G.R. No.

L-16704 March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS
 The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all
employers in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime
time pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration.
 The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is contrary to a
previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
 Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and the
employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.
 The counsel questioned the validity of the circular stating that they lack authority to promulgate
it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette
 Social Security Commission overruled the objections claiming that it is not a rule or regulation
that requires the approval of the president but merely an administrative interpretation of the
statute, a mere statement of general policy as to how the law should be construed
 Victorias Milling Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the
approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act”

HELD
Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for
employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.
Except:

 that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;
 bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
 dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required
to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation — All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other
than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned with the interpretation
of the law as amended which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission
simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not
require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it
renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative
interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
vs.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,INC.,

FACTS:
The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City and Decision of the Court of Appeals which declared Article 2, Section 3.1
of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional. Said executive issuance prohibits the
importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay
Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled “PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.” The challenged provision
states:
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before Branch 72 of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed by herein respondent entities,
who or whose members, are classified as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the
business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles.

Southwing Heavy Industries, Microvan, Inc., and Macro Ventures instituted a declaratory relief
against the Executive Secretary by (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional
and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs
and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the
Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone to process
the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the unimpeded entry
and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.

G.R. No. 164171: On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
(SOUTHWING) United Auctioneers, Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), and Microvan, Inc.
(MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed as Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against the
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of Customs,
Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of the Land
Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone. SOUTHWING, UNITED AUCTIONEERS and
MICROVAN prayed that judgment be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs,
Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles;
(2) ordering the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic
Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the
unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required
customs duties. The trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment holding that Article 2, Section
3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant to the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A.
Pursuant to the Separability clause of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it applies to
the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into
the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used
or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the
Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, on the ground
of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the
importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and
absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is
void.

Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the
order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature.
By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules
and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. To
be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Cebu, and the CITY OF
CEBU, respondent.

FACTS:
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina
Lagcao. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings
against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a
decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the
demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking
for a relocation site for the squatters.
During the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

ISSUE:
Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of substantive due process

RULING:
Yes, Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to
due process. It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this
ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of
demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that
the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a
relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843
for the expropriation of petitioner’s lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The
unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

For an ordinance to be valid:

1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
6) must not be unreasonable.
G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to nullify
Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands is
106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del
Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for
calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it
has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as
certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as
certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite
was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval
of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat
Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province.
Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of
the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the
rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects
and purposes of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.

RULING:
No.
The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from
such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria
prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion “The
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands. “
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as it already
conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no
dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
Kinds of Statute
 General Law – is the one that affects the community at a large. A law that relates to a subject of a
general nature, or that affects all people of the state or all of a particular class.
 Special Law – A law s special when it is different from others of the same general kind or designed for a
particular purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action on operation
 Local Law – A law which relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory
of the state.
 Public Law – A general classification of law, consisting of generally of constitutional, administrative,
criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, relations between the state
and the people who compose it, and to private persons, and the relations of states to one another. Public
law may be general, local or special.
 Private Law – those portions of the law which defines, regulates, enforces and administers relationships
among individuals, associations and corporations.
 Remedial Statute – A statute providing means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated
wrongs redressed and relief obtained
 Curative Statute – A form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to operate upon
past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and
effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended.
 Penal Statute – A statue that defines criminal offenses and specify corresponding fines and punishments
 Prospective Law – A law applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment
 Retrospective Law – A law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect
acts or facts occurring or rights occurring before it came into force
 Affirmative Statute – A statute couched in affirmative or mandatory terms. One which directs the doing
of an act, or declares what shall be done in contrast to a negative statute which is one that prohibits a
thing from being done or declares what shall not be done
 Mandatory Statutes – Generic term describing statutes which require and not merely permit a course of
action. They are characterized by such directives as “Shall” and not “may”.
How Laws are Passed
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA

FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll
call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Ramos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

HELD:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly
Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after
any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They
further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or
tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They
also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring
about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego
of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or
not.

Issues:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section
26 (2) of the Constitution.

Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1
and 2 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
Discussions:

Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to
propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by
the Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from
the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so
that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances.”

Rulings:

R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House
bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and
excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any
prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House
revenue bill.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This
is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will
not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.