serves as a haven in a heartless conservative 72 political world, where democratic agency seems next-to-impossible.
so long as self-described emancipatory political theory avoids arguing on the
But
institutions (and persons) of authority will react to their resistance. As Susan Bickford notes, much of
poststructuralist theory fails to comprehend the collective, inter-subjective nature of
political contestation and communicative performance.80 “Performance” not only necessitates a social audience, it also necessitates the
sociability of learning how to “resist.” We don’t “deploy” such strategies solely through our (incoherent) inner sanctum of discursive practices. The weakness
of a hard poststructuralist epistemological and political perspective is not only its failure to speak to ordinary people’s conception of themselves as having
(constrained) choice. It also fails to offer a theory of inter-subjectivity that provides insight into how human beings work to transform the institutions that
constrain them. If discourse is everything, then we need to ask: where are the people struggling to be free?
constituted through exclusion; some people are authorized to speak authorita- tively because others are silenced. Thus, in Butler's
view, the consti- tution of a class of authorized subiects entails "the creation of a
have often functioned as instruments of cultural imperial- ism. But is that due to
conceptual necessity or historical contingency? In fact, there are cases where such
theories have had emancipatory effects—witness the French Revolution and the
appropriation Of its foundationalist view of subjectivity by the Haitian "Black Jacobin,
Toussaint de I 'Ouverture.14 These examples show that it is not possible to deduce a
single, univocal political valence from a theory of subjectivity. Such theories, too, are bits of cultural
discourse whose meanings are subject to "resignification. ¶ How, then, should we resolve the Benhabib-Butler dispute over "the death of man"? I conclude
that Butler is right in maintaining that a culturally constructed subject can also be a critical subject, but that the terms in which she formulates the point give
rise to difficul- ties. Specifically, "resignification" is not an adequate substitute for "critique, since it surrenders the normative moment. Likewise, the view
the
that subiectivation necessarily entails subjection precludes nor- mative distinctions between better and worse subjectivating practices. ¶ Finally,
have been emboldened to take more aggressive military actions, possibly invading
Syria or Iran. Or, perhaps the Bush Administration would have had the confidence to pursue more ambitious conservative domestic policies.
Personally, I am inclined to believe that the movement did have these types of restraining effects but, as a social scientist, it is impossible to demonstrate
To claim that the policy and political effects of the antiwar movement
them convincingly.
were limited is not to say that the movement was unimportant. Indeed, the social effects
of the movement may have been its most lasting contribution. The antiwar
movement exposed millions of people to their first experiences with activism, which
will likely shape the way that many of them think of, and participate in, politics for
the remainder of their lives.[7] Commented [EM2]:
The movement provided critical opportunities for activists to learn about new tactics
and to implement them on unfamiliar terrain .[8] Alliances and conflicts within coalitions shaped the structure of the
social networks of movement participants.[9] The movement provided activists with opportunities to
can understand or can properly understand (and perhaps `properly' is particularly heavily loaded here) what it is like. You need to be a woman to
understand what it is like to live as a woman; to be disabled to understand what it is like to live as a disabled person etc. Thus Charlton writes of `the innate inability of able-bodied
people, regardless of fancy credentials and awards, to understand the disability experience' (Charlton, 1998, p. 128).
Charlton's choice of language here is indicative of the rhetorical character which these arguments tend to assume. This arises perhaps from the strength of feeling from which they
issue, but it warns of a need for caution in their treatment and acceptance. Even if able-bodied people have this `inability' it is difficult to see in what sense it is `innate'. Are all
credentials `fancy' or might some (e.g. those reflecting a sustained, humble and patient attempt to grapple with the issues) be pertinent to that ability? And does Charlton really wish to
maintain that there is a single experience which is the experience of disability, whatever solidarity disabled people might feel for each other?
The understanding that any of us have of our own conditions or experience is unique and special, though recent work on personal narratives also shows that it
is itself multi-layered and inconstant, i.e. that we have and can provide many different understandings even of our own lives (see, for example, Tierney, 1993). Nevertheless, our own
understanding has a special status: it provides among other things a data source for others' interpretations of our actions; it stands in a unique relationship to our own experiencing;
and no one else can have quite the same understanding. It is also plausible that people who share certain kinds of experience in common stand in a special position in terms of
understanding those shared aspects of experience. However, once this argument is applied to such broad
categories as `women' or `blacks', it has to deal with some very heterogeneous groups;
the different social, personal and situational characteristics that constitute their individuality may
well outweigh the shared characteristics; and there may indeed be greater barriers to
mutual understanding than there are gateways .
These arguments, however, all risk a descent into solipsism: if our individual
understanding is so particular, how can we have communication with or any
understanding of anyone else? But, granted Wittgenstein's persuasive argument against a private language (Wittgenstein, 1963, perhaps more
straightforwardly presented in Rhees, 1970), we cannot in these circumstances even describe or have any
individuals of their own experience and by extension accounts provided by members of a particular category or community of people. We
know that such accounts can be riddled with special pleading , selective memory, careless error, self-
centredness, myopia, prejudice and a good deal more. A lesbian scholar illustrates some of the
pressures that can bear, for example, on an insider researcher in her own community:
As an insider, the lesbian has an important sensitivity to offer, yet she is also more vulnerable than
the non-lesbian researcher, both to the pressure from the heterosexual world--that her studies conform to previous works and describe lesbian reality in terms of its relationship with
to pressure from the inside, from within the lesbian community itself--that
the outside-and
her studies mirror not the reality of that community but its self-protective ideology. (Kreiger, 1982, p. 108)
while individuals from within a community have access to a particular kind of
In other words,
O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us!3
-- even if they might have been horrified with what such power revealed to them . Russell
argued that it was the function of philosophy (and why not research too?) `to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom . . .It
keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect' (Russell, 1912, p. 91). `Making the familiar strange', as Stenhouse called it, often requires the
assistance of someone unfamiliar with our own world who can look at our taken-for-granted experience through, precisely, the eye of a stranger. Sparkes (1994) writes very much in
is
these terms in describing his own research, as a white, heterosexual middleaged male, into the life history of a lesbian PE teacher. He describes his own struggle with the question `
Finally, it must surely follow that if we hold that a researcher, who (to take the favourable case) seeks honestly, sensitively and with humility to understand and to represent the
experience of a community to which he or she does not belong, is incapable of such understanding and representation, then how can he or she understand either that same experience
as mediated through the research of someone from that community? The argument which excludes the outsider from
understanding a community through the effort of their own research, a fortiori excludes the outsider from that understanding through the secondary
source in the form of the effort of an insider researcher or indeed any other means. Again, the point can only be maintained by
insisting that a particular (and itself ill-defined) understanding is the only kind of
understanding which is worth having.
The epistemological argument (that outsiders cannot understand the experience of a community to which they do not belong) becomes
an ethical argument when this is taken to entail the further proposition that they ought not therefore attempt to research that community. I hope to have shown
that this argument is based on a false premise. Even if the premise were sound, however, it
would not necessarily follow that researchers should be prevented or excluded from
attempting to understand this experience, unless it could be shown that in so doing they would cause some harm. This is indeed part of
the argument emerging from disempowered communities and it is to this that I shall now turn.
Discussing the neo-colonialism of outsider research into Maori experience, Smith extends this
type of claim to embrace the wider methodological and metaphysical framing of outsider research: `From an
indigenous perspective Western research is more than just research that is located in a positivist tradition. It is research which brings to bear, on any study of indigenous peoples, a
cultural orientation, a set of values, a different conceptualization of such things as time, space and subjectivity, different and competing theories of knowledge, highly specialized forms
of language, and structures of power' (Smith, 1999, p. 42).5
This position requires, I think, some qualification. First, researchers are clearly not immune from some of the damaging and prejudicial
attitudes on matters of race, sexuality, disability and gender which are found among the rest of the population, though I might hope that their training and experience might give them
above-average awareness of these issues and above-average alertness to their expression in their own work. Even where such attitudes remain in researchers' consciousness, this
intelligent self-awareness and social sensitivity mean on the whole that they are able to deploy sufficient self-censorship not to expose it in a damaging way. Researchers may thus
remain morally culpable for their thoughts, but, at least, communities can be spared the harm of their expression. It is also a matter of some significance that researchers are more
exposed than most to public criticism, not least from critics from within these disempowered communities, when such prejudices do enter and are revealed in their work. If they
employ the rhetoric of, for example, anti-racist or anti-sexist conviction, they are at least in their public pronouncements exposed to the humiliation of being hoisted by their own
petard. It is difficult to see the fairness in excluding all outsider researchers on the a priori supposition of universal prejudice. It is better, surely, to expose it where it is revealed and, if
absolutely necessary, to debar individuals who ignore such criticism and persist in using the privilege of their research position to peddle what can then only be regarded as damaging
exclusively (as is implied) in a positivist tradition, even if this tradition has been a dominant
one. Phenomenology, ethnography, life history, even, more recently, the use of narrative fiction and poetry as
forms of research representation, are all established ingredients of the educational research worlds in the UK, USA or
Australasia. Contemporary research literature abounds with critiques of positivism as well as examples of its continuing expression.
I have placed much weight in these considerations on the importance of any research being
exposed to criticism--most importantly, perhaps, but by no means exclusively by the people
whose experience it claims to represent . This principle is not simply an ethical
principle associated with the obligations that a researcher might accept towards participants in the
research, but it is a fundamental feature of the processes of research and its claims to
engagement with a researcher provides any group with what is potentially a richly
response to any draft or final publication. Indeed,
as a reason to set up barriers to the outsider researcher, but they can and should more
often be seen as problems for researchers and participants to address together in the interests of their
The argument that insiders within `disempowered' communities (or any other communities for that matter)
should be researching and, where appropriate, giving public expression to their own experience is surely
uncontroversial. In a context in which insider research has been negligible and hugely subordinated to waves of outsider research, there is a good
case for taking practical steps to correct that balance and spare a community what can
understandably be experienced as an increasingly oppressive relationship with research.
There are, however, at last three reasons in principle for keeping the possibility of outsider
research open: (i) that such enquiry might enhance the understanding of the researcher; (ii) that it
might enhance the understanding of the community itself ; and (iii) that it might enhance the
understanding of a wider public. There is no doubt a place for researching our own experience and that of our own communities, but
surely we cannot be condemned lifelong to such social solipsism ? Notwithstanding some postmodernist
misgivings, `There is still a world out there, much to learn, much to discover; and the
that we cannot understand the experience of others and that `we have no right to
speak for anyone but ourselves', then we will all too easily find ourselves
epistemologically and morally isolated, furnished with a comfortable legitimation
for ignoring the condition of anyone but ourselves. This is not, any more than the paternalism of the powerful, the route to a
more just society.
How, then can we reconcile the importance of (1) wider social understanding of the world of `disempowered' communities and of the structures which contribute to that
disempowerment, (2) the openness of those communities and structures to the outsider researcher, and (3) the determination that the researcher should not wittingly or unwittingly
reinforce that disempowerment? The literature (from which a few selected examples are quoted below) provides some clues as to the character of relations between researcher and
researched which `emancipatory', `participatory' or `educative' research might take.
To begin with, we need to re-examine the application of the notion of `property' to the
ownership of knowledge. In economic terms, knowledge is not a competitive good. It has the distinctive virtue that (at least in terms of its
educative function) it can be infinitely distributed without loss to any of those who are sharing in
it. Similarly the researcher can acquire it from people without denying it to them and can
return it enriched. However, it is easy to neglect the processes of reporting back to people and sharing in knowledge and the importance which can be attached to
this process by those concerned. For Smith, a Maori woman working with research students from the indigenous people of New Zealand, `Reporting back to the people is never a one-
off exercise or a task that can be signed off on completion of the written report'. She describes how one of her students took her work back to the people she interviewed. `The family
was waiting for her; they cooked food and made us welcome. We left knowing that her work will be passed around the family to be read and eventually will have a place in the living
room along with other valued family books and family photographs' (Smith, 1999, pp. 15±16).
For some, what is required is a moving away from regarding research as a property
and towards seeing it as a dialogic enquiry designed to assist the understanding of
all concerned:
Educative research attempts to restructure the traditional relationship between researcher and `subject'. Instead of a one-way process where researchers extract data from `subjects',
basis to reach a mutual understanding. Neither participant should stand apart in an aloof or
judgmental manner; neither should be silenced in the process. (Gitlin and Russell, 1994, p. 185)
Despite recognition that racial classification systems are not constant, proponents of
whiteness studies treat whites as if they were an immutable, bounded, and cohesive
category (Bonnett 2003; Eichstedt 2001; Gabriel 2000; Giroux 1997; Hartigan 1997; Keating 1995; Kincheloe 1999; Kolchin 2002; Levine-Rasky
2000; McCarthy 2003; Pugliese 2002; Sidorkin 1999; Yans 2006 ). They posit a generic white subject, both
privileged and unaware of the extent of that privilege. However, even if whites coalesce at certain historical
junctures, we cannot conclude that the category “white” is an entity that will continue
indefinitely in the absence of antiracist initiatives (McDermott and Sampson 2005; Yans 2006; cf. Niemonen
2007). Reification has the unintended consequence of neglecting how the construction of racial identities is a negotiated, indeed manipulative, process
proponents of whiteness studies understate the
(Bonnett 1998; Rockquemore 2002). In doing so,
to capture the processes through which it acquires meaning, confers status, or exerts
a “structuring effect” (Bash 2006; Lewis 2004). By suppressing intra-group divisions and contradictions, whiteness studies ignore how
multiple statuses work together in people’s lives (cf. Brekhus 1998; Merton 1972) and perpetuate an “us-them” view of difference—the binary perspective
that is at the core of racist discourses. The reification of racial categories endows them with causal potential and predictive ability, implying that all persons
classified as white will exhibit the undesirable traits associated with whiteness, since being white is a condition with distinct, identifiable, but largely
In a
negative attributes that are in need of corrective attention (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Hartigan 2000b; Keating 1995; Santas 2000; Scott 2000).
whites do not is Am Soc (2010) 41:48–81 65 implausible at best (Hammersley 1993; Srivastava 1996). Such an
argument begs the question of how a correct perception of the world is achieved. In other
words, the argument that personal experience occupies the same epistemological ground as social science is rife with logical and empirical problems. By
grounding their framework on the epistemology of provenance (that only the oppressed can claim
epistemic authority by virtue of their experiences), proponents of whiteness studies have blurred the
The aff was always an advocacy rooted in our privileged position within
the traditional knowledge of IR---the availability of security claims and
conventional IR terminology to white folks is why a strategy of
immanent critique that turns those against themselves rather than
trying to transcend them magically is the best way for us to challenge
violence
Hardt 2 – Prof. of Literature @ Duke & The European Graduate School
New Left Review, New Left Review 14, March-April 2002,
http://newleftreview.org/II/14/michael-hardt-porto-alegre-today-s-bandung
Anti-capitalism and national sovereignty The Porto Alegre Forum was in this sense perhaps to happy, to celebratory and not conflic tual
enough. The most important political difference cutting across the entire Forum concerned the role of national sovereignty. There are
indeed two primary positons in the response to today’s dominant forces of globalization: either one can work to reinforce the
one can strive
sovereignty of nation-states as a defensive barrier against the control of foreign and global capital, or
towards a non-national alternative to the present form of globalization that is
equally global. The first poses neoliberalism as the primary analytical category, viewing the enemy as unrestricted global
capitalist activity with weak state controls; the second is more clearly posed against capital itself, whether
state-regulated or not. The first might rightly be called an antiglobalization posit on, in so far as national sovereignties, even
if linked by international solidarity, serve to limit and regulate the forces of capitalist globalization. National liberatio n thus remains for
this posit on the ultimate goal, as it was for the old anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The second, in contrast, opposes any
national solutions and seeks instead a democratic globalization. The first position occupied the most visible and dominant spaces of the
Porto Alegre Forum; it was represented in the large plenary sessions, repeated by the official spokespeople, and reported in the press. A
key proponent of this position was the leadership of the Brazilian PT (Workers' Party)—in effect the host of the Forum, since it runs the
city and regional government. It was obvious and inevitable that the PT would occupy a central space in the Forum and use the
international prestige of the event as part of its campaign strategy for the upcoming elections. The second dominant voice of national
sovereignty was the French leadership of ATTAC, which laid the groundwork for the Forum in the pages of Le Monde Diplomatique. The
leadership of ATTAC is, in this regard, very close to many of the French politicians— most notably Jean-Pierre Chevenement—who
advocate strengthening national sovereignty as a solution to the ills of contemporary globalization. These, in any case, are the figures
who dominated the representation of the Forum both internally and in the press. The non-sovereign, alternative globalization position, in
contrast, was minoritarian at the Forum—not in quantitative terms but in terms of representation; in fact, the majority of the
participants in the Forum may well have occupied this minoritarian position. First, the various movements that have conducted the
protests from Seattle to Genoa are generally oriented towards non-national solutions. Indeed, the centralized structure of state
sovereignty itself runs counter to the horizontal network-form that the movements have developed. Second, the Argentinian movements
that have sprung up in response to the present financial crisis, organized in neighbourhood and city-wide delegate assemblies, are
similarly antagonistic to proposals of national sovereignty. Their slogans call for getting rid, not just of one politician, but all of them—
que se vayan todos: the entire political class. And finally, at the base of the various parties and organizations present at the Forum the
sentiment is much more hostile to proposals of national sovereignty than at the top. This may be particularly true of ATTAC, a hybrid
organization whose head, especially in France, mingles with traditional politicians, whereas its feet are firmly grounded in the
movements. The
division between the sovereignty, anti-globalization position and the
non-sovereign, alternative globalization position is therefore not best understood in
geographical terms. It does not map the divisions between North and South or First
World and Third. The conflict corresponds rather to two different forms of political
organization. The traditional parties and centralized campaigns generally occupy the national
sovereignty pole, whereas the new movements organized in horizontal networks tend to cluster
at the non-sovereign pole. And furthermore, within traditional, centralized organizations, the top tends toward sovereignty and the base
away. It is no surprise, perhaps, that those in positions of power would be most interested in state sovereignty and those ex cluded least.
This may help to explain, in any case, how the national sovereignty, antiglobalization position could dominate the representations of the
Forum even though the majority of the participants tend rather toward the perspective of a non-national alternative globalization. As a
concrete illustration of this political and ideological difference, one can imagine the responses to the current economic crisis in Argentina
that logically follow from each of these positions. Indeed that crisis loomed over the entire Forum, like a threatening premo nition of a
chain of economic disasters to come. The first position would point to the fact that the Argentinian debacle was caused by the forces of
global capital and the policies of the IMF, along with the other supranational institutions that undermine national sovereign ty. The logical
oppositional response should thus be to reinforce the national sovereignty of Argentina (and other nation-states) against these
destabilizing external forces. The second position would identify the same causes of the crisis, but insist that a national s olution is neither
possible nor desirable. The alternative to the rule of global capital and its institutions will only be found at an equally g lobal level, by a
global democratic movement. The practical experiments in democracy taking place today at neighbourhood and city levels in Argentina,
for example, pose a necessary continuity between the democratization of Argentina and the democratization of the global syste m. Of
course, neither of these perspectives provides an adequate recipe for an immediate
solution to the crisis that would circumvent IMF prescriptions—and I am not convinced that such a solution exists. They
rather present different political strategies for action today which seek, in the course of
time, to develop real alternatives to the current form of global rule. Parties vs networks In a
previous period we could have staged an old-style ideological confrontation between the two
positions. The first could accuse the second of playing into the hands of neoliberalism, undermining state sovereignty and paving
the way for further globalization. Politics, the one could continue, can only be effectively
conducted on the national terrain and within the nation-state. And the second could reply
that national regimes and other forms of sovereignty, corrupt and oppressive as they are, are merely obstacles to the
global democracy that we seek. This kind of confrontation, however, could not take place at Porto Alegre—in part because of the
dispersive nature of the event, which tended to displace conflicts, and in part because the sovereignty position so successfu lly occupied
the central representations that no contest was possible. But the more important reason for a lack of confrontation may have had to do
with the organizational forms that correspond to the two positions. The traditional parties and centralized organizations hav e
spokespeople who represent them and conduct their battles, but
no one speaks for a network. How do you
argue with a network? The movements organized within them do exert their power, but
they do not proceed through oppositions. One of the basic characteristics of the
network form is that no two nodes face each other in contradiction; rather, they are always
triangulated by a third, and then a fourth, and then by an indefinite number of others in the
web. This is one of the characteristics of the Seattle events that we have had the most
trouble understanding: groups which we thought in objective contradiction to one
another—environmentalists and trade unions, church groups and anarchists—were suddenly able to work
together, in the context of the network of the multitude. The movements, to take a slightly different
perspective, function something like a public sphere, in the sense that they can allow full
expression of differences within the common context of open exchange. But that does
not mean that networks are passive. They displace contradictions and operate
instead a kind of alchemy, or rather a sea change, the flow of the movements transforming the
traditional fixed positions; networks imposing their force through a kind of
irresistible undertow. Like the Forum itself, the multitude in the movements is always overflowing, excessive and Commented [EM4]:
unknowable. It is certainly important then, on the one hand, to recognize the differences that divide the activists and polit icians gathered
at Porto Alegre. It
would be a mistake, on the other hand, to try to read the division according to the
traditional model of ideological
conflict between opposing sides. Political struggle in the age
of network movements no longer works that way. Despite the apparent strength of those who occupied
centre stage and dominated the representations of the Forum, they may ultimately prove to have lost the struggle. Perhaps the
representatives of the traditional parties and centralized organizations at Porto Alegre are too much like the old national l eaders
gathered at Bandung—imagine Lula of the PT in the position of Ahmed Sukarno as host, and Bernard Cassen of ATTAC France as
Jawaharlal Nehru, the most honoured guest. The leaders can certainly craft resolutions affirming national sovereignty around a
conference table, but they can never grasp the democratic power of the movements. Eventually they too will
be swept up
in the multitude, which is capable of transforming all fixed and centralized elements
into so many more nodes in its indefinitely expansive network.
FW
The term “United States” refers to the federal government of the United
States
NHIB 97, New Hampshire International Banking Act, TITLE XXXV: BANKS AND BANKING;
LOAN ASSOCIATIONS; CREDIT UNIONS, CHAPTER 384-F, Section 384-F:2 – Definitions,
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/XXXV/384-F/384-F-2.htm
XXII. "United States,'' when used in a geographical sense, means the several states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the American Virgin
Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other territory of the
United States; and, when used in a political sense, means the federal government of
the United States.
where a certain number of armed forces are stationed and which has military activities,
jurisdiction,
organized institutions, and military facilities.7 It is by nature the geographical and functional extension of a country’s
domestic military deployment.
Harold Pollack commended Kirk for those “wise words, sadly earned,” writing: “Such a profound physical ordeal – and one’s
accompanying sense of profound privilege in securing more help than so many other people routinely receive — this changes a person.”
Steve Benen was also impressed with Kirk’s hard-won change of heart, but noted:
I do wish, however, that we might see similarly changed perspectives without the need for
direct personal relevance . Many policymakers are skeptical about federal disaster
relief until it’s their community that sees devastation. They have no interest in gay rights
until they learn someone close to them is gay. And they’re unsure of the value of Medicaid until they see its
worth up close.
Which brings us to this week, and the news that conservative Republican Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio now supports
marriage equality for same-sex couples. The Cleveland Plain-Dealer’s headline for Sabrina Eaton’s report tells the story, “Sen.
Rob Portman comes out in favor of gay marriage after son comes out as gay“:
Republican U.S. Sen. Rob Portman on Thursday announced he has reversed his longtime opposition to same-sex marriage after
reconsidering the issue because his 21-year-old son, Will, is gay.
Portman said his son, a junior at Yale University, told him and his wife, Jane, that he’s gay and “it was not a choice, it wa s who he is and
that he had been that way since he could remember.”
“It allowed me to think of this issue from a new perspective, and that’s of a Dad who loves his son a lot and wants him to have the same
opportunities that his brother and sister would have — to have a relationship like Jane and I have had for over 26 years,” Portman told
reporters in an interview at his office.
The conversation the Portmans had with their son two years ago led to him to evolve on the issue after he consulted clergy members,
friends — including former Vice President Dick Cheney, whose daughter is gay — and the Bible.
This is a big deal. Portman is the first Republican senator to endorse marriage equality . And he
wasn’t previously someone who seemed on the fence — he was adamantly, religiously opposed before.
So the first thing I want to say is congratulations, kudos, and thank you to Portman. I heartily second the commendations and praise he’s
receiving from groups like the Human Rights Campaign, Freedom to Marry Ohio, and PFLAG.
For Portman, as for Kirk, an unbidden circumstance expanded his perspective of the
world. That new, larger appreciation in turn expanded his understanding of what justice requires — of what justice requires for
people who aren’t necessarily just like him.
This is one way we all learn — one way we all become bigger, better people. It is, for almost all of us, a necessary first step toward a more
expansive empathy and a more inclusive understanding of justice. Even if it is only a first step, it is an unavoidable one, a nd we should
celebrate the epiphany that challenging circumstance has allowed these senators.
What Steve Benen said about Kirk is still true for Portman. It
is good to see his perspective change due to
“direct personal relevance,” but it would be better if he could learn to expand his
perspective even without it . That’s the next necessary step , the next epiphany awaiting these
senators.
Kirk’s long recovery provided his “Aha!” moment when it comes to other people who are also recovering from a stroke. And Portman’s
coming to grips with his son’s identity provided him with an “Aha!” moment when it comes to other LGBT people and their families. But
it’s not yet clear that either senator has yet taken the next logical step — the next “Aha!” moment. The
next step is the big one.
It’s the
realization that because I didn’t understand others’ situation or others’ perspective
until I myself faced the same thing, I should then strive to listen and to learn and to
see the world through others’ eyes so that I can better understand the world without having to
experience every situation , every injustice , every ordeal personally .
This next step is necessary for justice , which can only come “ When those who are not
injured feel as indignant as those who are .”
That next step may seem obvious, but epiphanies always seem obvious in retrospect.
Until that next step occurs , though, the slightly expanded empathy of people like Kirk and
Portman seems self-serving , like the “cowardice and hypocrisy” of the privileged, as Morf Morford describes it. They
still seem to cling to a cramped, self-centered understanding of justice — one that can
only grow when their own, personal interests require it to do so. It still lacks the ability to
be “indignant” except when one is personally among the “injured .” Commented [EM5]:
“Moral and political positions aren’t supposed to be something you only take when they’ll benefit you,” Mark Evanier wrote. Empathy
becomes suspect when it coincides so closely with personal benefit. It begins to look like what Mark Schmitt calls “Miss America
compassion“:
Their compassion seems so narrowly and literally focused on the specific misfortune that their family encountered. Having a child w ho
suffers from mental illness would indeed make one particularly passionate about funding for mental health, sure. But shouldn’ t it also
lead to a deeper understanding that there are a lot of families, in all kinds of situations beyond their control, who need he lp from
government? Shouldn’t having a son whose illness leads to suicide open your eyes to something more than a belief that we need more
money for suicide help-lines? Shouldn’t it call into question the entire winners-win/losers-lose ideology of the current Republican Party?
If we take the first step without ever taking the next step — changing our perspective only when
“direct personal relevance” demands it and not otherwise — we can fall into what Matthew Yglesias describes as “ The
Politics of Narcissism “:
Remember when Sarah Palin was running for vice president on a platform of tax cuts and reduced spending? But there was one form of
domestic social spending she liked to champion? Spending on disabled children? Because she had a disabled child personally? Yet
somehow her personal experience with disability didn’t lead her to any conclusions about the millions of mothers simply struggling to
raise children in conditions of general poorness. Rob
Portman doesn’t have a son with a pre-existing
medical condition who’s locked out of the health insurance market . Rob Portman
doesn’t have a son engaged in peasant agriculture whose livelihood is likely to be
wiped out by climate change. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son who’ll be malnourished if SNAP benefits are cut. So
Rob Portman doesn’t care .
… But if Portman can turn around on one issue once he realizes how it touches his
family personally, shouldn’t he take some time to think about how he might feel about other
issues that don’t happen to touch him personally? Obviously the answers to
complicated public policy questions don’t just directly fall out of the emotion of
compassion. But what Portman is telling us here is that on this one issue, his previous
position was driven by a lack of compassion and empathy. Once he looked at the issue through his son’s eyes,
he realized he was wrong. Shouldn’t that lead to some broader soul-searching? Is it just a coincidence
that his son is gay, and also gay rights is the one issue on which a lack of empathy was leading him astray? That, it seems to me, would be
a pretty remarkable coincidence. The
great challenge for a senator isn’t to go to Washington and represent
the problems of his own family. It’s to try to obtain the intellectual and moral
perspective necessary to represent the problems of the people who don’t have direct
access to the corridors of power.
Senators basically never have poor kids. That’s something members of Congress should think about.
Will Femia notes that this widely shared observation prompted an insightful — and darkly funny — meme about “hypothetical
Republican empathy.”
“If empathy only extends to your flesh and blood, we gotta start shoving people into those families,” Rachel Maddow said.
“Now all we need is 59 more gay Republican kids,” Dave Lartigue wrote.
“Perhaps if we could get the Republican caucus to adopt gay, black Hispanic illegal-immigrant children, who will grow up to be denied
insurance due to pre-existing conditions, we’d make some more social progress,” mistermix wrote.
“Eventually one of these Republican congressmen is going to find out his daughter is a woman, and then we’re all set,” Anil Dash tweeted.
And Andy Borowitz chimed in with “Portman Inspires Other Republicans to Stop Speaking to Their Children.”
Endless variations of that joke circulated this week because that joke offers limitless possibilities — as limitless as the stunted
“hypothetical empathy” of “Miss America compassion” is limited.
That joke and Yglesias’ argument are correct. An empathy that never moves beyond that first step and that
first epiphany is morally indistinct from selfishness . To take that first step without the next one is only to move
from “me first” to “me and mine first.” (David Badash and Jonathan Chait also have insightful posts making this argument.)
But no one can take that next big step until they take the first one. So I’m less interested in criticizing Portman or Kirk or anyone else in
their position than I am in figuring out how we can urge and encourage them to take that next big step. How can we facilitate the next
epiphany?
