JUDICIAL ETHICS CASES

Petallar vs. Judge Pullos A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484, 2004

Facts: Petallar is the plaintiff in a Forcible Entry case filed sometime in

March 1999 before the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del
Norte presided by Judge Pullos. Defendants filed their Answer on April 8,
1999. After the preliminary conference, the parties were ordered to submit
there position papers and evidences, and subsequently the parties
submitted the required documents. 30 days after the receipt of the position
papers and evidences and expiration of period for filing, Judge Pullos did
not render judgment. Petallar often went to the court of Judge Pullos to
verify if there is already a judgment and even compelled his lawyer to file a
Motion for Rendition of Judgment.

In the complaint filed by Petallar on December 2001, respondent

judge in his comment by way of 2 nd Indorsement dated August 6, 2002
stated that he handed down the decision on the case on June 2002. Jugde
Pullos submitted that the charges against him had become moot.

The Office of Court Administrator found no merit in the respondent’s

contention and the observed decision was rendered out of time in breach
of Rule 70 Section 11 of Rules of Court and recommended that he be fined
with P5,000.00.

On March 30, 2003, Judge Pullos retired.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Pullos was liable for undue delay in rendering
judgment on the said case?

Held: Yes. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not
only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform
their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary
is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of
judicial functions. The position of judges exacts nothing less that faithful
observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official
duties.

The SC found no reason to disagree with the decision of the OCA

and that the respondent has indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11 of Rules
of Court for undue delay in rendering judgment. Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes violation of
Article 3, Section 16 of the Constitution.

Asensi vs. Judge Villanueva A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245, 2000

Facts: In a complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious

Physical Injuries, the complainant is the father of a seven-year old boy who
was hit by a car driven by the accused wherein Jugde Villanueva is the
presiding judge.

Asensi alleged that during the proceedings of the case, from

arraignment to the trial, Judge Villanueva consistently arrives one to one
and half hour late from the scheduled 2:00pm hearing. Judge Villanueva
even have the temerity to be late knowing very well that there are
sometimes more than twenty (20) cases calendared for that day. Judge
Villanueva even compelled Asensi’s lawyer to extend trial after 5:00pm
simply because the former arrived one and a half hour late. Litigants,
lawyers and witnesses in the said sala while waiting for Judge Villanueva
have mixed negative reactions against him for his tardiness that is
supposed to be a model of punctuality.

In his comment to the resolution, Jude Villanueva averred that

Asensi and his lawyer were “harassing him for the adverse rulings and
resolutions rendered, due to the negligence and omissions” of the
complainant’s counsel. He also averred that he has one of the highest
dispositions of cases and received award for judicial excellence.

The Office of the Court Administrator issues a resolution, referring

the complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court and
thereafter in the latter’s final report and recommendations, finds Judge
Villanueva guilty of habitual tardiness which amounts to serious
misconduct and inefficiency in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Villanueva violated the Canons of Judicial

Ethics?

Held: Yes. It need not be overemphasized that any delay in the

determination or resolution of a case no matter how insignificant is, at the
bottom line, delay in the administration of justice in general. The suffering
endured by just one person – whether plaintiff, defendant or accused –
while awaiting a judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty or property
taints the entire judiciary’s performance in its solemn task of administering
justice. Inefficient, indolent or neglectful judges are as equally
impermissible in tile judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. Any
of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary or brings it to the public
contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt
with or criminally prosecuted, if warranted, and punished accordingly.

Medina vs. Judge Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298

Facts: In Civil Case No. 7077, petitioner Pagels filed a Petition for
Injunction with prayer for issuance of Preliminary Injunction, Temporary
Restraining Order, Accounting, Damages and Attorneys Fees against
respondents Spouses dela Cruz wherein Judge Canoy was the acting
presiding judge. After the hearing, the TRO was granted and subsequently
implemented resulting in the transfer of possession of the duly licensed
primary and elementary school and church from respondent spouses to
Pagels. The parties agreed to submit position papers. Pagels filed her
position paper but respondent spouses filed a Motion to Hear their
Affirmative Defenses. Respondent judge granted the preliminary injunction
without need of a bond pending the hearing of respondent spouses Motion
to Hear Affirmative Defenses. Respondent spouses filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which judge set for to hearing on October 2009, and
were reset to March 2010.

