CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
manager of the cargo-passenger vessel M/V J & N
QUALIFIED PIRACY
G.R. No. 123101 November 22, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. TITING
ARANAS @ TINGARDS/RONNIE, ANGELO
PARACUELES, JUAN VILLA @ JUANTOY,
ELMER MANALILI, ET AL.
ELMER MANALILI, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 3, Tagbilaran City finding accused-appellant
Elmer Manalili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified piracy and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
certain individuals.
The Information indicting appellant reads:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1992 in the
seawaters of the municipality of Ubay, Province of
Bohol, Philippines, which is part of the Philippine
waters and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain, and by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously seize by boarding a
passenger sea vessel M/V J & N Princess, owned by
one Nelson Uy and under the complement of Gervacio
Uy and Saturnino Gaudicos with 19 officers and crew
members and while on board said vessel, seized its
radio and subsequently demanded and divested them
and its passengers cash in the amount of P200,000.00,
Philippine Currency and valuables and equipments
worth P350,000.00, Philippine currency or in the total
amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P550,000.00), Philippine Currency, and on the
occasion of said piracy, accused committed the crime of
physical injuries on the person of Ernesto Magalona,
the quarter master; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended parties in the above stated total amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 123
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 532.2
Accused Titing Aranas alias Tingards, Angelo
Paracueles, Juan Villa alias Juantoy, Gaudencio
Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas remain at large. Hence, this
case proceeded only against appellant Elmer Manalili
who was arrested on January 21, 1993 in Cebu City.
When arraigned on August 23, 1993, appellant Manalili
pleaded not guilty.3 He also waived his right to pre-
trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following testimonial
evidence:
Prosecution witness Gervacio Ong Uy, 62, operations
Princess, testified that at 9:40 in the evening of
December 15, 1992, Tuesday, he boarded said vessel.
The vessel plies the route between Ubay, Bohol and
Cebu (and vice-versa) every other day or every Sunday,
Tuesday and Thursday. It leaves the port of Ubay,
Bohol at 10:00 o’ clock in the evening. About twenty
minutes after departure on said date, he went down to
urinate at the lower deck. After urinating, two persons
were standing behind him; one was pointing a gun at
his back and the other was holding his collar. They
ordered him to go upstairs to the third or upper deck.
Arriving there, they told him to open the radio room,
and they destroyed the radio. They also ordered that all
lockers of the room be opened. They told him that they
were military men looking for firearms and shabu. He
opened all lockers except that of quartermaster Ernesto
Magalona, who was not around as he was hiding. The
crew members looked for him, and when he appeared,
the pirates scolded and hit him with an armalite. He was
about 3 meters away from Magalona. Magalona opened
his locker but the pirates were not able to find anything
inside. When the locker was opened, he saw that the left
hand of one pirate had a tattoo with the initials "G.V."4
The pirates took from Gervacio Uy P30,500.00 in cash
and his wristwatch worth P1,500.00. From an inventory
made by the purser, the pirates divested from the
passengers P200,000.00 in cash, and P300,000.00
worth of personal belongings including radio and
jewelry.5
After the robbery, the leader of the pirates told the
quartermaster to stop the engine of the vessel, then
there was a gunshot, which was apparently a signal for
the get-away pumpboat. Before the pirates left, they
told Uy’s group not to go back to Ubay, but to proceed
to Cebu, otherwise the boat would be strafed.
Nevertheless, they proceeded to Talibon, Bohol in order
to report the incident to the police. They arrived in
Cebu at 5:00 o’ clock in the morning of December 16,
1992.6
Gervacio Uy declared that he identified the two persons
who initially pointed a gun at him through pictures. The
one who pointed an armalite at him was about 5’6" in
height, regular in built, brown complexion, with straight
hair and between 25 to 28 years old. The second man
was older, about 42 years old, 5’3" or 5’4" in height,
medium built with brown complexion and black hair;
he was carrying what looked like an uzi gun. From
pictures presented by the Central Intelligence Service
(CIS) when he was investigated, he identified the two
as Titing Aranas and Paracueles, all at large. When
appellant Elmer Manalili was presented during the
preliminary investigation before the municipal judge of
Ubay, he told Municipal Judge Napuli that his face was
familiar among the eight pirates. However,
quartermaster Magalona and Boiser, a passenger,
identified him as one of the pirates.7
On cross-examination, Gervacio Uy said that out of the
20 pictures presented to him for identification by the
CIS, he only positively identified Titing Aranas and
Angelo Paracueles. He saw Elmer Manalili for the first
time when he was presented before Judge Napuli for
investigation.8
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Prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, 39,
quartermaster of M/V J & N Princess since 1991 to the
present, testified that on December 15, 1992, he was on
board the said vessel which left the port of Ubay, Bohol
bound for Cebu at 10:00 o’ clock in the evening. He
was off-duty then. At the time of the robbery, he was on
the second deck of the boat. He was lying on his cot
near the passage way leading to the upper deck when
someone shouted, "Ayaw paglihok kay duna miy
pangitaon nga shabu ug armas nga uzi," meaning, "Do
not move, we are searching for shabu and uzi gun."
Then he saw their manager Gervacio Uy being escorted
by two armed men. One was armed with an armalite
pointed at Uy. The other man was also armed because
something was bulging at his waist, but he did not see
the kind of firearm he was carrying. He could identify
the two armed men who escorted Uy, because he was
about three to four meters away from them and the
place was well illuminated with fluorescent lights. He
identified one of the said armed men by pointing to a
person inside the court room who, when asked his
name, answered that he was Elmer Manalili. He
declared that the other man carried a long firearm.
Describing the manner Uy was escorted, he said that the
man holding the armalite was also holding the collar of
Uy and pushing him while appellant followed. Uy and
the two armed men eventually reached the third deck
where the armed men destroyed the radio. He came to
know that the radio was destroyed because the purser
who came from the third deck looking for him told him
so. He tried to cover his face with his malong, but
ultimately a pirate saw him and struck him with his gun
hitting his right ear so he was forced to stand up and go
with them to the third deck. When he was at the third or
upper deck, Uy was on his way down to the second
deck escorted by appellant. Immediately after his locker
was opened, he was instructed to return to his cot and
ordered to lie down.9
Magalona said that there were about eight (8) pirates.
He could only remember and identify the two armed
men who escorted Gervacio Uy because the movements
of the pirates were so fast and coordinated. He could
remember Elmer Manalili because he was facing him
and he saw him frontally. The pirates divested the
passengers of their belongings. His wallet containing
P1,000.00 was taken.10
On cross-examination, Magalona stated that when the
robbers announced a hold-up, he was lying down. They
were ordered to remain lying down, face down for less
than an hour. The robbers were in pairs stationed at the
lower deck, second deck and third deck while the other
two made rounds of these decks. When the passengers
were divested of their belongings, operations manager
Uy was at the third or upper deck escorted by the two
armed men, one of whom was the appellant. He was
positive that from the start, the two armed men escorted
Uy from the comfort room at the lower deck to the
second deck and then the third or upper deck where the
radio room was located. They did not separate from Uy
but always followed him, and he had a good look at
them when they passed by the second deck.11
After the incident, Magalona saw the appellant at the
office of the chief of police in Ubay, Bohol and then
during the investigation at the office of the municipal
judge. He also saw the appellant from pictures of
suspects shown to him at the office of the chief of
police.12
Prosecution witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Ubay,
Bohol, testified that on December 15, 1992 he was a
passenger of M/V J & N Princess bound for Cebu. He
was asleep when the boat left the port of Ubay, but was
awakened by a gunfire. Then he saw a pirate aiming an
armalite rifle, and another one, about 16 years old,
aiming his carbine rifle, at him. Another pirate got his
bag, and taken therefrom was his service revolver, a
caliber .38 Smith and Wesson, issued by the Chief of
Police. The gun had twelve (12) rounds of ammunition.
After the incident, he went to the PNP in Bohol, and
from pictures that were shown to him, he identified the
pirate who got his bag as Angelo Paracueles. He did not
see the appellant during the incident.13
Due to fright suffered at the time of the incident, SPO2
Reyes asked for moral damages of ₱50,000.00, and
actual damages of ₱50,000.00 for the loss of the gun,
and ₱288.00 for the 12 rounds of ammunition.14
Prosecution witness PO3 Saul Pino Cuyno,15 a member
of the PNP, Ubay, Bohol, testified that in the evening of
December 15, 1992, he was also a passenger of M/V J
& N Princess. The pirates took from him ₱80.00 in cash
and his watch worth ₱4,000.00 The armed men
mentioned by SPO2 Reyes were the same men who
aimed their guns at him. From pictures that were shown
to him after the incident, he identified one of the armed
men as Angelo Paracueles.16
On the other hand, appellant Elmer Manalili denied that
he was involved in the piracy committed on board M/V
J & N Princess in the evening of December 15, 1992 in
the seawaters of Ubay, Bohol inasmuch as he was in his
residence in Cebu City at that time.
Defense witness Jeffrey Dadula Perandos, 26, single,
third year high school, industrial painter, testified that
he knew appellant since they were neighbors at
Cabantan St., Mabolo, Cebu City. Appellant started to
live there when he was eight (8) years old and stayed
with his elder brother Junior Manalili. He does not
know appellant’s father because the latter died in
Camotes Island before appellant transferred to Mabolo,
Cebu City. In 1989, appellant married Cherry Mae
Elimino from Lutopan, Cebu. After their marriage, they
stayed in Lutopan for a while, and resided in Nivel,
Lahug, Cebu City in October or November 1992.17
Perandos said that he has been working as an industrial
painter since he was 15 years old. In December 1992,
he was hired to paint the house of Mr. Chua in La
Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. His companions were
appellant, Reynaldo Cardona, Ernesto Dadula and
master painter Nicomedes Baguio who was the head of
their group. They started painting the house of Mr.
Chua sometime during the first week of December, but
he did not finish painting the house because he
transferred to another painting job at Basak, Mandaue
and stopped working with Mr. Chua about the end of
January 1993.18
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According to Perandos, when they started working at
La Guardia, he and Reynaldo Cardona slept at
appellant’s house. On December 14, 1992, he, appellant
and Reynaldo Cardona started painting the house of Mr.
Chua at 8:00 o’ clock in the morning and stopped
working at 5:00 o’ clock in the afternoon. Then they
proceeded to the house of appellant together with
Reynaldo Cardona and ate supper there at 8:00 o’ clock
in the evening. Appellant’s wife was not around
because she was working as an entertainer in a karaoke
bar. Thereafter, they had a drinking spree, and then
slept in appellant’s house. The next day, December 15,
1992, they went to work at the Chua’s residence early
in the morning and stopped working at 5:00 o’ clock in
the afternoon. They proceeded to appellant’s house and
arrived there at 6:00 o’ clock in the evening.
Appellant’s wife was still around and they ate supper
with her. She left for work at 6:30 in the evening.
Appellant was left to take care of their child. After
supper, he, Reynaldo Cardona and appellant were
drinking until 10:00 o’ clock in the evening. Appellant
slept ahead of them at 11:00 o’ clock that night.19
Perandos stated that appellant was working
continuously at the Chua’s residence from the first
week of December until his arrest at about 7:00 o’ clock
in the evening of January 21, 1993. He knew of the
arrest because appellant was arrested at the side of his
house. At that time, appellant went to his house in order
for them to borrow money from a close friend, money
lender Cecilia Cupta. After the arrest, he visited
appellant at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City and
asked why he was arrested. Appellant said he was only
a suspect.20
On cross-examination, Perandos said that he was asked
to testify by appellant’s wife, Cherry Mae, and
appellant himself in a letter handcarried by Cherry Mae.
In said letter, appellant also asked Reynaldo Cardona,
his neighbor, to testify for him. Appellant’s wife paid
for his fare.21
Defense witness Reynaldo Cupta Cardona, 21, single,
elementary graduate, painter, and a resident of 55-B
Cabantan Street, Barangay Mabolo, Cebu City, testified
that appellant resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. He
knew appellant since they worked together in painting
the house of Alfonso Chua at La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu
City. Aside from appellant, his other companions were
Jeffrey Perandos, Ernesto Dadula and Nicolas Baguio.
They started painting in December 1992 and finished
the work in February 1993. However, appellant was
arrested on January 21, 1993 so only four of them
finished the painting job.22
Cardona stated that on December 14, 1992, he,
appellant and Jeffrey Perandos started painting the
house of Mr. Chua at 7:00 o’ clock in the morning, and
stopped working at 5:00 o’ clock in the afternoon. Then
they proceeded to the house of appellant where they
slept to save on fare. They ate supper at 6:00 o’ clock in
the evening together with appellant’s wife Cherry Mae,
who did not work as it was her day-off. Appellant went
to bed at past 7:00 o’ clock in the evening, and slept
with his child. He and Cherry Mae talked about her
work, while Jeffrey Perandos listened. They all slept at
10:00 to 11:00 o’ clock that night. The following day,
December 15, 1992, they went to work at Mr. Chua’s
residence at 7:00 o’ clock in the morning. They stopped
working at 5:00 o’ clock in the afternoon, then
proceeded to appellant’s house. They ate supper at 6:00
o’ clock in the evening with Cherry Mae as it was still
her day-off. Appellant slept ahead because he had to
make his child sleep. They conversed with Cherry Mae
after they cleaned the house, and slept at past 10:00 o’
clock that night. The following day, December 16,
1992, he woke up ahead and prepared his "baon" at
5:50 in the morning. Appellant and Jeffrey Perandos
woke up at the same time. Appellant played ball with
his child. They left for work at past 6:00 o’ clock in the
morning, and started working at 7:00 o’ clock. His
companions were appellant, Jeffrey Perandos, Nicolas
Baguio and Ernesto Dadula.23
On cross-examination, Cardona said that appellant’s
wife requested him to testify in this case, and gave him
P70.00 for fare. On December 3, 1993, she gave him
and Jeffrey Perandos more than ₱200.00.24
On re-direct examination, Cardona clarified that while
they were staying at appellant’s house when they were
then painting the house of Mr. Chua, they contributed
money for their food.25
Defense witness Cherry Mae Manalili declared that she
was appellant’s wife. In December 1992, her husband
was a painter. She knew Jeffrey Perandos and Reynaldo
Cardona since the time they had a painting job together
with her husband at the Chua’s residence in La Guardia,
Lahug, Cebu City. At that time, her family consisting of
her husband and one-year-old child, was residing at
Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. They rented a room and
kitchen from one Nang Ason in the middle of
November. She was then working at the X-O Karaoke
Bar. Her work was from 7:30 in the evening to 2:00 o’
clock in the morning. In June 1993, she transferred to
Steve’s Karaoke Bar where she is presently
employed.26
Cherry Mae said that while working with her husband
at the Chua’s residence, Perandos and Cardona lived
with her family at Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City since
December 7, 1992 to minimize travel expenses. They
contributed money for their food.27
She stated that on December 14, 1992, Perandos and
Cardona were still staying with them. When she left for
work at 7:30 in the evening, her husband was at home
taking care of their child. On December 15, 1992, she
left for work at about 8:00 o’ clock in the evening. Her
husband, their son, Perandos and Cardona were left at
home. She arrived home at about 1:20 in the morning
after their Christmas party. It was her husband who
opened the door of their house; their child, Perandos
and Cardona were still sleeping.28
According to Cherry Mae, Perandos and Cardona
stayed in their house from December 7, 1992 to January
21, 1993. They left when her husband was arrested. At
the time of his arrest, she was in Lutopan, Toledo City
as she attended the burial of her grandmother on
January 20, 1993. It was Perandos who informed her
that her husband was arrested at 7:00 o’ clock in the
evening of January 21, 1993 in Mabolo, Cebu City. He
was in Mabolo at that time because he wanted to
borrow money.29
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Appellant Elmer Manalili y Pogio, 24 years old,
testified that he was a painter by profession. He does
not know the co-accused Titing Aranas, Angelo
Paracueles, Juan Villa, Gaudencio Tolsidas and
Rodrigo Salas. He denied that in the evening of
December 15, 1992, he was at the wharf of Ubay,
Bohol.30
He is married to Cherry Mae Elemino who is employed
as a disco karaoke entertainer in Cebu City.1âwphi1
They got married in 1989, and then lived with his in-
laws in Lutopan for about a year in 1990 before
transferring to Lahug, Cebu City.31
Appellant stated that in December 1992, they resided in
Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. In the morning and afternoon
of December 15, 1992, he was working as a painter in
the house of Mr. Chua in La Guardia, Lahug. In the
evening, he was at home with his wife and child,
Reynaldo Cardona and Jeffrey Perandos. That night, his
wife left after 7:00 o’ clock in the evening and attended
a party given by her employer at the X-O Karaoke
Bar.32
He was arrested at 7:00 o’ clock in the evening of
January 21, 1993, at Cabantan Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City by policemen without a warrant of arrest. He was
in Mabolo to borrow money from the spouses Cupta,
who were neighbors of Jeffrey Perandos. At that time,
his wife was in Lutopan as she attended the burial of
her grandmother. After his arrest, he was brought to
Camp Cabahug, Cebu City and then brought to Bohol
on January 24, 1993 and detained at Camp Dagohoy in
Tagbilaran City until September 10, 1993. He was later
transferred to the Bohol Detention and Rehabilitation
Center.33
against appellant, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises,
this Court finds accused ELMER MANALILI GUILTY
of Qualified Piracy beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, accused Elmer
Manalili is ordered to reimburse and pay complaining
witnesses the following:
Complaining witness Gervacio Ong Uy:
1. P30,500.00 - representing cash taken from
him by the pirates:
2. P1,500.00 - value of his Seiko watch;
3. P4,000.00 - value of his diamond ring;
4. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary,
and moral damages.
B. Complaining witness Ernesto Rodriguez Magalona:
1. P1,000.00 - representing cash taken from
him together with his wallet;
2. P10,000.00 - representing cash taken from
him together with his wallet;
C. Complaining witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes:
1. P200.00 - cash taken from him together with
his wallet;

According to appellant, while he was in the municipal 2. P15,288.00 - value of the government issued
jail of Ubay, Bohol, about 30 people, whom he did not firearm and live bullets taken by the pirates;
know, came to see him at his prison cell. Two of them
were prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto 3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary,
Magalona. It was Magalona who asked him, "Who is and moral damages.
Elmer Manalili?" He answered that he was the one.
There were four inmates then inside the prison cell. Uy D. Complaining witness PO3 Saul Cuyno Pino:
did not talk to him, but just took a good look at him.
Magalona pointed at him as one of the pirates and said 1. P80.00 - representing cash taken from him
"mao mao," which means, "looked like" one of the together with his wallet;
pirates.34
2. P4,000.00 - value of his Seiko watch;
Appellant denied that he was in the vicinity of Ubay,
Bohol in the evening of December 15, 1992. He went to 3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary,
Bohol for the first time when he was brought to and moral damages.
Tagbilaran City after he was arrested by the police in
Cebu City.35 But without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy testified
that one of the pirates who opened the locker of the Without pronouncement as to Costs.
quartermaster had a tattoo with the initials "GV" on his
left hand, the court found no such tatoo mark on
SO ORDERED.38
appellant’s left hand. Moreover, appellant’s height is 5
feet 7 and 1/2 inches.36

The trial court found that prosecution witnesses

Gervacio Uy and Ernesto Magalona identified appellant
as one of the pirates. It held that the defense of alibi
could not prevail over said positive identification.37 On
September 2, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment

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Appellant Elmer Manalili ascribes to the trial court the
following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCES BOTH FOR
THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE;
II. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED
GRAVE ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION
OF THE EVIDENCES FOR THE DEFENSE
REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF
ACCUSED ELMER MANALILI,
RESULTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.39
The appeal is meritorious.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
appreciating the testimonial evidence of both the
prosecution and defense which led to his conviction. He
argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he was one of the pirates in this
case.
We agree. A careful review of the records shows that
about twenty minutes after the vessel M/V J & N
Princess left the port of Ubay, Bohol bound for Cebu on
December 15, 1992, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy,
the operations manager of the vessel, urinated at the
lower deck. After urinating, two persons were standing
behind him; one pointed a gun at his back, while the
other held his collar. He was ordered to go upstairs with
them to the third or upper deck where the radio room
was located, and they then destroyed the radio.40 When
asked whether he could identify the two armed men
who initially pointed a gun at him, Uy replied in the
affirmative, and stated that he had identified them
through pictures presented by the CIS as Titing Aranas
and Angelo Paracueles. This is reflected in the records
thus:
FISCAL:
Q. You said that initially there were two persons after
they pointed a gun at you, if you can see these persons,
can you still identify them?
A. Yes, I identified them thru the pictures.
Q. Could you describe to this Honorable Court the
description of these two persons?
A. The one who pointed an armalite he was about 5’6"
in height, regular in built, brown complexion and his
age is between 25 and 28 years old.
The second suspect is older, I think about 42 years old,
5’3" or 5’4" in height , medium built, brown
complexion.
Q. How about the hair?
A. The hair is straight.
Q. How about the second?
A. Black hair and he was carrying like an uzi gun.
Q. You said a while ago that you were showed pictures,
where?
A. There were pictures presented by the CIS when I
was investigated.
Q. And did you identify those pictures?
A. I positively identified two, one is Titing Aranas and
the other Paracuellos, all at large.41
On the other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto
Magalona, quartermaster of the same vessel, testified
that while he was lying on his cot at the second deck
near the passage way to the upper deck, someone
shouted, "Do not move, we are searching for shabu and
uzi gun." Then he saw their manager, Gervacio Uy,
being escorted by two armed men. One was armed with
an armalite pointed at Uy; the other was also armed but
he did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying at his
waist. He could identify the two armed men who
escorted Uy because he was three to four meters away
from them and the place was well illuminated with
fluorescent lights. He identified one of the armed men
as appellant. He said that the other man holding the
armalite was also holding the collar of Uy while
pushing him, while appellant "followed fast." Uy and
the two armed men eventually reached the third or
upper deck where the armed men destroyed the radio as
reported to him by the purser who came down looking
for him from the upper deck.42 Of the eight pirates, he
could only remember and identify the two armed men
who escorted Uy, because their movements were so fast
and coordinated.43 He stated that from the start the two
armed men, one of whom he identified as the appellant,
escorted Uy from the comfort room at the lower deck to
the second deck and then proceeded to the third or
upper deck where the radio room was located. They did
always followed Uy, and he had a good look at them
when they passed by the second deck.44
From the foregoing, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy
identified the two armed men, who initially pointed a
gun at him in the comfort room at the lower deck, and
who ordered him to go with them to the radio room at
the third or upper deck, as Titing Aranas and Angelo
Paracueles. On the other hand, prosecution witness
Ernesto Magalona who saw Gervacio Uy and the two
armed men as they passed by the second deck on their
way to the third deck, identified one of those two armed
men as appellant Elmer Manalili.
Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital
question, such as the identity of the offender, the
element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be
lightly disregarded.45 The identity of the offender, like
the crime itself must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.46 In the case at bench, there is no positive
identification of the appellant inasmuch as prosecution
eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona contradicted
themselves on the identity of the alleged offender.
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Moreover, although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court
stated that one of the pirates who opened the locker of is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant Elmer
Ernesto Magalona had a tattoo on his left hand with the Manalili is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of
initials "GV," the trial court did not see any tattoo mark reasonable doubt.
on the appellant’s left hand.47
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to cause the
Further, witness Uy declared that he saw appellant for immediate release of appellant unless the latter is being
the first time during the investigation before the lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court
municipal judge of Ubay.48 He told the municipal accordingly within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
judge that appellant’s face was "familiar among the
eight seajackers," but Magalona identified appellant as SO ORDERED.
one of the pirates.49 Compared with the identification
made by Magalona, Uy’s statement that appellant’s face
was familiar among the pirates is characterized by
uncertainty. His identification of appellant in the trial
court based on the aforementioned statement retained
its doubtful tenor.

Significantly, the passenger named Boiser who

allegedly identified the appellant as one of the pirates
before the municipal judge of Ubay was significantly
not presented as a witness by the prosecution. The
records show thus:

FISCAL LIGASON:

I would like to made (sic) manifestation, Your Honor,

that I did not present Ms. Alma Casil and Melecio
Boiser, they were listed, but after I confronted them that
they did not identify this accused, so that I did not
present them, because there are others who can
identify.50

From the foregoing, it appears that the prosecution

failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
was one of the eight men who committed qualified
piracy in the instant case.

Appellant’s defense of alibi is generally considered a

weak defense. However, it assumes importance when
his identification as an alleged offender in the crime
charged is inconclusive or unreliable.51 Appellant
asserted that at the time of the piracy in the seawaters of
Ubay, Bohol, he was in his residence in Cebu City, and
which alibi was corroborated by Jeffrey Perandos,
Reynaldo Cardona and his wife, Cherry Mae Manalili.
Although alibi can be fabricated, it is not always false
and without merit, and when coupled with the
improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecution
evidence, the defense of alibi deserves merit.52

Besides, the prosecution has the burden of proof in

establishing the guilt of the accused.53 When the
prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused
need not even offer evidence in his behalf.54 In every
criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender or
offenders must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.55 There must be moral certainty in
an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who
committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of
evidence would mean exoneration for accused-
appellant.56 It is our view, therefore, and we hold that
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant was one of the pirates who committed the
crime charged. Hence, the appellant must be acquitted.

6|Page
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE
ARBITRARY DETENTION
G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003
BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the reversal of a Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July
5, 2001,1 as well as its Resolutions dated September 28,
2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed the following Information against Benito Astorga,
Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his
men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and
for sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating
and mutually helping with unidentified persons, who
are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN
DOES, who were armed with firearms of different
calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio
Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the
Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave
the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby
restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty
for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations
Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City
sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection
operations in line with the government’s campaign
against illegal logging. The team was composed of
Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo
Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree
Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of
the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as
team leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B.
Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian.3
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western
Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like
boats being constructed. After consulting with the local
barangay officials, the team learned that the boats
belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa. However, since
Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy.
Bagacay.4
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team
spotted two more boats being constructed in the vicinity
of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-
5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate.
Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the
DENR’s service pump boat and proceeded to the site of
the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga.
After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to
their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the
request of Mayor Astorga.5
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco,
and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try
and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was
suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor
Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo
papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka
maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo
makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha
misencounter." (I can make you swim back to
Tacloban. Don’t you know that I can box? I can box.
Don’t you know that I can declare this a
misencounter?)6 Mayor Astorga then ordered someone
to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes
later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived
bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue
uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14
rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns
pointed at the team members.7 At this, Simon tried to
explain to Astorga the purpose of his team’s mission.8
He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that
he was going to contact his people at the DENR in
Catbalogan to inform them of the team’s whereabouts.
Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon’s
radio, saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri
somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo
maka aro hin bulig." (It’s better if you have no radio so
that your office would not know your whereabouts and
so that you cannot ask for help).9 Mayor Astorga again
slapped the right shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong
siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay
diri kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in
Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not
tolerate it here.)10 Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to
allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga
retorted that they would not be allowed to go home and
that they would instead be brought to Daram.11 Mayor
Astorga then addressed the team, saying, "Kon
magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon
madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha
Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you
really want to confiscate anything, you start with the
big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at
Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.)12 Simon then
tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave,
which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who
angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko
kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya." (You
cannot go home now because I will bring you to
Daram. We will have many things to discuss there.)13
7|Page
The team was brought to a house where they were told
that they would be served dinner. The team had dinner
with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table,
and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14 After
dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were
allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the
barangay.15 On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the
rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team
was finally allowed to leave.16 1awphi1.nét
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary
detention against Mayor Astorga and his men, which
led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3,
2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.17 At the trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as
well as their Joint Affidavit.18 However, the
presentation of Simon’s testimony was not completed,
and none of his fellow team members came forward to
testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the
DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.19
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Decision, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused BENITO ASTORGA
Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correctional as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.20
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 11, 200121 which was denied by the
Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28,
2001.22 A Second Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 24, 200123 was also filed, and this was
similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002.24
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner
assigns a sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the
accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined and
penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code,
based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures
and, worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein
the latter categorically declared petitioner’s innocence
of the crime charged.25
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to
establish the required quantum of evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused,26 especially in light of the fact that
the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.27 Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the
records of the case is there any competent evidence that
could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was
employed upon the persons of the team members.28
Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed
men at the scene does not qualify as competent
evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they
would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer
or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.30 The elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.31
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts
assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not
disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary
Detention, that the offender is a public officer or
employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part
of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal
purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were
motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation" and the
feeling that he was being "singled out."32 The
detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby
satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the
team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which involved the
illegal detention of a child, we found the accused-
appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack
of evidence to show that any physical restraint was
employed upon the victim. However, because the
victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not
to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had
returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that
he could not leave because of his fear to violate such
instruction.34
In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that, in
establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his
liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be
kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of
locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended
party in said case was found outside talking to the
owner of the house where she had been taken. She
explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises
for fear that the kidnappers would make good their
threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein
that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew
where she resided and they had earlier announced that
their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him
on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known
to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears
of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar
threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence.36
8|Page
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal
detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s liberty
need not involve any physical restraint upon the
victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of the
accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim
sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the
victim is compelled to limit his own actions and
movements in accordance with the wishes of the
accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes,
detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is
evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the
complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go
home.37 This refusal was quickly followed by the call
for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all
armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to
encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants
and the witnesses.38 Given such circumstances, we
give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it
was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders.39 It
was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the
evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the
team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to
prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses
against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by
the private complainants, suffice it to say that the
principles governing the use of such instruments in the
adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus,
in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the
defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that
can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction
or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such
circumstances.40 Indeed, the belated claims made in
the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations
that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding
and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorga’s orders
"out of respect," are belied by petitioner’s own
admissions to the contrary.41 The Joint Affidavit of
Desistance of the private complainants is evidently not
a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in the
information and proven at the trial, but a mere
expression of the lack of interest of private
complainants to pursue the case.1awphi1.nét This
conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs,
which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to
prove our sincerity and improving DENR relations with
the local Chiefs Executive and other official of Daram,
Islands so that DENR programs and project can be
effectively implemented through the support of the
local officials for the betterment of the residence living
conditions who are facing difficulties and are much
dependent on government support.42
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court
to the evidence, pointing out that the Sandiganbayan’s
reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is
misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not
one of the private complainants in the case.43 He also
makes much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1
Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between
herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio
E. Simon, from their alleged ‘confrontation,’ until they
left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2
September 1997."44
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s factual
findings are conclusive and binding upon appellate
courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.45 Nothing in the case at bar prompts us
to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1
Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is
completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the rules of
evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively
supplied by the private complainants in cases of
Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorga’s
claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to
what transpired between Simon and himself is belied by
the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he
accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to
petitioner.46 He heard all of Mayor Astorga’s
threatening remarks.47 He was with Simon when they
were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and
wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles.48 In sum, SPO1
Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led to
the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of
Mayor Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team
was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob
or whether they had simply decided to "while away the
time" and take advantage of the purported hospitality of
the accused.49 On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly
and categorically denied that they were simply "whiling
away the time" between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following
morning.50 SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony,
saying that they did not use the time between their
dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the
following morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given
a choice, they would have gone home.51
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality
of an impartial judge", because the ponente of the
assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocate
when he propounded "very extensive clarificatory
questions" on the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan,
as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It can
propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order
to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court
cannot be assailed on the ground that clarificatory
questions were asked during the trial.52
9|Page
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan SO ORDERED.
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code provides that, where the detention has not
exceeded three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is
entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one (1)
month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words

of Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Lino v.
Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by
public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal
detention, and called for the intensification of efforts
towards bringing them to justice:

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal

detention committed by government officers form part
of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions
were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they
remained in effect under American rule; continued in
effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the
Japanese regime they were not repealed. The same
provisions continue in the statute books of the free and
sovereign Republic of the Philippines. This
notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of
violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that
prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the
fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to
the same government to which the prosecuting officers
belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty,
without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers
should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders
the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal
detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of

articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code will it
be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton
trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case.
The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without
prejudice to the detainees’ right to the indemnity to
which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation
of their fundamental rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding
petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