That’s the bigger issue, the more important challenge. Ari Kohen tackles this challenge in a bookish post building on Richard Rorty’s
thoughts. Kohen is interested most of all in how “to accomplish this progress of sentiments, this expanding of our sense of solidarity”:
The best way to convince the powerful that their way of thinking about others needs to evolve is to show them the ways in which
individuals they consider to be “Other” are, in fact, much more closely akin to them than they ever realized. It is, in short , to create a
greater solidarity between the powerful and the weak based on personal identification.
Rob Portman’s change of heart is a good example of the way in which we ultimately achieve a progress of sentiments that leads to the
equal treatment of more and more people. Viewed in this way, it’s really not something people on the Left ought to be criticizing; it’s
something we should be working to encourage for those without the sort of immediate personal connection that Portman fortunately
had.
(Note that we are, yet again, confronted with the idea of ethics as a trajectory.)
The vital question, then, is how? How can we encourage “a progress of sentiments” along a trajectory “that leads to the equal treatment of
more and more people”?
Part of the answer, I think, is to remember how we ourselves were encouraged along — how we ourselves each came to take that next
step, how we ourselves came to have that second epiphany.
That’s the approach that Grace at Are Women Human? takes in a firm-but-generous post titled “Changes of heart and our better selves.”
Grace highlights Portman’s case as an example of “the tensions between celebrating progress and recognizing that there’s stil l work to be
done.” She draws on her own story and history for humility and perspective, and as a guide to helping others see and take the next steps
in their journey:
How easy it is to say Portman … should have done better and forget that I wasn’t so different, not so long ago.
The honest truth: it was getting to know and love queer people that, more than anything else, led me away from the bigotry I’d been
taught as faith. … It’s important for me not to forget this, or that it took the thought that my not-yet-born child might be transgender for
me to realize that I needed to educate myself about gender identity. It would be dangerous to indulge the fiction that I’ve always held the
moral “high ground.” …
That history — her own and that of others who have come to a more inclusive, expansive understanding of justice — informs the advice,
and the warning, that follows:
Portman isn’t an exception in having, and indulging, the luxury of ignoring the consequences of
politics that don’t affect him personally .
This is a feature, not a bug, of our culture and political system. Power is concentrated in
the hands of people who routinely make policy on matters they have little experience or
real stakes in. You don’t need any conscious malice in this setup to produce policy that has
devastating effects on the communities these issues touch most directly (though there’s
plenty of malice, too). All you need is a system run by people who can afford not to care that
much about policies that mostly impact other people’s lives.
Which, I suppose, is why civil rights activism often depends on cultivating these very moments of identification with the “other,” on
spontaneous and planned appeals to emotion and basic decency. Systemic lack of incentive to care has to be confronted with stories that
get politicians or the public to care.
Emmitt Till’s open casket. Rosa Parks’ carefully planned protest of bus segregation – as a more “respectable” face of black resistance than
Claudette Colvin. Hydeia Broadbent and Ryan White as the faces of children with HIV. DREAMers taking over public spaces, stor ies about
families torn apart by racist, classist, unjust immigration policies.
… Rob Portman is not an exception. He’s the rule . I don’t say this to suggest that we cut him slack for finally
arriving at a basic (and still incomplete) recognition of the humanity of queer people. Nor am I arguing that we shouldn’t critique the
circumstances around his change of heart.
What I hope is that we don’t forget ourselves in these calls to do better . That we don’t fall into the
deceptive confidence that because we know or do better, we’ve arrived…or forget how many of us had to change and grow to get to
where we are now. We’re all capable of fooling ourselves into thinking our standpoints are
clearly “rational” or “moral” whenit comes to issues that don’t affect us.
1AR
AT: Spiritual Healing
Focus on spiritual healing leaves institutional causes of oppression
untouched and never moves beyond academia
Pyle 99—Boston College Law School, J.D., magna cum laude (Jefferey, Race, Equality and
the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C.L. Rev.
787)
How effective, then, is CRT as advocacy for racial minorities within the liberal system? The answer depends, of course, on one's
criteria. As a therapeutic screed against the frustrations of incremental liberalism , critical
race theory probably "works" well." It may also push liberals into constructive action, much as black radicals pushed whites
into the arms of Martin Luther King, jr.""' If advocacy is judged by its ability to persuade others,
however, CRT must be judged a failure. Despite its ten years as a "movement,"12 its
voluminous publications and ubiquitous presence in law schools,"" critical race theory has
had almost no influence outside the walls of academia?' This poor showing can be attributed to the inherent
inadequacies of the theory. <cont> Third, race-crits are politically ineffective because they deliberately choose racialist rhetoric that
alienates whites."'" Unlike Dr. King, who extended his hand to whites and expressed his faith that they
could redeem the promises of their ancestors,"21 race-crits give up on whites as slaves
to bigotry.325 Consider Bell's "Space Traders" story: in the year 2000, Bell posits, seventy percent of Americans would vote to send blacks away in
spaceships if presented with the right benelit."2' Jewish Americans would oppose the trade, he says, but not from principle."27 They would fear that "in the
absence of blacks, Jews could become the scapegoats."1 t28 Sonie rich whites would protest the deal,' but only because they know that blacks deflect
potential class-based unrest by poor whites, who are pacified in the knowledge that they "at least, remained ahead of blacks."329 In sum, Bell clearly implies,
It is hard to imagine how
all whites are racist—those who appear to stand up for minorities are only looking out for number one.'"
this story could inspire anything but frustration, dismay and resentment among
white readers. There is much to be done on behalf of minorities—the criminal justice
system, for example, screams for reform."' But like it or not, nothing can be accomplished in this country
without widespread support from white Americans. Name-calling and blame games like those of the
race-crits can only make reforms less likely to occur.
AT: Redeploy
Yokosuka is the only place we can dock the carrier
WCT 9/10, Want China Times, “The USS Ronald Reagan and US power projection in the
Western Pacific,” http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?id=20150910000162&cid=1101
Yokosuka's importance to the US comes from three things: first of all that it is able to maintain a large aircraft carrier. When
the US started returning some of the base's berths to Japan, it reserved the usage rights of berth No. 6, where the Japanese aircraft carrier Shinano was built and where repairs were
carrier in the area west of Hawaii stretching all the way to the coast of East Africa.
Second, the Yokosuka base is in a key location with regard to projection power in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It takes a US aircraft carrier seven days to sail from Hawaii
to Japan, whereas it takes 14 days to sail from the west coast of the continental United States to Japan. Whether carriers are being deployed to East Asia or the Persian Gulf, they can
reach there from Yokosuka much quicker than from the US. Third, military ports are expensive, so having a base established already is preferable to building one from scratch.
Round 6
1AC
Same as all previous 1AC’s at Coast #2
2AC
Anthro
AT: Subject Formation
Subject formation is not inherently violent and doesn’t dictate broader
politics
Nancy Fraser 95, “False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler,” Ch 3
in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, p 68, google books
This brings me to the second set of claims implicit in Butler'spost- structuralist account of subjectivity —normative, as
opposed to onto- logical , claims. Such claims arise, first, in relation to the social practices through which subjects are constituted. Here Butler follows
insists that subjects are
Foucault in claiming that practices of subiectivation are also practices of subjection. Like him, she
constituted through exclusion; some people are authorized to speak authorita- tively because others are silenced. Thus, in Butler's
view, the consti- tution of a class of authorized subiects entails "the creation of a
have often functioned as instruments of cultural imperial- ism. But is that due to
conceptual necessity or historical contingency? In fact, there are cases where such
theories have had emancipatory effects—witness the French Revolution and the
appropriation Of its foundationalist view of subjectivity by the Haitian "Black Jacobin,
Toussaint de I 'Ouverture.14 These examples show that it is not possible to deduce a
single, univocal political valence from a theory of subjectivity . Such theories, too, are bits of cultural
discourse whose meanings are subject to "resignification. ¶ How, then, should we resolve the Benhabib-Butler dispute over "the death of man"? I conclude
that Butler is right in maintaining that a culturally constructed subject can also be a critical subject, but that the terms in which she formulates the point give
rise to difficul- ties. Specifically, "resignification" is not an adequate substitute for "critique, since it surrenders the normative moment. Likewise, the view
the
that subiectivation necessarily entails subjection precludes nor- mative distinctions between better and worse subjectivating practices. ¶ Finally,
usually assumed" (Norton 2003, 163). Norton argues that the debate itself is mired in confusion over
the concept "anthropocentrism," and that clarifying its meaning will show, first, that
nonanthropocentrism is at least implausible if not incoherent, and second, that anthropocentrism
properly understood need not yield the human chauvinism attributed to it. For the nonanthropocentrist
there are at least some living (and possibly nonliving) things whose value inheres in them in such fashion that we
must regard this value (and hence the entity) as independent of any use we might otherwise make of them. It is, then, immoral to treat
merely instrumental^ anything that can be shown to have such a value. However morally attractive a notion, intrinsic
value's conceptual difficulties are many, not the least of which, as Norton suggests, is whether it can be shown that there
exists any such entity or quality in the universe (Norton 2003, 164-5). As anthropocentrists are quick to point out, the concept of intrinsic value is
questions, especially since we may be likely to apply the concept to Giant Pandas but deny it to
the Avian Bird Flu. What counts, moreover, as an individual, a species, or an ecosystem is itself less a
truth about nature than an artifact of human-made nomenclature. Lastly, even if we
could determine a method for recognizing intrinsic value, it is not clear it matters
much. After all, the power to enslave and exploit is still on our side. Tuming then to
anthropocentrism, what a proper understanding of the concept requires, argues Norton, is a distinction between
what he calls "felt preferences," namely, "any desire or need of a human individual that can at least
temporarily be sated by some specifiable experience of that individual," and "considered preferences," that is,
"any desire or need that a human individual would express after careful deliberation , including
judgment that the desire or need is consistent with a rationally adopted world view" (Norton 2003, 164). A felt preference, then, might
environmental deterioration owes a good deal to unrestrained human excess; few deny the
connection between global warming and the production of greenhouse gases, or the link between the loss of habitat and the escalation of species extinction.
Nonetheless, deterioration need not follow from human-centeredness, argues the strong
anthropocentrist, since preserving resources also falls within the ambit of human interest.
Weak anthropocentrism aims to carve a middle route between strong anthropocentrism's potential for
excess and nonanthropocentrism's conceptual inchoateness insofar as it recognizes (1) that not all felt
preferences are necessarily rational or consonant with a rational world view; (2) that considered preferences are not always consistent with felt
the sense that something has value does not necessarily imply that
preferences; and, lastly, (3) that
such value is unassigned. If I, for example, have a felt preference for having nonhuman animals available to my affection that 1 think can
only be fulfilled by going to the zoo every day, but also a considered preference that going to the zoo everyday will likely thwart my pursuit of other worthy
goals, then I am faced with a conflict between a less than wholly rational felt preference and a rationally considered one. Moreover, although I may believe
that my going every day is justified as a response to each animal's intrinsic value, my feeling that the zoo animals have such a value is not evidence that they
do.Weak anthropocentrism, argues Norton, offers neither autonomie sanction to the excesses of the strong
anthropocentrist nor concession to a notion of value that has no conceptual moorings. By
distinguishing between felt and considered preferences, it invites us to reflect case
by case upon whether our felt preferences ought always to be satisfied, or at least at
the expense of other human and/or nonhuman beings. In classic Deweyan tradition, weak
anthropocentrism seeks no ultimate truth about our responsibilities to the environment, but
rather "provides a basis for criticism of value systems which are purely exploitative of
nature" (Norton 2003, 165). The provision of such a basis, argues Norton, follows from the possibility of articulating a
worldview—a coherent set of evolving, contextually sensitive, considered preferences—that recognizes the
interdependence of human beings and nature, and thus provides a foundation for the
critique of practices inconsonant with this worldview. The concept "interdependence" does not, however, necessarily
imply any additional inferences such as the claim that the Earth itself is an organism that can be harmed. Instead, weak
anthropocentrism invites us to consider whether our preferences are something we
merely have or something over which we exercise some control. Moreover, it provides a
basis, argues Norton, for the review of value formation itself in that, by distinguishing between felt and considered
preferences, we can query whether what may appear to be a felt preference is actually a considered one whose duration or tradition makes it seem natural
(2003, 165), but whose practice may no longer be justified. Perhaps most importantly, however, for a practicable environmental ethic, is the role played in
Norton's argument by the deeply Deweyan concept of experience: Because weak anthropocentrism places value not only on felt
makes
preferences, but also on the process of value formation embodied in the criticism and replacement of felt preferences with more rational ones, it
possible appeals to the value of experience of natural objects and undisturbed places in human value
fonnation. To the extent that environmentalists can show that values are formed and infomied by contact with nature, nature takes on
Alt fails --- it’s utopian to expect every human to suddenly embrace
animal equality
Light 2 [Light, Andrew, Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy and Director,
Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002 (Environmental Ethics: What Really
Matters What Really Works David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott, p. 556-57)]
In recent years a critique of this predominant trend in environmental ethics has emerged from within the pragmatist tradition in American philosophy.' The
force of this critique is driven by the intuition that environmental philosophy cannot afford to be quiescent
about the public reception of ethical arguments over the value of nature. The original motivations
of environmental philosophers for turning their philosophical insights to the environment support such a position. Environmental
,
philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the growing environmental crisis,
and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the resolution of this crisis. But if environmental philosophers
spend all of their time debating non-human centered forms of value theory they will ar-
guably never get very far in making such a contribution. For example, to continue to ignore human motivations
for the act of valuing nature causes many in the field to overlook the fact that most people find it very difficult to extend moral consideration to plants and
animals on the grounds that these entities possess some form of intrinsic, inherent, or otherwise conceived nonanthropocentric value. It is even more
Claims about the value of nature as such do not
difficult for people to recognize that nonhumans could have rights.
appear to resonate with the ordinary moral intuitions of most people who, after all, spend
most of their lives thinking of value, moral obligations, and rights in exclusively human terms. Indeed, while
most environmental philosophers begin their work with the assumption that most people think of value in human-centered terms (a problem that has been
decried since the very early days of the field), few have considered the problem of how a non-human-centered approach to valuing nature can ever appeal to
we need to
such human intuitions. The particular version of the pragmatist critique of environmental ethics that I have endorsed recognizes that
and new possibilities for organizing the world. But its substance is to limit our sense of political possibility,
and to sever the relationship between the exercise of power and political
responsibility. As a consequence, there is little that is progressive about the current
retreat from state sovereignty. The result is that we endure all the negative aspects
of sovereignty, and enjoy few of its potential benefits. The sovereign state, however
imperfect, still provides the best framework for the organization of collective
political life. That, at least, is what we aim to show in this book.¶ No discussion of international affairs can avoid
discussing sovereignty, and everyone has something to say about it. The intellectual productivity around the concept has been enormous. Political scientists
Stephen Krasner and David Lake have published a number of books and articles examining the logical coherence and empirical relevance of the concept. Liberal theorists Fernando
Tesón and Robert Keohane have looked at the concept in relation to human rights and humanitarian intervention. Postmodern theorists, such as Richard Ashley and Jens Bartelson,
have traced the genealogy of sovereignty, while international lawyers, such as Martin Loughlin and Gerry Simpson, have outlined the basic tenets and historical movements of the
concept.1 What is more, sovereignty is a concept that escapes the dry arguments of academics and international lawyers into the wider realm of public debate. Major states and
international organizations have published standard-setting treatises on the topic, such as The Responsibility to Protect, the Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (2001), whose suggestions were incorporated in the United Nations’ reform report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004). Prominent public
figures feel obliged to take a stand on sovereignty. US President George W. Bush has repeatedly defended the invasion of Iraq on the grounds that he ‘restored sovereignty to the Iraqi
people’. 2 Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan tried to develop ‘two concepts of sovereignty’. 3 But in all these theories and political discussions, the understanding of
sovereignty is one sided. As we shall see, state sovereignty is in retreat on all fronts, and even its proponents are not what they seem (on the latter, see Christopher Bickerton’s,
Alexander Gourevitch’s and John Pender’s chapters). All of which has led us to ask, what is politics without sovereignty?¶ In this introductory chapter, we seek first to demonstrate the
breadth and depth of what we call the unholy alliance against sovereignty. We suggest that this unholy alliance explains the striking expansion of international theory in recent years.
Insofar as this new international theory builds over the ruins of state sovereignty, it plays a key role in helping us to understand the political possibilities beyond the sovereign state.
But how successful is it in this task? That is a question for the book as a whole. The second section of this introduction develops the conceptual relation between modern politics and
its critics, we pursue a different tack. We show that our central concern is the
possibility for politics. This emphasis gives us good reason to appreciate the
constraints of sovereignty, but also good grounds to judge theoretical and practical
alternatives to the sovereign state. That is to say, alternatives must be assessed by the extent to which
they expand our political and moral horizons in international affairs. Thus the second section of the introduction provides a
theoretical frame for the rest of the book, which subsequent chapters will develop by investigating various alternatives to the sovereign state in different domains of international life.
The cohering message of this book is that today’s politics without sovereignty is a
constrained and evasive politics, marred by a limited sense of political possibility,
and organized around the increasingly unaccountable exercise of power.
Anthro—Perm
Voting for our impact is an act of care for the world---it’s not
anthropocentric and doesn’t deny the intrinsic value of non-human life
and non-living matter---but, the fate of humanity in particular is an
important consideration can incorporate the perspective of the alt---
means the perm solves and there’s no tradeoff between advancing
human-centered and non-human centered justifications for action
Ella Myers 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University
of Utah, Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World, p. 126-130
If caring for the world means caring for the world as humans’ collective home and caring for the world as a mediating force b etween
human beings, is this ethos susceptible to the charge of anthropocentrism? Does it imply that the world is for humans and humans alone?
If so, does this ethics too readily tolerate or even promote harm to nonhuman elements of the world?
Although “anthropocentrism” carries multiple meanings, most relevant here is the term’s reference to a myopic outlook
focused on human interests at the expense of all other possible interests .60 The worry lies
with a sort of “human chauvinism,” “speciesism,” or egocentrism that shows insufficient concern for nonhumans.61 In particular,
critics of anthropocentrism object to the tendency to ascribe only instrumental, not
intrinsic, value to nonhumans, which in turn supports a dominating stance toward
nonhuman life.
Is the ethos of care for the world—refined to mean care for the world as home and as in- between—guilty of
promoting such anthropocentrism? Since both normative ends discussed above direct attention to human beings’
relation to the world, this is surely a legitimate question. Yet the ethos developed here does not reflect an
Coexistentialism refers to an ecological perspective that takes the interconnectedness of all worldly
entities, humans and nonhumans, organic and inorganic matter , as its starting point
(see chapter 3). Latour’s and Bennett’s work helped reveal the interdependent webs of relation that characterize what I call world but
that are obscured by traditional dichotomies between human agents, who are exalted, and inert matter, which is denigrate d.
Coexistentialism locates human beings within this worldly “mesh” rather than above it.63 Such
an ecological awareness challenges fantasies of mastery by reminding people of the extent to which they are affected by the doings of
nonhumans.
Our understandings of human well- being and self- interest are susceptible to
transformation by the coexistentialist perspective. The choice is not between the
domineering, shortsighted pursuit of human interests , on the one hand, and the rejection of
self- interest altogether , on the other. Indeed, the recognition of deep
interconnectedness can shape and nurture “new self- interest,” as Bennett suggests.64 Although
Vibrant Matter aims to question conventional human/nonhuman hierarchies, the book, Bennett explains, is motivated by a self-
interested “concern for human survival and happiness.”65 In place of “fantasies of conquest and consumption” Bennett encourages a
chastened form of self- interest. It is in people’s own interest, she argues, to understand the ways in which nonhumans and humans are
bound to one another, generating effects in parliament rather than in isolation from one another. The purpose of the coexiste ntialist view
is not to reject self- interest as hopelessly chauvinistic or destructive but to foster “new self- interest” that is guided by an ecological
sensibility.
Bennett’s reimagined self- interest resonates with notions of enlightened, weak, or broad anthropocentrism in the field of environmental
ethics, which emerged originally as a challenge to anthropocentrism and the tendency to assign only instrumental value to nonhuman
entities. Indeed, the enterprise of environmental ethics was initially defined as an attempt to develop a thoroughly nonanthr opocentric
worldview that renders nonhumans morally considerable. A
strand of recent environmental thought, however,
is concerned not with forgoing anthropocentrism altogether , a project it questions
on both metaphysical and practical grounds, but with transforming the understanding
of human interest so that it is enlightened .66
This broad form of anthropocentrism does not accept dominant economistic notions of human
well- being but instead redefines well- being to include a fuller range of values , for
example, aesthetic and spiritual, that reflect and further an ecological sensibility . Andrew Light and Bryan
Norton advocate this approach from a pragmatist- pluralist perspective. Light argues that if contemporary
Where does this leave the democratic ethos I advance here? Care for the world is a way of caring for human
beings; it is neither neutral nor disinterested. It is an ethos meant to generate benefits for people. But these benefits are
linked to self- interest properly understood, that is, they are born of the coexistentialist insight . Caring for
the world involves not owning, ruling, or enjoying dominion over but collaboratively
tending to the world, an entity that is bigger, richer, and more varied and lively than human life alone. Such care should be
guided by awareness of the webs of relation that link human beings across borders and time not only to one another, but also to other
“vibrant matter” as well. Such
awareness does not, however, require that one attempt (in
vain?) to thoroughly equalize one’s concern for humans with concern for
nonhumans . Genuinely ecologically minded self- interest is enough to aspire to.
Anthro—Squo Improving
Status quo is getting better – vote to prevent extinction
Matheny 9 (Jason Gaverick, research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at
Oxford University, where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment -
particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks, Sommer Scholar and PhD
candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University, March 14, “Ought we worry
about human extinction? [1]”, http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm)
Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use
animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of
animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with inefficient
technologies that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first
century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless
animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely
(Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will
likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond
this century, we should be very surprised.
This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use
sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would outweigh any
sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century for
animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm
animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 10^12 miserable
life-years. That is one-billionth of the 10^21 animal life-years humanity could save
by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years.
The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible
pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. To accept human
extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch. If human
life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters
its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals,
humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.
NukeSpeak K
No Link
Doesn’t assume ASB – not enough debate there now
Now is the key time for public intellectuals to investigate the nitty-gritty
consequences of ASB – ambiguous discussion fails to reign in the
Pentagon
Amitai Etzioni 13, University Professor and Professor of International Affairs at The
George Washington University, Summer 2013, “Who Authorized Preparations for War with
China?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs,
http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2013/06/Who-Authorized-Preparations-for-War-With-
China.pdf
FINISHING
The reason bad things have not occurred, then, is that wise
uniquely dangerous and indeed immoral category.
men and women foresaw that unless strenuous efforts were taken, disaster was
inevitable. Thus, nuclear fears became a self-denying prophecy. The aversion to war that Mueller
has discussed may owe more than a little to the nuclear arsenals that have led people to equate
frightening.” But, Fleisher concluded: “Our republic works best when an informed public
considers the important issues of the day from all perspectives…Citizens must examine
our nation’s policies on these issues and make informed choices. As educators, our
task is to give students the skills and knowledge that they need to become effective
citizens.”
XT – Fear Good
Especially true in the context of nuclear weapons---key to change
Krieger 12 David, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, "Fear of Nuclear
Weapons", June 19, www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=371
I was recently asked during an interview whether people fear nuclear weapons too much, causing them
unnecessary anxiety. The implication was that it is not necessary to live in fear of nuclear weapons.¶ My response was that fear is a healthy mechanism
when one is confronted by something fearful. It gives rise to a fight or flight response, both
of which are means of surviving real danger.¶ In the case of nuclear weapons, these are
devices to be feared since they are capable of causing terrifying harm to all humanity, including one’s family,
city and country. If one is fearful of nuclear weapons, there will be an impetus to do something
about the dangers these weapons pose to humanity.¶ But, one might ask, what can be done? In reality, there is a
limited amount that can be done by a single individual, but when individuals band together
in groups, their power to bring about change increases. Individual power is magnified even more
when groups join together in coalitions and networks to bring about change.¶ Large numbers of individuals banded together to bring
about the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of apartheid in South Africa. The basic building block of all these important
changes was the individual willing to stand up, speak out and join with others to achieve a better
world. The forces of change have been set loose again by the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement across the globe.¶ When dangers are viewed rationally,
there may be good cause for fear, and fear may trigger a response to bring about change. On the
other hand, complacency can never lead to change. Thus, while fear may be a motivator of change, complacency is an
irrupt within the heterogeneous collectives that humans co-constitute with diverse
nonhuman beings. War, for instance, destroys human lives and habitations, but also animal and plant
life, landscapes and cultures, as well as the complex linkages between these
phenomena. Similarly, ecological collapse or nuclear warfare could eliminate not only unique ecosystems, but also the very basis of biological life. The enormity of these
threats lies in the fact that they threaten not only certain beings, but rather whole worlds – that is, irreducible,
heterogeneous forms of collective being. If the norms, practices and processes of international
security are to offer an adequate response to these kinds of threats, then they need to be based on a conception of harm
that reflects the conditions of worldliness. However, existing approaches to security are radically
anthropocentric – that is, they frame the human subject and the institutions that produce it as the
only possible ‘subjects of security’ (see Walker, 1997). Moreover, worlds are unique and their co-
constituents cannot be predetermined in the abstract. This makes it very difficult to conceptualize harm in terms of the
ontological and ethical categories required to coordinate large-scale responses to acute events. Is it possible to formulate a ‘worldly’ conception of harm in which these issues are
This article explores three possible pathways to achieving this aim. First, it considers whether rejecting anthropocentrism can offer the basis for a worldly
resolved?
of each pathway seems to preclude the others: ‘expanding ethics’ and ‘new materialist’ approaches reject anthropocentrism, and
the indeterminacy of ‘new materialism’ seems to undercut the abstraction of the ‘expanding ethics’ approach. I argue, however, that it is
these elements, we can imagine an alternative concept of harm designed to reflect the
destruction of worlds and the conditions of worldliness: mundicide. Rather than a legal category,
mundicide is a phenomenological concept intended to help humans to grasp the
depth, complexity and distributed nature of harm. It can help to make the harms faced by international security thinkable
while reflecting their worldliness. To demonstrate the value of this concept, I apply it to an empirical case – the ‘rainforest Chernobyl’ (Aguinda v. Chevron-Texaco, 2011). In so doing, I
international security threats and enable humans to respond to them. Can worlds and worldliness be
the subjects of security? In the early 1990s, medical anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom (1997) carried out an ethnographic study of the harms caused by Mozambique’s brutal civil
war. Her respondents shared harrowing experiences of the physical suffering, mutilation, torture and killing of humans. However, these were ‘not the focal point’ of their narratives,
nor did they capture the full extent or depth of the harm that took place. Indeed, these respondents also mourned the loss of their collective social structures and gathering places; of
everyday patterns of work, cultivation, harvesting and eating; of their deceased ancestors, whose spirits they believed to be embedded in the landscape; of mythical spaces and
timescales accessed through ritual and ceremony; of fields, nonhuman animals and treasured belongings. The harm they decried did not only accrue to human bodies; rather, it was
distributed across, and instantiated in, a collective that could not be reduced to ‘component parts’. It was this unique, heterogeneous world that was lost in the war. Downloaded from
sdi.sagepub.com at University of Texas Libraries on September 6, 2014 Mitchell: Only human? Towards worldly security 7 It is commonplace in anthropological or phenomenological
studies of harm to speak of ‘worlds’ as the phenomena that are lost, destroyed or unmade by violence (see e.g. Das, 2007 and Scarry, 1985). But what, exactly, is meant by the concept
worldliness’? For Jean-Luc Nancy, the term ‘world’ refers to the conditions of ‘being-together’ – that is, to
of ‘worlds’ or ‘
impossible to think of harm accruing to one being or set of beings in isolation . For this reason,
Nancy argues that genocide cannot be understood adequately as an attack on peoples, but
rather as the destruction of the ‘singular plural’ – that is, ‘the putting to death of the
world’ (Nancy, 1997: 145). If worlds and worldliness are the bearers of harm, then it seems necessary to give them consideration within discourses and practices of security.
