Ex-Warden Sues Morgan County Sheriff

Case 5:18-cv-01085-UJH-LSC Document 1 Filed 07/13/18 Page 1 of 56 FILED
2018 Jul-13 PM 04:03

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
LEON W. BRADLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.:
)
ANA FRANKLIN, ROBERT )
WILSON, BLAKE ROBINSON, )
JUSTIN POWELL, )
in their official and individual )
capacities; and THE MORGAN )
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )
)
Defendants. )
COMPLAINT
INTRODUCTION
1. Public faith in the integrity of the Morgan County Sheriff’s Department
(“MCSO”), and in its ability to seek justice, has been eviscerated by systemic
misconduct under Sheriff Ana Franklin (“Franklin”).
2. Plaintiff was wrongfully discharged from his employment position and
subjected to unlawful searches and seizures.
3. This is a civil action for violations of federal and state law—
particularly, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
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Case 5:18-cv-01085-UJH-LSC Document 1 Filed 07/13/18 Page 2 of 56
1961 to 1968 (“RICO”) and the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4. This action arises under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 (“§ 1983”) and 1988 (§
1988), as amended, and under 18 U.S.C. § 1965, for damages and injunctive relief
for the deprivation against the named defendants for committing acts with the intent
of depriving Plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the United
States; retaliating against Plaintiff for his exercise of constitutionally protected
speech; for refusing or neglecting to prevent such deprivations and denials; and for
violating RICO.
5. Plaintiff asserts subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
(federal question) and 1343(a)(3) (civil rights) for the federal constitutional claims
contained herein.
6. This Court is an appropriate venue for this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b). The unlawful conduct of the named defendants took place in this judicial
district; evidence and employment records relevant to the allegations are maintained
in this judicial district; Plaintiff would be employed in this judicial district but for
the unlawful actions and practices of Defendants; and Defendants regularly conduct
affairs in this judicial district.
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7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction is also proper pursuant to RICO.
8. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
PARTIES
Plaintiff
9. Plaintiff, Leon Bradley (“Bradley”), is an African-American male over
the age of nineteen, and a resident of Morgan County, Alabama (“Morgan County”).
Plaintiff was employed as the Warden for Morgan County (the “Warden”) at times
relevant hereto.
Defendants
10. Defendant, Ana Franklin (“Franklin”), is the Sheriff for Morgan
County and was at all times relevant hereto.
11. Franklin exercised control over Plaintiff’s employment. Franklin is
sued in her individual and official capacity, as well as to the extent she was Plaintiff’s
employer.
12. Defendant, Robert Wilson (“Wilson”), is a Deputy Sheriff with the
MCSO and was at all times relevant hereto. Wilson is sued in his individual and
official capacity.
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13. Defendant, Blake Robinson (“Robinson”), is a Deputy Sheriff with the
MCSO and was at all times relevant hereto. Robinson is sued in his individual and
official capacity.
14. Defendant, Justin Powell (“Powell”) is an employee of the MCSO and
was at all times relevant hereto. Powell is sued in his individual and official capacity.
15. Defendant, MCSO, exercised control over Plaintiff’s employment.
MCSO is sued as Plaintiff’s employer and/or joint employer.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Background
16. Bradley was employed as the Warden beginning August 13, 2003, and
at all times relevant hereto.
17. Bradley, in his capacity as the Warden, was entrusted with the legal
custody and charge of Morgan County jail inmates.
18. Bradley received positive evaluations and was never cited for policy
violations and/or disciplinary actions until the occurrence of the events giving rise
to this Complaint.
Bradley’s Concerns Regarding MCSO
19. Through his employment as the Warden, Bradley became concerned
regarding Franklin’s abuse of power as the Morgan County Sheriff, namely,
improper use of inmate “trustee” labor, nepotism, racial discrimination in hiring
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practices, inmate treatment, ethics violations, and misappropriation of jail food
money in violation of a federal consent decree.
20. Bradley addressed these issues directly with Franklin through meetings,
internal memorandum, and electronic communications; however, Franklin never
resolved, or attempted to resolve, the problems.
21. Bradley had personal knowledge that Franklin abused trustee labor for
personal gain by taking inmates on official travel and using inmates to work personal
and official events.
22. Bradley had personal knowledge that Franklin continued to utilize
trustee labor for personal gain after she circulated internal memorandum purporting
to revise MCSO inmate trustee policies.
23. Bradley had personal knowledge that Franklin invested Morgan County
jail food funds, and other MCSO funds, into private businesses for personal gain.
24. Bradley had personal knowledge that Franklin was endangering the
safety of Alabama residents by releasing dangerous Morgan County inmates under
the trustee program without proper classification.
Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog
25. Bradley began communicating with Glenda Lockhart during his
employment as the Warden.
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26. Glenda Lockhart maintained and regularly contributed to a free, online
blog called the “Morgan County Whistleblower” (the “Whistleblower Blog”).
27. The Whistleblower Blog investigated and exposed public corruption in
the MCSO.
28. Glenda Lockhart primarily blogged from her personal computer, which
was kept at her business, Straightline Drywall & Acoustical (“Straightline”).
29. The Whistleblower Blog was publicly accessible online, and it was
often the subject of local and national news coverage.
30. Straightline contracts with the United States Government to install
specialty drywall and acoustical products.
31. Straightline’s office in Falkville, Alabama, contained valuable paper
files, electronic devices, data, and software containing sensitive business
information.
Lockhart’s Blog Posts
32. Glenda Lockhart frequently detailed corruption in the MCSO and
between Defendants on the Whistleblower Blog—including, but not limited to, the
following concerns:
(a) Franklin’s illicit investment and involvement in Priceville
Partners, L.L.C. (“Priceville Partners”), a used-car dealership offering title loans;
and any of its subsidiaries and/or associated companies;
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(b) disclosing a copy of Franklin’s $150,000 cashier’s check
online—signed over to Priceville Partners—from Morgan County jail food funds;
(c) Robinson’s investment in Priceville Partners;
(d) Robinson’s ownership and operation of a car wash located at
Priceville Partners in Hartselle, Alabama;
(e) conflicts of interest and corruption between the MCSO,
Defendants, and others; and
(f) the unlawful investigations of Plaintiff, Glenda Lockhart, and the
Whistleblower Blog.
Bradley’s Protected Speech
33. Defendants were subjected to a heightened degree of public scrutiny in
their official duties due to the Whistleblower Blog and the attendant media coverage.
34. Plaintiff discussed with Franklin, Lockhart, Christopher Hendon (a
Federal Bureau of Investigation agent), and Randy Cavnar that Franklin, and other
MCSO employees, were violating inmate trustee policies and procedures. Plaintiff
communicated these concerns through verbal, written, and electronic
communications.
35. Franklin repeatedly rebuked Plaintiff’s concerns identified supra at
Paragraphs 19 through 24.
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36. Plaintiff later met with Glenda Lockhart with the understanding that she
would anonymously publicize and investigate the concerns identified supra at
Paragraphs 19 through 24.
37. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was exercising his right as a
private citizen when he spoke with Franklin, Glenda Lockhart, Christopher Hendon,
and other MCSO employees about the concerns identified supra at Paragraphs 19
through 24.
Coercing Lockhart’s Grandson to Investigate

the Whistleblower Blog and Incriminate Bradley
38. Franklin told many individuals, including Wilson, Robinson, Powell,
and other MCSO employees, that she wanted to shut down the Whistleblower Blog
and punish everyone involved, including Plaintiff.
39. Daniel Lockhart, the grandson of Glenda Lockhart, worked at Falkville
Fire & Rescue (the “Falkville Fire Department”), with Robinson.
40. After the Whistleblower Blog began covering MCSO corruption—
including posts involving Defendants—Robinson began leveraging his familiarity
with Daniel Lockhart to obtain information relating to Glenda Lockhart and the
Whistleblower Blog.
41. Robinson, after discussions with Daniel Lockhart at the Falkville Fire
Department, suspected that Plaintiff was communicating with Glenda Lockhart.
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42. Robinson told Franklin, Wilson, and Powell that he suspected Plaintiff
was communicating with Glenda Lockhart.
43. Defendants agreed to recruit Daniel Lockhart to help Defendants
investigate and shut down the Whistleblower Blog and punish Glenda Lockhart and
any cooperating MCSO employees, including Plaintiff.
44. Defendants coerced Daniel Lockhart to work as a “confidential
informant” to unlawfully obtain information supportive of the investigation and
prosecution of Lockhart Whistleblower Blog, and anyone involved including
Plaintiff.
45. In September, 2016, Franklin paid Daniel Lockhart a total of $500 to
unlawfully access Straightline and Lockhart’s computer systems.
46. Defendants threatened Daniel Lockhart that he, or his grandmother,
Glenda Lockhart, would face criminal prosecution if he did not cooperate with
Defendants.
47. Defendants threatened Daniel Lockhart that he would be unable to
secure future employment if he did not cooperate in supporting Defendants’
unlawful investigation.
Violation of Bradley’s Constitutional Rights
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48. Defendants instructed Daniel Lockhart to, by any means necessary,
enter Straightline and obtain information relating to the Whistleblower Blog and any
cooperating MCSO employees including Plaintiff.
49. On or about September 27, 2016, Powell met Daniel Lockhart at the
Falkville Fire Department. Powell gave Daviel Lockhart a universal serial bus drive
containing “Ardamax Keylogger 4.6” software (the “Keylogger”).
50. The Keylogger, once installed on a host machine, covertly records and
logs every keystroke (e.g., capturing the victim’s messages, passwords, and credit
card numbers).
51. On or about September 27, 2016, Powell trained Daniel Lockhart how
to install, use, and obtain information from Lockhart’s computer systems supportive
of Defendants’ investigation and prosecution of Plaintiff, Glenda Lockhart, the
Whistleblower Blog, and any cooperating MCSO employees, including Plaintiff.
52. On October 4, 2016, Defendants used information obtained from
Daniel Lockhart, the Keylogger, and other unlawful surveillance to obtain search
warrants targeting to Plaintiff and Glenda Lockhart.
53. On October 4, 2016, a search warrant was applied for and signed by
Circuit Judge Glenn Thompson for Plaintiff’s residence (the “Bradley Search
Warrant”).
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54. The MCSO Drug Task Force executed the Bradley Search Warrant on
October 4, 2016, raiding Plaintiff’s residence and rifling through his belongings,
including, but not limited to, personal and intimate effects wholly unrelated to
Defendants’ unlawful investigation.
55. The Bradley Search Warrant was unlawful and constituted an
unconstitutional intrusion on Bradley’s liberty, possessions, and privacy.
56. But for the intentional and/or reckless omissions relied on by
Defendants to obtain the Bradley Search Warrant, there would have been no
probable cause finding sufficient to justify the broad search conducted at Plaintiff’s
residence.
57. The search of Plaintiff’s residence greatly exceeded the scope of the
Bradley Search Warrant.
58. Franklin and Robinson deliberately misled the Circuit Court of Morgan
County to obtain the Bradley Search Warrant.
59. Franklin and Robinson deliberately misled the Circuit Court of Morgan
County to obtain a search warrant for Glenda Lockhart’s residence.
60. After executing the Bradley Search Warrant, Franklin and others
interrogated Plaintiff for several hours.
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61. During the interrogation, Franklin characterized Plaintiff’s
involvement with Glenda Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog as a “crazy
vendetta” against Franklin and the MCSO.
62. Eleven months after the Bradley Search Warrant, Plaintiff was only
charged with misdemeanor tampering of governmental records (ALA. CODE § 13A-
10-12).
63. Defendants acted willfully, knowingly, and purposefully, with
deliberate indifference, and/or recklessly to deprive Plaintiff of his Constitutional
rights at all times relevant hereto.
64. The Bradley Search Warrant violated Plaintiff’s rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
65. The Bradley Search Warrant was issued and executed in bad faith for
purposes of harassment and retaliation against Plaintiff.
66. In early 2017, Defendants lied to Etowah County Sheriff’s Department
(“ECSD”) investigators in attempting to garner its assistance in prosecuting Bradley.
Bradley’s Termination
67. Franklin unlawfully terminated Bradley on October 13, 2016.
68. Bradley’s termination letter stated that he (1) violated MCSO computer
policies; (2) misappropriated confidential information; (3) misused county property;
(4) disobeyed official orders and rules; and (5) improperly divulged information.
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69. Franklin’s proffered rationale for terminating Plaintiff was pretext for
the unlawful conduct and retaliation of Defendants against Plaintiff as detailed
herein.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL RICO COUNTS
The RICO Enterprise
70. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants were persons acting on behalf
of themselves and the MCSO pursuant to its rules, policies, and procedures.
71. Defendants abused Morgan County offices and employment positions
for illegal purposes through a corrupt “enterprise.”
72. Defendants’ racketeering acts were not isolated, but rather formed a
pattern of conduct in furtherance of common goals and effectuated through similar
participants, victims, and methods of commission.
73. Defendants, through a pattern of racketeering activity, used the MCSO,
and positions therein:
(a) for personal monetary gain;
(b) to silence Plaintiff from discussing and exposing Defendants’
illegal and fraudulent acts;
(c) to deprive Plaintiff of his employment and/or livelihood;
(d) to keep Franklin in office to ensure any MCSO employees,
including Plaintiff, would be punished for cooperating with the Whistleblower Blog;
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(e) to provide Franklin with political power to investigate and attack
opponents of Franklin, Robinson, Wilson, and other associated persons;
(f) to protect the private business and investment interests of
Defendants, and other associated persons, from public and law enforcement scrutiny;
and
(g) to financially enrich all Defendants and other associated persons
and entities.
74. At all times relevant hereto, the MCSO—a legal entity wherein all
Defendants were employed or elected to serve—constituted an “enterprise” pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
75. Alternatively, Defendants operated as an association-in-fact designed
to further the same common purposes, including, but not limited to, those identified
supra at Paragraphs 72(a) through (g).
76. Defendants’ enterprise existed, and continues to exist, separate and
apart from the pattern of racketeering activity alleged herein. Particularly, at all times
relevant hereto, Defendant Franklin was the Sheriff, and Defendants Robinson,
Wilson, and Powell were employees of the MCSO.
77. Defendants operated the enterprise through a consensual and/or
hierarchical structure, separate from the MCSO as a whole, in furtherance of their
unlawful racketeering activity.
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78. Additionally, Franklin, Robinson, and Wilson were business partners
in Priceville Partners and other related subsidiary companies and/or entities.
Pattern of Racketeering Activity
79. Defendants’ pattern of racketeering activity (the “Predicate Acts”),
described below, were done within the past ten years and continuing.
80. By the Predicate Acts alleged herein, all Defendants, jointly and
severally, willfully, recklessly, and/or knowingly committed and/or conspired to the
commission of “racketeering activity” through a “pattern” involving a separate
“enterprise” and/or “association in fact” that affected interstate commerce.
81. Defendants could be charged, indicted, and convicted of multiple,
related violations of Alabama and federal law constituting a “pattern,” and which
violations are each potentially punishable by one or more years in jail.
82. The Predicate Acts were committed in furtherance of a common
scheme:
(a) to ensure that Defendants continued to benefit from their
investment and involvement with private businesses;
(b) the continued concealment of said financial investments and
interests;
(c) to ensure that Defendants continued to benefit from involving the
MCSO with private business and investment interests;
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(d) to ensure that Defendants continued to benefit from skimming
financial resources from the MCSO to private business and investment interests;
(e) to defraud Morgan County taxpayers through said concealment;
and to silence, unlawfully investigate, intimidate, and terminate any MCSO
employee, including Plaintiff, who provided information to Lockhart or otherwise
cooperated with the Whistleblower Blog;
(f) to keep Franklin in office as the Sheriff; and
(g) to financially enrich Defendants and other associated persons.
83. The Predicate Acts include, but are not limited to, two or more
“racketeering activities” as that term is defined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
84. Defendants’ known uses of the United States mail and interstate wires
in furtherance of their pattern of racketeering activity are enumerated below:
(a) MCSO receipt of federal funds, at all times relevant hereto,
which were controlled and converted to use by Franklin in furtherance of
Defendants’ unlawful racketeering activity;
(b) bank deposits made by Franklin, Robinson, and Wilson
regarding investments and profits from Priceville Partners;
(c) purchase and sale of automobiles and equipment manufactured
in the global supply chain by Franklin, Robinson, and Wilson;
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(d) purchase and installation of the Keylogger which utilized
interstate wires to transmit information and data to Defendants for the purpose of
concealing and continuing unlawful racketeering activity; and
(e) telephone and electronic communications between Defendants,
and others, which were routed through interstate wires, in furtherance of the
unlawful racketeering activity described herein.
85. Plaintiff was a primary and intended target of Defendants’ pattern of
racketeering activity as Defendants perceived him to be communicating with, or
otherwise providing information to, Glenda Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog.
86. Plaintiff was injured as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(b) through (d).
87. Defendants’ pattern of racketeering activity targeted, in part, MCSO
employees, including Plaintiff, communicating or cooperating with, or otherwise
providing information to, Glenda Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog
88. But for Defendants’ unlawful racketeering activity, Plaintiff would not
have been terminated and subjected to economic and non-economic damages.
Predicate Acts
Honest Services Wire Fraud
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89. Defendants, jointly and severally, willfully, recklessly, and/or
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the commission of honest services wire
fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1346).
90. Defendants agreed with themselves and others, both known and
unknown, to devise and intend to devise a scheme to defraud and to deprive the
citizens of Alabama, including Morgan County, of the intangible right to honest
services of a public official; that is, to deprive the honest services of Plaintiff, the
duly appointed Warden; and Franklin, the elected Morgan County Sheriff.
91. It was part Defendants’ scheme to defraud as to material matters and to
engage in the commission of honest services wire fraud by means of materially false
and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, that Defendants jointly and
severally, willfully, recklessly, and/or knowingly acted as follows:
(a) Franklin and Robinson invested public and private funds into
Priceville Partners;
(b) Priceville Partners offered and gave things of value to Franklin.
Among those things of value given by Priceville Partners to Franklin were business
interests in its operations, monetary discounts for automobiles and other valuable
equipment, offers to directly repay creditors on Franklin’s behalf, campaign
contributions, and opportunities to invest MCSO funds into its operations without
disclosing any conflict of interest to the public;
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(c) Priceville Partners offered and gave things of value to Robinson.
Among those things of value given by Priceville Partners to Robinson were access
to its property to operate a car wash and offers to directly repay creditors on
Robinson’s behalf;
(d) Priceville Partners offered and gave these things of value to
Defendants for the purpose of inducing Franklin to take official action that would
benefit its investors, including Franklin and Robinson; namely, to investigate and
prosecute any MCSO employee, including Plaintiff, that provided information to
Glenda Lockhart or otherwise cooperated with the Whistleblower Blog;
(e) Defendants took steps to conceal these payments and conflicts of
interest, to wit: Defendants proposed and agreed that the Whistleblower Blog should
be shut down as the Whistleblower Blog contained negative coverage of Franklin
and the MCSO; recruited Daniel Lockhart, through phone messages and electronic
communications, to work as a “confidential informant” to unlawfully enter
Straightline Drywall, install unauthorized keylogger software on Lockhart’s
computers, and to obtain unauthorized access to Lockhart’s computers; installed
and/or caused to be installed unauthorized keystroke logging software on Lockhart’s
computer systems; monitored the confidential data recorded, obtained, and stored by
the Keylogger; used data obtain from the Keylogger to perpetuate the unlawful
investigation of Lockhart and Plaintiff; sent and received wire communications in
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interstate commerce, specifically, electronic mail and phone messages in furtherance
of the scheme;
(f) Defendants received monetary bribes, kickbacks, or other
personal benefit from, or facilitated by, Priceville Partners to secure Defendants’
cooperation in investigating, terminating and prosecuting any MCSO employees,
including Plaintiff, that provided information to Glenda Lockhart or otherwise
cooperated with the Whistleblower Blog. These bribes and/or kickbacks were
facilitated and/or paid through electronic wires in interstate commerce, including,
but not limited to, discounted equipment and automobiles and business and financial
investments.
92. Defendants deprived the citizens of Alabama, including those in
Morgan County, Alabama, of the honest services of Franklin, the Sheriff, and
Plaintiff, the Warden, through monetary bribes, kickbacks, or other personal gain
from Priceville Partners, its subsidiaries, and others.
Wire Fraud
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the commission of wire fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1343).
94. Defendants jointly and severally did knowingly and willfully conspire,
combine, and agree with themselves and others, both known and unknown, to devise
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and intend to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
transmit or cause to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate commerce, electronic communications for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice: to wit, electronic e-mail communications, cell
phone communications, and illegal keystroke logging devices that record, collect,
store, and transmit stolen data over the internet.
95. It was part of the scheme to defraud as to material matters and to obtain
money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations, and promises, that Defendants jointly and severally, willfully,
recklessly, and/or knowingly acted as follows:
(a) proposed and agreed that Defendants wanted to terminate and
punish any MCSO employee that provided or otherwise cooperated with Lockhart
and the Whistleblower Blog;
(b) proposed and agreed that Defendants use their positions in the
MCSO to investigate Lockhart to obtain information sufficient to investigate,
terminate, and prosecute any MCSO employee that provided information to, or
otherwise cooperated with, Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog;
(c) conspired to interfere with Plaintiff’s lawful employment and
livelihood by unlawfully investigating, terminating, and prosecuting Plaintiff after
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the Whistleblower Blog began reporting on the corrupt activities of Defendants and
the MCSO.
(d) through electronic communications in interstate commerce
between each other and others, concocted and/or participated in, a scheme to defraud
Lockhart out of money and/or property through unlawful wiretapping, computer
tampering, surveillance, and the initiation of judicial proceedings;
(e) through electronic communications in interstate commerce
between each other and others, concocted and/or participated in, a scheme to defraud
Plaintiff out of money and property through unlawful wiretapping, computer
tampering, surveillance, and the initiation of judicial proceedings;
(f) told Daniel Lockhart that the purpose of entering Straightline and
accessing Lockhart’s computer systems was to terminate any MCSO employees that
provided information to, or otherwise cooperated with, Lockhart and the
Whistleblower Blog.
(g) installed and used keystroke-logging devices, i.e., the Keylogger,
on Lockhart’s computer systems to record the keystrokes of Lockhart and thereby
obtain her account information and passwords without her knowledge and/or
consent. Defendants recruited and paid Daniel Lockhart to act on their behalf in
furtherance of this scheme.
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(h) instructed Daniel Lockhart to gain access to Straightline and
Glenda Lockhart’s computer systems, files, and records by any means necessary,
including unlawful means;
(i) used the stolen usernames, passwords, and other data to access
Lockhart’s online accounts without consent and/or authorization and knowing that
the data was confidential and unique to the owner; and
(j) used the stolen information and data in relation to Plaintiff’s
termination of employment and initiate judicial proceedings against him.
96. Defendants used the information obtained from the Keylogger to
complete the intended goal of their conduct, i.e., to terminate Plaintiff’s
employment. Defendants, therefore, deprived Plaintiff of his property interests in
public employment, including wages and benefits, by using the data collected from
the Keylogger to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.
Laundering of Monetary Instruments
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the laundering of monetary instruments
(18 U.S.C. § 1956).
98. Defendants knowingly conducted or attempted to conduct financial
transactions involving proceeds of one or more “specified unlawful activities” with
the intent to promote the carrying on of said specified unlawful activities, in violation
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of 18 U.S.C §§ 1956(a)(1)(A) to (B)—particularly, the misappropriation, theft,
and/or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of Franklin:
(a) Defendants collected large sums of money through public
fundraising “rodeo” events;
(b) Defendants removed, deposited, and/or concealed “rodeo”
admission fees to avoid said fees from any formal accounting of the “rodeo” event;
(c) Defendants removed, deposited, and/or concealed pistol permit
registration fees to avoid said fees from any formal accounting of the Morgan County
pistol permit program;
(d) Franklin invested $150,000.00 of public funds earmarked for the
Morgan County, Alabama jail food program into Priceville Partners;
(e) Robinson and Wilson also invested personal funds into Priceville
Partners;
(f) The investments made by Franklin, Robinson, and Wilson were
not disclosed as liabilities of Priceville Partners;
(g) Franklin, Robinson, and Wilson obtained discounted equipment
and automobiles as investors in Priceville Partners, particularly, Defendants
purchased official MCSO and personal vehicles from Performance Auto Sales
(“Performance Auto”) which was a subsidiary of Priceville Partners;
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(h) Franklin, Robinson, and Wilson sold official MCSO and
personal vehicles back to Performance Auto and/or Priceville Partners for personal
monetary gain, receiving the entire benefit of the purchases without consideration;
and
(i) Franklin regularly drafted checks to Priceville Partners in return
for unreported cash from Priceville Partners.
transactions involving proceeds specified unlawful activity the intent to engage in
conduct constituting a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 7201 by willfully evading or
defeating, or attempting to do so, taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code.
Defendants by the conduct described herein, concealed public funds to avoid
reporting said funds to the Internal Revenue Service.
transactions involving proceeds from specified unlawful activity with the intent to
engage in conduct constituting a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 7206(4).
Retaliating Against a Witness – Glenda Lockhart
101. Defendants acted in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2) and (e) by
causing Daniel Lockhart to break into Straightline and install the Keylogger,
unlawfully seizing Glenda Lockhart’s property and valuable business data, and
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threatening her prosecution and imprisonment as retaliation for her contact with
Plaintiff regarding the MCSO.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to retaliate against a witness by engaging in
conduct that damaged, or threatened to damage, the tangible property of Glenda
Lockhart, with intent to retaliate against Plaintiff for providing information relating
to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense by Defendants to a
law enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2).
knowingly committed and/or conspired to retaliate against a witness by interfering
with the lawful employment and/or livelihood of Glenda Lockhart for Plaintiff
providing to law enforcement officers any truthful information relating to the
commission or possible commission of any Federal offense by Defendants in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).
Retaliating Against a Witness – Daniel Lockhart
104. Daniel Lockhart provided information to Defendants, and conducted
unlawful operations for Defendants, to investigate and prosecute MCSO employees,
including Plaintiff, who were providing information to Glenda Lockhart or
otherwise cooperating with the Whistleblower Blog.
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105. Defendants overtly threatened Daniel Lockhart to prevent him from
divulging any information to law enforcement officers regarding federal offenses by
Defendants, namely, that he would arrested and imprisoned, and that he would no
longer be able to join the military.
with the lawful employment and/or livelihood of Daniel Lockhart for providing to
law enforcement officers any truthful information relating to the commission or
possible commission of any federal offense by Defendants in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(e).
Retaliating Against a Witness – Plaintiff
107. Defendants believed that Plaintiff was providing information to federal
law enforcement officers regarding violations of federal law by Defendants.
108. Defendants believed that Plaintiff was providing information to
Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog, which were being communicated to law
enforcement officers, regarding violations of federal law by Defendants.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to retaliate against a witness by engaging in
conduct that damaged, or threatened to damage, the tangible property of Plaintiff,
with intent to retaliate against Plaintiff for providing information relating to the
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commission or possible commission of a federal offense by Defendants to a law
enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2).
with the lawful employment and/or livelihood of Plaintiff for providing to law
enforcement officers any truthful information relating to the commission or possible
commission of any Federal offense by Defendants in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1513(e).
111. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by damaging or threatening to
damage Plaintiff’s tangible personal property when they executed an unlawful
search warrant on Plaintiff’s residence in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1513(b)(2).
112. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by interfering with his lawful
employment and livelihood by disseminating defamatory statements about Plaintiff
to the public through various media outlets in retaliation for providing truthful
information to Glenda Lockhart and Special Agent Hendon in violation of 18 U.S.C
§ 1513(e).
113. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by conspiring to interfere with
his lawful employment and livelihood by publishing and circulating disparaging
statements about Plaintiff to the public through various media outlets in retaliation
Page 28 of 56
for providing truthful information to Glenda Lockhart and law enforcement in
violation of 18 U.S.C § 1513(f).
114. Defendants conspired to interfere with Plaintiff’s lawful employment
and livelihood by terminating Plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for providing
truthful information relating to conduct of Defendants and the MCSO to Glenda
Lockhart and Special Agent Hendon in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1513(f).
115. Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s lawful employment and
livelihood by initiating criminal proceedings against Plaintiff in retaliation for
providing truthful information relating to conduct of Defendants and the MCSO to
Glenda Lockhart and Special Agent Hendon in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1513(e).
116. Defendants conspired to interfere with Plaintiff’s lawful employment
and livelihood by initiating criminal proceedings against Plaintiff in retaliation for
providing truthful information relating to conduct of Defendants and the MCSO to
Glenda Lockhart and Special Agent Hendon in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1513(f).
Extortion – Daniel Lockhart
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the commission of extortion in the second
degree in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-8-5.
118. On more than one occasion, Defendants knowingly obtained by threat
control over the property of Daniel Lockhart, namely, an audio recording device and
Page 29 of 56
other documents in his position. Defendants obtained said control by unlawful
means, including, but not limited to, the threat of physical confinement and threat of
criminal charges.
119. Defendants’ extortion of Daniel Lockhart was carried out with the
express purpose of securing information to use in furtherance of their intent to
terminate any MCSO employee, including Plaintiff, that provided information to
Glenda Lockhart or otherwise cooperated with the Whistleblower Blog.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON

TO ALL CIVIL CONSPIRACY COUNTS
120. Plaintiff restates and realleges all prior allegations.
121. Defendants, as well as others both known and unknown, in Morgan
County, and within the Northern District of Alabama, and elsewhere, knowingly and
intentionally conspired, combined, and agreed with themselves and others, in part,
to violate Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights and terminate his employment.
122. Defendants jointly and severally, willfully, recklessly, and/or
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the commission of the overt acts detailed
supra at Paragraphs 70 through 119, in addition to those pled infra.
Additional Overt Acts
123. Robinson met with Daniel Lockhart to discuss working for Defendants
to investigate Plaintiff and Lockhart. Robinson and Daniel Lockhart met inside
Robinson’s truck.
Page 30 of 56
124. On or about September 21, 2016, Robinson texted Daniel Lockhart,
stating that he had money for Daniel Lockhart to start gathering information relating
to Plaintiff and Glenda Lockhart.
125. On or about September 28, 2016, at Franklin’s office, Franklin, Wilson,
Robinson, and others met with Daniel Lockhart to review a binder of information
collected by Daniel Lockhart regarding Plaintiff, Glenda Lockhart, and the
Whistleblower Blog.
126. At the September 28, 2016, meeting, Franklin handed Daniel Lockhart
$300 in cash for the binder of information, and she instructed him to get additional
information from Straightline and Lockhart’s computer systems.
127. On or about September 28, 2016, Robinson and Powell met with Daniel
Lockhart at the Falkville Fire Department computer room to install the Keylogger
onto a USB drive and instruct Daniel Lockhart on its operation.
128. On or about September 30, 2016, pursuant to Defendants’ scheme and
instructions, Daniel Lockhart broke into Straightline, installed the Keylogger, and
copied files from Lockhart’s computer systems. During this time, Robinson
maintained perimeter around Straightline to lookout for Glenda Lockhart.
129. On or about September 30, 2016, after Daniel Lockhart accessed
Straightline and Lockhart’s computer systems, Wilson met with Daniel Lockhart at
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Lowe’s Home Improvement, 1807 Highway 31 NW, Hartselle, Alabama 35640
(“Lowe’s”), to:
(a) obtain the data gathered by Daniel Lockhart.
(b) obtain a recording device from Daniel Lockhart which was never
returned or otherwise produced; and
(c) pay Daniel Lockhart as a “confidential informant.”
130. On or about September 30, 2016, Wilson met with Daniel Lockhart at
Lowe’s a second time to discuss the investigation into Plaintiff and Lockhart.
131. On or about October 5, 2016, at Starbucks, 800 Airport Road, Suite A,
Huntsville, Alabama 35802, an FBI agent met with Daniel Lockhart.
132. On or about October 5, 2016, after Daniel Lockhart’s Starbucks
meeting, Defendants met with Daniel Lockhart at Franklin’s office to go over
everything that had happened since breaking into Straightline. At this meeting,
Defendants also wanted to discuss why Daniel Lockhart met with an FBI agent
earlier in the day and what was discussed.
133. Prior to the issuance of the search warrants, Franklin met with an
investigator from Madison County Sheriff’s Department for purposes of seeking
their assistance in the prosecution of Plaintiff and Lockhart. During this meeting,
Franklin acknowledged that she knew about the Keylogger and would soon receive
its data.
Page 32 of 56
134. Prior to issuance of the search warrants, Franklin shopped the
investigation of Plaintiff to the Madison County Sheriff’s Office.
135. After issuance of the search warrants, Franklin met with the following
law enforcement to further shop the investigation and prosecution of Plaintiff and
Lockhart:
(a) the Sheriff of Madison County, Alabama, Blake Dorning;
(b) the Sheriff of Limestone County, Alabama, Mike Blakely;
(c) an agent from the Alabama Attorney General’s office, Andrew
Arrington;
(d) investigators from the Etowah County Sheriff’s Department,
Todd Entrikin and Stephen McGlathery.
CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

§ 1983 - Violation of First Amendment Rights
Freedom of Speech
(All Defendants)
136. Plaintiff realleges all preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully
set forth herein.
137. Plaintiff’s complaints and disclosures made to Franklin constituted
speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988.
Page 33 of 56
138. Plaintiff’s communications with Lockhart constituted speech protected
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
139. Plaintiff’s communications with Special Agent Hendon constituted
speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
140. Plaintiff’s communications with other MCSO employees constituted
speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
141. At all times, Plaintiff’s complaints, disclosures, and communications
made subject of this Complaint were speech of a private citizen on a matter of public
concern.
142. Plaintiff’s free speech right to disclose his observations and knowledge
of wrongful conduct of Franklin and the MCSO outweighed any interest of
Defendants had in suppressing that speech.
143. As a result, Plaintiff was deprived of his unique and valuable position
as the Warden, which he had a reasonable expectation of continuing to possess
based upon the MCSO’s policies, procedures and anti-retaliation rules.
144. As a result of Plaintiff’s protected expression on matters of public
concern as a citizen, and for seeking redress, Plaintiff suffered adverse
employment action and retaliation by Defendants.
145. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for Plaintiff’s
clearly established constitutional rights.
Page 34 of 56
146. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, Plaintiff suffered and incurred substantial damages. These
damages include lost wages, lost employee benefits, lost raises, diminished earnings
capacity, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including
attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental
and emotional anguish, and other compensatory damages, including reinstatement
of Bradley to his former position, back pay, and benefits, in an amount to be
determined by a jury and the Court.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

§1983 - Fourth Amendment Violation
Unreasonable Search/Entry
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
148. Defendants entered Plaintiff’s residence.
149. Defendants searched Plaintiff’s residence.
150. Defendants were acting or purporting to act in the performance of their
official duties in entering and searching Plaintiff’s residence without the existence
of Plaintiff’s consent, exigent circumstances, and/or a lawfully obtained search
warrant.
151. Defendants knew, or should have known, that the warrant to search
Plaintiff’s residence was facially invalid due to the lack of probable cause, its lack
Page 35 of 56
of specific description of the area to be searched, and its lack of a specific description
of procedures to be used.
152. Defendants knowingly supplied false information that was used to
support an allegation of probable cause to search Plaintiff’s residence.
153. Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ unlawfully entering and searching
his residence.
154. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered a
violation of his rights as secured under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
155. Defendants’ entry and search of Plaintiff’s property was unjustified,
unlawful, and in retaliation for Bradley’s legitimate exercise of his rights to free
speech.
156. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered special
damages and general damages, including emotional distress, pain, and suffering, and
he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages.
157. Defendants’ conduct was performed with malice and an intent to cause
injury to Plaintiff; was despicable and in willful and knowing disregard of Plaintiff’s
rights and safety; and was despicable insofar as it was vile, base, and/or contemptible
and would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. As such, Plaintiff
is entitled to punitive damages.
Page 36 of 56
158. As a further direct and legal cause of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has
been compelled to retain the services of counsel to protect and enforce his rights,
and, therefore, has incurred, and continues to incur, attorneys’ fees, legal fees, expert
fees, and costs for which Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement in an amount to be
established at the time of trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

§ 1983 - Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights
Unreasonable Seizure/False Arrest
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
160. Defendants arrested Plaintiff without a lawful warrant.
161. Defendants arrested Plaintiff without probable cause.
162. Defendants possessed direct exculpatory evidence proving Plaintiff’s
innocence.
163. Defendants were acting, or purporting to act, in the performance of their
official duties.
164. Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ unlawful arrest.
165. Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s
harm.
166. Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his Fourth Amendment rights to be
secure in his person by falsely arresting him.

Page 37 of 56
167. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff suffered loss of
liberty, embarrassment, humiliation, pain and suffering, and emotional distress.
168. Defendants acted willfully, knowingly, purposefully, recklessly, and/or
with deliberate indifference, to deprive the Plaintiff of his Constitutional Rights. As
a result of the nature of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive
damages against the individual Defendants.
169. Defendants’ conduct was performed with malice and an intent to cause
injury to Plaintiff; was despicable and in willful and knowing disregard of Plaintiff’s
rights and safety; and was despicable insofar as it was vile, base, and/or contemptible
and would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. As such, Plaintiff
is entitled to punitive damages.
170. As a further direct and legal cause of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has
been compelled to retain the services of counsel to protect and enforce his rights,
and, therefore, has incurred, and continues to incur, attorneys’ fees, legal fees, expert
fees, and costs for which Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement in an amount to be
established at the time of trial.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

§ 1983 - Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Malicious Prosecution
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.

Page 38 of 56
172. Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated Plaintiff’s clearly
established right to be free from unreasonable seizures by unlawfully causing a
criminal prosecution to be instituted against him.
173. Defendants initiated said criminal proceedings without probable cause.
174. Defendants initiated said criminal proceedings maliciously and/or for a
purpose other than bringing Plaintiff to justice.
175. Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of said criminal proceedings.
176. Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges initiated against him.
177. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions,
Plaintiff suffered actual harm including interference with his First Amendment
rights, the chilling of his freedom of speech, the deprivation of his liberty, fear,
emotional injury and pain, mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

§ 1983 - Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
179. Defendants, by their conduct as described herein, are liable to Plaintiff
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation, under color of state law, of the
Page 39 of 56
constitutional right to be free from any deprivation of liberty without due process of
law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
180. Defendants termination of Plaintiff was an arbitrary and malicious
abuse of power, thereby violating Plaintiff’s procedural due process of law as
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
181. Defendants intentionally and/or recklessly failed to give Plaintiff, a
public employee, procedural due process protections related to his termination.
182. Plaintiff was terminated without notice, hearing, and an opportunity to
be heard, or a meaningful opportunity to contest the allegations against him.
183. Plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest in his property right,
namely public employment as the Warden.
184. The MCSO had policies and practices promulgated and fostered by
state officials that justified Plaintiff’s entitlement to continued employment absent
sufficient cause.
185. Plaintiff was not given procedural due process to contest the allegations
against him.
186. The conduct of Defendants damaged and impugned the good name,
reputation, honor, and integrity of Plaintiff, a law enforcement officer, in the State
of Alabama.
Page 40 of 56
187. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful actions,
Plaintiff suffered, and will continue to suffer, damages including, physical, mental
and emotional injury and pain, mental anguish, suffering, humiliation and
embarrassment.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

§ 1983 – Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights
set forth herein.
189. Defendants reached an understanding to deny Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights as described in this Complaint.
190. Defendants reached an agreement amongst themselves to investigate,
terminate, and prosecute Plaintiff for providing information to Glenda Lockhart or
otherwise cooperating with the Whistleblower Blog, and to thereby deprive Plaintiff
of his constitutional rights, all as described in the various Paragraphs of this
Complaint.
191. Before and after Plaintiff’s termination, Defendants reached an
agreement, and further conspired, to deprive Plaintiff of exculpatory materials to
which he was lawfully entitled, and which would have led to his more timely
exoneration of the false charges as described in the various Paragraphs of this
Complaint.
Page 41 of 56
192. In this manner, Defendants acting in concert with other unknown co-
conspirators, including persons who are not members of the MCSO, conspired by
concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose by unlawful means.
193. In furtherance of the conspiracy, each of the Defendants and co-
conspirators committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in joint
activity.
194. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreement referenced
above, Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, and he suffered financial
damages, as well as severe emotional distress and anguish, as is more fully alleged
above.
195. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice,
willfulness, and/or reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and others.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Acquisition and Maintenance of an Interest in and Control of
an Enterprise Engaged in a Pattern of Racketeering Activity:
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(g), 1962(b)
196. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the
foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein, and specifically repeats and
realleges the allegations concerning RICO liability pled supra at Paragraphs 70
through 119.
197. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and Defendants were “persons”
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).

Page 42 of 56
198. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants formed and operated an
“enterprise” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
199. Defendants did cooperate jointly and severally in the commission of
two (2) or more RICO predicate acts, as detailed supra at Paragraphs 89 through
119, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) (prohibited activities).
200. Defendants did acquire and/or maintain, directly or indirectly, an
interest in or control of a RICO enterprise that engaged in and affected interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4), (5), (9), and 1962(b).
201. Alternatively, Defendants did acquire and/or maintain, directly or
indirectly, an interest in or control of a RICO enterprise of individuals who were
associated in fact and who did engage in, and whose activities did affect, interstate
and/or foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4), (5), (9), and 1962(b).
202. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b), Plaintiff suffered the loss of valuable property, his public employment,
income, employment benefits, and suffered other pecuniary damages.
203. Defendants committed two (2) or more of the predicate acts itemized
above in a manner which they calculated and premeditated intentionally to threaten
continuity, i.e. a continuing threat of their respective racketeering activities, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
Page 43 of 56
204. Plaintiff demands that judgment be entered against Defendants, each
and every one of them, jointly and severally, including an award of trebled damages
as consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b), compensatory and actual damages,
reasonable attorneys’ fees, pre-judgment interest, post-interest, costs, and an award
that this Court deems just and proper.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Conduct and Participation in a RICO Enterprise
through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c)
(All Defendants)
through 119.
206. Defendants did cooperate jointly and severally in the commission of
two (2) or more of the RICO predicate acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)
(prohibited activities).
207. Defendants did conduct and/or participate, either directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of the affairs of said RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4), (5), (9), and 1962(c).
Page 44 of 56
continuity, i.e. a continuing threat of their respective racketeering activities, also in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
as consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), compensatory and actual damages,
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Conspiracy to Engage in a
Pattern of Racketeering Activity:
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(d)
(All Defendants)
through 119.
211. Defendants did jointly and severally conspire to the commission of two
(2) or more of the RICO predicate acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (prohibited
activities).
212. All Defendants did conspire to acquire and maintain an interest in a
RICO enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1962(b) and (d).
Page 45 of 56
213. All Defendants did conspire to conduct and participate in said RICO
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1962(c) and (d).
continuity, i.e. a continuing threat of their respective racketeering activities, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
as consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), compensatory and actual damages,
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to violate the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act.
Page 46 of 56
218. Defendants’ violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
were made willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their respective
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law and acting under color of
state law.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the violation of the Electronic
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511) by intentionally intercepting and/or
attempting to intercept Plaintiff’s electronic communications without Plaintiff’s
knowledge, authorization, or consent.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to the violation of the Electronic
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511) by intentionally using and/or attempting to
use the Keylogger to intercept Plaintiff’s electronic communications with Glenda
Lockhart.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to intentionally collect, gather, intercept,
attempt to intercept, transmit, procure, and/or store Plaintiff’s electronic
communications.
knowingly committed and/or conspired to intentionally collect, transmit, store and
Page 47 of 56
disclose, or endeavor to disclose, to any other person, the contents of Plaintiff's
electronic communications, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of Plaintiff's electronic communications
without consent or authorization.
223. Defendants’ violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy
injured Plaintiff as described herein.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Invasion of Privacy
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
225. Defendants, through their concerted, callous, reckless and agreed upon
conduct as alleged herein, engaged in actions which constituted the intentional
intrusion on the seclusion of Plaintiff's private concerns, including, but not limited
to, the private occurrences, communications, engagements, and otherwise personal
and private engagements, transmissions and recordings of information, whether
occurring in their homes or office or in other places in which Plaintiff and others had
a reasonable expectation of privacy.
226. Each Defendant's actions played an integral and necessary part, without
which, these intrusions on seclusion and invasions of privacy could not have been
Page 48 of 56
committed, insofar as the Defendants intended to intrude upon Plaintiff's seclusion
by causing the Keylogger to be installed on Glenda Lockhart’s computer systems.
227. Plaintiff’s private information surreptitiously obtained as referenced
herein, was viewed, posted, ogled, shared, made available and displayed
unnecessarily and illegally by Defendants.
228. Defendants are liable for participation in the illegal conduct alleged
herein.
229. The intentional, deliberate, willful and/or reckless intrusion on
seclusion as referenced in the preceding paragraph and throughout this Complaint,
did cause, and would cause, mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to persons of
ordinary sensibilities, and thus, was substantial and highly offensive to reasonable
persons, and thus, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for his injuries.
230. Defendants’ intentional, deliberate, willful, and/or reckless intrusion on
seclusion as referenced herein constituted wanton, willful and malicious conduct
justifying an award of punitive damages against Defendants.
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Malicious Prosecution – State law
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
Page 49 of 56
232. On or about the October 4, 2016, Defendants, maliciously, and without
probable cause therefor, caused Plaintiff to be arrested under a warrant issued by a
Morgan County magistrate on a charge of misdemeanor tampering with
governmental records.
233. Before the commencement of this action, this charge was judicially
investigated, the prosecution ended, and Plaintiff discharged and exonerated on or
about April 27, 2018.
234. Plaintiff was harmed by the judicial proceedings initiated by
Defendants, including, but not limited to, loss of society of Plaintiff’s family, loss of
credit, injury to Plaintiff’s feelings, injury to Plaintiff’s reputation, costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees.
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

State Law - Conspiracy
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
236. Defendants, acting in concert with other unknown co-conspirators,
including persons who are not members of the MCSO, conspired by concerted
action, to do something that was unlawful, oppressive, or immoral.
including persons who are not members of the MCSO, conspired by concerted
Page 50 of 56
action, to do something that was not unlawful, oppressive, or immoral, by unlawful,
oppressive, or immoral means.
including persons who are not members of the MCSO, conspired by concerted action
to do something that was unlawful, oppressive, or immoral, by unlawful, oppressive,
or immoral means.
239. Franklin, Wilson, Robinson, and Powell harmed Plaintiff by acting in
concert, as pled supra, to commit or attempt to commit the following acts:
a. violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights;
b. engage in a pattern of racketeering activity and violate civil
RICO laws;
c. violate the Electronic Private Communications Act;
d. invade the privacy of Plaintiff;
e. malicious prosecution of Plaintiff;
f. shutdown the Whistleblower Blog; and
g. terminate Plaintiff’s employment;
240. In furtherance of the conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed
overt acts and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity as detailed in this
Complaint.
Page 51 of 56
241. As a direct and proximate result of the illicit prior agreements
referenced above, Plaintiff's rights were violated, and he suffered financial damages,
as well as severe emotional distress and anguish, as is more fully alleged above.
242. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice,
willfulness, and/or reckless indifference to the rights of others.
243. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the
policy and practice of the MCSO in the manner described more fully in preceding
paragraphs and was tacitly ratified by policy makers for the MCSO including those
with final policymaking authority.
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3)
(All Defendants)
set forth herein.
245. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants and two or more of them,
conspired for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff of (a) equal protection of the law;
and (b) equal protection and immunities under the law; and for the purpose of
preventing and hindering the constituted authorities from giving and securing to
Plaintiff equal protection of the law and deprivation of liberty and property without
due process of law.
Page 52 of 56
246. Defendants, and each of them, did and caused to be done, an act or acts
in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whereby Plaintiff was deprived of the
rights and privileges as set forth above.
247. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been
damaged as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court:
(a) assume jurisdiction over this action;
(b) award Plaintiff compensatory damages against Defendants in an
amount the jury determines will compensate Plaintiff for his losses and damages
suffered;
(c) award punitive damages against Defendants in an amount that the jury
determines is adequate to punish Defendants for their wrongful conduct and to deter
others from similar conduct in the future, and/or nominal damages as may be
appropriate;
(d) order the RICO Defendants to pay an amount equal to three times the
damages caused by Defendants’ racketeering activity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§
1964(b) and (d);
(e) enjoin Defendants from engaging in further racketeering activity
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964;
Page 53 of 56
(f) reinstate Plaintiff to his former position, with seniority and benefits
dating back to the date of Plaintiff’s unlawful termination; or in the alternative,
award Plaintiff front pay;
(g) award Plaintiff back pay, including benefits, dating back to the date of
Plaintiff’s unlawful termination;
(h) award Plaintiff reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees associated with this
action;
(i) award Plaintiff reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees associated with
Defendants’ malicious prosecution of Plaintiff; and
(j) award Plaintiff such other equitable and legal relief to which he may be
entitled to receive.
JURY DEMAND
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY FOR THE TRIAL OF THIS

CAUSE.
/s/ Rebekah Keith McKinney

Rebekah Keith McKinney
Page 54 of 56
Respectfully submitted this the 13th day of July, 2018.
/s/ Rebekah Keith McKinney

Rebekah Keith McKinney (ASB-3137-T64J)
WATSON MCKINNEY, LLP
200 Clinton Ave. SW
Suite 110
Huntsville, Alabama 35801
(256) 536-7423 telephone
(256) 536-2689 fax
mckinney@watsonmckinney.com
/s/ Philip M. DeFatta

Philip M. DeFatta (ASB-9307-R74F)
WATSON MCKINNEY, LLP
200 Clinton Ave. SW
Suite 110
(256) 536-7423 telephone
(256) 536-2689 fax
defatta@watsonmckinney.com
/s/ Nickolas Heatherly

Nickolas Heatherly (ASB-9108-A47H)
223 East Side Square
(256) 534-5049 telephone
(256) 536-2501 fax
n.heatherly@yahoo.com
/s/ Robert Tuten

Robert Tuten (ASB-4036-E56R)
223 East Side Square
(256) 536-6009 telephone
(256) 536-2501 fax
rtuten@tutenlaw.com
Page 55 of 56
DEFENDANTS TO BE SERVED BY PROCESS SERVER:
Ana Franklin
Morgan County Sheriff’s Office
119 Lee Street Northeast
Decatur, Alabama 35601
Robert Wilson
Blake Robinson
Justin Powell
The Morgan County Sheriff’s Office

Page 56 of 56

Ex-Warden Sues Morgan County Sheriff

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Case 5:18-cv-01085-UJH-LSC Document 1 Filed 07/13/18 Page 1 of 56 FILED

2018 Jul-13 PM 04:03

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1. Public faith in the integrity of the Morgan County Sheriff’s Department

misconduct under Sheriff Ana Franklin (“Franklin”).

2. Plaintiff was wrongfully discharged from his employment position and

subjected to unlawful searches and seizures.

3. This is a civil action for violations of federal and state law—

particularly, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§

the United States Constitution.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

States; retaliating against Plaintiff for his exercise of constitutionally protected

5. Plaintiff asserts subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

6. This Court is an appropriate venue for this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

affairs in this judicial district.

28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction is also proper pursuant to RICO.

8. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

9. Plaintiff, Leon Bradley (“Bradley”), is an African-American male over

10. Defendant, Ana Franklin (“Franklin”), is the Sheriff for Morgan

County and was at all times relevant hereto.

11. Franklin exercised control over Plaintiff’s employment. Franklin is

12. Defendant, Robert Wilson (“Wilson”), is a Deputy Sheriff with the

13. Defendant, Blake Robinson (“Robinson”), is a Deputy Sheriff with the

14. Defendant, Justin Powell (“Powell”) is an employee of the MCSO and

15. Defendant, MCSO, exercised control over Plaintiff’s employment.

MCSO is sued as Plaintiff’s employer and/or joint employer.

at all times relevant hereto.

custody and charge of Morgan County jail inmates.

Bradley’s Concerns Regarding MCSO

19. Through his employment as the Warden, Bradley became concerned

regarding Franklin’s abuse of power as the Morgan County Sheriff, namely,

improper use of inmate “trustee” labor, nepotism, racial discrimination in hiring

practices, inmate treatment, ethics violations, and misappropriation of jail food

money in violation of a federal consent decree.

internal memorandum, and electronic communications; however, Franklin never

resolved, or attempted to resolve, the problems.

and official events.

22. Bradley had personal knowledge that Franklin continued to utilize

to revise MCSO inmate trustee policies.

safety of Alabama residents by releasing dangerous Morgan County inmates under

the trustee program without proper classification.

Lockhart and the Whistleblower Blog

25. Bradley began communicating with Glenda Lockhart during his

employment as the Warden.

26. Glenda Lockhart maintained and regularly contributed to a free, online

blog called the “Morgan County Whistleblower” (the “Whistleblower Blog”).

27. The Whistleblower Blog investigated and exposed public corruption in

was kept at her business, Straightline Drywall & Acoustical (“Straightline”).

often the subject of local and national news coverage.

30. Straightline contracts with the United States Government to install

specialty drywall and acoustical products.

31. Straightline’s office in Falkville, Alabama, contained valuable paper

files, electronic devices, data, and software containing sensitive business

Lockhart’s Blog Posts

32. Glenda Lockhart frequently detailed corruption in the MCSO and

(a) Franklin’s illicit investment and involvement in Priceville

Partners, L.L.C. (“Priceville Partners”), a used-car dealership offering title loans;

and any of its subsidiaries and/or associated companies;

(b) disclosing a copy of Franklin’s $150,000 cashier’s check

online—signed over to Priceville Partners—from Morgan County jail food funds;

(c) Robinson’s investment in Priceville Partners;

(d) Robinson’s ownership and operation of a car wash located at

Priceville Partners in Hartselle, Alabama;