Hydropower expansion in the Western Himalayas: mapping resistances to the “consensus of infrastructures”

Daniela Del Bene, Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona
(corresponding author)
UAB Campus, Edifici Z · Carrer de les Columnes, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona · Spain
Email contact: d.delbene@gmail.com
Kesang Thakur, Independent Researcher at Himdhara Environment Research and Action Collective
HIMDHARA,Village Kandbari, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, India
Email contact: kesang.thakur@gmail.com

Abstract
The increase of the social metabolism and belief in economic growth has led to the expansion of the commodity
extraction frontier worldwide. To meet power demand, large-scale renewable energies represent one such frontier,
justified by the sustainability of these energy technologies and their alleged crucial role against climate change.
This article analyses the hydropower expansion, mainly Run-of-River projects, in the Indian state of Himachal
Pradesh, whose energy program aims to exploit the whole 27,000MW identified potential, both from small and
large plants. We first present a collaborative mapping project to dig out ground data; second, we explain how
hydropower technology led to the expansion of infrastructure; third, we investigate what discourses inform and
shape the opposition, and finally we draw some research lines relevant for degrowth and environmental justice
literature.
We argue that these new commodity extraction frontiers rely on a ‘consensus of infrastructures’ that sustains the
commodity chains. Such consensus is being challenged on three major grounds at local and national level, a. Socio-
environmental impacts, b. Systematic violation and dilution of environmental laws, c. Undemocratic and
sometimes violent character of the hydropower frontier expansion. We finally show how the growing criticism by
communities, environmentalists, and researchers of hydropower technology in the Himalayas is leading to a re-
politicized assessment of energy needs.
We suggest that Indian literature on ‘appropriate technologies’ and relocalization of production can fruitfully
inspire such processes. We conclude with a discussion on plural values and plural forms of energy, as relentlessly
defended by front-line communities, as well as by a global growing advocacy movement for energy sovereignty and
democracy.
 1. Introduction
The increase of the social metabolism of our industrial economies in terms of flows of materials and energy have
led to the expansion of commodity extraction frontier worldwide (Fischer-Kowalski, M., & Haberl, H, 2007;
Krausmann et al., 2009; Martínez-Alier et al., 2010; Singh et al., 2012). At the same time, social environmental
conflicts are mounting, as well as the number of communities and groups organizing for environmental justice
(Schlosberg, 2004). In Latin America, conflicts are considered as an intrinsic feature of what political economists
and sociologists call the “consensus of commodities” (Svampa, 2013), a mindset that is locking communities in an
export-oriented extractivist economy (Gudynas, 2013) of raw materials. Worldwide, conflicts often unveil the
narrow techno-economic rationality that has been shaping development policy and practice for decades (Goldman,
2001), as well as the resistance to a preconceived idea of “development” (Escobar, 2008) as a one-dimensional
thinking of prosperity that sidelines complex socio-environmental issues and uncertainties (Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1994). Conflicts also show the intrinsic contradiction between sustainability and economic growth, especially when
they are triggered by projects promoted in the name of a “greener economy”. Renewable energy technologies are
not an exception; they often meet with social discontent (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007), especially when they require
large infrastructure and acquisition of land. Environmental justice (EJ) scholars and political ecologists, among
others, have highlighted for example how large wind (Cowell et al., 2011) and solar plans (Hamouchene, 2015;
Mulvaney, 2013) are also matter of injustice, and how differing values and valuation languages stand up for
defending alternative understanding and use of the territory (Zografos and Martínez-Alier, 2009). EJ literature has
pointed out how there is today a global EJ movement with a transnational and transdisciplinary character (Sikor
and Newell, 2014; Walker, 2009, Martínez-Alier et al 2016) across regions and topics, while the analysis of conflicts
more and more calls for an epistemic rethinking of justice and democracy regarding socio-environmental issues
(Temper and Del Bene, 2016; Velicu and Kaika, 2015).
As energy plays a central role in the social metabolism of our societies, the power sector, its technology and related
infrastructure complex needs to be re-thought both for the disruptive impacts it often has, but also for the
alternative uses of the territory it crowds out. Degrowth inspired works have already addressed some of these issues
especially in the European context (Jenkins 2016; Kunze and Bekker 2014); however, degrowth research needs to
strengthen alliances with other movements and disciplines, such as environmental justice (Martínez-Alier, 2012),
ecological anthropology, sociology and science and technology studies (STS). In India, degrowth finds excellent
interlocutors in the critical minds who have challenged the concept of development -some since the 1980s- (Nandy,
2001; Nandy, 1988; Visvanathan, 2000), its relation to technology (Alvares, 1980) and more recent studies that
question the very basis of development and growth (Shrivastava and Kothari, 2012).
This article focuses on hydropower as a sector enthusiastically promoted by international initiatives for
sustainable development, climate mitigation, poverty alleviation and green economy (World Bank, 2009; IHA,
2012). It represents one of the pillars of the XII Five-Year Plan of the Government of India for “green” and
“inclusive” growth (GoI 2013). Run-of-River (RoR) hydropower technology, in specific, is presented as a key win-
win solution in a “transition” scenario where the role of renewables grows in importance and size in the national
and international grids (World Bank, 2009). Globally, India today ranks 5th for installed generation potential, with
almost 41,000 MW installed, counting for around 20% of total power generation capacity (GoHP, 2015a).
Sustainability, modernity and modernization are highly hegemonic beliefs that have profoundly permeated into the
pro-dams ideology (Kaika, 2006; Nandy, 2001). The Himalayas are considered ‘gold mines’ of unexploited energy
and over the last decade, the government has identified Himalayan river basins and its tributaries as a priority front
for energy generation through RoR schemes. The Western Himalayan state of Himachal Pradesh is one such
laboratory for hydropower production as a sustainability and green growth solution to climate change, economic
growth and local development. While in some areas like the North-East of India, hydropower is positioned as a
major strategy to mitigate regional development discrepancies (Huber and Joshi, 2015), in case of Himachal
Pradesh, one of the better-off states in the country according to the HDI data (Planning Commission of India,
2011), the government is promoting hydropower as core to environmental sustainability and "green growth", and a
near perfect resource for equitable development alongside sustainable tourism.
The paper has the following sections. After this introduction, we present the collaborative mapping project at
EJAtlas for Himachal Pradesh to dig out ground data; in the third section, we explain how hydropower technology
led to the expansion of infrastructure of an internal extraction frontier, where we refer to the “consensus on
infrastructures”; in the fourth section, we investigate what discourses inform and shape the opposition to dams,
and show in detail the main arguments for opposition by local communities, state and national level environmental
groups and activists. The final section shows the contributions of our research to degrowth, political ecology and
environmental justice literature. Here we point out that the originality of the article lies in its combination of a
critique of a technology of production of renewable energy and the study of social movements for socio-
environmental justice; its links to a degrowth discussion in a region of India (when degrowth is usually a “Northern”
topic of research and practice”); and its proposals for energy democracy and sovereignty as concepts that link
energy technology, degrowth and environmental justice.

2. Methods and Materials: the EJAtlas and the collaborative mapping project
The authors combined consolidated social research methods (Bryman, 2001) with a new tool for research in
environmental justice and conflicts related to social metabolism, the Global Atlas of Environmental Justice –
EJAtlas (Temper et al., 2015), developed between 2012 and 2015 within the EU funded FP7 EJOLT and a Seed
Grant by the T2S programme funded by the ISSC.
The authors collaborated with a local environmental and research collective working on socio-environmental issues
in the Himachal Pradesh for the last six years. The analysis presented in this paper focuses on 17 cases of
hydropower conflict, i.e. emblematic cases of opposition and mobilization in relation to environmental injustices
and ecological distribution conflicts (or, equivalently, socio-environmental conflicts)1 and understand the different
valuation languages (Martínez-Alier, 2002; Martínez-Alier et al., 2010) confronting hydropower expansion.
Theoretical reflections draw on literature review on hydropower dams, “extractivism” and resistance movements
especially in the field of political ecology, environmental justice literature and science and technology studies (STSs).
The mapping process relied on activist-led research and co-production of knowledge (Brown, 1997; Fals-Borda,
1987; Jasanoff, 2004; Durose et al. 2011), carried out by both activists and local residents in the project affected
areas and other experts of the hydroenergy sector. As Escobar (2008) argues, social movements are important
spaces of knowledge production that do not only enact politics through protest and cultural contestation but are
generators or facilitators of diverse types of knowledge creation. The Himachal Pradesh featured map (nested in the
EJAtlas), besides being a database became a communication tool for visibilizing and campaigning for the local
collective and for other socio-environmental groups in India questioning hydropower expansion and advocating a
different energy model.
Data was gathered several times between November 2014 and October 2015. Joint fieldwork by authors was done in
November-December 2014 and April 2015. Project specific technical details were searched in official documents of
companies, and from state and central ministry websites. Information on controversies, reasons of protests,
chronologies and local accounts come from 27 semi-structured interviews carried out with local residents during on
spot visits throughout the research period, in person or over telephonic conversations, due to considerable traveling
distance; identified through snow-ball sampling and for their remarkable work on the issue, our main informants
are 16 opponents, 8 people holding pro-hydro opinions, and 3 journalists. Questions asked included reasons of
opposition and direct and indirect impacts on land. Additional semi-structured interviews were carried out in April
2015 with three key high government officials; the director of Directorate of Energy, the Principal Secretary of
Department of Power of the Government of Himachal Pradesh and Chief Executive Officer of HIMURJA (H.P.
Govt. Energy Development Agency), and with three engineers of a state construction company. Interviews with
officials focused on the state policy on hydropower and renewable energies, successes and difficulties of
implementation, compensation policies, investment policy for national and international actors. When satisfactory
information could not be found available in public domain, the authors used materials fetched by the local
environment collective Himdhara through Right to Information Act, by which any Indian citizen can request
specific information from a "public authority" if not available publicly and the accountable body of Government is
required to reply within thirty days. A great amount of data and records informing this article come from the
archives of national organizations and independent analysts, that when needed are cited in the text.
                                                                                                               
1
These can be defined as follows: “mobilizations by local communities, social movements, which might also include support of
national or international networks, against particular economic activities, infrastructure construction or waste
disposal/pollution whereby environmental impacts are a key element of their grievances” (See more at www.ejatlas.org).
 The data gathered, both qualitative and quantitative, was organized as per the database form of the EJAtlas,
which allows a systematic organization of the information and comparative analysis of the cases. Qualitative data
was analysed through a keywords-(Williams, 1988) and discourse analysis (Gee, 2014) of the sections in the
database form “Description”, “Development of Alternatives” and “Environmental Justice (Success or not)”. These
sections, together with the check menu on “Impacts (Environmental, Health, Socio-economic)”,“Actors” and
“Form of mobilization”, provide the needed information for our research questions.

