PRETERITION
In case my brother Segundo Acain
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108)
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent
Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII
(Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as
to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain
and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio
Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose
and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will
allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya
(Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner
without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G.
Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's
property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties.
house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa
Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN
Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City.
pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in
Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be
given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed
Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who
are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No.
591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of
tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the
trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner,
p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p.
6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157);
the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy
under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring
into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it
cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted
to probate;
1
 (C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be
admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the
New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the
direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not
compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will
be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that
suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a
definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly
expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in
violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and
standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate
of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is
therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been
pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as
the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854,
Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia
A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by
petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person
the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were
not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions
which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for
inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin,
74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated
above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene
in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item
of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article
782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a
will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the
will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be
dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v.
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573
2
[1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador
Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper
remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a
case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of
Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only
to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v.
Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of
the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for
solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by
the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute
the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing
held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed
the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright.
Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court
should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21,
1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to
be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the
case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case
to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and
his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious
fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang
v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition
for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy
and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967
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TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all
surnamed Reyes y Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil
Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the
same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the
properties receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late
Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued
at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the
barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share of
plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of
plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989,
31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his
share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and
Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa
Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew anä nieces® The usufruct oæ the
fishponä situateä iî barrio Saî Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned,
however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the meantime¬ Maria
Gerardo was appointeä administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of
partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor
Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the
delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud
Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in
the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5,
1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first
of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs;
and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In
rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud
Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria
Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the same.1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate
heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not
only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered
to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate
of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of
partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared
the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be
null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano
Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the
basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so,
has been included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since
Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil
Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at
least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only
true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the
latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's
estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the
Philippines establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its
acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this
opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them
to return the properties received under the project of partition previously mentioned as
prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied
4
defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and
defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been
misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud
Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and
testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them
could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs(without distinction
between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to
be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly
named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion
of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud
impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than
her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here
no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72
Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance
of preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil
status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is
erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through
mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano
Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of
the testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a
compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by
the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is
merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it
is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63
Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules
of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the
distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the
testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it
had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the
estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate
of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by
Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian
of the minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the
heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have
no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being
in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata,
92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the
proposition that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of
mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed
before the compromise agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p.
436). In the case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified
by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the
titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in
favor of the heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata
does not apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that
the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact,
even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the
probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had
been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in
1939, provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the
court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates
in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed
the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without
jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court
ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not
only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this
Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for
probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over
all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by
section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is binding
against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final
order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the
land of the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of
5
 Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these
salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs.
Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the
partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian.
The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs.
3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in the project of
partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros
Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had not
yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet
been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the
appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already
appointed when she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no
irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the
record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no
power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor
Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that
the order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and
may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a
party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through
her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of
First Instance which settled her father's estate.
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo)
could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said
widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees
rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the
estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants'
predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so
that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely
responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held
liable therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom
can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this
period had elapsed long ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old
(Exhibit 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of
action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her
father's estate and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948
(Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true
facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly,
therefore, the action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her
counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's
estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that
appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to
reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable
evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of
Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such
promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise
was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the
real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as
to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro,
55 Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by
the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void
for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that
Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred
by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties
inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have
been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is
reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is
affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records
be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for
partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits
thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
6
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951,
some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for
the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the
court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is
the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court
below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might
as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed
will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of
the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age
34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name
this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
7
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article
814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes
a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de
los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b)
Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A.
342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs.
Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va.
283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid.
And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este
ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The
one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more.
No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we
say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says
Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el
articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero
en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues,
entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como
especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura
de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo
universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion
se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814,
al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion
de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping
the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance
results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will
tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our
opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha
realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los
de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en
legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia,
con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si
esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una
interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario
8
 a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese,
sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion
contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion,
pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere
establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that
the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him
bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez
Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that
preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added
(in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras
disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts
it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance
rather than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article
854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the
distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion
expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma
se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating
that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is
presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must
be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we
repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance
shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which
the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el
derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el
caso. 23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor
of the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation
of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing
the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining
provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure
to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a
general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the
only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed
that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and
distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not
only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but
because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by
universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution
of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity".
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir".
9
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is
null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
RESERVA TRONCAL
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of
DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA,
REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P.
DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA.
DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE
JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS
SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS
SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684,
with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot
Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos 5
(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent
but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to
Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion,
Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes,
Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged
that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of
an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death,
her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated
unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria.
Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent
in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil
Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did
not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned by Placido
and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and
Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only
Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in
petitioners’ claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva
Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4,
2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of
land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint
including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property
described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia
Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the
same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that
Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even
assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be
subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor
did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO
FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that
the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva
troncal. They also claim the properties in representation of their own predecessors,
Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13
10
 Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are,
however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CA’s findings are
contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being the case in the petition at hand, the
Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA
on the two issues that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable
properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these
properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is
by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or
reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third
degree from which the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not
applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that
Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence,
it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga,
determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and
who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only
from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or
from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther
than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
property.17 It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What
is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom
the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by
the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this
case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an
ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus.
Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral
relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants
and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come
from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are
not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
(Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents,
great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she had
one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being
Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the
common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is
made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made
from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor,
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that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,
her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third
degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not
relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The
person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the
one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property
last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth
degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as
Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third
degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is
in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent
their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus
and relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of
the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to
the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives
of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are
within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. x x x. 23 (Emphasis and
underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the
purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not
Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the
complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at
all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and
1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper
distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by
petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal.
Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception of evidence on
Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in
an action filed specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s disposition of
the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the
reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their
names. What the RTC should have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva
troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on
respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to
annotate the reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the
reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation
of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively. 25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to
the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario
becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. 28 In any event,
the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled
to a reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and
Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694
insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are
AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of
Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of
ownership of the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.
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