Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court granted the petition. According to the Court, while the trial
court in the civil case could have simply acknowledged the presence of public
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug
Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its
finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue
to be in operation." Verily, the meaningful statements in the body of the Decision
warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so
until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." The
inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its
undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any
airport expansion project, the rights vis-a-vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and
920, as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be
equitably adjusted; and, (b) the unmistakable declarations in the body of the
Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof
which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is
not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof. The return or
repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified
as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial court's underlying
presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it granted
the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities. The
Court ordered respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority to
reconvey to petitioners the subject lots with all the improvements thereon
evolving through nature or time, but excluding those that were introduced by
third parties, i. e., DPWH, which shall be governed by existing contracts and
relevant provisions of law. The Court also remanded the case to the trial court
for purposes of determining the amount of compensation for Lots Nos. 916 and
920 to be paid by petitioners.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J : p
THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA, petitioners herein, are
the successors-in-interest of the former registered owners of two (2) parcels of
land situated in Lahug, Cebu City, designated as Lot No. 916 with an area of
2,355 square meters under TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T-13694, and Lot No. 920
consisting of 3,097 square meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107) T-13695. 1
On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the purchase of the lots necessary for
the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport irredeemably broke down, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration as the successor agency of the National Airport
Corporation filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for the
expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other subject realties, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-1881.
On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No.
R-1881 condemning Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other lots for public use upon
payment of just compensation. 5 Petitioners' predecessors were paid P7,065.00
for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by
way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. No appeal was taken from
the Decision on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, and the judgment of condemnation
became final and executory. 6Thereafter, the certificates of title for these parcels
of land were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No.
58691 for Lot No. 916 and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No. 920, which under RA 6958
(1990) were subsequently transferred in favor of respondent MCIAA. 7
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to
MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was opened for
incoming and outgoing flights. 8 Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which had been
expropriated for the extension of Lahug Airport were not utilized. 9 In fact, no
expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-
interest. 10 Hence, petitioners wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and the
airport manager begging them for the exercise of their alleged right to
repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920. 11 Their pleas were not heeded. 12
When the civil case was pending, one Richard E. Enchuan filed a Motion for
Transfer of Interest alleging that he acquired through deeds of assignment the
rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920. 13 The
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) also sought to intervene in
the civil case claiming that it leased in good faith Lot No. 920 from the
predecessor agencies of respondent MCIAA and that it built thereon its Regional
Equipment Services and its Region 7 Office. 14
On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and
granted them the right to repurchase the properties at the amount pegged as
just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but subject to the alleged property
rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH. 15 The trial court opined
that the expropriation became illegal or functus officio when the purpose for
which it was intended was no longer there. 16
Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64456.
On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on
the ground that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was
unconditional so that the rights gained therefrom by respondent MCIAA were
indicative of ownership in fee simple. 17 The appellate court cited Fery
v. Municipality of Cabanatuan 18 which held that mere deviation from the public
purpose for which the power of eminent domain was exercised does not justify
the reversion of the property to its former owners, and Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 19 which is allegedly stare
decisis to the instant case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as
the former dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No.
R-1881. 20
Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the
case at bar since what was involved therein was the "right of reversion" and not
the "right of repurchase" which they are invoking. They also
differentiate Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals 22 from the instant case in that the landowners in the MCIAA case
offered inadmissible evidence to show their entitlement to a right of repurchase,
while petitioners herein offered evidence based on personal knowledge for which
reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived whatever objection it might have
had to the admissibility thereof. Finally, petitioners allege that their right to equal
protection of the laws would be infringed if some landowners are given the right
to repurchase their former properties even as they are denied the exercise of
such prerogative.
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with, there
exists an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent
MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug
Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the
termination of the airport's venture. 23 Some acted on this assurance and sold
their properties; 24 other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of
eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent's
predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further the judgment of
condemnation if the same right of repurchase was extended to them. 25 A
handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with
the ownership of their lands. 26
In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court in Fery
v. Municipality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Court of Appeals, which define the rights and obligations of landowners whose
properties were expropriated when the public purpose for which eminent domain
was exercised no longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent case
of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 27 we declared that the government acquires only
such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of
its title over the properties —
The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to
Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was
no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to
CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if
the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if
the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport.
CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence
was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing
the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
proceedings but a contract of sale . . . To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove
the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have
entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of
judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the
judgment of a court which has long become final and executory . . . And
even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove
the existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right
to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was
admissible . . . Aside from being inadmissible tinder the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also inadmissible for being
hearsay in nature . . . 29
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged
the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of
the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but
instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in
the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties
would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer
"in operation." This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug
Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being
used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis-à-vis the expropriated Lots
Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners
herein, must be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable
declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an
intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate
since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the
body thereof. 31
To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance in the case at bar of
standing admissible evidence validating the claim of petitioners as well as the
portions above-quoted of the Decision in the expropriation case volunteered no
less than by respondent itself, takes this case away from the ambit of Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals 33 but within the
principles enunciated in Fery as mentioned earlier. In addition, there should be
no doubt that our present reading of the fallo of the Decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 so as to include the statements in the body thereof afore-quoted is
sanctioned by the rule that a final and executory judgment may nonetheless be
"clarified" by reference to other portions of the decision of which it forms a part.
In Republic v. De Los Angeles 34we ruled —
This Court has promulgated many cases . . . wherein it was held that a
judgment must not be read separately but in connection with the other
portions of the decision of which it forms a part. Hence . . . the decision
of the court below should be taken as a whole and considered in its
entirety to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion
thereof . . . Neither is this Court inclined to confine itself to a reading of
the said fallo literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a
decision should be interpreted and construed in harmony with the ratio
decidendi thereof . . . As stated in the case of Policarpio vs.Philippine
Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same
must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and
does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in
the fallo thereof . . . The foregoing pronouncements find support in the
case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil., 87, 91-92, wherein this
Court allowed a judgment that had become final and executory to be
"clarified" by supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted
and which, when supplied, in effect changed the literal import of the
original phraseology . . . This is so because, in the first place, if an
already final judgment can still be amended to supply an omission
committed through oversight, this simply means that in the construction
or interpretation of an already final decision, the fallo or dispositive
portion thereof must be correlated with the body of such final decision .
. . [I]f an amendment may be allowed after a decision has already
become final . . . such amendment may consist . . . either in the . . .
interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body of
the decision which gives it life. 35
We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights of the State and petitioners to
the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated
by Art. 1454 is not perfect, the provision is undoubtedly applicable. For, as
explained by an expert on the law of trusts: "The only problem of great
importance in the field of constructive trusts is to decide whether in the
numerous and varying fact situations presented to the courts there is a wrongful
holding of property and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant." 38 Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no
unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any
situation in which the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain
the beneficial interest. 39
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary,
in this case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are
echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, "When the conditions have for their
purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the
fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have
received . . . In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the
provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding
article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return . . ."
Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, "If the thing is improved by its nature, or by
time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor . . .," the creditor
being the person who stands to receive something as a result of the process of
restitution. Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not have to settle as part of
the process of restitution the appreciation in value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920
which is the natural consequence of nature and time. aSCDcH
Petitioners need not also pay for improvements introduced by third parties, i.e.,
DPWH, as the disposition of these properties is governed by existing contracts
and relevant provisions of law. As for the improvements that respondent MCIAA
may have made on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, petitioners must pay
respondent their prevailing free market price in case petitioners opt to buy them
and respondent decides to sell. In other words, if petitioners do not want to
appropriate such improvements or respondent does not choose to sell them, the
improvements would have to be removed without any obligation on the part of
petitioners to pay any compensation to respondent MCIAA for whatever it may
have tangibly introduced therein. 45
The medium of compensation for the restitution shall be ready money or cash
payable within a period of three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date that
the amount to be returned by petitioners is determined with finality, unless the
parties herein stipulate and agree upon a different scheme, medium or schedule
of payment. If after the period of three hundred sixty five (365) days or the
lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of payment such amount owed is
not settled, the right of repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of
respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the latter's
improvements as set forth herein shall be deemed forfeited and the ownership of
those parcels of land shall vest absolutely upon respondent MCIAA.
Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for attorney's fees and P15,000.00 for
litigation expenses in favor of petitioners as decreed in the assailed Decision of
12 April 1999 of the trial court. It is not sound public policy to set a premium
upon the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as in the
present case, albeit the decision to resist the claim is erroneous. 46
The rule on awards of attorney's fees and litigation expenses is found in Art.
2208 of the Civil Code —
(5)Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing
to satisfy the plaintiff's valid and demandable claim;
(9)In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(11)In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorney's fees in cases of clearly unfounded
civil actions, this exception must be understood to mean those where the
defenses are so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. Evidence
must be presented to the court as to the facts and circumstances constituting
the alleged bad faith, otherwise, the award of attorney's fees is not justified
where there is no proof other than the bare statement of harassment that a
party to be so adjudged had acted in bad faith. The exercise of judicial discretion
in the award of attorney's fees under Art. 2208, par. (11), demands a factual,
legal or equitable justification that would bring the case within the exception and
justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64456 dated 20 December 2001 and
its Resolutionof 28 November 2002 denying reconsideration of the Decision are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12 April 1999 in Civil Case No.
CEB-20015 is MODIFIED IN PART by —
(g)DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorney's fees and P15,000.00 for
litigation expenses against respondent MCIAA and in favor of petitioners.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2.Id., p. 154.
3.Ibid.
4.Id., p. 68.
5.Decision penned by Judge Mateo Canonoy, RTC-Br. 3, Cebu City; Rollo, pp. 84–110.
6.Rollo, p. 17.
8.Id., p. 154.
9.Id., p. 157.
12.Id., p. 71.
13.Id., p. 52.
14.Ibid.
15.Decision penned by Judge Ramon G. Codilla Jr., RTC-Br. 19, Cebu City, Rollo, pp.
149–159.
24.Ibid.
25.Ibid; Republic v. Escaño, CA-G.R. No. 33045-R, 27 July 1964 as cited in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, 27
November 2000, 346 SCRA 126.
31.Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137566, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA
179; People v. Lacbayan, G.R. No. 125006, 31 August 2000, 339 SCRA 396.
37.The statutory enumeration of implied trusts in the Civil Code is not exclusive,
hence, Art. 1447 of the Civil Code provides "The enumeration of the following
cases of implied trust does not exclude others established by the general law of
trust, but the limitation laid down in article 1442 shall be applicable."
41.Id., p. 209.
42.Ibid.
43.Ibid.
44.Civil Code, Art. 1187, "The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the
condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation imposes reciprocal prestations
upon the parties, the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition
shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. If the obligation is
unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the fruits and interests received, unless
from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it should be inferred that
the intention of the person constituting the same was different."
47.Ibid.