However, existing accounts of security – both statist and critical – cannot account for
world(s) because they frame the human subject as the only conceivable locus of
harm. According to R.B.J. Walker (1997), in traditional, state-centred accounts of security, the subject of security (that is,
the phenomena to which security attends) has been elided with the subject (a being possessing human subjectivity) and the
institutions that produce it. In this model of security, states seek to protect themselves as the
collective embodiments and guarantors of human subjects. As Walker argues, states have
invested considerable effort into ensuring that they are the only kind of political
community that can be conceptualized in this way. Critical approaches have challenged this notion of security by placing
alternative political communities at its heart: for example, societies of states and networks of individuals linked by global politicaleconomic structures or cosmopolitan norms. Yet,
constituents of these communities. For instance, Andrew Linklater’s (2011) recent work expands the concept of security to encompass a
plethora of harms, from the ‘concrete’, strategic violence used in warfare to the ‘abstract’, nonviolent, structural harm caused by unjust economic relations and processes. However,
some animals), he grounds his conception of harm in human suffering. The ability to suffer, let alone to articulate this suffering as part of an ethical discourse,
requires the form of subjectivity possessed only by humans and a handful of other
species. Harms to non-sentient nonhumans are considered only if they cause
suffering to humans (e.g. in the case of ‘environmental’ degradation that reduces human
well-being). As I shall argue later, the norm of ‘human security’ takes this line of reasoning to a
greater extreme. Its proponents seek to produce autonomous, individual human
subjects (see Chandler and Hynek, 2011) by instrumentalizing nonhumans as ‘resources’ for human
well-being. In other words, they attempt to secure human subjects by dominating nonhumans
in the same way that states secure their subjects by colonizing territory. So, both statist
and critical conceptions of security are incompatible with the conditions of
worldliness because they frame the human subject as the only thinkable subject of
security. Nonetheless, the emancipatory impulse that drives Linklater’s work offers a starting point for developing a ‘worldly’ account of security. It hones our attention on
multifaceted harms, underscores the plasticity and plurality of moral-political communities, encourages an ethos of Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at University of Texas Libraries
on September 6, 2014 8 Security Dialogue 45(1) interconnection, and calls for responsiveness to radically different (human) others. This impulse can be redirected so that, instead of
restricting its scope to humans or amplifying the dominance of the human subject, it embraces the diverse beings that co-constitute worlds. I begin with this basic image of security as
the complex of logics, practices, processes and norms that humans have developed to respond to harm on multiple scales. But I aim to open it up even more radically, so that harms to
world(s) and the conditions of worldliness are its central concern. I shall now explore three possible pathways to achieving this goal. Rejecting anthropocentrism Many authors
suggest that anthropocentrism is the main obstacle to recognizing the constitutive role and ethical status of nonhumans in international relations (see e.g. Coward, 2009; Cudworth
and Hobden, 2013; Eckersley, 2007). Indeed, the logics of security discussed above are premised on a radically
anthropocentric belief: that only human subjects can be the subjects of security . Would it,
then, be possible and desirable to reject anthropocentrism as a feature of international security? To answer this question, it is crucial to distinguish
between different kinds of ‘anthropocentrism’. This term usually brings to mind what I shall call ‘anthro-
instrumentalism’: an ethical orientation that reduces the value of nonhumans to
their instrumental usefulness to humans. Within anthro-instrumental logic, politics is defined by a ‘Great Divide’ (Latour, 1993), in
which human beings are placed on one side and all ‘nonhumans’ on the other. On the upper side of this divide, human beings are prioritized, to
the extent that their non-essential needs (e.g. for luxury or entertainment) are elevated above the
survival or non-suffering of nonhumans (see Derrida, 2004; Nussbaum, 2006). Moreover, the relation between
the needs of humans and those of nonhumans is assumed to be zero-sum. That is, any consideration
given to nonhumans is thought to detract from the attention or effort devoted to human needs (see Bennett, 2010). Anthro-instrumentalism lies at
economic and political participation, rights and dignity (see Commission on Human Security, 2003; United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), 1994). Sustaining a ‘secured’ human requires the instrumentalization of
many nonhumans: the material beings produced and traded to ensure economic
security; the plants and nonhuman animals cultivated and killed to provide food
security; the production of chemical compounds and the destruction of bacteria to
ensure health security. Although nonhumans lend their names to various dimensions of human security, they are only indirect referent objects; that is, they
are secured only insofar as they contribute to the well-being of humans, who are the real referent objects (see Buzan et al., 1999). ‘Environmental
security’, for instance, is not concerned with securing the environment in and for itself. Rather, it aims to ensure natural resources
for humans – that is, ‘environmental security for people’ (Barnett, 2001: 122; emphasis added). Anthro-instrumental logics of this kind reduce the relations between
humans and nonhumans to the mere satisfaction of the needs of the former, and so are utterly incompatible with the conditions of worldliness described above. However, Eugene Hargrove (1992) argues that ‘anthropocentrism’ is not a synonym for ‘instrumentality’. It
simply refers to values rooted in the human experience, which can take many forms. So, a ‘weak anthropocentrist’ might value nonhumans because they meet instrumental human needs, or because doing so fits within a wider worldview – for instance, the belief that
human connection with ‘nature’ is spiritually fulfilling (see Norton, 1984). Humans can also attribute ‘intrinsic’ value to nonhumans – that is, value independent of their usefulness to humans (see also O’Neill, 2003). Indeed, Hargrove identifies four kinds of value that humans
might recognize in nonhumans: (a) anthropocentric instrumental value (as described above); (b) non-anthropocentric instrumental value (the instrumental value that nonhumans – animals and plants, say – have for each other); (c) non-anthropocentric intrinsic value (the
value that nonhumans have, independent of human judgement); and (d) anthropocentric intrinsic value (value attributed by humans to nonhumans, regardless of the latter’s usefulness to the former). Hargrove argues that the first form of value is too narrow, and that
humans cannot truly appreciate the second and third forms because we can only, at best, imagine what it is like to be another form of being. So, from this perspective, our best bet is to embrace the fourth form of value and harness the power of human reflection and agency –
and indeed, imagination – to act ethically towards other kinds of beings. This argument seems to fit with a worldly approach to understanding harm and security. Accepting that humans cannot entirely transcend their own perspective, it mobilizes their capacities for
reflection and agency as a means of protecting nonhumans. It acknowledges that humans are co-constituents of worlds, but does not privilege them in ontological terms or afford them an exclusive ethical status. It also offers a range of reasons for humans to protect the
worlds of which they are part, and to activate their own capacities to this end. If we accept this argument, then the question is not whether a worldly approach to security can be anthropocentric, but rather whether it can fit with existing ontological and ethical categories. I
shall now explore two alternative answers to this question. Expanding ethics The first alternative pathway retains the existing ontological and ethical categories that dominate international security and politics, but extends them to include some nonhumans. I shall briefly
explore two of the most salient strands of this approach. The ‘expanding circle’ approach1 The first approach applies to animals or other sentient beings, and advocates including some of them within the human ‘moral community’ and thus within the scope of security. It is
epitomized by the work of Paola Cavalieri (2004), who advocates the application of human rights to any animal that meets the criterion of being an agent – an ‘intentional being that has goals and wants to achieve them’ (Cavalieri, 2004: 131). In so doing, she rejects criteria
for inclusion such as autonomy, cognitive ability or linguistic/communicative capacities, which would also rule out many ‘non-paradigmatic’ humans (such as the disabled, young children, or people with low intelligence). According to this logic, ‘human’ rights as they stand
should be extended to all those beings that meet the criterion of being an agent (mammals, birds and ‘probably all vertebrates’). Alasdair Cochrane (2012) advocates extending ‘human’ rights to all sentient beings, on the basis that sentience is a necessary and sufficient
condition for possessing interests, which command basic rights. Some authors writing in this vein argue that the best way to convince humans to protect nonhumans is to translate the latter’s intrinsic value into the language of human interests. For instance, where
nonhumans can be framed as ‘enablers’ of human rights or security, it is possible to offer them protection under existing laws, norms and conventions (see Woods, 2006). In such cases, the intrinsic value of nonhumans can be reconciled with the instrumental value placed on
them by humans (see Norton, 1984). This argument may also be applied in cases where humans and certain groups of nonhumans are affected by the same harm. Robin Eckersley (2007) identifies two hypothetical cases in which this kind of argument could be used to justify
international intervention: environmental emergencies with transboundary spillover effects (e.g. a radiation leak) or ‘ecocide’ involving serious human rights violations (e.g. the destruction of an ecosystem that also involves the loss of livelihood or health for humans). In
these cases, anthro-instrumental efforts to restore human rights or ensure access to resources can be used tactically to protect nonhumans. However, this works only in cases where the protection of a set of nonhumans can be directly reconciled with the instrumental
interests of humans. There are, Eckersley (2007) argues, some situations in which this logic still holds even when no humans are subject to the harm in question. She sketches out one such scenario, suggesting that it may be possible to justify military intervention in the case
of ‘ecocide’/‘crimes against nature’ (the deliberate and irreversible destruction of an entire ecosystem or species). Indeed, she contends that the ‘responsibility to protect’ might be extended to apply to such cases, where human intervention is possible. In each of these cases,
then, the argument is that some nonhumans should be encompassed within the human moral community as it stands, and be subject to the same protections it affords to humans. The ‘extension of humanity’ approach A related approach, which I shall term the ‘extension of
humanity’ perspective, also calls for the protection of specific categories of nonhumans. However, instead of treating humanity as a discrete category of being, it suggests that the distinctive qualities of humanness are made possible and even mediated by nonhuman, material
beings. This approach embodies a narrowly co-constitutive ontology: it recognizes the intersectionality of humans and nonhumans, but restricts it to the relations between humans and the material beings that they ‘make’. From this perspective, made objects and built
environments act as mediums onto which human genius, knowledge, memory or values are projected, or as prostheses for human bodies. They provide safety, mediate relations of care between individuals separated by time and space (Scarry, 1985), and may even offer a
form of material ‘immortality’ to living beings (see Arendt, 1998; Mitchell, 2014). One of the most influential articulations of this approach is found in Hannah Arendt’s (1998) T he Human Condition. According to Arendt, material beings – and human-made objects in particular
– separate and connect human beings, making genuine plurality possible. They also provide a public ‘stage’ upon which humans can act and be witnessed by their peers. The possibility of this kind of action, she argues, is definitive of, and therefore integral to, a distinctly
human life. For Scarry (2012: 10), made objects can even embody humanity in the sense that ‘something, or someone, gave rise to their creation and remains silently present in the newborn object’. From this perspective, an attack on human-made objects is a threat to the
conditions of humanness. Within contemporary security studies, Martin Coward (2009) has adopted this approach in his work on ‘ urbicide’, applying the insights of Arendt, Heidegger and Nancy to the destruction of urban spaces. Specifically, Coward argues that deliberate
attacks on urban and public spaces during warfare should not be treated as ‘collateral’ damage or unintended consequences of attempts to kill their human inhabitants. Rather, he claims, urban spaces and built environments foster conditions of plurality and heterogeneity,
which are the real targets of violence. Applying this analysis to the Bosnian war, he suggests that attacks on major urban areas such as Sarajevo and Mostar were attempts to eradicate the conditions of multi-ethnic plurality and cohabitation that existed before the war.
Accordingly, we should not reduce these attacks to the destruction of mere ‘objects’, but rather recognize them as an ‘an assault upon humanity’ (Coward, 2009: 6). Similar arguments can be found in the work of Douglas Porteous and Sandra Smith (2001), who are concerned
with domicide, or the deliberate, global-scale destruction of ‘home’. From their perspective, ‘home’ can include buildings, public spaces and ecosystems, but it is defined primarily as the place in which humans can ‘truly be ourselves and display and nurture our being’
(Porteous and Smith, 2001: 3). In the same vein, Robert Bevan (2006) condemns ‘memoricide’, or the destruction of cultural artefacts that enable a group of people to maintain their integrity and way of life – often in contravention of international law. Indeed, the existing
international law protecting artefacts and habitations in times of war is a prime example of this approach. For instance, the 1954 Hague Convention protects ‘property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’ (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 1954), and the UN has designated thousands of sites and objects for special protection through UNESCO’s World Heritage programmes (UNESCO, 2003). Both of these approaches seek to challenge the dominant anthro-instrumentalism of
international relations by expanding its ontological and ethical categories. They offer a number of advantages. First, they responsibilize human beings to protect some nonhumans, harnessing human agency and value judgements to this end. Second, both approaches make it
possible to alter existing ethical categories to include some nonhumans. In particular, the ‘extension of humanity’ approach argues convincingly for a (limited) co-constitutive ontology and manages to reconcile it with existing legal and normative categories. Third, this
approach lends itself to abstraction. It offers clear grounds for protecting certain nonhumans as members of the human moral community. This fits well with existing security logics, and institutions, which are designed to protect this moral community. Moreover, it specifies
conceptions of harm that can be applied generically to similar situations (e.g. ‘ecocide’, ‘urbicide’, ‘domicide’, ‘memoricide’) and that are linked to concrete ethical prescriptions. This makes it possible for security actors to use existing categories, norms, laws and institutions to
does the ‘expanding ethics’ pathway reflect the conditions of worldliness? Not very well, it
offer protection to some nonhumans. But
inheres in the irreducible relations between diverse beings, which cannot be derived
simply by aggregating discrete beings or their interests. Furthermore, the abstract categories
offered by the ‘expanding circle’ approach make it possible to identify generic categories of harm and to work from precedents, which makes it possible for
circle’ of the human moral community, millions of beings are prima facie excluded
from consideration (see Weston, 2006). As I argued earlier, each world is a unique instantiation of the conditions of worldliness; it is impossible to determine in
the abstract which beings co-constitute worlds. For these reasons, simply expanding existing ontological and ethical categories cannot offer a basis for protecting worlds. Does this
reflect the diverse co-constituents of worlds? Transforming ontology A new wave of literature on the theme of ‘new materialism’2 in
philosophy – and, increasingly, in international relations – seems to suggest precisely this. This approach rejects ontologies that enforce dichotomous divisions between humans and
nonhumans on the basis of agency. Instead, it focuses (human) attention on the lively and even quasi-agential properties of matter (see Coole and Frost, 2010). Among proponents of
this approach, the work of Jane Bennett (2010) has been particularly influential. She contends that the material beings that tend to be treated as ‘dull matter’ within the rationalist
tradition actually have ‘trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own’, which ‘can aid or destroy, enrich or disable, ennoble or degrade us, [and] in any case call for our
attentiveness, or even “respect”’ (Bennett, 2010: ix). To conceptualize the sources of this quasi-agency, she draws on the work of Bruno Latour (1993), who argues that causation
results not from intentional human agency alone, but rather from the properties of networks, collectives or ‘political ecologies’. She also adopts Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the
‘assemblage’ to explain how collective agency can emerge from the confluence of heterogeneous bodies. For instance, Bennett claims, electrical grids can bring about massive
disruptions to human life and food may alter human propensities towards warfare. The form of quasi-agency that these beings possess is not individual or linear, but rather
‘confederate’. That is, it is the emergent product of myriad interacting forces and bodies that collide, respond, react, and counteract one another. It is not intentional human agency, but
rather what Latour calls ‘actancy’: the ability of a material being to ‘make a difference’ in the world by helping to produce and shaping the dynamics of complex networks. According to
nonhumans may also have a speaking role in politics . Specifically, their bodies can
this viewpoint,
nature of past or planned violence. From this perspective, nonhumans are creative and lively
features of the worlds humans share with them. William Connolly’s (2011) work on the politics and ontology of ‘becoming’ has
been similarly influential in the emergence of ‘new materialism’. He argues that we cannot understand the world in terms of linear time or as a static object. Rather, he claims, it is
composed of heterogeneous ‘force fields’, or patterns of motion that unfold in multiple timescales and frequently metamorphize. When this occurs, they throw previously stable
often magnify each other – for instance, the fusion of globalized capitalism and
climate change. The scale and amplitude of these resonances is such that they exceed human control (and, in some cases, human comprehension). Accordingly,
we cannot assume that human agency is the only creative – or destructive – force in
the universe. In fact, Connolly suggests, human agency is not a property of individual humans; rather, it
is enabled by a range of sub-agential influences exerted by nonhuman bodies.
Octas
1AC
Plan
The United States should significantly reduce counter-anti-access/area-
denial offensive strike presence in Northeast Asia, including carrier
strike groups, to a level consistent with a deterrence by denial force
posture.
1AC – Naval Strategy Adv
Carrier deterrence in Northeast Asia is collapsing – improvements in
anti-ship missiles and air defense technology negate their strategic
utility
Robert C. Rubel 11, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, “The Future of
Aircraft Carriers,” September, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-
4715-b2ed-05df6e416b3b/The-Future-of-Aircraft-Carriers
THE IMPACT OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY
Armed with an understanding of their doctrinal roles, we can proceed to assess how current and future weapons and systems technologies might affect the utility of aircraft carriers.
It is a matter not simply of whether the carrier can be defended or not but of whether
it can fulfill the doctrinal role the nation requires of it.
the Chinese DF-21F intermediate-range
Antiship Ballistic Missiles. Professional journals have been full of articles analyzing the potential impact of recently developed
ballistic missile has an antiship seeker built into it. The purpose is
, fitted with a maneuvering reentry head that of this missile
not so much to sink the carrier as to achieve a “mission kill,” causing fires and
thought to be
damage to the air wing and topside structures. the missile system its If is perceived to be effective at this, then
would seem to threaten seriously the future utility of the aircraft carrier anywhere
within its range. On the other hand, having a seeker, it could be vulnerable to decoying. If this is the case, the probabilities for missile success are reduced. This leads us to think in terms of what role the carrier might be playing as it sails
into DF-21 threat range. If the carrier is functioning as cavalry, a capital ship, or a nuclear-strike platform—that is, delivering a pulse of power and then escaping—the risk tolerance inherent in those roles might be compatible with the reduced but still significant threat posed
by the DF-21. If the carrier is being used as an airfield at sea or a geopolitical chess piece
, however, either , its
mobility sacrificed and the risk incurred likely would be incommensurate with the role.
Submarines, Antiship Cruise Missiles, and Other Access-Denial Systems. The effect of these systems is similar to that of the DF-21. Current and anticipated defensive systems for the carrier are likely to be able to handle small numbers of these weapons. However, when larger
numbers are employed against the carrier —and this will probably only happen in littoral waters—the likelihood of “leakers” increases. Once again, depending on the role the carrier is playing, the risk may be tolerable, especially if the carrier is free to maneuver. If a
combination of geography and doctrinal role constrains its mobility and maneuverability, the risk climbs quickly.
Some have advocated that smaller carriers ought to be built in larger numbers
, on these grounds,
to achieve “tactical stability,” Games at the the condition in which the defensive capabilities of the ship and its contributions to the overall offensive power of the force are in balance.
Naval War College have cast some doubt on this logic, quite apart from
considerations of the relative efficiency of large and small flight decks. It appears that doctrinal role is a governing
if mobility is compromised by doctrinal role, the net risk to the force is the
factor. In general, it seems that
same, whether the force is composed of one or two large, or four to six small,
carriers. Nothing changes, except in the inefficiencies and added cost of multiple
small carriers.
New types of surface-to-air missile
Improved Air-Defense Systems. In one important sense, the viability of tactical airpower is the essence of the future utility of aircraft carriers.
systems have made operation of nonstealthy aircraft excessively risky. new within their range Also,
generations of fighters, notably the Su-27 have eroded the , its derivatives, and even newer designs from Russia and China,
Short-Takeoff/Vertical-Landing Jets. The advent of the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) promises to enhance significantly the overall capabilities of a ski jump–equipped carrier. The question is whether this increase in capability would both allow such smaller aviation-
capable ships to function as regular aircraft carriers and change the calculus of the various doctrinal roles. It appears that the F-35B will offer increases in range and load-carrying capability over the AV-8 Harrier, the British-developed “jump jet” that has served a number of
navies and the U.S. Marines for decades. However, these increases do not come close to bringing the F-35B into the same class as conventional-takeoff-and-landing carrier aircraft, and the range and endurance of even these are short enough to require the carrier to get in
rather close to the fight. The principal advantages of the F-35B will be its increased connectivity, sensing, and stealth—all good things, but not sufficient to change the logic inherent in the doctrinal roles. Moreover, the small number of aircraft that can be carried on the ski-
jump carriers limits their ability to perform some of the doctrinal roles. They will likely remain useful support ships for amphibious and antisubmarine operations, especially operating helicopters, and will constitute prestige platforms for small navies to show the flag.
Unmanned Aircraft (UAVs). What could potentially change the calculus of doctrinal roles is the unmanned aircraft. For a given “deck spot” (the square footage an aircraft takes up parked on a carrier’s flight or hangar deck), unmanned aircraft offer double or triple the range
and endurance of manned aircraft. Moreover, without the need to accommodate a human, their form can be considerably more stealthy, and their operations do not need to take into account crew-rest factors, at least to the extent that they do in manned aircraft. What this
may offer in terms of doctrinal roles is a return of the carrier as the eyes of the fleet, operating a wing of long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and perhaps line-of-sight communications relay. A carrier could then remain outside most threat “envelopes,” with much more scope
for maneuvering to keep from being targeted. The longer range of UAVs (including unmanned combat aerial vehicles, or UCAVs) would also allow the carrier to function as an airfield at sea with less risk. In terms of command and control, however, UAVs that require a
constant “man in the loop” would not offer as much flexibility to the carrier as those with higher degrees of autonomy.
The traditional rationale for aircraft carriers is that they provide tactical airpower independent of land bases and that—no small thing—they are ready to do so on arrival. While all of this is true and constitutes concrete benefits of having aircraft carriers, the real arguments
for and against them reside in their doctrinal roles. Which of the traditional roles are obsolete? Do the remaining ones justify continuing investment in aircraft carriers? Are there emerging or potential roles for carriers that would justify building more?
As has been mentioned, the development of unmanned aircraft may revitalize the primordial role of aircraft carriers as eyes of the fleet. Operating a wing of various kinds of UAVs, the carriers could conduct what is known as C4ISR (command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) or establish a grid of airborne relay nodes that would support a fleet battle network if satellites were destroyed or intense jamming occurred. Because of the vulnerability of land bases to ballistic missiles, and at
increasing distances from potential war zones, the arguments that the Navy has used in the realm of tactical airpower to justify carriers also serve for carrier-based C4ISR. As with tactical airpower, regardless of how long aircraft range is and how much in-flight refueling is
available, if land bases are distant from the area of operations, it takes far more aircraft to generate a continuous presence in the battle space and operations are far less responsive and flexible than they would be if based from a nearby carrier. A local source of UAVs, if land
bases are far away, is invaluable operationally and strategically.
The cavalry role for carriers , practiced as late as the 1986 EL DORADO CANYON strikes on Libya, has become a victim of the missile
age. In the most recent round of strikes on Libya, Tomahawk cruise missiles were used. Now possessing guided-missile submarines that can carry over a hundred Tomahawks, the Navy does not have to accept risks of running a carrier surreptitiously into hostile
waters to carry out a strike or subjecting manned tactical aircraft to robust air defenses. In a similar manner, the introduction of the ballistic-missile submarine made the carrier nuclear-strike role obsolete. Whatever the trade-offs between tactical aircraft, manned or
the lethality of modern air defenses and the difficulty of moving naval forces
unmanned, and missiles,
undetected militate strongly against using carriers in this role. It does not appear
that a carrier operating UCAVs would offer any significant advantage in the cavalry
role over a submarine carrying cruise missiles.
As for the capital-ship role, in the missile age the whole concept may be obsolete. There has
missiles are very fast and hard to shoot down. Certainly, they are dependent on the successful functioning of their seeker heads; these can be decoyed or blinded, and the
carrier cannot in turn succeed in attacking enemy naval forces. Improvements in air-
defense technology by Russia and China and the prospects for their proliferation will
make the tactical offense progressively more difficult and risky. It should be recalled that in the great carrier battles of World War II,
the aircraft losses were brutal, on the order of 70 percent for the Japanese and 28 percent for the Americans.7 In the late 1970s, as naval aviation developed aircraft-centric antiship tactics in the aftermath of the wake-up call of the 1973 episode, it became clear that a single
strike on a single formation of Soviet ships might cost a quarter of an air wing.8 Whereas we were able to replace such losses in 1942–45, no such thing would be possible today, given the complexity and expense of modern jets.
the seas, at least certain areas of them, are becoming a no-man’s-land for
The upshot is that
Currently, the “airfield at sea” is almost the exclusive role for the large aircraft carrier, essentially fused with that of the “geopolitical chess piece.” This (combined) role will continue to be highly useful into the future, so long as the intensity of defenses stays below a certain
threshold. If either high-tech air or naval defenses proliferate , the number of areas and scenarios in which carriers can function in this role will decline. If this
happens, the value of the carrier as a geopolitical chess piece will erode proportionately. This is a key uncertainty about the future and a
central difficulty in assessing the future value of aircraft carriers. If a ground fight occurs close to the coast and a carrier could move in with impunity to provide air support, perhaps through-deck amphibious ships flying STOVL aircraft would suffice. But their capacity to
generate sorties and the number of targets they can strike are nowhere near what is possible for large carriers with catapults and arresting wires; moreover, if deep penetration is needed, as has been the case in Afghanistan, nothing less than a large carrier operating
conventional aircraft will do. Because of miniaturization, advanced electronics, and advances in missile, mine, torpedo, and submarine design, it is becoming easier to hide naval defenses. A particular case in point is the Club-K cruise missile marketed by the Russian company
The
Novator. Four missiles could be housed in an innocuous-looking shipping container, hidden in plain sight and ready to be fired from trucks, railroad cars, or commercial ships.9 Similar advances in covertness can be expected in other weapons types.
Another potential supporting role for the carrier is as a mother ship for the littoral combat ship (LCS). The LCS has limited sea-keeping capability and must have a source of logistical support relatively close by, especially if it is to operate at high speed and high combat tempo.
If a squadron of LCSs must enter a highthreat area where there are no bases and where regular logistical ships would be at excessive risk, a nuclear carrier might be the answer. Having considerable fuel and ammunition-storage capacity, high sustained speeds, and self-
defense ability (with its escorts), a carrier could range around undetected or untargeted until a covert rendezvous with one or more LCSs could be arranged. While a logistical support system that employs submarines might be the ideal, this arrangement may be the most
feasible in the short term. In conjunction with this role, the carrier, operating both manned and unmanned aircraft, could provide tactical scouting for littoral combat vessels as well as a secure and robust local battle network.
A NEW CALCULUS
This assessment of doctrinal roles is revealing. Certain roles for the carrier are
already obsolete, and others are eroding . Whereas . A few new roles are emerging, but these place the carrier in a new position in relation to the rest of the fleet
the carrier has been the central pivot of the fleet since World War II, the arbiter and
yardstick of naval supremacy and the keystone of fleet architecture, it will gradually
become a more narrowly useful role player. There will be, for the foreseeable future, situations that demand an aircraft carrier, so it can be said with confidence that the ship
the constriction in its roles and in the locations and circumstances in which
type will be needed. However,
it could be appropriately used indicates that a new calculus is needed (i.e., where doctrinal role and risk intersect)
An embedded implication in all this for amphibious operations should be noted. If things are too hot to allow a carrier to operate as an airfield at sea, they are too hot for an amphibious assault. If the number of times and places a carrier can operate as an airfield at sea
decrease, they decrease as well for amphibious operations. Any assumptions about the ability to “roll back” enemy defenses must be severely tempered by the likelihood that new technologies will produce weapons that can be hidden from preemptive strikes—like the
improvised explosive devices and car bombs that have been such intractable problems in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is no question that some capacity for amphibious operations from the sea will be needed in the future, but a rigorous and objective analysis of the number of
times and places in which they would be possible is warranted, and as with carriers, a new calculus for sizing that capability is needed.
Another key consideration that would govern carrier force structure is deployment
posture. Since World War II, the United States has maintained a forward-deployed
posture for the Navy The Navy has found that for each carrier it wants to
, at times severely stressing its capacity.
keep forward, it needs two additional ones to account for crew deployment tempo , training,
additional carrier is needed to compensate for the extended yard periods required
for nuclear refueling. That adds up to ten but Congress has legislated that the Navy CVNs,
maintain eleven, the “extra” carrier being available for surge operations. There is
currently a carrier homeported forward in Japan, which provides additional
scheduling flexibility . In practice, however, the demand for carriers by the combatant commanders, coupled with the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan deployment scheme (which seeks to maximize the number of carriers available for
surge operations), makes even eleven carriers seem insufficient. But the increasing expense of tactical jets and delays in their development, as exemplified by the JSF, means that there will not be enough aircraft to populate eleven flight decks adequately, let alone a higher
number.
In the future, as the doctrinal roles of the aircraft carrier change and become more
narrowly defined, the number of carriers needed forward at any time may decline. Using
inventory could, in theory, be reduced by three. The savings would be enormous, and ,
surface ships . On one hand, a reduction of one carrier on station would take the Navy to a force of eight CVNs. On the other hand, if new doctrinal roles do materialize, a higher number of carriers may be warranted. USS Enterprise, the first nuclear
carrier, commissioned fifty years ago, is on a forward deployment as this article is written. There is no reason to think that the Nimitz-class carriers will have shorter service lives, and the newer ones may last even longer. There is at least reason to think that a number of
roles for the aircraft carrier become too risky or are significantly constrained in
terms of where and when they might be feasible, the value of so expensive a platform
will be called into question.
The purpose of this article has been to explore the future of the aircraft carrier using the framework of doctrinal roles. It appears that despite changing technology there will be a continuing need for the ship type, although the obsolescence of some doctrinal roles and the
anticipated constriction of its use as an airfield at sea may limit the numbers that are justified. New doctrinal roles may emerge, depending on the flexibility of mind shown by the naval aviation community. However, even if these new roles do pan out, they may not justify
the carrier’s day as the supreme arbiter of naval power and the
significantly greater numbers of ships. Moreover,
determinant of fleet architecture may be coming to a close . Its continuing utility will increasingly be in support roles. Once this shift occurs, it
may actually be easier to arrive at an objective determination of numbers required, as much of the emotional and political baggage surrounding them will have been shed.
Disentangling the carrier from offensive “sea control” is key – shores up
command of the seas by re-focusing carriers to day-to-day maintenance
of the global system – deterrence-by-denial solves
Robert C. Rubel 14, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, “Command of
the Sea: An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form,” in “Writing to Think: The Intellectual
Journey of a Naval Career,” p. 49-52
Beyond a certain level of destruction, given
If a win of sorts is possible for the U.S. Navy, what cost would be acceptable?
the length of time needed to build, fit out, and work up a modern warship, the U.S.
Navy would become less than a global navy. At that point it could no longer provide
the security environment necessary for the global system to operate.17 If the current U.S.
Navy, at around 280 ships, is stretched thin and strains to meet demands from regional commanders, the amount and
kind of losses it could absorb in a fight with the Chinese and still maintain command
of the sea—in its modern instantiation—likely would be relatively low. This is especially the case
for aircraft carriers, whose capacity to project power ashore has made them such useful geopolitical chess pieces that President Barack
Obama dictated that the Navy retain eleven in commission, even in the face of huge defense-budget cuts. Almost paradoxically, the
wisdom. It must be understood if we are properly to assess risk and structure fleet
architecture.¶ Assessing and Managing Risk¶ “Command of the sea” is a descriptive term. What it describes is a strategic condition. As the world
geopolitical environment evolves, so does the nature of the condition that the term describes. Great and broad strategic conditions are not easily
encapsulated by a four-word term, so it is both necessary and useful to inquire more deeply into its definition and thus into the parameters of the condition.
