THIRD DIVISION

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, G.R. NO. 168796

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

MAY ASCENSION A.
PATALINGHUG and the Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. April 15, 2010
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between
petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed
that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He
described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed,
characterized their marital relations.

Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she
had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend
in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored.
His persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence.

In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their
children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to
reconcile with her.

The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless.
May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that
she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male
lover.
 Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the
same was serious and incurable.[3]

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were
based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and,
therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.[4]

The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate

her but to no avail.

Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees

with the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves

outright dismissal.

Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule

65 of the Revised Rules of Court,[5] the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of

discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The

abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an

arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to

lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. [6]

In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the
assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. [7] The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals.[8]Relevant to this petition are the following:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to
establish respondent Mays psychological incapacity.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents
condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained
and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. [9]
 More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological
incapacity that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.[10]
Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had
some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at
the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations. [11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

NOEL B. BACCAY, G.R. No. 173138

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 1, 2010
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution[2]dated June 13, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B.
Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36[4] of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up
Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual
friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous
pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel
as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive.[5]

Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel
observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he
always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas,
and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended
those occasions with Noels family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once
did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude
towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did.

Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels
relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time
to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.

Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had
several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel
never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel
informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed
to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio
Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at
Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and
did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she
pleased. Maribel never contributed to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their
support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.

Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of
pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and
they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home
for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and
was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.

Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion
escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels mother tried to intervene but
Maribel shouted Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam at her. Because of this, Noels mother asked them to
leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left
Noels house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went
to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls.[6]

On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition[7] for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate
in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested that no collusion existed
between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did
not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the case.[8]

On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties hereto
celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics
Office are hereby directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records of the
parties in their respective marriage registers.

The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and,

henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime of complete separation of
property.

With costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and
such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the
findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very
insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove
something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was
emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her
husband without any provocation.[10]

On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee
and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[11]
 The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic
Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and
incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or
neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the
appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital obligations
but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness
sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.[12]

The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute
a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As Noel
admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot
be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular obligation and that such incapacity existed at the
time of marriage.[13]

Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an
action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)[14] of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3)
involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article 46[15] of
the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the
fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated under Article 46.[16]

On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribels
personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the
essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the
manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection with Maribels failure to
perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribels alleged psychological incapacity,
any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.[17]

Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT
OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING
FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER
FAILURE TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[18]
 The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate as
psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with
Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during their
marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital
obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to
stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters
between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate
through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation of the
marriage for the start of family life is different from plain, simple and casual sex. He further stresses that
Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming that she was pregnant with
his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to consummate their marriage as she would not be
sexually intimate with him.[19]

Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity and that she
consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
before and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and
never with Noels family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She
was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also interpersonally exploitative as shown by her
misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect
and love to Noel and his family. She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before
the marriage she would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same
jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.

Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and
incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and
would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable. Such
persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality. The
psychologist added that Maribels psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system
since early childhood and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and
mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their over-protection
of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to the needs of
others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure.[20]
 On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel
did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were merely
mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital
obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that
it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had sexual
relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how
Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

The petition lacks merit.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals[21] that the phrase psychological incapacity is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[22] of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as
the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
 stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that
Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have
sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted
her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and
establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA,
the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same
psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be
difficult for her to sustain one.[24] Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by
law.

The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.[25] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:[26]
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

ROSALINO L. MARABLE,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 178741

Present:
- versus -

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

MYRNA F. MARABLE, Chairperson,

BRION,
Respondent.
BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 17, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated January 4, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioners
prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but
initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside
each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though
petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and demanded more time
and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time and
attention.

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal
before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the
Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.

As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common
occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels
increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became
worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner
gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another
cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent
learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it.But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their
quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was
further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was
unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his
lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the
properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their
children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition[4] for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential responsibilities of marital life.

In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships
of farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and
womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This
caused petitioners mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and
worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.

Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he
joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice
President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and
loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
 In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report [5] of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical
psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from
Antisocial Personality Disorder, characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity,
self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is
rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-
absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of
petitioners psychological incapacity.

Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is
declared valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder
nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The
appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.In addition, the incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision.

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly
proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation
conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latters findings:

Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the
present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to
fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate
 and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim for a much better personal
and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional
instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and
changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.

Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature
of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social
deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence

as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and
incurable.The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This
insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital
life.Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological
incapacity.[7]

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his
psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and
sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags
findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely
because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners personality disorder which
rendered him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision
compelled the parties to continue to live under a non-existent marriage.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment[8] maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his
psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the
conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact,
contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial
difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his
children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless,
rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person.

Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological
incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioners psychologist was
insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity
was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his general
dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. These, however, do not constitute psychological incapacity.
 Respondent also filed her Comment[9] and Memorandum[10] stressing that psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.

The appeal has no merit.

The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and
factual bases.