Complainant avers that in this case judge should be charged with

gross ignorance of the law and procedure for disregarding the basic and
elementary principle that TRO and preliminary injunction are improper
remedies to transfer possession of one party to another whose title has not
been clearly established and for failure to decide the Motion for
Reconsideration within the 30 days as required by the rules and
jurisprudence.

In Spec. Proc. No. 701, petitioner Noel filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus on August 19, 2009. Subsequently respondents testified
during the hearing an on August 21, 2009, which was holiday, respondent
judge issued an Order for the release of petitioner Noel upon finding the
latter was unlawfully arrested and was implemented on the same day.

On this case, complainants charge respondent with gross ignorance

of procedure and undue interference in the administrative functions of the
Bureau of Immigration by ordering the release of the expired passport of
petitioner Noel, and by preparing the said Order outside of the courts
premises because it was not single-spaced and did not have a stamp by
the Clerk of Court and for violating Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct due to his friendly greeting to petitioner Noel and for acting as
counsel for the latter.

In Civil Case No. 7065, defendant Philex-Lascogon Mining Corp.

filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by the plaintiffs
Heirs of Alcaraz on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs Heirs of
Alcaraz submitted their Oposition and 2nd Amendment Complaint on August
2009, however it was only on September 2010 that respondent judge
issues the Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. Complainants claim that
respondent judge should be held guilty of gross inefficiency and of violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct for his undue delay in resolving a simple
Motion to Dismiss.

Complainants aver that respondent judge is guilty of tardiness and

efficiency in trying cases before his branch. Complainants state that
respondent judge usually starts the hearing between 9:45am to10:00am.

Held: Well-settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued to transfer

possession or control of a property to another when the legal title is in
dispute between the parties and the legal title has not been clearly
established. In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this
established doctrine applied in numerous cases when it granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels whose legal title is disputed. When
the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is the
disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.

Respondent judge should have been more cautious in issuing writs

of preliminary injunctions because as consistently held these writs are
strong arms of equity, which must be issued with great deliberation.
In Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. Luczon, the Court held the judge
guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he failed to conduct a hearing
prior to issuance of an injunction in violation of the Rules of Court. It was
further emphasized in Zuo v. Cabredo, where it was held that the act of
respondent in issuing the TRO to enjoin the Bureau of Customs and its
officials from detaining the subject shipment amounted to gross ignorance
of the law.

On the charge of violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct, the SC finds the same bereft of merit. A judge may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in
the course of the testimony of the witness. In City of Cebu v. Gako, the
Court finds nothing irregular when respondent judge unduly arrogated unto
himself the duty of a counsel by calling a witness to the stand and
conducting the latters direct testimony even if the respective counsels were
not interested or did not intend to present said person as their witness.
Here, the records show that respondent judge merely propounded
questions to illicit relevant facts from the witness respondents. The
Transcript of Stenographic Notes, by itself, was not sufficient to show bias
or partiality. It has been held that the Court has to be shown acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before
the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.

Libarios vs. Judge Dabalos A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, 1991

Facts: In March 1998, Pablo Macapas in the courtroom of respondent shot

former Mayor Mariano Corvera Sr.. As a result of the killing of Corvera Sr.
a formal charge of murder was filed with the Fiscal’s office against Pablo
Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo Jr., counsel of the accused, and his
driver Alloco and two (2) other “John Does”.

In June 1998, Investigating Fiscal Balansag issued a resolution

finding a prima facie case for murder against respondents and
subsequently signed an information however a motion for reconsideration
was filed by respondent Calo, Jr. which delayed the filing of the
information.

In July 1998, respondents filed with the RTC in Butuan City a petition
for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, to enjoin the Investigating Fiscal from acting to their
motion for reconsideration. The Executive Judge Hidalgo issued a TRO,
directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from acting on the said motion
for reconsideration and to from proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of the murder charge against Calo, Jr. however the TRO
expired after the lapse of twenty (20) days without a preliminary injunction
issued.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved,

Investigating Fiscal Balansag was gunned down in cold blood on his way
to his office. Based on the investigation conducted by the NBI linking the
death of the Fiscal to the killing of Corvera Sr., which another formal
complaint for murder was filed against Calo Jr. and four (4) others.
 The information signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag was filed
before the RTC carrying NO BAIL recommendation however it was
withdrawn for being fatally defective and being signed by the Investigating
Fiscal who is already dead at the time of the filing.

