B. OTHER OBLIGATIONS ARTICLE 372.
ARTICLE 372. The value of the goods which the carrier must pay in cases if loss or misplacement shall
1. Duty to accept goods
a. Grounds for valid refusal to accept goods
2. Duty to deliver goods
a. Time of delivery (Art. 358, Code of Commerce)
ARTICLE 358. If there is no period fixed for the delivery of the goods the carrier shall be bound to
forward them in the first shipment of the same or similar goods which he may make point where he must
deliver them; and should he not do so, the damages caused by the delay should be for his account.
b. Consequences of delay (Art. 1740 and 1747, NCCC; Arts. 370-374, Code of Commerce)
Article 1740. If the common carrier negligently incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a natural disaster
shall not free such carrier from responsibility.
Article 1747. If the common carrier, without just cause, delays the transportation of the goods or changes
the stipulated or usual route, the contract limiting the common carrier’s liability cannot be availed of in
case of the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods.(NCC)
ARTICLE 370. If a period has been fixed for the delivery of the goods, it must be made within such time,
and, for failure to do so, the carrier shall pay the indemnity stipulated in the bill of lading, neither the
shipper nor the consignee being entitled to anything else.
If no indemnity has been stipulated and the delay exceeds the time fixed in the bill of lading, the carrier
shall be liable for the damages which the delay may have caused.
ARTICLE 371. In case of delay through the fault of the carrier, referred to in the preceding articles, the
consignee may leave the goods transported in the hands of the former, advising him thereof in writing
before their arrival at the point of destination.
When this abandonment takes place, the carrier shall pay the full value of the goods as if they had been
lost or mislaid.
If the abandonment is not made, the indemnification for losses and damages by reason of the delay
cannot exceed the current price which the goods transported would have had on the day and at the place
in which they should have been delivered; this same rule is to be observed in all other cases in which this
indemnity may be due.
be determined in accordance with that declared in the bill of lading, the shipper not being allowed to
present proof that among the goods declared therein there were articles of greater value and money.
Horses, vehicles, vessels, equipment and all other principal and accessory means of transportation shall
be especially bound in favor of the shipper, although with respect to railroads said liability shall be
subordinated to the provisions of the laws of concession with respect to the property, and to what this
Code established as to the manner and form of effecting seizures and attachments against said
companies.
ARTICLE 373. The carrier who makes the delivery of the merchandise to the consignee by virtue of
combined agreements or services with other carriers shall assume the obligations of those who preceded
him in the conveyance, reserving his right to proceed against the latter if he was not the party directly
responsible for the fault which gave rise to the claim of the shipper or consignee.
The carrier who makes the delivery shall likewise acquire all the actions and rights of those who preceded
him in the conveyance. The shipper and the consignee shall have an immediate right of action against
the carrier who executed the transportation contract, or against the other carriers who may have received
the goods transported without reservation.
However, the reservation made by the latter shall not relieve them from the responsibilities which they
may have incurred by their own acts.
ARTICLE 374. The consignees to whom the shipment was made may not defer the payment of the
expenses and transportation charges of the goods they receive after the lapse of twenty-four hours
following their delivery; and in case of delay in this payment, the carrier may demand the judicial sale of
the goods transported in an amount necessary to cover the cost of transportation and the expenses
incurred.
c. Place of delivery (Art. 360, Code of Commerce)
ARTICLE 360. The shipper, without changing the place where the delivery is to be made, may change
the consignment of the goods which he delivered to the carrier, provided that at the time of ordering the
change of consignee the bill of lading signed by the carrier, if one has been issued, be returned to him,
in exchange for another wherein the novation of the contract appears.
The expenses which this change of consignment occasions shall be for the account of the shipper.
 d. To whom delivery shall be made (Art. 368-369, Code of Commerce) 2. Who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity
it paid Columbia.
ARTICLE 368. The carrier must deliver to the consignee, without any delay or obstruction, the goods
which he may have received, by the mere fact of being named in the bill of lading to receive them; and if HELD:
he does not do so, he shall be liable for the damages which may be caused thereby. 1. R&B insurance may seek reimbursement from Glodel and Loadmaster. As subrogee of the rights and
interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters
ARTICLE 369. If the consignee cannot be found at the residence indicated in the bill of lading, or if he or Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort.
refuses to pay the transportation charges and expenses, or if he refuses to receive the goods, the
municipal judge, where there is none of the first instance, shall provide for their deposit at the disposal of 2. Both. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or
the shipper, this deposit producing all the effects of delivery without prejudice to third parties with a better
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land,
right.
water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Based on the aforecited definition,
Loadmasters and Glodel are considered common carrier. Being both common carriers, are mandated
CASES
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence
21. LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES INC. VS. GLODEL BROKERAGE
in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as
Ponente: J, Mendoza Counsel:
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the
custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or
FACTS: On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of
robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused
Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes. On August 28, 2001, the
by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor,
warehouse. Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to
Manila. Columbia then engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from
ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to
the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of
the designated destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by
Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes. The goods were loaded on board
taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the
twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its
cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters.
employed truck helpers. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached
the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver
22. TRANSIMEX CO. v. MAFRE ASIAN INSURANCE CORP
its cargo. As a result, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
Ponente: Sereno, CJ
of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the
amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity. R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for FACTS: On 21 May 1996, M/V Meryem Ana received a shipment consisting of 21,857 metric tons of
damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Prilled Urea Fertilizer from Helm Duengemittel GMBH at Odessa, Ukraine. The shipment was covered by
Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the two separate bills of lading and consigned to Fertiphil for delivery to two ports - one in Poro Point, San
consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss.[2] Fernando, La Union; and the other in Tabaco, Albay. Fertiphil insured the cargo against all risks under
Marine Risk Note Nos. MN-MAR-HO-0001341 and MN-MAR-HO-0001347 issued by respondent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not R&B insurance may seek reimbursement from Glodel and Loadmasters.
 M/V Meryem Ana arrived at Poro Point, La Union, and Tabaco, Albay. As soon as the vessel docked
at the Tabaco port, the fertilizer was bagged and stored inside a warehouse. When the cargo was
subsequently weighed, it was discovered that only 7,350.35 metric tons of fertilizer had been delivered.
The present controversy involves on the second delivery because of the alleged shortage of 349.65
metric tons. Fertiphil filed a claim with respondent for P1,617,527.37.
Respondent MAFRE Asian Insurance demanded reimbursement from petitioner on the basis of the
right of subrogation. The claim was denied, prompting respondent to file a Complaint with the RTC and
ordered petitioner to pay the claim of P1,617,527.37 was affirmed by the CA and denied petitioner’s
appeal.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the transaction is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers or by the
provisions of COGSA; and
2. Whether petitioner is liable for the loss or damage sustained by the cargo because of bad weather.
HELD:
1. The Civil Code on common carriers. As expressly provided in Article 1753 of the Civil Code, "[t]he law
of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for
their loss, destruction or deterioration." Since the cargo in this case was transported from Odessa,
Ukraine, to Tabaco, Albay, the liability of petitioner for the alleged shortage must be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers. The Code takes precedence as
the primary law over the rights and obligations of common carriers with the Code of Commerce and
COGSA applying suppletory.
2. Yes. While the records of this case clearly establish that M/V Sea Merchant was damaged as result of
extreme weather conditions, petitioner cannot be absolved from liability. As pointed out by this Court in
Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance, Inc., a common carrier is not liable for loss only when (1)
the fortuitous event was the only and proximate cause of the loss and (2) it exercised due diligence to
prevent or minimize the loss. The second element is absent here. As a common carrier, petitioner should
have been more vigilant in monitoring weather disturbances within the country and their (possible) effect
on its routes and destination. More specifically, it should have been more alert on the possible attenuating
and dysfunctional effects of bad weather on the parts of the ship. It should have foreseen the likely
prejudicial effects of the strong waves and winds on the ship brought about by inclement weather and
should have taken the necessary precautionary measures through extraordinary diligence to prevent the
weakening or dysfunction of the parts of the ship to avoid or prune down the loss to cargo.
23. UNSWORTH TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.), INC., - versus - COURT OF APPEALS
and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION
Ponente: J, Nachura
FACTS:
On August 31, 1992, the shipper Sylvex Purchasing Corporation delivered to UTI a shipment of
27 drums of various raw materials for pharmaceutical manufacturing, consisting of: 1) 3 drums (of)
extracts, flavoring liquid, flammable liquid x x x banana flavoring; 2) 2 drums (of) flammable liquids x x x
turpentine oil; 2 pallets. STC: 40 bags dried yeast; and 3) 20 drums (of) Vitabs: Vitamin B Complex
Extract. UTI issued Bill of Lading No. C320/C15991-2, covering the aforesaid shipment. The subject
shipment was insured with private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation in favor of
Unilab against all risks in the amount of P1,779,664.77 under and by virtue of Marine Risk Note Number
MC RM UL 0627 92 and Open Cargo Policy No. HO-022-RIU.
