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Thomas A. Stoffregen
Human Factors Research Laboratory
School of Kinesiology
University of Minnesota
Chemero, Klein, and Cordeiro (this issue) present an argument about the utility of a
concept of events within the ecological approach to perception and action. They de-
fine ecological events as changes in the layout of affordances, and they distinguish this
concept from earlier definitions of event, which they refer to as physical events. They
argue that changes in the layout of affordances should be perceived, that is, that their
perception is motivated by the ecological approach to perception and action. They
also argue that changes in the layout of affordances are perceived, and they offer an
experiment that supports the hypothesis that humans are sensitive to changes in the
layout of affordances. What they do not do, I argue, is offer any compelling reason
why event should be applied to changes in the layout of affordances. I also argue that
changes in the layout of affordances do not have a special ontological status that
might merit a unique name or constitute a category of perceivables that is logically
distinct from affordances.
Chemero, Klein, and Cordeiro (this issue) present arguments and data in response
to my earlier discussion of relations between affordance and event as within the
ecological approach to perception and action (Chemero, 2000; Stoffregen, 2000a,
2000b). Accordingly, it seems appropriate briefly to restate the position that I ar-
gued in these earlier articles.
I set out to more fully understand the concept of affordance by comparing it with the
concept of event (Stoffregen, 2000a). I chose this comparison because there are
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas A. Stoffregen, Director, Human Factors Research
Laboratory, School of Kinesiology, University of Minnesota, 1901 Fourth Street SE, Minneapolis,
MN 55414. E-mail: tas@umn.edu
30 STOFFREGEN
1This differs from the ambient information that enables the perception of events; such information
must be defined with respect to the observing animal at least in the sense of referring to the point of ob-
servation. However, although the information is defined with respect to the observer, the event itself
typically is not (Stoffregen, 2000a, 2000b).
AFFORDANCES ARE ENOUGH 31
they often do not have consequences for behavior. For this reason I suggested that
there is not a clear motivation within the ecological approach for the perception of
events (Stoffregen, 2000a).
Chemero et al. (this issue) “take it to be a fact” (p. 27) that events are perceived.
At the same time, they accept Stoffregen’s (2000a, 2000b) argument that the eco-
logical approach cannot motivate the perception of events as classically defined.
This led Chemero (2000) to propose a new definition of events, not as animal-neu-
tral spatiotemporal things but as changes in the layout of affordances. In the article
in this issue, Chemero et al. offer (a) an experiment on the perception of changes in
the layout of affordances, and (b) additional arguments in favor of Chemero’s
novel definition of event as a change in the layout of affordances.
AN EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION
It seems to me that the essential issues are not empirical, but conceptual. As I did
earlier (Stoffregen, 2000b), I agree with Chemero (2000) that perceivers should
detect changes in the layout of affordances. What I continue to disagree about is
whether there is anything to be gained by using the term event to refer to changes in
the layout of affordances. The argument of Chemero et al. (this issue) is contained
in the following quotation:
We offer the following as an argument for applying the word event to changes in the
layout of affordances. Suppose Stoffregen’s (2000a) arguments do effectively prob-
32 STOFFREGEN
lematize event perception research that takes events to be changes in physical magni-
tudes in the environment. Given that, applying the word event to changes in the lay-
out of affordances saves ecological psychology from a worrisome fate. We submit that
any theory that hopes to explain human behavior must have a theory of event percep-
tion. If one understands events as changes in physical magnitudes, ecological psy-
chology has no way to account for the fact (and we take it to be a fact) that humans
perceive events. Conceiving of events as changes in the layout of affordances gives
ecological psychologists the ability to do empirical work on event perception with a
good conscience. (pp. 26–27)
Chemero et al. (this issue) concentrate on their attempt to find a meaning for
event that is compatible with the idea that perceivers are sensitive primarily (per-
haps exclusively) to affordances. One problem with this effort is that it does not
spell out the implications of their analysis for the existing literature on event per-
ception. Chemero et al. suggest that changes in the layout of affordances constitute
“ecological events,” and that these differ from “action-neutral” changes that they re-
fer to as “physical events” (p. 20). Chemero et al. imply that the mainstream litera-
ture on event perception fits within the latter term; that is, most studies of event
perception deal with the perception of physical events. In this sense, Chemero et
al. appear to agree with my argument (Stoffregen, 2000a, 2000b) that there is not a
clear motivation within the ecological approach for the perception of events as
classically conceived. Given this, it is difficult to understand in what sense their ap-
proach saves the ecological approach from a worrisome fate.
