ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec
3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be
declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as
the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the
protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied
Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
I S S U E : 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over teh Electoral Commission and teh subject matter
of the controversy upon the foregoing facts;2.WON the Electoral Commission committed a grave abuse
of its discretion having entertained aprotest after the National Assembly passed Resolution 8 which
declared the deadline of filing of protests.
H E L D : 1. The nature of the present case shows the necessity of a final arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. NOt taking cognizance of said
controversy would create a void in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework.In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutitonl
organ which can be calledupon to determine the proper allocation of powers between teh several
departments and among teh ingral or constituent units thereof. 2. The
Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly". Thus,
entertaining the protest of Ynsua must conform to their own prescribed rules and the National Assembly
cannot divest them of any such powers.
 The Facts

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative

Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La
Trinidad, Benguet.

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198,
as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within
the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a
certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay
Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC's application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic,
industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the
extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such
resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.

In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC's application for a CPC. In
its 15 August 2002 Decision,[4]the NWRB held that LTWD's franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and
maintain a waterworks system. NWRB stated that:

With respect to LTWD's opposition, this Board observes that:

1. It is a substantial reproduction of its opposition to the application for water permits previously filed by
this same CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was decided upon by this Board on April
27, 2000. The issues being raised by Oppositor had been already resolved when this Board said in
pertinent portions of its decision:

"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang is within
their territorial jurisdiction, this does not mean that all others are excluded in engaging in such service,
especially, if the district is not capable of supplying water within the area. This Board has time and again
ruled that the "Exclusive Franchise" provision under P.D. 198 has misled most water districts to believe
that it likewise extends to be [sic] the waters within their territorial boundaries. Such ideological
adherence collides head on with the constitutional provision that "ALL WATERS AND NATURAL
RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE".
Issue

TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable
mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,[8] the Court held that, "What one cannot do directly, he cannot do
indirectly."[9] In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino,[10] quoting Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[11] the Court held that, "This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal
maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."[12] In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[13] the Court held that, "No one is allowed to do indirectly
what he is prohibited to do directly."[14]

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public
utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly
prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the
laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in characteror for a longer
period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the
LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic,
industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to
the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted,
such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree No.
198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the 1 October 2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004 Order of
the Regional Trial Court,
Metrobank vs tobias
CIVIL COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA +

PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a letter[1] dated June 23, 2006 by Director David E. Cabanag, Jr. of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. VII calling the attention of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to the continued employment of Merle Ramoneda-Pita (Ramoneda-Pita) as Clerk III
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Danao City. It informed the OCA that in CSC Resolution No.
010263[2]dated January 26, 2001, Raoneda-Pita was found guilty of dishonesty and dismissed from the
service. As accessory penalties, she was perpetually barred from joining government service and her
civil service eligibility was revoked. However, Ramoneda-Pita did not declare her ineligibility when she
stated in her Personnel Data Sheet (PDS)[3] dated June 14, 2005 that she had never been involved in any
administrative case and that she was civil service eligible.

The antecedent facts follow.

On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter[4] informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity in the civil service
eligibility of Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity concerned Ramoneda-Pita's taking of
the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987.

The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the pictures and
signatures of Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS
dated October 17, 1990. As the pictures and signatures did not match, the CSC required Ramoneda-Pita
to explain why it seemed that another person took the civil service examination on her behalf.

Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her stead. She averred
that she took the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that
there were dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP and the PDS because these were not taken on the
same year and might have deteriorated in quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for
the difference in her signatures to her low educational attainment leading to her non-development and
non-maintenance of a usual signature.[5]

In its Investigation Report[6] dated May 3, 1999, the CSC made the following observations and
recommendation:

The person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu
City, was the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature were affixed in the Admission
Slip/Notice of Admission and in the Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture
and signature appear in the Personal Data Sheet dated October 17, 19[9]0 of the real Merle C.
Ramoneda.

In view of the foregoing, considering that the evidence presented [is] substantial, it is recommended
that respondent Merle C. Ramoneda be adjudged guilty of the charges and meted the penalty of
dismissal with all its accessories.[7]

Thus, the CSC issued Resolution No. 010263 dated January 26, 2001 finding Ramoneda-Pita guilty of
dishonesty, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Merle C. Ramoneda guilty of the offense of Dishonesty.
Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties is imposed.

Since the respondent is not in the government service, the penalty of dismissal is deemed implemented.
She is also perpetually barred from entering the government service and from taking any civil service
examination in the future. Her Civil Service Sub-Professional Eligibility is likewise revoked.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas for whatever legal
action it may take under the premises.[8]

Ramoneda-Pita moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied it in Resolution No. 010880[9] dated May
3, 2001.

Ramoneda-Pita appealed CSC Resolution Nos. 010263 and 010880 to the Court of Appeals and,
subsequently, to this Court. In both instances, her appeal was denied.[10]

On January 14, 2005, Ramoneda-Pita wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appealing for
clemency stating that she accepted her fate and turned a new leaf with a solemn commitment to do
good for the rest of her life. The Office of the President referred the matter to Director David Cabanag,
Jr. of the CSC Regional Office No. VII for validation, verification and investigation.[11]

While the appeal for clemency was pending and in the course of the CSC's investigation, the CSC
discovered that, again, Ramoneda-Pita had been declaring in her PDS, particularly the PDS dated June
14, 2005 submitted to the Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in any administrative case
and that she was civil service eligible.[12]

Thus, on MAy 11, 2006, the CSC, in tis Investigation Report[13] pursuant to the Office of the President's
referral, found that Ramoneda-Pita had not sufficiently established moral reformation which is crucial in
the grant of executive clemency. It recommended that the plea for executive clemency be denied.

On June 23, 2006, Director Cabanag, Jr. wrote a letter to the OCA informing it of the continued
employment of Ramoneda-Pita as Clerk III of the MTCC, Danao City despite the finality of CSC Resolution
No. 010263.

On August 18, 2006, the OCA required Ramoneda-Pita to submit her comment within fifteen (15) days.

In her Comment dated September 7, 2006, Ramoneda-Pita asserted that she never concealed that she
had been previously found guilty of dishonesty. She claimed that her immediate supervisor, Judge
Manuel D. Patalinghug, was furnished a copy of CSC Resolution No. 010263. She admitted having filed
request for executive clemency with the Office of the President. In connection to this, she said that the
CSC directed her to submit some documents needed for its processing. She explained that she made the
entries in her June 14, 2005 PDS because she wanted to be consistent in her statements in her previous
PDS and, considering her low education, she just copied the data entries contained in her earlier PDS.
She said that it was never her intention to falsify the PDS and she did not understand the legal
implications. She prayed for the Court's understanding and cited her good record during her years of
service.

In its Report[14] dated July 4, 2008, the OCA recommended, among others, that the case be docketed as a
regular administrative matter and that this Court conduct its own investigation on the matter.

This Court noted and adopted the recommendation of the OCA in a Resolution[15] dated August 6, 2008
where it directed the OCA to conduct its own investigation on the matter and submit a report and
recommendation thereon.

Thus, this administrative case.

In its Memorandum[16] dated February 19, 2009, the OCA recommended Ramoneda-Pita's dismissal
from the service. It found that Ramoneda-Pita fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC
never once questioning its jurisdiction. It stated:

In the instant case, respondent Ramoneda-Pita, who never even questioned the jurisdiction
of the CSC, fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC. Although she was not yet a Supreme
Court employee when the CSC instituted the case against her, she had already become a member of the
judiciary when Resolution No. 01-0263 dated January 26, 2001 finding her guilty and meting her the
penalty of dismissal was issued - having been appointed by the Court to her present position on July 24,
2000. Her motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution was denied. The respondent then filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the same Resolution. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed with the Supreme Court which in its Resolution dated
August 24, 2004 found no reversible error in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals to warrant
the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case. Taking into consideration
the pronouncement in the Ampong case, we believe that with all the more reason the doctrine of
estoppel should thus be considered applicable in the instant case as the respondent went all the way to
the Supreme Court to question the CSC Resolution. In addition, the Court itself has even ruled on the
case, effectively upholding CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 when it explicitly stated that in any event, the
petition would still be denied for failure thereof to sufficiently show that the public respondent
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.

xxxx

There lies the question as to how should respondent then be proceeded against with respect to her
employment in the [J]udiciary. We deem that we cannot just implement CSC Resolution No. 01-0263
and dismiss the respondent outright. The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction over the
respondent and should therefore have the final determination of her administrative liability.

Considering, however, that the CSC had already conducted both fact-finding and formal investigations,
we find no reason why the Court should replicate what the CSC had done more ably.[17]

In support of its conclusion, the OCA cited Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No.
11[18] among others. Said the OCA:
The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
Supreme Court through the OCA as shown in several cases. The Court, however, has made exceptions in
certain cases. In the very recent case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared that it had
administrative jurisdiction over the petitioner, nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel. In the said case, petitioner Ampong, a court interpreter at the time the CSC
instituted administrative proceedings against her, questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC after it found
her guilty of dishonesty in surreptitiously taking the CSC-supervised Professional Board Examination for
Teachers (PBET) in 1991 in place of another person and dismissed her from the service. The Court
denied the petition on the ground that the previous actions of petitioner estopped her from attacking
the jurisdiction of the CSC which had accorded her due process.[19] (Citations omitted.)

The OCA then proceeded to discuss the merits of Ramoneda-Pita's contention. It noted Ramoneda-
Pita's claim that her physical appearance changed over the intervening years since she took the Civil
Service Sub- Professional Examinations. She also posed the possibility that the picture quality had
deteriorated over time. In addition, she also claims that the examiner must have interchanged her
picture with someone else as he was the one who pasted the pictures to the seat plan.

However, the OCA seriously doubted the validity of Ramoneda-Pita's claim saying:

We do not think that a mere three-year gap would bring about drastic changes in a person's
appearance. Besides, the respondent failed to substantiate her claims. She could have easily submitted
additional evidence, such as pictures to show the gradual change in her appearance through the three-
year period.[20]

On the confusion with respect to the pictures, the OCA said that it was not "likely due to the strict
procedure followed during civil service examinations x x x."[21] Moreover, the OCA stated:

The presentation of various explanations and conjectures show the inconsistent stands taken by the
respondent. She insists that the picture in the seat plan was her and that her physical appearance has
changed over the years, yet in the same breath argues that the examiner must have interchanged her
picture with the pictures of other examinees.

The same inconsistency is manifest in all her records. Upon the Court's resolution of her petition for
review on certiorari, the respondent states in her letter dated January 14, 2005 addressed to President
Arroyo that she fought hard to prove her innocence but had accepted her fate and mistake, with the
solemn commitment that she would never commit the same or similar mistake for the rest of her life.
x x x.
 GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review
or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to
a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death,
his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the
land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification
occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Topic: Presumption of ConstitutionalityCase: Perez vs PeopleMnemonic: Pera
Pereza
kapatid(peraparasakapatid) and
Perezumption
of Constitutionality

Facts:

Zenon Perez is the Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol on 1988.

In a recent audit made on his office, it was found that the public funds that he
was entrusted to isshort of Php72,784.57.

When he was asked regarding the shortage of funds, he confessed that he used
them to pay for theloan of his brother, and that he also spent it for his family's
food and his medicine.

When the case is filed to the Sandiganbayan, petitioner retracted his previous
statement as heclaimed that he was mentally and physically weak at that time,
as he was suffering from DiabetesMiletus.

He was found guilty of Malversation of Funds by the Sandiganbayan, and is

imposed a penalty of 10 years and one day for prision mayor (min), up to
14 years 8 months of reclusion temporal(max).Upon appeal at the SC level:

Peitioner claims that he was violated the right to a speedy trial and due process,
as over 13 yearshad passed, before the case had been filed against him.

He claims that the sentenced imposed upon him is cruel and violates section 19
of Article III of the Constitution.Ruling:
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated onlywhen the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or whenunjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his casetried.

There is strong
presumption of constitutionality
accorded to statutes.
It is presumed that thelegislature has acted within its constitutional powers.
So, it is the generally accepted rule thatevery statute, or regularly accepted act,
is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid andconstitutional.

He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the

onus probandi
to show why such law is aviolation to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its
presumption of constitutionality, a claim thata law is cruel, unusual, or
inhumane, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.

Court affirms the decision of the Sandiganbayan and found petioner guilty
of malversation of funds.
With the modification of the penalty to 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional(min) to 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor (max), with perpetual
special disqualification.
ANNOTATION JUDICIAL REVIEW 583 SCRA 142
 Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s
Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative
fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to
choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said
6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot,
signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November
21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10,
1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May
11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
 III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional
laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the
force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced
acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine
should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC
Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only
were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution
thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that
may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which
only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to
rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the
DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian
reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but
were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
 However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too
restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the
area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the
DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified
FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita
per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation
and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which
shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of
Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by
intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare
land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989
(the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to
own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject
of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the
SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the
notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of
the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases
cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely
apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The
landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10
years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
 qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly,
the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands
under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to
land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the
subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of
the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands
of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares
and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will
constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus
one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially
fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
 Dela llana vs chairperson
Statement of the Facts and the Case

On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system
of pre-audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The
circular affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be
managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and
safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a
view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of
government. Further, the circular emphasized that the responsibility to ensure
faithful adherence to the policy rested directly with the chief or head of the
government agency concerned. The circular was also designed to further facilitate
or expedite government transactions without impairing their integrity.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave
irregularities and anomalies in the governments financial transactions were
uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which
reinstated the pre-audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit
was perceived to be an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said
anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of
government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which
again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national government
agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs). The
rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility
resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services
and improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and
ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and
protect the integrity of these transactions. Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit
of government transactions of NGAs and GOCCs, Circular No. 89-299 mandated
the installation, implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control
system, which would be the direct responsibility of the government agency head.
Circular No. 89-299 further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by
the COA as therein outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the implementation
or prosecution of projects and the payment of claims. The COA aimed to henceforth
focus its efforts on the post-audit of financial accounts and transactions, as well as
on the assessment and evaluation of the adequacy and effectivity of the agencys
fiscal control process. However, the circular did not include the financial
transactions of local government units (LGUs) in its coverage.
The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 on 17 February 1994 and Circular
No. 95-006 on 18 May 1995. Both circulars clarified and expanded the total lifting
of pre-audit activities on all financial transactions of NGAs, GOCCs, and LGUs.
The remaining audit activities performed by COA auditors would no longer be pre-
requisites to the implementation or prosecution of projects, perfection of contracts,
payment of claims, and/or approval of applications filed with the agencies.[1]
It also issued COA Circular No. 89-299, as amended by Circular No. 89-
299A, which in Section 3.2 provides:
3.2 Whenever circumstances warrant, however, such as where the internal control
system of a government agency is inadequate, This Commission may
reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to protect
the funds and property of the agency.

On 18 May 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002, which reinstituted the
selective pre-audit of government transactions in view of the rising incidents of
irregular, illegal, wasteful and anomalous disbursements of huge amounts of public
funds and disposals of public property. Two years later, or on 22 July 2011, COA
issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the pre-audit of government transactions
implemented by Circular No. 2009-002. In its assessment, subsequent developments
had shown heightened vigilance of government agencies in safeguarding their
resources.
In the interregnum, on 3 May 2006, petitioner dela Llana wrote to the COA
regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food
that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. On 18 July
2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the prior issuance of Circular
No. 89-299.[2] The 18 July 2006 reply of the COA further emphasized the required
observance of Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992, which directed the
strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through the
installation of an internal audit service (IAS).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He
alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section
2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.[3] He further claims that, because of the
lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have
been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in
the P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher
Education, and many others.
On 22 February 2008, public respondents filed their Comment [4] on the
Petition. They argue therein that the Petition must be dismissed, as it is not proper
for a petition for certiorari, considering that (1) there is no allegation showing that
the COA exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions when it promulgated Circular
No. 89-299; and (2) there is no convincing explanation showing how the
promulgation of the circular was done with grave abuse of discretion. Further, the
Petition is allegedly defective in form, in that there is no discussion of material dates
as to when petitioner received a copy of the circular; there is no factual background
of the case; and petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of the circular. In any
case, public respondents aver that the circular is valid, as the COA has the power
under the 1987 Constitution to promulgate it.
On 9 May 2008, petitioner filed his Reply[5] to the Comment.
On 17 June 2008, this Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. On 12 September 2008, public respondents submitted their
Memorandum.[6] On 15 September 2008, Amethya dela Llana-Koval, daughter of
petitioner, manifested to the Court his demise on 8 July 2008 and moved that she be
allowed to continue with the Petition and substitute for him. Her motion for
substitution was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 7 October 2008. On 5
January 2009, petitioner, substituted by his daughter,[7] filed his Memorandum.[8]
The main issue for our resolution in this Petition is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.