Naval
Such inquiry as we have outlined reveals important relationships between strategic conditions and the nature and use of naval forces.¶
forces have always been expensive and relatively scarce. Their employment,
especially of the largest and scarcest of these, must therefore be attended by clearheaded
calculations of acceptable risk.18 Bottom-up examinations of potential tactical outcomes using computer simulations have their
uses, but these must not constitute the sole basis for assessing risk. The enemy could always get lucky, and an understanding of risk from the top-down
strategic perspective allows us to understand the consequences of loss in a way that provides better ability to better assess and manage risk. ¶ The inquiry
a new relationship has emerged between command of the sea
conducted in this article reveals that
and sea control, and the kinds of ships that are appropriate to each function. Whether an
aircraft carrier is a capital ship in the sense a battleship was in 1922 is beside the point. Their unique characteristics,
coupled with today’s changed geopolitical circumstances, suggest that they should be
used in a dispersed manner to exercise command of the sea on a day-to-day basis, much
While carriers will never be
as British frigates in 1812 exercised sea control around the periphery of the British Empire.
numerous, the implication is that we should have enough of these ships to make them readily
available in most regions. The U.S. Navy may never again have more than eleven of them, but assuming most nations have incentives to
do their part to protect the global system, their carriers, even including those of China, could be enlisted in the common effort. More total carriers being
operated by like-minded nations make the continuous and systemic exercise of command of the sea all the more effective, because they will be available in
more places more often. Aircraft carrier building is more widespread today than it has been at any time since World War II. But
given their vulnerability to missiles, torpedoes, and mines, why would nations
devote their scarce resources to such ships? Beyond national prestige, which is no small thing, it appears that there is a
tacit understanding that they contribute to the overall security environment—a corporate command of the sea by an informal condominium of nations all of
which, despite particular differences in policy, share a common incentive to keep the global system operating. ¶ The new logic of command of the sea also
suggests a kind of strategic equivalence between aircraft carrier forces and amphibious forces. Modern amphibious groups, especially when equipped with
missiles, unmanned systems, and modern vertical/ short-takeoff-and-landing jets, have a legitimate capability to conduct autonomous power-projection
operations, thus increasing the capability of the U.S. Navy and others to exercise command in more places at more times, making that command more
effective and secure. Moreover, the flexibility of some new designs, such as the San Antonio (LPD 17) class, offers the potential of significantly increasing the
There
sea control, shore-bombardment capability, and cooperative international expeditionary operations capabilities of an amphibious group. ¶
may never be a fight for sea control between the United States and China. If there is, it will
be in the American interest to fight it with forces made up of units that are relatively
hard to find and hit and whose acceptable-risk profile is more compatible with the
conditions that would obtain in the East Asian arena.19 This would allow the president to feed the fight without
placing himself on the horns of a difficult strategic dilemma. If the United States has the option of fighting—and winning—the war solely at sea (on, under,
. If such a posture is
and above it, using joint forces), the strategic risks of nuclear escalation and rupture of the system are minimized
credibly attained through force-structure investments, concept and doctrine development, and strategic
communication, deterrence will be enhanced. In the end, the issue may not be U.S. ability to
seize sea control in the South China Sea but its ability to deny it to China —a less
rigorous and presumably less costly requirement.
most disruptive threat to the global system. When one considers the almost eighty-
year global system “dark age” between the outbreak of the First World War and the
end of the Cold War, the impact of major power war becomes obvious. It would be arrogant and facile to
suggest that navies themselves can prevent such wars, but it should be noted that a naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany played no small part in the chain of events leading to 1914 and the perceived
naval arms races and perceived naval vulnerability, constitute factors that
vulnerability of the U.S. fleet in Hawaii was a factor in the Japanese decision to attack in 1941. These two themes,
have continuing relevance in today’s systemic world.¶ Let us start with naval arms
races. We must admit that nations build navies for a range of reasons beyond protection of merchant shipping. These may include the desire to protect a vulnerable coast line, deter depredations by other powers
and even generate prestige. There is, perhaps, one element of Mahan’s syllogism that continues to be true: at a certain level of economic activity and wealth, nations start building navies. A capable, ocean-going navy is a
sign that a nation has “arrived” as a major power. Whether such navy building is a herald of future war or is a politically neutral phenomenon is not clear, although the historical record is cause for concern.
Today, China, Japan, India, Brazil and other nations are building navies. They each
have their reasons, but the prospects that such building programmes will lead to
suspicion, alarm, fear and ultimately war may depend very much on how the current
leading navies and their parent nations proceed.¶ An important reason the world
system has been able to stitch itself back together after the world wars is the military
superiority of the United States. A liberal democratic trading nation, it has coupled this superiority with free trade policies to stimulate economic growth. Capital, goods and people can
flow freely around the globe, generating systemic behaviour. A key element of American military superiority is command
of the seas, a term denoting the inability of any other navy to impose a strategic defeat on the U.S. Navy on the high seas. It is this command, like that
achieved by the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century, which helped create the necessary conditions
for system formation. When it is lost, as it was in 1914 and 1941, the world fragments
and falls into war.¶ The challenge becomes how to use command of the sea to manage
or influence the emergence of other navies such that true naval arms races do not
occur. The right way to do this is not completely clear but there appear to be several sure-fire losing strategies. The
first is for the United States to start the arms race itself by reflexively viewing the
emergence of the Chinese Navy or others as a threat. Policies and patterns of building and deployment
based on alarm and fear will generate reciprocal responses in China and elsewhere.
This is why CS21 does not mention China or any other nation by name, something often criticized by those with an alarmist bent. Among the ways the U.S. Navy can stimulate Chinese alarm is to openly consider
interdiction of their seaborne commerce in exercises, war games or articles. Not only would this strengthen the hand of Chinese alarmists, but commerce interdiction would probably be infeasible on a number of counts
anyway. Another good way to invoke this kind of reciprocal security dilemma is to link sea
control and power projection. After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy focused so narrowly on power projection that it and some of its allied navies forgot how to talk about sea
control.12 While progress has been made in this area, there is still a sense in the doctrine that U.S. forces will use land
strikes to neutralize shore based antiaccess systems with sea control being an exercise in
access generation that is prerequisite to projecting power ashore.13 One can imagine the effect such talk has on a
nation like China that has suffered humiliation and exploitation from the sea at the
hands of western nations. Already, the Chinese are reacting to the most recent U.S. concept of this ilk, Air-Sea
Battle: “If the U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to
develop anti-Air-Sea Battle.”14¶ A second way to increase the odds that navy building
will lead to war is for the leading navies to allow vulnerabilities to emerge. The U.S. Navy did this in
two ways during the 1930s and up to 1941. First, it was slow to recognize and accept that the bomb-carrying aircraft had replaced the major calibre gun as the dominant naval weapon. Although war games at the Naval
War College and demonstrations by Billy Mitchell provided clear indicators, it took the December 1941 disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales to force the new reality on the
Today, the new reality is that the anti-ship missile is the arbiter of what floats
admirals.
and what does not. This is a condition that has existed since the early 1970s but has not been compellingly revealed due to the lack of an all-out naval battle, just as there was no all-out naval
battle between 1922 and 1941 to reveal the bomb’s superiority. Vulnerability can also be generated by concentration. In 1941 the bulk of the U.S. fleet was concentrated at Pearl Harbor, leading Admiral Yamamoto to
think that a single knock-out blow was possible. Although today the U.S. Navy is strategically dispersed around the
world, its principal combat power is concentrated into eleven aircraft carriers. Taking
several of these out would seriously compromise the strategic capabilities of the U.S.
Navy, not to mention the potential adverse effects of derailing U.S. policy as happened via the loss of
eighteen Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, or conversely stimulating escalation, possibly to the nuclear level.
Moreover, a hit on a nuclear carrier that killed hundreds, if not thousands, of U.S. sailors in a single blow might easily generate national
outrage and serve to escalate the conflict far above initial intentions. In naval warfare, history has shown that
the tactical offense has most often trumped the tactical defence, and thinking that aircraft carriers can be defended against the
array of existing and potential anti-ship missiles is not much different than the outlook of
battleship admirals in the fall of 1941.15¶ The combination of vulnerability issues
suggests that the U.S. Navy and any allied or cooperating navies that seek to constitute a combat credible
force in ocean zones threatened by anti-ship missiles will have to disaggregate their
power into a dispersed grid of submarines, destroyers and unmanned vehicles,
themselves armed with highly lethal anti-ship missiles. Their purpose should be
clearly articulated as defending the system by deterring aggression via the sea by
means of defeating—at sea—any attempt to do so. Even the best anti-ship missile cannot hit what cannot be found. By
disaggregating naval combat power and equipping it to exert sea control—at sea—we
thereby eliminate both forms of naval vulnerability that contribute to naval arms
races, and the deterioration of deterrence. ¶ There is one other vulnerability issue that must be considered, and that is positioning. If caught out of
position when a crisis erupts, the reactive movements of naval forces can catalyse rather than deter military action. In 1982, during the crisis leading up to the Falklands War, fears that the British were gathering up naval
forces to send south helped put the Argentine Junta in a now-or-never state of mind, which precipitated their invasion and the war.16 If catalysis is to be avoided, naval forces must maintain a persistent presence in such
areas where deterrence is necessary. This is why CS21 prescribes concentrated, credible combat forces be stationed forward in East Asia and the Persian Gulf. The Navy’s inventory of ships, aircraft and other systems
achieved and maintained wisely by not provoking alarm and not allowing naval
vulnerabilities to occur, the seas can constitute a massive geopolitical shock
absorber, preventing conflicts in one area of the world from spilling over into others,
mainly by keeping hostile armies from moving by sea, and allowing one’s own to do so. Even though this
condition holds today as a function of American command of the sea, there has
emerged, since the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the prospect of terrorists and their weapons being
smuggled by sea to the shores of America, Europe, China, Japan and other developed
countries. Given the disruptive potential of terrorist attacks, it is reasonable to
regard them as only a step down from major power war as a threat to the system . Although
the attacks of 9/11 were perpetrated by the radical Islamic organization al Qaeda, in the future such strikes might be staged by any number of
our own government time for reflection and preserving the option of doing nothing. In the cooperative naval operations off Somalia, we
see another aspect of the phenomenon emerging in a very positive way. It turns out
that ships from the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean navies have taken to
operating together in the Gulf of Aden . Strange bedfellows indeed, but as both the Japanese navy’s operations
chief and a Chinese maritime scholar have said to the author on different occasions, cooperating on easier missions can build trust and confidence that will provide a basis for achieving
resolution of more difficult maritime issues between the nations. This is indeed geopolitical shock
absorbing of the most congenial kind.¶ We have now arrived at a point where we can put all of the elements of modern naval endeavour together in a new
syllogism. Navies protect their nations’ economic prospects by operating cooperatively to
defend all elements of the global system of commerce and security. Their necessary functions range from averting
naval arms races to rendering disaster relief to, yes, protecting shipping. But it is not an every navy for itself process; the more
cooperation, the better. It may even turn out that sustained and habitual international naval cooperation will someday make the concept of command of the sea irrelevant. Until then,
the U.S. Navy must exert careful stewardship over its command of the sea, keep its global logistics
system robust and develop the capacity to catalyse a global maritime security partnership on a broad front by being in a lot of places at the same time. Other navies must also look at the world in systems terms if they are
to most effectively develop utility arguments and determine how to most effectively target their limited resources.¶ If one accepts the arguments that underpin the new syllogism of how navies support economic
prosperity, then reasons for optimism become clear. Naval building programmes in China, India and elsewhere do
not have to lead to war as has happened in the past in Europe; there is a reasonable
prospect that the seas can be denied to terrorists; the seas can be used to bring the Non-Integrating Gap
into the system; and the emerging pattern of naval cooperating can not only secure
the seas but reduce the likelihood of conflict and war.¶ None of this will happen if
nations let their navies decay. The unique thing about navies is that their optimum utility is in time of peace. When sea power is
hitting on all cylinders, it is invisible. An investment in sea power is most appropriate and effective at a
point when threats are not apparent. In Mahan’s day the syllogism of sea power focused on the sovereign interests of individual nations and its application led
eventually to war.¶ Today we see the world as a system, with a sea power logic that is expressed in systems terms. Its application, that is, investment in navies structured along systemic lines,
promises a massive return in the form of an extended and improving peace and —despite the
current global economic woes—prosperity.
the US has its Air Sea Battle challenge. US spokespeople categorically deny this is only or even mainly
asymmetrical anti-naval capabilities,
strategic levels[38]. Operationally, China’s “exclusive” intended missions has heightened the need for secrecy and reduced transparency, elements which hinder
exchange and cooperation between Chinese and US navies. Strategically, China’s build-up has sparked the US to reinforce its
forward presence, responding as a crisis-stabilizing force, through its Air-Sea Battle challenge. This has enlarged the
strategic atmosphere with the introduction of more advanced competitive
capabilities, and at the same time has increased the security dilemma[39].¶ India’s recent
commissioning of an aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya, can be seen to be a reaction to Chinese development of its first aircraft, the Liaoning[40]. Many have raised questions as to
why India is investing in such expensive state of the art naval capabilities, when more immediate tensions across the India-Pakistani border appear to be taking up much of its defense
resources. There is a strong argument that India has strategic maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean, and the expansion of its naval scope to include an aircraft carrier is a response
to counter China’s increasing aspirations in the Indian ocean. Hence, strong action-reaction dynamics between India and China can be discerned ¶ . Among ASEAN
members, aggregate defence spending has increased from US$15.88 billion in 2000 to US$28.14 billion in 2011[41].
This rise in defence spending confirms an action-reaction dynamics as it coincides with a
number of countries with rising economic clout, the increase in tensions over maritime disputes that
involve China, and uncertainties towards the US security strategy in the Pacific. China’s
unilateral claims in the South China Seas, as seen in its vast claims to the SLOCs, and a 2012 establishment of a garrison on the disputed territories, have served as
members to reach a breakthrough on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea issue indicates
that divergences exists on issues of security interests among ASEAN member
countries, and between China and ASEAN. Competing cooperative security strategies
in the region has reduced prospects for multilateral cooperation among ASEAN
nations and between the ASEAN states and China.
Nuke war
Michael J. Panzner 8, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the
global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for
HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, 2008, Financial
Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition,
p. 136-138
Continuing calls forcurbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the
triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe
notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it
helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons
will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration
will almost certainly intensify. ¶ Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for
a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to
limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire
certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by
noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course,
continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets
through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates
bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas,
and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving
raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where
demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace.
tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation.¶ In
Around the world, such
some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from
cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other
countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying
attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.¶ Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok.
Iran may
Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while
embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of
allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a
political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point.¶ More than a
few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-
nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will
interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war .
1AC – SCS Adv
Offensive naval strike presence motivates China’s SCS island-building –
they’ll establish an Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] unless the U.S.
withdraws threatening assets
Harry Kazianis 15, Executive Editor of the National Interest, Senior Fellow for Defense
Policy at the Center for the National Interest, as well as a Senior Fellow (nonresident) at the
China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, “China's East China Sea ADIZ
Gamble: Past, Present, and South China Sea Future?,” June 19,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-east-china-sea-adiz-gamble-past-present-
south-china-13150
Will Beijing
This essay, divided into several sections, offers a rationale for China’s ADIZ declaration, with an eye towards an even more important question:
declare such a zone in the area of the South China Sea? This author believes China’s recent island-reclamation
projects are an effort to create the core infrastructure for the declaration and
enforcement of such a zone within the next several years. Unless serious action is undertaken to
change Beijing’s calculus for creating such zones—utilizing confidence-building measures to change the core of its geostrategic
thinking, along with strategies that will challenge such island reclamations—a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea is a near
certainty.¶ There are various prospective motivations behind Beijing’s 2013 ADIZ declaration that are worthy of consideration—the rise of a great power acting in its own
self-interest, a deeply rooted sense of historical wrongdoing at the hands of stronger nations in the past, combined with an attempt to shield itself from future actions, as well as
plausible rationale: China’s 2013 declaration and possible moves towards an ADIZ in the South China
Sea should be seen as part of a series of actions that are rooted in an effort to push U.S.
and allied forces away from Chinese “near seas” and areas of “core interest,” while at the same time attempting to
negate operational concepts like the much-debated but often-misunderstood Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept and associated weapons
platforms that could challenge China’s growing antiaccess/area-denial capabilities (A2/AD).¶ This analysis will then conclude with
recommendations on how a joint U.S.-Japan-Vietnam trilateral approach could impact Beijing’s decision making on a South China Sea ADIZ, utilizing a two-tier approach of incentives
and deterring strategies to negate the foundations of any future ADIZ.¶ China’s ADIZ and Air-Sea Battle: A Reaction to a Reaction?[1]¶ On November 23,
2013, China declared an ADIZ, rattling nerves across Asia and around the world. While many nations, including the United States, have declared ADIZs in the past, Beijing’s
announcement warrants special consideration. The new zone covers a large expanse of the East China Sea—a critical waterway and airspace traversed by many of the Asia-Pacific’s
most powerful nations, but also many countries from around the globe. Competing territorial claims in this area by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan complicate this matter even
it would inflame regional tensions? One possible explanation for the move was that it was a response to Japan’s “nationalization” of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While this is certainly a strong possibility, there are deeper motives likely at play beyond Beijing and Tokyo’s long-standing dispute. China’s actions were
Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief,the rollout of the new zone displayed no signs of crisis language,
but instead appeared to be the result of a careful policy process—to neutralize the
United States’ and possibly others’ efforts to ensure access to the East China Sea; these efforts are themselves a reaction to previous Chinese actions in
the recent past.[2]¶ Beijing’s 2013 ADIZ belongs not only to the context of China’s territorial disputes, but also to an escalating
disagreement with the United States over operations in the near seas. It provides a legal framework for China’s
complaints about U.S. intelligence-gathering flights near China’s borders, and for radar tracking and harassment of aircraft that fail to report flight plans to Chinese authorities.¶ Enter
the ASB Operational Concept: Pushing China towards an ADIZ? ¶ Considering Chinese concerns as noted above,
Beijing feels its ADIZ effort is necessary for resisting growing threats from the U.S.
military against the integrity of Chinese borders. Chinese fears over the U.S. ASB operational concept
only reinforce these concerns; Chinese analysis highlights ASB as proof of the threat
of possible U.S. military intervention in China’s interests. ¶ ASB, now renamed by the Pentagon the Joint Concept for
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), is itself a reaction to Chinese efforts to develop A2/AD capabilities, suggesting that Chinese and U.S. military planners are
Here we can see a clear reaction
already engaged in a conceptual arms race to produce frameworks for controlling access to the near seas.
cycle and/or security dilemma that is highly disturbing: China, out of a need to protect its core interests and near seas,
develops a potent A2/AD capability. The United States then develops ASB to counter this capability. Beijing, seeing the development of
ASB, then begins deploying an ADIZ in the East China Sea in another attempt to push U.S. forces back and regulate its near seas and
airspace.¶ While China’s military capabilities are growing, they pale in comparison to those of the United States in terms of command and control (C2), communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, deployable forces across all possible domains of conflict, overall training, sheer technological edge, and
deployability around the globe. To negate such capabilities, Beijing has developed a strategic posture that places its forces in a position to wage an asymmetric struggle. PLA forces
would utilize A2/AD tactics and strategies in an attempt to exact vicious losses using ballistic and cruise missiles, ultra-quiet conventional submarines, advanced mines, possibly UAVs,
and other weapons that are sophisticated and increasingly home-grown to keep U.S. and allied forces away from China’s near seas. Beijing sees strategic suicide in allowing a larger
power the military advantage of building up forces in and around its near seas and striking in mass. Halting or deterring such a buildup through an A2/AD strategy—with various
Chinese scholars arguing for massive preemptive strikes if conflict seemed certain—seems like the best approach, should a conflict ever occur.¶ Why the United States Developed
ASB¶ In response to growing A2/AD challenges around the world—and with a clear focus on China’s and Iran’s growing A2/AD capabilities—the United States developed the
operational concept of Air-Sea Battle. Holding a similar title to the 1980s NATO concept of AirLand Battle, ASB in very broad terms seeks to create a higher level of “jointness” between
American air and sea power to overcome the challenges of A2/AD environments.¶ Battling Misconceptions¶ Since the ASB concept was first revealed in various formats in 2009/2010,
the concept has proven controversial—mainly thanks to a detailed analysis by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a prominent Washington think tank that in
2010 laid out a scenario in which ASB would be used in a war with China to strike targets on the mainland, an analysis that was not endorsed by the Pentagon.[3]¶ However, the
concept has been embraced by the Department of Defense (DoD) and evolved dramatically since the 2010 CSBA ASB report. ASB was reworked, differing substantially in tone, as well
as in substance from the CSBA ASB concept. This new version of ASB, in order to avoid any lingering confusion, was treated to multiple official DoD briefings and explanations. Most
Pentagon officials this author has spoken with over the last several years have explained ASB as a necessary aspect of America’s reconceptualization of how its armed forces will need
to counter antiaccess challenges in a post–“war on terror” world and not as a strategy to fight a war against China, as many in the media have portrayed the concept.¶ At a 2013 House
Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing, Rear Admiral James G. Foggo defined the concept in an effort to put growing confusion to rest:¶
“(ASB) is designed to assure access to parts of the “global commons”—those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace and space that no one “owns,” but which we all depend on—such as the
sea lines of communication. Our adversaries’ anti-access/area denial strategies employ a range of military capabilities that impede the free use of these ungoverned spaces. These
military capabilities include new generations of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality [which] are being produced and
proliferated…Accordingly the Air-Sea Battle Concept is intended to defeat such threats to access.”[4]¶ ASB Evolves: Enter JAM-GC¶ Over the last five or so years, the ASB concept has
been tested in various wargames and integrated into Pentagon planning for usage in contested operating environments—with both China and Iran being the primary challenges.
However, at the end of 2014, rumors began to surface that important changes to the operating concept were being made, with specific consideration given to making the concept truly
joint and integrating all U.S. military branches to ensure the concept would truly be “cross-domain” and not just a U.S. Navy and Air Force project. In an article for The National
Interest, experts from the Air-Sea Battle Office at the Pentagon laid out a vision for what Air-Sea Battle will become:¶ “An updated supporting joint concept will also describe an
evolutionary approach to joint and allied operations across service, component and multinational lines in A2/AD environments. Building on existing JOAC precepts, the refined
concept will incorporate the most useful ideas from the existing “ASB Concept” to include a force that is networked, fully integrated, and capable of cross-domain attack and defense in
depth by U.S., allied and coalition forces in the global commons...¶ …Based on recent assessments, current doctrinal command-and-control methodologies will likely be inadequate to
address A2/AD environments where beyond-line-of-sight communications and other connectivity between units can be disrupted or denied by an adversary. Therefore, evolutionary
modifications to command-and-control structures and protocols are necessary in order to effectively command and control Joint Forces in a heavily disrupted electromagnetic-
spectrum environment. Additionally, cross-domain expertise within component and lower-echelon operations centers must be leveraged to create cross-domain effects in support of
the commanders’ intent and schemes of maneuver.”[5]¶ What Does Beijing Think of Changes to ASB? ¶ While there has been little to no scholarly literature articulating a Chinese
position on JAM-GC in open-source texts, there is every reason to believe China would see this as nothing more than an evolutionary upgrade to the ASB concept—with the above text
various attempts to strengthen its A2/AD platforms and defensive systems in areas
that would negate ASB. For example, recent sleuthing of Chinese open-source material has
revealed preliminary efforts to develop sonar nets in the Yellow, East and South
China Seas, something that would target the very heart of ASB: U.S. Navy attack
submarines.[7] China also still has an active interest in Russian military technology, with recently confirmed purchases of the S-400 air-defense platform, as well as
continued interest in the Su-35 fighter, Russian airplane engines, and ultra-quiet submarines and technology—all items that would greatly enhance Beijing’s A2/AD capabilities.¶
Recommendations[8]¶ Clearly the United States, Japan, and Vietnam have a shared interest in deterring
China from not only declaring a new ADIZ in the South China Sea—an area through which over $5.3 trillion in seaborne
trade passes every year—but also enforcing such a zone . Here, there is a clear opportunity for a trilateral approach to shift Beijing’s calculus in
terms of creating such a zone. Such a strategy must make halting or at least dramatically slowing the
foundations of any Chinese South China Sea ADIZ project an absolute priority—growing
island-reclamation projects. The reason for this is obvious: If China were to deploy
aircraft, coast-guard vessels, warships, radar stations, and various other platforms on multiple
islands across the South China Sea, Beijing would have the tools necessary to declare and
enforce a new ADIZ. While there are many different approaches that are certainly possible, they must be balanced with
a clear effort to ensure tensions in the area of the South China Sea are not enflamed even more. The three
below—utilizing the classic “carrot and stick approach”—should merit strong consideration. Such recommendations could be attempted as part of a complete strategy or utilized
selectively with different levels of intensity on a case by case basis as needed:¶ 1. Work to Negate the Growing A2/AD vs. ASB Security Dilemma: At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in
Chinese admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), explained
Singapore,
that “[t]he Chinese government and military never said they were going to establish an ADIZ
in the South China Sea” and that the creation of such a zone would be based on
Beijing’s view of the security situation in the area—a line that has now been repeated almost word for word by multiple
Chinese officials recently.[9] The United States, along with the support of Japan and Vietnam, should test such declarations.¶ One possible method for doing this would be to look for
ways in which Washington and Beijing can halt the deployment of weapons platforms that only engrain what is quickly becoming a high-tech security dilemma by those who wish to
retain access to areas like the East and South China Sea (the United States and its partners) and those who wish to restrict access to such near seas (China). The United States, with the
support of Japan and Vietnam, should propose that Washington and Beijing limit the deployment of selected future types of next-generation weapons platforms that could greatly
enhance their competing A2/AD and ASB strike systems—an effort to break the reactionary cycle of events. For example, considering the lethal nature and game-changing capabilities
to
of hypersonic weapons, this could be one area where both sides could work to halt such deployments to the Asia-Pacific region. Such an agreement could go a long way
“freeze” the A2/AD and ASB security dilemma where it is when other types of next-generation weapons and defensive systems seem
ripe for deployment. This could (at least in theory) show China that a new ADIZ in the South China Sea would be
unneeded, as the United States and its partners are actively making good-faith
efforts to address its security concerns and working to break this growing security
dilemma.¶ 2. Time for “Shamefare”: While Washington and its partners must reach out to Beijing in an effort to ease its security concerns, they should expose to the world
any increased efforts to enhance its island-reclamation projects in the South China Sea—the foundation of any new ADIZ in the region.¶ CNN's recent reporting in the South China
Sea—providing clear video and pictures of Chinese island-reclamation projects—and reports and satellite images provided by CSIS' Asia Maritime Project are excellent examples of
what Washington, along with Japan and Vietnam, should be doing on a regular basis. They must set out to win the media narrative and define Beijing's motives for reclamation projects
in the South China Sea—projects that would be the life blood of a new ADIZ. While it seems unlikely that Washington and its partners and allies will be able to force Beijing to scale
back its present island-reclamation projects, they can ensure the world is aware of every move Beijing makes—making China think twice about reclaiming any new islands and hence
limiting the ease with which Beijing can declare a new ADIZ. Here are some examples of how what this author calls “shamefare” could work in practice:¶ A: When China takes any new
action to expand its capabilities in the South China Sea—like constructing a new runway that could be used to patrol the area or installing sophisticated military hardware like antiship
weapons systems—photos and video should be distributed to the media immediately.¶ B: If U.S., Japanese, or Vietnamese vessels exercising freedom of navigation come under Chinese
Shaming”
harassment in the South China Sea, the incident should be captured on video and placed on YouTube and other prominent social-media channels immediately.¶ “
China repeatedly for its actions will allow America and its partners to win the battle of
competing narratives and put Beijing on the defensive . China would be left having to
constantly explain its actions time and time again. America and its partners should use these tactics to their advantage.¶ 3.
Time for Increased “Lawfare”: The United States, along with Japan and Vietnam, should work with all other claimants in the South China Sea to settle
any disputes in the region that do not involve China. While clearly not an easy task, Beijing's growing mastery of the region through growing island-reclamation projects could spur
these parties to reach an accommodation. With this achieved, all parties that have claims against China could file their own legal complaints jointly in international courts.¶ While
“lawfare” will likely not evoke a formal challenge from Beijing beyond its standard claims of “indisputable sovereignty,” as is the case with the Philippines’ lawsuit, a much larger
filing by a united front of nations would certainly constitute a stronger action.[10] Washington by design would take no official stance, but it could certainly work “unofficially” to spur
. Even a
such actions while actively offering words of encouragement and intentionally pushing Beijing to settle such disputes with its neighbors in a multilateral setting
the display of U.S. naval power at the height of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved
highly embarrassing. There is evidence that the PLA had difficulty monitoring the movement of the two carrier
battle groups, much less in offering its civilian leaders credible military options in response to
the carrier presence. This galling experience steeled Beijing’s resolve to preclude
U.S. naval deployments near Taiwan in a future crisis. Notably, the Yokosuka-based USS
Independence (CV 62) was the first carrier to arrive at the scene in March 1996, cementing Chinese
expectations that Washington would dispatch a carrier from Japan in a contingency
over Taiwan.
Beyond Taiwan, other territorial disputes along China’s nautical periphery could
involve U.S. naval intervention. A military crisis arising from conflicting Sino-Japanese claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands northeast of Taiwan
could compel an American reaction. While doubts linger in some Japanese policy circles whether foreign aggression against the islands would trigger Washington’s defense
commitments as stipulated by the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, joint allied exercises and war games since 2004 suggest that the U.S. military is closely watching events in the East
Chinese territorial claims over large swathes of the South China Sea could also be sources of
China Sea. Farther south,
regional tensions. If a local tussle there escalated into a larger conflagration that threatened international shipping, the U.S. Navy might be ordered to maintain
freedom of navigation. In both scenarios, the U.S. carrier based in Japan and other strike groups operating near Asian waters
In Ye’s view, U.S. naval power is a double-edged sword. While the U.S. fleet has been
essential to Beijing’s free access to and use of the seas , underwriting the nation’s prosperity, it could just
as easily be employed to strangle China’s economy. If the U.S. Navy were ever called upon to fulfill an undertaking of such
magnitude, forward basing in Asia would undoubtedly play a pivotal role in sustaining what could deteriorate into a protracted blockade operation.
Chinese analysts have also expressed a broader dissatisfaction with the United States’ self-
appointed role as the guardian of the seas. Sea-power advocates have vigorously pushed for a more expansive view of China’s
prerogatives along the maritime periphery of the mainland.