A second problem with the definition proposed by Chemero et al. (this issue) con-
cerns the types of things that are perceived. Chemero et al. discuss changes in the
layout of affordances as if these entities constitute a category of perceivables that is
logically distinct from the category of affordances (e.g., their statement that “any
theory that hopes to explain human behavior must have a theory of event percep-
tion”; p. 27). Implicitly, Chemero et al. appear to set up affordances as one category
of perceivables and changes in the layout of affordances as another distinct cate-
gory of perceivables. This raises the question of whether changes in the layout of
affordances really are distinct from affordances per se. Chemero et al. appear to
take for granted that such a difference exists. However, I believe that such a differ-
ence cannot be taken for granted. More than this, I believe that the difference ac-
tually does not exist.
Nested Affordances
Chemero et al. (this issue) argue that although animals need to perceive afford-
ances, they also need to perceive changes in the layout of affordances. This cer-
tainly is true, but it does not imply that affordances and changes in the layout of
affordances are different entities. In part this is because whether one considers
something to be an affordance or a change in the layout of affordances depends
on the level of analysis. For a given animal in a given situation there are an un-
limited number of affordances. These affordances exist in a nested structure
(Reed, 1996; Vicente & Rasmussen, 1990). The nesting involves levels of both
time and space (and levels of space–time). Changes in the layout of affordances
(i.e., events in the animal–environment system) are part of the nesting of
affordances within levels. What constitutes a change in the layout of affordances
at one level often constitutes a distinct affordance at another level. Thus,
whether something is an affordance or a change in the layout of affordances of-
ten depends on the level of analysis.
Baseball offers a good example of the multiplicity and multilayered nature of
affordances. Consider pitching. The pitch has end points (i.e., before the pitch
and after the pitch), and these end points have distinctive affordances. For ex-
ample, before the pitch, when the pitcher still holds the ball, a pickoff attempt
may be afforded (if there is a base runner). After the pitch, when the catcher
holds the ball (i.e., if the batter has not hit it, and the pitch is not wild),
affordances include handing the ball to the umpire in exchange for a new one,
throwing to a base to cut down a steal attempt, and so on. The pitch itself as an
event in the game has its own affordances, such as being called a ball or strike,
that do not exist when the ball is held by either the pitcher or the catcher.
Above and beyond these affordances there are additional affordances that exist
because individual pitches are embedded in larger contexts within the game.
Each pitch occurs within the sequence of pitches that is thrown to a given batter,
and the sequence has affordances that do not inhere in individual pitches (e.g., a
pitcher may elect to alternate pitches on the inside and outside parts of the plate
rather than repeatedly throwing to only one side). In addition, individual pitches
are part of the larger sequence of pitches that constitutes an inning (e.g., the
pitches that are thrown to a given batter often are influenced by the skill of the
person who will bat next) and part of the larger sequence of pitches over the se-
quence of innings (e.g., pitchers often adjust their pitches as they become fa-
tigued in the late innings). Thus, each pitch has affordances that exist at four
levels (at least): the level of the individual pitch, the level of the sequence of
pitches for this batter, the level of the sequence of pitches for this inning, and the
level of the sequence of pitches for this game. Each pitch changes the layout of
affordances, but the layout of affordances is also changed by the group of pitches
thrown to each batter, by the groups of pitches thrown in each inning, and by the
aggregate sequence of pitches thrown over the course of the game. Events in the
AFFORDANCES ARE ENOUGH 35
CONCLUSIONS
Chemero et al. (this issue) and I appear to agree that there is no motivation within
the ecological approach for the perception of events when events are conceived as
being animal-neutral. That is, we appear to agree that the ecological approach does
not motivate the perception of what Chemero et al. refer to as physical events. We
agree that affordances are perceived and that the perception of affordances is moti-
vated by the ecological approach. Finally, we agree that perceivers should and do
perceive changes in the layout of affordances. We disagree about whether the term
event should be used to refer to changes in the layout of affordances.
Ultimately, Chermero et al. (this issue) provide no new argument for why the
term event should be applied to changes in the layout of affordances. By noting the
nested structure of affordances (nested in space and time), I have argued that
changes in the layout of affordances have no special status in the ontology of the
ecological approach to perception and action and therefore do not constitute a dis-
tinct category of perceivables. For this reason, changes in the layout of affordances
do not need a special name (such as event).
Chemero et al. (this issue) “take it to be a fact” (p. 27) that events are perceived,
but it is difficult to give credence to this view while there is such wide disagreement
about what events are (e.g., Bingham, 2000; Chemero et al., this issue; Hecht,
2000; Stoffregen, 2000b, pp. 101–102). A subtext of the Chemero et al. argument
seems to be that there is something special about event, something that is not em-
bodied in the concept of affordances, something that needs to be recognized and
named within the ecological approach. If this is their argument, then it should be
36 STOFFREGEN
made explicitly. In particular, Chemero et al. should indicate what is missing from
the concept of affordances (in terms of perceivables, aspects of the animal–envi-
ronment interaction, and so on) that would motivate the creation or retention of a
category of perceivables that is distinct from affordances. My argument is that
there is no additional category of perceivables; that is, I argue that the category of
affordances includes everything that is perceived.
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