Fig.1; Himachal Pradesh map of Environmental Justice conflicts - EJAtlas

3. Theory and Background: the expansion of a commodity extraction frontier and energy infrastructures
3.1 A Consensus on Infrastructures and Energy Technology
Indian industrial economy and population growth are boosting energy demand; current economic growth of
around 8%, relies on increasing supplies of energy and materials (an increasing social metabolism) despite
biophysical constrains (Singh et al., 2012). The subcontinent of India relies mostly for electricity on national
sources, like coal, and increasingly hydropower and some nuclear (Martínez-Alier et al. in Dale et al., 2016). The
internal commodity extraction frontiers in energy generation are expanding significantly, both geographically and
technologically. Although the usual approach to the concept of “ extraction frontier” looks at materials, commodity
chains and global trade across national boundaries (Moore, 2000; Conde and Walter, 2014), the concept clearly
applies to areas inside India producing coal for coal power stations. It also applies to the internal extraction frontier
of electricity production through large scalehydropower connected to a central grid. Today, the frontier is
continuously moving outwards and upwards, from main river basins towards tributaries, narrow valleys, even
smaller rivulets. Commodity chains here have become imprinted and visible in a technoscape that modifies
drastically the social hydro-cycle and the landscape, made up of mined mountains, cement plants, dams, tunnels,
power houses and a large web of transmission lines and roads interconnecting all the “dots”. Here, even when a
single small-sized plant is considered, it cannot be understood outside the web of other interrelated and
interdependent plants. Isolated projects would not even serve their function as they need a lot of side infrastructure
(roads, transmission lines); moreover, the latter would only make economic sense if utilised by a high number of
projects, in this way increasing pressure over the same stretch of a river.
In South America, an important debate was opened in late 1990s by the Argentinean sociologist Maristella
Svampa on a new era of “Commodities Consensus” (Svampa, 2015) that reached the subcontinent irrespective of
the political colour of governments, and that had arrived after the neoliberal Washington Consensus. National
extractivist economies (Gudynas, 2013) are based on large scale export of a few primary products, sustained by the
international boom in prices of raw materials and the ever increasing demand for consumer goods in both central
and emerging economies. It was claimed that both neoliberal and leftwing or “populist” governments participated
in this new consensus. Svampa’s contribution highlighted the global dependence of LA countries and the territorial
response to large projects on extraction of minerals, biomass (like transgenic soybeans), and energy in its various
forms (coal, oil, gas, hydroelectricity, bioenergy) either directly for export or as an input for mineral processing or
for direct consumption.
In dialogue with her analysis, we suggest that an industrial growth-based economy, both national and global,
also requires a “consensus of infrastructures”, as built environment lies at the core of territorial and resource
control for fuelling any extractivist project. In India, although hydropower is nota commodity to be exported
outside national boundaries and its ‘material premises’ remain on the local ground, it provides an eloquent example
of inner primary commodity flows based on a form of extractivism within India, to an extentsimilar to bauxite or
coal coming out of the mining belt of Odisha or Jharkhand. This is due to the following reasons: a. it expands the
frontier of dependency and dispossession through massive damming in previously untouched valleys; b. the energy
generated is meant for selling to the Northern Grid and exported to other states; c. the state of Himachal Pradesh
or other Himalayan states receive important revenues from the generating companies, and through this, they may
gain the consensus of voters. Therefore, the governments of water rich states see in hydropower a comparative
advantage for their economy, as rivers are exploited to their maximum potential, energy generated with low labour-
intensive activity and entailing no internal processing (no added economic value). Ironically enough, hydropower
potential and power generation is usually much lower than projected, while cost and time overuns are systemically
underestimated (Ansar et al., 2013). Recent calculation at the national level for the Financial Year 2014-15 by the
organization South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) shows diminishing production from
hydro by a 4.25% from the previous year, even though the installed capacity has instead gone up (SANDRP, 2012).
The commodity (electricity) is therefore not extracted to the degree foreseen but infrastructures are built anyway.
While water power is renewable being part of a natural cycle moved by sun energy, the infrastructures built, the
roads, diversion tunnels and power transmission lines, are indeed as irreversible as the exhaustion of fossil fuels and
minerals in an extractivist economy, plus entail social disruption due to displacement and change in the local
economies.
The consensus on hydropower infrastructures also lies on the supposed sustainability of the RoR design
technology implied (Huber and Joshi, 2015; Shah, 2013). The hydropower boom was in fact facilitated by a
consensus among governments, corporate lobbies and associations, donors and even large so-called “green”
organizations on the necessity of such technology for a green growth and climate mitigation (Cole et al., 2014). In
the name of sustainability, many of such projects have received CDM credits (Erlewein and Nüsser, 2011) and are
presented as proofs of international climate change mitigation commitments, and national renewable obligation.
The need for hydropower infrastructure for fostering development in India finds total agreement in the
government, both at the union and state level and from both dominant political parties (Nüsser, 2003), as well as in
many academic departments. Although countless prominent intellectual voices and scientists have clearly spoken
against hydropower impacts on communities, local economies and the environment (Baviskar, 1995; Roy, 1999;
McCully, 2001; Sneddon and Fox, 2008; Tullos et al., 2009; Grumbine and Pandit, 2013; Fearnside, 2016), and so
have anti-dam movements, social workers and activists (Khagram, 2004), technology and engineering approach still
dominates contemporary scientific research. The latter is important to stress, as scientific voicesplay an important
role in shaping energy policies with an optimism on techno-fixes and mechanisms of monetary compensation to
affected people.
However, as Svampa suggests, the Commodity Consensus clashes with ambivalences, contradictions and
paradoxes, that mark the coexistence and interweaving with different logics of territorial valuation. The dispute that
generates out of this clash lies at the core of the mounting ecological conflicts in the region.

3.2 Hydropower as a pillar of sustainability in Himachal Pradesh

The state of Himachal Pradesh is agressively pursuing hydropower production as a sustainable green growth
solution. Though thestate's economy is predominately agriculture based, however, recent trends point to a decline
inthe share of agriculture and allied sectors in the overall state domestic product from 26.5 percent in 1990-91 to
10.4 percent in 2014-15 (GoHP, 2016). The industrial sector received a further boost in 2006 as a result of host of
subsidies introduced as part of amendments to the state's Industrial Policy (World Bank, 2015). The provision of
land and commercial electricity on cheaper rates along with labor, roads and access to information technology
paved way for increased private investments. To set precedents for a "green state", the government alongside private
investments began investing heavily on renewable energy production, agricultural diversification, forest
conservation schemes, carbon offsetting programmes, and indevising 'sustainable' tourism structures. This vision is
today shared by both the Congress Party and the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), and enjoys financial backing of World
Bank, and other international donors and related agencies.
While some initiatives might be praised, some have received significant criticisms. Centralized programmes of
conservation, for example, have been deemed as incompatible with the exigencies of democracy for conservation
ideology and science that tried to impose a culturally narrowly defined vision of nature on society at large (Chhatre
and Saberwal, 2006). Baviskar’s analysis of conservation plans and “ecodevelopment” argues that such programs are
in fact “project(s) of rule that seek to manage landscapes and people in order to keep the state in business”
(Baviskar in Saberwal and Rangarajan, 2005:295).
Interestingly, ‘renewable’ hydropower is projected as a sector maintaining the state's business and ‘growth’,
attracting this way public consensus through promises of ‘development’. While central and state share in hydro
development is considerable, the HP Hydro Power Policy 2006 and the Electricity Act 2003 have paved way for
private business in the sector in order to attract investments from India and abroad (Dharmadhikary 2009, World
Bank, 2015). Among projects >25MW in the state, the ratio between central/state and private is almost 1:2 (authors’
own calculation). Below 25MW, small hydro projects are almost entirely in the private sector.
The 'estimated potential' figures in the state have been increasing over time, with a significant jump in the last
years with the development of remote sensing technology, as new spots with waterfall or slope are being identified.
In most of cases, due to distances and poor availability of road connection, no field visit or specific assessment of
geological and hydrological conditions are carried out, but nonetheless new projects are being allotted (Interview
with HIMURJA officers, April 2015). According to last official assessments (GoHP, 2015a), the hydropower
potential of the state of Himachal Pradesh amounts to27,436 MW, out of which 23,500 MW is harnessable,
counting for around 15% of total hydro potential of India. A potential of 20,640 MW stands allotted (as per April
2015), out of which 9,213MW has already been commissioned (GoHP, 2015a). Most of the energy generation today
comes from medium and large size projects above 25MW of installed capacity (around 8,000MW out of the
harnessed capacity of 9,213MW, authors’ own calculations). The Satluj basin comprises the highest potential with
13,332 MW; Beas basin follows with 5,995 MW, Ravi basin with 3,237MW, Chenab basin with 4,032 MW and
Yamuna with 840 MW (GoHP, 2016).
In order to boost the sector, the Asian Development Bank launched two programs in 2008, in partnership with
the state company, the HP Power Corporation Ltd. (HPPCL). The HP Clean Energy Development Program aims at
providing financial resources and technical assistance for the completion of four HEPs, adding around 1,200MW to
installed capacity by 2016, while the HP Clean Energy Transmission Investment Program supports expansion of
transmission lines. According to the Energy Head of the ADB South Asia Department, a substantial portion of the
bank's funding is for their transmission programme under which the aim is to build dedicated transmission lines in
each river basin to eventually transfer power to the national grid. The capacity and the structure are being designed
in a manner to accommodate the future hydropower plants of the state, with special attention to the private
investors (Interview April 2015). Despite the publication of positive assessments and praise of the bank’s programs
for sustainability (Evans and Hamner, 2003), an engineer of ADB sponsored project 111MW Sawra-Kuddu HEP in
Pabbar River of Shimla district gives a different picture, boldly confirming that the current trend is to maximise the
approval of projects, through allotting the less viable (due to ecological conditions or social discontent) to the state
company and most profitable ones to the private sector (Personal Communication under request of anonymity,
interview April 2015). However, interestingly, for donors such as ADB, working with state companies is much
more viable than taking 'transmission risks' for private companies given the time involved for various clearances
and otherwise huge finances invested for developing infrastructure such as roads to remote areas. As per the ADB
Energy Head, an ideal situation would entail working with the state utility company which does all the upfront
development work for the project, and following that either go for a joint venture or sell projects off completely to
the private sector when closer to the investment stage, and after all the government clearances are taken.
Apart from ADB-state initiatives, private companies investing significantly in the state are middle-size
companies from across India and also international (mainly building small and middle size plants), like the UK-
based Greenko Group, the Norwegian Statkraft, Andritz From Austria, Patel Engineering from Mumbai, or
Grandhi Mallikarjuna Rao (GMR) Energy Limited from Chennai. Bigger companies control large projects; Jindal
Steel Works Energy Limited (JSW) for example now runs the 300 MW Baspa HEP, the first project allotted to an
Independent Power Producer (IPP) after the liberalization of electricity sector, and the largest private plant in India
at the moment, the 1200MWKarcham-Wangtoo HEP, apart from controlling infrastructure sector through cement,
construction, and real estate across Himachal.

<Insert here Del Bene_Table1>

4. Findings: Socio-environmental conflicts as contradictions of the consensus ofinfrastructure

The EJAtlas Featured Map presented in this paper reports stories of 17 conflicts over hydro plants across the
five river basins of Himachal Pradesh. Although many more projects have faced local opposition or critiques from
local communities, activists and environmental groups at the state and national level, these have been identified as
the most emblematic contentious projects through the collective screening described in Section 2.
Based on the interviews and the media coverage analysis, we created 12 main categories to capture the causes
for opposition from local communities and negative critiques from independent researchers and analysts (see
Graph 1).
We argue that the 12 categories refer to three major issues, which are explained below: a. the disruption of local
ecologies and sources of livelihood, b. the systematic violation of environmental law and regulations, c. the
potentially violent and undemocratic character of hydropower technology and infrastructure.
a. The environmental impacts of hydropower expansion in the Himalayas has been a subject of many studies
given that it represents a striking dimension of socio-environmental injustice (Pandit and Grumbine, 2012;
Agrawal, 2013; Grumbine and Pandit, 2013; Sharma and Rana, 2014; Ahlers et al., 2015), as well as the limits of
Environmental Impact Assessments in capturing the complexity of ecological disruption and social distress
(Erlewein, 2013; Sinclair and Diduck, 2000). These studies have particularly addressed the drying up or complete
depletion of natural water sources, deforestation, landslides due to soil destabilization, excessive muck in the river
bed, disruption of fisheries based livelihoods, and vulnerability to the increased risk of earthquakes.
Based on the data gathered for the mapping work, we found the depletion of water sources as the most visible
ecological impact, and that in most cases triggered local concerns. Water depletion is mostly caused by two main
factors; first, the decreasing water flow in the river, which disrupts the hydrological cycle, and the tunneling activity
and indiscriminate heavy duty blastings for the same, causing material damage in villages. Despite the legal
obligation of HP Hydropower Policy to maintain a minimum flow of 15% based on the minimum lean season into
the riverbed, this is seldom applied as confirmed in several studies such as of Erlewein (2013). One of our
informants said, “Blasting for tunnel construction is usually carried out at night in hope of creating less troubles for
themselves (company). Most houses have cracks by now and I personally had to rebuild the foundation wall of my
house thrice". On impacts on water aquifers, "They claim no impacts on it, but our physical calculation of water
springs show the contrary. The villages above the 11 kms long tunnel had 42 natural water aquifers, only 3 to 4 still
have water running.” (Local resident and ex village pradhan–head-and member of the local collective Gaon Vikas
Samiti in Sawra-Kuddu HEP area, one of the projects funded by ADB, personal interview April 2015).
Forests are the second frequent concern related to environment and livelihood, as they provide fodder, non-
timber forest products, herbs and firewood. Claims on the ground show that the portion of forest land diverted for
hydroprojects is much higher than official figures. This is particularly grave in a state like Himachal, where large
part of the land in himachal comes under forests and pastures, and agricultural land is less than 10 percent, so
dependence of people on forests is high2. Plus, land diversion for transmission lines (which then becomes
imperative to connect powerhouses to the grid) is not officially accounted for.
Other significant ecological alterations reported are those on fisheries and aquatic ecosystems putting at risk
the livelihood of fishermen. In the tribal district of Kinnaur, it was reported that fish species have altogether
disappeared between the Rampur HEP, Karcham and Tapri stretch (Field Notes, April 2015), which clearly points
to the discontinuity in flow of Satluj due to hydropower cascading. Here again, the issue of slope destabilisation
and landslides due to unregulated and indiscriminate blasting for tunnel construction has emerged as a serious
concern in the region. In the particular case of Urni village landslide disaster, there has been a clear lack of
institutional accountability evident in response of the state's Geological Department. The recurring landslides were
conveniently attributed to thin soil cover, rainfall and snowfall fluctuations, further exacerbated by flood irrigation
methods used for agricultural purposes. It then seems that in official justifications, the issue is nothing but a natural
phenomena sinking the region owing to its structurally fragile slopes and soil instead of admitting to absence of
infrastructural planning, and acknowledging the linkages between increasing landslides in the region and
unregulated hydropower construction and related infrastructure (Field Notes from an RTI application filed by
Himdhara to State Geological Department, April 20153).
Another disputed issue is the potential risk of flash floods and collapse of dam infrastructure, especially as most
districts of the state are prone to floods (See Fig. 2) and fall in Seismic Zone IV and V. In June 2013, a flash flood
unfolded in the region of Kinnaur, and in the neighbouring state of Uttarakhand, causing severe floods, landslides,
rapid soil erosion and damage to agriculture fields, apple orchards and livestock, and claimed thousands of lives. At
a time when scientific evidence on unprecedented changes in Himalayan snow melt and water discharge is
produced (Khanal et al., 2015; Mukherji et al., 2015), and the correlation between ill planned infrastructure
construction and floods in Uttarakhand has been proved even by a central government agency (MoEF, 2014),
persevering with hydropower frenzy in ecologically and geologically sensitive areas will surely increase the risk of
human-induced disasters. Both, large and small scale disaster reiterate that hydropower technology under these
conditions and at this pace of contruction lacks an efficient safety and monitary mechanism; on Novembver 2015,
the penstock pipe of 100 MW Sorang hydropower burst open claiming lives of three people and several others

                                                                                                               
2
More details here: http://www.himdhara.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Re-Satluj-public-consultation-7-Dec-2013.pdf
3
More details here: http://www.himdhara.org/2015/09/05/photo-essay-on-a-slippery-road/
injured. The incident occurred in spite of repeated efforts of villagers to report leakages issues to the project
authorities and the district administration.4

Fig.2; flood prone area according to Water Acueduct project.

b. Local communities have also denounced a systematic violation and dilution of laws to fast track these
projects. Regular violations of the Hydropower Policy 2006, the Forest Rights Act and Panchayat (Extension to
Scheduled Areas Act (PESA), and the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) Notification 1997 characterizes
almost every single hydroproject. An apt case of illegality is the Bajoli-Holi HEP in Chamba district. In 2008, the
company GMR, in absence of a fair consultation with local people shifted the project's tunnel and powerhouse
location from uninhabited right bank to the left bank of the river Satluj, which comprises of four gram panchayats,
dense forests and rich agricultural land. This change in plan occurred without any EIA, and according to the
company the shift was needed due to "greater techno-economic feasibility". This illegal act of the company formed

                                                                                                               
4
More details on the Sorang disaster: http://www.himdhara.org/2015/12/29/video-accidents-or-sheer-negligence-the-burang-story-
kinnaur/  
the basis of local opposition and led to a formation of a unique struggle. The granting of a false certificate to the
Ministry of Environment by the Deputy Commissioner stating that people's forest rights were already settled
further fuelled the local agitation. The peculiarity of this particular struggle was that it was entirely led by women of
affected panchayats but was eventually suppressed by the district administration through violent means as a 'law
and order' problem.5
Several Right to Information applications filed by Himdhara, especially on issues where official and public
knowledge is minimal, bring repeated violations of hydropower policy provisions into public domain. For instance,
the Irrigation and Public Health department in one of its responses admitted about there being no agency to
monitor water flows, and in another case about absence of a safety authority to oversee hydrological and
infrastructural violations. In 2009, a response disclosed that 43 out of 167 (26%) of water sources in Karcham-
Wangtoo area had dried up and in many other discharges was severely reduced (RTI response to Himdhara,
Fieldnotes 2015).
Apart from environmental laws, lack of due compensation and reparation measures has been highlighted in at
least 9 cases. For the above-mentioned Karcham-Wangtoo project, around 800 villagers since 2010 have been
fighting a legal battle demanding compensation for dried up water springs, the only source of irrigation for apple
cultivation and other cash crops6. Farmers in the region have also reported disruptions in apple pollination process
due to excessive dust and soot deposits from hydropower construction related activity. Similarly, for the operational
412 MW Rampur project touted by World Bank as its 'success story', the project faced severe criticisms locally and
nationally for inadequate compensation measures. In case of the highly controversial Renuka project in district
Sirmaur district, huge disparity was reported between prices at which the company purchased the land, and
compensation offered to locals. Activists in Himachal also lament that although HP Hydropower Policy 2006 rules
that 12% of electricity produced by any HEP should go for free to the state as compensation, and additional 1% of
electricity (converted to equivalent money) to local communities through the Local Area Development Fund, the
reality on the ground is far different. As illustrated by Baker (2014) in case of all 49 commissioned small
hydropower projects in HP, LADA programme implementation has been highly unsatisfactory in most cases.
Finally, agitations for the violation of labour rights have occurred in at least six cases. The unskilled labor force
for hydropower construction is drawn from some of the most impoverished states of India like Jharkhand and
Bihar recruited through a network of contractors and sub contractors. In the context of hydropower infrastructure
in Himachal, there is a paucity of academic intervention or even environment justice or activist groups actively
questioning the exploitative labor conditions. The workers often work in precarious conditions with minimal safety
measures, their housing colonies in most cases are makeshift shelters exposed to extreme climatic conditions and
often located close to the construction sites. These 'able bodied' men are anonymous victims of hydropower
industry, and the situationis similar for most infrastructural works in India (Rogaly, 2009). As reported by Tribune,
in Karcham-Wangtoo HEP, more than 100 workers have lost their lives eversince its construction began, and many
                                                                                                               
5
More details on the Bajoli Holi issue: http://www.himdhara.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Holi-FF-Team-Report_Final1.pdf
6
More details here: https://sites.google.com/site/dissentmatters/home/opinions/andar-se-solid. Last accessed 10.08.2016
working were unregistered7. However, the unexpected event of March 2015 witnessed close to 1364 workers of the
Karcham-Wangtoo and Baspa II projects (earlier owned by the cement and energy giant Jai Prakash Ventures
Limited, later sold off to Jindal Steel Works Private Limited) staging a joint protest at the construction site for 112
days demanding regularisation, fair and minimum wages, adequate housing facilities, safety conditions and fair
implementation of the Factories Act.8

c. People’s protests faced violent repression in at least three of the analysed cases. For Karcham Wangtoo
HEP, the opposition has been ongoing since 2005, and first visible sign of state repression was in December, 2006,
at a people's convention organised in opposition of the project. The local administration responded by declaring
Section 144 of the penal code to suppress the public demonstration. The event took a violent turn when peacefully
protesting locals were “lathi charged” (beaten up by police with sticks) leading to arrest of movement leaders and
injuring several others.
Instances of violence are not only restricted to large HEP; in February 2010, the contractors involved with Hul
small hydropower projects openly attacked those opposing its construction with swords, guns and sticks with five
members having suffered life threatening injuries. The Hul projects, though of small dimension, managed to unite
five panchayats under the banner of Sal Ghaati Bachao Sangarsh Morcha against a joint venture of local and
international private capital, including hedge funds registered in tax heavens.
Interviewed people also expressed concerns about the undemocratic nature of hydroproject implementation,
and power stakeholders pushing it through illicit channels. For instance, in 2014, to assess the environmental
impacts of hydropower projects in district Kinnaur, the Directorate of Energy commissioned a study to the Indian
Council of Forest Research and Education (ICFRE) for a Cumulative Environmental Impact Assessment (CEIA) of
the Satluj basin (Directorate of Energy, 2014). At the outset, the local population welcomed the effort of evaluating
the cumulative impacts of hydropower projects. However, the report produced ended up being a mere formality to
an extent that locals and environment organizations termed the process as an eyewash for completely overlooking
the impacts of the three major projects (Nathpa Jhakri, Karcham Wangtoo and Baspa HEPs). Major issues like
impacts of massive muck dumping, tunneling and air pollution were completely negated, nor did the study refer to
a clear baseline data for its assessments (Himdhara, 2014). When the CEIA study was first presented publicly in
Kinnaur, the affected community, foremost questioned the non-availability of relevant documents in local language
and the undemocratic nature of consultations during the study period, in violation of the EIA (Environmental
Impact Assessment) Notification 1997. Quite ironically, an independent committee appointed by the government
itself later backed the popular local demands. Interestingly, to look into the discrepancies in the consultation
process, later on in January 2015 a panel of experts set up by the same Government of Himachal Pradesh (PESE -
Panel of Environmental and Social Experts) observed that: "popular opposition to large hydel power projects on the
                                                                                                               
7
The Tribune, 8th March 2015. “1,300 workers to step up stir against Jaypee”. Available at: http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/himachal/1-
300-workers-to-step-up-stir-against-jaypee/50645.html Last Accessed: 28.07.2016
8
More details on: http://www.epw.in/journal/2015/18/reports-states-web-exclusives/kinnaurs-curse.html  
Sutlej is being fanned by the establishment’s ‘indifference’ to the problems of the people". The panel also declared
that the CEIA’s conclusions were “a matter of opinion and not supported by facts and figures” (GoHP, 2015b),
acknowledging this way people’s claims.

5. Results and discussion. From “Energy” to diverse “energy-communities”; discussing technology from an
energy democracy and sovereignty perspective
In section 4, we saw that while support for hydropower looms large in the political realm of Himachal Pradesh,
significant expressions of distrust and questioning too exist alongside. In this section, we argue that this shows a
growing mistrust in the very promises of development that hydropower is supposed to bring about and therefore
represents fundamental contradictions in the consensus of infrastructure and energy technology; the mistrust
increasingly generates rejection of projects, challenges the way energy is being generated, questions the irreversible
consequences this energy model will bring along in the territory, and finally raises the questions of “whose
development, and for whom?”.
In heavily impacted district Kinnaur and otherwise in Satluj Basin, the affected communities have launched the
slogan of “No-go zones for hydropower” or "Kinnaur Bachao" (Save Kinnaur), demanding their territory to be
excluded from hydropower projects and to let the remaining stretch of Satluj flow freely. In the case of World Bank
backed Luhri HEP, even when the company, Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited (SJVNL), opted for technical
modification of the conflictive components to please the protests, the community continued to demand total
scrapping of the project, forcing also the World Bank to withdraw its funds 9.
In the Sawra Kuddu area, one of the persons interviewed challenged the kind of employment hydropower offers
and who it benefits: “Initially everyone wanted to work in the dam. Those who made money were some very few
entrepreneurs working as contractors, but the rest did hard manual work. Many young men got addicted to alcohol
and some even lost all their savings in futile diversions. We have land here and apples in abundance. What they
offered were only short-term jobs. Not much benefit for the valley.” [Interview with a young taxi driver in the area
of Sawra Kuddu HEP, April 2015]
The tribal area of Lahaul and Spiti District, presents another critical positioning; people uniting against the 300
MW Jispa storage dam by HPPCL, and 400 MW Seli hydropower project by private company Hindustan Power
Projecrs Private Limited (HPPPL) have repeatedly denounced the branding of their eight year long struggle as 'anti
development' by state government and private companies, but instead frame their struggle as upholding of
fundamental rights granted by the Indian constititution. They challenge the misconception of tribal population by
private and state companies as innocent, ill informed, and in need of 'development' by reclaiming their democratic
spaces for decision making, and demanding development infrastructure and policies in line with the ecological
specificities and cultural peculiarities of their territory. They also advocate 'eco tourism' and local cooperative based

                                                                                                               
9More details on Luhri conflict: http://www.himdhara.org/2015/08/06/press-note-5th-august-2105-sjvn-changes-luhri-project-design-
drops-tunnel-component-locals-relieved-demand-that-the-stretch-of-the-satluj-be-left-free-flowing/  
mini hydropower projects as an alternative to commercially exploitative tourism and state and private owned hydro
projects. However, to what extent will these locally rooted initiatives and innovations be oriented towards and
driven by the electricity market (Pansera and Owen, 2016), or conversely, what challenging the 'commoditised'
technology means for the communities and their economies, needs to be studied.
We suggest that the Himalayas offer inspiring stories both of defence of the territory (Guha, 1989), of re-
questioning of “development”, and of alternative systems, like community-run micro hydel systems in Chamba
district (Himachal) and in Uttarakhand (Shrivastava and Kothari, 2012), but also forest management committees.
The expansion of hydropower industry affects such alternatives undermining their ecological premises and
downgrading them in terms of political relevance and priority. This is why movements often need to deploy
“transformative acts” (Velicu and Kaika, 2015) or what Castoriadis termed “radical imaginaries” (Castoriadis, 1997),
as they need to redefine sovereignty over their territories and forms of democracy, as well as re-build (energy-)
communities and re-signify their work politically. Scaling-up processes of these initiatives coming together
represent promising places for doing so. Some of these small scale energy initiatives across India, for example, have
met in 2016 at an Energy Democracy program called Bijli Vikalp Sangham in the state of Bihar; they issued a
statement demanding transitions programs centered on decentralized solutions including micro grids and stand
alone systems10. These initiatives may indeed represent new space, a multitude of what Shrivastava and Kothari
(2012) call “newheres”, showing that profoundly different, disruptive, contra-hegemonic practices and ways of being
in this world are not only possible but already exist and live in resistance.
We argue that the emerging concept of “energy sovereignty” (ES) or “energy democracy” (ED) provides indeed
a fruitful ground in this direction11. ES or ED has been defined as the ability of a political community to control,
regulate and manage their own energy sources, and the knowledge about it. It entails the right of conscious people
to make their own decisions on energy generation, distribution and consumption in a way that is appropriate
within their ecological, social, economic and cultural circumstances, provided that these do not affect others
negatively (See also XSE, 2014; Kunze and Becker, 2014; Ariza-Montobbio, 2015). Interestingly enough, the concept
of “appropriate technology" was first defined in the 1990s in India itself as a holistic integration where the increase
of energy services that is the essential basis of development must be achieved through a mix of efficiency
improvements, decentralized renewables and centralized sources (Reddy, 1991), or what the British economist E.F.
Schumacher called “intermediate technology” (Schumacher 1973). Both concepts refer to technologies that are
mainly small in scale and managed by small communities, as these are more likely to take care of a small portion of
territory they live in.
Also, ES/ED addresses the energy question well beyond the control and choice of energy sources (i.e. fossil fuels
vs renewables) or fair distribution, when it interrogates the basis of our social structure. ES/ED in fact aims to re-

 10                                                                                                              
The full declaration is available here: http://www.kalpavriksh.org/images/FeaturedArticles/TowardsEnergyDemocracy.pdf

11
The two terms “sovereignty” and “democracy” are used interexchangably, with the former more frequent in Spanish texts while the latter in English. A
theoretical discussion on sovereignty and democracy in relation with energy, although of great relevance, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
politicize (Swyngedouw, 2014; Asara et al. 2015) the energy issue and questions the idea of absolute need of energy,
differentiating between Energy with a capital “E” (as the abstract massive and uniform commercial generation of
energy, as a function of capital accumulation), and the incommensurable and contextually diverse uses of energy,
with a small “e” (Hildyard et al. 2012). We suggest that this interpretation is of utmost relevance in regions like the
Himalayas, where only a small percentage of energy consumption relies on electricity, while the rest comes from
other free access sources (energies).
The debate on energy technology and infrastructures cannot avoid re-thinking social structures and
questioning the current hegemonic energy paradigm, based on a centralized control over energy generation and
distribution, a consumption-based growth-oriented idea of wellbeing, and a technocratic understanding of
technology. We advocate for an “opening up” in terms of participation, and for overcoming the disjuncture
between the deterministic notions of technology and the growing recognition of social agency and its urgency in
setting up agenda and goals (Stirling, 2007).
Given the contradictions of so-called “renewable” but irreversible hydropower technology and the financial
constraints hydro plants are going through, we need to also question the generally accepted tenet that prosperity,
modernity and development will only happen through universal connection to the electricity grid, and investigate
the political implications of it (Gupta, 2015). This requires putting together disciplines and knowledge systems that
can inform a reflection on what sort of energy technology is not only viable but also desirable.

Conclusions
We have showed how hydropower expansion in the Indian Himalayas is a new internal commodity extraction
frontier in a growth-oriented economy. We suggested we should talk of a “consensus of infrastructures”, where
hydropower energy technology, especially RoR schemes, is endlessly promoted as a sustainable source of energy,
despite environmental, economic and financial constraints. Through a collaborative mapping process, we have
shown how such consensus operates amidst contradictions and paradoxes, such as socio-environmental conflicts,
less power generation compared to installed capacity, and ecological constraints, which go beyond the critique to
the ecological impacts.
In this paper we provide a comparative political ecology study of conflicts on hydroelectric power development in
Himachal Pradesh. Here, communities are placed at water and electricity “commodity extraction frontiers”. We
have traced a parallel between discussions on the “commodity consensus” in the South American school of “post-
extractivism” and what could be called a “consensus of infrastructures” that we claim relevant in the electricity
sector in India. Although hydroelectricity is often literally sold as renewable energy, the infrastructures build are
clearly irreversible, thou trigging mounting socio-ecological conflicts and resistance.
We argue that the debate on the future of energy technology and infrastructures cannot avoid re-thinking social
structures and questioning the current hegemonic energy paradigm, based on a centralized control over energy
generation and distribution, a consumption-based growth-oriented idea of wellbeing, and a technocratic
understanding of technology. We suggest that the emerging concepts of Energy Sovereignty and Energy Democracy
can enrich the already existing debates on technology in India and elsewhere, and fruitfully contribute to the
framing and understanding of systemic alternative proposals.
The dimension of grass root environmentalism needs attention by EJ literature, political ecology, and degrowth
as a promising area of research that not only looks at power relations in environmental conflicts, but also explores
how the latter can be transformative, towards a different territorial setting, new paradigms, alternative worldviews
to development (Escobar, 2008; Kothari, 2014). We also argue that to do so we need to reconsider the way these
issues are being investigated and assessed, what scientific knowledge is being produced, as well as how the energy
model is (not) being discussed or questioned between engineers and technology-minded people, and those holding
a lay and situated territorial knowledge.

Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to activists, analysts and committed citizens in Himachal Pradesh and elsewhere who
shared their work and reflections. Special thanks go to the Himdhara collective, the Sambhaavna Institute and
family, SANDRP-based tireless analysts, the Kalpavriksh team, the frontline communities in affected villages, and
the non-human inhabitants of Himachal Pradesh who inspired our work. This work was supported by the EJOLT
FP7 EU project and a seed grant from the ISSC under the Transformations to Sustainability Programme
(T2S_PP_289) and funded by Fundación Autónoma Solidaria (UAB). Special thanks for the GIS support to Lucia
Argüelles.

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