Jurisprudence

In the situation of your sister and brother-in-law, it may
be said that theirs is a bigamous marriage considering

that your brother-in-law contracted marriage with
another woman prior to his marriage to your sister, and
that marriage has not been dissolved or nullified by the
court. This is in consonance with Article 35 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, which provides, “The following
marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x (4)
Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling
under Article 41; x x x”
Notwithstanding the fact that the law above-mentioned

is clear and unequivocal, there must still be a declaration
coming from the court nullifying a marriage. As provided
for under Article 40, Id., “The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.” The Supreme
Court emphasized that the necessity of obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not only for
purposes of remarriage. It held, “x x x Crucial to the
proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word ‘solely.’ As it is placed, the same
shows that it is meant to qualify ‘final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.’” “x x x That
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for
purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive
of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes
other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latter’s presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. x x x” (Roberto Domingo vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226
SCRA 572).
------------------
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID

MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
A. M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
[MARCH 4, 2003].
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. cralaw
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court. cralaw
(c) Imprecriptibility of action or defense. - An action

or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage shall not prescribe. cralaw
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36

of Family Code shall specially allege the complete
facts showing the either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriages at the time
of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration. cralaw
The complete facts should allege the physical

manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration
of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged. ch
-----------------------
I. Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

A. Generally
The declaration of nullity of marriage applies to marriages
that are null and void from the beginning (void ab initio),
due to the absence of at least one of the essential or formal
requisites of marriages. It is convenient to classify these
void ab initio marriages into five categories: (a) void
marriages due to lack of requisites (Family Code [“FC”],
Article 35); (b) void marriages due to psychological
incapacity (FC, Article 36); (c) incestuous marriages (FC,
Article 37); (d) marriages against public policy (FC, Article
38); (e) bigamous marriages (FC, Article 41); and (e) void
subsequent marriage, when one of the spouses remarry
without complying with the recordal requirement of the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the previous
marriage, etc. (FC, Article 52 and 53). The requisites for
each of the aforementioned grounds are more specifically
described in the Family Code and in cases decided by the
Supreme Court.
---------------
You may also file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. A bigamous marriage or
marriage contracted by parties who both or either one of them has an existing previous marriage
is null and void under Article 35 of the Family Code, to wit:
“The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
xxx”
In relation thereto, Article 41 of the Family Code provides that a subsequent marriage is valid
despite existence of previous marriage if the spouse of one or both of the parties to such
subsequent marriage has been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. The spouse present, in this case,
must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.
An order from the court declaring a bigamous marriage as null and void is still necessary. Parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact
but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again (Domingo v. CA, G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993).
On the other hand, the filing of a petition for the declaration of your marriage as null and void is
separate and distinct from the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of your husband
with his previous wife. Thus, even if the petition filed by the first wife is dismissed, your
marriage may still be declared as null and void based on the merits of the case.
Please be reminded that the above legal opinion is solely based on our appreciation of the
problem that you have stated. The opinion may vary when other facts are stated.
-------------
They must not be married to someone else.
In nullity of marriage, the marriage is void from the very beginning.
This happens when a couple's marriage is officiated by someone

without the necessary authority. The one who "officiated" the
marriage ceremony is also liable.
"Kung nagpa-fixer kayo, nagpunta kayo sa isang tao diyan sa City

Hall at nagsabi siya na pari siya, yung guy na 'yon may criminal
liability."
Another case when a marriage can be void from the beginning is

when a person gets married knowing he or she still has a valid
marriage with someone else.
-------------------------
LESSON II: DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
A petition to declare the marriage void presupposes that the marriage was void or invalid from the beginning. Legally, it
can be said that the marriage did not even exist. But there are so many questions about this issue like, do you need to file
the Petition if your marriage did not even exist from the beginning? The answers that you have been looking for can be
found below.
Q. I just found out that my husband was married before and I have obtained a
marriage contract from the NSO to prove this. It was also confirmed when I
confronted my husband about this. Do I still have to file a Petition? Can I also file
a criminal case against my husband? Can his ex-wife file a criminal case against
me? What is my defense, if any?
GTALAW: Although your marriage was void from beginning, the law still requires you to
obtain a declaration of absolute nullity of your marriage by filing a petition in court. Yes, you
can also file a criminal case for Bigamy against your husband. Yes, his ex-wife may file a
criminal case for bigamy against you and your husband. But your defense is lack or absence
of knowledge regarding his prior marriage or absence of criminal intent.
-----------------------------
Because there is no absolute divorce possible under the laws in

