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Functional Analysis
Author(s): Robert Cummins
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 20 (Nov. 20, 1975), pp. 741-765
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024640
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' +44
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
A on the na-
SURVEY of the recentphilosophicalliterature
ture of functionalanalysisand explanation,beginningwith
the classic essays of Hempel in 1959 and Nagel in 1961,
reveals that philosophicalresearchon this topic has almostwithout
exceptionproceededunderthefollowingassumptions:*
(A) The pointof functional in scienceis to explainthe
characterization
presenceof the item(organ,mechanism, processor whatever)that
characterized.
is functionally
(B) For somethingto performitsfunctionis forit to havecertaineffects
on a containingsystem,whicheffects
contribute to the performance
of someactivityof,or the maintenance of some conditionin, that
containingsystem.
Puttingthese two assumptionstogetherwe have: a function-ascrib-
ing statementexplains the presenceof thefunctionallycharacterized
item i in a systems by pointingout that i is presentin s because it
has certaineffectson s. Give or take a nicety,thisfusionof (A) and
(B) constitutesthe core of almost everyrecentattemptto give an
account of functionalanalysisand explanation. Yet these assump-
* Cf, Carl Hempel,"The Logic ofFunctionalAnalysis," in AspectsofScientific
Explanation(New York:Free Press,1965),reprintedfromLlewellynGross,ed.,
Symposiumon SociologicalTheory (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), and
ErnestNagel, The Structure of Science(New York: HarcourtBraceJovanovich,
1961),ch. 12, sec. x. The assumptions, of course,predateHempel's 1959 essay.
See, for instance,Richard Braithwaite,ScientificExplanation (Cambridge:
University "Thoughtson Teleology,"
Press,1955),ch. x, and Israel Scheffler,
BritishJournalfor the Philosophyof Science, x, 36 (February1959): 265-284.
More recentexamplesinclude FranciscoAyala, "TeleologicalExplanationsin
EvolutionaryBiology,"Philosophyof Science,xxxvii, 1 (March 1970): 1-15;
Hugh Lehman,"FunctionalExplanationsin Biology,"ibid., XXXii,1 (January
1965):1-20; RichardSorabji,"Function,"PhilosophicalQuarterly, xiv, 57 (Octo-
ber 1964): 289-302; and Larry Wright,"Functions,"PhilosophicalReview,
Lxxxii, 2 (April1973): 139-168.
74'
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742 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 743
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744 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 745
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746 THE JOURNAL OF PHIlLOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 747
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748 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 749
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750 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCrIONAL ANALYSIS 751
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752 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
I1
In spite of the evidentvirtuesof (5), (5a) has seriousshortcomings as
an analysisof (1). In factit is subject to the same objection Hempel
brings to the analysis that simply replaces 'function' by 'effect':
vertebratesincorporatinga workingheart in the usual way exhibit
the productionof heartsounds,yetthe productionof heartsoundsis
not a function of hearts in vertebrates.The problem is that,
whereas the productionof certain effectsis essential to the heart's
performingits function, there are some effectsproduction of
which is irrelevantto the functioningof the heart. This problem
is bound to infect any "selected-effects" theory,i.e., any theory
built on (B).
What is needed to establisha selected-effects theoryis a general
formulathat identifies the appropriate Both Hempel and
effects.7
Nagel attemptto solve this problem by identifying the functionof
somethingwith just those effects which contribute to the mainte-
nance of some special conditionof, or the performance of some spe-
cial activityof, some containingsystem. this If sort of solution is
to be viable, there must be some principled way of selectingthe
relevantactivitiesor conditionsof containingsystems.For no mat-
ter which effectsof somethingyou happen to name, therewill be
some activityof thecontainingsystemto whichjust thoseeffects con-
tribute,or some conditionof the containingsystemwhich is main-
tained with the help of just those effects.Heart activity,for ex-
ample, keeps the circulatorysystemfrombeing entirelyquiet, and
the appendix keeps people vulnerable to appendicitis.8
Hempel suggeststhat,in general,the crucial featureof a contain-
ing system,contributionto whichis to count as the functioningof a
7 Larry Wright (op. cit.) is aware of this problem, but does not, to my mind,
make much progress with it. Wright's analysis rules out "The function of the
heart is to produce heart sounds," on the ground that the heart is not there
because it produces heartsounds. I agree. But neither is it there because it
pumps blood. Or if, as Wright maintains, there is a sense of 'because' in which
the heart is there because it pumps blood and not because it produces heart-
sounds, then this sense of 'because' is as much in need of analysis as 'func-
tion'. Wright does not attempt to provide such an analysis, but depends on the
fact that, in many cases, we are able to use the word in the required way.
But we are also able to use 'function' correctlyin a varietyof cases. Indeed, if
Wright is right,the words are simply interchangeablewith a little grammatical
maneuvering. The problem is to make the conditions of correct use explicit.
Failure to do this means that Wright'sanalysis providesno insightinto the prob-
lem of how functional theories are confirmed,or whence they derive their
explanatoryforce.
8 Surprisingly,when Nagel comes to formulate his general schema of func-
tional attributionhe simply ignores this problem, and thus leaves himself open
to the trivializationjust suggested. Cf., Nagel, op. cit., p. 403.
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FUNCrIONAL ANALYSIS 753
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754 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONALI ANALYSIS 755
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756 THkE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 757
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758 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
2. Two ExplanatoryStrategies
(i) The SubsumptionStrategy.Suppose a has a dispositiond. The
associated dispositional regularityconsistsin the fact that certain
kinds of eventswould cause a to manifestd. One way to explain
thisfactwould be to discoversome featureof a which allowed us to
representthe connection between precipitatingevents and mani-
gists-or because there is some likelihood that real and intended function
diverge-social institutions,complex computers.Functional talk may have origi-
nated in contexts in which referenceto intentions and purposes loomed large,
but referenceto intentions and purposes does not figure at all in the sort of
functionalanalysis favoredby contemporarynatural scientists.
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 759
1-15. See also my discussionof this example in "Dispositions, States and Causes,"
ibid., xxxiv.6, 162 (June 1974): 194-204.
15 Also, we must explain why submerging a free elevant object causes it to
rise, and why a free submerged object's becoming elevant causes it to rise. One
of the convenient featuresof elevancy is that the same considerationsdispose of
all these cases. This does not hold generally: gentle rubbing, a sharp blow, or a
sudden change in temperaturemay each cause a glass to manifesta disposition
to shatter,but the explanations in these cases are significantlydifferent.
16 By "programmed" I simplymean organized in a way that could be specified
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760 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 76I
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762 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 763
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764 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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NOOLREvEws 765
CONCLUSION
Almostwithoutexception,philosophicalaccountsof function-ascrib-
ingstatements and offunctionalexplanationhavebeencrippledby
adoptionof the assumptions (A) and (B). Though therehas been
wide-spread agreement thatextantaccountsare notsatisfactory,(A)
and (B) have escapedcriticalscrutiny,perhapsbecausetheywere
thoughtof as somehowsettingthe problemratherthen as part
of proffered solutions.Once the problemis properlydiagnosed,
however, it becomespossibleto givea moresatisfactory and more
illuminating accountin termsof theexplanatory strategy thatpro-
vides the motivation and formsthe contextof function-ascribing
statements,To ascribea functionto something is to ascibe a ca-
pacity to it which is singled out by its role in an analysisof some
capacityof a containingsystem. When a capacityof a containing
system is appropriately
explainedby analyzingit intoa numberof
othercapacitieswhoseprogrammed exerciseyieldsa manifestation
of the analyzedcapacity,the analyzingcapacitiesemergeas func-
tions.Sincetheappropriateness of thissortof explanatory
strategy
is a matterofdegree,so is theappropriatenessoffunction-ascribing
statements.
ROBERT CUMMINS
The JohnsHopkinsUniversity
BOOK REVIEWS
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