Texas Tower Weld Failure

Alert nr: 200902 Shell Global Solutions RAM Rating: Date:

Reliability Act.A-4 – Pot.A5C May’09
International

Focus Area:

This LFI Alert is applicable to all manufacturing sites that operate equipment in high temperature
hydrogen service that are constructed using dissimilar metal welds, in particular Texas Tower heat
exchangers or feed effluent heat exchangers.

Summary:

In March 2008 at a site operated by Shell, oil stains were

observed on the external insulation material of the Texas
Tower Heat Exchanger of the Platformer Unit. The unit was
shut down and inspection revealed a through-wall crack in
the dissimilar metal weld (DMW) joining the upper
1Cr-½Mo section of the exchanger shell to the lower carbon
steel section.

The repair took 30 days and resulted in a margin loss

exceeding $ 8 million. There were no health, safety, or
environmental consequences.

Here’s what happened:

The Texas Tower Heat exchanger operated at a temperature above the Nelson curve for carbon steel.
This resulted in High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA) along the fusion line of the Dissimilar
Metal Weld (DMW) between the 1Cr –½Mo. upper portion of the shell and the carbon steel base
metal of the lower section of the shell resulting in a through wall crack.

How Did This Happen (Causes of incident):

HTHA can occur in carbon and low alloy steels subject to high temperature and high-pressure
hydrogen. It is defined as a reduction in strength and ductility by a high temperature reaction
between absorbed hydrogen and the carbon in the steel resulting in surface decarburization and
internal fissuring. These fissures form when the hydrogen reacts with carbon to form methane. The
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methane bubbles are trapped at the grain
boundaries and create pressure causing the
steel to crack. Localized stresses, heat
treatment, and time at high temperature
influence the rate and extent of damage.
Crack
HTHA is normally avoided by operating at
temperatures on or below the Nelson curve for
the steel involved. These curves have been
developed through Industry experience and
are documented in API Recommended
Practice 941, Steels for Hydrogen Service at
Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in
Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical
Plants.

The incident investigation team discovered that conditions for HTHA were created at the DMW of
the Texas Tower because of the following:

• The project team involved in the design of the Texas Tower in 1983 had selected the location
of the DMW such that the operating temperature of the DMW at the end-of-run conditions of
the Platformer would be “on” the Nelson curve for carbon steel.

• The DMW was subject to highly localized stresses based on the geometry and the fact that
the DMW was selected as the “closure weld” during construction of the Texas Tower.

• The Texas Tower had been operated with fouled/plugged tubes during recent years, which
caused an increase of temperature at the DMW (above the Nelson curve for carbon steel).

Operation of the Texas Tower with fouled/plugged tubes was considered to be within the acceptable
“operating window” of the Platformer because the heat duty requirements of the Texas Tower had
been significantly reduced over the years.
When an RBI study was conducted for the Platformer in 2003, the site reported that the Texas Tower
shell was in 1Cr – ½Mo but in reality a part of the shell was in carbon steel. Based on the operating
conditions at the time of the study, the exchanger was evaluated as not being at risk for HTHA.

Key Learning:
Current design guidelines recommend the equipment to operate 14oC, 25oF below the Nelson curve
and 1.7 bar, 25 psi below the appropriate Nelson curve versus on the Nelson curve as was practiced
in the past. Hence, other Texas Towers and feed effluent heat exchangers may be at similar risk for
HTHA if the exchanger shell is partly constructed of carbon steel.
Crack formation due to HTHA is known to accelerate in areas of high stress. Due to its design and
construction, the DMW closure joint had two types of stress concentrators at the fusion line (notch
and weld defects).

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Page 2 LFI Alert 200902 - Texas Tower Weld Failure.doc
The site provided information to the 2003 RBI study of the Platformer that the shell of the Texas
Tower was 1Cr – ½Mo. The study concluded that the shell was not at risk to HTHA.

Recommended Actions:

• Sites with Texas Tower shells partly constructed of carbon steel shall develop a risk
management strategy for this equipment that includes:
o Identification of Texas Tower shells partly constructed of carbon steel
o Provision of both the original design cases per Equipment Data Record Sheet and test run
data to GSDP in Amsterdam.
o Contracting of Shell GS (GSEMH) to analyse the temperature distribution along the
length of the Texas Tower as well as the orientation of the shell.
o Depending on outcome of the thermal analysis, Shell GS will advise on the next steps,
which may include installing temperature monitoring at the DMW, inspecting the DMW
or cleaning the Texas Tower.
• To prevent HTHA, Shell GS (GSEMH) will revise DEP’s by modifying / adding guidelines for
material selection in hydrogen service.
• Sites will assess the integrity of their Texas Towers in accordance with the recommended
practice BPG PEI-10-I.

More Information and Data Sources:

1. Shell has developed a recommended practice, BPG PEI-10-I, which has clear operating limits and
inspection guidelines to avoid HTHA based on the Nelson curves. The recommended practice gives
guidance on how and where to set Integrity Operating limits. The recommended practice also gives
guidance for materials selection for new projects based on the proximity to the Nelson curves.

Although the damage mechanism (HTHA fissuring) is very challenging to detect and accurately
assess, ultrasonic inspection procedures have been developed by Shell Global Solutions that are
capable of detecting and assessing HTHA damage in equipment.

Further information on the subject of this Alert is available from the sources provided below

• SGSI – GSDP, Light Ends Technology Group

• SGSI – GSEMH, Mechanical and Heat Exchanger Engineering Group
• SGSI Learning From Incidents Coordinator
• Shell best practice BPG PEI-10-I High Temperature Hydrogen Attack Materials Selection,
Operating, and Inspection Guidelines
• API RP 941 Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures in Refineries and
Petrochemical Plants

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 Goal Zero: Zero injuries, Zero fatalities

This LFI Alert/Standard is made available to you ('Recipient') pursuant to the relevant agreement between Shell Global Solutions International
and/or affiliates of Shell ('Shell Global Solutions'), and your company, and is written for intended Shell use and not tailored for non-Shell use,
including Recipient's company. Although the LFI’s represent Shell Global Solutions’ good faith judgment of the matters dealt with, they are
merely provided for information only and for Recipient’s use by its qualified professionals, and should not be relied upon as authoritative
guidance in any particular situation. When relevant, Recipient shall seek advice from its own technical advisors and the vendors of their specific
equipment. Shell Global Solutions makes no representations or warranties, express or implied, concerning the accuracy, sufficiency or
completeness of the information contained in any LFI Alert. Shell Global Solutions accepts no liability whatsoever for any loss or damage arising
out or in connection with the contents of this LFI Alert.

Copyright 2005, 2009 All Rights Reserved, Shell Oil Company

Copyright 2005, 2009 All Rights Reserved, Shell Internationale Research Maatschappij B.V.

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