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. [11] These are
the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to
the marriage he or she has contracted.[12] Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. [13]

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36. The Court held,

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to
establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are
insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the
root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated
for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[15] the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to
declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags evaluation which became
the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly
specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly,
there was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.[16]

For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles[17] and differences in handling finances and managing their business
affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity
which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial
difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly
during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children.
Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why
he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a
result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal
history.His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a
psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of
his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in
various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity.[18] It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[19] That not being the case with
petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more
than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [21]

All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and
subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to
fulfill his essential marital obligations.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 175367

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, June 6, 2011
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the October 6, 2005 Decision[2] and October 26, 2006 Resolution,[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
SP No. 82238.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.[4] In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner
were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital
obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even
during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
 Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to
wit:

x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically
incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said
psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological
incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and
incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy
and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He
refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and
provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the
feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their
children.

Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her
feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she
cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset
when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility
towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent
manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The
psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that
the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is
grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive
(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the
normal obligations of a marriage.[5]

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] the petition. Petitioner principally argued that
the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[7] denying petitioners motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the
RTC in an Order[8] dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the
allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:

A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of
 the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent
contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence
was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability
was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was
quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for
the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be
presented by both parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only
be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic)
preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail.
Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the
merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its
nullity.[9]

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari[10] under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[11]

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration
of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine
revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE
SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION
FOR CERTIORARIDESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
 JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE
OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. [12]

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003,
this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10[13] prohibits
the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review
of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.[15]

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in
the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. [16]

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner
contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation
must be stated in the petition.[17]

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was
stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of
both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity.
Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring
about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand,
allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to
perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged
in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68
of the Family Code which states that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines
would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have
testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from
guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be
too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are
sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.[18] It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the
best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the
ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[19] Even
assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents
petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error
of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[20]

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss,
which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his
motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an
adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time. [21] The existence of that adequate remedy removed the
underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.[22]

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October
26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168335

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR. and
*
- versus - SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 6, 2011

NESTOR GALANG,
Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
challenging the decision[2] dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution[3] dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and
void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the
respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the
Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a
housewife. They have one child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked
money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the
respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care,
love and affection [towards him and their] child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears
to be incurable.[5]

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of
collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want
to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market
when Juvy brought him there.[6]

The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her.
He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the
respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times.
Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a
hospital.[7]

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she
conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an
interview, but the latter did not respond.[8] In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following
findings:

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured

individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations
but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure
anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable
emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his
wifes behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife:
(1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her
involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which
exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude
towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to
change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving,
responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant
is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

xxx

The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:

1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on
such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because
the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of the
plaintiff before reporting to work;

2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the
plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her
gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;

3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of
the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;

4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an
occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them
for gambling;

5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place,
wherein the defendant would come with stories so
that people [would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through false pretenses she
[would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other
people.

6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle
(gambling), but the defendant never listened to his advices;

7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff
will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go
[to] some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an
irresponsible mother;

8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the
couples separation.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and
behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling
and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these
disorders appear to be incorrigible.

The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again
and hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care,
treating her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt
care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and
failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
 So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion
that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son. [9]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no
controverting evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological
incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with
petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject
cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average
couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root
cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt
manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed
the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all
obtaining in this case.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted

and the marriage between petitioner and defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.[10]

The CA Decision

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its
decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It
explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts of gambling and swindling,
undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys
condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the
respondent.[11]

The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9,
2005.[12]

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was
insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner
additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys
condition.[13]The respondent took the exact opposite view.

The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold

that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code

and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [14]

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[16] We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano
Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.[17] These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we
established in Santos.[18]
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,[19] we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the
Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages)[20] which provided that the complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.

Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te[21] placed some cloud in the
continued applicability of the time-tested Molina[22] guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to
fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on "all fours" with another.

Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting[23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,[24] however, laid to
rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.[25] In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te[26] did
not abandon Molina.[27] Far from abandoning Molina,[28] Ngo Te[29] simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. We also explained that Suazo[30] that Ngo Te[31] merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.[32]

The Present Case

In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to
prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

a. The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b)
left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of
the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw
the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up
false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We
stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et
al.,[33] we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not
physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with
the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to
discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of
immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,[35] we emphasized that
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the
respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while
no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the
evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for
playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child
was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy
engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as swindling) only two (2) years after their
marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even
tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by
working as a manicurist.

b. The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by
Article 36 of the Family Code.

To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the
information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a
considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be
considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos[36] that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the
psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological
incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent
evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew
Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added
weight to the psychologists report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys
negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and
irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and
declared that psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be
incorrigible.[37] In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion
that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.[38]

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not
even identify the types of psychological
tests which sheadministered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition.
We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage;
there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to
prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically
state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys
condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that her mental incapacity
appears incorrigible[39] are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

c. The Psychologists Testimony

The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or
incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy
was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived
people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again,
these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any
information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage,
and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history
of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she
merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this
premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to
cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another.
To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.[40]

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution,
and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.[41] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where
the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie.[42]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision
and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

VALERIO E. KALAW, G.R. No. 166357

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ,⃰ JJ.

MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 19, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court
of the existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004
Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties
marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision

is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship
and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon
Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to
a son in March 1983.[5]

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of
the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.[9]

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn
acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and
chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children,
Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged
weekend plans with their father.[11]

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her
psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their
co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:

1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all
night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day;
and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his
brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room
with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15] At rebuttal,
Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After
an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and
parental rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr.
Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).[17] NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyns NPD is manifest in
her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.[20]

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and
the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.[22] He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary.Malyn is
so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her familys needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute
psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial
duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan),
Malyns expert witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits
because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations
are indeed true.
Malyns version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as
Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And
in those instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayaswith
her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically
abusive husband.[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing
to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed
cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their
bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300
to leave the house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came
from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she
was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel
room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and
parental rights under duress.[34]

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial
custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently
dismissed for lack of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested
by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical
psychologist, as her expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual
narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her mahjong habit,[36] while
Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to
the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
 The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly
ready for marriage even after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone
who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she
could take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his
life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man,
she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was
overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that
when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not
necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody
man with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more
about his work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and
Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in
their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual
personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties
as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]

Childrens version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they
would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being
neglected or feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical
abuse inflicted on her mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in
school.[43]

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was
abroad.[44] While they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their
mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would
call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones
confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise
testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel
room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He
likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.[48]

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they
would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.[49]

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the
minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in
partner, Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive
relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the
interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better
supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made
efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the
children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for
several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.[52] The social worker
found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the
formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be
awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this
paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without
as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the
 conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such
that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]

Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the
facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological
incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations.At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by
petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to
satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.[60]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the
best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude,
immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from
performing her essential martial obligations;[62] and

c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her
upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on
petitioners part.[64]

Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues
that the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and
attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even
Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its
conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual findings.

Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69]She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility
that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of
the case with justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and
factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations.[72] The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him
or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits,
when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner
did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her
frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order
to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that
one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is
no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they
like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father.There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact
that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their
academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is
no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which
can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its
December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20
March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing
in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 [3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether
the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon
City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the
[Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the
motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC
Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage
is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge
of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure [6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October
2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met
since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. [11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes
any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. [16] At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration of the nullity of
a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.[19]

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-
04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual
Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. 6 To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia,
learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, 7 Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16,
1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions
business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home.10He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned
of her illicit affair with Alvin.11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric
illness,"13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as
well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship." 16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare
Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with
her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a
ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its
original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision, 20 the CA found
two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1)
Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of
abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from
a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and
incurable psychological incapacity.

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; 21 not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of
the condition of the errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates
when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, 24 as well as his continued
financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, 25 but he merely mentioned in passing
Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. 27 No evidence on record
exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric
illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice
as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a
spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities
are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and
relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison
with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr.
Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital
relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot
support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed
a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 It cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS,
.JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between
respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the ground
that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.

Antecedents

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage.3

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalina’s
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to
the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion
between Eduardo and Catalina.6

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home
in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour. 7

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a
psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of
Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly
characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. 9

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she admitted her
psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with
different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the
conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11
 Ruling of the RTC

The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and
judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the parties
from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her
incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically
incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was
the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological incapacity.13

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.

On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that
Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not
have known her marital obligations;" and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.

Issue

In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE

CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE
CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.

II

MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM

OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

III
 ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.

IV

GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES

FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT
EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE. 14

The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid
down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); 15 and that Catalina’s refusal to do household chores,
and her failure to take care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature
warranting the declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to
perform her marital obligations.

The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not
grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred
prior to the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of
the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s
psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life,
attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a
finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between
the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for
her non-appearance in the trial.

The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment that had required him
to be away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship and forced her to seek her friends’
emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to
her inability to bear children of her own.

Issue

The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to
Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling

We grant the petition for review.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and
duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the
Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the
confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, 18 viz:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x
x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. x x x.19

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during
trial,21making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and severity of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage. 23

We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining
the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in
their appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without
Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling),
were not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At
best, his testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that
was submitted to a court of law.

Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr.
Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In
particular, they relied on the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several
aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a person cannot really come up
with what is expected in a relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as
they do not have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to
as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for
their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these
mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with
these pattern of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is
expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out.

Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the background of
the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such.

xxxx

With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being
concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude
before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her
psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage.
Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties
inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will still
change because her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained within her. 24

Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s supposed
psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the
report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality
disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have
brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or
omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her
behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina
was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having
already reached an age "beyond maturity." 25

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 26 We
have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating:

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by
separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. 28

But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons,
aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the
marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary
support for the conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological incapacity to perform
her marital duties.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged
borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly
pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29

What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal
to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. 30 To
rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were
manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. 31

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz:

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor –
an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal
home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the
Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under
Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity
was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her
infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was
based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home
in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, 34 to wit:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG

Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de
Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer attending and
represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?

A No, sir.

Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this
case you filed against her, is it not?

A No, sir. I did not.

Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case?

A None, sir.

Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell
us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?

A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.

Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?

A Yes, sir.

Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?

A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which you
filed against her?

A She does not opposed [sic], sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal
properties?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not
pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer around here?

A Yes sir, it could be.35

Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo.1âwphi1 To
recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but
she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The
probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also
to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage
should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but
resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under
Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

Costs to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: