[G.R. NO.

171491 : September 4, 2009]

DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS, Petitioner, v. RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III, CESARIO R.

PAGDILAO, AND FORTUNATA B. AQUINO, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated September
30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779, and its Resolution2 dated February
9, 2006 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research
and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and drawn against the
Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted project being implemented by PCAMRD. To
avoid being caught, Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the
PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check
for the amount of P385,000.00, forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it
appear that the check was endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check
that was drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of the money to the
Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.3

Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week of February 1999
while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the Trust Fund for the month of
January. Not finding the check anywhere in her office, Atienza called the bank to look for the
same. She was shocked to learn from a bank employee that the check had been issued payable in
her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine the check, she noticed that her signature
and the signature of Dir. Rafael D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were
forged. She also found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed the check.4

Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about the incident, but
begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza also promised to return the money in a
few days. Against her good judgment, Atienza acquiesced to Bareza's request, seeing Bareza's
remorse over his transgressions. But Atienza also felt uneasy over her decision to keep silent
about the whole thing, so Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino (Aquino),
PCAMRD Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did. Bareza, however,
decided to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III, instead.5

When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to report the matter to
Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to commit suicide if his misdeeds were
ever exposed. Due to his fervent pleading and his promise to repay the amount he took, Bosque,
like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to remain silent.6

True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD account on February 25,
1999.7

On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted concerning
irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records Section in order to
clear his tracks.8

A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD Memorandum Circular No.
309 to investigate the burning incident and forgery of checks by Bareza. After investigation, the
fact-finding committee found sufficient evidence to charge Bareza with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and falsification of official document.10 The fact-finding committee likewise found
1
sufficient evidence to charge Atienza with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties11 and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.12

Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation committee to conduct

formal investigations on the charges filed against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque.13 The
investigation committee found Bareza guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
recommended his dismissal from the service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the charge
filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a minimum penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for
Bosque.14

On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the investigation committee but
imposed only the penalty of six (6) months suspension on Atienza and only three (3) months
suspension on Bosque.15

Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on Bareza, Atienza
and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the complete records of the
proceedings had. Upon reading the same, petitioner was of the opinion that the investigation
conducted by the fact-finding committee and investigation committee was perfunctorily and
superficially done, and made only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues because the report
exonerated other persons involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to
him, these circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence, petitioner filed with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) a complaint against Guerrero,
Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy Executive Director, and Aquino, among
others, for incompetence and gross negligence.16 The case was docketed as OMB Case No. L-A-
02-0209-D.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution17 dated July 9, 2002,
the respondents argued that the complaint is wanting in material, relevant and substantive
allegations and is clearly intended only to harass them. Furthermore, they contended that
petitioner failed to identify the persons he claims were exonerated, and worse, petitioner failed to
state with particularity their participation in the crimes.18

In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit19 dated July 25, 2002, petitioner belied the
allegation of the respondents that his complaint was lacking in substance. He stressed that the
report of the investigation committee that was submitted by the respondents reinforced his claim
that the investigation relative to the forgery and arson case was indeed perfunctory and
superficial, designed only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues. To bolster his contention,
he pointed out that the sworn affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain
funds of the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously signed by
Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the failure to implicate Pagdilao as a conspirator to the crime of
forgery shows that the investigation was just a farce. Petitioner also claimed that Atienza and
Bosque were not charged with the proper administrative offense to avoid their dismissal from the
service. Petitioner pointed to the command responsibility of respondents over Bareza, Atienza
and Bosque. He maintained that had they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRD's finances,
the forgery of checks and the arson incident could have been avoided. Furthermore, petitioner
alleged that being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero should have pursued investigations on the
criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and arson because a huge amount of government money
was involved therein. His act, therefore, of declaring the cases closed after the conduct of the
investigations in the administrative aspect only is contrary to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) because its object is to conceal "more big anomalies and
issues."20

In a Decision21 dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case filed against the respondents for lack of merit. It agreed with the respondents
that the complaint was couched in general terms that contains no material, relevant and
substantial allegation to support the theory of cover-up or whitewash. The Ombudsman also held
2
that there is nothing to sustain petitioner's allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in the
forgery because petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in blank by
Pagdilao was Land Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check encashed by Bareza. Even
assuming that the forged check was the one signed in blank by Pagdilao, the Ombudsman opined
that the latter still cannot be said to have participated in the forgery because the check was in the
custody and safekeeping of Atienza, the cashier, when it was stolen. In the same vein, the
Ombudsman found no adequate basis in the petitioner's allegation that Guerrero charged Atienza
and Bosque with erroneous administrative infractions to lessen their liability, noting that
Guerrero merely adopted the recommendation of the fact-finding and investigation committees
as to what they should be charged with. The Ombudsman added that Guerrero cannot be indicted
for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 or be held administratively liable for his
failure to initiate criminal cases against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque because he had no personal
knowledge of the commission of the crimes allegedly committed by them.22

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an Order23 dated
November 25, 2003. According to the Ombudsman, nowhere in petitioner's complaint did he
allege that respondents should be blamed for arson and forgery because of command
responsibility. It held that petitioner's averment of the same only in his reply-affidavit and in his
motion for reconsideration should be disregarded altogether since it materially and belatedly
alters his original cause of action against the respondents, which cannot be allowed.24

Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a Petition for Review 25 under Rule
43 before the appellate court. Petitioner claimed that the Ombudsman gravely erred when it
recommended the dismissal of the charges against the respondents and denied his motion for
reconsideration despite the existence of a prima facie case against them for incompetence and
gross negligence.

On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the August 5, 2002
Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D.
The appellate court found that the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the complaint against the
respondents. The appellate court held that petitioner questioned the handling of the PCAMRD
finances without specifying the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross negligence of
the respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative, cannot, by
their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.26

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied by the appellate
court in the Resolution dated February 9, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONER'S
PETITION AND AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION OF AUGUST 5, 2002 IN
OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY RELYING
SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE GENERAL RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE
COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE -
PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE
EXERCISE THEREOF.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS

REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA
3
FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS, [THAT] IF CONSIDERED,
WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.27

Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in affirming the dismissal
of the complaint. We hold that it did not.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot
be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions,
and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack
of merit.28

Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents because according
to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would not have happened had they not
been remiss in the performance of their duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero, being the
head of PCAMRD, should have seen to it that all the resources of the government are managed
and expended in accordance with laws and regulations, and safeguarded against loss and waste;
Pagdilao should have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they were
intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino supervised Bareza, Atienza
and Bosque, her subordinates, properly and efficiently. In sum, petitioner argues that they are
accountable because of command responsibility.29 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint against the respondents
should be dismissed. A perusal of petitioner's allegations clearly shows that they are mere general
statements or conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary support and substantiation. It is not
enough for petitioner to simply aver that respondents had been derelict in their duties; he must
show the specific acts or omissions committed by them which amount to incompetence and gross
negligence. This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner's allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of respondents which show
that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification lacks merit. Aside from the fact that nowhere
in the records does it appear that he has indeed shown the particular acts or omissions of
respondents constituting dishonesty or which amounted to falsification of whatever nature, it
must be emphasized that the case he filed before the Ombudsman was an administrative
complaint for incompetence and gross negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to
prove by substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At the very least,
petitioner should have shown how his accusations of dishonesty and falsification constituted
incompetence and gross negligence on the part of the respondents.

To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner argues that he had in
his petition established the existence of probable cause to hold respondents liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.30 He then
concludes that "if there is sufficient basis to indict the respondents of a criminal offense then
with more reason that they should be made accountable administratively considering the fact that
the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial
evidence."31

4
This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is merely proceeding
from his own belief that there exists sufficient basis to charge respondents criminally. This is not
within his province to decide. He could not arrogate unto himself the power that pertains to the
proper authorities enjoined by law to determine the absence or existence of probable cause to
indict one of a criminal offense.

More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may
proceed independently thereof.32 Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a
crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same
will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.

As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza33 and which we have
reiterated in a host of cases,34 a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents' acquittal will not
necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases
are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will
not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.35

It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The
purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.36 To state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated
criminal liability to administrative liability.

Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the respondents
liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the respondents,
administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility.37 Without
proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the
negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence
of the latter's own negligence.38 While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were
sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not follow that those
holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are likewise negligent, especially
so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible error in the assailed
decision and resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said Decision dated September 30, 2005 and
Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.