They bristle at the U.S. Navy’s apparent presumption of the right to command any parcel of the ocean on
earth outside coastal states’ territorial waters, including areas that China considers its own nautical preserves. Some take
issue with the 2007 U.S. maritime strategy, a policy document that baldly states, “We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and
allies, but by ourselves if we must.”21 Lu Rude, a former professor at Dalian Naval Academy, cites this passage as evidence of U.S. “hegemonic thinking.” He concludes,
of U.S. forward presence could be eroding even more quickly than once thought. Against
this backdrop of increasing Chinese ambivalence toward American naval power, U.S. basing arrangements in Japan have come
Chinese analysts have carefully studied the extent to which U.S. global strategy rests on uninterrupted access to overseas bases. Indeed, they are well acquainted with the centrality of
foreign naval bases to seagoing forces, especially those forces that must operate far from the homeland for extended periods of time. In a comprehensive survey of strategic
deployment, Senior Colonel Ou Yangwei underscores the nexus between expeditionary naval power and shore support: “Maritime power, whether it is a surface
combatant or a submarine operating at sea and undersea respectively, must still depend on shore bases and island bases. As such, the various
bases of a navy constitute the basic form and system of maritime power deployment.” This interdependence extends to carrier operations.
Colonel Ou argues, “The duration of maritime mobile deployments is a function of the endurance and survivability of the carrier strike group and the replenishment fleet.
Endurance and survivability in turn are inseparable from fixed naval bases. Shore bases will always be
the foundation upon which maritime power rests.”23
consumes massive quantities of fuel, food, ammunition, and spare parts while
placing nearly continuous demands on maintenance and repair facilities. In an in-depth analysis of
carrier operations, Senior Colonel Liu Yonghui of the Navy Arms Command College estimates that during high-intensity combat operations, naval aviation units
require resupply of munitions every seven days while the carrier and other surface
combatants need to be rearmed every five days. The replenishment fleet must shuttle between the carrier strike group and a
network of bases that store these supplies to sustain continuous cruises at sea. Structural repairs and the replacement of military components, such as aircraft engines, require the
direct support of major bases.25 The Chinese clearly appreciate the dynamic and complex interaction between frontline formations and the shore-based infrastructure that supports
their operations. It is this keen awareness that has informed Chinese thinking about U.S. naval bases in Japan.
Some Chinese strategists appraise Washington’s military posture in the Asia-Pacific region in stark geopolitical terms. Applying the “defense perimeter of the Pacific” logic elaborated
by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the early Cold War, they see their nation enclosed by concentric, layered “island chains.” The United States and its allies, they argue, can encircle
China or blockade the Chinese mainland from island strongholds, where powerful naval expeditionary forces are based. Analysts who take such a view conceive of the island chains in
various ways.
Yu Yang and Qi Xiaodong, for example, describe U.S. basing architecture in Asia as a “three line configuration .”26 The first line stretches in a sweeping arc from Japan and South Korea
to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, forming a “zone of forward bases .” This broad notion that the U.S. presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean constitutes a seamless,
interlocking set of bases is widely shared in Chinese strategic circles.27 The second line connects Guam and Australia. The last line of bases runs north from Hawaii through Midway to
the Aleutians, terminating at Alaska. While these island chains may bear little resemblance to actual U.S. thinking and planning, that the Chinese pay such attention to the geographic
structure of American power in Asia is quite notable. These observers discern a cluster of mutually supporting bases, ports, and access points along these island chains. Among the
networks of bases in the western Pacific, those located on the Japanese archipelago—the northern anchor of the first island chain—stand out, for the Chinese. Modern Navy, a monthly
journal published by the Political Department of the PLA Navy, produced a seven-part series on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces in 2004 and 2005. Notably, it devoted an entire
article on Japan’s main naval bases, including Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru.28 The depth of the coverage of these bases is rather remarkable, especially when compared to the
sparse reporting on similar topics in the United States and in Japan.
Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka, which analysts portray as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia.29 One analyst depicts a “Northeast
Asian base group ” radiating outward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Pusan, and Chinhae.30 Writers provide a wide range of details about the Yokosuka naval base, including its precise
location, the surrounding geography, the number of piers (particularly those suitable for aircraft carriers), the types and number of maintenance facilities, and the storage capacity of
munitions, fuel, and other supply depots.31 Wu Jian, for instance, finds the geographic features of Yokosuka comparable to Dalian, a major base of the Chinese navy’s North Sea
Fleet.32
Beyond physical similarities, Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the Chinese. One commentator recalls the U.S.
transfer of 203-mm heavy artillery from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis.33 Tracking more recent events, another observer notes that
the Kitty Hawk Strike Group’s deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably coincided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004, and 2008.34 As Pei
“Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese people.” 35 Moreover,
Huai opines,
Chinese analysts are keenly aware of Yokosuka’s strategic position. Du Chaoping asserts:
“Yokosuka is the U.S. Navy’s main strategic point of concentration and deployment in
the Far East and is the ideal American stronghold for employing maritime forces in
the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. A carrier deployed there is akin to the
sharpest dagger sheathed in the Western Pacific by the U.S. Navy. It can control the
East Asian mainland to the west and it can enter the Indian Ocean to the southwest to secure Malacca, Hormuz, and other important thoroughfares.”36 Ma Haiyang concurs: “The
it can
Yokosuka base controls the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and the sea and air transit routes in the Indian Ocean. As the key link in the ‘island chain,’
support ground operations on the Korean Peninsula and naval operations in the Western Pacific. It can support combat in the
Middle East and Persian Gulf regions while monitoring and controlling the wide sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic position is extremely important.”37 It is notable that both
Du and Ma conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub that tightly links the Pacific and Indian oceans into an integrated theater of operations.
Intriguingly, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegis-equipped destroyers
armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based in Yokosuka could erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Indeed, analysts see concentrations of sea-based BMD capabilities
falling roughly along the three island chains described earlier. Ren Dexin describes Yokosuka as the first line of defense against ballistic missiles, while Pearl Harbor and San Diego
provide additional layers.38 Yokosuka is evocatively portrayed as the “forward battlefield position ,” the indispensable vanguard for the sea-based BMD architecture.39 For some
Chinese, these concentric rings or picket lines of sea power appear tailored specifically to bring down ballistic missiles fired across the Pacific from locations as diverse as the Korean
Peninsula, mainland China, India, or even Iran.40 Specifically, Aegis ships in Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego would be positioned to shoot down missiles in their boost,
midcourse, and terminal phases, respectively.41
Chinese observers pay special attention to Aegis deployments along the first island chain. Some believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South China seas would be
able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic missile deployed in China’s interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost phase. Dai Yanli warns, “Clearly, if Aegis
systems are successfully deployed around China’s periphery, then there is the possibility that China’s ballistic missiles would be destroyed over their launch points.”42 Ji Yanli, of the
Beijing Aerospace Long March Scientific and Technical Information Institute, concurs: “If such [sea-based BMD] systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the
effectiveness of China’s strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security.”43 Somewhat problematically,
the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strategic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable Aegis fleet than is technically possible
in the near term.
Analysts in China
The indispensability of the ship-repair and maintenance facilities at Yokosuka emerges as another common theme in the Chinese literature.
often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the
wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yokosuka is irreplaceable as
long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain unavailable. Li Daguang, a professor at China’s National Defense University and a frequent commentator on naval affairs, casts
Guam as a potential candidate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of
doubt on
scale to service carriers.44 China’s Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) published a translated article from a Japanese military journal, Gunji
Kenkyu (Japan Military Review), to illustrate the physical limits of Guam as a permanent home port for carriers.45
Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo, the second-largest naval base in Japan. Various commentators call attention to its strategic position near key sea-lanes and its proximity
to China.46 As Yu Fan notes, “This base is a large-scale naval base closest to our country. Positioned at the intersection of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, it
guards the southern mouth of the Korea Strait. This has very important implications for controlling the nexus of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and for
blockading the Korea Strait.”47
It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists recognize the importance of U.S. naval bases in Japan for fulfilling a range of regional and extraregional responsibilities. Indeed, some believe
that the American strategic position in Asia hinges entirely on ready military access to bases on the Japanese islands. Tian Wu argues that without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would
have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii. Tian bluntly asserts: “If the U.S. military was ever forced to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan, then it would be compelled to retreat thousands of
kilometers to set up defenses on the second island chain. Not only would it lose tremendous strategic defensive depth, but it would also lose the advantageous conditions for
conducting littoral operations along the East Asian mainland while losing an important strategic relay station to support operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through
the South China Sea.”48
This emerging discourse offers several clues about Beijing’s calculus regarding U.S. naval basing arrangements in Japan. Chinese strategists see these bases as collectively representing
both a threat to Chinese interests and a critical vulnerability for the United States. Bases in Japan are the most likely locations from which the United States would sortie sea power in
response to a contingency over Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese are acutely aware of the apparent American dependence on a few bases to project power. Should access to and
use of these bases be denied for political or military reasons, they infer, Washington’s regional strategy could quickly unravel. While the commentaries documented here are by no
means authoritative in the official sense, they are clearly designed to underscore the strategic value and the precariousness of U.S. forward presence in Japan.
Authoritative PLA documents correlate with this emerging consensus that U.S. bases
on the Japanese home islands merit close attention in strategic and operational terms. Indeed, Chinese doctrinal writings clearly
indicate that the American presence in Japan would likely be the subject of attack if the United States were to intervene in a cross-strait conflict. The unprecedented
public availability of primary sources in China in recent years has opened a window onto
Chinese strategic thought, revealing a genuinely competitive intellectual environment that has substantially advanced Chinese debates on military affairs.
This growing literature has also improved the West’s understanding of the PLA.
In an effort to maximize this new openness in China, this chapter draws upon publications closely affiliated with
the PLA, including the prestigious Academy of Military Science and the National
Defense University, that address coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia.49 Some are widely cited among Western military analysts as authoritative
works that reflect current PLA thinking. Some likely enjoy official sanction as doctrinal guidance or educational material for senior military commanders. The authors
of the studies are high-ranking PLA officers who are either leading thinkers in
strategic affairs and military operations or boast substantial operational and
command experience. These works, then, collectively provide a sound basis for
examining how regional bases in Asia might fit into Chinese war planning.
Among this literature, The Science of Military Strategy stands out in Western strategic circles as an authoritative PLA publication. The authors, Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi,
advocate an indirect approach to fighting and prevailing against a superior adversary in “future local wars under high-technology conditions.”50 To win, the PLA must seek to avoid or
bypass the powerful fielded forces of the enemy while attacking directly the vulnerable rear echelons and command structures that support frontline units. Using the human body as
an evocative metaphor for the adversary, Peng and Yao argue, “As compared with dismembering the enemy’s body step by step, destroying his brain and central nerve system is more
meaningful for speeding up the course of the war.”51 To them, the brain and the central nervous system of a war machine are those principal directing and coordinating elements
without which the fighting forces wither or collapse.
The aim, then, is to conduct offensive operations against the primary sources of the enemy’s military power, what the authors term the “operational system.” They declare, “After
launching the war, we should try our best to fight against the enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to enemy’s operational base, even to his source of war, and to actively
strike all the effective strength forming the enemy’s war system.”52 In their view, operational systems that manage command and control and logistics (satellites, bases, etc.), are the
primary targets; they relegate tactical platforms that deliver firepower (warships, fighters, etc.) to a secondary status. To illustrate the effects of striking the source of the enemy’s
fighting power, Peng and Yao further argue: “To shake the stability of the enemy’s war system so as to paralyze his war capabilities has already become the core of the contest between
the two sides in the modern high-tech local war. So, more attention should be paid to striking crushing blows against the enemy’s structure of the operational system . . . especially
those vulnerable points which are not easy to be replaced or revived, so as to make the enemy’s operational system seriously unbalanced and lose initiative in uncontrollable
disorder.”53 The authors are remarkably candid about what constitutes the enemy’s operational system. Particularly relevant to this study is their assertion that the supply system
emerges as a primary target: “The future operational center of gravity should not be placed on the direct confrontation with the enemy’s assault systems. We should persist in taking
the information system and support system as the targets of first choice throughout. . . . In regard to the supply system, we should try our best to strike the enemy on the ground, cut
the material flow of his efficacy sources so as to achieve the effect of taking away the firewood from the caldron.”54
Destruction of the supply system in effect asphyxiates the adversary. In order to choke off the enemy’s capacity to wage war, Peng and Yao contend, a “large part of the supply systems
must be destroyed.”55 Their prescriptions for winning local high-tech wars suggest that the horizontal escalation of a conflict to U.S. regional bases in Asia is entirely thinkable. Even
more troubling, some Chinese appear to envision the application of substantial firepower to pummel the U.S. forward presence. While The Science of Military Strategy should not be
treated as official strategic guidance to the PLA, its conceptions of future conflict with a technologically superior adversary provide a useful framework for thinking about what a
Chinese missile campaign against regional bases might entail.
posited in these writings, U.S. intervention is a critical premise, if not a given. In an important
PLA study on joint campaigns involving “firepower strikes,” the authors foresee external intervention by a “powerful enemy”—code for the United States—that would impact Chinese
They contend: “In future joint firepower strike campaigns, the military
military operations.
intervention by the powerful enemy power is inevitable. The powerful enemy’s main military intervention actions
include: assisting the enemy’s contest against us for information dominance, air superiority, and sea control; attacking our important coastal and strategic in-depth targets; assaulting
our firepower forces, etc. The powerful enemy’s military intervention greatly influences our joint firepower strike campaigns, severely complicates and adds to the difficulty of joint
firepower strike campaigns, and increases the difficulty of joint firepower strike campaigns.”56
For PLA planners, the primary aims are to deter, disrupt, or disable the employment of carriers at
the point of origin—namely, the bases from which carriers would sortie. Given the limited capability, range, and survivability of China’s air and sea power,
most studies foresee the extensive use of long-range conventional ballistic missiles to
achieve key operational objectives against U.S. forward presence. In Intimidation Warfare, Zhao Xijun proposes several novel missile tactics that could be employed to deter the use of
naval bases in times of crisis or war.57 Zhao proposes demonstration shots into sea areas near the enemy state to compel the opponent to back down. Zhao explains, “Close-in (near
border) intimidation strikes involve firing ballistic missiles near enemy vessels or enemy states (or in areas and sea areas of enemy-occupied islands). It is a method designed to
induce the enemy to feel that it would suffer an unbearable setback if it stubbornly pursues an objective, and thus abandons certain actions.”58
One tactic that Zhao calls a “pincer, close-in intimidation strike” is particularly relevant to missile options against U.S. military bases. Zhao elaborates: “Pincer close-in intimidation
strikes entail the firing of ballistic missiles into the sea areas (or land areas) near at least two important targets on enemy-occupied islands (or in enemy states). This enveloping
attack, striking the enemy’s head and tail such that the enemy’s attention is pulled in both directions, would generate tremendous psychological shock.”59 Zhao also proposes an
“island over-flight attack” as a variation of the pincer strike. He states: “For high-intensity intimidation against an entrenched enemy on an island, an island over-flight attack employs
conventional ballistic missiles with longer range and superior penetration capabilities to pass over the enemy’s important cities and other strategic targets to induce the enemy to
sense psychologically that a calamity will descend from the sky. This method could produce unexpected effects.”60
While these missile tactics are primarily aimed at coercing Taiwan, they could in theory be applied to any major island or archipelago. Reminiscent of the 1996 cross-strait crisis, the
PLA could splash single or multiple ballistic missiles into waters near Yokosuka (shot across Honshu Island, over major metropolitan cities) in the hopes that an intimidated leadership
in Tokyo would stay out of a contingency over Taiwan, deny American access to military facilities, or restrict U.S. use of naval bases in Japan.
Should deterrence through intimidation fail, the Chinese may seek to complicate U.S. naval operations originating from bases located in the Japanese home islands. The authors of The
Science of Joint Campaign Command believe that countries aligned with the United States could join actively in an anti-China coalition, significantly widening the scope of a Sino-U.S.
confrontation. They state, “Allies of the powerful enemy along China’s periphery could provide military bases; some countries that have territorial and maritime rights disputes with
us could take advantage of the opportunity to make unreasonable demands or perhaps provoke an incident, trapping us in a disadvantageous position of confronting two lines of
operations.”61 Japan certainly fits the description of a regional power that not only could furnish bases to U.S. military forces but could also escalate tension with China over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea.
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, the most authoritative work on the PLA’s strategic rocket forces, furnishes astonishingly vivid details on the conditions under which China
might seek to conduct conventional missile operations against outside intervention.62 Notably, the document explores “firepower harassment” as a potentially effective tactic to resist
external interference. Given its explicit references to the U.S. use of military bases on foreign soil, a passage on harassment strikes is worth quoting in its entirety:
When the powerful enemy uses allied military bases in our periphery and aircraft carriers as aircraft launch platforms to implement various forms of military intervention; and when
the powerful enemy’s allied military bases around our periphery are beyond our air arm’s firing range, and when the carrier battle groups are far away from our shores, thus making it
difficult to carry out the overall operational advantages associated with firepower coordination among the armed services and service arms, conventional missiles can be used to
implement harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy’s allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups.63
In other words, PLA planners intend to assign long-range strike missions to the ballistic-missile force if warships, bombers, and submarines prove unable to reach enemy bases. Since
U.S. bases in South Korea are well within reach of China’s short-range ballistic missiles, shore-based aircraft, surface combatants, and undersea fleet, the “allied military bases” to
which the study refers can only be those located in Japan. For the authors, harassment strikes might involve periodic missile launches into “no go” zones erected near the naval bases
in order to “block the points of entry and exit to important enemy ports,” or they might entail direct attacks against “key targets within the enemy ports, such as fueling and fuel
loading facilities, and logistical supply facilities.”64 Such operations would be intended to disrupt seriously the resupply and movement of U.S. naval forces.
Beyond selective attacks, some Chinese analysts advocate highly destructive operations against U.S. military bases. In a study on the PLA’s blockade operations against Taiwan,
Chinese defense planners entertain the possibility of significant vertical and horizontal escalation to defeat U.S. intervention. The authors call for “opportune counterattacks” to defeat
would do everything it could successively to weaken, isolate, and ultimately sink the
carrier. In addition to lethal strikes against aircraft carriers, the authors envision concerted efforts to inflict
massive damage on the military bases supporting carrier operations. According to Zhu Aihua and Sun
Longhai, “To punish the external enemy and to accommodate world opinion, it is not enough to sink the external enemy’s aircraft carrier. . . . It is necessary to destroy the springboard
of combat operations, to pulverize the operational bases, to cut off the enemy’s retreat . . . in order to render obsolete hegemonism and power politics.”65
It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists have systematically examined the strategies, doctrines, and operational concepts for dissuading, disrupting, and denying the use of U.S. military
bases along China’s periphery. These studies suggest that the PLA is prepared to calibrate the scale and magnitude of its military exertions against American forward bases across a
spectrum that includes deterrence, compellence, and high-intensity conflict. It is equally evident that an extension of missile operations to the Japanese homeland is well within the
bounds of Chinese planning. Should circumstances warrant, the PLA may not hesitate to escalate a
crisis or conflict radically with missile salvos directed at Japan in order to demonstrate political resolve,
preclude Japanese involvement, or unhinge U.S. intervention.
will become in response. That’s the new reality of Chinese foreign policy. ¶ And the
Pentagon’s plan, if it were to become policy, would have the opposite effect of its intention — as
happens often with ill-conceived strategic thinking. It would give China justification to regularly send naval
units to the surrounding waters; to speed up the construction and installation of military
facilities on the artificial islands; and to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over its
territory in the South China Sea. While the Pentagon intends to prevent China from militarizing
the South China Sea, its plan would instead harden China’s determination to develop
its military presence in the region.¶ Before the Pentagon’s plan went public, China had
no intention of declaring an ADIZ over the South China Sea anytime soon, said Zhou Fangyin, a professor at the Guangdong
Research Institute for International Strategies. (An ADIZ extends a country’s airspace, allowing it more time to respond to foreign and possibly hostile
aircraft.) The East China Sea — over which China declared an ADIZ in November 2013 — is already the site of a great power competition among China,
Japan, and the United States.In April 2014, the United States committed itself to defending Japan ’s claim to the
embroiling itself in a territorial dispute between Beijing and Tokyo.
Diaoyu Islands, thus officially
But in the South China Sea, where Beijing faces several small powers, the United States is
officially neutral. China is trying to manage competing claims and prevent diplomatic disputes with countries like Vietnam and the Philippines
from degenerating into military conflicts.¶ In that sense, the involvement of the United States (and increasingly Japan) in the
South China Sea is doing the region a disservice: it is changing the South China Sea into a region
of great power competition between China and the United States and its allies. If Washington
determines to get militarily involved in the South China Sea, Chinese planners are likely to
adopt a similarly assertive logic and establish an ADIZ over territories in the region that it claims.¶ Of
course, Chinese policymakers understand that there are many negative
consequences that would come from establishing an ADIZ in the South China Sea. The scale and
speed of China’s land reclamation projects have created widespread anxiety
internationally, and many in the West already see China as a regional “bully.” Beijing does not want this
perception to persist or grow; it cares about the reputational costs of land
reclamation. As a result, Beijing has been reluctant to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea,
which the international community will surely perceive as another provocation.¶ But the Pentagon’s current plan and posture
leaves Beijing few options. It will compel China to leave reputational considerations
aside and adopt straightforward strategic assertiveness. Beyond the ADIZ designation, which
China will almost certainly announce soon, Beijing will formally station naval units on it reclaimed artificial islands —
which will soon be fit for military purposes, particularly Fiery Cross Reef. This probably would have happened anyway; but U.S. military
over the South China Sea to please a nationalist domestic audience.¶ Is that really what America wants?
Scenario 1 is Accidents
SCS disputes will escalate unless the U.S. backs down – island building
has brought conflict to a tipping point – risks full-scale US/Sino war
Ryan Pickrell 10/26/15, MA in IR and Ph.D. Candidate in IR and Diplomacy @ Central
China Normal University, his research focuses primarily on Sino-American relations, “The
Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?” The
National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-
relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3
Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist
scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no
return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point. As
traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues
presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have
been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics.
That’s especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest
points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific
that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain
China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid
confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally
enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a
number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and
revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to
China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on
par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects
abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the
Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric
regional order.
Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion
point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country
relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating
global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines,
acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides
trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement.
While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation
for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its
territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s
extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of
the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States
that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed.
America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect
cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old “shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the
geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach
is only a temporary stop on the road to functional strategic stability. At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United
States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the
already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While both
states have made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or implementable solution for Sino-
American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into conflict.
reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities have stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded
that China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not only has China dismissed America’s
demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in order to establish
anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within the scope of international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in violation of the
law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty issue, yet the United States regards this
issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for the preservation of the international legal system—a cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order.
In August of this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims “to safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and
naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “opposes any country’s attempt to challenge China’s
territorial sovereignty and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom.” Responding to Chinese criticisms of America’s new regional maritime security strategy,
American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “Make no mistake, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits…We will do that at times and places of our
choosing.” In 2014, the United States carried out “freedom of navigation” exercises in various parts of the world and challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries;
States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities in the South China
Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-
American relationship. How the United States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two
great powers.
increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political preservation and a potential
Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the United States, the liberal
world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner or later, this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy
or military force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both countries. Were the international institutions for collective security strong enough to handle
situations like this when they arise—and if China and the United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each country’s respective security
But given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful
thinking. As there is currently no clear solution to this problem that would allow both countries to walk out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are
pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each country’s level of commitment and resolve, this situation may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome of the geopolitical
the South China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue
power struggle between China and the United States will almost certainly be decided in
choose to back down or be forced to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea, geopolitics in the
Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.
“chance of a U.S. defeat is comparable to that of a Chinese defeat.” Given the daunting
constraints (e.g. surprise, geography, etc.) that U.S. forces could face in such a conflict, I concur with that
conclusion. It seems thus quite clear that Vuving does not subscribe to the “clean their clocks” school among America’s South China Sea hawks. That is
encouraging, and on the basis of his realistic understanding of the military balance, he does conclude near the end of his essay that “war is something that
needs to be avoided.” Once again, I strongly agree with Vuving on this point. ¶ So what is the main issue of disagreement, after all? It concerns what Vuving
and others have termed “gray-zone” operations. Vuving suggests that my analysis is flawed because I am using the “wrong lens” of war/peace binary
decisions when, according to his assessment, “disputes and contestation [are primarily] occurring in a gray zone between war and peace.” Thus, the claim is
advanced that Washington would have had a variety of options for contesting against Beijing in the so-called “Scarborough Shoal Crisis” during spring
2012—if only Americans understood that the game is weiqi rather than chess. Vuving is highly critical of the Obama Administration for being allegedly
misled by Beijing’s tricks in the so-called grey zone. Vuving actually undermines his own critique when he concedes that Manila most likely did call on
Washington for “military backup” in those circumstances.¶ The critique is further undermined by the lack of specifics regarding what exactly were
Washington’s options during that crisis—apart from calling in airstrikes. Should Washington have organized some fishing boats to contest against the
Chinese fishing boats at the atoll? Perhaps Vuving and others are calling for U.S. Coast Guard cutters to go “head-to-head” with water cannons and the like
against their Chinese counterparts? These are, of course, rhetorical questions, because no such feasible options exist for mounting counter–gray zone
operations of this kind. Nor is it feasible to retaliate by having our diplomats and prompting sympathetic journalists to use the moniker “West Philippine
Sea,” vice “South China Sea” as a smart power method to turn the tables against China. The point is that the only way to stop China’s advance in the South
China Sea in its tracks is to threaten the use of force, and, barring that threat, we are mostly reliant on Chinese good will.¶ It is quite instructive, actually,
when considering “gray-zone operations,” to think about the other classic case. Indeed, the term only really became popular [5] in strategic studies circles
after Russia’s seizure of Crimea by “little green men” in March 2014. The implication of Vuving’s argument in this critique seems to be that if the U.S. and
NATO had simply understood that this was a gray-zone operation rather than being fooled by Mr. Putin, that there could have been a proper gray-zone
response. Washington could respond against “little green men” with “little beige men” (U.S. combat troops in desert camo, but lacking U.S. insignia, of
course). The scenario is laughable, and no such options were ever under any consideration, to my estimate. The point is that the Russian “gray-zone
operation” in Crimea was successful because Moscow’s gambit also represented a clear and credible threat to resort to the use force. ¶ True, Beijing’s
shenanigans in and around Scarborough Shoal are a little less clear and credible in that respect, but the unmistakable message has been that these ships,
albeit unarmed for the most part, will be defended by Chinese armed might if necessary. Arguably, the Chinese gray-zone initiatives are more clever as they
are less easily condemned since they do not represent an overt use of force, but rather a veiled threat to employ force. Thus, the first and most obvious
counter to Vuving’s critique is that U.S. non-military options for use in such maritime gray-zone operations do not presently exist and are not likely to be
created in the next decade—no matter how many former U.S. and Japanese coast guard vessels are gifted to the Philippines. ¶ Still, the far more potent
argument beyond the relatively obvious questions regarding feasibility against countering Chinese shenanigans with American shenanigans is that
neither side knows where the other’s red lines actually lie. Thus, Vuving’s prescription to “up the
ante” with either containment measures or robust support for front-line states is all but certain to
increase tensions, such that “sleepwalking” into a U.S.-China direct armed clash becomes a near
certainty. What is ultimately so shallow, therefore, about Vuving’s line of critique and the argumentation of most hawks is they
do not admit that their prescriptions necessarily entail risks associated with the slippery slope of
escalation. Perhaps I’ve misunderstood him, but Vuving seems to me to be saying implicitly: “Trust me. Beijing is not really serious.
This is just a game of weiqi with no actual risk of military conflict. If Washington is serious, Beijing will back down.Ӧ This type of
oblivious attitude to the risk of conflict could be excusable perhaps if China was not a
nuclear power with increasingly potent conventional forces to match. In fact, this demeanor is distressingly
common among hawks of the “cakewalk” school, but we have already seen that Vuving has a relatively clear appraisal of the military balance and has recognized that outright U.S.
military superiority in the Western Pacific is a vestige of the past. Thus, there is a clear contradiction in Vuving’s thinking: he does not view the military balance as favorable to the U.S.,
and yet he recommends escalatory maneuvers.¶ This is not only foolhardy from a military-strategic point of view, but also starkly ignorant of history. Did the Russian czar think that he
would spark the largest war in history when he opted to mobilize forces in response to the Serbian crisis in 1914? Did President Roosevelt know that he was contributing to setting the
Pacific War in motion when he pushed the U.S. Pacific Fleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor to deter Japan from striking at Singapore in 1940? Washington clearly misunderstood
Chinese intentions in 1950 during the Korean War and underestimated Hanoi’s determination when undertaking escalation in Vietnam. The point is that one hardly has to look very
far to find examples of leaders, including American leaders, “sleepwalking” into major conflicts. Do we really believe our leaders are any wiser or better informed today than they were
back then?¶ Another point made by Vuving in his critique is more sensible, and concerns the actual strategic value of China’s newly built facilities in the South China Sea. He contends
that I misunderstand China’s strategy, because I focus on resources (oil and fish) vice strategic location. For example, he holds that the main value of Scarborough Shoal is that it is an
“ideal place from which to watch and patrol the central eastern sector of the South China Sea.” But another surveillance post in the South China Sea is quite redundant, because Beijing
already has more than enough patrol assets (military, coast guard or militia)—and that is not even considering ample and developing aerial surveillance capabilities, as well as real-
time satellite reconnaissance.¶ In fact, our assessments are not that different with respect to the new facilities in the Spratly islets. He explains, “Although China’s military assets on the
South China Sea islands will be highly vulnerable in wartime, they can be very useful for peacetime patrolling and psychological intimidation.” A main point of my initial analysis was
to draw attention to the high vulnerability of any Chinese assets based on these facilities in the age of precision guided munitions. So Vuving evidently accept my analysis for military
conflict scenarios—as does a Pentagon official who was quoted in this forum [6] as saying, “If China wants to build vulnerable airstrips on these rocks, let them—they just constitute a
bunch of easy targets that would be taken out within minutes of a real contingency.Ӧ I agree with Vuving that these facilities in the South China Sea will allow for somewhat increased
surveillance and even maybe, yes, “intimidation.” Chinese sailors and air crews may be a little less green after getting a break from their long patrols. Chinese fishing boats may indeed
grow more numerous in the area if they know they have a truly safe shelter from the common typhoons that sweep the area. But who exactly will be intimidated by the increased
Chinese presence during peacetime? Will the U.S. Navy be intimidated? Of course not. Those likely to be intimidated by an elevated Chinese patrol presence are local hydrocarbon
exploration and fishing interests. Thus, we return to the issue of resources, and I again emphatically reject the notion that Washington should take active steps in the direction of
military conflict with Beijing to support Philippine or Vietnamese oil and fishing interests.¶ Vuving’s critique repeats many times that the new Chinese facilities in the Spratlys will
indeed “allow China to upset the military balance.” Not only does he posit that China is likely to deploy thirty to forty fourth-generation aircraft to the new airstrips in the Spratlys, but
he also claims that regional states will be deterred from attacking the new airfields, because “China can declare that it makes no difference between an attack on these islands and an
attack on its mainland.Ӧ To my estimate, it is still quite early to suggest that China is able or likely to stage so many fighter aircraft out of the new facilities. One leading expert on PLA
development has stated, for example, that the only plane that will fly from these “bases” will be the small maritime patrol aircraft, the Y-7. As he explained it, that is partly due to the
weak coral base of these airstrips, which can neither support heavy aircraft nor the tough tempo that fighter operations would require. But let’s assume the worst case, putting
aviation logistics aside as well, that Chinese fighter interceptor squadrons will not only be deployed to these remote airstrips, but will deploy in operationally significant numbers. I
have posited that, in any contest with the U.S., these aircraft would likely be smoking, twisted metal wrecks within the first twenty-four hours of the beginning of a conflict. Vuving
does not contest that point, but says that the new Chinese facilities will “upset the regional balance.”¶ My response to this point is that there is actually no “regional balance” to upset.
