HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC
The requirement of bona fide ownership
OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan
filed an application for original registration
of title covering a parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo
Velazco and that he and his predecessors
in interest had been in open, notorious,
exclusive and continuous possession of
the said land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land
was originally owned by his great-
grandfather which passed down to his four
sons. By 1966, one of the sons became
the administrator of the properties which
the son of the latter succeeded his
parents. One of the properties therein was
the one sold by the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence
on the classification of land to be
alienable and disposable by the
DENR on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the
CA reversed citing the case of Republic v
Hebierto.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the
property should be allowed
Held: No. Given the length discussions of
questions of law, we would need to dissect them.
The case settles down the correct interpretation of
Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141,
particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to
ownership to those who satisfy its
prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1)
recognizes such rights. One did not repeal
the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the
term “alienable and disposable” from
“agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands
to be registered, as we may take a look at
Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for
Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter
being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original
registration. Thus:
1.
since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at
the time of the application, the land is
already classified as alienable and
disposable. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity
rendering the presumption of the right
nugatory and the provision inoperative,
aggravated by the fact that at the time the
Philippine is still not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the
State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. If
the reverse is true, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14
(2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art.
1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only
objects within the commerce of men and
the patrimonial property of the State can
be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary
acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the
property of public dominion when no
longer in use, is converted into patrimonial
property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio
vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia,
there is a positive act of the executive or
legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear
that only when there is a positive act,
regardless if the land was classified as
alienable and disposable, that the land
sought to be registered, can be acquired
through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax
declarations presented was 1948. No
other substantive evidence was
presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the
subject property was declared as alienable
or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the
 development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Petition Denied.
Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013)
Ojeda v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 92047)
ROPPONGI PROPERTY
FACTS:
These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the
sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306
Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The
latter case also, prays for a writ of mandamus to fully
disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push
through with the sale of the Roppongi property.
The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in
Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparation Agreement entered into with Japan. The
other three (3) properties include Nampeidai Property
(present site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery),
Kobe Commercial Property (commercial lot being used
as a warehouse and parking lot for consulate staff) and
Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now
vacant).
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations
valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years
in accordance with annual schedules of procurements
to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. The procurements are to be divided into
government sector and those for private parties in
projects, the latter shall be made available only to
Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in
national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired under the
heading “Government Sector” for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeida due to the need for major repairs. However,
the Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped
since that time.
Although there was a proposal to lease the property
with the provision to have buildings built at the
expense of the lessee, the same was not acted
favorably upon by the government. Instead, President
Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens
or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions.
Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors,
the Executive branch of the government pushed for the
sale of reparation properties, starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first
was a failure, while the second has been postponed
and later restrained by the SC.
Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the
subject property is not governed by our Civil Code, but
rather by the laws of Japan where the property is
located. They relied upon the rule of lex situs which is
used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a
property.
ISSUES:
1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its
kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?
NO. There can be no doubt that the property
is of public dominion and the respondents
have failed to show that it has become
patrimonial.
The property is correctly classified under Art
420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to
the State and intended for some public
service. The fact that it has not been used for
actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Such
conversion happens only if property is
withdrawn from public use, through an
abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property. Abandonment
must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
The EO does not declare that the properties
lost their public character, merely intending
the properties to be made available to
foreigners and not to Filipinos alone, in case of
sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore,
 it is based on the wrong premise that the
Japan properties can be sold to end-users,
when in fact it cannot.
Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the
properties into patrimonial properties, merely
stating that sources of funds for its
implementation be sourced from proceeds of
the disposition of the Government in foreign
countries, but not that the Roppongi property
be withdrawn from being classified as a
property of public dominion.
CONFLICT OF LAW
Furthermore, the respondents’ argument that
the Japanese law and not our Civil Code shall
apply is incorrect. There is no conflict of law
in this situation. A conflict of law arises only
when:
a. There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that
the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and
effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined.
b. A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law
should apply. Both elements does not exist in
the case. The issues are not concerned with
the validity of ownership or title. There is no
question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
government officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the state and the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect
the sale, which should be governed by
Philippine law The rule of lex situs does not
apply.
2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and
agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
sell the Roppongi property?
NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw
the Roppongi property from public domain to
make it alienable and a need for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property is
needed. None has been enacted for this
purpose.
3. W/N EO No. 296 is constitutional?
The SC did not anymore pass upon its
constitutionality.
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868
June 8, 2006
Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the
Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The
wife died and left a will where she left her entire
estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's
death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years
after, Richard died and left a will where he left his
entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his
shares in a company which he left to his adopted
daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in
CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal
properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for
a partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also
admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).
Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue
should be governed by the law where the property
is situated
Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the
law where the property is situated. However, since
the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic
validity of her will is governed by her national law.
The national law of the person who made the will
shall regulate whose succession is in consideration
whatever the nature of the property and regardless
of the country where the property maybe found (Art
16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in
the Philipppines, however the successional rights
over those properties are governed by the national
law of the testator.
City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta
GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city
which approved the the regulation ofestablishment
of private cemeteries in the said city. According to
the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private
memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or
confiscation of property restricts the use of
property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property. It also contends that
the taking is not a valid exercise of police power,
since the properties taken in the exercise of police
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the
public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon
City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a
valid way of taking private property. The ordinace
is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a
public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without
benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to
unjust taking of a real property. Since the property
that is needed to be taken will be used for the
public's benefit, then the power of the state to
expropriate will come forward and not the police
power of the state.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in
sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land
being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop
their property. They have already acquired the proper
permits to do so but they discovered that the land was
occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers
(members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.)
These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve
to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and
they already have their crops all over the property. In
short, they are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and;
demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The
respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of
their property without due process of law by trespassing,
demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property
situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA
reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the
decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a
forcible entry case against petitioner?
RULING:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since
private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by
petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the
legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can
commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is
merely a quieting process and never determines the
actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual
possession. It is undisputed that private respondents
were in possession of the property and not the
petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the
petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does
not in any way justify their act of ―forcible entry.‖ It
must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of
the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The
doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to
justify their actions, are not applicable in the case
because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at
bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to
remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article
536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has
a better right over the land must resort to judicial means
to recover the property from another person who
possesses the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of property.
As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the
thing.‖
 seeks vindication for the alleged malicious and
unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs’ business premises.
Villafuerte vs CA
Issue:
Facts:
1. Whether or not the respondents can invoke
Spouses Reynaldo C. Villafuerte and Perlita Tan- the doctrine of self-help contained in Article
Villafuerte operated a gasoline station known 429 of the Civil Code.
as Peewees Petron Powerhouse Service Station and 2. Whether or not it was improper for private
General Merchandise on the premises of three (3) respondents to resort to fencing their properties
adjoining lots at the corner of Gomez Street and in order to remove petitioners from the
Quezon Avenue in Lucena City. One of these lots, is premises.
owned by several persons namely, Edilberto de Mesa,
Gonzalo Daleon and his brother Federico A. Daleon and Ruling:
Mrs. Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of appellee Perlita Tan-
Villafuerte. 1. No.

