SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

GSIS VS. CALUMPIANO

G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014

NATURE:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which Set Aside the Decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and
ordered the payment of disability benefits to the herein respondent and denying the
reconsideration of the CA Decision.

FACTS:

Respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano was a court employee and served as the Court
Stenographer at the then Court of First Instance of Samar from January 5, 1972 until
her retirement on March 30, 2002. As a Court Stenographer, her duties were no
doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment,
hypertension.

On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, respondent filed before the
Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her ailments,
Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease and Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To
strengthen her claim, respondent submitted the medical certificates issued by her
attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are
Ophthalmologists at Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together
with the results of her perimetry test, a certificate of which was issued by Dr. Lim.
On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved respondent’s application for
disability retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Respondent’s disability claim was forwarded to GSIS, but the latter denied her claim
for the reason that hypertension and glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not
work-related. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS. On
appeal to the ECC, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS for lack of merit. On appeal
to the CA, the ECC’s decision is Set Aside and remanded the case to the Employees’
Compensation Commission for the payment of the disability benefits due to
respondent. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same is denied.
Hence, this instant appeal to the Supreme Court.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT ON APPEAL TO CA & TO THE SC:

Respondent sought to set aside the ECC’s decision and argued that her illness is
work-connected which thus entitles her to disability compensation. Her petition was
given a favorable judgment and remanded her case to the Employees’ Compensation
Commission for the payment of the disability benefits due to her.

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

Respondent further argued relevantly that the "increased risk theory," which applies
to her, has been upheld in several decided cases; that in disability compensation
cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but rather the incapacity to work
resulting in the impairment of the employee’s earning capacity; and that while the
ECC has the expertise and knowledge relative to compensation cases, the CA is not
precluded from making its own assessment of the case which goes against that of
the ECC’s.

CONTENTION OF GSIS & ECC BEFORE THE CA:

Petitioner argued that respondent’s hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable
under the principle of increased risk; that although essential hypertension is listed as
an occupational disease, it is not compensable per se as the conditions under Section
1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation should be satisfied;
that hypertension is compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body
organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability;" that
since respondent did not suffer "end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys,
heart, eyes and brain which resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not
compensable; that respondent’s other illness – glaucoma – is not compensable; and
that the findings of the ECC should be accorded respect and finality, as it has the
expertise and knowledge on account of its specialized jurisdiction over employee
compensation cases.

ISSUES:

WON the respondent’s illness is work-connected which thus entitles her to disability
compensation.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. The The fact that the essential
hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was
already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for its
compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason of her
employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is
immaterial.
Indeed, an employee’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in
time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was
considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a
partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. The
right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless
it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own
negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow from
the primary injury are compensable.

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

It can also be said that given respondent’s age at the time, and taking into account
the nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer –
which requires her to faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the court’s
proceedings; transcribe these notes immediately in order to make them available to
the court or the parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and
transcribe them; and type in final form the judge’s decisions, which activities extend
beyond office hours and without additional compensation or overtime pay – all these
contributed to the development of her hypertension – or hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, as petitioner would call it. Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension
caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due to "advanced to late stage
glaucoma", which rendered her "legally blind."

In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles,
declared in Bauland De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation cases; that the primordial and paramount consideration is the
employee’s welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims
for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be received
in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of
compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw
medical findings and a claimant’s personal and social history; that where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless
it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own
negligence or misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law
on employees’ compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder.

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

GSIS VS. CAPACITE

G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014

NATURE:

This is an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court of the decision dated August 4,
2011 and the resolution dated November 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 116030. The appealed decision reversed and set aside the Decision dated
June 29, 2010 of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which denied the
claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 filed by Jose M. Capacite.

FACTS:

Respondent Elma Capacite was an employee in the Department of Agrarian Reform

(DAR) – Eastern Samar Provincial Office, Borongan, Eastern Samar, who successively
held the following positions between the periods of November 8, 1982 to July 15,
2009: Junior Statistician, Bookkeeper, Bookkeeper II and finally as Accountant 1.