Subsequently Acting Fiscal Brocoy filed new information carrying

also a NO BAIL recommendation. The case was erroneously assigned to
Branch IV of RTC of Butuan City where the original information prior to its
withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or
Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, and in alternative,
accused sought the fixing of bail for their temporary release.

Respondent-judge issued an order in his capacity as Executive

Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due notice to the parties.
Without conducting any prior hearing in the same order, respondent judge
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing the
bail for the accused Calo Jr. and Allocod however no bail was
recommended for the temporary release of the accused Macapas.
Respondent Judge fixed a bail for the temporary release of accused Calo
Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they are not charged as co-principals by
cooperation or inducement, and the evidence of guilt against them was
merely circumstantial.

In the petition for certiorari by herein complainant, the Court of

Appeals rendered a decision that the order of the Executive Judge as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest and the bail bonds filed by the
accused were declared void.

Complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in granting bail

to the accused Calo Jr. and Allocod without hearing, is tantamount to gross
ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard the provisions of
Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The impartiality of
the respondent judge in issuing the warrants of arrest was also questioned
on the ground of his “close association” with the accused Calo Jr.

Held: It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where
a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a
hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity
to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce
to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before
resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure
to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a
violation of due process. 12 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that
the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and
settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail
was fixed for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail
was at all justified. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of
law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross
ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close

association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said
accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he
should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from
concluding that the evidence against him was merely "circumstantial", in
order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge
should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to
whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of
said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just,
correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free
from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

Tan vs. Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, 2004

Facts: Lucila Tan was the private complainant in cases involving B.P. 22
and other deceits filed before the MeTC of San Juan Manila presided by
the respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent
allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to the complainant. The staff
member told her that the respondent judge was asking for P150, 000.00 in
exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. Copies of the respondent
judge decision were shown to her, both still unsigned. She was told that
the judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon the she
remits and allowed the complainant to keep the copy of the draft however
did not accede for she believe that she had a very strong case well
supported by evidence. The respondent judge eventually dismissed the
criminal cases.

Respondent judge in his Comment, along with his staff as witnesses

denied the allegations of the complainant.

Held: The respondents’ evidence did not overcome the facts provided by
complainant. The SC notes that the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses
contradict each other.
 We have repeatedly admonished judges to adhere to the highest
tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodied of competence,
integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be
pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from the judges are designed to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because
the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to posses.

Sabitsana vs. Judge Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474, 1991

Facts: Respondent judge was charged by complainant for falsification of

his Monthly Certificate of Service by making it appear that he had resolved
all cases submitted for decision within the 90-day period required.

The Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Bernad to make an

on-the-spot audit of all pending cases in the sala of respondent judge. In
the report of the Deputy Court Administrator there were indeed 87 cases
undecided beyond the 90-day reglementary period consisting of 6 criminal
cases with prisoners, 36 criminal cases without prisoners, 45 civil cases
and 6 criminal cases that were not in the records but acknowledged by
respondent judge to have been in his possession. Complainant again
brought to the attention of the Court 7 additional cases submitted for
decision, still unresolved by respondent.

In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that the Complaint was

more for harassment and vengeance. He further claimed that he did not
violate the 90-day rule when the Court required the adoption of the
continuous trial system.

Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that

there were 5 additional unresolved cases handled by him and not to speak
cases handled by other lawyers.

Also, respondent judge was charged of undue interest in a pending

criminal case.

Held: A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned
to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of
gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For
true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize
the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate
unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisite attached to
said office must be weeded out

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in
mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2,
Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the
end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only
subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's
faith in its integrity and impartiality.

Olga Samson vs. Judge Caballero A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, 2009

Facts: Complainant alleged that respondent judge should not have been
appointed in the judiciary for lack of constitutional qualifications of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence and for violating Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council which disqualifies from nomination any
applicant for judgeship with a pending case.

Complainant claims that respondent during his JBC interview,

deliberately concealed the fact that he has a pending administrative
charges. She disclosed that she filed criminal and administrative charges
for grave abuse of authority against the respondent judge. To further
support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed
out the Personal Data Sheet filed by respondent, which the latter
categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction.

The Office of Court Administrator found respondent administratively

liable for dishonesty and falsification of and official document.