the Philippines, there are ways to legally separate or through
Family Code to obtain a relative divorce. However, legal
separation between partners does not lead to divorce
proceedings, and the husband and wife are still married by law. If
there is a reason to consider one of the spouses guilty, he or she
is not permitted to inherit from the other that is aggrieved. And,
neither is able to marry again. This makes an annulment or nullity
of marriage so important so that the relationship is dissolved
completely.
If the marriage between the two spouses has been considered

null and void from the very moment the two have been legally
married together, there is a proper path to file a Petition for the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage. The other possibility is
when there is a reason that the relationship is voidable or valid
until this point, it is possible to file action for Petition for
Annulment of Marriage. The differences are often slight, but they
are entirely dissimilar. It is vital for the spouses to understand
what these two processes mean so that one or the other may be
utilized when necessary.
Annulment Explained Further
An annulment is possible when the Family code of the Philippines

consider it to have been void at the beginning through certain
factors. These would be an absence of essential and formal
requisites that are necessary for a marriage to have validity. The
elements of a marriage entail legal capacity such as age of the
spouse, gender requirements and when the relationship is against
public policy which may involve incestuous situations or when one
of the parties has already married another individual. Mental
incapacity or deficiencies could cause a void marriage, and
similar circumstances may lead to the same end.
Nullity of Marriage Explained
When a marriage is voidable but valid until then, a nullity of

marriage is possible. However, the relationship is not severed
until adjudged by the courts. One example of this situation is
when the contract for marriage was initiated through consent that
was forced. Another is when intimidation or undue influence on
one party has been achieved. Another is if the spouse was of
unsound mind when entering into the marriage contract. However,
unlike an annulment, a nullity of marriage is still a registered and
recorded marriage for both parties even after the process has
been completed.
Determining which to use for Dissolution
If either spouse is unaware of what option to use for attempting to

dissolve a relationship, it is important to consider what process is
connected to the marriage. If the wife was influenced into
marrying the husband by him, the family or his family, a nullity of
marriage is possible. However, if the wife was not of sound mind
when entering into the contract, a nullity would be the wrong
choice to pursue. It is best to consult experts if there are
confusing factors to consider. Additionally, if there are multiple
elements included in the marriage, the spouses could have both
options open when they want to end the relationship.
The important consideration when the spouses have come to an

end of the relationship is that the annulment wipes away the
marriage from record and future processes. However, a nullity of
marriage keeps the relationship on record and may be part of
future proceedings. Nullity for the factors included should be filed
within five years of the force, intimidation or influence on the other
party. Similar circumstances of five years are permitted for other
situations such as one party not of age. Annulment should be
completed swiftly, but there are situations where it may be
completed years later.
Legal Help in Annulment or Nullity of Marriage

A lawyer is best contacted when there is confusion or the parties
are unsure of how to proceed. It is best to ensure the dissolution
is started when the spouses are unable to resolve issues and
retain the relationship. Then, a lawyer should be hired to help with
these processes and determine the best course of action.
----------------
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At
the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally
subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his
first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after
his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of
petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in
fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.[17]
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His
contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
-----------------------
CENON R. TEVES, G.R. No. 188775
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
- versus - BRION
PERALTA*
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and DANILO R. BONGALON, Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 24, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in Criminal
Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision[2] found petitioner Cenon R.
Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
THE FACTS
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon)
and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila.[3]
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the
Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her
husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify
the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of
the Certificate of Marriage[4] indicating that her husband and Edita contracted
marriage on 10 December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint[5] accusing
petitioner of committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information [6] which
reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the
municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously united
in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said
marriage having legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of
the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the
execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the
existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court ,
Branch 130, Caloocan City, rendered a decision[7] dated 4 May 2006 declaring the
marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a
Certification of Finality[8] issued on 27 June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Cenon R. Teves, also known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional,as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.[9]
Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court
of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal
action or liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed that the trial
court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed
by the prosecution.[10]
On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of

which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007
in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.[11]
On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the

decision.[12] This however, was denied by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July
2009.[13]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there
is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of. [14] He
differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and
void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one
can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose,
need not be judicially determined.
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] is
inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy
was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioners
case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy
case was filed in court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law
that would sustain petitioners contention.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.[16]
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was
correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At
the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally
subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his
first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after
his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of
petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in
fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.[17]
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His
contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.[18]
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.[19]
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also

for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[20]
In numerous cases,[21] this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can

simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein
before anyone institutes a complaint against him.We note that in petitioners case
the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only
the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint has
been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided
that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information
in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy
dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to
immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly,
petitioners strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining
prescription.[22] The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December
2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June
2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma
cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
-----------------------------
The Supreme Court held that Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. It further held that the Revised Penal
Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. The Supreme Court also ruled that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity “is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.”[32] Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of Tenebro’s second marriage
is not a defense in avoiding criminal liability for bigamy.
And the question thus arises: Is psychological
incapacity an element of legal capacity or of consent to
marry? If it is neither, then the Supreme Court should
have said that a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is more in the nature of a voidable marriage and
thus, not a defense to bigamy.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not utilize Article
41 of the Family Code in convicting Tenebro of bigamy.
Instead, the Supreme Court based its bigamy
conviction on Article 40 of the Family Code which
states:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.[33]
Why was Article 40 of the Family Code applied when

the Supreme Court merely considers it as a rule of
procedure? [34] What are the implications of
the Tenebro ruling? As Justice Carpio pointed out in his
dissenting opinion inTenebro:
1. The mere act of entering into a second
marriage contract while the first marriage
subsists consummates the crime of bigamy,
even if the second marriage were void ab
initio on grounds other than the mere
existence of the first marriage.[35]
2. A marriage declared by law void ab
initio and judicially confirmed void from the
beginning, is deemed valid for the purpose
of a criminal prosecution for bigamy.[36]
According to Justice Carpio, in so ruling, the majority

opinion simply brushed aside the law and overturned
75 years of consistent rulings that if the second
marriage were void on grounds other than the
existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of
bigamy. Justice Carpio reminded that, “It is an essential
element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.”[37]
Article 41 of the Family Code, not Article 40, should
have been the basis for convicting Tenebro. It should
be reiterated that Article 40 of the Family Code is
merely a rule of procedure.[38] It contemplates a
situation of two void marriages: a prior existing void
marriage and a second marriage that would have been
valid had there not been a prior void marriage.
To illustrate Article 40 of the Family Code, the Supreme
Court consistently cites the case of Wiegel v. Sempio-
Diy.[39] Here, Karl Wiegel sought the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lilia Wiegel, which was
celebrated in 1978, on the ground of Lilia’s previous
existing marriage to a certain Eduardo Maxion, which
was celebrated in 1972. While admitting that her
marriage to Maxion existed, Lilia claimed it to be null
and void because they were allegedly forced to enter
the marital union. Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
court order, Lilia asked that she be able to present
evidence before the court not only that the first
marriage was vitiated by force, but also to prove that
Maxion was already married to somebody else at the
time she married him. Judge Sempio-Diy did not allow
the presentation of evidence since the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had
already been agreed upon at pre-trial. On a side note,
the question also begs itself: is it really possible under
Article 48 of the Family Code[40] and its predecessors
to stipulate on the ground for nullity of a marriage?
In upholding Sempio-Diy’s order, the Supreme Court
held that, first, Lilia does not have to present evidence
that her first marriage has been vitiated by force. A
marriage vitiated by force is merely voidable—that is,
valid until annulled. Since no annulment had yet been
made, it is clear that when Lilia married Wiegel, she is
still validly married to Maxion. Consequently, her
marriage to Wiegel is void.. Second, Lilia does not have
to present evidence as to her husband’s alleged
marriage at the time they married. While Lilia and
Maxion’s marriage is void, it still needs to be declared
void by a court.[41]Thus, the Supreme Court said that
since the first marriage had not been annulled or
declared void, then Lilia was considered a married
woman at the time she married Karl, consequently, her
marriage with Karl is void. This is a proper application
of Article 40, and the author agrees to the various
aforementioned conclusions. However, Wiegel is not a
case involving bigamy.
It is shocking therefore that the Supreme Court ruled,
without qualification, in Terre v. Terre[42] that the
second marriage entered into by Atty. Jordan Terre
was “bigamous and criminal in nature.” In this case,
Dorothy Terre accused Atty. Jordan Terre of grossly
immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman, while his prior marriage with
Dorothy remained subsisting. It turned out that Dorothy
had a previous marriage with one Merlito Bercenilla,
her first cousin. Jordan thus believed that his marriage
to Dorothy was void ab initio, and that he could contract
a second marriage with Helen Malicdem.
The Supreme Court disbarred Jordan for grossly
immoral conduct under Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules
of Court.[43] The Court held that even if Jordan had
entered into his first marriage in good faith, a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the same is still required
before remarriage. The Supreme Court then held his
marriage to Dorothy was valid and his marriage to
Helen was “bigamous and criminal” in nature.
But, why was there a need to qualify Jordan’s second
marriage as “bigamous and criminal in nature”? Surely,
for the criminal liability for bigamy to attach, both the
first and second marriages must be valid?
Mercado[44] is yet another “difficult” ruling. Here, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage of Vincent
Mercado and Consuelo Tan, Mercado was already
married to a certain Thelma Oliva. Consequently,
Consuelo Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against
Mercado. More than a month after the bigamy case
was filed, Mercado filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Thelma Oliva with the RTC,
which judicially declared the marriage between
Mercado and Oliva to be null and void on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code. Mercado was still
convicted of bigamy by the lower court and thus,
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 40 of the Family
Code (again, a rule of procedure)[45] effectively sets
aside the conflicting jurisprudence on whether a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary before
one can contract a subsequent marriage. The fact that
the first marriage is void from the beginning cannot
now be a defense against a bigamy charge. As with
a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting a second marriage.[46] That Mercado
subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage was immaterial as the
“crime” had already been consummated.
Another Supreme Court decision that has confused the
application of the Article 40 of the Family Code is that
of Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis.[47] In this case, Isagani
Bobis first married a certain Dulce Javier in 1985.
Without annulling, nullifying, or terminating his first
marriage, Isagani married a second time, to petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis in 1996. Then, Isagani married a
third time, to one Julia Hernandez. After an information
for bigamy was filed against Isagani by Imelda, he
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
had been celebrated without a marriage license. He
then moved to have the proceedings in the criminal
case suspended invoking the pending civil case for the
nullity of his first marriage as a prejudicial question.
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent filing of a
civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry and that
it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.[48]
Surely, reductio ad absurdum, if a person is married to
a sibling, there is no need for a prior declaration of
nullity. The law itself tells us that the complete absence
of a valid marriage license makes a marriage
absolutely void.[49]Article 39 of the Family Code is very
clear: The action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
While Isagani Bobis should not have married three
times, should the Supreme Court really have ruled on
passion against the “adventurous bigamist”? And which
of the three marriages was actually bigamous? Yes, the
second marriage in Bobis is void. However, it cannot be
considered bigamous through Article 40 of the Family
Code. It is the third marriage that is void, illegal, and
bigamous under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Either Bobis is right and Morigo v. People[50]is wrong,
or vice-versa.
In the case of Morigo, Lucio Morigo married Lucia
Barrete, who then reported back to her work in Canada
eight days after their marriage. A year later, Barrete
filed a petition for divorce against Morigo before the
Ontario Court, which petition was granted. Morigo
married Maria Lumbago and eventually filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Barrete with the Family Court on the
ground that no marriage ceremony had taken place.
Soon after, a charge of bigamy was filed against
Morigo by Lumbago. Morigo moved for suspension of
the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his first marriage posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
denied and he was convicted. While the case was on
review in the Court of Appeals, the Family Court
judicially declared Morigo’s first marriage void for
absence of a marriage ceremony. The Court of
Appeals, however, affirmed the bigamy conviction on
the ground that the subsequent declaration of Morigo
and Lucia’s marriage could not acquit Morigo as what is
sought to be punished by the Revised Penal Code is
the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage has been dissolved.
The Supreme Court overturned Morigo’s conviction
since the first element of bigamy—that is, that the
offender had been legally married—was not present.
Morigo and Lucia’s marriage is void ab initio and as
such, following the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married from the beginning.
But was not Morigo still married when he married a
second time? Did not the Supreme Court say that a
person cannot judge for himself whether his marriage is
valid or not? And did not the Supreme Court also tell us
that the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage does not constitute a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy; that
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a
party may remarry; and that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage? And finally, unlike Isagani
Bobis, both of Morigo’s marriages took place when the
Family Code was already in effect, so why was Article
40 not applied?
Interestingly, the Supreme Court
distinguished Morigo from Mercado in theBobis case.
The Supreme Court said that in Mercado, while the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
likewise obtained after the second marriage was
already celebrated,[51] unlike Morigo, the marriage
inMercado was celebrated on two occasions:
“Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to
have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.”[52]
Please note, however: In Morigo, there was no
marriage ceremony performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. In Mercado, the marriage was
declared void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family
Code—not on the absence of either an essential or a
formal requisite. The two cases should not have been
compared. Again, I raise the question: Is psychological
incapacity an element of legal capacity or of consent to
enter into a marriage?
Based on the case of Morigo and present
jurisprudence, is it safe to say that:
1. If one wanted to get out of a criminal