On the same day that the bill of lading was issued, the shipment was loaded in a sealed 1x40
container van, with no. APLU-982012, boarded on APLs vessel M/V Pres. Jackson, Voyage 42, and
transshipped to APLs M/V Pres. Taft for delivery to petitioner in favor of the consignee United
Laboratories, Inc. (Unilab).
On September 30, 1992, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila. On October 6, 1992,
petitioner received the said shipment in its warehouse. On October 9, 1992, Oceanica Cargo Marine
Surveyors Corporation (OCMSC) conducted a stripping survey of the shipment located in petitioners
warehouse. The survey results stated: 2-pallets STC 40 bags Dried Yeast, both in good order condition
and properly sealed;
19- steel drums STC Vitamin B Complex Extract, all in good order condition and properly sealed; 1-steel
drum STC Vitamin B Complex Extra[ct] with cut/hole on side, with approx. spilling of 1%
On October 15, 1992, the arrastre Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc. (Jardine) issued Gate
Pass No. 7614 which stated that 22 drums Raw Materials for Pharmaceutical Mfg. were loaded on a truck
with Plate No. PCK-434 facilitated by Champs for delivery to Unilabs warehouse. The materials were
noted to be complete and in good order in the gate pass. On the same day, the shipment arrived in
Unilabs warehouse and was immediately surveyed by an independent surveyor, J.G. Bernas Adjusters
& Surveyors, Inc. (J.G. Bernas). The Report stated: 1-p/bag torn on side contents partly spilled; 1-s/drum
#7 punctured and retaped on bottom side content lacking; 5-drums shortship/short delivery.
 On October 23 and 28, 1992, the same independent surveyor conducted final inspection surveys
which yielded the same results. Consequently, Unilabs quality control representative rejected one paper
bag containing dried yeast and one steel drum containing Vitamin B Complex as unfit for the intended
purpose.
On November 7, 1992, Unilab filed a formal claim for the damage against private respondent
and UTI. On November 20, 1992, UTI denied liability on the basis of the gate pass issued by Jardine that
the goods were in complete and good condition; while private respondent filed a complaint for Damages
against APL, UTI and petitioner with the RTC of Makati.
On February 22, 2001, the RTC decided in favor of private respondent and against APL.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision on April 29, 2004. The CA rejected UTIs defense
that it was merely a forwarder, declaring instead that it was a common carrier. The court further concluded
that upon the delivery of the subject shipment to petitioners warehouse, its liability became similar to that
of a depositary. As such, it ought to have exercised ordinary diligence in the care of the goods. The CA
also rejected petitioners claim that its liability should be limited to $500 per package pursuant to the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) considering that the value of the shipment was declared pursuant
to the letter of credit and the pro forma invoice. As to APL, the court considered it as a common carrier
notwithstanding the non-issuance of a bill of lading inasmuch as a bill of lading is not indispensable for
the execution of a contract of carriage.
ISSUE:
1. Is UTI liable as a COMMON CARRIER.
2. What is a freight forwarder?
HELD:
1. Yes. A freight forwarders liability is limited to damages arising from its own negligence, including
negligence in choosing the carrier; however, where the forwarder contracts to deliver goods to their
destination instead of merely arranging for their transportation, it becomes liable as a common carrier for
loss or damage to goods. A freight forwarder assumes the responsibility of a carrier, which actually
executes the transport, even though the forwarder does not carry the merchandise itself. UTI is liable as
a common carrier. Common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent
if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they
exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or
damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence. Mere proof of
delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination
constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is
given as to how the deterioration, loss, or destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be
held responsible.
2. The term freight forwarder" refers to a firm holding itself out to the general public (other than as a
pipeline, rail, motor, or water carrier) to provide transportation of property for compensation and, in the
ordinary course of its business, (1) to assemble and consolidate, or to provide for assembling and
consolidating, shipments, and to perform or provide for break-bulk and distribution operations of the
shipments; (2) to assume responsibility for the transportation of goods from the place of receipt to the
place of destination; and (3) to use for any part of the transportation a carrier subject to the federal law
pertaining to common carriers.
24. BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING vs. PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO.,
INC.,
Ponente: J, Panganiban
FACTS: CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V Anangel Sky at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of
various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel
Trading Corporation. On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the
subsequent days, discharged the subject cargo. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order. Finding the
four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine Steel
Trading Corporation declared the same as total loss. Philippine First Insurance paid the claim of Philippine
Steel and was thus subrogated. Philippine First then instituted a complaint for recovery of the amount
paid to the consignee as insured. Belgian claims that the damage and/or loss was due to pre-shipment
damage, to the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods, or to perils, danger and accidents of the sea,
or to insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their
representatives. Belgian further argued that their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the limitations
of liability provided for in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws. Finally, Belgian averred that, in any
event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to said
shipment. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and ruled that Belgian were liable for the
loss or the damage of the goods shipped, because they had failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on common carriers. As to the extent of Belgian’s liability, the CA held that the
package limitation under COGSA was not applicable, because the words "L/C No. 90/02447" indicated
that a higher valuation of the cargo had been declared by the shipper.
ISSUES: Whether the package limitation of liability is applicable.
HELD: No. The Civil Code does not limit the liability of the common carrier to a fixed amount per package.
In all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the right and the obligations of common carriers shall be
governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws. Thus, the COGSA, which is suppletory to the
provisions of the Civil Code, supplements the latter by establishing a statutory provision limiting the
carrier's liability in the absence of a shipper's declaration of a higher value in the bill of lading. In the case
before us, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading limiting the carrier's liability. Neither did the shipper
declare a higher valuation of the goods to be shipped. Petitioners' liability should be computed based on
US$500 per package and not on the per metric ton price declared in the Letter of Credit.
25. SULPICIO LINES INC. (PETITIONER) V NAPOLEON SISANTE (RESPONDENTS)
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the petitioner, sank near
Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived
the sinking. He sued the petitioner for breach of contract and damages. In its defense, the petitioner
insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from
the Port of Manila by the proper authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had
not been negligent; and that its officers and crew had also not been negligent because they had made
preparations to abandon the vessel because they had launched life rafts and had provided the
passengers assistance in that regard. The RTC rendered judgement in favor of plaintiff Napoleon Sesante
and ordered defendant to pay temperate and moral damages. The RTC observed that the petitioner,
being negligent, was liable to Sesante pursuant to Articles 1739 and 1759 of the Civil Code. The CA
reduced the award of the temperate damages to the approximate cost of Sesante's lost personal
belongings and held that petitioner remained civilly liable. The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the
vessel to the storm notwithstanding its position on the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient. Yet,
the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner's attribution, as the BMI found that petitioner’s
fault was the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking due to the Captain's erroneous maneuvers
of the M/V Princess of the Orient minutes before she sunk.
ISSUE: Is there a breach of contract of carriage? Is it absolved from liability because of force
majeure?
RULING:
Yes. Article 1759 of the Civil Code explicitly makes the common carrier liable in the event of death or
injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common carrier's employees: Common carriers
are liable for the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or
in violation of the orders of the common earners. The liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is
demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in safely carrying their
passengers. On the other hand, Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of negligence
against the common carrier in the event of death or injury of its passenger.
It is not required to make an express finding of the common carrier's fault or negligence. Even
the mere proof of injury relieves the passengers from establishing the fault or negligence of the carrier or
its employees.22 The presumption of negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing that: (a) a
contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the injury or death took place
during the existence of such contract.23 In such event, the burden shifts to the common carrier to prove
its observance of extraordinary diligence, and that an unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the
injury. In the instant case, Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and consequent
sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient where he was a passenger. Thus, there was a breach of contract of
carriage.
2.No.To be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused
by a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of
the incident due to its own or its employees' negligence.27 We explained in Schmitz Transport &
Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc.,28 as follows:
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it
must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. In the instant case, the Captain's erroneous maneuvers
of the MIV Princess of the Orient minutes before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident.
26. SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC.,
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and BLACK SEA SHIPPING AND DODWELL now
INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES (#14)
27. SEALOADER SHIPPING CORPORATION, ET. AL. VS. GRAND CEMENT MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,
Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro
FACTS: On March 24, 1993, Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Agreement[7] with Joyce Launch
and Tug Co., Inc. (Joyce Launch), a domestic corporation, which owned and operated the motor tugboat
M/T Viper. By virtue of the agreement, Sealoader chartered the M/T Viper in order to tow the formers
unpropelled barges for a minimum period of fifteen days.
Subsequently, Sealoader entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement
clinkers and the delivery thereof to Manila. On March 31, 1994, Sealoaders barge, the D/B Toploader,
arrived at the wharf of Grand Cement tugged by the M/T Viper. The D/B Toploader, however, was not
immediately loaded with its intended cargo as the employees of Grand Cement were still loading another
vessel, the Cargo Lift Tres.
On April 4, 1994, Typhoon Bising struck the Visayas area, with maximum recorded winds of 120
kilometers per hour. The D/B Toploader was, at that time, still docked at the wharf of Grand Cement. In
the afternoon of said date, as the winds blew stronger and the waves grew higher, the M/T Viper tried to
tow the D/B Toploader away from the wharf. The efforts of the tugboat were foiled, however, as the towing
line connecting the two vessels snapped. The following day, the employees of Grand Cement discovered
the D/B Toploader situated on top of the wharf, apparently having rammed the same and causing
significant damage thereto.
On April 7, 1994, Grand Cement sent a letter[10] addressed to Johnny Ponce, demanding the
payment of the cost of the damage to the wharf in the amount of P2,423,318.58. As Grand Cement still
failed to receive a reply, it sought the assistance of the Coast Guard Investigation Service Detachment in
Cebu. The said office scheduled consecutive hearings, but Sealoader allegedly did not appear.
On October 3, 1994, Grand Cement filed a Complaint for Damages[9] against Sealoader; Romulo
Diantan, the Captain of the M/T Viper; and Johnny Ponce, the Barge Patron of the D/B Toploader.
On November 25, 1994, Sealoader filed a motion to dismiss[11] the complaint. Sealoader insisted
that Joyce Launch should have been sued in its stead, as the latter was the owner and operator of the
M/T Viper.
On January 2, 1995, Sealoader instituted a Cross-claim[14] against Joyce Launch and Romulo
Diantan.
On April 19, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision on Civil Case No. 161602, declaring that from
the evidence adduced, the Court is of the view that the defendants are guilty of negligence, which caused
damage to the [Grand Cements] wharf.
On December 9, 2004, Sealoader filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On March 3, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued an Amended Decision reducing by 50% the
award of actual damages that was previously granted due to the contributory negligence by the Grand
Cements.
Both parties filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Who among the parties in this case should be liable for the damage sustained by the wharf of
Grand Cement?
HELD: Sealoader, et. al. (solidary) Sealoader was guilty of negligence in the conduct of its affairs during
the incident in question under the following instances:
a. Lack of a radio or any navigational communication facility aboard the D/B Toploader;
b. The crew of the D/B Toploader failed to keep a watchful eye on the prevailing weather conditions;
c. Acosta merely relied on the assurances of the M/T Beejay crew and the opinion of Romulo
Diantan that the typhoon was nowhere near their area. As it turned out, such reliance was utterly
misplaced;
d. Sealoader should have not taken the initiative to cast off the mooring lines early on or, at the
very least, requested the crew at the wharf to undertake the same.
Sealoader cannot pass to Grand Cement the responsibility of casting off the mooring lines connecting
the D/B Toploader to the wharf. The Court agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Decision
dated November 12, 2004 that the people at the wharf could not just cast off the mooring lines without
any instructions from the crew of the D/B Toploader and the M/T Viper. As the D/B Toploader was without
an engine, casting off the mooring lines prematurely might send the barge adrift or even run the risk of
the barge hitting the wharf sure enough.
28.
29. DESIGNER BASKET INC. VS. AIR SEA TRANSPORT INC. & ASIA CARGO CONTAINER LINES
INC.
Ponente: J, Jardeleza
FACTS: DBI is a domestic corporation engaged in the production of housewares and handicraft items for
export.4 Sometime in October 1995, Ambiente, a foreign-based company, ordered from DBI5 223 cartons
of assorted wooden items (the shipment).The shipment was worth Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Ninety
and Eighty-Seven Dollars (US$12,590.87) and payable through telegraphic transfer.7 Ambiente
designated ACCLI as the forwarding agent that will ship out its order from the Philippines to the United
States (US). ACCLI is a domestic corporation acting as agent of ASTI, a US based corporation engaged
in carrier transport business, in the Philippines.8 On January 7, 1996, DBI delivered the shipment to
ACCLI for sea transport from Manila and delivery to Ambiente at 8306 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1239, Beverly
Hills, California. To acknowledge receipt and to serve as the contract of sea carriage, ACCLI issued to
DBI triplicate copies of ASTI Bill of Lading No. AC/MLLA601317.9 DBI retained possession of the originals
of the bills of lading pending the payment of the goods by Ambiente.10 On January 23, 1996, Ambiente
and ASTI entered into an Indemnity Agreement (Agreement).11 Under the Agreement, Ambiente
obligated ASTI to deliver the shipment to it or to its order “without the surrender of the relevant bill(s) of
lading due to the non-arrival or loss thereof.”12 In exchange, Ambiente undertook to indemnify and hold
ASTI and its agent free from any liability as a result of the release of the shipment.13 Thereafter, ASTI
released the shipment to Ambiente without the knowledge of DBI, and without it receiving payment for
the total cost of the shipment. 14 DBI then made several demands to Ambiente for the payment of the
shipment, but to no avail. Thus, on October 7, 1996, DBI filed the Original Complaint against ASTI, ACCLI
and ACCLI’s incorporators-stockholders15 for the payment of the value of the shipment in the amount of
US$12,590.87 or Three Hundred Thirty-Three and Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Pesos (₱333,658.00), plus
interest at the legal rate from January 22, 1996, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.16
In its Original Complaint, DBI claimed that under Bill of Lading Number AC/MLLA601317, ASTI and/or
ACCLI is “to release and deliver the cargo/shipment to the consignee, x x x, only after the original copy
or copies of [the] Bill of Lading is or are surrendered to them; otherwise, they become liable to the shipper
for the value of the shipment.”17 DBI also averred that ACCLI should be jointly and severally liable with
its co defendants because ACCLI failed to register ASTI as a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines. In addition, ACCLI failed to secure a license to act as agent of ASTI.
ISSUE: WON ASTI, ACCLI, and Ambiente are solidarily liable to DBI for the value of the shipment
HELD: NO, The general rule is that upon receipt of the goods, the consignee surrenders the bill of
lading to the carrier and their respective obligations are considered cancelled. The law, however, provides
two exceptions where the goods may be released without the surrender of the bill of lading because the
consignee can no longer return it. These exceptions are when the bill of lading gets lost or for other cause.
In either case, the consignee must issue a receipt to the carrier upon the release of the goods. Such
receipt shall produce the same effect as the surrender of the bill of lading. We have already ruled that the
non-surrender of the original bill of lading does not violate the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence
over the goods (Republic v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation). Thus, we held that the surrender of the
original bill of lading is not a condition precedent for a common carrier to be discharged of its contractual
obligation. Clearly, law and jurisprudence is settled that the surrender ofthe original bill of lading is not
absolute; that in case of lossor any other cause, a common carrier may release thegoods to the consignee
even without it.
2) Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 of the Civil Code are not applicable.
Articles 1733, 1734, and 1735 speak of the common carrier's responsibility over the goods. They refer
to the general liability of common carriers in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods and the
presumption of negligence against them. The applicable provision instead is Article 353 of the Code of
Commerce, the Article allows the release of the goods to the consignee even without his surrender of the
original bill of lading. In such case, the duty of the carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence is
not violated. Nothing, therefore, prevented the consignee and the carrier to enter into an indemnity
agreement of the same nature as the one they entered here. No law or public policy is contravened upon
its execution.
30. CALVO V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE
Ponente: J, Mendoza
Facts: Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), and a custom
broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-
chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the Tabacalera
Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, said cargoes arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa
Maru”. After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila
Port Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the
cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the goods
were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper
were “wet/stained/torn” and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages cost P93,112.00.
SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on the
other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On December
20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the shipment. The
decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?
2. Whether or not Calvo is liable for damages?
Decision:
1. Calvo is a common carrier. The contention of the petitioner, that she is not a common carrier but
a private carrier, has no merit. Article 1732 provides “Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.” It makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. (De
Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)
The concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 coincides with the notion of “public service”,
under the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section
13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes: “ x x x every person that now or hereafter
may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with
general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for
general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway,
subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and
whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power
petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless
broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x”
Thus, petitioner is a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her
business.
2. Calvo is liable for damages.
Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides: Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the
common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction
of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render
service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature
and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and
stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.
To prove the exercise of extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show
the possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage. It must prove that
it used all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
[transport] and that [it] exercise[d] due care in the handling [thereof].
Art. 1734(4), which provides “Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: … (4) The
character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers…
For the provision to apply, the Rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the
container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but
he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is
not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom.[14] In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo
without exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of
petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or
that she is exempt from liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735[15] holds.
31.
32. SARKIES TOURS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: Romero, J
FACTS: On August 31, 1984, Fatima boarded petitioners De Luxe Bus No. 5 in Manila on her way to
Legazpi City. Her brother Raul helped her load three pieces of luggage containing all of her optometry
review books, materials and equipment, trial lenses, trial contact lenses, passport and visa, as well as
her mother Marisols U.S. immigration (green) card, among other important documents and personal
belongings. Her belongings was kept in the baggage compartment of the bus, but during a stopover at
Daet, it was discovered that all but one bag remained in the open compartment. The others, including
Fatimas things, were missing and could have dropped along the way. Some of the passengers suggested
retracing the route to try to recover the lost items, but the driver ignored them and proceeded to Legazpi
City.
Fatima immediately reported the loss to her mother who, in turn, went to petitioners office in Legazpi
City and later at its head office in Manila. The latter, however, merely offered her P1,000.00 for each
piece of luggage lost, which she turned down. After returning to Bicol disappointed but not defeated, they
asked assistance from the radio stations and even from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same route
on August 31st. The effort paid off when one of Fatimas bags was recovered. Marisol also reported the
incident to the National Bureau of Investigations field office in Legazpi City, and to the local police.
On September 20, 1984, respondents, through counsel, formally demanded satisfaction of their
complaint from petitioner. In a letter dated October 1, 1984, the latter apologized for the delay and said
that (a) team has been sent out to Bicol for the purpose of recovering or at least getting the full detail[1] of
the incident.
After more than nine months of fruitless waiting, respondents decided to file the case below to
recover the value of the remaining lost items, as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation. They claimed that the loss was due to petitioners failure to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of Fatimas luggage and that petitioner dealt with them in bad faith from
the start. Petitioner, on the other hand, disowned any liability for the loss on the ground that Fatima
allegedly did not declare any excess baggage upon boarding its bus.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as a common carrier, is responsible for the loss.
HELD: The petitioner as a common carrier, is responsible for the loss. Under the Civil Code, "common
carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods . . . transported by them," and this liability "lasts
from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to
. . . the person who has a right to receive them," unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes
under Article 1734 thereof.
The cause of the loss in the case at bar was petitioner's negligence in not ensuring that the
doors of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care,
almost all of the luggages were lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.Where the common carrier
accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it placed in the vehicle by its own
employee, its failure to collect the freight charge is the common carrier's own lookout. It is responsible for
the consequent loss of the baggage. In the instant case, petitioner’s employee even helped Fatima and
her brother load the luggages in the bus' baggage compartment, without asking that they be weighed,
declared, receipted or paid for.
33.
34. THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC vs. MGG MARINE SERVICES
INC. and DOROTEO GAERLAN
Facts:
On March 1, 1987, San Miguel Corporation insured several beer bottle cases with an aggregate
value of P5,836,222.80 with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company. The vessel left
the port of Mandaue for Bislig, Surigao del Sur. The cargo were loaded on board the M/V Peatheray
Patrick-G to be transported from Mandaue City to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. On March 3, the vessel sank
off Cawit Point, Surigao. The cargo belonging to SMC was lost, hence SMC claimed the amount of loss
from Philamgen Insurance. Philamgen then requested a certain Mr. Sayo to survey the circumstances of
the loss of cargo. In his report, the vessel was structurally sound and that he did not see any damage or
crack thereon. He concluded that the proximate cause of the listing and subsequent sinking of the vessel
was the shifting of ballast water from starboard to portside.
SMC was paid in full of the amount 5.8 Million php because of the insurance contract. Philamgen
sued MGG Marine Services and Gaerlan as subrogee of San Miguel at Makati RTC Branch 134.
Meanwhile, the Board of Marine Inquiry made an investigation and declared that the cause of sinking was
a fortuitous event, and that the captain and the crew should not be liable administratively. The RTC then
ruled in favour of PhilamGen. MGG and Gaerlan appealed to the CA, which reversed the decision of the
RTC, because of the fortuitous event which absolves them from any liability.
Issue: Whether or not MGG and Gaerlan are liable, despite the fortuitous event
Ruling:
No, respondents are not liable due to the fortuitous event.
In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability where the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods is due to a natural disaster or calamity, it must further be shown that the such
natural disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss;[9] there must be “an entire
exclusion of human agency from the cause of the injury of the loss.”
The parties do not dispute that on the day the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G sunk, said vessel
encountered strong winds and huge waves ranging from six to ten feet in height. The presence of a crack
in the ill-fated vessel through which water seeped in was confirmed by the Greutzman Divers who were
commissioned by the private respondents to conduct an underwater survey and inspection of the vessel
to determine the cause and circumstances of its sinking. In its report, Greutzman Divers stated that “along
the port side platings, a small hole and two separate cracks were found at about midship.” The findings
of the Board of Marine Inquiry indicate that the attendance of strong winds and huge waves while the M/V
Peatheray Patrick-G was sailing through Cortes, Surigao del Norte on March 3, 1987 was indeed
fortuitous. A fortuitous event has been defined as one which could not be foreseen, or which though
foreseen, is inevitable. The vessel was also seaworthy. It had 3 diesel engines, 3 operational propellers,
and had a captain and the chief mates had been commanding the vessel for more than 3 years.
Since the presence of strong winds and enormous waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March
3, 1987 was shown to be the proximate and only cause of the sinking of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G
and the loss of the cargo belonging to San Miguel Corporation, private respondents cannot be held liable
for the said loss.
IV. OBLIGATIONS OF A COMMON CARRIER IN THE TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS
A. Safety of Passengers
1. Exercise of utmost diligence (Art. 1755, NCC)
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
2. Presumption of negligence (Art. 1756, NCC)
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
**Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
3. Stipulation on liability (Arts. 1757-1758, 1760 NCC)
Article 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in articles
1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise.
Article 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability
for negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier’s liability.
Article 1760. The common carrier’s responsibility prescribed in the preceding article cannot be eliminated
or limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.
4. Contributory negligence (Art. 1762, NCC)
Article 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his
death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount
of damages shall be equitably reduced.
B. Duration of liability
1. Waiting for carrier or boarding of carrier
2. Arrival at destination
C. Liability for acts of others
1. Employees (Art. 1759, NCC)
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
2. Other passenger and strangers (Art. 1763, NCC)
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
D. Vacarious liability
E. Extent of liability for damages
CASES
35. PERENA vs ZARATE (#8)
Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Pereña vs Spouses Nicolas and Teresita Zarate
Civil Law – Common Carrier – Private School Transport are Common Carriers
Torts and Damages – Heirs of a high school student may be awarded damages for loss income
Facts:
In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate contracted Teodoro and Nanette Pereña to transport their
(Zarate’s) son, Aaron Zarate, to and from school. The Pereñas were owners of a van being used for
private school transport.
At about 6:45am of August 22, 1996, the driver of the said private van, Clemente Alfaro, while the children
were on board including Aaron, decided to take a short cut in order to avoid traffic. The usual short cut
was a railroad crossing of the Philippine National Railway (PNR).
Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to block vehicles crossing the railway) was up which means
it was okay to cross. He then tried to overtake a bus. However, there was in fact an oncoming train but
Alfaro no longer saw the train as his view was already blocked by the bus he was trying to overtake. The
bus was able to cross unscathed but the van’s rear end was hit. During the collision, Aaron, was thrown
off the van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head was severed. He was only 15 years old.
It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the train honking from 50 meters away before the collision
because the van’s stereo was playing loudly.
The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereñas (Alfaro became at-large). Their cause of action against PNR
was based on quasi-delict. Their cause of action against the Pereñas was based on breach of contract
of common carriage.
In their defense, the Pereñas invoked that as private carriers they were not negligent in selecting Alfaro
as their driver as they made sure that he had a driver’s license and that he was not involved in any
accident prior to his being hired. In short, they observed the diligence of a good father in selecting their
employee.
PNR also disclaimed liability as they insist that the railroad crossing they placed there was not meant for
railroad crossing (really, that’s their defense!).
The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In the decision of the RTC
and the CA, they awarded damages in favor of the Zarates for the loss of earning capacity of their dead
son.
The Pereñas appealed. They argued that the award was improper as Aaron was merely a high school
student, hence, the award of such damages was merely speculative. They cited the case of People vs
Teehankee where the Supreme Court did not award damages for the loss of earning capacity despite the
fact that the victim there was enrolled in a pilot school.
ISSUES: Whether or not the defense of due diligence of a good father by the Pereñas is untenable.
Whether or not the award of damages for loss of income is proper.
HELD: Yes, in both issues.
Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father
This defense is not tenable in this case. The Pereñas are common carriers. They are not merely private
carriers. (Prior to this case, the status of private transport for school services or school buses is not well
settled as to whether or not they are private or common carriers – but they were generally regarded as
private carriers). Private transport for schools are common carriers. The Pereñas, as the operators of a
school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business, not just as a
casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over established roads by the method by which
the business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle,
the Pereñas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation
indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service
and for a fee.
Being a common carrier, what is required of the Pereñas is not mere diligence of a good father. What is
specifically required from them by law is extraordinary diligence – a fact which they failed to prove in
court. Verily, their obligation as common carriers did not cease upon their exercise of diligently choosing
Alfaro as their employee.
(It is recommended that you read the full text, the Supreme Court made an elaborate and extensive
definition of common and private carriers as well as their distinctions.)
Award of Damages for Aaron’s loss of earning capacity despite he being a high school student at the time
of his death
The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a reputable school (Don Bosco). He was of normal health
and was an able-bodied person. Further, the basis of the computation of his earning capacity was not on
what he would have become. It was based on the current minimum wage. The minimum wage was validly
used because with his circumstances at the time of his death, it is most certain that had he lived, he would
at least be a minimum wage earner by the time he starts working. This is not being speculative at all.
The Teehankee case was different because in that case, the reason why no damages were awarded for
loss of earning capacity was that the defendants there were already assuming that the victim would
indeed become a pilot – hence, that made the assumption speculative. But in the case of Aaron, there
was no speculation as to what he might be – but whatever he’ll become, it is certain that he will at the
least be earning minimum wage.
36. HERMINIO MARIANO, JR., vs.ILDEFONSO C. CALLEJAS and EDGAR DE BORJA
Ponente: CJ Puno
FACTS: At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12, 1991, along Aguinaldo Highway, San Agustin, Dasmarias,
Cavite, the Celyrosa Express bus, carrying Dr. Frelinda Mariano as its passenger, deceased spouse of
the petitioner, collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer bearing plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531. The
passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay while the trailer truck came from the opposite direction, bound
for Manila. The trailer truck bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion. Due to the impact, the
passenger bus fell on its right side on the right shoulder of the highway and caused the death of Dr.
Mariano and physical injuries to four other passengers. Dr. Mariano was 36 years old at the time of her
death. She left behind three minor children, aged four, three and two years.
Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against respondents
Callejas, the registered owner of Celyrosa Express, and Edgar de Borja, the driver of the for their failure
to transport his wife to her destination. Respondents denied liability for the death of Dr. Mariano. They
claimed that the proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness of the driver of the trailer truck
which bumped their bus while allegedly at a halt on the shoulder of the road in its rightful lane. Thus,
respondent Callejas, filed a third-party complaint against Liong Chio Chang, doing business under the
name and style of La Perla Sugar Supply, the owner of the trailer truck, for indemnity in the event that he
would be held liable for damages to petitioner.
On the other hand, Callejas filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. NC-397 before the
RTC of Naic, Cavite, against La Perla Sugar Supply and Arcadio Arcilla, the truck driver, for damages he
incurred due to the vehicular accident. On September 24, 1992, the said court found Arcilla liable to pay
Callejas the cost of the repairs of his passenger bus, his lost earnings, exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. A criminal case, Criminal Case No. 2223-92, was also filed against truck driver Arcilla in the RTC of
Imus, Cavite. On May 3, 1994, the said court convicted truck driver Arcadio Arcilla of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide, multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property.
The trial court on September 13, 1999, found respondents Ildefonso Callejas and Edgar de
Borja, together with Liong Chio Chang, jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner damages and costs of
suit. Respondents Callejas and De Borja appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court
erred in holding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court on May 21, 2004 ruling that the injury sustained by
the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting
or to the negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury
arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge
or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held
liable. The CA denied the MR filed.
ISSUE: Should the Celyrosa Express be absolved from liability?
HELD: Yes. The provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to the case at bar states that:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
This Court interpreted the above quoted provisions in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals that:
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the
carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the
carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing
evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common
carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its
contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous
event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to
curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries
sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that
the law requires.
The totality of evidence shows that the death of petitioners spouse was caused by the reckless
negligence of the driver of the Isuzu trailer truck which lost its brakes and bumped the Celyrosa Express
bus, owned and operated by respondents. The sketch prepared by PO3 Magno S. de Villa, who
investigated the accident shows that the passenger bus facing the direction of Tagaytay City and lying
on its right side on the shoulder of the road, about five meters away from the point of impact. On the other
hand, the trailer truck was on the opposite direction, about 500 meters away from the point of impact. PO3
De Villa stated that he interviewed De Borja, respondent driver of the passenger bus, who said that he
was about to unload some passengers when his bus was bumped by the driver of the trailer truck that
lost its brakes. PO3 De Villa checked out the trailer truck and found that its brakes really failed.
In fine, the evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising on its
rightful lane along the Aguinaldo Highway when the trailer truck coming from the opposite direction, on
full speed, suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane, and bumped the passenger bus on its left
middle portion. Respondent driver De Borja had every right to expect that the trailer truck coming from
the opposite direction would stay on its proper lane. He was not expected to know that the trailer truck
had lost its brakes. The swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was running on a fast speed as it
was found 500 meters away from the point of collision.
Petition is denied and The Decision dated May 21, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 7,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66891 are AFFIRMED.
37. JOSE PILAPIL, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC.,
Ponente: Padilla, J
FACTS: Jose Pilapil, a passenger, boarded ALATCO's bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on
16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. Upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Baao, Camarines
Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit
Jose above his left eye. Respondent's personnel rushed Jose to the provincial hospital in Naga City where
he was confined and treated. Jose was taken to Dr. Malabanan of Iriga City, subsequently, to Dr.
Capulong of V. Luna Hospital, for treatment, but Jose still lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained
a permanent scar above the left eye.
Jose filed an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch
I, which ordered ALATCO to pay Jose Pilapil the sum of P 10K for actual and material damages for
causing a permanent scar on the face and injuring the eye-sight, P5K as moral and exemplary damages,
P300.00 for his medical expenses and attorney's fees in the sum of P 1K.
ALATCO appealed to the CA and on 19 October 1979, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division
of Five, rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of the court a quo.
Jose now appeals arguing that the nature of the business of a transportation company requires
the assumption of certain risks, and the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to passenger
is one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
ISSUE: Is ALATCO liable in the instant case?
HELD: No. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however,
make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies
the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers
to only such as human care and foresight can provide. The presumption of fault or negligence against
the carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either
that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event. In the instant case, the injury sustained was in no way due to
any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of
private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe
and suitable cars as well as competent employees. With the injury arising wholly from causes created by
strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable.
38. DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. VS COURT OF APPEAS
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito
Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident. Among others, it was alleged that while petitioner Theodore
M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent
manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran
over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest
hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his
other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto
Hospital where he expired.
The RTC ruled in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his
death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito. The Court of Appeals reversed
and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of
the suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners as common carrier are negligent and liable for the damages
claimed
HELD: The petitioners are guilty of negligence. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the
conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not
manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion
there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public
utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty
of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of
increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature
acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or
motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting
from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to
pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence
must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
39. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD
Ponente: J, Vitug
FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk,
entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned
to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently
ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or
who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad
was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with
her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and
Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in
its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was
negligent in his assigned task. The trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. The
complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its now assailed
decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased
might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when
the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was
nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by
reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the
fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT LRTA (Common Carrier) AND RODOLFO ROMAN (train driver) LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD.
DECISION: YES, with respect to the common carrier. However, Roman is absolved from the liability. Law
and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. In the absence
of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to
the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception
from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of
the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT
and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
liable only for his own fault or negligence. Thus, in this case, Roman is absolved from liability.
40. LA MALLORCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: J, Barrera
Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old,
Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga,
bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.
They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belonging. The
conductor of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child
Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height which fare is charged
in accordance with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of
their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his
companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from
the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind,
but in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers near the
seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete stop,
it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
41. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running board
Ponente: J, Regalado
without getting his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the
FACTS: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping
shaded place where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather
Corporation, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. On May 12, 1975, said vessel
around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was
arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having
none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her
been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto
parent.
Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed,
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from
the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel.
the latter damages.
The crane owned by the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and operated by its crane operator Alejo
Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had
ISSUE: Should the child still be considered a passenger?
disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being
operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that
HELD: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus
some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was
for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the
pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him,
petitioner remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where
pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where
the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from
he later expired three (3) days thereafter. Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages
the car.
against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger
alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues
ISSUE: Is Aboitiz Shipping Corporation still liable to the death of Viana after he had disembarked from
until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
the vessel?
premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they
HELD: Yes, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation is still liable. According to Article 1755 of the New Civil Code,
alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although the father was still on
a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstance.
to run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child,
Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is
carrier’s agent had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by Article 1755
required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the
of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely
carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination.
its passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started
to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who
remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.
The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his
baggage. In the case at bar, Viana was still unloading his cargoes when the incident happens, Anacleto
Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. Thus, Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation is still liable to the death of Viana even after he had already embarked from the vessel.
42. TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INC. VS ALBERTO CRUZ
FACTS: On January 9, 1998, at around 7:50 p.m., respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu
Passenger Jitney (jeepney) that he owns with plate number DSG-944 along Angeles-Magalang Road,
Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga. Meanwhile, a Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines)
with plate number NXM-116, owned by petitioner Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc. and driven by Edgar
Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that of respondent Edgar Hernandez vehicle. Subsequently,
the bus bumped the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree which resulted in the
death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious physical injuries of Virginia Muñoz.
Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muñoz and Alberto Cruz, Sr., father of the
deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 9006 before the
RTC claiming that the collision was due to the reckless, negligent and imprudent manner by which Edgar
Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing traffic laws, rules and regulations, and
praying that judgment be rendered ordering Edgar Calaycay and petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc.
to pay for the damages and expenses of the victims.
On January 30, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents. The Petitioners
then filed its appeal with the CA, in which the latter affirmed and added some modifications to the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Did the petitioner exercised ordinary diligence of a good father of a family in its selection and
supervision of driver Calaycay?
HELD: No. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service records.19 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision
of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees,
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern
of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.20 In this case, as shown by the above findings of the RTC, petitioner was not able to prove that
it exercised the required diligence needed in the selection and supervision of its employee.
Be that as it may, this doesn't erase the fact that at the time of the vehicular accident, the jeepney
was in violation of its allowed route as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and driver of the
jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows: When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable for the damages caused to the
victims. The petitioner must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.21 It is, therefore, proper to mitigate the liability of the petitioner and its driver. The
determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on the circumstances of each
case.
43. MARIANO C. MENDOZA AND ELVIRA LIM vs. SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ AND GABRIEL
V. GOMEZ.
Ponente: J Perez
FACTS:On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW 582, 3 owned by
respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora)4 and driven by Antenojenes Perez (Perez),5 was hit by a
Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) with temporary plate number 1376-1280, registered under
the name of petitioner Elvira Lim (Lim)7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza. Reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against Mendoza. 9
Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate complaint for damages against
Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. Petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the
bus in question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of
the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation
Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called “kabit system.” Respondents then impleaded both Lim
and Enriquez. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented Teresita Gutierrez (Gutierrez), whose testimony
was offered to prove that Mayamy Bus or Mayamy Transport is a business name registered under her
name, and that such business is a sole proprietorship. Such was presented by petitioners to rebut the
allegation of respondents that Mayamy Transport is a corporation; and to show, moreover, that although
Gutierrez is the sole proprietor of Mayamy Transport, she was not impleaded by respondents in the case
at bar.alawred
ISSUE: Who is liable for the act committed?
HELD: Settled is the fact that based on the existing circumstances, Mendoza was negligent in driving the
subject Myamy bus. His negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is certainly liable to repair said
damage. Furthermore, Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability
or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission which
caused damage or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or
subsidiarily under certain circumstances.25
In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, it was held that the registered owner is deemed the employer of
the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil
Code. Citing Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom,28 the Court ruled that in so far as third persons are
concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the
actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner. As such, there can be no other
conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza. Consequently, Mariano Mendoza and Elvira
Lim are held solidarily liable to respondent Spouses Leonora and Gabriel Gomez.
44. FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES VS JOSE A. ESPINAS
Ponente: J, Brion
FACTS: On November 22, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car
along Leon Guinto Street in Manila when he was suddenly hit by another car. After verifying with the Land
Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car with plate number UCF-545 is
Filcar. The car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor. At the time of the incident
happened, the car was driven by Timoteo Floresca, Atty. Flor’s personal driver.
On May 31, 2001, Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor,
President & Gen Manager before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City.
Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or
negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor.
The CA, affirmed the decisions of the MeTC and RTC for the liability of Filcar to pay Espinas
damages.
ISSUE: WON Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held
liable for the damages caused to Espinas.
HELD: Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus
vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that
Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on
this basis that Filcar is primarily and directly liable to Espinas for damages. As a general rule, one is only
responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the torts
committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an
employee's act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act
or omission committed by his employee.
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the
basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts
of one's subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed
by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. In so far as third persons
are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the
actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
 Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily
and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required.
It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order
that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
45. EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION V. SUYOM
Ponente: J, Panganiban
FACTS: On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store
of Myrna Tamayo located at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinned
to death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent Myrna Tamayos son, Reniel Tamayo, and
Respondent Felix Oledans daughter, Felmarie Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself,
Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent Lucita Suyom. Tutor was charged with and
later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12. Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office,
respondents were furnished a copy of Official Receipt No. 62204139 and Certificate of Registration No.
08262797, showing that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to
Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and
Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a complaint for damages in the RTC of Manila, Branch 14.
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, issued an Order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin
Lim from the Complaint, because they could not be located and served with summonses. On the other
hand, in its Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine
and that the former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also
claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine. After trial on the merits, the RTC
rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and attorneys fees to
respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered
with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the legal owner was still Equitable. Thus, petitioner was liable
to respondents. Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed the
owner/operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of
Ecatine on December 9, 1992. The reason cited by the CA was that the Certificate of Registration on file
with the LTO still remained in petitioners name. In order that a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle
can bind third persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO.
ISSUE: Are respondents liable?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered
owner of the tractor at the time of the accident. The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales
made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons
are concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the
deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.Petitioner further claims that it is not liable
for moral damages, because respondents failed to establish or show the causal connection or relation
between the factual basis of their claim and their wrongful act or omission, if any.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted. This is so because moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219
(2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. Having established the
liability of petitioner as the registered owner of the vehicle respondents have satisfactorily shown the
existence of the factual basis for the award and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor, who is
deemed as petitioners employee.[58] Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the
proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission.
Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court. The evidence gives no ground for doubt that such
discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court.[61] The award is in fact consistent with
the rule that moral damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering
undergone by that party by reason of the defendants culpable action.
46. GV Florida Transport, Inc., Petitioner v Heirs of Romeo L. Battung (GR No. 208802, October
14, 2015)
FACTS: Battung boarded the bus of petitioner with body number 037 and plate number BVJ-525 in Delfin
Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila. He was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the
ride. Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus reached
the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted
to check the tires. At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung
at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident
and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. Hence,
respondents filed a complaint on July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of P1,826,000.00
based on a breach of contract of carriage against petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for damages arising from culpa contractual
RULING: No. In the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect
in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of the common
carrier's employees, namely Dulipio and Daraoay, in the capabilities as driver and conductor respectively,
and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well as
competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the
carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and
the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the
insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
The case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger
who, after consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.
The law exacts, provided in Articles 1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code, from common carriers
(i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services
to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its
passengers.
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
47. HERMINIO L. NOCUM vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY G.R. No. L-23733. October 31,
1969
Ponente: J, Barredo
FACTS: Appellee (Nocum), who was a passenger in appellant's (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.) Bus No. 120
then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence
of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus. The bus conductor testified that
the box belonged to a passenger whose name he does not know and who told him that it contained
miscellaneous items and clothes. He also said that from its appearance there was no indication at all
that the contents were explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he just relied on
the word of the owner. Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista added that they were not authorized to open the
baggages of passengers because instruction from the management was to call the police if there were
packages containing articles which were against regulations.
The trial court's (Court of First Instance of Batangas) decision was that appellant, Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co, did not observe the extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as
required by the articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil Code:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
ART 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Appellant, Laguna Tayabas Bus Co assailed the decision of the lower court, that it erred as a
matter of law in not absolving it from liability resulting from the explosion of firecrackers contained in a
package, the contents of which were misrepresented by a passenger.
Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Did Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. fail to exercise extraordinary diligence?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court does not agree with the lower court's findings. It said that, no doubt, it's
vews do seem to be in line with the reasons that the Code Commission had for incorporating the above-
quoted provisions in its draft of the Civil Code. Indeed, in approving the said draft, Congress must have
concurred with the Commission that by requiring the highest degree of diligence from common carriers
in the safe transport of their passengers and by creating a presumption of negligence against them, the
recklessness of their drivers which is a common sight even in crowded areas and, particularly, on the
highways throughout the country may, somehow, if not in a large measure, be curbed.
But the Supreme Court is not convinced, however, that the exacting criterion of said provisions
has not been met by appellant in the circumstances of this particular case. It said that, Article 1733 is not
as unbending as His Honor has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of
common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be "according to all the
circumstances of each case." In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
The Supreme Court said that, it must be considered that while it is true the passengers of
appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control, fairness
demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to
the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their
common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the
lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. The right to privacy to which each
passenger is entitled is not to considered lightly. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when
he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the
case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage
when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger
of being transgressed.
The Supreme Court also qouted that, a carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers
from fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by other passengers, in the
absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees, was aware of the nature of the article or
had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom. (Bogard v. Illinois C. R Co. 144 Ky. 649, 139 S. W. 855,
36 L. R. A.[N. S.] 337; Clarke v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 34, 39 S. W. 840, 36 L. R. A. 123 [explosion
of can of gasoline]; East Indian R. Co. v. Mukerjee [1901] A. C. [Eng.] 396, 3 B. R. C. 420 — P. C.
[explosion of fireworks]; Annotation: 37 L. R. A. [N. S.]
Thus, in holding that appellant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by
showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, "according to the
circumstances of the (each) case" the appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is
dismissed.
48. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: Ynarez-Santiago
FACTS: Estela Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed
"Jewels of Europe". The package tour included the countries of England, Holland, Germany, Austria,
Liechstenstein, Switzerland and France at a total cost of P74,322.70. She was given a discount of 5% of
the amount because her niece, Meriam Menor, was the ticketing manager. Pursuant to their contract,
Menor delivered the travel documents and ticket to her aunts house, and in turn, Crisostomo gave the full
payment. Menor then told Crisostomo to be at NAIA on June 15. Crisostomo, without checking her
documents, went on June 15 to NAIA, only to discover that the flight was on June 14, and her plane ticket
was for the 14th. She called Menor to complain, and Menor was able to convince Crisostomo to take
another tour package called the “British Pageant.” Crisostomo paid partial payment and went on her trip.
Upon her return, Crisostomo demanded that she be reimbursed with the difference of the Jewels of
Europe and British Pageant package. Caravan Travel refused, contending that the tickets were non-
refundable.
Crisostomo then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, claiming that
it was Caravan Travel’s fault that she missed her flight and that it was also negligent in telling her the
correct date. The RTC ruled in favor of Crisostomo, and found Caravan negligent. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, finding fault in both parties. Petitioner contends that respondent did not observe
the standard of care required of a common carrier when it informed her wrongly of the flight schedule.
She could not be deemed more negligent than respondent since the latter is required by law to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the fulfillment of its obligation.
ISSUE: Is Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. a common carrier?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that, by definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one
whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or
news from one place to another for a fixed price. Such person or association of persons are regarded
as carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers. A common
carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. It is obvious from the above definition that
respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or goods and is
therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner
from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in
their behalf. Respondent’s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel
permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.
While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company,
this does not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as
an agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe.
Respondent's obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply to see to it that petitioner was properly
booked with the airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination,
meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline.
The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the latter’s service of arranging
and facilitating petitioner’s booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the
object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the
contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage.
Petitioners submission is premised on a wrong assumption.
The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the
degree of care required in the performance of the latters obligation under the contract. As earlier stated,
respondent is not a common carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not bound under the law to observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims.
Therefore, it is clear that respondent performed its prestation under the contract as well as
everything else that was essential to book petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due diligence
in the conduct of her affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss the flight. Needless to say,
after the travel papers were delivered to petitioner, it became incumbent upon her to take ordinary care
of her concerns. This undoubtedly would require that she at least read the documents in order to assure
herself of the important details regarding the trip.
Finally, the Supreme Court said that, the evidence on record shows that respondent company
performed its duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover
and must bear her own damage. And thus denied the petition for lack of merit.
49. FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U. CAORONG, and minor children
Ponente: J Mendoza
FACTS: Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Caorong is the
widow of Atty. Caorong, while private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander are
their minor children.
On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos.
Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted
an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in
Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner
by burning some of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of
the Philippine Constabulary Regional Hearquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt.
Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, at its main office in Cagayan
de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property
would be taken.
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be
passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among
the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader ofthe Maranaos, identified as one Bashier
Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side ofthe highway.
Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. Then
one ofthe companions ofMananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the
passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passengers to get off the bus. The
passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some
distance from the highway.
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At
that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had
meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver
as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The armed men were,
however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they were going to burn the bus along with its
driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from
inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus
was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush
him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation.
 Respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch VI, Iligan City. In his decision, dated December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed
ISSUE: 1. Was there a breach of the Contract of Carriage?
2. Was the seizure of the vehicle a fortuitous event?
HELD:1. Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common
carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the
present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioners employees, the seizure of the bus
by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioners operation
manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to
protect the safety of its passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary
measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have
been employed without violating the passengers constitutional rights. As this Court intimated in Gacal v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking
passengers and inspecting their baggages.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack on one
of petitioners buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
2. No. Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to be
considered as force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being excused
from liability.
In the present case, this factor of unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be
considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that
the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners
operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really
done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
50. RAYNERA VS HICETA
Ponente: J Pardo
FACTS: Mar 23, 1989, 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. Hewas riding a
motorcycle.
The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck was loaded with
two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There
were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates.[5] The asphalt
road was not well lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck
trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck
helper Geraldino D. Lucelo,rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the
attending physician pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
The heirs of the deceased demanded[10] from respondents payment of damages arising from
the death of Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the
claims
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila[11] a complaint[12] for damages against
respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck
Petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He testified that at about 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning, he
and his wife went to Alabang market, on board a tricycle. They passed by the service road going south,
and saw a parked truck trailer, with its hood open and without tail lights. They would have bumped the
truck but the tricycle driver was quick in avoiding a collision. The place was dark, and the truck had no
early warning device to alert passing motorists.the trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. It
found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent in view of these circumstances.
Respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals
rendered decision setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate court held that Reynaldo Rayneras
bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death and consequently,
absolved respondents from liability.
ISSUE: Should the respondents be absolved from liability?
HELD: Yes. During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. Despite the absence of
tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate
speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway,
because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land
Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136) respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the
steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind
the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of
the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him.
He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts bulbs were on top
of the steel plates, which were visible from a distance of 100 meters. Virgilio Santos admitted that from
the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten
(10) meters. In light of these circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless the
victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise due care and prudence demanded of him under the
circumstances.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to
be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the
presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of him.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front
vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim
himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last
clear chance of avoiding the accident.
51. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and HONORIO CABARDO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, and BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC.
Ponente: MELO, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff was passing thru the town of Calumpit Bulacan, temporarily while the bridge at Hagonoy,
Bulacan was under construction. Philippine National Railways is a purely government owned and
regularly passes along the intersection of Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando,
La Union from Manila and return; On August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in the afternoon, Passenger
train No. 73 hit and bumped the right mid portion of the plaintiff's passenger bus No. 1066, while the rear
portion of said bus was at the railroad track and its direction was towards Hagonoy, Bulacan at about
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon; At the time of the collision there was a slight rainfall in the vicinity of the
scene of the accident and that there was at said intersection no bar, semaphores, and signal lights that
would warn the public of the approaching train. On account of said collision, the Baliuag Transit Bus with
Body No. 1066 driven by Romeo Hughes was damaged and eighteen (18) of its passengers died and the
rest who were more than fifty three (53) passengers suffered physical injuries;
ISSUES:
1. Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit Incorporated and Honorio Cabardo,
train Engineer of the Philippine National Railways was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles, or whether or both were negligent?
2. Could either of the companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine National Railways be
held accountable for the collision because of negligence?
RULING: The instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR
which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become
immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on
common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized."
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable diligence commensurate with the surroundings
it should be apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of his
danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the duty of the company to use such precautions, by
warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him.
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the authority in this jurisdiction to the effect that the
failure of a railroad company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman
to warn the public of the passing train amounts to negligence.
52. JAPAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 118664)
Ponente: J, Romero
FACTS: On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San
Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana,
Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No.
JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover
at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko
Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport
to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private
respondents trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely. To accommodate the needs of its stranded
passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16,
1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much
to the dismay of the private respondents, their long-anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due
to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer
defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita. Since NAIA was only reopened
to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and
meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita
ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. To support their claim, private respondents
asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when
it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita,
Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they
were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline
passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents. CA
lowered the damages.
ISSUES: Did JAL have the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses even if the delay was
caused by force majeure? Whether or not the award of damages was proper.
HELD: When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that
he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. When JAL was prevented from resuming its
flight to Manila due to the effects of the eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred cannot be charged to JAL. The predicament of the
private respondents was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange the
respondents’ flight back to Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it made the passengers arrange their flight back to Manila on their own and after waiting
in the airport for a whole day.
While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents living expenses during their
stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements
to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged
on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private
respondents from transit passengers to new passengers as a result of which private respondents were
obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private
respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on
an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was
only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be accommodated in said
flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.
Yes, the award of nominal damages is proper. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that
a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized
and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him.
53. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS
Ponente: J, Bellosillo
FACTS: On 2 August 1976, private respondent was among the twenty-one (21) passengers of PAL Flight
477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato.
While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes before landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot received a radio
message that the airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should
proceed to Cotabato City instead.
Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options
to return to Cebu on flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or take the
next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz
City on 5 August 1975. Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because
he checked-in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 477 and there were only six (6) seats available as there were
already confirmed passengers for Manila.
PAL then issued to private respondent a free ticket to Iligan city, which the latter received under
protest.5 Private respondent was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in the Ford Fiera loaded
with PAL personnel.6 PAL neither provided private respondent with transportation from the airport to the
city proper nor food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City.
On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract
of carriage2 against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
private respondent. On appeal, the CA found no reversible error.
PAL then sought recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari it asserts that
it should not be charged with the task of looking after the passengers' comfort and convenience because
the diversion of the flight was due to a fortuitous event.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAL should be held liable in looking after the passengers’ comfort and
convenience considering that the diversion of its flight was due to a fortuitous event?
HELD: Yes. The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law
requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. The relation
of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in
safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
54.
55. MARANAN VS. PEREZ G.R. NO. L-22272
Ponente: J Bengzon
FACTS: Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez, was
stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was found guilty for homicide by the
Court of First Instance and was sentenced to suffer Imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P6000. While pending appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed
that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The court a quo, after trial, found
for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against
defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to
this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability .Defendant-
appellant relied solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is under
no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Perez should be held liable for the death of the passenger?
HELD: Yes. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests
on the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. As between the carrier
and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees
against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. Common
carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. The liability of the common
carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employees. (Art. 1759)
The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar were very different. In
the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. The Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike he
present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carrier’s absolute liability for the safety of passengers
against willfull assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in
the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability
56. SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner, vs. ANDION FERNANDEZ, respondent.
Ponente: J, Callejo
FACTS: Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano here in the Philippines and abroad. At
the time of the incident, she was availing an educational grant from the Federal Republic of Germany,
pursuing a Masters Degree in Music majoring in Voice. She was invited to sing before the King and Queen
of Malaysia on February 3 and 4, 1991. For this singing engagement, an airline passage ticket was
purchased from petitioner Singapore Airlines which would transport her
to Manila from Frankfurt, Germany on January 28, 1991. From Manila, she would proceed
to Malaysia on the next day.[4] It was necessary for the respondent to pass by Manila in order to gather
her wardrobe; and to rehearse and coordinate with her pianist her repertoire for the aforesaid
performance.
On January 27, 1991, Flight No. SQ 27 left Frankfurt but arrived in Singapore two hours late or at
about 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991. By then, the aircraft bound for Manila had left as
scheduled, leaving the respondent and about 25 other passengers stranded in
the Changi Airport in Singapore. Upon disembarkation at Singapore, the respondent approached the
transit counter who referred her to the nightstop counter and told the lady employee thereat that it was
important for her to reach Manila on that day, January 28, 1991. The lady employee told her that there
were no more flights to Manila for that day and that respondent had no choice but to stay
in Singapore. She was told that she can actually fly to Hong Kong going to Manila but since her ticket
was non-transferable, she would have to pay for the ticket. She then stayed overnight with her relatives.
The next day, after being brought back to the airport. The respondent approached petitioner’s male
employee at the counter to make arrangements for immediate booking only to be told: Cant you see I am
doing something. She explained her predicament but the male employee uncaringly retorted: Its your
problem, not ours.
The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight
from Singapore to Malaysia on January 29, 1991, through the efforts of her mother and travel agency
in Manila. Her mother also had to travel to Malaysia bringing with her respondent’s wardrobe and
personal things needed for the performance that caused them to incur an expense of about P50,000.
Because of these, the defendant sued the petitioner and was ordered to pay for damages by the RTC
which was affirmed by the CA. The petitioner assails the award of damages contending that it exercised
the extraordinary diligence required by law under the given circumstances and that the two hours delay
was due to a fortuitous event and beyond petitioners control.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages.
DECISION: Yes. The petitioner is liable for damages. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger,
confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has
every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier
opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of carriage.
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, the law requires
common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. In an action for
breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was
at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its
non-performance by the carrier.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the respondent carried a confirmed ticket for the two-
legged trip from Frankfurt to Manila: 1) Frankfurt-Singapore; and 2) Singapore-Manila. In her contract of
carriage with the petitioner, the respondent certainly expected that she would fly to Manila on Flight No.
SQ 72 on January 28, 1991. Since the petitioner did not transport the respondent as covenanted by it on
said terms, the petitioner clearly breached its contract of carriage with the respondent. The respondent
had every right to sue the petitioner for this breach. The defense that the delay was due to fortuitous
events and beyond petitioners control is unavailing.
In the instant case, petitioner was not without recourse to enable it to fulfill its obligation to transport the
respondent safely as scheduled as far as human care and foresight can provide to her destination. It
maybe that delay in the take off and arrival of commercial aircraft could not be avoided and may be
caused by diverse factors such as those testified to by defendant’s pilot. However, knowing fully well that
even before the plaintiff boarded defendants Jumbo aircraft in Frankfurt bound for Singapore, it has
already incurred a delay of two hours. Nevertheless, defendant did not take the trouble of informing
plaintiff. Such information should have been given and inquiries made in Frankfurt because even the
defendant airlines manual provides that in case of urgency to reach his or her destination on the same
date, the head office of defendant in Singapore must be informed by telephone or telefax so as the latter
may make certain arrangements with other airlines in Frankfurt to bring such a passenger with urgent
business to Singapore in such a manner that the latter can catch up with her connecting flight such as S-
27/28 without spending the night in Singapore[23]
Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship,
exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. In this case, petitioners employees acted in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted in this case.
57.
58. CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL., vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
Ponente: Reyes, JBL
FACTS: That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba,
Laguna to Manila;
That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad
Company assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened to be in said station waiting
for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was going to report for duty; That
Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same dating back during the
Japanese occupation; That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine
furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside
the train coach; That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the wound which he sustained from the shot fired
by Devesa.
It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted with homicide by final judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Appellant's contention is that, on the foregoing facts, no liability attaches to it as employer of the killer,
Emilio Devesa; that it is not responsible subsidiary ex delicto, under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary
duties and service; nor is it responsible ex contractu, since the complaint did not aver sufficient facts to
establish such liability, and no negligence on appellant's party was shown. The Court below held the
Railroad company responsible on the ground that a contract of transportation implies protection of the
passengers against acts of personal violence by the agents or employees of the carrier.

ISSUE: Is Manila Rail Road Company is liable for the damages for the death of Gillaco caused by Devesa

HELD: No. The Manila Rail Road Company is not liable for the damages for the death of Gillaco caused
by Devesa. Under the Civil Code, a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the
carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a
passenger safely to his destination. But this responsibility under the law extends only to those that the
carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of car and diligence required of it.
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge nurtured against
the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The
latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee
every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the
thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso
fortuito" within the definition of article 105 of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable
under the given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of appellant's
contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.
No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care and diligence in the
protection of its passengers; but, considering the vast and complex activities of modern rail transportation,
to require of appellant that it should guard against all possible misunderstanding between each and every
one of its employees and every passenger that might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time,
strikes us as demanding diligence beyond what human care and foresight can provide.
More importantly, When the crime took place, the guard had no duties to discharge. Devesa was
therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the
deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. His position would be that of
a passenger also waiting transportation and not of an employee assigned to discharge duties that the
Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault cannot be deemed
in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.