10 | P a g e
ART. 125 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO
NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M.
SOLOMON, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the
Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
dated 19 January 19981 which recommended the
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by petitioner
against herein private respondents for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the
delivery of detained persons, and the Order of April 13,
19982 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at
bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a
certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at
the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged
violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."3 The following day, or on
September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A.
7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before
the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her
daughter Gayle4 . The complaint, insofar as pertinent,
reads as follows:
That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio
Bonbon, Brgy. Catarman, Liloan, Metro Cebu,
Philippines and within the Preliminary
Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, willfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, conspiring,
confederating, helping with one another, while
accused JASPER AGBAY manipulating to
finger the vagina of GAYLE FATIMA
AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion
block the sight of the Private Complainant,
Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a
tricycle going their destinations. Upon initial
investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy.
Catarman, accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT
was released and accused JASPER AGBAY is
presently detain Liloan Police Station Jail.
Medical Certificate issued from Don Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center, Cebu City is
hereto attached.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote
the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate
release of petitioner considering that the latter had
"failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the
proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours
from September 7, 1997."5 Private respondents did not
act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner.6
On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued an order,
denominated as "Detention During the Pendency of the
Case", committing petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu
City.7 Five (5) days later, or on September 17, 1997,
petitioner was ordered released by the said court after
he had posted bond.8
On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for
delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein
private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr.,
SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified
police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation,
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas.9
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it
is alleged by petitioner that on November 10, 1997, the
7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution
containing the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the
crime in Violation of Republic Act 7610, it is
hereby recommended that an INFORMATION
be filed against the two aforenamed accused.
Forward the record of this case to the
Provincial Fiscal's Office for appropriate
action.10
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
1995, dated 10 October 1995 of the Office of the
Ombudsman,11 the case for delay in delivery filed by
petitioner against herein private respondents before the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper
disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the
complaint, now denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-
0786, and which issued the questioned Resolution dated
January 19, 1998 recommending its dismissal against
herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of this Resolution but this motion was
denied in an Order dated April 13, 1998.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The grounds relied upon in the present petition12 are as
follows:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN RELYING ON
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 14, SERIES OF
1995, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1995, OF THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN HOLDING THAT IT
HAS COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED CASE BEFORE IT, THE SAID
CIRCULAR BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND VOID.
11 | P a g e
 II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT IS
BEYOND ITS COMPENCE TO DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA HAS
IN FACT NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE
FILED AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
MCTC, WHILE HAVING AUTHORITY TO
CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, IS
NOT THE "PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY "
CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND, HENCE, THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DID NOT
INTERRUPT THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY ART.
125.
IV.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN HOLIDING THAT THE ISSUE
OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF
DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY
OF DETAINED PERSONS.
V.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE DUTY
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE
NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS
FULFILLED WHEN THEY FILED A FORMAL
COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH THE
7TH MCTC OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to the
civilian character of the Philippine National Police, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, by
virtue of the description of the Office, has no
competence or jurisdiction to act on his complaint
against private respondents who are members of the
PNP. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of
Memorandum Circular No. 14 insofar as it purports to
vest the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against
personnel of the Philippine National Police.1âwphi1.nêt
There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our
police force. The 1987 Constitution, in Section 6,
Article XVI, has mandated the establishment of "one
police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian character (emphasis supplied)." Likewise, R.A.
697513 is categorical in describing the civilian
character of the police force.14 The only question now
is whether Memorandum Circular No. 14, in vesting the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military with
jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members
of the PNP, violates the latter's civilian character.
As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Comment dated 7 December 199815, the issue as to
whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has
the authority to investigate civilian personnel of the
government was resolved in the affirmative in the case
of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.16 In that case, the
petitioners, who were members of the Philippine
National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the
Deputy Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout
of certain suspected members of the "Kuratong
Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court held that:
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military
establishment do not yield conclusive evidence
that such deputy is prohibited from performing
other functions or duties affecting non-military
personnel. On the contrary, a review of the
relevant Constitutional provisions reveal
otherwise.
As previously established, the Ombudsman
"may exercise such other powers or perform
such functions or duties" as Congress may
prescribe through legisiation. Therefore,
nothing can prevent Congress from giving the
Ombudsman supervision and control over the
Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy
for the military establishment. In this light,
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. —
The authority and responsibility for the
exercise of the mandate of the Office of
the Ombudsman and for the discharge
of its powers and functions shall be
vested in the Ombudsman, who shall
have supervision and control of the said
Office.
While Section 31 thereof declares:
Sec. 31. Designation of Investigators
and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman
may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate or deputize any fiscal,
state prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to
assist him herein shall be under his
supervision and control.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases
involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy for Military
Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no
irregularity attended the referral by the Acting
Ombudsman of the Kurutong Baleleng case to
respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a
panel of investigators.17
12 | P a g e
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However,
petitioner, in his Reply to Comment dated February 1,
1999, argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not on
all fours with the case at bar18. Petitioner states that the
doctrine laid down in the said case is simply that "the
Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military
personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military
Affairs. This doctrine, petitioner argues, "applies only
to isolated or individual cases involving non-military
personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the Deputy for
Military Affairs" and does not apply when, as in this
case, there is a wholesale or indiscriminate referral of
such cases to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there is no
basis for the distinction.
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the
referral of cases involving non-military personnel to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to isolated or
individual cases. The Office of the Ombudsman, in
issuing Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply
exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman "to
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or
deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or the or lawyer in
the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution
of certain cases." This Court, absent any grave abuse of
discretion, may not enterfere with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of his power of supervision and control
over the said Office.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular
No. 14 violates the clear intent and policy of the
Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian
character of the police force and "would render
nugatory and meaningless the distinction between cases
involving civilian and military personnel and the
creation of separate divisions of the Ombudsman."19
Said contentions are misplaced.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his
designation as such, is by no means a member of the
military establishment. The said Office was established
"to extend the Office of the Ombudsman to the military
establishment just as it champions the common people
against bureaucratic indifference". The Office was
intended to help the "ordinary foot soldiers" to obtain
redress for their grievances against higher authorities
and the drafters of the Constitution were aware that the
creation of the Office, which is seemingly independent
of the President, to perform functions which
constitutionally should be performed by the President,
might be in derogation of the powers of the President as
Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces20.
It must be borne in mind that the Office of the
Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers of the 1987
Constitution as the "eyes and ears of the people"21 and
"a champion of the citizen.22" Sec. 12, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his
deputies as "protectors of the people." Thus, first and
foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies, including
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their
allegiance to the people and ordinary citizens, it is
clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the
assumption of jurisdiction by the said office over the
investigation of cases involving the PNP would detract
from or violate the civilian character of the police force
when precisely the Office of the Ombudsman is a
civilian office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the
application of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides as follows:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities. —
The penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person for the proper judicial authorities within
the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent; and thirty-six hours (36)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained
at the Liloan Police Station on 7 September 1997 for an
alleged violation of R.A. 7610, specifically section 5
(b) thereof23. This crime carries a penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, an
afflictive penalty. Under these circumstances, a
criminal complaint or information should be filed with
the proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36)
hours of his arrest.
As borne by the records before us the mother of private
complainant, Joan Gicaraya, filed a complaint on 8
September 1997 against petitioner for violation of R.A.
7610 before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Liloan, Metro Cebu.
Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant
in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for
purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has
no jurisdiction to try the offense. This act of private
complainant petitioner argues, was unnecessary, a
surplusage which did not interrupt the period prescribed
by Art. 12524 considering that under the Rules it is the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to try the
case against him. As such, upon the lapse of the thirty-
six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his
delivery to the proper Regional Trial Court, private
respondents were already guilty of violating Art. 125.
Thus, petitioner argues, when the Judge-Designate of
the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on
September 12, 1997, he was acting contrary to law
since by then there was no basis for the continued
detention of petitioner.25
13 | P a g e
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April 1998 Order,
stated that the duty of filing the corresponding
complaint in court was "fulfille by respondent when the
formal complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 with
the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours
after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7,
1997."26 The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that
while a municipal court judge may conduct preliminary
investigations as an exception to his normal judicial
duties, he still retains the authority to issue an order of
release or commitment. As such, upon the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC, there was already
compliance with the very purpose and intent of Art.
12527.
The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes to a "proper
judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to
prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person
without informing him of his offense and without
permitting him to go on bail28. More specifically, it
punishes public officials or employees who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the periods prescribed by law. The continued
detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the
expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125
without such detainee having been delivered to the
corresponding judicial authorities29.
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art.
125 mean "the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with
having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme
Court and other such inferior courts as may be
established by law.30"
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a
municipal trial court judge, as in the instant case,
conducts a preliminary investigation, he is not acting as
a judge but as a fiscal. In support, petitioner cites the
cases of Sangguniang Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs.
Albano, 260 SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171
SCRA 39, where it was held that "when a preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge, he performs a
non-judicial function as an exception to his usual
duties." Thus, petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v.
Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 862, that the city
fiscal is not the proper judicial authority referred to in
Art. 125 is applicable.
Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The
cited cases of Sangguniang Bayan and Castillo dealt
with the issue of whether or not the findings of the
Municipal Court Judge in a preliminary investigation
are subject to review by provincial and city fiscals.
There was no pronoucement in these cases as to
whether or not a municipal trial court, in the exercise of
its power to conduct preliminary investigations, is a
proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125.
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in
Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra, since the facts of this
case are different. In Sayo, the complainant was filed
with the city fiscal of Manila who could not issue an
order of release or commitment while in the instant
case, the complaint was filed with a judge who had the
power to issue such an order. Furthermore, in the
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Sayo case31, this Court even made a
pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person
"is a legal one and consists in making a charge or filing
a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice
of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance in
provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an
information with the corresponding city courts after an
investigation if the evidence against said person
warrants."
The power to order the release or confinement of an
accused is determinative of the issue. In contrast with a
city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge,
even in the performance of his function to conduct
preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an
order of release or commitment32. Furthermore, upon
the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court, the intent behind art. 125 is satisfied considering
that by such act, the detained person is informed of the
crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail33. Petitioner
himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order
his release when he applied for and was granted his
release upon posting bail34. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the
filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with
the postion of the Ombudsman that such filing of the
complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period
prescribed in said Article.
Finally, we note that it was the mother of private
complainant who filed the complaint against petitioner
with the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu. If tere was
any error in this procedure, private respondents should
not be held liable. In the same manner, petitioner's
argument that the controversial orders issued by the
MCTC are contrary' to law does not give rise to
criminal liability on the part of the respondents.
Respondent police officers may have rendered
themselves open to sanctions if they had released
petitioners without the order of the court, knowing fully
well that a complainant was a already filed with it.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of the assailed January 19, 1998
Resolution and the April 13, 1998 Order of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, the Court
resolves to DISMISS the petition. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
14 | P a g e
PD 1866/SEARCH WARRANTS
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD
PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live
ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP
131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y
with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3,
1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under P.D. 18662 thru the following
Information:3
That on or about the 26th day of October,
1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under
his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby
Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4)
long and one (1) short magazines with
ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver
Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6)
live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the
same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of
petitioner,5 but granted his application for bail. 6
During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea
of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused, 7 upon advice of counsel, 8 to make any
plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be
present in any and all stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete
rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting
petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an
"indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of
reclusion perpetua, as maximum". 11 Petitioner filed
his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the
appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the
Solicitor-General, convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on
December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail
bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in
the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining
petitioner's conviction 14 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
circumstances considered, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and
furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond
posted by accused-appellant for his
provisional liberty, FGU Insurance
Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is
hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is
directed to issue the Order of Arrest of
accused-appellant and thereafter his
transmittal to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National
Police where the said accused-appellant
shall remain under confinement
pending resolution of his appeal,
should he appeal to the Supreme Court.
This shall be immediately executory.
The Regional Trial Court is further
directed to submit a report of
compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on
July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a
"motion for reconsideration (and to recall the
warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was denied
by respondent court in its September 20, 1995
Resolution 18 copy of which was received by
petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next
day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari with
application for bail 19 followed by two
"supplemental petitions" filed by different
counsels, 20 a "second supplemental petition"
21 and an urgent motion for the separate
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the
Solicitor-General 22 sought the denial of the
application for bail, to which the Court agreed
in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.
23 The Court also granted the Solicitor-
General's motion to file a consolidated
comment on the petitions and thereafter
required the petitioner to file his reply. 24
However, after his vigorous resistance and
success on the intramural of bail (both in the
respondent court and this Court) and thorough
exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page
Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-
General now makes a complete turnabout by
filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment"
praying for petitioner's acquittal. 25
15 | P a g e
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported
by evidence on record and given credence by
respondent court, is as follows: 26
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26,
1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny
Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway
Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they
took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6,
TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their
ride on motorcycles (pp 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur
Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero,
running fast down the highway prompting him to
remark that the vehicle might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In
the local vernacular, he said thus: "Ka bilis na,
mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p. 7,
ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle
had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden
and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp.
7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the
vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz,
quite sure of what had happened, remarked "oy ta
na" signifying that Manarang had been right in his
observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and
immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or
shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its
side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of
both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay
Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report
the incident to the Philippine National Police of
Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and
called the Viper, the radio controller of the
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10,
ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the
vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident
taking the general direction to the north (p. 11,
ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the accident and
found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11,
ibid).
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he
went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle
and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the
chase he was able to make out the plate number of
the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15,
1193). He called the Viper through the radio once
again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading
north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in
a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993).
The Viper, in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan, upon
receipt of the second radio call flashed the message
to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to
apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units
of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was
its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the
Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993).
SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito
Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol
vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves
near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it
was the only passable way going to the north (pp.
8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to
cover the distance between their office and the
Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded
to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile
No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was
then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue
(pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO
Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar
(p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told
SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to
intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777
(p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the
vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident,
even passing through a flooded portion of the
MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of
the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch
up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15,
1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing
went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan
bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not
passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the
Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles
coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993).
He approached them and informed them that there
was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon
learning that the two police officers already knew
about the incident, Manarang went back to where
he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang
was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the
vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident
emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's
Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He
saw that the license plate hanging in front of the
vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and
he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan
bridge.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja
and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about
twelve (12) meters away from their position, the
two police officers boarded their Mobile car,
switched on the engine, operated the siren and
strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle
(p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle
forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from
Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993).
SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate
number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight
(p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window
and put his head out while raising both his hands.
They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla,
appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no
one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that
moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and
stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of
appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant
to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant
was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN,
16 | P a g e
March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with
both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit "C") tucked
on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15,
TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15,
ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the
gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging
that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16,
ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun
really was covered by legal papers, it would have to
be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming
appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and
run incident which was angrily denied by appellant
(p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at
the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the
cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets
inside (p. 20, ibid).
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing,
Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan
and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12,
TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police
officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He
pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate
number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing
and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and,
instead, played with the crowd by holding their
hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja
with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril
ko" (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket
was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of
an armalite rifle tucked in appellant 's back right,
pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so
when appellant turned around as he was talking and
proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid).
Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a
rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going
back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of
appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby
armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the
front by the driver 's seat. It had a long magazine
filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode
(pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers
covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily
that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO
Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of
firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to
appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic
Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32,
ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a
third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit "L")
with a single round in its chamber and a magazine
(pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live
bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a
black bag containing two additional long magazines
and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp.
36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated
by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was
transferred to the Police Investigation Division at
Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building
where he and the firearms and ammunitions were
turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-
10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation,
appellant admitted possession of the firearms
stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid).
He was not able to produce any permit to carry or
memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms
(pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit
"F") was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario
Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms
and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4,
1993). The Certification stated that the three
firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380
Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in
the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second
Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by
Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of Robinhood C.
Padilla (p. 10, ibid).
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest
was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule;
(2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple
illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel
punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the
Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime
charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the
Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality
of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not
make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following
instances: 28
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
17 | P a g e
 Paragraph (a) requires that the person be
arrested (i) after he has committed or while he
is actually committing or is at least attempting
to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. 29 Both
elements concurred here, as it has been
established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a
hit and run — an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be
stressed at this point that "presence" does not
only require that the arresting person sees the
offense, but also when he "hears the
disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at
once to the scene." 30 As testified to by
Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the
police and thereafter gave chase to the erring
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found
responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who
effected the actual arrest of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of
his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. 32
We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the
aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in
the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring
petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in
effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner)
who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of
resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able
to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover,
it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration
with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation, that the offense herein involved
fortunately did not become an additional entry to the
long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect,
like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has
been set in motion in a public place for want of a
warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need
to render aid or take action. 33 The exigent
circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, a
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining
nighttime — all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court
acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop
since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle
has been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover,
when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition
(M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was
proper as he was again actually committing another
offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions)
and this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner
could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he
had in fact just committed an offense. There was no
supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the
Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching
Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate number (PMA
777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and
railings thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting
police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the
vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then,
the arresting police officers acted upon verified
personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information. 40
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence,
any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea. 41
Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his
failure to quash the information, his participation in the
trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in
estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise,
by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects. 43
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized
from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless
search and seizure of property is valid, 44 are as
follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing
jurisprudence 46,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the
elements of which are: 47
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure
of evidence without further search. 48
3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
18 | P a g e
 4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it
indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that
which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within "plain view" of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver
and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back
pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies
to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was
immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a
casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been
held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in
the commission of a criminal offense, the . .
. police officers should happen to discover
a criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers
for the apprehension of the guilty person
and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53
Objects whose possession are prohibited by
law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant.
54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag
containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. 55 This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his
right against the alleged search and seizure 56, and
that his failure to quash the information estopped
him from assailing any purported defect. 57
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were
products of an active search done by the authorities on
the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure
without a search warrant nonetheless can still be
justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest
(first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the
police may undertake a protective search 58 of the
passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle 59
which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied
the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to
be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody
or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of
that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a
moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he
could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because
he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess
and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as
evidenced by a Mission Order 64 and Memorandum
Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang,
the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga,
Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two
requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of
the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first
element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and
offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face
of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as
our meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere
afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent
court's incisive observation. Thus:
Appellant's contention is predicated on the
assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Order were issued before the subject
firearms were seized and confiscated from him by
the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so.
The evidence adduced indicate that the
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were
prepared and executed long after appellant had been
apprehended on October 26, 1992.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any
document as proof of his authority to possess and
carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary
investigation of the charge against him for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions he could
not, despite the ample time given him, present any
proper document showing his authority. If he had,
in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and
Missions Order, he could have produced those
documents easily, if not at the time of
apprehension, at least during the preliminary
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel
inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms under
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the
initial presentation of his evidence in court,
appellant could have produced these documents to
belie the charged against him. Appellant did not.
He did not even take the witness stand to explain
his possession of the subject firearms.
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed
after the prosecution rested contain no allegation of
a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
authorizing appellant to possess and carry the
subject firearms.
19 | P a g e
 At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence,
the witness cited was one James Neneng to whom a
subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was
not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in
court but was not presented by the defense.
Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense
found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in
court without subpoena on January 13, 1994. 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce
and present the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt if they were really issued and existing before
his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that
the subject firearms were intended for theatrical
purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential
Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further
compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably
expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein
petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to
present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in
question and save himself from the long and agonizing
public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent
excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the
Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in
providing that:
VIII. c. When a Mission Order is
requested for verification by
enforcement units/personnels such as
PNP, Military Brigade and other
Military Police Units of AFP, the
Mission Order should be shown
without resentment to avoid
embarrassment and/or
misunderstanding.
IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is
the injunction that the confidential
instruction will be carried out through
all legal means and do not cover an
actuation in violation of laws. In the
latter event, this Mission Order is
rendered inoperative in respect to such
violation. 68
which directive petitioner failed to heed
without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt.
Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal
side of the Mission Order and declared further that he
did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly
misspelled as
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders
and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission
Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the
Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.
71 PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a
Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere
deputy commander. Having emanated from an
unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force
and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom
1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas outside Supt. Gumtang's
area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval
"by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in
this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also
unsupported by a certification as required by the March
5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense
which pertinently provides that:
No memorandum receipt shall be
issued for a CCS firearms without
corresponding certification from the
corresponding Responsible Supply
Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that
such firearm has been officially taken
up in that units property book, and that
report of such action has been reported
to higher AFP authority.
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been
authentic, we see no reason why he cannot
present the corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as
certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP,
does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform
Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees
of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a
Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel.
74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the
then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel
V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
No Mission Order shall be issued to
any civilian agent authorizing the same
to carry firearms outside residence
unless he/she is included in the regular
plantilla of the government agency
involved in law enforcement and is
receiving regular compensation for the
services he/she is rendering in the
agency. Further, the civilian agent must
be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which
specifically required the use of
firearms(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is
duly approved at the PC Regional
Command level or its equivalent level
in other major services of the AFP, INP
and NBI, or at higher levels of
command. 75 Circular No. 1, dated
January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of
Justice likewise provides as follows:
If mission orders are issued to civilians
(not members of the uniformed
service), they must be civilian agents
included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law
enforcement and are receiving regular
compensation for the service they are
rendering.
20 | P a g e
 That petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces
of evidence is accentuated all the more by the
testimony and certification of the Chief of the
Records Branch of the firearms and Explosives
Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's
confiscated firearms are not licensed or
registered in the name of the petitioner. 76