Appellants Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon Private respondents could not invoke the doctrine of
acquired their respective lots subject to the lease by self-help contained in Article 429 of the Civil Code.
Petrophil Corporation which had built thereon the
gasoline station being managed by the Villafuerte Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has
couple. When the lease of Petrophil Corporation the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
expired on December 31, 1988, the Villafuertes disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
obtained a new lease on the lot of Edilberto de Mesa force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
for a period expiring on December 31, 1989.
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
As regards the lot of Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes invasion or usurpation of his property.
were not as lucky. For, instead of obtaining a lease
renewal, what they received were demand letters from
The doctrine finds no application when occupation was
the brothers counsel ordering them to vacate the
effected through lawful means such as in this case
premises. Instead of complying therewith, the
where petitioners possession of the lots owned by
Villafuertes simply ignored the demand and continued
private respondents was effected through lease
operating the gas station.
agreements
Gonzalo Daleon filed a complaint against the
2. No.
Villafuertes in the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Tres, Lucena City. No settlement was
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired
reached.
through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he
Villafuertes, upon expiration of lease contract with
has an action or a right to deprive another of the
Edilberto de Mesa, the same was not renewed. The
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
spouses continued to operate their gasoline station
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
and other businesses on the lot of de Mesa despite the
latters demand to vacate.
Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law,
private respondents were held accountable to
Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of
petitioners for the various damages prayed for by
several persons and without the knowledge of the
petitioners in their amended complaint.
Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latters gasoline
station by constructing fences around it. Villafuertes
countered with a complaint for damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction against both
Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon. The complaint Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938 (April 1
 everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
Surface Rights of Landowner (Article 437) reasonable height.

Facts:
Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land on his own behalf and on behalf of his
children. This application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big
Wedge Corporation (Atok).
The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land
from their parents and that they have been in possession
of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on
the ground that they have mineral claims covering the
property and had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be
either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which
was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral — and completely mineral — once
the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of

Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to the
rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while
at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.

Held:

No, the CA was incorrect.

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of

its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations
and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface

owner will be planting on the land while the mining
locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the
operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest
he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer,
and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between
the surface and the sub-surface rights?

It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of

land has rights not only to its surface but also to