Held: Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS

was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his
part when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS.
He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that
he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To
make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his
predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already
dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not
the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the
phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged?,
meaning, charged at anytime in the past or present.

Respondent, a judge knows (or should have known) fully well

that the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to
dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his
dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty
to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter.
His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an
obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of
the judiciary.

Fernandez vs. Judge Hamoy A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821, 2004

Facts: Complainant is the counsel of a plaintiff in a civil cases presided by

respondent judge. Despite the lapse of 10 years, respondent judge failed
to render judgment in the said cases. After respondent judge was
transferred to the RTC, complainant learned that he brought the records of
the subject cases to his new station.

Complainant wrote a letter seeking the help of the Court

administrator for speedy disposition of the said cases, which has been
subsequently referred to respondent judge, but the latter failed to answer.
The Court Administrator directed respondent judge to comment on the
complaint however the latter failed to comply.

The Office of Court Administrator issued a resolution requiring the

respondent judge to show cause why he should not be held for his failure
to comply.

Respondent judge finally filed an Explanation/Compliance stating

that he misplaced the records of the said civil cases and that his utility
mixed up the records of the said cases with the records of cases assigned
to his current court. The missing case records were found only when the
old records were transferred to the newly acquired storage. He also said
that he was unable to act on the cases notwithstanding the discovery of
the records because he had to attend to the many family-related cases,
being then the only designated Family Court; that his docket became more
congested when the other courts forwarded to his sala cases falling under
the jurisdiction of the Family Court; and that he had no intention of
disregarding the directives of the Court Administrator or of this Court.
 Held: The SC agree with the recommendation of the Court
Administrator that respondent is administratively liable for gross
inefficiency, dereliction of duty and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. However, we find the recommended penalty not
commensurate to the gravity of the nonfeasance and malfeasance
committed.
In his Comment, respondent Judge attributes the delay in the
resolution of Civil Cases Nos. 2744 and 3645 to the mix-up of the records
with those of the other cases assigned to his court.
Such an excuse hardly merits serious consideration. Respondent
Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court
personnel. Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of
organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity. Indeed, he is ultimately responsible
for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties
are promptly notified of his orders and decisions. It is his duty to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor
the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.
More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the
elementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional
time. It must be stressed, however, that their application for extension must
be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. A close scrutiny of
the records does not disclose any attempt by respondent Judge to request
for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the aforementioned cases.
Not only did he consign the cases in limbo for an unreasonable period of
13 years, worse, respondent Judge brought the records of the unresolved
cases to his new station without clearance from the Office of the Court
Administrator. Upon his transfer to another post, respondent Judge should
have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the records
of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of
his action with respect thereto. This way, the Office of the Court
Administrator and the parties involved are aware of the progress of the
cases instead of leaving them in the dark. More importantly, this would
dispel any suspicion that the respondent Judge was unduly holding on to
the records for corrupt or ill motives.
Lachica vs. Judge Flordeliza A.M. No. MTJ-94-921, 1996

Facts: Masaglang and Puton were referred to complainant, the Municipal

Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao Del Sur, for the signing of the
Death Ceritificate of Hilario Kiawan however complainant refused for she
has no personal knowledge of the latter’s death. Even complainant
explained politely her reasons, the two women still insisted. The two
women returned and demanded that the Death Certificate be signed as
stated by the respondent judge.

During the Municipal Night Party respondent judge who was drunk,
told the complainant in an angry manner on why the latter didn’t sign the
Death Certificate. Respondent even threatened complainant that he will file
an administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the Death
Certificate.

Complainant further avers that she again met the two women who
handed the Death Certificate but still she refused and advised that the
attending physician of General Santos sign the certificate.

Respondent judge in his comment denied all the accusations

against him.

The Investigating Judge in his evaluation finds respondent judge

administratively liable for violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct in his act be an active combatant in court proceedings.

Held: As noted by the Investigating Judge, this is yet another occasion for
reminding members, of the bench to conduct themselves beyond reproach,
not only in the discharge of their official duties, but in their private lives as
well.
Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide as follows:

Canon 1. A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the

judiciary.

Canon 2. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all activities.

On the other hand, item 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reads:

A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is
convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has
been established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases.[5] His undue interest in having
complainant sign the Death Certificate is highly questionable, to say the
least. Further, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the
festivities, as attested to by a witness,[6] is reprehensible in a judge and
should be subjected to disciplinary action.