Thus:
Q. In all these files that you have just
mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you
find, if any?
A. I found that a certain Robin C.
Padilla is a licensed registered owner of
one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson
with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the
following firearms being asked whether
it is registered or not, I did not find any
records, the M-16 and the caliber .357
and the caliber .380 but there is a
firearm with the same serial number
which is the same as that licensed
and/or registered in the name of one
Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
Q. So in short, the only licensed
firearms in the name of accused Robin
C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith and
Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No.
TCT 8214?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the firearms that were the
subject of this case are not listed in the
names of the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir. 77
xxx xxx xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local
Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
PNFEO5 28 November 1992
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of
59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and
Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214
covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
Further certify that the following firearms are
not registered with this Office per verification
from available records on file this Office as of
this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380,
Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva
Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig,
MM under Re-Registered License.
This certification is issued pursuant to
Subpoena from City of Angeles.
FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.) JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch 78
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification from,
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO)
attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm. 79 In
People vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such
certification is sufficient to show that a person has in
fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact
that petitioner does not have the license or permit to
possess was overwhelmingly proven by the
prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed
with in the light of the evidences 81 that an M-16 rifle
and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol,
akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a
civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner. The Court,
therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible reason,
and none was presented, to depart from the factual
findings of both the trial court and respondent court
which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect
and finality. 83
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent
court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience
(sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that
respondent court should have applied instead the
previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the
reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no
longer exists. 84 He stresses that the penalty of 17 years
and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession
of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution. 85
21 | P a g e
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The
trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply
the governing law at the time of appellant's commission
of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. 87
And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted
for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous
statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that
the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to
appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a
penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and
excessive.
It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion, or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. "The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel and
unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188).
Expressed in other terms, it has been
held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive", "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community" 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional
prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as
the nature of the punishment that determines
whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and
that sentences of imprisonment, though
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual
if within statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity
of the statute in question lies with the appellant which
burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In
fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld
twice by this Court. 91 Just recently, the Court declared
that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms
[are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. .
. " 92 Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of the
prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us.
Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within
the province of Congress which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The
only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret
and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as
affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of
reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same
in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93
where the Court en banc provided that the
indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal
possession of firearm, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of
ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of
prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible
from the following explanation by the Court:
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
accordance with the doctrine regarding special
laws explained in People v. Simon, 94 although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law,
the penalties therein were taken from the
Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said
Code for graduating by degrees or determining
the proper period should be applied.
Consequently, the penalty for the offense of
simple illegal possession of firearm is the
medium period of the complex penalty in said
Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day
to 20 years.
This penalty, being that which is to be actually
imposed in accordance with the rules therefor
and not merely imposable as a general
prescription under the law, shall be the
maximum of the range of the indeterminate
sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken,
as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty
next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in
its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium
period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction
by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED
EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is
MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
22 | P a g e
RA 9165/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425
affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint
Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack
Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team composed of member of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence
group of the Philippine Army and the local police force
to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police
appellant’s name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that appellant would
arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the
agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis
bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the
day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members then posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the
same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier.
Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the
highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him
to his final destination. As appellant was about to board
a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to
the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu.
Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he
pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5
The team then brought appellant to the police station
for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned
over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who
marked it with his initials and with appellant’s name.
The field test and laboratory examinations on the
contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations,
one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section
11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the
accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on
May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully
have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or
4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without
any permit or license from the proper authorities to
possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on
May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did
then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully
transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or
4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license
from the proper authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty"
to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that
he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform
him about their ailing father. He maintained that the
charges against him were false and that no shabu was
taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest,
he explained that the police officers, through their van,
blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to
alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his
clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police
station for investigation.9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10
convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article
II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00;
but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section
11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
confiscated drug because of the team’s failure to mark
the specimen immediately after seizure. In his
supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time,
the legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search. He questions the
admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground
that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We
have reviewed such factual findings when there is a
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case.13
23 | P a g e
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest
and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and,
consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is
noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest
were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the
arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence
against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter
and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate
courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens
the whole case for review.1avvphi1 This Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in
arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every
circumstance in favor of the accused shall be
considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional
mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent
unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.14
After a thorough review of the records of the case and
for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that
appellant can no longer question the validity of his
arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during
the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact,
this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering
this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the
trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed
to have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended
his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellant’s
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis
of his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it
is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful.16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.17 Said proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.19
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act
of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit
a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as
he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet
of shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was
considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the
lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a
lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search;
generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless,
a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause
to make the arrest at the outset of the search.21 Thus,
given the factual milieu of the case, we have to
determine whether the police officers had probable
cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.22
The determination of the existence or absence of
probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the
established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential
agent of the police transacted through cellular phone
with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent
reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the
agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime
of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The
team members posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of
the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and
when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team
approached him and invited him to the police station as
he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out
his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug.23 The team then
brought appellant to the police station for investigation
and the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory
examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
24 | P a g e
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend
appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by
the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler,
Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to
another question: whether that information, by itself, is
sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless
arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that
"reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that
the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.24 We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People
v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by
his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the
police assembled a team and deployed themselves near
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in
front of the PNB building where two females and a man
got off. The informant then pointed to the team
members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then
carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team
approached her and introduced themselves. When asked
about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the
apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and
August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City,
received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors
of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining
that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the
Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five
days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud
was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the
civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had
headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day
with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that
same day, a team of police officers posted themselves
to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton. The police officers approached the suspects and
asked if they could see the contents of the box which
yielded marijuana leaves.29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received
information that a certain male person, more or less
5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on
the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and
maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana
leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the
accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag.
The police accosted the accused and informed him that
they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic
bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana
dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his
bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two
other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana
leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later
identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the
police approached them, introduced themselves as
police officers, then inspected the bag they were
carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag
turned out to be marijuana leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the
warrantless search precisely because there was no
adequate probable cause. We required the showing of
some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not
committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed, was committing, or about to
commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant
had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting
for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that he was committing or intending to commit a crime.
Were it not for the information given by the informant,
appellant would not have been apprehended and no
search would have been made, and consequently, the
sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that
deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a
search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited
in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33
People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People v.
Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the
Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious
circumstances that would indicate that the accused had
committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court,
except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by
the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless
searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any
urgency that would allow them to do away with the
requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1
Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the "tipped information" on May 19,
2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellant’s physical description but also his
name. Although it was not certain that appellant would
arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an
assurance that he would be there the following day
(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to
apply for a warrant.39
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
25 | P a g e
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction
cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence.
Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of
appellant of his right to question the illegality of his
arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in
the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of
justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to
be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection
of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges
may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure
as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence
of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-
breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of
justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While
this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace
and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them
to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set
by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of
Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the
latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to
inform the Court of the date of his release, or the
reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from
notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
ART. 134 OF THE RPC vis-à-vis RA 1700
G.R. Nos. 83837-42 April 22, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, PATERNA
RUIZ, NOLI G. NARCA, FR. NICK RUIZ, LYDIA
R. NARCA, RODOLFO CORTEZA and TOMAS
DOMINADO, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
In a Petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, the People raise the issue of whether the
crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives, punishable under P.D. 1866, is absorbed by
the crime of subversion, i.e., membership in a
subversive organization, punishable under R.A. 1700,
as amended.
The People filed this petition assailing the Resolution
dated May 4, 1988 of respondent Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion, granting the motion of private respondents to
quash the Information charging them with violation of
P.D. 1866, as being void ab initio and the order dated
June 8, 1988 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said resolution.
Private respondents Paterna Ruiz, Noli Narca, Fr. Nick
Ruiz, Lydia Narca, Rodolfo Corteza, and Tomas
Dominado, were charged with Subversion under R.A.
1700 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 40, based on the following information
filed on February 10, 1988:
That on or about the 1st and 2nd day of February,
1988 in Quezon City, Metro Manila Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one
another by overt acts with the common objective to
overthrow the duly constituted government of the
Republic of the Philippines, did, then and there,
willfully and unlawfully and feloniously affiliate
themselves with, become and remain members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/National
Democratic Front and/or its successor or of any
subversive association in violation of said law. 1
On February 12, 1988, six separate informations for
violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms)
were filed against the same respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. Said
Informations in substantially identical language allege:
That on or about the (1st and 2nd days) of February
the accused without any authority of law, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in (his/her) possession and control and
custody one (cal .45 pistol, armalite rifle,
handgranade, fragmentation granade, M-14 rifle),
without first securing any license/permit from the
proper authority and that said firearm is being used
in support and furtherance of the crime of
subversion or rebellion. 2
26 | P a g e
The facts 3 as presented by the prosecution reveal that
sometime in February 1988, elements of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines apprehended the private respondents in
separate operations.
Various ammunitions, firearms, and explosives were
found in their possession, while subsequent searches in
their respective hide-outs resulted in the confiscation of
several subversive materials, including documents
showing that they are ranking members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army, or are mere members.
Private respondents, in their motion to quash, 4 argued
that the filing of two (2) separate informations for each
of the accused violates the rule on double jeopardy, and
that there being only a single criminal intent, the other
offense of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives should be absorbed in the charge of
violation of R.A. 1700, following the doctrine in People
v. Hernandez. 5
The respondent Judge, in his questioned resolution,
agreed with this contention and held:
After evaluating the grounds and the arguments
in support of the same, the Court is of the
opinion that the motion to quash, as prayed for
should be GRANTED.
Applying by analogy the doctrine laid down in
the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515),
the possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives to which all the accused are charged
before this Court is a constitutive ingredient of
the crime of subversion and, hence, absorbed
by the same and cannot be punished separately.
Deadly weapons are needed and necessary to
generate the kind of force and violence to
accomplish the purpose of subversion. As
pointed out by Atty. Poncevic Ceballos,
counsel for the accused, the elements of force,
violence and other illegal means mentioned in
the law (R.A., 1700 as amended), may be done
with the use of violence, explosives and
ammunition or the possession thereof. 6
(Emphasis supplied)
It should be recalled that in People v. Hernandez,
supra, and even in the more recent cases of Enrile v.
Amin, 7and Enrile v. Salazar, 8 the issue resolved is
that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with,
nor may a separate information be filed, for violation of
common crimes, since force and violence are already
necessary ingredients of the same.
Private respondents do not dispute the fact that
rebellion is distinct from subversion. However, they
want to adopt by analogy existing jurisprudence on
rebellion to subversion on the theory that both crimes
are political offenses intended to destabilize and
overthrow the government with the use of force,
violence or other illegal means. 9 The trial court went
along with respondents when it stated:
. . . The possession of said items by all the
accused, as alleged in the information, is the
very element of force, violence, or other illegal
means in the crime of subversion. So that the
crime of alleged possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion or, subversion cannot
be separated from the charge of subversion. the
former crime being merely an element of the
latter crime. 10
We cannot agree.
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that
force and violence are the very essence of subversion,
then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v.
Liwanag,11 the Court categorically distinguished
subversion from rebellion, and held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion,
as it is more commonly called, is a crime distinct
from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion
is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms
against the Government for any of the purposes
specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code;
while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No.
1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In
rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking
of arms against the Government; whereas, in
subversion, mere membership in a subversive
association is sufficient and the taking up of arms
by a member of a subversive organization against
the Government is but a circumstance which raises
the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno vs. Military
Commissions, 12 this Court said that subversion, like
treason, is a crime against national security, while
rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government is the
very element of the crime of rebellion. 13 On the other
hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP), other similar
associations and its successors because their existence
and activities constitute a clear, present and grave
danger to national security. 14
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the
CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means. This is a
recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute
force and violence (contra to the arguments of private
respondents), but may partake of other forms as well.
One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring
subversive materials, where force and violence is
neither necessary or indispensable.
Private respondents contended 15 that the Court in
Misolas v. Panga 16 impliedly ruled that if an accused
is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866
and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of common
crimes as applied in rebellion would have found
application therein. The respondents relied on the
opinion of this Court when it said:
27 | P a g e
 . . . in the present case, petitioner is being
charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME
OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS
HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo
and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
17
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the
Court upheld the validity of the charge under the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined
that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable
in that case, considering that the legislature deemed it
fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal
possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D.
1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of
arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). "The
practical result of this may be harsh or, it may pose
grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to
those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of
the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to
enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire
into . . ." 18
The Court further said:
Undeniably, it is easier to prove that a person
has unlawfully possessed a firearm and/or
ammunition under P.D. 1866 than to establish
that he had knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliated himself with, became or
remained a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and/or its successor or of any
subversive organization under R.A. 1700, as
conviction under the latter "requires that
membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives
of the Party" (quoting from People v. Ferrer,
supra).
However, that the same act may be penalized
under two different statutes with different
penalties, even if considered highly
advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to
the accused, will not necessarily call for the
invalidation of the third paragraph of Section 1
of P.D. 1866 which provides for the higher
penalty. 19
On the issue of whether the filing of the subsequent
information constitutes double jeopardy, the trial court
in its resolution articulated, thus:
On the question of double jeopardy, the Court
agrees with the observation of the herein
accused that the filing of two separate
informations against each of the accused
constitute a violation of their constitutional
right of not being twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense where it can
be shown that the offenses in question arise
from a single criminal intent. (People v.
Elkanish, 90 Phil. 53)
The case of People v. Elkanish, 20 relied upon by the
Honorable Judge, is not in point with the present case.
Since We have resolved that P.D. 1866 can be
prosecuted independently of R.A. 1700, there can be no
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy can be invoked only
if one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds
from the same act, in which case, they cannot be subject
to separate prosecutions. Art. III, Section 21 of the
present Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
Implementing the constitutional provision, Rule 117,
Section 7 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
When the accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Thus, according to a long line of cases, in order that a
defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is
necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or
(2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of
the offense charged, that is, that the former case against
him for the same offense has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to
the charge.
Premises considered, We find this petition meritorious
and the resolution of the trial court dated May 4, 1988
quashing the informations for violation of PD 1866 is
hereby reversed and the informations reinstated. Let
this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings and trial. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
28 | P a g e
ART. 157 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 141718 January 21, 2005
BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, as the Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
56, and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, as the City
Jail Warden of Angeles City, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered on January 31,
2000.1
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was
indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-
816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 3.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda,
counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision
without offering any evidence, due to the petitioner’s
constant absence at hearings.
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of
the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24,
1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for
promulgation of the decision in the court of origin.
Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not
appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with
the notation that he no longer resided at the given
address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at
the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued
an order directing the recording of the decision in the
criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest
against the petitioner.2
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the
petitioner was apprehended and detained at the
Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000,
petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He
impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of
Mabalacat, Pampanga.3 Petitioner contended that his
arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one
day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal
Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade
service of sentence for almost nine years, his
criminal liability has long been totally
extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the]
Revised Penal Code.4
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on
January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein
respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail Warden of
Angeles City, as respondent.5
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner’s
detention was pursuant to the order of commitment
(mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court
III of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 3, dated January 25, 2000.6
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the
decision, which is the subject of this present appeal,
which pronounced:
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the
petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the
decision adverted to above had already prescribed,
hence, his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code:
"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should
go to some foreign country with which this Government
has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.
The elements of prescription are:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final
judgment;
2. That convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from
prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with
which we have no extradition treaty, or
committed another crime;
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the
lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the
service of the sentence by the convict.
In this case, the essential element of prescription which
is the evasion of the service of sentence is absent.
Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the
penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the
service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably,
at the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date
set for the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the
petitioner failed to appear and remained at
large.1a\^/phi1.net
29 | P a g e
"There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in
this case, because such evasion presupposes escaping
during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty." (Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G.
No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).
Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles
City Jail in compliance with the Order of Commitment
(Exhibit E) is not illegal for –
"A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment,
convicting and sentencing the defendant in a criminal
case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his
detention, unless it appears that the court which
pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or
exceeded it." (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil 90, 24 J.F. 94,
Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).
WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-
founded, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Angeles City, January 31, 2000.7
From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on a question purely of law
and raised the following issue:
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE "SHALL
COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN
THE CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF
SENTENCE" IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE CONSTRUED?
PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN
TO RUN?8
Petitioner claims that:
xxx the period for the computation of penalties under
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to run
from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes
final and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and
dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.9
Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner:
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based
on the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs. Warden, 48
O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most
respectfully submits, not good case law. It imposes
upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is
contrary to the spirit, nature or essence of prescription
of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and opens
the law to abuse by government.
THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A
CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.
It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an
essential element, the convict must serve at least a few
seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail
sentence and then escapes before the computation of
prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner
respectfully submits is not a condition stated in Article
93, which states that, the prescription of penalties "shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence."
There is no dispute that the duty of government to
compel the service of sentence sets in when the
judgment of conviction becomes final.
The dispute, however, is in the construction of the
phrase "should evade the service of sentence." When
does the period of prescription of penalties begin to
run? The Infante ruling construes this to mean that the
convict must escape from jail "because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence
consisting in deprivation of liberty."
Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that
were the intention of the law, then the phrase "should
evade the service of sentence" in Article 93 would have
read: "should escape during the service of the sentence
consisting in deprivation of liberty." The legislature
could have very easily written Article 93 to read this
way –
"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should escape
during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should
go to some foreign country with which this Government
has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription."
But they did not.
The legislature wrote "should evade the service of
sentence" to cover or include convicts like him who,
although convicted by final judgment, were never
arrested or apprehended by government for the service
of their sentence. With all the powers of government at
its disposal, petitioner was able to successfully evade
service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at
least nine (9) years, from August 9, 1991 to January 20,
2000. This is approximately 3 years and 5 months
longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of the penalty
imposed on him.
That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did
not attend the trial at the Municipal Trial Court and the
promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August
9, 1991 is of no moment. His bond for provisional
release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was
surely issued against petitioner. The undisputed fact is
that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioner’s
arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch III.
30 | P a g e
The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner
and compel him to serve his sentence began on August
9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto
mayor penalty also began to run on that day considering
that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner
never gave himself up [n]or was [he], until January 20,
2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor
did he flee to some foreign country with which [our]
government has no extradition treaty, that 5-year
prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from
August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.
For reasons known only to it, however, government
failed or neglected, for almost nine (9) years, to arrest
petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence
[which] should not be taken against petitioner. He was
able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a
period longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of his
penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of his
criminal liability.
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive
period of the penalty never began to run in favor of
petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the
service of his sentence imposes a condition not written
in the law. It also violates the basic principle that the
criminal statutes are construed liberally in favor of the
accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit
behind or essence of statutes of limitations [and]
prescription, in criminal cases.10
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case
of Infante v. Warden11 . In said case, Infante, the
petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced
to seventeen years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven
months and eleven days, he was granted a conditional
pardon. The condition was that "he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Ten
years after his release on conditional pardon, Infante
was found guilty by a Municipal Court for driving
without a license. Infante was immediately ordered
rearrested for breach of the condition of his pardon.
One of the issues raised by Infante in his petition,
xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the
petitioner had been recommitted to jail – one year and
11 days – had prescribed. xxx 12
The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:
The contention is not well taken. According to article
93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription
of penalties commences to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is
evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence
is an essential element of prescription. There has been
no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one
and prescription were to be applied, its basis would
have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and
computation could not have started earlier than the date
of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.13
A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that
it is not on all fours with the present case. In Infante,
the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-
arrested. Hence, he had started serving sentence but the
State released him. In the present case, the convict
evaded service of sentence from the start, and was
arrested eight years later.
The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in
accord with applicable decisions of this Court. The
issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code14 has been interpreted several times
by the Court.
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan15 falls squarely
within the issues of the present case. In that case,
petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day
of the execution of her sentence.1awphi1.nét On the
same day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her
arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later,
petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant
of arrest, on the ground that the penalty had prescribed.
Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light
offense and since light offenses prescribe in one year,
her penalty had already prescribed. The Court
disagreed, thus:
xxx The period of prescription of penalties — the
succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence". What then is the concept of
evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says
Article 157:
"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict
who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. xxx"
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the
offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is
serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of
liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be
so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during
the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." That escape should take place while serving
sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken
place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts
or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed,
evasion of sentence is but another expression of the
term "jail breaking."
xxx
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence
to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
31 | P a g e
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a
convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment — was thereafter never placed in
confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run
in her favor.16
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo 17 , the Court cited and
reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was charged
for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election
Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in
toto. During the execution of judgment on October 14,
1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge
issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his
bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years
later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of
arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him
had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the
trial court. Del Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial
court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Upon denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this
Court. The Court decided against Del Castillo and after
quoting the ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeals in
full, it ratiocinated, thus:
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is
consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega vs.
Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the
term of such imprisonment.1a\^/phi1.net
Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed.
He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based
on settled jurisprudence and applicable laws. It did not
engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted
the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed
in confinement, prescription never started to run in his
favor.18l^vvphi1.net
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court
pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to
those who are convicted by final judgment and are
serving sentence which consists in deprivation of
liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins
only when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. Since
petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before
his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence
never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of
his service, the period for prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his
sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor
and should forthwith be released unless he is being
detained for another offense or charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is AFFIRMED, but
petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for
having fully served his sentence unless he is detained
for another offense or charge.
No costs.

The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not SO ORDERED.

perceive any compelling reason to deviate from our
earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the
Tanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the

prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under
said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have
been convicted by final judgment by escaping during
the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,

"escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles
93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one
who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to
have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to

prison. In fact, even before the execution of the
judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding.
Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court
because he has ceased to live a life of peace and
tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who
chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords
compassion only to those who are deserving.

32 | P a g e
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FALSIFICATION BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
ART. 171 PAR. 4 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 146731 January 13, 2004
AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and
SERVANDO BERNANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Resolution2 dated 31 May 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58875. The Court
of Appeals dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Agustina
M. Enemecio against respondents Office of the
Ombudsman and Servando Bernante. The present
petition also assails the Court of Appeals’ Resolution
dated 7 December 2000 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio ("Enemecio") is a
utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and
Technology, College of Fisheries Technology
("CSCST-CFT"), Carmen, Cebu. Private respondent
Servando Bernante ("Bernante") is an Assistant
Professor IV of CSCST-CFT.
On 30 March 1998, Enemecio filed an administrative
complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of public
documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation
against Bernante before the Office of the Executive
Dean of CSCST-CFT.3 Dr. Severino R. Romano,
CSCST-CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint
to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas
("Ombudsman").
Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal
complaint against Bernante for falsification of public
document.4 The Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to
submit her affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses.
After Enemecio submitted the required affidavits, the
Ombudsman ordered Bernante to submit his counter-
affidavit. The administrative complaint was docketed as
OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201, while the criminal
complaint was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286.
The Ombudsman jointly tried the two cases.
Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-
painting of obscene and unprintable words against her
on the walls of the CSCST Carmen Campus. Enemecio
claimed that Bernante also shouted defamatory words
against her while she was inside the school premises.
Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear
in his leave application that he was on forced leave
from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation
leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth,
Bernante was serving a 20-day prison term, from 14
May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of
the crime of slight physical injuries in Criminal Case
No. NR-1678-CR. Bernante was able to receive his
salary during his incarceration since then CSCST-CFT
Superintendent Andres T. Melencion approved
Bernante’s application for leave. Enemecio contended
that Bernante was not entitled to receive salary for that
period because of his "falsified leave applications."5
For his part, Bernante did not deny that he was in prison
from 15 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. He maintained that
he received his salary for that period because of his
duly approved leave applications. Bernante also alleged
that Enemecio filed the criminal and administrative
complaints against him in retaliation for the case he
filed against Enemecio’s friends, Dean Severino
Romano and Bernadette Mante. Bernante denied he was
behind the spray-painting of obscenities against
Enemecio on the walls of the school campus.6
On 13 January 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a
decision dismissing the administrative complaint
against Bernante in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201. The
Ombudsman explained:
On the issue of the alleged falsification of respondent’s
application for leave by making it appear that he was on
vacation when in truth and in fact he was serving a
sentence for a criminal conviction, we have determined
that there is no regulation restricting the purpose or use
of an employee’s earned leave credits. Considering that
the application for leave filed by the respondent was
duly approved by the appropriate official concerned, it
matters not how he utilizes his leave for it is not a
requirement that the specifics or reasons for going on
leave be spelled out in such application.
On the issue of the spray painting of obscenities on the
walls of the school, the evidence is insufficient to prove
that respondent was the person responsible for such as
there were no eye witnesses to such activity. The
testimony of Bernadette Mante merely identifies the
respondent as allegedly having a drinking session with
security guard Estanislao Lavaria at around 11:00 on
the night of March 29, 1998. Furthermore, witness
Mante states that there are about ten (10) to twelve (12)
families living inside the dormitory facing the school
walls where the grafitti appeared. Despite this number,
not one single person appeared to have witnessed
respondent spray painting the questioned grafitti on the
walls of the campus (TSN, April 19, 1999). While it
may be probable that the only person or persons who
could have had the opportunity to spray paint the said
grafitti on the night of March 29, 1998 or in the early
morning hours of March 30, 1998 were the respondent
and security guard Lavaria, this is not sufficient
justification to directly blame them for such event.
33 | P a g e
Regarding the complainant’s allegation that on March
10 and 25, 1998, the respondent defamed the former by
uttering slanderous words, it appears that only the
incident occurring on March 10, 1998 was corroborated
by the testimony of witness Delfin Buot (TSN, April 7,
1998). Witness Buot testified that he was about (3)
meters from the respondent when the latter shouted the
words ‘buricat’ (whore) ‘putang ina’ and ‘maot’ (snob)
to the complainant. However, the circumstances of the
utterance, particularly the time and the relation of the
protagonists involved, leads us to conclude that the
same is removed from the official functions of the
respondent as a professor of the school. Stated
otherwise, the act of the respondent was not in relation
to his official functions. In the case of Palma vs.
Fortich, et al., 147 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court ruled
that:
In administrative actions against municipal
officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v.
Crisologo, et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]),
classified the grounds for suspension under two
categories, namely: (1) those related to the
discharge of the functions of the officer
concerned (neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other forms of maladministration
of office and (2) those not so connected with
said functions. Under the second category,
when the crime involving moral turpitude is not
linked with the performance of official duties,
conviction by final judgment is required as a
condition precedent to administrative action.
Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation
charge is now pending before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court in Catmon, Cebu under
Criminal Case No. 30006-CR, the matter of
respondent’s administrative culpability is still
premature to be determined herein.7
On the same date, the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal complaint against Bernante in OMB-VIS-
CRIM-98-02868 finding no probable cause to indict
Bernante for falsification of public document. The
Ombudsman explained thus:
It is well established by documentary evidence
that the applications for leave filed by the
respondent for the period from May 15 to 31,
1996 were duly approved by the head of office,
which in this case is Mr. Andres T. Melencion,
Vocational School Superintendent. All these
leaves were with pay indicating that the
respondent availed of his leave credits which
are undeniably due to him by law. It matters not
how the respondent utilizes the days where he
is on leave, be they enjoyed as a vacation or, in
this case, incarceration for a crime. There
appears to be no regulation or law against the
utilization of leave credits for purposes other
than recreation. As such, there could be no
falsification where nothing is being
misrepresented in the official leave forms
which the respondent prepared and submitted.9
The Ombudsman denied Enemecio’s motion to
reconsider the dismissal of the criminal complaint in its
Order of 28 February 2000. In denying the motion, the
Ombudsman stated:
We find the complainant’s arguments
untenable. There is no dispute that the leave
forms are public documents. What is in dispute
is whether or not the failure of the respondent
to indicate therein the reasons for his leave
amounts to a crime of falsification. It is
submitted that it does not, for the simple reason
that the form itself does not require stating the
reasons for going on leave. An employee
simply indicates through check marks the
nature of the leave he is availing of, which in
the case at bar, respondent chose to avail of his
forced and vacation leave credits. Nevertheless,
the omission does not affect the validity of its
approval. What is indicated in the leave forms
is only the need to specify the whereabouts of
the employee who goes on leave. However, it is
not a requirement that specifics must be
provided. In any case the omission to state the
location of a vacationing employee is not a
condition sine-qua-non for its approval.
To sum it up, there is no falsification of leave
forms where there is no requirement for the
indication of reasons for going on leave.
Regardless of such a requirement, the need to
indicate the whereabouts of a vacationing
employee is not a necessity for its approval.10
Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, assailing the resolutions
which dismissed the criminal complaint and denied the
motion for reconsideration in OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-
0286. Applying the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,11 the
appellate court dismissed Enemecio’s petition for
having been filed out of time. The appellate court also
stated that the proper remedy available to Enemecio
was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In her motion for reconsideration, Enemecio argued that
the appellate court should not have relied on Fabian.
Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA 6770") and
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
("AO No. 07") insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman
to the Supreme Court. Enemecio asserted that the other
provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of
AO No. 07, including the "final and unappealable
character" of orders, resolutions or decisions
exonerating a respondent from any criminal liability,
still stand. Enemecio stated that she filed the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
because she considered Bernante’s absolution from the
administrative complaint in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201
as already final and unappealable. As there was no
adequate remedy of appeal, Enemecio claimed that her
only recourse was a petition for certiorari before the
appellate court under Rule 65.12
34 | P a g e
The Court of Appeals denied Enemecio’s motion for
reconsideration in its Order of 7 December 2000.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals stated
that in Fabian, the Supreme Court held that appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman
to the Court of Appeals must be brought by petition for
review under Rule 43. The appellate court stated that a
petition for review must be filed within 15 days from
notice of the assailed final order or resolution. Since
Enemecio received on 22 March 2000 a copy of the
Ombudsman’s Order denying her motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that Enemecio
had only until 6 April 2000 to file a petition for review.
Enemecio filed her petition only on 8 May 2000. The
appellate court further stated that Enemecio’s allegation
in the petition that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law is false. The proper remedy available to Enemecio
is a petition for review.13
In denying Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals clarified that Fabian does not apply
to Enemecio’s petition assailing the dismissal of the
criminal complaint against Bernante. The appellate
court stated that what Fabian declared void was
Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the
Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. Under the Fabian
ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in
administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added
that it follows that the power to review decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the
Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the
appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.14
The Issues
Enemecio contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction
over the petition.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing
to appreciate that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 was the appropriate course of action
considering the circumstances obtaining.
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule
65 filed by petitioner by misinterpreting the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Fabian vs.
Desierto.15
The issues boil down to whether a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed before the Court of Appeals is the
proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal
complaint filed with the Ombudsman.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to dismiss this petition.
Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 6516 questioning the
Ombudsman’s Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and
Order dated 28 February 2000 dismissing the criminal
case against Bernante.17 Thus, the Prefatory statement
of Enemecio’s Petition in the Court of Appeals states:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and the
Order dated 28 February 2000 both issued by
the Public Respondent in the Ombudsman Case
docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0201 and
entitled, "Agustina Enemecio vs. Servando
Bernante, Asst. Professor IV, CSCST- College
of Fisheries Technology, Carmen, Cebu", for
being a manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The
Resolution dated 13 January 2000 dismissed
the criminal complaint for malversation and
falsification of public documents filed against
herein Private Respondent while the Order
dated 28 February 2000 denied herein
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Certified machine copies of the aforesaid
Resolution and Order are hereto appended as
Annexes "A" and "B" respectively. (Emphasis
supplied)
The appellate court dismissed Enemecio’s petition and
denied her motion for reconsideration. Enemecio now
comes to this Court via this petition for review,
claiming that "what was involved in the petition
before the appellate court was the administrative,
not the criminal case."18 Enemecio thus stresses that
"there is no reason for the Court of Appeals to say that
the petition concerned the criminal case."19
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete
turnabout of Enemecio and her counsel, Atty. Terence
L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandez’s conduct has fallen far
too short of the honesty required of every member of
the Bar.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed
with the Court of Appeals a certiorari petition assailing
the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dismissing the
criminal case, not the administrative case against
Bernante. For this reason, the appellate court in its 7
December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and stated
that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition as
the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative
disciplinary actions. Atty. Fernandez’s attempt to
mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to secure a
decision favorable to his client’s cause does not escape
our attention. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Fernandez is duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
35 | P a g e
He must always bear in mind that good faith and
honorable dealings with judicial tribunals are primary
obligations of an attorney. He must always remember to
deal with courts with truthfulness and not to trifle with
court proceedings.20 For this, Atty. Fernandez should be
admonished not to commit similar acts again.
Even if we consider Enemecio’s petition before the
Court of Appeals as questioning the dismissal of the
administrative case against Bernante, the action must
also fail. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.21 The only
provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the
designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum
and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other
matters in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality
or non-finality of decisions of the Ombudsman, remain
valid.22
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the
findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of
probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.23
Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the
Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she
availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence,
the instant petition should be dismissed outright.
As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio
failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the
legal obligation to disclose where he was going to
spend his leave of absence. "Legal obligation" means
that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth
of the facts narrated.25 Bernante may not be convicted
of the crime of falsification of public document by
making false statements in a narration of facts absent
any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend
his vacation leave and forced leave.
In PCGG v. Desierto,26 the Court ruled that the
Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a
criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should
be filed or not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in form or
substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the
inquiry if he finds otherwise. If, in the Ombudsman’s
view, the complaint is sufficient in form and substance,
he may proceed with the investigation. In fact, the
Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint
outright without going through a preliminary
investigation.27
Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion
that the Ombudsman has carefully studied the merits of
the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has
thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint, it
would not be right to subject the private respondent to
an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.28

Even if we consider the substance of the case, we find WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s merit. No costs.
determination of whether there exists a prima facie case
against Bernante. SO ORDERED.

Enemecio assails the dismissal of the criminal charges

against Bernante for two reasons: (1) that she was able
to prove before the Ombudsman the charge for
malversation against Bernante; and (2) that Bernante
himself admitted that he signed and filed the subject
leave applications.

Enemecio asserts that she was able to present before the

Ombudsman the payroll of the CSCST-CFT employees
covering the period from 16 May 1996 to 31 May 1996
signed by Bernante. Enemecio asserts that this
document proved that Bernante "actually received and
was paid the amount of P3,185.08 as a result of his
falsified letter-requests and leave applications."
According to Enemecio, these constituted acts of
malversation.

Enemecio’s contentions do not deserve serious

consideration.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal

Code, the elements of falsification of public documents
through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c)
the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false;
and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third
person.24

36 | P a g e
ART. 171 PARS. 2 AND 4 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 144026 June 15, 2006
FERNANDO S. DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 109, finding petitioner Fernando S. Dizon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Private Document as defined and
penalized under Art. 172, par. 2, in relation to Art. 171,
pars. 2 and 4 thereof of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner was charged with falsification of a private
document under the following information:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July,
1986, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Fernando S. Dizon, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit
falsification of a private document, to wit: Said
accused, with intent to damage Titan Construction
Corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a
certification dated July 10, 1986, by stating and making
it appear in said document that the First United
Construction Corporation has undertaken building
construction, sewage, water, and other civil works, for
the following projects of Titan Construction
Corporation:
Title Cost
1. Calapan Super Area Shop P 8,900,000.00
2. Masbate Super Area Shop 9,800,000.00
3. Catarman Super Area Shop 12,000,000.00
and that the same was executed and signed by the
President of Titan Construction Corporation, when in
truth and in fact, as said accused well knew that said
certification was not issued nor authorized to be issued
by Titan Construction Corporation and that it is false
because First United Construction Corporation never
had any participation of the projects listed therein
which were undertaken by Titan Construction
Corporation and that the signature appearing in said
certification as being that of Titan Construction
Corporation’s President is false and a forgery since it
was not signed by its President, to the damage and
prejudice of Titan Construction Corporation.3
Under arraignment on 17 May 1991, accused petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
This criminal case against petitioner originated from a
civil action4 for prohibition, damages with petition for
the issuance of temporary restraining order/preliminary
injunction filed by Titan Construction Corporation and
Fernando M. Sopot on 25 January 1991 against the
members of the Pre-Post Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Public Estates
Authority (PEA). In said civil case, plaintiffs
maintained that the members of the PBAC and the PEA
erroneously awarded to First United Construction
Corporation, in a bidding held on 30 October 1990, the
contract for the construction of the Bahay Pangarap
Project of the PEA.
A witness for the prosecution, Atty. Jaime Linsangan,
counsel for Titan Construction Corporation, presented
certain documents submitted by First United
Construction Corporation during the bidding conducted
on the Bahay Pangarap Project. Among those presented
as evidence in court was the alleged "Certification"
dated 10 July 1986 issued by Titan Construction
Corporation which reads as follows:
July 10, 1986
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that FIRST UNITED
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION has undertaken
building const’n, sewerage, water, and other civil works
for the following on-going projects of Titan
Construction Corporation
Title Cost
1. Calapan Super Area P 8,900,000.00
2. Masbate Super Area 9,800,000.00
3. Catarman Super Area 12,000,000.00
Titan Construction Corporation
by: (Sgd.) President5
According to Atty. Linsangan, he had presented a copy
of said certification to the officers of Titan Construction
Corporation, and upon verification learned that the
projects mentioned in said certification were never
undertaken by First United Construction Corporation.
He was likewise informed by the same officers that the
signature on the said certification was not the signature
of the former President of Titan Construction
Corporation, Vicente Liwag.
Another witness, Jose Caneo, testified that he is the
Vice President for Special Projects of Titan
Construction Corporation since 1981 and that petitioner
and his father, Felipe Dizon, were his former co-
employees and had worked with them. He alleged that
petitioner, as the possessor of the questioned
certification, which petitioner himself submitted to the
PEA in support of their bid, must be presumed to be the
author and/or perpetrator of the falsification, and that he
presumes it must be the petitioner who delivered the
certification to the PEA as the certification was among
the records of the First United Construction
Corporation where the petitioner was one of its officers.
He further claimed that he has no personal knowledge
as to who affixed the forged signature on the document.
37 | P a g e
For the defense, petitioner and his father testified. From
their testimonies, it was discerned that petitioner is a
civil engineer by profession and had worked with the
National Housing Authority from 1978 to 1981. He was
likewise an employee of Titan Construction
Corporation as office engineer before he accepted
overseas employment in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return
in 1985, he worked with some friends and organized
their own construction company now known as First
United Construction Corporation. Petitioner had
discussed with his father his plans to participate in
government projects and thus, requested the latter to
secure a certification from the Titan Construction
Corporation attesting that they had done some
construction works for said company. Thereafter, his
father gave him the certification he requested.
The petitioner claimed that he had no part in the
preparation of said document, and neither does he have
knowledge as to who signed said certification, as his
father only informed him that the certification came
from Jose Caneo. He also disclosed that he does not
know Mr. Vicente Liwag. Petitioner also admitted that
the First United Construction Corporation had no part
in the completion of the three projects referred to in the
certification, but nonetheless allowed his engineers,
specifically, Myleen Hizon, to include said certificate in
the documents submitted for their pre-qualification bid
thinking that the signature appearing therein was
genuine. According to petitioner, he only used the
questioned certification due to the belief that the Titan
Construction Corporation had authorized its use, and
only came to know of the alleged forgery of the
signature appearing in said document when the criminal
case was filed against him. Furthermore, petitioner
maintained that the reason the criminal case was filed
against him was due to his refusal to pay the ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) demanded of him by Jose
Caneo and Benito Yao, said amount representing the
expected profit from the Bahay Pangarap Project.
Felipe Dizon, father of the petitioner, on his part,
testified that he was employed by Titan Construction
Corporation from 1981 until 1991, and was both vice
president and project manager of said corporation in
1986. He stated that his son requested him to secure a
certification to the effect that he had done some
construction work in order to help him take part in
public biddings, and explained that he found nothing
wrong with this request as this was an ordinary practice
of construction companies, the same having been done
by Titan Construction Corporation when it was starting.
In order to secure said certification, he approached Jose
Caneo and conveyed his son’s request. Jose Caneo then
told him to prepare the certification and he will have the
same signed by Vicente Liwag. Thereafter, he asked
one of the employees of Titan Construction Corporation
to type said certification, choosing the projects to be
mentioned therein as said projects were known to him
as vice president and project manager. He asserted that
when Jose Caneo gave him the certification two weeks
later, he was of the belief that the signature appearing
thereon was genuine; otherwise, he would not have
given the same to his son. Also, Felipe Dizon claimed
that the case was filed as a result of the disqualification
of Titan Construction Corporation from the public
bidding for the Bahay Pangarap Project, and that he was
informed by Benito Yao that the case will be withdrawn
if his son paid ten million pesos representing the
expected profit from said project.
On rebuttal, Jose Caneo countered that he was never
approached by Felipe Dizon to have any certification
signed by Vicente Liwag and likewise denied
demanding any amount from the petitioner for the
withdrawal of the case.
After trial and a perusal of the evidence presented, the
trial court concluded that petitioner, then the Executive
Vice President of First United Construction
Corporation, in his desire to join public biddings,
requested his father to secure a certification that would
show that he had participated in some of the projects of
Titan Construction Corporation, knowing fully well that
he in fact had not participated in any of Titan
Construction Corporation’s projects. His father, in turn
gave the petitioner a certification allegedly from Titan
Construction Corporation declaring that First United
Construction Corporation had participated in the
construction of the three projects mentioned therein.
The said certification was material to enable First
United Construction Corporation to qualify for the pre-
qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap Project of the
PEA. As a result of the submission of said certification,
First United Construction Corporation pre-qualified and
was thereafter awarded the project, causing the other
bidders, including Titan Construction Corporation, to
lose and thus, sustain loss.
Consequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of
conviction on 22 April 1993. According to the court a
quo:
From the foregoing evidences (sic) it would appear that
the accused Fernando Dizon caused it to appear in the
certification that the President of Titan Construction
Corporation, Mr. Vicente Liwag participated in the act
of issuing the said document. His admission to the
effect that he caused the securing of the certification for
the purpose of submitting the same to the Public Estates
Authority (PEA) as part of the pre-qualification
requirements in the bidding. In the case of People vs.
Domingo, 49 Phil 28; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil
1253, the possessor of the falsified document is
presumed to be the author thereof, and the one who
stands to benefit therefrom is presumed to be the author
thereof. He admitted requesting his father to secure the
said certification. He likewise admitted that he has no
participation in anyone of the projects mentioned
therein. That despite such knowledge of falsity of the
contents of the document he accepted and allowed the
same to be used for the pre-qualification bidding before
the PEA.
His admission to the effect that said certification was
necessary to pre-qualify his company to participate in
the bidding for government projects knowing fully well
its falsity shows his intent to misrepresent facts and/or
pervert the truth in the narration of fact contained in the
certification with a wrongful intent to injure and/or
damage third person.
38 | P a g e
The Court hardly believe[s] the defense of the accused
that one Benito Yao was extorting money from him in
the amount of P10,000,000.00 on the promise that the
case would be withdrawn. The records of the Titan
Construction Corporation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission does not show on
record that Benito Yao is a stockholder, director, or
officer of the said company.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
FERNANDO S. DIZON guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private Document
as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in
relation to Art. 171, par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby
sentences him to imprisonment of Two (2) YEARS,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and
a fine of P5,000.00.6
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the conviction before
the Court of Appeals. On 29 November 1999, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming
the judgment of the trial court with modification of the
penalty, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that, absent any aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, appellant FERNANDO S.
DIZON is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto
mayor, minimum term, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9)
MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision
correccional, as maximum term. All other aspects of the
appealed decision stay.7
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently denied; hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the judgment of conviction because the
prosecution failed to adduce any proof to substantiate
the allegation that petitioner was involved in the
preparation of the falsified certification, and that the
sole basis of the conviction was the legal presumption
that the possessor of the falsified document is presumed
to be the author thereof. Petitioner argues that for said
presumption to take hold, it must first be shown that the
questioned document is a forgery or was indeed
falsified. According to petitioner, the foregoing is not
true in the instant case because the State failed to
introduce satisfactory evidence of the forgery or
falsification of the certification, as well as to establish
that the said certification was unauthorized. Petitioner
rationalizes that while it is true that, other than the
signature of the president of Titan Construction
Corporation, the representations made in the
certification are false, it does not necessarily follow that
its execution was unauthorized by Titan Construction
Corporation. He further justifies that there is evidence
in record that attests to a furtive practice in the
construction industry where certifications, of the kind
involved in this case, are issued by established
construction corporations to assist new construction
firms to pre-qualify in public biddings.
Petitioner also stresses that, based on his testimony and
that of his father, it has been satisfactorily shown that
he had no participation in the drafting and issuance of
the certification. Petitioner explains that the
certification was prepared by his father, Felipe Dizon,
who was then still an officer of Titan Construction
Corporation, and that through an intermediary, Felipe
Dizon arranged to have the certification signed by the
president of Titan Construction Corporation, Vicente
Liwag. Thereafter, Felipe Dizon delivered the signed
certification to his son. Petitioner maintains that with
his father’s admission of complicity, it was tenuous for
both the trial court and the appellate court to hold that
petitioner is the forger of the certification.
In order to properly address the issues presented by
petitioner, it is necessary that we discuss the elements
of the crime of Falsification of Private Document under
the Revised Penal Code which the petitioner has been
accused of perpetrating. The elements of Falsification
under Paragraph 2 of Article 172 are as follows:
1. That the offender committed any of the acts
of falsification, except those in par. 7,
enumerated in Art. 171;
2. That the falsification was committed in any
private document;
3. That the falsification caused damage to a
third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.
Under Article 171, par. 2, a person may commit
falsification of a private document by causing it to
appear in a document that a person or persons
participated in an act or proceeding, when such person
or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or
proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 4
of Article 171 is perpetrated by a person who, having a
legal obligation to disclose the truth, makes in a
document statements in a narration of facts which are
absolutely false with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person.
In order that petitioner may be convicted of falsification
under par. 2 of Article 171, it is essential that it be
proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had caused it to
appear that Mr. Vicente Liwag had authorized the
issuance of said certification, when in truth, Mr. Liwag
did not partake in said issuance of the certificate. Stated
differently, for petitioner to be convicted of falsification
under par. 2, the allegation in the Information that he
"willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a
document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by
stating and making it appear in said document x x x that
the same was executed and signed by the President of
Titan Construction Corporation, when in truth and in
fact, as said accused well knew that said certification
was not issued nor authorized to be issued by Titan
Construction Corporation x x x and that the signature
appearing in said certification as being that of Titan
Construction Corporation’s President, x x x" must be
clearly established.
39 | P a g e
The threshold issue then is whether the signature of Mr.
Vicente Liwag was forged. Contrary to the findings of
the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, this
Court deems that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, Atty. Jaime Linsangan and Jose Caneo,
failed to prove with moral certainty that Mr. Liwag did
not authorize the issuance of the certification.
Atty. Crescini: Mr. Caneo, I address your attention to
paragraph 8 of your affidavit complaint which reads:
"that being in possession of the said certification which
he himself submitted to the PEA in support of their bid,
the said Fernando S. Dizon is presumed to be the
author/perpetrator of the said falsification." You
remember this allegation of this affidavit-complaint?

As a general rule, findings of fact by the trial court, as Mr. Caneo: Yes, sir.
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are given great
respect and even regarded with finality by this Court; Q: I understand and take it therefore that your only
however, this rule accepts of certain exceptions, such as conclusion in believing that the certification Annex A
1) when the findings are grounded entirely on of your affidavit complaint was falsified by the accused
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when the is because he was allegedly in possession of the same?
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; 3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; A: Yes, sir.
4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) Q: It actually therefore also goes [to say that] you did
when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went not actually see him prepare physically the certification
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are Annex A, you did not see it?
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to the trial A: I did not see.
court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
Q: You have no personal knowledge as to who affix(ed)
9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the signature on Annex A purporting to be the signature
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
of the President. You did not see it also?
by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or 11) when the A: Yes, sir.
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if Q: You have no personal knowledge of who affix(ed)
properly considered, would justify a different the signature?
conclusion.8 Particularly in criminal cases where the
accused stands to lose his liberty upon conviction, the A: Yes, sir.
Court must be content that the findings of fact and the
conclusions drawn by the lower courts leading to his Q: As a matter of fact, when you claimed that Mr.
conviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond Dizon was the one who himself submitted to the PEA
reasonable doubt. this certification, Annex A, you only presumed it was
he who personally delivered it?
The conviction of petitioner was anchored on the
testimonies of Atty. Linsangan that he was informed by A: Yes, sir.
the officers of Titan Construction Corporation that the
signature appearing on the certification was not the Q: You did not see him in person actually in the act of
signature of the corporation president Vicente Liwag; delivering that certification to the PEA?
and of Jose Caneo that he has no personal knowledge as
to who actually affixed the signature on the certification A: Yes, sir.
and that he presumes it to be the petitioner. He (Caneo)
assumes that it must be petitioner who was in Q: You only presumed he was the one who delivered it
possession of the document as he presumes that it must because the certification was among the records of the
be petitioner who delivered the certification to the PEA FUCC?
as the certification was among the records submitted by
First United Construction Corporation, where the A: Yes, sir.
petitioner was one of the officers.
Q: And you further made the presumption because Mr.
From the foregoing, the Court holds that the Dizon is an officer of FUCC?
prosecution fell short of sufficiently ascertaining that
the signature appearing in the certification was, in fact,
A: Yes, sir.
not that of Mr. Vicente Liwag, much less, that
petitioner is the author of the certification. Atty.
Linsangan was merely informed that the signature Q: That’s all you know, your presumptions?
appearing in the certification was not that of Mr. Liwag.
On the other hand, Jose Caneo only presumed that A: Yes, sir.9
petitioner was the possessor of the alleged falsified
document as he assumed that it was petitioner who
delivered the certification to the PEA. Jose Caneo’s
presumption was, however, directly demolished by the
cross-examination of Atty. Crescini:

40 | P a g e
Thus, the presumption then of Jose Caneo is totally
devoid of any basis.
From the foregoing it is clear that Atty. Linsangan and
Jose Caneo had no personal knowledge as to the matter
they testified to. The testimony of Atty. Linsangan
merely established that he was informed by certain
officers of Titan Construction Corporation that the
signature of Vicente Liwag appearing on the
certification was forged, however, the said officers
where never presented during trial to prove such claim
of forgery. When evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without any
evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.10 On the
other hand, the testimony of Jose Caneo was based on
mere presumptions and speculations, and bare
assumptions and speculations cannot be bases for
conviction.11 A conviction for a criminal offense must
be based on clear and positive evidence and not on
mere assumptions.12 Thus, the reliance by the lower
court on the hearsay and speculative testimonies of the
abovecited witnesses, is misplaced.
By and large, there was no competent evidence to prove
the allegation of the officers of Titan Construction
Corporation that the signature affixed on the
certification was not that of Vicente Liwag, thus
making the issuance of the certification unauthorized.
The prosecution did not present Mr. Vicente Liwag, or
any other knowledgeable witness to testify whether the
signature appearing on said certification was indeed not
by Mr. Liwag, thus establishing the fact that the
certification was falsified by making it appear that the
issuance was actually consented to by the president of
Titan Construction Corporation. Absent clear proof that
Vicente Liwag did not sanction the issuance of said
certification, the Information that petitioner has
committed falsification of private document under
Article 172, in relation to par. 2, Article 171, cannot be
considerably proved.
With respect to par. 4 of Article 171, what is sought to
be penalized is the act of making in a document of
utterly false narration of facts by a person who has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of said facts,
thereby causing injury to a third party. And in the case
at bar, in order that petitioner may be penalized under
par. 4, it is necessary that the allegations in the
Information that "x x x accused, with intent to damage
Titan Construction Corporation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a
document, to wit: a certification dated July 10, 1986, by
stating and making it appear in said document that the
First United Construction Corporation has undertaken
building construction, sewage, water, and other civil
works, for the following projects of Titan Construction
Corporation: 1.Calapan Super Area Shop –
P8,900,000.00; 2.Masbate Super Area Shop –
P9,800,000.00; 3.Catarman Super Area Shop –
P12,000,000.00 x x x, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew x x x that it is false because First
United Construction Corporation never had any
participation of the projects listed therein which were
undertaken by Titan Construction Corporation x x x, to
the damage and prejudice of Titan Construction
Corporation" be proved.
According to the court a quo, it has been substantially
gathered from the evidence adduced in trial that:
. . . [A]ccused Fernando Dizon, then the Executive
Vice-President of the First United Construction
Corporation, in his desire to be able to join public
biddings, requested his father Felipe Dizon to secure a
certification to the effect that he has participated in
certain projects of the Titan Construction Corporation,
knowing fully well that he has no participation
whatsoever on said projects. That the father in turn gave
the son a certification from the Titan Construction
Corporation to the effect that he has participated in the
construction of the three (3) projects mentioned therein.
That the said certification is material to enable him to
qualify the pre-qualification bid for the Bahay Pangarap
Project. That because of the certification submitted, he
actually pre-qualified and was awarded the project.
That the same caused the other bidders to lose in the
bid, hence damage is present.13
From the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the
elements of the crime of falsification under par. 4 of
Article 171 necessary to convict petitioner, particularly
that a) the offender makes in a document statements in
a narration of facts; b) that he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; c) that
the fact narrated by the offender are absolutely false;
and d) that the perversion of the truth in the narration of
fact was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person are present in the instant case.
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the trial court,
further stressed that petitioner admitted in court that he
had requested his father to secure a certification from
the Titan Construction Corporation declaring that First
United Construction Corporation had done some
construction work for the former; that said certification
was necessary for First United Construction
Corporation to qualify in public biddings for
government projects; and that petitioner knew fully
well the falsity in said statements. Said acts of the
accused caused damage not only to Titan Construction
Corporation which suffered when it lost in the bidding,
but also to the State which expected faithful compliance
with the requirements of prequalification, bids, and
awards on government infrastructure contracts as
provided under Presidential Decree No. 1594.
This Court is not convinced. In the case at bar, the
circumstances relied upon by the trial court do not lead
to an inference exclusively consistent with the guilt of
the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution failed to prove that it was indeed petitioner
who prepared the document nor that he was the one
who provided the facts contained in the certification.
Even from the admissions of both petitioner and his
father, what can only be established is that petitioner
requested his father to secure a certification that they
had done some construction work for Titan
Construction Corporation. Nothing in said testimony
indicates that petitioner had asked his father to commit
any falsification. Petitioner did not provide nor even
suggest what detailed information will be included in
said certification.
41 | P a g e
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses merely
inferred that by virtue of petitioner’s position as
Executive Vice President of First United Construction
Corporation, he was in possession of said document and
thus can be presumed to be the author of said
falsification. There is nothing in the evidence to support
a positive conclusion that petitioner was actually in
possession of the falsified document.
Even the presumption that the person who is benefited
by the falsified document is presumed to be the author,
cannot be applied in this case. Petitioner was not
directly benefited by the certificate. It must be pointed
out here that the said certification benefited First United
Construction Corporation which was granted the
construction project, and petitioner was merely an
officer of said company and any benefit he may have
received from said project would only have been
incidental.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20143, dated 29
November 1999, affirming the Decision dated 22 April
1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Branch 109,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new
one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Fernando S.
Dizon of the crime of Falsification of Private Document
as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2, in
relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code,
on reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

From the totality of evidence presented before the

Court, it cannot, with propriety and due respect for the
law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent
evidence on which to base an affirmative finding of
guilt in relation to the requisite degree of moral
certainty. The Court finds the testimonies and
documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there
may be inherent weaknesses for the defense, at most,
the proofs in this case only cast suspicion on petitioner.
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench
and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. While the Court is not inclined
to hold that the evidence is conclusive that he is not
guilty, neither is it convinced that he is so, based on the
circumstances of this case. The Court is, thus, under a
long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in
favor of herein petitioner. So long as the acts of the
petitioner and the circumstances can be explained upon
any other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with his
guilt, he must be acquitted.

To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal

is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the
guilt of the petitioner beyond the point of moral
certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon
it.14 It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court,
keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as
precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that
which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on
reasonable doubt will prosper even though the
accused’s innocence may be doubted, for a criminal
conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.16
And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient
to support a conviction,17 and, thus, that which is
favorable to the accused should be considered.18