Since the 1990s (if not before), China has had the firepower to take on and defeat any Southeast Asian opponent with relative ease. In 1988, for example, they swept aside Vietnamese
forces in a lopsided set of naval skirmishes to set up several preliminary bases in the Spratlys. I have discussed the very uneven nature of the China-Vietnam military contest in some
detail in an interview with the [7]New York Times [7] and also in this article [8] for National Interest. Thus, Vuving is correct to say that China will have vast military superiority in the
South China Sea with its new set of airstrips in the Spratlys. However, my view is that China was already vastly superior in military terms (when the U.S. is not involved), so the actual
change to the military balance is quite marginal.¶ And for the same reason that the new facilities will be highly vulnerable to U.S. firepower, so even Southeast Asian nations will have a
reasonably good chance to put the new airstrips out of commission for lengthy periods. Indeed, one does not have to turn the islets into a “sea of fire” by cratering every part of the
runway, when all that is required is to take out the fuel or munitions storage facilities. Most ideally, stealthy and relatively invulnerable submarines could barrage the new Chinese
bases with missiles from various vectors. Vietnam and Malaysia could develop those capabilities quite easily. But even laggard Philippines could likely put ordnance on these obvious
targets by, for example, quietly purchasing an array of medium and long-range surface-to-surface cruise missiles that South Korea has been developing [9] for a long time. True, that
may require some adjustment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but that would be wholly reasonable in the face of China’s major conventional missile buildup. Other
weapons systems could also be used to inhibit air operations, such as planting sea mines [10] around the islets to interdict their resupply.¶ This kind of deterrence will be much more
effective than attempts to massively scale up the Philippines’ coast guard to play gray-zone games against China’s massive coast guard forces. The latter approach is a genuine pipe
dream for the foreseeable future. Maybe Vietnam’s coast guard prospects are a little better, but most Americans would oppose their taxes going to fund Vietnam’s coast guard since
these gray-zone games are just about oil and fisheries interests and do not seriously impact U.S. national security.¶ The strangest and most objectionable part of Vuving’s critique
comes near the end. Here he candidly suggests that “China and the United States may share the same view when it comes to nautical freedom…” and, as I have related above, Vuving
also explains that “freedom of navigation” does not quite fit the bill as a persuasive rallying cry for confronting Beijing in the South China Sea. Therefore, he argues, the real question in
the South China Sea is about China’s alleged “grave threat to U.S. leadership in the region.” This line of reasoning seems to resemble closely that classic neo-conservative tract [11]
from 1992, authored by Paul Wolfowitz, that claimed the goal of U.S. foreign and defense policy should be primacy, plain and simple.¶ Vuving may underestimate Americans’ distaste
for the rather tautological formula of seeking to maintain leadership in all areas of the world in order to preserve primacy. In the critique’s final, tortured logic, Vuving explains: “The
concentration in this domain of Asia’s chief arteries means that, to paraphrase Harold Mackinder, he who controls the East and South China Seas, dominates Asia; and with the rise of
Asia, he who dominates this region, commands the world.” It strikes me as particularly odd and disappointing that even today leading American strategists could engage in such
bombastic nineteenth-century rhetoric by looking to British imperialist theorists [12] for guidance. Mackinder and such thinkers were obsessed with protecting India from the
imagined Russian threat, neglecting the fact that Russia’s help would be badly required in the contests that would follow for Britain. Next, these contemporary South China Sea hawks,
with Mackinder tucked under their arms, will propose erecting myriad new coaling stations around the “spice islands” and perhaps also making the U.S. presence in Afghanistan
permanent—the better to protect the Asian “heartland” from China’s encroaching Silk Road initiative. Americans thankfully have more common sense than to pursue expansion and
endless conflict on the other side of the planet indefinitely. Certainly, that is how the founders of our country distinguished themselves from statesmen in London way back when.¶ I
am on record repeatedly calling for both a stronger U.S. Navy (increased numbers of submarines, for example [13]), as well as the prudent drawing of credible red lines that would
cover the home islands of our allies. Vuving mischaracterizes my approach when he suggests that my view is the U.S. should “keep its hands out of the South China Sea.” Indeed, I am
reasonably comfortable with present U.S. force levels in the area, as well as occasional patrols by U.S. forces. Limited goals require neither massive forces nor enormous engagement.
There may come a day when the U.S. needs to commit many more resources for deterrence in the Western Pacific, or could even have to contemplate a major war to halt Chinese
aggression. But such dangers are nowhere on the horizon. The present danger is “fear itself,” related to the Thucydides Trap [14], not to mention the quite irrational or uninformed
urgings of odious parochial and nationalist interests of various “third-party” states.¶ To summarize, Vuving does make a number of valuable points and I concur with parts of his
assessment, including especially his clear-eyed view of the military balance and his rejection of high-sounding, but quite inappropriate rhetoric. As noted above, I do accept that Beijing
has made some incremental gains with its new facilities in the Spratlys both with respect to “gray-zone” operations and also in underlining its military superiority versus Southeast
Asian states, though I don’t think these marginal gains should be exaggerated, since they do not fundamentally alter previous strong advantages held by Beijing. Far and away the
biggest problem in Vuving’s critique, and among many like-minded hawks, however, is the misguided notion that there is a clear and discernible line between non-military methods of
That binary
coercion (“gray-zone” operations) and actual combat that rational leaders in Beijing, Manila, Hanoi and Washington certainly will not cross.
Pacific, the highly competitive aspects of the military relationship in the waters closer to
China would overwhelm them. This could become a new “Cold War at sea” with a
greatly elevated probability of crisis escalation and heightened operational risk for both
countries. In a more antagonistic relationship, the military necessity for the United States to conduct operations in
China’s EEZ would likely increase, despite the heightened risks of confrontation and
escalation. To the degree that the Chinese continue harassment of U.S. military forces operating in international waters in the western Pacific, the United States might look, in conjunction with regional
allies, to pursue similar measures against PLA forces operating in the EEZs of other states.¶ A cooperative maritime future likely requires the development of a United States–China modus vivendi on the issue of EEZ
operations, but a range of solutions is imaginable. Some options might involve China converging on U.S. perspectives, as a China with expanding global interests and a more active military sees less value in restrictions on
what militaries can do in other EEZs. A PLA officer suggested in June 2013 that China might respond to U.S. reconnaissance activities by “sending ships and planes to the U.S. EEZ,” acknowledging that China has already
done so “a few times.”30 China’s recent military activities within the EEZs of other countries—including naval activity around Guam and Hawaii—suggest that Chinese naval operations are becoming more parallel to
American operations.31 It is also possible to imagine a more transparent and cooperative China, such
that the United States feels less need to conduct surveillance in China’s EEZ. The nature of
the modus vivendi is likely to have a significant impact on how other maritime
powers interpret UNCLOS with respect to EEZ military operations. Chinese
compliance with more generally agreed-on norms of maritime behavior might
compel the handful of countries (especially India and Brazil) with restrictive
interpretations to modify their stances to align more closely with the interpretations
held by the United States and most other countries. Conversely, American acceptance of
strong limitations on EEZ surveillance operations may induce a broader sense of
hyperterritoriality with respect to maritime boundaries, whereby operations in any country’s EEZ are treated in a restrictive
manner akin to the regime of the territorial sea. In this case, restrictive interpretations of UNCLOS may become more
At the dawn of the atomic age, Soviet and Western naval strategists found themselves grappling with a
set of daunting and unprecedented challenges. Accustomed to the laws of conventional naval warfare, fleet commanders were suddenly
compelled to operate under a nuclear shadow. As a result, many of their core assumptions concerning the conduct of naval operations, whether in times of peace or of war, underwent a fundamental revision.
Looming in the backdrop of every naval deployment was the possibility , however remote, of
tensions escalating into conflict and of conventional maritime combat spiraling into
a potentially catastrophic naval nuclear exchange. As Paul Nitze observed in a seminal article in 1956, the situation confronting the two
superpowers had become analogous to a hair-raising game of chess, whereby¶ the atomic queens may never be brought into play; they may never actually take one of the opponent’s pieces. But the position of the atomic
queens may still have a decisive bearing on which side can safely advance a limited-war bishop or even a cold-war pawn. The advance of a cold-war pawn may even disclose a check of the opponent’s king by a well-
positioned atomic queen.93 ¶ Using a different metaphor but describing essentially the same phenomenon, French strategists, such as Andre Beaufre, wrote that “the nuclear force may be unseen, but it is always there,
The problem with the maritime domain, however, was its very lack
and it is this which sets the boundaries of the battlefield.”94 ¶
of boundaries. In contrast to the clear terrestrial delineations among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern and Central Europe, the world’s oceans provided
a vast arena where both superpowers’ navies were in almost incessant interaction. The frequency of these contacts inevitably led to moments of friction and occasionally to incidents that severely imperiled strategic
stability. As both superpowers aggrandized and diversified their nuclear arsenals, they devoted a great deal of attention to the maritime domain—not only in terms of SSBN operations and CASD—but also as a theater of
operations potentially more susceptible to the conduct of tactical nuclear warfare. ¶ As academics such as Francis Gavin have aptly noted, the study of history can prove most useful when it is conducted “horizontally,”
inevitably come to face in the not-too-distant future were, in fact, discussed at length
during the Cold War’s multidecadal naval nuclear competition. ¶ Conventional Naval Operations Under a Nuclear
Shadow ¶ For much of the Cold War, the balance of conventional military power on the Eurasian continent was in the Soviet Union’s favor. As a result, NATO planners relied heavily on the threat of nuclear use as a means
of projecting deterrence. ¶ In the naval domain, the situation was reversed, with Western navies enjoying a distinct superiority—both technological and numerical—over their Soviet rival. From the very beginning of the
Cold War, Western planners fretted over the possibility that the Soviets might attempt to offset their conventional naval inferiority by threatening to employ nuclear weapons at sea.¶ The vulnerability of large surface
ships to nuclear attack, in particular, became a source of much concern to nuclear strategists. For instance, Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, advised against the deployment of aircraft carriers, writing that
in his mind, an aircraft carrier looked to me like quite a good target. In fact, if I project my mind into a time, when not only we, but also a potential enemy, have plenty of atomic bombs, I would not put so many dollars and
so many people into so good a target. Come to think of it, I would not put anything on the surface of the ocean—it’s too good a target.96 ¶ U.S. naval commanders warned that, in the event of conflict, the Soviet Union’s
Strategic Missile Forces might seek to supplement the actions of a conventionally outmatched Soviet Navy by targeting Western naval task forces or convoys. Writing in the Naval War College Review in the late 1960s,
one U.S. lieutenant commander made a dire observation: ¶ If one side presented the preponderance of targets the use of nuclear forces could be advantageous to the other side. The preponderance of surface forces in the
West makes it extremely strong in a conventional war. However, as soon as the [Soviet] Bloc use of nuclear weapons is conceded, the loss of many of these vessels can be expected with a relatively small amount of effort
on the part of the Bloc Forces.97 ¶ Strategists such as Desmond Ball also noted that the destruction of large naval assets would disproportionately disadvantage the United States, both because of the enormous U.S.
investment in its carrier forces, and because of the greater U.S. dependence on sea lines of communication.98¶ This vulnerability of large, densely concentrated naval formations to nuclear weapons led to something of a
conundrum. The natural response to such a threat, argued both Soviet and Western strategists, was to engage in fleet or battle group spacing to reduce the likelihood of multiple kills resulting from a single nuclear
blast.99 The need for dispersal, however, flew in the face of centuries of naval practice. Preeminent Soviet military theorists began to question the very relevance of naval strategy, commenting that in the nuclear missile
era, the most deeply ingrained principles of Soviet naval tactics, such as “massed action” (massirovanie) and “combined action” (vzaimodeystvie raznorodnykh sil), could no longer be considered valid.100 This presented
military planners with a fundamental dilemma, as, notes one former U.S. Army attaché to Pakistan, “Survival in a nuclear environment required dispersal, while success in a conventional fight required mass and
concentration.”101 ¶ Within such a heavily nuclearized environment, the prospective operational benefits to be derived from launching a first salvo became even more apparent.102 Additionally, the escalation dynamics
of warfare in the maritime theater appeared, in the eyes of many naval analysts, to be considerably less constrained than those attending military operations on land. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, figures such as
Henry Kissinger noted that limited nuclear war between Soviet and Western forces was far more likely to flare up in secondary or peripheral theaters than along the heavily militarized Central European front.103 ¶ To
some theorists, the likelihood of one side initiating limited nuclear war hinged upon two main factors: whether the use of nuclear weapons could be confined to a specific geographical area, and whether they could be
used “surgically,” without incurring mass civilian casualties or the destruction of strategic centers.104 Out on the wide-open waters, the use of low-yield nuclear weapons against enemy vessels would result in little to no
collateral civilian casualties. As one U.S. naval officer wrote in 1967, “What targets of a tactical or strategic nature can be attacked and destroyed with less direct involvement of civilian populations than naval forces at
sea?”105 ¶ How then, wondered Western nuclear strategists, could the Soviets be deterred from employing—or from threatening to employ—nuclear weapons against NATO’s naval forces? Some posited that there was
scant likelihood that the Soviet Navy would seek to erode firebreaks between conventional and nuclear forces by genuinely subscribing to a nuclear warfighting strategy.106 The use of even a few tactical nuclear
weapons—however isolated the maritime theater in question—ran the risk of escalating to strategic exchange through the phenomenon of linkage. There was little reason, therefore, for the United States and its allies to
emphasize naval nuclear warfare.107 ¶ Others argued that the only true way to prevent the Soviets from engaging in coercive nuclear escalation at sea was to nuclearize close to the entirety of the combat fleet
architecture. The U.S. Navy agreed and adopted a strategy of escalation dominance by engaging in the wholesale nuclearization of its combat fleet while striving to disabuse the Soviet leadership of any notion that a
nuclear war at sea could be limited. ¶ This evolution in naval nuclear force posture was greatly facilitated by the wider doctrinal shift, in the mid-1950s and onward, from a deterrent policy predicated on massive
retaliation toward one of a more graduated or flexible response.108 In 1982, Richard Perle, then assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, declared that official U.S. policy was to “discourage the
Soviets from believing that they could limit a nuclear war to forces at sea.” He also stressed that¶ the Soviets retain a significant capability to attack ships at sea, and they may, as a consequence, be misled into believing
that so long as civilian casualties are not involved in such attacks, as they presumably would not be, they could in fact limit a war to attacks on forces at sea. . . . The desire on our part is not to permit the Soviets to
determine the scope of the battle to give whatever advantages would be inherent in their having the freedom to choose where the battle would be fought.109 ¶ By the 1980s, however, conventional and nuclear weapons
were commingled on U.S. surface and subsurface vessels. The fleet was equipped with a large and impressively broad inventory of tactical nuclear weapons, ranging from nuclear anti-submarine rockets to nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles.110 For proponents of a strategy of flexible response, such a shift made eminent sense. Supporters argued that this wide dispersal of nuclear assets across the fleet had vastly
augmented the allied nuclear reserve, thus effectively dampening any lingering Soviet temptation to conduct a “coordinated, preemptive strike at sea.”111 Moreover, the ubiquitous presence of theater nuclear weapons
aboard U.S. vessels served a vital signaling function. It was both a means of communicating resolve, thus dissuading the Soviets from engaging in escalatory naval actions, and a way of demonstrating the strength of U.S.
commitment to certain fretful, and geographically distant, allies. The deployment of naval platforms with nuclear-delivery capability, wrote military analyst Richard Fieldhouse, could “critically affect the dynamics of the
crisis situation in a number of ways.” For example, perceptions of the stakes involved could be raised by the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear forces; and these forces could significantly alter the actual military capabilities
of the forces involved, thus improving escalation control by complicating the adversaries’ calculations of success and failure.112¶ Naval Friction and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation ¶ For many analysts, the
generalized commingling of conventional and nuclear assets at sea was dangerously escalatory. In times of conflict, Soviet and Western naval commanders would have no way of determining whether enemy vessels were
armed with nuclear weapons or not, and a radioactive fog of war would float over combat operations. ¶ The most controversial dual-capable system was the sea-launched variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile. Fitted
aboard both surface and subsurface vessels, the Tomahawk’s long range (approximately 2,500 kilometers, or about 1,550 miles) and precision made it an ideal candidate for counterforce missions.113 This meant, noted
one observer, that with respect to the conventional/nuclear firebreak, the Soviet Union must consider any vessel equipped with Tomahawks to be a nuclear threat even if in fact these missiles are only carrying
conventional payloads. The obfuscation of these distinctions is likely to increase Soviet paranoia about U.S. naval deployments in the vicinity of the Soviet homeland; it inevitably reduces the degree of certainty with
which Soviet responses can be predicted; it increases the likelihood of escalation from actions that the U.S. might regard as tactical; and it increases the chances of miscalculation and misperception and hence of
inadvertent escalation.114¶ The dangers of sudden escalation arising from ill-perceived signaling or
deployments were heightened in the maritime domain, where naval interactions
frequently led to friction and where conflicts at times continued even after crises had abated on land.115 A classic example is the tense
situation that unfolded underwater during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which almost led to disaster. Historians now know that each of the Soviet submarines deployed off Cuba was armed
with nuclear-tipped torpedoes, a fact that was not known by the U.S. Navy at the time. In an attempt to force the Soviet submarines to surface, the U.S. fleet dropped practice depth charges. They were not intended to hit
the submarines, but rather to coerce them into revealing themselves. The Soviet submarine officers, however, viewed these actions in a different light, and one harried commander ordered his men to assemble the
nuclear torpedo to battle-readiness.116 ¶Even after both superpowers signed the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, their naval
interactions remained prone to sporadic bursts of tension, such as during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict.117 Episodes of
brinkmanship involving games of chicken, aggressive forward intelligence gathering, and accidental collisions were particularly prevalent
in the subsurface domain, which had been deliberately excluded from the
agreement.118 ¶ The risks of inadvertent escalation were exacerbated, argued Professor Barry Posen, when
conventional naval operations produced “patterns of damage or threat” to structural components of
a nation’s nuclear reserves, such as its SSBNs.119 During the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy
explicitly called for an aggressive ASW campaign by U.S. and allied naval forces against the entirety of the Soviet submarine fleet, SSBNs included.120 Conventional attrition of a substantial portion of the Soviet Union’s
second-strike capability, argued Posen, could be viewed by Moscow as a precursor to a nuclear attack, and this, in turn, might heighten Soviet temptations to engage in a preemptive nuclear strike against NATO forces.
destabilizing, noting that ¶ some strategies also can cause forces to intermingle in a crisis in a manner
that produces a tactical or strategic first strike advantage. . . . Some strategies can raise the risk that
forces will collide with one another in a manner that activates one side’s rules of engagement,
leading it to commence firing. In each instance crisis stability is undermined, and crises are more likely to erupt into
war.121¶ Hardline defenders of the 1980s maritime strategy rejected these critiques, and they argued that, to the contrary, threatening Soviet SSBNs provided the allies with significant leverage in times of conflict,
which might then be used in favor of war termination.122 Linton Brooks, who served on the Reagan administration’s National Security Council, agreed with this assessment, noting that the maritime strategy also
provided a means of eroding the offensive capability of the Soviet SSN fleet, which would find itself compelled to focus its energy on protecting SSBNs, rather than on attacking allied sea lines of communication.123 ¶ For
this school of thinkers, the systemization of dual-use platforms at sea did not weaken but buttressed deterrence—precisely due to the fact that it injected a certain degree of ambiguity. Professor Thomas Schelling
famously referred to this as the “threat that leaves something to chance.”124 Thus, for Linton Brooks, deterrence is enhanced through the deliberate importation of both risk and uncertainty. . . . Sea-based systems, able to
attack a wide spectrum of targets from a large number of platforms, over a broad spectrum of attack azimuths, complicate Soviet defense planning immeasurably, thus strengthening deterrence.125¶ Other observers
expressed skepticism over the notion that the Soviet Navy might respond to conventional attacks on its SSBNs by employing sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, arguing that Moscow’s political control over nuclear
drawn from the Cold War’s wealth of deliberations over issues such as sea-based nuclear weapons, naval nuclear warfare, and escalation control? As New
Delhi and Islamabad lay out the rudiments of their respective naval nuclear
architectures, they will no doubt find themselves wrestling with a remarkably
similar array of operational predicaments and deterrence-related challenges. ¶ Both nations are
still in the process of shaping their sea-based nuclear force structures, and naval nuclear interactions are likely to remain
somewhat sporadic for the next few years. This constitutes a singularly opportune
moment, therefore, for security communities in both capitals to engage in a much more granular analysis of past naval nuclear operations and strategies. ¶ The issue of dual-use platforms, whereby
conventional and nuclear assets commingle and overlap, is of particular relevance to contemporary South Asia, as are many of the Cold War era’s discussions over the tactical quandaries inherent in naval operations
under a nuclear shadow. ¶ South Asia’s maritime environment remains, for its part, alarmingly unstructured,
and the challenges posed by naval friction and misperception will no doubt loom
large in future times of crisis. Perhaps most importantly, Cold War theorists’ concerns over the considerable risks linked to the conventional targeting of strategic or nuclear-
armed platforms will urgently need to be addressed.¶ The Commingling Issue¶ Both India and Pakistan appear to be opting for naval
nuclear force structures that incorporate dual-capable systems. In India’s case, this may only be a temporary
phenomenon. It remains unclear whether the Dhanush program is truly envisaged as forming a component of India’s nascent sea-based deterrent, or whether the decision to fit surface ships with modified versions of the
Prithvi SRBM is simply a stopgap measure while the country’s SSBN fleet gradually takes shape.127 Writing in 2001, a seasoned observer of security developments in South Asia depicted the Dhanush program as the
result of mainly bureaucratic calculations, stating that it is unlikely to result in a sea-based nuclear deterrent—at least on present plans—since it is driven primarily by the Indian Navy’s interest in acquiring a land-attack
capability vis-à-vis Pakistan in order to assert its own strategic relevance to the larger war-fighting outcomes within the Indian subcontinent.128 ¶ There are also some practical considerations that would appear to
militate against equipping Indian surface vessels with such a system. First of all, the Dhanush is a liquid-fueled SRBM, and it can prove both difficult and hazardous to handle liquid propellants at sea. Moreover, liquid-
fueled missiles take longer to launch than their solid-fueled counterparts, which raises questions over the viability of the Dhanush as a robust second-strike system. Finally, in the event of conflict, India’s surface ships
could prove highly vulnerable to enemy anti-surface-warfare operations. ¶ Unfortunately, due to the Indian political leadership’s traditional reticence to discuss details pertaining to the nation’s nuclear force structure,
public discourse on the Dhanush has been captured by the scientists of India’s DRDO. In 2011, officials from this organization were recorded as saying that the successful launches of the Prithvi from land and sea had
established that “different forms of [India’s] nuclear deterrence are in place” and that the launches allowed India’s Strategic Forces Command to launch (nuclear) attacks “both from land and sea.”129 The Defense
Research & Development Organization, however, has developed an unfortunate habit of issuing assertive statements that do not necessarily reflect the views of India’s political leadership.130 ¶ Beyond the practical
limitations associated with deploying SRBMs from surface vessels, the debate, as it did during the Cold War, appears to revolve around two very different schools of thought. On the one side are those who believe that
deterrence can be strengthened through the injection of ambiguity, and on the other are those who argue that the deliberate blurring of conventional and nuclear platforms is far more likely to heighten the risks of
could have serious ramifications in times of crisis. This problem has been singled out by a trio of U.S. Naval War College professors, who
have warned that¶ if one navy stations nuclear weapons aboard conventionally armed warships,
its antagonist could end up inadvertently destroying nuclear forces in the process of
targeting conventionally armed forces.132¶ Echoing the arguments of Linton Brooks during the Cold War, Ashley Tellis, formerly at the RAND Corporation,
has taken a different position, arguing that the very ambiguity of the SRBM’s payload could provide India with the opportunity to “secure strategic benefits,” adding that ¶ the fact that Islamabad can never be certain as to
whether these standoff capabilities—especially the ship-based ballistic missile systems—are purely conventional or nuclear-armed make such unorthodox deployment postures particularly attractive from a strategic
point of view: These sea-based systems serve to levy a potential threat on Pakistan from what is otherwise a non-traditional axis, and, by that very fact, compel Islamabad to allocate military resources to sanitize them
even though the strike systems in question may finally turn out to be no more than conventionally armed vehicles of little strategic significance.133¶ Whereas it remains unclear whether India has expressly chosen a
school. As discussed in the first section of this report, Pakistan’s naval officers and strategists openly advocate
nuclearizing a large portion of the Pakistani fleet architecture —not only submarines, but also surface vessels and
maritime patrol aircraft. ¶ By wantonly engaging in a horizontal dispersal of its nuclear assets at sea,
Islamabad runs the risk of adding a considerable amount of instability to its naval
interactions with its larger South Asian neighbor. Pakistan’s calculation may be that such a move would
effectively neuter the Indian Navy by preventing it from prosecuting Pakistani vessels in the event of
hostilities. This assumption, however, may be deeply flawed. ¶ Conventional Operations and Strategic Instability¶ Several
observers have noted that Indian military personnel have openly alluded to the fact that Pakistan’s
nuclear assets would be targeted by Indian conventional forces in the event of war. 134 ¶
Although India’s nuclear doctrine may revolve around countervalue targeting, its conventional operational constructs appear to incorporate some potentially destabilizing counterforce elements. In many ways, this is
India’s maritime
reminiscent of Barry Posen’s discussion of the risks posed by conventional operations that cause patterns of damage or threat to nuclear-armed platforms.
strategy, for instance, places a heavy emphasis on offensive sea control, as well as on “marking and counter marking” as a
means to “clear the cobwebs” in the preliminary phases of conflict.135 ¶ Going forward, subsurface interactions are liable to
become particularly problematic. Andrew Winner, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, has noted:¶ Submarine-versus-submarine interactions occur already
without any public acknowledgment of increased tensions, but the importance of nuclear weapons may cause both sides to take greater risks both to gather intelligence and to defend a nuclear-armed platform. Similarly,
both sides may become more aggressive in patrolling and defending territorial
waters, contiguous zones, and even exclusive economic zones if they want to deny the other side from
gaining familiarity with a particular stretch of water.136¶ The history of the Cold War is littered
with examples of submarine intelligence-gathering operations gone awry, resulting in collisions, accidental
groundings, or near confrontations. ¶ A number of key questions about India-
Pakistan interactions remain very open and are seldom discussed in either New
Delhi or Islamabad. This is cause for concern . As India and Pakistan begin to deploy
nuclear-armed submarines, will both navies manage to avoid succumbing to the
escalatory pressures tied to such operations? In the event of conflict, would India and Pakistan eschew targeting nuclear-armed or dual-use platforms? If
Pakistan engaged an Indian SSBN, or if India destroyed a Pakistani surface ship
armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, could strategic stability be preserved? ¶
Greater attention will also need to be paid to naval force disposition and signaling. India is still far from acquiring the capabilities to conduct CASD and to seamlessly maintain SSBNs on deterrent patrol. As a result, it
is likely that in times of high tension, New Delhi would surge its undersea nuclear
assets from their deepwater ports in the Bay of Bengal.137 If detected, such a move might be deemed highly provocative by
Islamabad and could invite preemptive conventional action. Indian ASW forces, for their part, may feel a similar pressure to
engage in early attrition of Pakistan’s conventional attack submarines if they were detected moving close to Indian carrier groups or in the vicinity of major Indian port cities such as Mumbai.¶ Thomas Schelling famously
defined brinkmanship as the manipulation of the shared risk of war.138 By deliberately cultivating uncertainty and importing tactics of intimidation, weak actors may hope to convincingly deter a more risk-averse
opponent from effectively leveraging its conventional superiority. In terms of everyday maritime operations, this can dissuade the stronger naval actor from pressing its claims or maintaining a regular presence in certain
areas, out of fear of an isolated incident spiraling out of control.139 Pakistan has displayed a strong attachment to naval brinkmanship over the years, frequently buzzing Indian naval task forces with maritime aircraft,
and in some cases threatening to enter into direct collision with Indian naval ships. Both nations have failed to resolve long-standing maritime boundary issues, and they continue to engage in the systematic detention of
fishermen they consider to have violated their territorial waters.140 The most dramatic incident occurred in 1999, when a Pakistani Dassault-Breguet Atlantic aircraft violated Indian airspace, refused to respond to hails,
conditions, and they become even more hazardous in an environment where dual-
use systems have become the norm. Until now, both Indian and Pakistani naval officers have been accustomed to operating within a conventional maritime setting.
In the future, the Indian Air Force may have no way of ascertaining whether a
straying Pakistani maritime patrol aircraft is carrying nuclear ordnance or not .
Accurately fathoming an adversary’s intentions is a singularly challenging
enterprise.141 It becomes even more arduous when one player relies on a policy of tactical brinkmanship and
naval nuclear coercion to compensate for its conventional inferiority.¶ Last but not least, the scattering of nuclear assets at
sea, particularly aboard surface ships, heightens the risks of an accidental release or of a nuclear weapon’s
being intercepted by a malevolent nonstate actor . Concerns are already widespread with regard to the security of Pakistan’s land-based
nuclear inventory. One analyst noted in 2013 that although Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may be relatively well
protected in times of peace, this may be far from the case in times of crisis: ¶ Forced to
adopt a more delegative C2 [command-and-control] system during nuclear alerts and operational deployments of nuclear
weapons, Pakistan’s protection against inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear releases at
Pakistani vessels anchored in the shallow waters off Karachi or equally cluttered littorals remain acutely vulnerable, however, to
Ormara.144 ¶
suicide attacks or boarding actions by terrorists piloting fast attack craft. If nuclear weapons are
placed aboard surface ships, there is a chance they could be perceived as “soft
targets” for interception by nefarious nonstate actors or by radicalized elements within the Pakistan Navy itself.¶ Implications for Surface Warfare¶ During the Cold War, naval commanders found
themselves compelled to operate within an environment where commingling of nuclear and conventional weapons had become the new norm. For India’s military planners, however, the progressive nuclearization of the
higher defense management does not provide fertile ground for the blossoming of
serious thought on issues such as limited nuclear war , conventional operations under a nuclear overhang, or the
mechanics of intra-war escalation. There is little intellectual cross-pollination between the
Strategic Forces Command and the Integrated Defense Staff, let alone between the different services. Furthermore, no higher defense
the United States has been surprisingly lax in maintaining awareness of military risks posed
however,
by peer state rivals, and the relationship between grand strategy and oceans policy.
What are the greatest military risks in the international system?
First,the greatest military threat to a stable order comes from China, which is rising on
a wave of economic, scientific, and military power. Success in these spheres is producing political power for the first time,
creating in Beijing a heady atmosphere of arrival. China is a trendsetter in Asia, and is marketing its illiberal perspective on
oceans policy, both in the Pacific region and at the IMO. Following behind China, nations such as
Brazil and Iran are becoming dominant in their respective geographic and political spheres. Brazil is filling
a power vacuum on the continent of South America; Iran is filling a void created by the toppling of Saddam Hussein and subsequent civil war in Iraq. Second, a resurgent
autocratic Russia could further destabilize Europe. Moscow’s heavy hand has frightened
the states on its western border, and encumbered better relations with NATO and
the EU. Empowered with energy wealth to rebuild its military forces, Russia still suffers from a decayed infrastructure and an unhealthy and declining population base. But
Moscow aspires to be a naval power once again, so there may be opportunity to engage with Russia more effectively. The United
States has more in common with Russia on oceans policy than any other issue, and the two states worked closely to achieve the navigational regimes in UNCLOS. But instead of
working in tandem with Moscow at the IMO, the United States and Russia have been more inclined to butt heads. For the United States, the goal is to reassure European allies and
curry favor with the EU nations; for Russia, the objective has been to myopically define its foreign policy in terms of opposition to whatever the U.S. is promoting. Both nations share
essential interests in a liberal order of the oceans, and should work together closely to maintain and stabilize the system of rules in UNCLOS that they created.
the Middle East is under a grave threat from an aggressive and dedicated assault
Third,
by an irreconcilable wing of Islam, funded by radical Shiites and Sunnis. The extremists seek to attack the West in order to weaken its resolve
and dilute its institutions, destroy Israel, and impose a caliphate dictatorship throughout the Middle East. The states in the region — Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia — are caught in
the crosshairs, and any one of them could erupt into chaos, anarchy, or war. Whereas Egypt and Saudi Arabia care so much about stability that they stamp out all dissent, breeding a
seething anger that could explode, Syria and Iran are breeding instability by conducting secret, irregular wars through proxy forces throughout the Levant and beyond. Iran’s “split
personality” between the more professional Iranian Navy on the one hand and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy (IRGCN) on the other, keeps the Persian Gulf in a constant state of
high tension.
Fourth, there are a growing number of rogue regimes eager to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, mass murder, and mass disruption. These regimes, including North Korea, are developing chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons in order to limit the flexibility of the democratic states to challenge them, to deter neighborhood policing by the
United States and its allies, and to be able to impose their will on their neighbors. Iran is the most unpredictable nation in the Middle East, and Tehran has
Islamabad remains focused inward toward the continent, it also bristles at Delhi’s grip on the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, like its neighbor India, purports to
restrict foreign military activities in its EEZ.
there is an emerging international governance system of
Finally — particularly relevant for this study —
pseudo-legality sustained by bureaucratic international elites and anti-American and anti-Western states, which
weakens the democracies, “protects the vicious and the evil, and absorbs the energy of decent countries into endless maneuvers of utter impotence and
dishonesty.” 29 In the maritime context, the tribulations of international law are exposed in
the application of UNCLOS. The international law of the sea is pulled in so many
different, even contradictory directions, by dissimilar domestic and international constituencies that it is becoming
unmoored from its roots as a system for international peace and stability. As a global
system, the law of the sea is becoming less coherent, not more. By working at cross-purposes to obfuscate international
law of the sea in a bureaucratic web of contradictory transnational, foreign, and domestic rules, oceans law risks being an agent of
be attached to and promote the defeat of these six threats. Freedom of the seas,
particularly in the EEZ, is a crucial element for meeting each of these challenges.
Both China’s build-up of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) weapons and Russia’s “escalate-to-
lead.
deescalate” tactical nuclear doctrine are examples of efforts to deprive the United States of
escalation dominance in future contests. While they have virtually no effect on U.S. nuclear deterrence, these changes
erode the effectiveness of deterrence by punishment by reducing the certainty that America
could manage escalation and successfully impose high costs for acts of aggression.2
They increase the presumed reliance of the United States on nuclear deterrence for
managing even small confrontations—a recourse that America’s competitors rightly assume it will be loath to use in an era of public aversion
to casualties (both inflicting and suffering them).
Third and most importantly, America’s rivals are developing tactics for evading
retaliatory deterrence. Russia and China have introduced limited-war techniques
designed to avoid trigger mechanisms of extended deterrence—for Russia, “jab and
grab” land incursions; for China, the creeping militarization of maritime zones. Both
techniques operate below the threshold of deterrence by punishment and seek to create
territorial faits accomplis that lower the costs of revisionism. Such methods pose
serious problems for deterrence by punishment, which is predicated on aggression
being identifiable and therefore punishable. In a limited war setting, punishment
quickly morphs into compellance—not just dissuading an enemy but dislodging him and forcing a withdrawal from his limited, stealthy
conquest. As Thomas Schelling has argued, compellance (“a threat intended to make an adversary do something”) is
inherently harder than deterrence (“a threat to keep him from starting something). Limited war shifts the
psychological burden of conflict—fear of retaliation—away from the aggressor and
places it on the shoulders of the defender—fear of escalation. It puts the defender in
the position of perpetually under-responding to ambiguous provocations (and
thereby losing control of strategically vital spaces by default) or over-responding
(and risking war).
Diversifying Deterrence Options
So far, America’s response to erosions in its military position has been mainly
technological: to bolster its competitive advantages against rivals and thereby shore up the credibility of existing deterrence methods. Attempts at
reassuring frontline allies through the deployment of tripwires (most recently, in Eastern Europe); the push
to refocus U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine on deterring major war; and some (though not all) of the components of the Pentagon’s third offset are all examples of how the United States
is “doubling down” on punishment. These efforts are likely to yield positive results in bolstering key components of retaliation and ensuring that deterrence by punishment remains
the backbone of America’s extended deterrent for the foreseeable future.However, as America’s lead in advanced weaponry
narrows amid prolonged cuts in defense spending, the United States may face limits to how
far it can go in using technology to deter its rivals. Unlike its past responses to the problem of competitor “catch-up” (for
example, Eisenhower’s “New Look” and the Offset Strategy of the 1970s), the United States will need to look for other sources of
predatory, frontline states now have a powerful incentive to do more for themselves
in defense: self-preservation. Thus motivated, many are arming and aligning with
similarly placed neighbors in an effort to contain large powers.
These dynamics create an opportunity for the United States. America’s extensive frontline
alliances offer a natural means of pursuing a strategy of deterrence by denial, both
as an end in itself for containing growing rivals , and as a compliment to deterrence by punishment. Historically, Great Powers
have often employed alliances with states located near rivals in this way. Prior to the nuclear era, denial was a more common way to achieve extended deterrence, since the tools for
often more effective to make it physically harder for them to expand rather than by
threatening to punish them . Such denial strategies were especially common among
maritime or status quo powers attempting to raise the costs of revisionism in key
strategic zones. Since they worked with the momentum of the small states’ desire to remain independent, deterrence by denial had
the added benefit of being cost-effective, particularly at moments of power
transition.
Three Ways to Deny
there are three ways that a Great Power can achieve extended deterrence
Generally speaking,
by denial. One is to make an ally or piece of territory harder to take. This usually
involves placing defensive attributes of some kind in the place that is likely to be the object of the revisionist
power’s desire—either using the forces of the patron or, far better, those of the targeted ally. The crucial difference between this
approach and the “trip-wires” used for deterrence by punishment is that forces
deployed for denial are intended not to die and trigger punishment but to live and
inflict pain on the attacker. The most common way to ensure this is to help the
frontline ally beef up its defensive properties. The classic example is 18th-century Britain’s policy of providing subsidies and arms
to Europe’s smaller states to deter the expansion of continental rivals. Another, bolder method is to help the ally acquire offensive capabilities.3 This requires the ally to be large
enough in size and capabilities to attempt a conventional deterrent of its own. France’s alliances de revers of the 17th and 18th centuries, for example, created an extended deterrence
based on denial by building a bulwark of aggressive mid-sized frontier states (Sweden, Poland, and Turkey). Through subsidies, advisers, and shared technology, France encouraged
these states to adopt eastward-facing offensive postures (Charles XII’s famous exploits were largely funded by France) to keep Russia on the defensive and impede its expansion into
Europe proper.
A second form of deterrence by denial is to make the revisionist’s coveted object
harder to keep. This is usually the best option when the ally in question is too weak to mount a credible defense but
possesses sufficient willpower to make it indigestible for an attacker. Since the
ultimate goal of revisionist powers is to achieve quick, easy grabs, this strategy seeks
to make them prolonged and costly—what could be called the “bitter pill” strategy.
Sixteenth-century Switzerland is one such example; another is 20th-century Finland. Both used scrappy defensive techniques and small but well-trained forces to advertise
indigestibility to predators. In extended form, this approach can involve a Great Power providing weapons of a type or number that enable an otherwise indefensible state to be
capable of waging guerilla war against an attacker and outlasting occupation. Britain used such an approach with the Netherlands in the early 18th century by funding mercenary
armies and encouraging the flooding of Holland’s fields; in the early 19th-century, it supplied weapons and fortifications to Portugal to resist French encroachments. ¶
The third form of deterrence by denial is to make the ally or territory in question stronger industrially than the attacker. Unlike the methods above, which focus on militarily
penalizing an attack, this form of deterrence is long-term and mainly economic. Since a major goal of revisionist aggression is to break alliances, denying them their objective can be
aided by strengthening the ties between the target country and its patron. Abundant evidence shows that extended deterrence is most effective when the military relationship
1900 and 1980 found that defensive alliances characterized by close political ties and
even small amounts of trade succeeded in deterring aggression seven times out of eight, compared
to much lower success rates in alliances based purely on military relations. France famously
sought to build up the resiliency of its CEE alliances not just by aiding and advising their militaries but by providing investment to build up strategic industries and railways, and to
fuel economic growth.
America has abundant opportunities to inter-weave denial methods into its wider
punishment-based system. Rimland alliances offer natural tools for managing multiple, large Eurasian competitors. In both Europe
and Asia, the United States possesses alliances with small states with the motivation to oppose local hegemons. A U.S. strategy
to “activate” these alliances as instruments for discouraging attempts at control of
important real estate could include all three of the forms of denial mentioned above. It would
use the military geography of frontline allies to make them and nearby real estate
harder to take. America’s archipelagic Asian allies can employ naval mines,
submarines, and an increasingly advanced array of missiles to turn the region’s
narrow waterways into clogging mechanisms for impeding Chinese naval expansion.
Similarly, in Eastern Europe, allies in the Baltic-Black Sea corridor can be turned into
“bitter pills” bristling with anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. Mid-sized states (like
Poland, Finland and Romania) can be armed with offensive weapons like the AGM-158 JASSM and
Tomahawk missiles to keep revisionists off balance and diverting budgets to defensive capabilities. Tiny but determined allies like the
Baltic States can be made harder to hold in an invasion by, for example, offering pre-set U.S. packages of nasty weapons like landmines that are automatically released on the first sign
intra- and inter-regional cooperation in strategic industries and R&D would thicken the “hide” of
allied frontiers on a longer-term basis.
Incorporating denial into the U.S. extended deterrence system would offer important advantages for the United States. Strategically, it would
focus scarce resources to the places where conflict is most likely to occur . Technologically, it
would play to many of America’s emerging areas of competitive strength, including
in defensive weapons like surface, air, and naval missiles favored in the third offset,
while prompting greater clarity in Pentagon thinking on the as-yet underexamined role for alliances in the offset strategy.
In defensive terms, it would provide tools that, should deterrence fail, are more easily
employed to fight and win a conflict than those used for punishment. Geographically, denial
would play to America’s latent, underdeveloped advantage: its wide range of frontline allies with
the predisposition and location to disrupt rivals’ offensive moves. Organizing these states for stronger self-
defense would raise the visible costs of revision without necessarily adding commensurate defense burdens for the United States. By systematically bolstering the denial capabilities of
would also reinforce and clarify the trigger mechanisms for deterrence by punishment
and help to make extended deterrence as a whole more solvent against hybrid-war
threats.
Injecting greater emphasis on denial into U.S. strategy could also have a political
benefit for America’s alliances. Traditionally, frontline states have had an aversion to
patron relationships that are overly reliant on punishment, especially when the patron in question is a maritime
power. Unlike retaliation, which can seem remote and beyond control to the state being
great-power bargaining chip, joint investment by the patron and ally in denial strengthens the
political bonds of the alliance.
Most importantly , a greater focus on denial could help to shift the psychological burden of 21st-
century conflict back where it belongs: on the shoulders of states that wish to
rearrange the international order. Whereas limited-war techniques enable
revisionists to believe they can avoid triggering retaliation and thereby get away with an
easy victory, denial signals that they will pay a steep price for aggression at the place
it occurs, ranging from a sharp rebuff to a war of attrition . From Eastern Europe to the
Western Pacific, the goal should be the same: to limit options for easy revisions and
to increase the immediate cost and difficulty of grabbing and holding territory .
Building up such mechanisms will help the United States avoid the predicament of holding
together through compellance what it could not through deterrence. The goal should be to restore a
healthy sense of fear in would-be predators. Doing this now, while the century is still young and revisionists
are still mulling over their options, will be a far cheaper policy in the long run than
waiting for deterrence by punishment to fail and then trying to regain lost ground
through coercion.
Asset removal is key – Chinese fears stem from U.S. presence, not
declaratory policy – carrier removal is a prerequisite to deterrence-by-
denial
Michael Ryan Kraig 13, assistant professor of national security studies at the Air Command
and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base; and Leon J. Perkowski, PhD candidate in the
history of US foreign relations senior instructor in the Department of International Security
and Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Summer 2013, “Shaping Air and
Sea Power for the “Asia Pivot”: Military Planning to Support Limited Geopolitical
Objectives,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 114-136
Indeed, recent literature by Air Force and Navy officers has begun to define and argue for a range of capabilities that flexibly threatens not only greater or lesser military costs, but also lesser or greater policy stakes. For instance, evolving
concepts focused on countering A2/AD anti-access and area denial ( ) strategies— such as A S B the ir- ea attle—rightly argue the U that nited
level military capacities might give added credibility to US deterrent threats and plans in a tense
reducing
environment, the prospect of fullscale warfare.
the likelihood that the United States be confronted with either “backing down” or committing to actions that raise In sum:
the ability to credibly and capably impose negative costs without dramatically
escalating the political stakes involved would facilitate the eventual resumption of a
stable peace.and at least partially cooperative
deep-strike, precision, forces being called for under speed, and stealth of some new conventional missile and bomber the generic banner of both conventional
To the extent that the US Department of Defense is pursuing the latter specific goal in particular, it is courting the danger of making too little of a distinction between the universal, timeless need for decisive combat at the tactical level and the far rarer need to win an all-out
war with a competitor at a truly strategic level of policy objectives. We infer these troubling consequences based on the core military characteristic often attributed to CPGS or global strike forces: to create “strategic level” military effects on deep Chinese target sets, a military
operational and tactical goal that implicitly encompasses all-out political and/or military strategic objectives.
For instance, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a leading, highly influential defense think tank with myriad Pentagon contracts and personal military connections,33 has fretted that “the Air Force’s current bomber force lacks the capabilities and
capacity needed to penetrate contested airspace to strike thousands of targets in future air campaigns.” In answer to this perceived deficit in the US deterrent and war-fighting posture, the CSBA has called for “one hundred new optionally manned penetrating bombers with
all-aspect, broadband stealth, a payload capacity of approximately 20,000 pounds, and a range of 4,000–5,000 nautical miles. The bomber should have on-board surveillance and self-defense capabilities to permit independent operations against fixed and mobile targets in
degraded C4ISR environments.”34
deliver strategic paralysis that disarms the enemy without having to repeatedly
a form of literally
fight its frontline forces . The latter has generally been achieved (or at least attempted) by applying pressure against more indirect political, industrial, infrastructural, and other military-supporting as well as societal
targets, which in turn has been meant to undermine overall enemy political will and decision-making coherence. The latter exercise is generally what is meant by the term offensive strategic interdiction, whether advocated by theorists such as Giulio Douhet and B. H. Liddell
Hart, or by the Air Corps Tactical School in the form of the “Industrial Web Theory,” or more recently, in the planning documents and writings of Col John Warden III.35
would confront Beijing with not just degraded power projection but a severely even
degraded ability to defend its own homeland given the PRC’s historical focus on the . And
sanctity of its current borders —as shown in both its intervention in the Korean War and later in bruising battles with both the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the 1970s, costing tens of thousands of
escalate any hostilities rather than lead to a stable crisis resolution such threats . Indeed,
would almost certainly run afoul of the innate nationalist impulses implicit in the
millennia-long existence of collective Confucian culture in China ,37 and especially its felt “victim status” as a result of the “century
of humiliation” visited upon it by external colonial powers from 1839 to 1945.38
One might argue the capability to win such a large war decisively would
that deter an inherently
opponent from escalating to that point. However the empirical reality , in the security studies literature, concept and
powers harbor weapons at an operational level that can easily preempt the other
side’s forces quickly this exacerbates international anarchy The
, the grand strategy–level condition known as “ .”
decision calculus can quickly veer toward preventive war because decision or preemptive strikes
makers are tempted through opportunity and genuine fear to “strike first” to keep a both
political effect during both periods of “general deterrence” in peacetime and during
a diplomatic-military crisis . In essence, Bernard Brodie’s 1959 assessment of nuclear deterrence strategies is generally applicable here: “[A] plan and policy which offers a good promise of deterring war is . . . better
in every way than one which depreciates the objectives of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chances of winning” (emphasis added).40
2AC
Naval Strategy
before sequestration, it was obvious that the Obama administration was underfunding U.S.
defense requirements.
Hagel commented in February 2014 that, due to sequestration, the military readiness
Secretary of Defense
and modernization budget would be cut, leading to “a hollow force . . . that is not ready,
that is not capable of fulfilling assigned missions. In the longer term . . . the resulting force would be . . .
too small to fully execute the President's defense strategy.”
The Asia Pivot—which never provided for new permanent deployments of additional military forces to the Pacific—has been
derailed by defense budget cuts. Beyond that, Seoul and Tokyo were flummoxed by Obama’s
refusal to live up to the pledged military response when Syrian President Assad crossed the U.S.
redline against using chemical weapons against civilians. The allies have privately expressed fears that
Obama might similarly abandon U.S. defense commitments if North Korea or China
attacked them. Similarly, U.S. inability or unwillingness to prevent Vladimir Putin’s actions in
Crimea generated concerns that China would be encouraged take similar action against
areas Beijing claims as its own.
Despite strong U.S. rhetoric, America’s opponents haven’t moderated their behavior. Our
Asian allies now fear that the administration’s slashed defense budgets and unfilled ‘red
lines’ will embolden Beijing and Pyongyang to employ more coercive diplomacy—or
worse.
Carrier worse for cred -- decks deterrence and assurance --- nobody
takes the carrier seriously
Jerry Hendrix 15, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and the director
of its Defense Strategies and Assessments Program, former Navy captain, “The U.S. Navy
Needs to Radically Reassess How It Projects Power,” April 23,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417306/us-navy-needs-radically-reassess-how-
it-projects-power-jerry-hendrix
This argument as it regards the U.S. Navy is taking place with special vigor. The budget will have serious consequences for the size of the fleet and its ability to maintain combat readiness, which in turn will have
If the Navy wants to address its budget crisis, its falling ship count, its
consequences for U.S. strategy.
and strategic developments of recent years indicate that the day of the carrier is over
and, in fact, might have already passed a generation ago — a fact that has been obscured by the preponderance of U.S. power on the
seas. The carrier has been operating in low-threat, permissive environments almost
continuously since World War II. At no time since 1946 has a carrier had to fend off
attacks by enemy aircraft, surface ships, or submarines. No carrier has had to establish a sanctuary for operations and then defend
it. More often than not, carriers have recently found themselves operating unmolested closer to enemy shores than previous Cold War–era doctrine permitted, secure in the knowledge that the chance of an attack ranged
between unlikely and impossible. Such confidence in the dominance of the carrier encouraged naval architects to put more capabilities into their design, going from the 30,000-ton Essex-class carrier in 1942 to the
94,000-ton Nimitz-class carrier in 1975. Crew size of a typical carrier went from 3,000 to 5,200 over the same period, a 73 percent increase. Costs similarly burgeoned, from $1.1 billion for the Essex to $5 billion for the
Nimitz (all in adjusted 2014 dollars), owing to the increased technical complexity and sheer physical growth of the platforms in order to host the larger aircraft that operated at longer ranges during the Cold War. The
lessons of World War II, in which several large fleet carriers were lost or badly damaged, convinced Navy leaders to pursue a goal of a 100,000-ton carrier that could support a 100,000-pound aircraft capable of carrying
larger bomb payloads, including nuclear weapons, 2,000 miles or more to hit strategic targets, making the platform larger, more expensive, and manned with more of the Navy’s most valuable assets, its people.
Today’s new class of carrier, the Ford, which will be placed into commission next year, displaces 100,000 tons of water, and has a crew of
4,800 and a price of $14 billion. The great cost of the Cold War–era “super-carriers” has resulted in a reduction of the carrier force, from over 30 fleet carriers in World
War II to just ten carriers today. While the carrier of today is more capable, each of the ten can be in only one place at a time, limiting the Navy’s range of effectiveness. This points to the
first reason the U.S. should stop building carriers: They are too valuable to lose. At $14 billion
apiece, one of them can cost the equivalent of nearly an entire year’s shipbuilding budget.
(Carriers are in fact funded and built over a five-year period.) And the cost of losing a carrier would not be only monetary.
Each carrier holds the population of a small town. Americans are willing to risk their lives for important reasons, but they
have also become increasingly averse to casualties. Losing a platform with nearly 5,000 American souls onboard would
not just raise an outcry, but would undermine public faith in elected officials — and the officials know it.
removed from the arena as a result of a political decision not to risk their damage or
loss, current plans to defend U.S. interests would collapse. For this reason, the modern carrier
violates a core principle of war: Never introduce an element that you cannot afford
to lose. There can be no indispensable person or platform in war, for as soon as that
element is identified, the enemy will risk everything to destroy it, and in that
moment a war can be lost. The carrier has done well in the benign environments of
recent decades, but in the face of current rising threats, in which U.S. credibility is on
the line, there are serious questions about its continued worth. In 1996, China found itself embroiled in a controversy
with a government in Taiwan that was intent on declaring its formal independence. To send a message, China conducted a series of tests that involved firing missiles into the waters around Taiwan and built up forces to
conduct an amphibious exercise in the Taiwan Strait. In response, President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft-carrier strike groups to the strait. China, chastened, embarrassed, and well aware of the United States’ recent
demonstration of its ability to project power at will into Iraq and the former Yugoslavia from seaborne air bases, set about developing a series of capabilities that could credibly threaten American aircraft carriers and
push them back beyond the combat range of their aircraft. In the years that followed, China developed long-range aircraft equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, surface ships with long-range missiles, and
Chinese coast knows that it can be targeted at any moment. And the problem looks even more serious when we consider that
China has often exported military technologies to other nations willing to pay for them. The United States, the center of technological
innovation, thus finds itself in the position of being out-innovated. To counter emerging “anti-access/area denial”
(A2AD) technologies that include ballistic and cruise missiles that can reach ships over a thousand miles from shore, the U.S. Navy has invested billions of
dollars in anti-A2AD capabilities — such as electronic-spectrum jamming, directed-energy weapons, electromagnetic rail guns, and ballistic-missile defenses — in
a vain attempt to defend the carrier. An objective outside observer can easily
identify who is imposing costs on whom in this competition. The same outside
observer would also discern where the difficulty with the carrier design lies. The efficacy of the
carrier lies not in the ship but in the capabilities of its planes. Today, most of those planes are F/A-18 Hornets — a superb aircraft that has undergone many improvements in its lifetime but remains limited by its original
light-attack-mission requirements. In the past 14 years of combat operations, in which Navy aircraft have flown tens of thousands of sorties, we have learned a number of things. First, nearly 80 percent of a Hornet’s
9,000-flight-hour lifetime is spent maintaining the flight qualifications of its pilots. Second, if we factor in the life-cycle costs of the aircraft — including the cost of buying it, maintaining it, fueling it, and training its pilots
— and then divide that cost by the number of bombs dropped in combat, we arrive at an average cost per bomb of nearly $8 million. This is seven times the cost of a Tomahawk precision-strike cruise missile. Third,
the current average combat range of a carrier light-attack plane is only 500 miles. This
means that, even steaming at 30 knots, the carrier would spend 15 hours under an A2AD
threat in order to carry its planes close enough to hit land targets. The Navy has consistently opposed investing in
the type of unmanned long-range combat strike platforms that could renew its relevance, and today’s carrier planes do not have sufficient in-flight refueling capacity to significantly extend the range of the attack aircraft.
Proposals to use large “big-wing” U.S. Air Force tankers to extend the refueling capacity beyond what carriers can provide ignore the fact that these aircraft will not be able to operate within the A2AD threat bubble
unescorted by single-seat fighters, whose pilots cannot remain physically effective throughout the long 14-hour missions.
ASB destroys alliance credibility --- ineffective, risky, and too anti-China -
-- causes militarization
Richard A. Bitzinger 15, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations
Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2015, “China’s Military
Buildup: Regional Repercussions,” in China's Power and Asian Security, p. 57-58
The political and military establishment in the U.S. emphasizes the growing importance and complexity of East Asia's security challenges,
including the strategic and operational consequences of China's ongoing military modernization. U.S.
allies in East Asia,
however, have not fully embraced the ASB concept or the rationale behind it. Indeed, South
Korea, Japan, Australia and other U.S. partners in the region have been relatively quiet on the
implications of ASB, largely because they do not possess the full extent of the planned operational details, which remain
classified. Such hesitance is also attributable to concerns, from the allied perspective, over the
extent to which ASB provides strategic reassurance as opposed to representing
abandonment by the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. DoD has not clarified the link between the ASB
concept and its "rebalancing strategy " in the Asia-Pacific region, nor what particular aspects of
ASB will be relevant for future allied interoperability requirements and involvement. Moreover,
at the operational level, U.S. allies question whether implementing ASB would actually mitigate
military effectiveness and the defense of proximate U.S. allied bases in the region.
At this point, no
U.S. ally or potential military partner in Northeast or Southeast Asia is anywhere near equipped
at this point to make much of a contribution to U.S. AirSea Battle operations. Japan is
probably the most concerned about a rising Chinese military threat , as reflected in its 2011
National Defense Program Guidelines and its embrace of a "dynamic defense force." This "dynamic defense" emphasizes high-mobility, an
expeditionary capacity (to specifically defend off-shore islands), jointness (within the entire Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF)) and
interoperability with U.S. forces.29 At
the same time, the JSDF remains overwhelmingly a
defensively oriented military; its major potential contributions to ASB are in
providing secure forward basing to U.S. forces, missile defense, and a small but growing
capacity for power projection (e.g. new helicopter carriers, an expanding submarine force, additional sea- and airlift).
According to Benjamin Schreer: "Japan's defense planning has thus started to shift toward complementarity in a possible 'Allied AirSea
Battle' concept. Militarily, it's increasingly well placed to 'plug and play' in a future Sino-US conflict."30 On the other hand, Japan remains
militarily and strategically hamstrung by an extremely tight defense budget that limits the acquisition of ASB-supporting equipment or
infrastructure, and a continuing pacifist streak that runs through the general populace; its ability to make a substantial contribution to
ASB operations is still limited, therefore.
China’s possesses a wide variety of antiship cruise missile (ASCM) types, whose range,
speed, and performance will increasingly threaten U.S. surface ships. China employs
ASCMs from aircraft like the Flanker, surface ships, submarines, small fast patrol
craft, and land-based mobile TELs. U.S. surface naval forces will thus encounter a
thickening defense of ASCM launch platforms as they approach China’s coast.
Chinese Flanker aircraft, armed with the latest models of ASCMs, will present one of the
first, and perhaps most dangerous, threats to U.S. surface ships, such as those in carrier
and expeditionary strike groups. As mentioned above, China’s Flankers have a combat radius of
1,500 kilometers. They can be armed with up to six ASCMs, including the highly capable Russian SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic
ASCM, with a range of about 250 kilometers, or the Chinese-built YJ-91/12 ASCM, with a range of up to 400 kilometers.46 The
Flanker-ASCM combination can thus attack targets 1,750 to 1,900 kilometers from
the Flanker’s last refueling point.
China’s most advanced ASCM models—the Sunburn, the Russian submarine-launched SS-N-27 Sizzler, and
the YJ-91/12—are especially dangerous to adversary surface warships . These missiles
approach their targets at wave-top heights to avoid detection and fly at supersonic
speeds while executing very sharp terminal attack maneuvers to thwart ship defense
systems. These missiles use both inertial and satellite navigation and acquire their targets with active radar, infrared tracking, and
homing on the target’s own electronic emissions.47 There are grave doubts about the capacity of U.S.
warships to defend themselves against ASCMs that have acquired their targets,
especially when launched in coordinated, multi-axis volleys.48
China’s acquisition of long-range air-launched ASCMs like the Sunburn and YJ-91/12 has greatly
increased the danger to U.S. carrier strike groups. Previously, when China’s air-launched ASCMs had ranges
under one hundred kilometers, U.S. aircraft carriers and their air defense escorts would be able to prepare
for the incoming attackers and employ the full range of the strike group’s defenses. The carrier’s early
warning aircraft and combat air patrols could detect incoming formations of enemy
aircraft many hundreds of kilometers from the strike group. This would allow the carrier time to launch
more interceptors to battle the incoming attackers before they reached a launch point for their ASCMs. Even worse for the
adversary, that launch point would be well within the range of the strike group’s surface-to-air missiles, directed by the powerful Aegis
combat system.
But the addition of the YJ-91/12 has shifted the advantage to China. The four
hundred kilometer–range of this missile places its launch point beyond the range of
the Aegis and its missiles. It also allows very little time for the carrier to get more
interceptors into the air to battle the inbound Flankers before they reach the four
hundred–kilometer launch point. A hypothetical attack by two Flanker regiments
would involve forty-eight aircraft, about 12 percent of China’s Flanker inventory in 2020. These two
regiments could approach the carrier strike group from at least two axes. Since such an
attack could arrive at any time, the strike group could maintain a continuous combat
air patrol of only a few interceptor aircraft. Although the strike group could rush a
few more interceptors to the air defense perimeter before the Flankers reached their missile launch
points, the Flankers would heavily outnumber the defenders and would likely approach
from more axes than the Navy fighters could defend.
Accepting that the strike group would shoot down some Flankers before they
launched their antiship missiles, the strike group would still have to contend with 125
to 200 incoming ASCMs, which would make wave-top, supersonic approaches to the
U.S. ships. In past engagements of antiship missiles against alerted surface warships, 32
percent of attacking missiles scored hits.49 If only 5 percent of the ASCMs scored hits,
the carrier strike group’s ships would still receive five to ten missile impacts, likely causing enough damage to
render the group ineffective and possibly defenseless against another attack. Even if few or no
ASCMs achieved hits, the carrier strike group would still very likely have to retire, having
exhausted its defensive missile magazines.
U.S. naval
forces will also have to contend with Chinese attack submarines armed with
ASCMs and wake-homing torpedoes. In 2012 China possessed twenty-nine attack submarines, each armed with up to eight advanced
ASCMs. Eight of these submarines are Russian-built Kilo-class boats armed with the supersonic Sizzler ASCM.50
China’s attack submarine force will continue to expand, with two indigenous models the focus of production. The Type 041 Yuan-class is
a new diesel-electric submarine. The Yuan-class submarine is expected to have air-independent
propulsion (AIP), for sustained and very quiet subsurface operations. Unlike nuclear-powered
submarines, diesel-electric submarines like the Type 041 are not well suited for long-range operations. But AIP-equipped diesel-
electric submarines present a particular challenge to antisubmarine forces, especially
when operating in the relatively shallow waters such as those in the First Island
Chain zone.51 The Yuan boats are armed with new models of long-range land-attack and
antiship cruise missiles, wired-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and naval mines (China has over fifty
thousand naval mines). The Congressional Research Service estimated that China added five Yuan submarines to its fleet in 201 2,
presumably with a similar production rate in the future.52
In 2015 China is expected to begin production of a new Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine, which will feature improved
quieting technology. Although somewhat easier to detect than the Type 041 Yuan, as a nuclear-powered boat the Type 095 will be
capable of wide-ranging missions in the Pacific, including intelligence gathering and land-attack strikes on bases in the Second Island
Chain (e.g., Guam) and beyond. China’s total attack submarine force is expected to reach more than seventy units by 2020 and become
increasingly modern and well armed, as new models replace obsolescent types.53
China also operates thirteen destroyers and twenty-two frigates armed with ASCMs.
Four of China’s destroyers are the Russian-built Sovremenny-class ships, each armed with sixteen of the supersonic Sunburn ASCMs.
Closer to shore, the PLAN operates over eighty fast attack craft, each armed with eight ASCMs. In
almost all cases, the
ASCMs China deploys on surface ships outrange the U.S. Navy’s Harpoon ASCM. In a
hypothetical surface engagement, U.S. warships would have to endure missile volleys
from China’s surface forces before they closed to the Harpoon’s range. Finally, China’s
land-based ASCM batteries, deployed on TELs, will be able to strike naval targets out to
160 kilometers.54
China’s layers of ASCM launch platforms thus present a substantial challenge to the
U.S. Navy’s long-favored method of projecting power ashore. Since the closing months of World War
II and up through the employment of carrier-based strike aircraft over Afghanistan, U.S. fleet commanders have enjoyed the freedom to
sail their aircraft carriers close to an enemy’s shore, confident that these adversaries had little or no capacity to interru pt the carriers’
flight operations. With
the missile and sensor revolution, the rules have changed
dramatically. In a conflict with China, it will be highly dangerous for U.S. aircraft carrier strike
groups to operate within 1,100 kilometers of China, the maximum combat radius of the
carrier’s strike aircraft. We should expect the missile and sensor revolution to continue, with ASCM ranges increasing,
pushing the U.S. Navy’s airpower capability even farther from shore.
SCS
Defensive strategy key to tailored deterrence which deescalates crises
Michael Johnson 14, a Senior Defense Research Analyst at the RAND Corporation, and
Terrence K. Kelly, Tailored Deterrence: Strategic Context to Guide Joint Force 2020,
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-74/jfq-74_22-29_Johnson-
Kelly.pdf
the United States should develop a defense strategy based on tailored
To guide strategic choices driven by reduced resources,
approaches to deter the principal threats to national security while preserving flexibility to account for their
uncertain trajectories and potential shocks. This hybrid approach would provide a strategic framework to ensure that defense planning scenarios are realistic and necessary, indicate the missions and forces required to
necessary and prudent to deter China from attacking U.S. allies, but underinvesting in the balanced joint force
necessary to deter rogue states from conducting an expanded range of hostile acts and to secure
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in failing states .
A deterrence strategy seeks to prevent or discourage a specific hostile actor from performing specific undesirable acts by introducing doubt in its ability to succeed or fear of retaliation. As the DSG states, “Credible
deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.”3 Linking deterrence
with capability, the DSG describes a decisive joint campaign to defeat aggression that includes the ability to “secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance.”4 The DSG implies some
measure of continuity with the two-war construct by stating, “our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-
scale operation elsewhere.”5 While consistent with deterrence theory and joint doctrine, the DSG does not take the next steps to specify whom and what to deter, or how, which is necessary to guide development of Joint
Force 2020 given declining defense resources.
As a result, there is disagreement among defense leaders about the types of forces required to deny objectives and impose costs when it comes to force-sizing. For example, to deter a wide range of threats, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey considers that the essential task of a flexible joint force is to prevail in simultaneous contingencies wherever and whenever they occur:
Now, there’s been much made . . . about whether this strategy moves away from a force structure explicitly designed to fight and win two wars simultaneously. Fundamentally, our strategy has always been about our
ability to respond to contingencies wherever and whenever they occur. This won’t change. . . . We can and will always be able to do more than one thing at a time. More importantly, wherever we are confronted, and in
whatever sequence, we will win.6
Yet others contend that the DSG represents a significant change that would use air and naval forces in lieu of ground forces to deter and defeat aggression. For example, retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary
Roughead suggests that fighting “two land wars simultaneously is not the Obama strategy.”7 His interpretation of a significantly different force-planning construct would use air and naval power to deny objectives or
impose costs in emergent challenges:
The defense strategy set forth by Defense Secretary Panetta in January 2012—a significant departure from prior Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ focus on winning our current land wars—seeks to rebalance our force
toward facing emergent challenges, which will be predominantly air and maritime in nature. . . . The structure of a force to meet these needs would maintain the Navy and Air Force at current objectives. . . . The active
duty Army would be reduced by [an additional] 200,000 soldiers from the 490,000 planned in the FY 2013 budget.8
Military leaders have different views about the requirements to deter and defeat aggression because the DSG never moves beyond the doctrinal template for deterrence to provide specific strategic guidance. It does not
define the adversary and hostile acts the United States seeks to deter or the military missions and forces to deny the (unknown) objective or impose the (unspecified) cost. Deny and defeat are ambiguous terms that vary
with the strategic objective in different cases. For example, the joint force could be required to:
• Deny the aggressor’s ability to attain the objective (that is, successful defense). Examples include preventing Iraq from seizing oilfields in Saudi Arabia and preventing North Korea from striking the United States with a
ballistic missile.
• Deny the aggressor’s ability to retain the objective (that is, successful offensive to restore the status quo ante bellum). Examples include restoring the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950 and reversing Iraqi aggression by
liberating Kuwait in 1991. This would also include a limited offensive to deny North Korea’s ability to strike Seoul with long-range artillery.
• Defeat the aggressor to prevent future attacks (that is, a successful offensive to defeat military forces and remove the regime as punishment for crimes against humanity). Examples include defeating Germany and Japan
in World War II and the Taliban in 2001.
• Threaten to punish the aggressor with nuclear weapons (that is, in extreme cases, threaten to retaliate in kind or overcome a conventional imbalance). During the Cold War, the strategy of flexible response incorporated
direct defense by conventional forces to resist an attack and gain time for a diplomatic resolution. If defense became untenable, deliberate escalation included the limited use of nuclear weapons to blunt an attack and
signal the will to proceed to the next stage—a general nuclear response against the enemy’s homeland.
the missions and forces required to deter and defeat aggression are highly
These examples reveal that
dependent on the circumstances in specific cases. Rather than assuming that air and
naval power are sufficient to deny objectives in all second contingencies, DOD should
develop tailored approaches to deter the principal future challenges to U.S. national
security interests as the basis for deriving realistic force-planning scenarios, military
missions, and joint forces.
Deter Aggression by China
There is inherent tension within the U.S. strategy to engage China while simultaneously deterring aggression and assuring allies. The National Security Strategy states that the United States is “working to build deeper and
more effective partnerships” with countries, including China, “on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect.”9 However, the underlying defense strategy since 1991 has been to sustain U.S. military dominance to
security dilemma by increasing fear of containment in China.11 Furthermore, the high financial
cost and risk of escalation associated with defeating China’s antiaccess/ area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities suggest that policymakers should weigh this approach against a
defensive form of flexible response that would provide more time to reach a political
resolution in future crises.12
The current approach is apparently to deter China with the Air-Sea Battle concept—at least that is how
Beijing sees it.13 China’s land-based missiles, which can strike aircraft carriers and air
bases at extended range, create a military-technical problem. The fear is that if the U.S. Navy and Air Force could be
denied access to the East and South China seas, then China could dominate Asia because the United States would be unable to deter its aggression. The proposed military-
technical solution is to develop the offensive strike and cyber capabilities to destroy
China’s sensor, command, and missile systems to “break the kill chain” by striking hundreds
of targets on the mainland.14
The advantage of sustaining military dominance (if possible) is the ability to preserve freedom of navigation by protecting aircraft carriers and tactical aircraft operating close to China. The capability to project power
the second largest economy is another matte r. Yet the lack of clearly articulated defense
policy to deter China is resulting in a force planning process that presumes that
breaking the kill chain in China is militarily necessary and politically realistic
despite obvious questions and considerations .15
The political and strategic disadvantages of offensive Air-Sea Battle become clear when
policymakers consider likely Chinese reactions to destroying hundreds of targets on the
mainland they deem essential for self-defense. China is no more likely to accept the loss of
its A2/AD system than the United States would be willing to accept the loss of its Pacific fleet
without escalating and making nuclear threats. An offensive doctrine to destroy
China’s A2/ AD system is destabilizing because each side would have a military incentive to
strike first based on a use-it-or-lose-it calculus. This incurs high risk of immediate
vertical escalation, leaving policymakers with little or no room for developing
political solutions to defuse a crisis.
In other words, recommending the use of Air-Sea Battle to break the kill chain in China would offer the President an escalatory option in the same vein that Helmuth von Moltke the Younger offered Kaiser Wilhelm II in
1914 (execute the Schlieffen Plan), Douglas MacArthur offered Harry Truman in 1951 (bomb mainland China), and Curtis LeMay offered John F. Kennedy in 1962 (bomb Cuban missile sites). American policymakers today
should realize that their predecessors rejected similar options because there is no credible theory to “defeat” a great power with nuclear weapons at acceptable risk, especially when the Chinese threaten “unrestricted
warfare” to defend their core interests. Policymakers should therefore drive the creation of more acceptable military options to defend U.S. interests while minimizing the incentives to strike first and escalate attacks.
To provide survivable and reinforcing joint fires, the Army could develop land-based antiship missiles for its existing rocket artillery systems, consider investing in antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, and increase the
Partners would
number of Patriot batteries in a new theater A2/AD brigade. It could then train with partners to develop A2/AD capabilities and tie them into U.S. systems if mutually beneficial.
become more capable of deterring China while the close relationship would
demonstrate U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. Even if China invests billions
to project power despite our A2/AD defenses, the risk of escalation, including the use
of nuclear weapons, would be sufficient to deter aggression. 18
This part of a deterrence strategy in Asia based on flexible response is similar to the
defensive posture that deterred the Soviet Union from attacking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.19
U.S. conventional forces were never built to attack and defeat the Soviets in a decisive joint campaign;
on the contrary, the United States recognized its ground forces in Europe were vulnerable to
attack. Their strategic purpose was to prevent a rapid fait accompli and trigger the
uncertain process of escalation at a local conventional level . Thomas Schelling explains why the “manipulation of risk”
succeeded in deterring the Soviets from attacking the isolated garrison in Berlin, which was surrounded by overwhelming force in multiple crises:
It has often been said, and correctly, that a general nuclear war would not liberate Berlin. . . . But that is not all there is to say. What local military forces can do, even against very superior forces, is to initiate the uncertain
process of escalation. One does not have to be able to win a local military engagement to make the threat of it effective. Being able to lose a local war in a dangerous and provocative manner may make the risk . . .
outweigh the apparent gains.20
ASB strikes will be conducted by the carrier strike group --- it’s highly
threatening to China
Henry Holst 14, M.A. Candidate at Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, has previously worked at the National Defense University’s College of
International Security Affairs, “The U.S. Military's Ultimate Fear: Are Aircraft Carriers Too
Big To Fail?” Aug 12, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-ultimate-
fear-are-aircraft-carriers-too-big-11066?page=3
How it Could Happen:
If the Navy’s worst nightmare came true and U.S. adversaries strengthen their ability
to threaten aircraft carriers, how does the Navy reorganize itself to project power?
The entire concept of a carrier strike group (CSG) is based on putting bombs on
target by primarily carrier-based planes. This is a large part of the Navy’s new
operational concept, Air-Sea Battle. Air-Sea Battle (ASB) integrates forces from all domains: space, air, land, sea, and cyber, in order to defeat
“adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities.” An asymmetric weapon that can bypass a carrier’s layered defenses and have even a remote chance
at hitting a carrier would throw a wrench in a plan that may be costing U.S. taxpayers around half a trillion dollars.
activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be “engaged in
presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.”
We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they
are not. In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities , i.e., what do
presence activities actually entail doing? ¶ Overseas military presence activities are
generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US government
uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A
variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella”
concept of military presence. These include but are not limited to US military efforts
overseas to train foreign militaries; to improve inter-operability of US and friendly
forces; to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend
US interests; to gain intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to conduct
peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that
they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security
operation or contingency should call for them. 2
CP
Asset removal is key – Chinese fears stem from U.S. presence, not
declaratory policy – carrier removal is a prerequisite to deterrence-by-
denial
Michael Ryan Kraig 13, assistant professor of national security studies at the Air Command
and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base; and Leon J. Perkowski, PhD candidate in the
history of US foreign relations senior instructor in the Department of International Security
and Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Summer 2013, “Shaping Air and
Sea Power for the “Asia Pivot”: Military Planning to Support Limited Geopolitical
Objectives,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 114-136
Indeed, recent literature by Air Force and Navy officers has begun to define and argue for a range of capabilities that flexibly threatens not only greater or lesser military costs, but also lesser or greater policy stakes. For instance, evolving
concepts focused on countering A2/AD anti-access and area denial ( ) strategies— such as A S B the ir- ea attle—rightly argue the U that nited
level military capacities might give added credibility to US deterrent threats and plans in a tense
reducing
environment, the prospect of fullscale warfare.
the likelihood that the United States be confronted with either “backing down” or committing to actions that raise In sum:
the ability to credibly and capably impose negative costs without dramatically
escalating the political stakes involved would facilitate the eventual resumption of a
stable peace.and at least partially cooperative
deep-strike, precision, forces being called for under speed, and stealth of some new conventional missile and bomber the generic banner of both conventional
To the extent that the US Department of Defense is pursuing the latter specific goal in particular, it is courting the danger of making too little of a distinction between the universal, timeless need for decisive combat at the tactical level and the far rarer need to win an all-out
war with a competitor at a truly strategic level of policy objectives. We infer these troubling consequences based on the core military characteristic often attributed to CPGS or global strike forces: to create “strategic level” military effects on deep Chinese target sets, a military
operational and tactical goal that implicitly encompasses all-out political and/or military strategic objectives.
For instance, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a leading, highly influential defense think tank with myriad Pentagon contracts and personal military connections,33 has fretted that “the Air Force’s current bomber force lacks the capabilities and
capacity needed to penetrate contested airspace to strike thousands of targets in future air campaigns.” In answer to this perceived deficit in the US deterrent and war-fighting posture, the CSBA has called for “one hundred new optionally manned penetrating bombers with
all-aspect, broadband stealth, a payload capacity of approximately 20,000 pounds, and a range of 4,000–5,000 nautical miles. The bomber should have on-board surveillance and self-defense capabilities to permit independent operations against fixed and mobile targets in
degraded C4ISR environments.”34
deliver strategic paralysis that disarms the enemy without having to repeatedly
a form of literally
fight its frontline forces . The latter has generally been achieved (or at least attempted) by applying pressure against more indirect political, industrial, infrastructural, and other military-supporting as well as societal
targets, which in turn has been meant to undermine overall enemy political will and decision-making coherence. The latter exercise is generally what is meant by the term offensive strategic interdiction, whether advocated by theorists such as Giulio Douhet and B. H. Liddell
Hart, or by the Air Corps Tactical School in the form of the “Industrial Web Theory,” or more recently, in the planning documents and writings of Col John Warden III.35
would confront Beijing with not just degraded power projection but a severely even
degraded ability to defend its own homeland given the PRC’s historical focus on the . And
sanctity of its current borders —as shown in both its intervention in the Korean War and later in bruising battles with both the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the 1970s, costing tens of thousands of
escalate any hostilities rather than lead to a stable crisis resolution such threats . Indeed,
would almost certainly run afoul of the innate nationalist impulses implicit in the
millennia-long existence of collective Confucian culture in China ,37 and especially its felt “victim status” as a result of the “century
of humiliation” visited upon it by external colonial powers from 1839 to 1945.38
One might argue the capability to win such a large war decisively would
that deter an inherently
opponent from escalating to that point. However the empirical reality , in the security studies literature, concept and
powers harbor weapons at an operational level that can easily preempt the other
side’s forces quickly this exacerbates international anarchy The
, the grand strategy–level condition known as “ .”
decision calculus can quickly veer toward preventive war because decision or preemptive strikes
makers are tempted through opportunity and genuine fear to “strike first” to keep a both
political effect during both periods of “general deterrence” in peacetime and during
a diplomatic-military crisis . In essence, Bernard Brodie’s 1959 assessment of nuclear deterrence strategies is generally applicable here: “[A] plan and policy which offers a good promise of deterring war is . . . better
in every way than one which depreciates the objectives of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chances of winning” (emphasis added).40
TPA DA
That was a gamble that President Obama probably had to take. It is one thing for a Republican president to
work exclusively with a Republican majority in Congress over the objections of Democrats–which is
how the Bush administration succeeded in securing ratification of the numerous trade agreements it concluded–but quite
another for a Democratic president to shun his party and reject its orthodoxy,
wrong-headed as it may be.
So far, the president’s efforts to woo Democrats have backfired. His aversion to making a comprehensive
moral and economic argument for TPP, focusing instead on
the deal’s “progressive” features–
enforceable labor and environmental provisions, anti-tobacco provisions,
limitations on intellectual property protection for pharmaceutical products– has
attracted fewer Democrats than it has repelled Republicans. That formula begs for
failure, or at least deferral, of TPP ratification.
Despite the approval of the Pentagon and the strong support of the Navy and the Air Force
the new operational concept has been facing consistent opposition within the
government, in Congress and even between other branches of the armed forces. The
House Armed Service Committee in its FY 2014 National Defense Authorisation Act advanced a number of
concerns about the concept and the efficacy of the newly established ASB Office in
advancing interoperability and cooperation between Navy and Air Force (US House of
Representatives 2013). In addition to that, the Army and Marines have expressed their concerns about
the shift of resources towards the Navy and the Air Force caused by the adoption of
ASB. Moreover, ASB has not been fully approved by the President.
but also suggests that once trade is already fairly open, the gains from opening it further are small. But because
economists want to keep shouting, "yay free trade!," they look for reasons that those gains might be larger, even
though the stories they end up telling are inconsistent with the competitive model that was the basis for their free
trade advocacy in the first place.¶ Oneparticular misuse of the yay-free-trade sentiment is the persistent effort
to make protectionism a cause of economic slumps, and trade liberalization a route to recovery. How many
times have you seen the Kindleberger "spiderweb" chart showing declining world trade in the early years of the Great
Depression, which is then invoked as showing the evils of protectionism (see Slide 2 of my talk)?In fact, it shows no
such thing.¶ The fact is that today trade is fairly free, and estimates of the costs of protectionism
from standard models suggest that these costs are quite small. Trade restrictions just aren't a major drag on
the world economy these days, so the gains from liberalization must be slight.
1AR
Naval Strategy
makes the destruction of hardened targets (e.g., integrated air defense systems,
command and control nodes, and armored/mechanized troop formations) difficult, if
not impossible. For the PLA to effectively execute a denial strategy, they would have to reduce Taiwan’s forces—nearly two million combined active duty and
reservist troops—to the point that less than six PLA divisions could conduct an effective landing and hold a beachhead against a fully mechanized opposition force for the
approximately 20 hours it would take for Chinese reinforcements arrive. The implausibility of this scenario makes a denial strategy that many analysts fear almost laughable.¶ This
leaves the punishment and risk coercive strategies on the table. The SAC’s conventional forces certainly have the capability to target the Taiwanese population, hoping they force the
Republic of China to surrender or face mass uprisings. History has shown this to be a naïve and baseless expectation. During the Second World War, Germany was unsuccessful in
forcing the British to surrender despite conventional missile attacks against London. Allied European strategic bombing campaigns saw a total of 2,770,540 tons of ordnance dropped
in Europe, causing some 600,000 deaths. Japan saw the destruction of 67 cities by way of 503,000 tons of ordnance, leaving 500,000 dead and five million displaced. Despite these
lengthy and destructive campaigns, neither state capitulated until it faced total defeat after years of conventional force-on-force conflict. Some 30 years later, American and allied
forces expended 864,000 tons of munitions during the strategic bombing campaigns targeting North Vietnam, yet the Communists continued their war and eventually attained victory.
Even with the advent of precision guided munitions, strategic bombing failed to produce a victory in Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Both the First
China has
and Second Gulf Wars were only won after the destruction of Iraq’s military forces made further resistance irrational or impossible.¶
approximately 1,200 conventional SRBMs—each capable of delivering 500kg warheads—and 200 launch
vehicles. This translates to a mere 110 tons of deliverable ordnance per launch cycle
of 30 minutes. With history as a guide, it is safe to assume that China’s conventional
missile capability is not the trump card many believe it to be. In the event that a cross-strait crisis occurs and
PLA missiles bombard Taiwan, history suggests that the Taiwanese will rally around their leaders, their military will mobilize, and the fight will continue despite the inevitable
destruction of large surface-area targets such as airfields. With the threat of a fait accompli almost inconceivable, there would be no need for a quick kinetic response to suppress short
range ballistic missile launchers located in mainland China.¶ What does this mean for Taiwanese and U.S. strategy in the event of cross-strait conflict? Taiwan’s ability to passively
absorb a conventional missile attack allows the island to implement a deterrent strategy transcending this tactical threat. Such a plan would cease procurement of expensive fixed-
wing aircraft due to its vulnerability to a first strike and low survivability in the event of follow-on strikes by the qualitatively and quantitatively superior PLA Air Force. Instead,
defense spending should be allocated for mobile missiles and the continued hardeningof existing missile batteries, coastal defensive positions, C2 nodes, logistical infrastructure, and
its newly operational phased array early warning system. This more efficient strategy not only costs less, but enhances Taiwanese integrated air defense system (IADS) survivability
and effectiveness. Such a strategic shift will fundamentally alter China’s strategic calculus due to its inability to accurately destroy mobile and hardened targets with a conventional
missile strike. A robust and hardened IADS – expanding upon the eleven electronic warfare facilities (including the powerful PAVE PAWS) conducting air surveillance and the twenty-
two fixed missile batteries employing HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung SAM systems – could decrease the utility of a follow-on air attack to the point that Chinese leadership deem they
would lose too many assets in a bid for air superiority, thus creating a successful deterrent.¶ Nation states do not capitulate easily, especially when surrender means annexation or
to modern states. While the Second Artillery Corps’ tactical capabilities should be
taken seriously, U.S. policy makers and strategists should not allocate exceedingly
scarce resources to countering what amounts to a paper tiger . A strategy based on rationality and fiscal
responsibility should be adopted. That is, instead of focusing on penetrating a defense-in-depth, the U.S. should encourage Taiwan to procure its own Anti-Access/Area Denial
capability.
• A large carrier fleet with a modified role that likely emphasizes rear-area support
in the early stages of a conflict, along with more traditional forward-based power
projection missions after China’s A2/AD-type defenses are subdued;
• A commitment to expensive, albeit selective, hardening of existing military bases in Japan and
Guam, along with an expansion of temporary basing and access for U.S. forces across
Northeast and Southeast Asia and in Australia;
• A large and integrated missile defense system across air, sea, and land, requiring a
high degree of interoperability between U.S. and Japanese ballistic missile defense (BMD) for regional
bases, across services and systems;
and
• A high level of integration of doctrine, missions, and capabilities between the U.S.
Air Force and U.S. Navy, to enable counter-A2/AD campaigns across multiple domains in operationally difficult environments.
One variation of this concept would emphasize long-range, stealth airpower over forward-based or carrier-deployed airpower. As discussed in detail in
chapters 2 and 4, Chinese A2/AD-type capabilities, principally the implementation of long-range precisionguided munitions, put at risk the present U.S.
conception of air and naval power, which currently relies on large aircraft carrier platforms and short-range tactical aircraft (TACAIR) for local air
superiority and power projection. An alternative to such a U.S. reliance on carriers and TACAIR would involve the heavy use of long-range conventional
precision-strike capabilities, long-range stealth bombers, and long-range stealth unmanned aerial vehicles capable of penetrating Chinese airspace. Though
shifting away from a primary emphasis on aircraft carriers and TACAIR-based power projection, this new conception would in principle enable the alliance
to maintain a credible level of deterrence at longer ranges, as part of the ASB concept.
According to U.S. defense officials and analysts, the purpose of such capabilities and accompanying doctrinal approaches would be to perpetuate the viability
and hence the credibility of U.S. power projection and access to the global commons and to prevail in the event of any conflict involving maritime spaces.
This ability to prevail in a conflict would presumably also deter China from being tempted to engage in coercion, aggression, or other actions judged
threatening to stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and would reduce the perceived need to withdraw U.S. military assets from forward positions due to their
growing vulnerability to missile and air attacks.
between Japan and the United States in some key areas, most notably C4ISR, as well
as missile defense and antimine/antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, along
with more ambitious and more frequent joint exercises in areas surrounding Japan.
Japan might be required to make significant, unprecedented
In terms of specific roles and missions,
There appear to be dramatic differences between Japanese and American perceptions of Japanese concerns and intentions regarding
nuclear weapons policy. In a consensus opinion firmly held for more than four decades, Japanesesecurity officials and
experts see the acquisition of Japan’s own nuclear deterrent as counter to overall
Japanese interests. In contrast, some U.S. officials and experts, who seem to take a more
narrow military view of the issue, see a serious risk that Japan will seek to acquire
nuclear weapons—serious enough that the United States should constrain U.S. decisions on nuclear weapons policy, even
when it runs counter to the president’s nonproliferation and arms control policy. Both governments should address
this misunderstanding at the earliest possible opportunity.
SCS
Chinese leaders understand this and so are highly unlikely to seek predominance if
they feel that they can achieve a decent amount of security in less confrontational
ways. They are likely to seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting merely opportunistically
and in a more limited manner) only if Washington’s words and actions convince them that even the
minimal level of security they seek requires it. Unfortunately, the United States’ adoption of aggressive military
concepts—such as Air-Sea Battle, Offshore Control, or even Archipelagic Defense—would
deny them such security and thus contribute to an ever-worsening security dilemma.