conviction, the defense is not psychological
incapacity or the lack of a marriage license, but the
lack of a marriage ceremony?
2. If both marriage ceremony and marriage
license are elements of formal requisites, then the
absence of a marriage license does not have the
same effect as the absence of a marriage
ceremony? [Please note: A marriage ceremony
does not have a particular form, but a marriage
license does.]
3. If the defense were psychological incapacity, it
will not acquit one of bigamy? Therefore,
psychological incapacity does not render a
marriage void? Is the Supreme Court, therefore,
ready to say that the presence of psychological
incapacity merely makes a marriage voidable? If
so, thenMercado is correct?
4. One will always be a bigamist even if both
marriages were void and one did not seek the
nullity of the first marriage before subsequently
marrying?
5. No one can ever file a petition based on newly-
discovered evidence and a void marriage can be
ratified on the basis of res judicata, specifically
because of Mallion?
6. The existence of a judicial declaration of a void
marriage is not a defense to bigamy if the ground is
any other than the absence of a marriage
ceremony?"
--------------------------
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-
CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated February 1,
2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information
which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging

that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of
Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring

the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal
wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion

(to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him
and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted

petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be

dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in
Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity
of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was

stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not
similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case
and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not
determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and

arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there
is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears
that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley
G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-
existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such,
this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set

aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of

the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No.
128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said

decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24,
2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari

alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS

TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF
THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF
BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE
FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE
CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID
DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS
BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION
AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS

FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF
FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO
LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G.
TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH
AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE
DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND
DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of

nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal
case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed

upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender
has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still
be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for

bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage

was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to

[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the

aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held
that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the

offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is
clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from
the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent.
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for
bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
-------------------
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
72322 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded �not guilty,�
while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5 redarc law
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow
then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-
in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was �without
responsibility.�7 redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in
the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she
argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified
for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and
September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that
she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the
trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos.8 reda rclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, �her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of
their marriage.�9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10 reda rclaw
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.

Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the
parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not
lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued
that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void,
justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11 redarclaw
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused
wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court can not do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court
cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the
former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses� narration. It
likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the
appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her
marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12 redarclaw
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
because she was not aware of Santos�s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues
that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant
in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without
a license is void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances
the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as
regards her husband�s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner�s denial of any
knowledge of Santos�s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial
evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Law lib raryofCRAlaw
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
In Monta�ez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows: Lawlib ra ryofCRAlaw
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting
marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the
fact of her spouse�s existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
The Ruling of the Court
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner�s

knowledge of Santos�s first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry
each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
in Nepomuceno:18 reda rclaw
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner�s knowledge of Santos�s

marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as
shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him;
(2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status;
and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had
various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual
findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the
CA. Indeed, the trial court�s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great
respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20 redarc law
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she
was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts�
imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse,
if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada,
Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that �a person, whether
man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound
in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.�22 Therefore, her
conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve
years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence
imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23prision correccional, which has a
duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of
two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term,
to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of
one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.25 If the accused
wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during
the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner
has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground
that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab
initio.28 redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could
not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of
petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos
took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated
under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years
before their marriage.31
re darc law
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without
any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited
her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34and her children from her previous
marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of
petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36reda rclaw
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other
for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited
for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath
that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article
34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus
face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on
her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that
they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making
claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as
bigamy, punish an individual�s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.38In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State�s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals �to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.�
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner�s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would
only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.40 re darc law
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will �lend its aid to x x x one who
has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded.�41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a
result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43 reda rclaw
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case
of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a
marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate
of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement
based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her
illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on
the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the
Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18
August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August
1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage
license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a
Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking
her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court
cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that �marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.�45 It must be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum
to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
----------------------
Attacking void and voidable
marriages – Part 8 – Personality to
assail a bigamous marriage
The discussion here is linked to previous posts under this topic. It will be recalled
that in Part 4 (Attacking void and voidable marriages – Part 4 Void marriages –
collateral attack rules from jurisprudence; during the lifetime of the spouses)
there were two situations to consider:
 (I) During the lifetime of the spouses (or before either spouse
dies)
 (II) After death of either spouse.
In Part 4, it was argued under situation (I) that
(I.4) the personality to institute the direct action solely belongs to the husband
and the wife: see Section 2(a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which states that a ‘petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife’.
In Part 4, we made note that proposition (I.4) does not apply for actions for
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage excepted from A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
under the rulings of Ablaza vs Republic (G.R. No. 158298, 11 Aug 2010)
and Carlos vs Sandoval (G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008).
In Part 5 (Attacking void and voidable marriages – Part 5 Void marriages –
collateral attack rules from jurisprudence; after the death of either spouse) we
considered whether a direct action may be maintained after the death of either
spouse to the marriage, who had the personality to institute the direct action.
There were two views:
(II.2) The unqualified view, arguably from Niñal vs Bayadog (G.R. No. 133778,
March 14, 2000) where there is no prohibition for interested parties (not
confined solely to the surviving spouse) to institute a direct action (after the
death of the other spouse) to have the marriage declared void.
(II.3) The presently controlling view in Enrico vs Heirs of Spouses
Medinaceli (G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007) that the right of an interested
party (who is not a spouse) to file a direct action to nullify a void marriage is
limited to marriages that are not covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and that this
rule applies regardless of whether a spouse to the marriage has died. Pursuant to
this view, if a spouse to the marriage has died, it is still the surviving spouse that
has the right to institute the direct action; an interested party (who is not a
spouse) may still maintain a collateral action to assail the validity of the marriage.
The discussion here applies to situations (I) and (II) where a subsequent
marriage is being assailed on the ground of bigamy. The succeeding discussion
will illustrate that whenever it is a ‘spouse’ that has the right to institute the direct
action, case law has included within that definition of ‘spouse’, a spouse of the
first marriage.
Preliminarily, one notes that in Carlos vs Sandoval (G.R. No. 179922, December
16, 2008), the rationale for giving a spouse to the assailed marriage the sole right
to assail it was explained by the Supreme Court as follows:
‘Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made
it exclusively a right of the spouses…’
xxx
‘Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the
Rule is enlightening, viz.:
xxx
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when
and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of
their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
In Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 Jun 2013), the Supreme Court explained
that the reference to the husband or the wife in Section 2(a) is not confined to the
spouses themselves to the subsequent bigamous marriage, but includes the
spouse of the first marriage. In Fujiki, it was the Fujiki (husband of the first
marriage) who filed the petition for recognition of the Japanese court judgment
voiding the second bigamous marriage entered into by his wife. The Supreme
Court’s explanation although arguably obiter (there was an express statement by
the Court that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC ‘does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country’) on the significance of Section 2(a) is as follows:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,[47][G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637] this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”[48][Juliano-Llave v.
Republic G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637, at 655.]
xxx
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife ”[75][Emphasis supplied.] ―it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages
are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,[76][REVISED
PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815, as amended), Article. 349. Bigamy . – The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can

proper proceedings.]
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.[77][See III RAMON AQUINO , THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.] If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,[78][RULES OF COURT , Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
there is more reason to confer

reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.]
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior
spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.[79][Cf.
R RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest . ― A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as
interest.]
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse.”[80][Juliano-Llave v. Republic , supra] Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
Juliano-Llave vs Republic (G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011)
This case involves two marriages by Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano — first, with
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites; second, with petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave whom Sen. Tamano
married twice 11 months before he died ‘initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993’.
It was Zorayda together with Zorayda and Sen. Tamano’s son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib) who filed on November 23, 1994 a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage of Sen. Tamano and Estrellita.
Upon the argument that Zorayda or Adib had no personality to file the complaint
for declaration of nullity due to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which limits
the petitioner to either the husband or the wife, the Supreme Court said that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because ‘[a]lbeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application
and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.[58][Carlos v.
Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116, 132 citing Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, supra note 57 at 428.]’.
It was in obiter that the Supreme Court declared that (assuming A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC was applicable), Zorayda (aggrieved spouse of the first marriage) had the
capacity to file a petition for declaration of nullity of the second bigamous
marriage, being likewise an ‘aggrieved spouse’ since the rationale of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC states that ‘[o]nly an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages’, and according the the Supreme Court:
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the “injured spouse” who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of
the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity
is protected by the Constitution.
----------------
G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in
1
CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution that affirmed the same.
2
The CA reversed the Decision dated 23 March 2007 issued by the

3
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous
valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the
other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a
second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this
purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first
marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA
was correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's
declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married

Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married
herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be
4
declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA
states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the
CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that

her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. 5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision declaring
6
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying
that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to

Evidence claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was
8
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the

ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, petitioner countered
9
that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time
she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid
and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in
its Order dated 8 March 2005.
10
In a Decision dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage

11
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the

ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The dispositive portion reads:
12
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court

hereby declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and
LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the
Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage,
under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a
judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it
also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since
Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to
Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their

properties were concerned. His motion, however, was denied by the
15
RTC in its Order dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both

16
petitioner and Respondent filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

17 18
In a Decision dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the
19
RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the
applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled
20
that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was

likewise denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated 16 September
22
2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment praying that the CA Decision finding

23
her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all

properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared
conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment, petitioner reiterated the
24
allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in

accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this
25
case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was
the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the
Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court
must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on
void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first
26 27 28
paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second

29
paragraph), 85 and 86.

30 31 32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage
in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there
was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the
marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void
marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified
by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally
attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and
the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in
a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante,
34 35 36
that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a

judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936,

1941, and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief
that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was
contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the
first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the
second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third
marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree
declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved
substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977),
citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages
under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code

rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to
marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity
of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this
38
declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and

void. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind
39
the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an

"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their
"nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect
to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were
this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a
mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And
the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a
socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting
norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone. (Emphases supplied)
40
1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court

41
of Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not

42
apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the

Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while
the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases
continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which
embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal

trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced
into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of
nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private

respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before
he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is
valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be

retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice
the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations
omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is

applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent
marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license.
That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void
ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the
nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion
that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in

upholding the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The

Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated
16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
-----------------

Jurisprudence

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Jurisprudence

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

In the situation of your sister and brother-in-law, it may

be said that theirs is a bigamous marriage considering

Notwithstanding the fact that the law above-mentioned

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of

(c) Imprecriptibility of action or defense. - An action

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36

The complete facts should allege the physical

I. Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

“The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

They must not be married to someone else.

In nullity of marriage, the marriage is void from the very beginning.

This happens when a couple's marriage is officiated by someone

"Kung nagpa-fixer kayo, nagpunta kayo sa isang tao diyan sa City

Another case when a marriage can be void from the beginning is

LESSON II: DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

Because there is no absolute divorce possible under the laws in

If the marriage between the two spouses has been considered

Annulment Explained Further

An annulment is possible when the Family code of the Philippines

Nullity of Marriage Explained

When a marriage is voidable but valid until then, a nullity of

Determining which to use for Dissolution

If either spouse is unaware of what option to use for attempting to

The important consideration when the spouses have come to an

Legal Help in Annulment or Nullity of Marriage

Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of

On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:

The elements of this crime are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also

If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can

Why was Article 40 of the Family Code applied when

According to Justice Carpio, in so ruling, the majority

1. If one wanted to get out of a criminal

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of

We rule in the negative.

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage