Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity
of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad

can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which
is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.P
HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to

physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-
absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile
(insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one
has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be
exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of
Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in
the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would
mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still
lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue
of RA 9189.
ra vs Abano
PETITIONER Marcos Yra: the vice-president elect of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, who challenges the right of the respondent,RESPONDENT
Maximo Abano: the municipal president elect of Meycauayan
Facts: Respondent Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred to Manila to study.
Whiletemporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter
there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the
deathof his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live
there.From May 10, 1927, up to present, Abano has considered
himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections
wereapproaching, he made an application for cancellation of
registration in Manila dated April 3, 1928, but this application was
rejected bythe city officials for the reason that it was not deposited
in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano
presentedhimself as a candidate for municipal president of
Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote
to that office.Petitioner Marcos Yra assails the eligibility of Abano on
the ground that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at
least oneyear previous to the election.
of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a
candidatefailed to register as an elector in the municipality does not
deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted
for.Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that "No person shall
be eligible to any office who is not at time of his election a
qualifiedvoter of the city and who has not resided therein three
years preceding his election." It was said that "The act of registering
is onlyone step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that
makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter
without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the
right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right."The
distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such,
and a registered qualified elector and the respondent issuch
although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
suchright.It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan
have spoken and their choice to be their local chief executive is
therespondent. The will of the electorate should be respected.

Issue: Is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal

office for the reason that he was not a “qualified voter in his
municipality”, connoting that he was not a “qualified elector
therein”, sufficient to nullify his election?

Held: No.Ratio Decidendi: One of the qualifications required by law

of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly
qualified elector. TheExecutive Bureau has held that the term
"qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that
a person must be aregistered voter. To become a qualified candidate
a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that
he possessesall the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none
AKBAYAN YOUTH v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, 26 March 2001
BUENA, J.:
FACT:
Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration
before the 14 May 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189. Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report
on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only is
submitted but was then denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No.
3584 on 8 February 2001.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus.
Section 8 (System of Continuing Registration of Voters) of R.A. No. 8189
The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 provides:
The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office
hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and
ninety (90) days before a special election.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated 8 February 2001.
2. WHETHER OR NOT the Supreme Court can compel respondent
COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a
special registration of new voters during the period between the
COMELEC’s imposed 27 December 2000 deadline and the 14 May 2001
general elections.
RULING:
1. It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be
done. A two-day special registration for new voters would give rise to
time constraints due to additional pre-election matters. Accordingly,
COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law
on the matter. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent simply
performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
2. The Supreme Court cannot control the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
MAXIM:
1. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility.
2. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. In other words, there is no obligation
to do an impossible thing.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:
The authority and duty of the courts: When the law is clear, the court’s
primary duty is to apply the law.
 KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners, registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated.
vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with applicationfor
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015 temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.

ISSUES:
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an
TOPIC: Biometrics validation unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation
on October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.
FACTS:

RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a

mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order HELD:
to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology.

RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters FIRST ISSUE: No.

whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for
validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
elections shall be deactivated x x x.” The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to
the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
No. 9863 and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the
registration records of voters without biometricsdata who failed to submit The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration
for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right
to vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must
nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the
level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis
to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public
good -the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden
befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Presence of compelling state interest
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation
requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was
precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible
elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having
flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the
above-said interest
Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure
for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to:
(a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a
competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and
fingerprints recorded.
Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not
mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time
there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the
validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding
elections, provided that he remains an active voter.
Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivatedvoters
from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify
such status, they could still apply for reactivation.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:
System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.
The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer
to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be
conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct
voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which
may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative
necessities and other exigencies.