On May 11, 2009, due to persistent cough coupled with abdominal pain, Elma was
admitted at the Bethany Hospital. The pathology exam showed that she was suffering
from “Adenocarcinoma, moderately differentiated, probably cecal origin with
metastases to mesenteric lymph node and seeding of the peritoneal surface.”

On July 16, 2009, Elam died due to “Respiratory Failure secondary to Metastatic
Cancer to the lungs; Bowel cancer with Hepatic and Intraperitoneal Seeding and
Ovarian cancer”.

On May 13, 2009, Elma’s surviving spouse, Jose, filed a claim for ECC death benefits
before the GSIS Catbalogan Office Branch, alleging that Elma’s stressful working
condition caused the cancer that eventually led to her death.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On August 18, 2009, the GSIS denied Jose’s claim. The GSIS opined that Jose had
failed to present direct evidence to prove a causal connection between Elma’s illness
and her work in order for the claimant to be entitled to the ECC death benefits. Jose
appealed the GSIS decision to the ECC. On June 29, 2010, the ECC denied Jose’ claim
for death benefits.

CONTENTION OF THE GSIS:

GSIS primarily argues that Elma’s illness is not work-related. It is neither

listed under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employee’s Compensation,
nor was it caused by her working conditions. GSIS asserts that the liberal
attitude to grant benefits should not be used to defeat the mandate of the
GSIS to provide meaningful protection to all government employees who are
actually working under hazardous circumstances.

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

Jose contended that throughout Elma’s 27-year service at the DAR, she had a
very demanding job; that she rose from the ranks as a Junior Statistician,
until she reached the position of Accountant I. Jose also explained that Elma
had to examine various financial statements for accuracy; perform complex
accounting reports; and prepare financial statements. She also had to
constantly render overtime work, even during weekends, in order to study,
analyze, balance, formulate and finalize reports. All these involved prolonged
sitting, exposure to cold room temperature at the office, physical effort and
mental exertion, making her highly susceptible to physical and mental fatigue,
stress and strain.

ECC’s FINDING:

The ECC held that colorectal cancer is not listed as an occupational and compensable
disease under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employee’s Compensation.
Although its item 17 provides that "cancer of the lungs, liver and brain shall be
compensable," the rules required "that it had been incurred by employees working
as vinyl chloride workers, or plastic workers."

CA’s DECISION:

Jose appealed the ECC ruling to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. On
August 4, 2011, the CA granted the petition and reversed the ECC findings. Without
discussing the nature of Elma’s employment, the CA ruled that she had
“adenocarcinoma of the lungs” or “lung cancer,” which is a respiratory disease listed
under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employee’s Compensation, entitling her
heirs to death benefits even if she had not been a “vinyl chloride worker, or plastic
worker.”

ISSUE:

WON Alma Capacite’s illness that metastasized to the lungs which is an ailment akin
to respiratory disease under Annex “A” of P.D. No. 626, as amended, and that such
disease is work related, therefore, compensable.

HELD:

No, the ailment does not warrant a substantial consideration to make it

compensable under P.D. No. 626.

While it is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation, lung cancer is occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers
and plastic workers. However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if
the complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the
ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

illness is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee

is exposed to.
In the case at bar, aside from Jose’s general allegations proving the stressful duties
of his late wife, no reasonable proof exists to support the claim that her respiratory
disease, which is similar to lung cancer, was aggravated by her working conditions.
The records do not support the contention that she had been exposed to voluminous
and dusty records, nor do they provide any definite picture of her working
environment.
The grant of death compensation benefits cannot be solely granted on the assumption
that Elma might have been exposed to deleterious substances while working as
bookkeeper and accountant. The compensation benefits cannot be also awarded on
the basis of stress and fatigue, which are general consequences of working in
practically all kinds of human activity.

BARTOLOME VS. SSS

G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

NATURE:

This appeals seeks to annul the Decision of the Employees’ Compensation

Commission (ECC) under the Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, entitled the herein
petitioner Bernardina Bartolome against the respondents and declaring that the
petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under PD No. 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death,
childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of SSS La Union Branch. The ECC ruled that death benefits sought
after under PD 626 on the ground that the Petitioner can no longer be considered
John’s primary beneficiary.
ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER:

The petitioner argued that she is entitled to the benefits because she is the biological
mother and the sole remaining beneficiary which the ECC did not agree.

CONTENTION OF ECC:

The ECC argued that it was Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
the petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s
secondary beneficiary even if it were proven that Cornelio had already passed away.
The commission further noted by citing Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626 which provides
that beneficiaries are the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries…

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to
the restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.

2. WON the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and thus, entitled to receive the benefits under
the ECP.

HELD:

1. The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s
death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away.

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is

concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition
is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender
age.

As can be gleaned from the facts, it is apparent that the biological parents retain
their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee
do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits
from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the
blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include
the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

2. The Court held in the AFFIRMATIVE. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more,
does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during
John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.

ESMARIALINO VS.
EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC) &
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS)

NATURE:

PETITION for review on the Decision rendered and Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals which Affirmed the Decision of ECC, which denied the Petitioner’s claim for
death benefits under PD No. 626, otherwise known as the Employees’ Compensation
Law.

FACTS:

Petitioner’s husband, Edwin C. Esmarialino, worked as a Security Guard for Jimenez

Protective and Security Agency. While with the said security agency, Edwin was
diagnosed through biopsy with Acute Myelogenous Leukemia and succumbed to
Sepsis secondary to Pneumonia. He did not endure and overcome his illnesses which
resulted to his demise. The death certificate shows that the immediate cause of
Edwin’s death is Cardiopulmonary Arrest. Antecedent cause is Sepsis secondary to
Pneumonia and the underlying cause of which is Pneumonia. Other significant
condition contributing to his death is Acute Myelogenous Leukemia.

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

While Edwin was still alive, he made his last premium contribution with SSS in May,
2004. On account of his ailment, he was granted with the following medical benefits
under the SSS law, to wit: (a) SSS Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits of 120
days effective September 19, 2004; (b) SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD)
benefits of twenty-three (23) months effective February 11, 2005; and c) SSS Death
with Funeral Benefits effective March 20, 2005 granted to his beneficiaries.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The SSS denied the Claim for EC death benefits on the ground that “there is no causal
relationship between Acute Myelogenous Leukemia to the member’s job as a security
guard.” The petitioner appealed the SSS decision to the ECC. The ECC likewise
dismissed the claim. Hence, the petitioner filed before the CA a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER ON APPEAL TO CA:

The petitioner argued that her husband’s employment regularly required him to take
either straight 12 or 24 hours of duty, with only a 24-hour rest period on the last day
of each month. Thus, Edwin was constantly sleep-deprived and his immune system
became weak. Eventually, he succumbed to leukemia.

CONTENTION OF SSS & ECC:

The SSS and ECC averred that Rosemarie failed to offer substantial evidence to prove
that Edwin’s working conditions increased the risk of contracting leukemia.

DECISION OF THE CA:

The CA affirmed the ECC’s ruling.

ISSUES:

3. WON Edwin’s illness which caused his death is work-related.

4. WON the petitioner is entitled to the death benefits contemplated under the
Employees’ Compensation Law before the SSS.

HELD:

1. The petition is bereft of merit. Under the Rules Implementing PD 626, for the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A”, otherwise,
proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.

Stated otherwise, if an ailment or sickness is not listed as an occupational disease,

the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the illness suffered was
increased by his or her working conditions. The degree of proof required is

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO
 SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.

Leukemia is considered as an occupational disease if the nature of employment

involved exposure to X-rays, ionizing particles of radium or other radioactive
substances or other forms of radiant energy, or it is contracted by operating room
personnel due to exposure to anesthetics.

It is worth noting that in an attempt to prove that Edwin's employment increased

his chances of contracting leukemia, Rosemarie presented copies of her husband's
daily time records. However, even if the Court were to co-relate these to the
medical abstract submitted by Rosemarie, there is nothing in the documents from
which the Court can infer or conclude that indeed, Edwin's risk of contracting
leukemia increased by reason of his work conditions.

2. The petition though treated with leniency but would not pass muster the spirit and
intent of the Employees’ Compensation Law. Thus, the CA, ECC and SSS
uniformly found that Rosemarie cannot be granted death benefits as she had failed
to offer substantial evidence to prove her claims.

ERWIN L. SABORNIDO