42 | P a g e
ART. 171 PAR. 2 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 170453 October 30, 2006
NESTOR A. BERNARDINO and CELEDONIA N.
TOMAS, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 170518 October 30, 2006
EUGELIO G. BARAWID, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review are
the September 19, 2005 Decision1 of the
Sandiganbayan which found petitioners guilty of
falsification of public document in Criminal Case No.
27548 and its November 18, 2005 Resolution2 denying
petitioners' motion for new trial.
The facts show that petitioner Nestor A. Benardino
(Bernardino) was the former Municipal Mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija and Chairman of the
PreQualification Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC)
for the construction of the extension of the public
market of Guimba; while petitioner Eugelio G.
Barawid (Barawid), a Municipal Treasurer was a
member of the PBAC. Petitioner Celedonia N. Tomas
(Tomas) was the PBAC's acting Secretary. The other
members of the PBAC were Municipal Councilors,
Ernesto T. Mateo and Benito A. Rillo; Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator Efren N.
Fronda; Municipal Budget Officer Abraham P. Coloma;
Municipal Engineer Jose F. Mateo; Municipal
Accountant Renato L. Esquivel; and non-government
organization representatives Paulino G. Quindara and
Luis F. Rendon, Jr.
The "Minutes of the opening of bids"3 show that on
December 8, 1997, the PBAC members convened at the
Municipal Library of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The Acting
Chairman, assisted by Commission on Audit (COA)
representative Rolando E. Ronquillo (Ronquillo),
assessed the qualifications of the four bidders who
participated and thereafter awarded the project to
Mascom Design and Engineering International
(MASCOM) whose bid was determined to be the
lowest and most advantageous to the government of
Guimba. The Minutes was signed by petitioner Tomas
in her capacity as the acting Secretary of the PBAC.
On the same date, petitioners Bernardino and Barawid
and the other PBAC members signed a
"Prequalification Bid and Award Committee"4
stating that "after due deli[b]eration, the committee
resolved as it is hereby resolved, to recommend [the]
Award [of the] Contract [to MASCOM] for offering the
lowest [bid]." Their signatures also appear in an
"Abstract of Bidding"5 and "Abstract of Proposal"6
both reflecting the names of the four bidders and their
respective bids.
Meanwhile, prior to the construction of the public
market extension, prosecution witness Jose Lucius
Pocholo Dizon (Mayor Dizon) was elected Municipal
Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 1998 local
elections. He thereafter conducted a public bidding for
the construction of the same extension of the public
market and awarded the project to KYRO Builder as
the lowest bidder. Consequently, MASCOM filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal
compliant against Mayor Dizon and petitioner Barawid
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In his Rejoinder-Affidavit,7 Mayor Dizon contended
that the award to KYRO is proper because the project
could not be validly given to MASCOM as there was in
fact no competitive public bidding held on December 8,
1997. In support thereof, he attached the similarly dated
June 27, 2000 affidavits8 of former PBAC members,
namely, Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara,
Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo,
Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr., stating
that no public bidding was held in connection with the
construction of the Guimba public market extension nor
was the local PBAC convened on December 8, 1997.
Affiants also declared that the documents in connection
with the alleged bidding were delivered to their
residence/office; and that they signed the same upon the
representation of MASCOM's representative that the
documents were necessary for the Philippine National
Bank loan application of the municipality in connection
with the construction of the public market.9
On the basis of the admission of the said affiants, the
Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the case against
Mayor Dizon and petitioner Barawid and instead filed
the instant case for falsification of public documents
under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code against all the members of the PBAC members
including the herein petitioners.
The Information charged petitioners and the PBAC
members of falsification by making it appear in the
"Minutes of the opening of bids," "Prequalification Bid
and Award Committee," "Abstract of Proposal," and
"Abstract of Bidding," that they and COA
representative conducted a public bidding on December
8, 1997, participated in by four bidders, when no such
bidding was in fact conducted, to wit:
That sometime on December 8, 1997, or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Celedonia N. Tomas, Acting Secretary
of the Prequalification, Bids and Award
Committee (PBAC) of the Municipal
Government of Guimba, Nueva Ecija; Nestor
A. Bernardino, then Mayor and PBAC
Chairman; and the PBAC members, namely:
Benito A. Rillo and Ernesto T. Mateo, both
members of the Sangguniang Bayan; Eugelio
G. Barawid, Municipal Treasurer; Efren N.
43 | P a g e
 Fronda, Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator; Abraham P. Coloma, Municipal
Budget Officer; Jose F. Mateo, Municipal
Engineer; Renato L. Esquivel, Municipal
Accountant; and Paulino G. Quindara and Luis
[F.] Rendon, Jr., NGO representative, while in
the performance of and taking advantage of
their official positions, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
prepare and make it appear in the 'ABSTRACT
OF BIDDING', the 'ABSTRACT OF
PROPOSAL', the MINUTES OF THE
OPENING OF BIDS' and the 'PBAC
RECOMMENDATION', that a public bidding
for the construction of the New Guimba Public
Market Extension (wet market) was concluded,
that four (4) firms, to wit:
1. Bounty Builders
2. M.O.M Enterprise
3. F.L. Reguyal Construction
4. MASCOM Design and Engineering
International
purportedly participated therein and submitted
their bids, that a COA representative was
supposedly present during the opening of the
bids, and that the PBAC supposedly convened
and deliberated on the purported bids when, in
truth and in fact, the aforesaid firms and the
COA representative did not so participate and
the PBAC did not actually convene and
deliberate on the purported bids, as in fact, no
such public bidding was conducted and said
documents were executed to justify the award
of the contract to build the aforesaid public
market extension to MASCOM Design and
Engineering International to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Upon arraignment, petitioners and the other PBAC
members, except for Benito A. Rillo who died on
December 5, 2001, pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, prosecution witness and COA
representative Ronquillo declared that he did not attend
any public bidding regarding the construction of the
Guimba public market on December 8, 1997.11 He
admitted, however, that he has no personal knowledge
whether or not a bidding was truly conducted on said
date.12 The same declaration was made by prosecution
witness Mayor Dizon who admitted that he does not
know whether the PBAC conducted a public bidding.13
The prosecution also offered in evidence the affidavits
of PBAC members, Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G.
Quindara, Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto
T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma,
Jr., in support of its theory that no public bidding was
held by the PBAC on December 8, 1997. Counsel for
the said affiants admitted the genuineness of the
signature appearing in the affidavits.14
Petitioners and the PBAC members filed their separate
motions for leave to file demurrer to evidence but were
denied. They were, however, given a 10 day period
within which to file their respective demurrer to
evidence without prior leave of court, subject to the
legal consequences under Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court. Nevertheless, petitioners and the PBAC
members filed separate demurrer to evidence.
On September 19, 2005, the Sandiganbayan rendered
the assailed judgment of conviction holding that the
Affidavits of Luis F. Rendon, Jr., Paulino G. Quindara,
Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F. Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo,
Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P. Coloma, Jr., as
corroborated by the testimonies of COA representative
Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon proved beyond reasonable
doubt that no public bidding was conducted by the
PBAC on December 8, 1997. The dispositive portion
thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Nestor A. Bernardino, Ernesto
T. Mateo, Eugelio G. Barawid, Efren [N.]
Fronda, Abraham [P.] Coloma, Jr., Jose F.
Mateo, Renato [L.] Esquivel, Paulino [G.]
Quindara, Luis [F.] Rendon, Jr. and Celedonia
N. Tomas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged in the Amended
Information and, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence law and without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby
sentencing each of them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) Years,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE DAY of prision mayor as
maximum with the accessories thereof and to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00) with costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners Bernardino and Tomas filed a motion for
new trial16 on the basis of the alleged newly discovered
evidence consisting of the affidavits executed in 2003
to 2005 by Renato L. Esquivel, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren
N. Fronda, Jose F. Mateo, Abraham P. Coloma, Jr.,
Eugelio G. Barawid, 17 Luis F. Rendon, Jr.,18 and
Paulino G. Quindara,19 in connection with a separate
administrative case filed against said affiants for
dishonesty and grave misconduct before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Affiants stated in the said affidavits
that there was in fact a public bidding held on
December 8, 1997; and that they executed their June
27, 2000 affidavit stating that no bidding occurred,
because of the fear and intimidation employed by
Mayor Dizon who needed said affidavits to bolster his
defense in the case for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act filed against him. Petitioners
Bernardino and Tomas claimed they were not party to
the said administrative case against the affiants and that
it was only after the promulgation of the decision in the
falsification case that affiants apologized and informed
them of the existence of said 2003 and 2005 affidavits.
44 | P a g e
Petitioner Barawid and the other PBAC members also
filed their separate motion for new trial20 on the ground
of alleged errors of law and irregularities in the trial of
their case.
On November 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied the
separate motions for new trial.21 Renato Esquivel, Jose
Mateo, Efren Fronda, Luis Rendon, Jr., and Paulino
Quindara filed a petition before this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 170499 but was denied in a Resolution dated
June 26, 2006. Their motion for reconsideration was
denied with finality on September 18, 2006.
Petitioner Barawid filed a separate petition docketed as
G.R. No. 170518 which was consolidated with the
petition of Bernardino and Tomas in G.R. No.
170453.22
The issue is whether the guilt of petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To
justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution
must adduce the quantum of evidence sufficient to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
of the accused. Accordingly, when the guilt of the
accused-appellants have not been proven with moral
certainty, it is our policy of long standing that their
presumption of innocence must be favored and their
exoneration be granted as a matter of right.23
In the instant case, petitioners were charged with
falsification under paragraph 2, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate. Its elements are: (1)
that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary
public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official
position; (3) that he falsifies a document by causing it
to appear that a person or persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.24
The evidence presented by the prosecution to establish
that no bidding was conducted on December 8, 1997
were the June 27, 2000 affidavits of Luis F. Rendon,
Jr., Paulino G. Quindara, Renato L. Esquivel, Jose F.
Mateo, Ernesto T. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and
Abraham P. Coloma, Jr. The testimonies of COA
representative Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon could not be
considered for purposes of determining whether a
public bidding was indeed held on that day because of
their admission that they do not have personal
knowledge whether or not said bidding was indeed
conducted.
Pertinent portions of the similarly worded affidavit of
Luis F. Rendon, Jr., and Paulino G. Quindara, reads:
5) That the truth of the matter is that no public
bidding for the contract to construct the new
public market [extension] x x x of the
Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija was
actually held or conducted on 08 December
1997 nor was the Local PBAC convened in
connection therewith, and that bidding
documents relative thereto purporting to show
that a public bidding was conducted in
accordance with the applicable laws, rules and
regulations on public bidding and award of
contracts were hand delivered to me in my
residence by a representative of Mascom, a
certain Caloy Santos for my signature.
6) That I have no knowledge of and/or
participation in the preparation of the subject
bidding documents, except my signature
thereon.25
Renato L. Esquivel deposed that:
3. That no actual public bidding was held
and/or conducted on 08 December 1997 in
connection with the contract for the
construction of the new public market
[extension] x x x of the Municipality of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija as supported by the
following:
a. The Office of the Municipal
Accountant of the Municipality of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, was not
furnished any
communication/letters/notice stating
that such public bidding will be
conducted which is normally done
before any public bidding is held.
b. The covering public bidding
documents were personally delivered to
me in my residence by a representative
of Mascom Design & Engineering
International for my signature.
c. I have no knowledge of and/or
participation in the preparation of the
covering public bidding documents
allegedly held on 08 December 1997,
except for my signature thereon.
d. The covering public bidding
documents were not signed by the
assigned Commission on Audit
representative.26
Jose F. Mateo, Efren N. Fronda and Abraham P.
Coloma, Jr., similarly averred that:
3. That no actual public bidding was held
and/or conducted on 08 December 1997 in
connection with the contract for the
construction of the new public market
[extension] x x x of the Municipality of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
4. That the covering bidding documents for the
public bidding allegedly held on 08 December
1997 were hand delivered to me by a
representative of Mascom Design &
Engineering International (Mascom for brevity)
in my office for signature.27
45 | P a g e
Likewise the Affidavit of Ernesto T. Mateo, reads:
3) That no actual public bidding was
held/conducted on 08 December 1997 in
connection with the contract for the
construction of the new public market
[extension] x x x of the Municipality of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
4) That the covering bidding documents for the
alleged public bidding conducted on 08
December 1997 were signed by me in my
residence.28
As can be gathered from the foregoing, the affiants
declared that no public bidding was held on December
8, 1997. However, said declaration is merely an
expression of an opinion and not a fact considering that
like prosecution witnesses Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon,
they also have no personal knowledge as to whether or
not a bidding was indeed conducted at the Municipal
Library of Guimba, Nueva Ecija on December 8, 1997.
Pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the opinion of witnesses, as in the instant case, is not
admissible. Since affiants were not in the place where
the alleged bidding was held, they are not in the
position to declare with moral certainty that no such
bidding in fact occurred. Their statements that they
signed the documents showing that they participated in
the determination of the lowest bidder with knowledge
that they did not in fact so participate therein, bind only
them and not petitioners whose whereabouts on
December 8, 1997 were not established to be known to
said affiants. And while the Information alleged
conspiracy such that the acts of the affiants may be
attributed as well to petitioners Bernardino and Tomas,
the same cannot be considered against said petitioners
inasmuch as no evidence was presented by the
prosecution to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy must be
established by positive and conclusive evidence. It
cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be
established as a fact.29
Under Section 36, Rule 130 of the same Rules,
witnesses can testify only to those facts which they
know of their personal knowledge, that is, which is
derived from their own perception, except as otherwise
provided by the rules. They are not generally allowed to
testify on their opinions or conclusions but must state
facts within their knowledge as it is the province of the
court to make deductions from pertinent facts placed in
evidence and to decide matters directly in issue. Their
testimony must be confined to statements of concrete
facts within their own observation, knowledge, and
recollection – that is, facts perceived by the use of their
own senses – as distinguished from their opinions,
inferences, impressions and conclusions drawn from
such facts, which are incompetent and inadmissible.30
While there are exceptions31 to the rule on
inadmissibility of opinions, the subject declarations in
the instant case is not one of them.
Moreover, the evidence showing that seven members of
the PBAC did not attend the public bidding does not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Tomas as
acting Secretary and the other three members, that is,
the deceased Benito A. Rillo, and herein petitioners
Bernardino and Barawid, did not convene on December
8, 1997. Otherwise, stated, the absence of the seven
PBAC members did not eliminate the possibility that
the rest of the members convened and carried out the
public bidding with four participating bidders. Under
the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof, which in this case is the prosecution, loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present
case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction.32
In sum, the Court finds that petitioners Bernardino and
Barawid must be acquitted considering that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond moral
certainty. The law, to guard against injustice, requires
that the offense be established by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. It is a serious matter, not only to a
party, but to the state as well, to take a person from the
ordinary avocations of life, brand him a felon, and
deprive him of his liberty, appropriate his labor, and
cast a cloud upon his future life, and humiliate his
relatives and friends. To authorize the state in doing
this, there must be no reasonable doubt on the accused's
guilt.33
However, the same cannot be said with respect to
petitioner Tomas. Even if we assume that all the PBAC
members attended the bidding, including those who
executed an affidavit to the contrary, petitioner Tomas
is still liable for falsification. Note that she was the only
one who signed the "Minutes of the opening of bids"
which stated, among others, that COA representative
Ronquillo attended the public bidding on December 8,
1997. As acting Secretary of the PBAC she has the duty
to prepare or intervene in the preparation of the Minutes
of the meetings of the PBAC which should be recorded
pursuant to Section 3734 of the Local Government
Code. In making it appear that COA representative
Ronquillo attended the bidding when the latter
categorically testified that he never attended a public
bidding in the Municipality of Guimba, Nueva Ecija on
December 8, 1997, petitioner Tomas took advantage of
her official position,35 rendering her liable for
falsification under Article 171 paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Finding the testimony of COA
representative Ronquillo to be convincing and there
being no ill motive shown that would impel him to
perjure himself, the Court gives credence to his
declaration and sustains the judgment of conviction
against petitioner Tomas.
In the same vein, petitioner Tomas' motion for new trial
was correctly denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
evidence presented in support of said motion was that a
public bidding was truly conducted and that the PBAC
members attended the same. However, this has no
bearing on the culpability of petitioner Tomas which is
predicated on her untruthful declaration that the COA
representative attended the bidding, regardless of the
presence or absence of the PBAC members.
46 | P a g e
Under Article 171 of the of the Revised Penal Code,
falsification is punishable with prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed P5,000.00. There being no modifying
circumstance in the instant case, the penalty of
petitioner Tomas shall be imposed in its medium
period, ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36 she is
entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of
which may be fixed anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor, which is
prision correccional with a duration of 6 months and 1
day to 6 years. Petitioner Tomas is therefore sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the September 19, 2005 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27548 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE with respect to
petitioners Nestor A. Bernardino and Eugelio G.
Barawid who are ACQUITTED of the crime of
falsification under Article 171 paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Insofar as petitioner Celedonia N. Tomas is concerned,
the September 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 27548 finding her guilty of the
crime of falsification under Article 171 paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the indeterminate penalty
which is fixed at 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.
ART. 171 PAR. 4 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner, vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian,
the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the
crime of falsification of public document under Art.
171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second
Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as
follows:
That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the
Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and
within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking
advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be
false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil
Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is
required by law in order to support the appointment of a
certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the
Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he
appointed as such by stating and making it appear in
said document that there was such a position existing
and that funds therefore were available. When in truth
and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was
no such position or item and no funds were available
for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for
1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating
said position and appropriating the necessary funds
therefor.
xxx
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The
facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as
follows:
It appears from the evidence that sometime in June
1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a
resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel
L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan,
Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the
office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to
the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if
there was any vacancy. When she was informed that
there was, she went to see the accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because
he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal
Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was
not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to
report for work the following day and that she should
be included in the budget. The accused then
accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she
could report for work.
47 | P a g e
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the
Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When
she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the
Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment
papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in
the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975
by the accused.
xxx
Accompanying her appointment is the certification,
among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No.
203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel
L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of
Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed
to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh.
"C").
xxx
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on
July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same
day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered
services for the months of July, August, September,
October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B",
"B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as
October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to
receive her salary, but she was told that there was no
money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the
accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She
went to the treasurer who told her that there was no
money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan,
Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid
salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia
Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if
she had complete appointment papers. hereafter, she
filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976,
against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to
Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal
council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the
annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly,
and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the
previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-
enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as
the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-
1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the
municipal council of Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was
deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there
was no new item or appropriation for the position of
clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of
Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the
office of the Municipal Council appearing in the
Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for
1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974
by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez
to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to
the new position of a Clerk to the office of the
Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was
already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic
A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits
"K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same
position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who
was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs.
"K" and "K-l").
xxx
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public document as charged in the
information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a
fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in
accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby
therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the
CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L.
Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court
has decided a question of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of
the trial court convicting him of the crime of
falsification despite the following
A. The evidence on record which consists of the
testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows
the absence of criminal intent on the part of the
accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage
of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the
allegedly falsified certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the position are
available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of
law.
D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due
process of law when the trial court proceeded with the
trial in his absence despite a pending petition for
change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p.
13.]
Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any
merit.
The offense of falsification by a public officer under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by
"any public officer, employee or notary who, taking
48 | P a g e
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts: . . .
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; .
. .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification,
the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472,
July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at
bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of
the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an
untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained
in the certification which he issued in connection with
the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The
certification, having been issued by a public official in
the exercise of the function of his office is a public
document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is
immaterial whether or not the Civil Service
Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed
received the document issued by petitioner. Since the
certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance
with the standard forms prescribed by the government
(specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to
law, the certification was invested with the character of
a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S.
v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which
is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. Here, falsification of such document was
committed when the petitioner stated that funds were
available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was
appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position
itself did not even exist and no funds had been
appropriated therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued
contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion
of law is not meritorious. The respondent court,
upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly
ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not
arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a
fact or combination of facts stated but by the
application of the artificial rules of law to the facts
pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161;
Black's Law Dict., p. 362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that
the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the
position are available' does not require the application
of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are
available for the position what one should do was (sic)
to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the
applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists
and funds are allocated therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the records
which shows that there is no position and funds therefor
referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware
of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that
"funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of
Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and
therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year,
1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477.
In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2")
accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality
of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975,
there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal
Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the
position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed.
Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the
Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such
position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his
certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute
falsity of the statement made in the document is met
when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in
what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot,
10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the
foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third
requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are
fully satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise present.
Under the civil service rules and regulations,
specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of
Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and
"D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the
position to be filled up is required to be signed by the
head of office or any officer who has been delegated the
authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to
issue this certification which is designated as Civil
Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him in said certification which includes
information as to the availability of the funds for the
position being filled up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a
wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary
when the falsified document is a public document. This
has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955
case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The
Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that
wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a
third person is not an essential element of the crime of
falsification of public document. The rationale for this
principal distinction between falsification of public and
private documents has been stated by the Court in this
wise: "In the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the Idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the
reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at
918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In
falsification of public documents therefore, the
controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to
third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such
damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].
49 | P a g e
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the
evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of
criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this
Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to
falsification of public documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7
Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to
exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith
has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as
municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all
meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d),
Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances
and resolutions passed by the municipal council
[Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He
was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the
Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was
the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela
for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that
under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that
fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the
position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His
knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he
even affixed his signature in attestation to the
correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V
and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1"
and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot
claim good faith in issuing a certification of the
availability of funds for the questioned position since at
the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the
fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no
new ordinance creating the new position to which he
appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the
municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must
be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the
absolutely false certification as to the availability of
funds for the subject position. The law considers his act
criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4),
Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to
commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the
person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear [United States v.
Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the
presumption that petitioner committed the act with
criminal intention, which arose from proof of his
commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he
took advantage of his official position in falsifying the
document should likewise be rejected. This essential
element of falsification of a public document by public
officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or
use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his
office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v.
Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office
is considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his office
which consist of either making or preparing or
otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document
[U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v.
Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of
petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the
certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa
Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law
committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the
trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a
pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme
Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough
review of the record reveals that petitioner had been
afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the
absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable
the defense to present its evidence although the
prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7,
1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]
It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to
due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza,
G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110
SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion
to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has
been properly accorded due process of law:
. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard,
and a judgment awarded within the authority of
a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-
48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing
People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946);
Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused
is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf
but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at
the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be
deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be
deemed to have waived his right to be present during
the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules
of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf
[People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue
with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for
the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of
the petition for change of venue, he also failed to
appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original
Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of
the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the
trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his
client for the reason that he has lost contact with the
latter who already went abroad [See Original Records,
p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for
rendering its decision on the basis solely of the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in
conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same
is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
50 | P a g e
ART. 172 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which
seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in
Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7 August 2007
which found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of
Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, and its Resolution2 dated 22
October 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial/Reception
of Newly Discovered Evidence.
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents,
defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto in Cotabato City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused NORMALLAH A.
PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato
City, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation thereto, taking
advantage of her official position, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her
Employee Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura
Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM,
for the purpose of claiming her salary for the months of
August and September 2000.4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation asking that she be given the
opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a
preliminary investigation in order that her right to due
process would not be violated.5 Petitioner further filed
an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or
Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s
motion for preliminary investigation/reinvestigation
decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the
opportunity to be heard before the Office of the
Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on
preliminary investigation.7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.8
Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and the
Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order.9 The parties
did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and
agreed that the issues to be resolved were as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum,
being then the Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, falsified her
Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the
Office of the Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by
imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the
Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes
of claiming her salary for the months of August and
September 2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of
her official position in order to commit the crime
charged.10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely:
Subaida K. Pangilan,11 former Human Resource
Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan,
former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism,
ARMM;12 and Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph
Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a
retired government employee and formerly a Human
Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which
position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As
such, one of her duties was to receive applications for
clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She
explained that an Employees Clearance was a
requirement to be submitted to the Office of the
Regional Director by retiring employees, employees
leaving the country or those applying for leave in
excess of thirty days. The person applying for clearance
shall get a copy of the employees clearance and shall
accomplish the same by having the different division
heads sign it.
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-
petitioner – Norma Pacasum – to be the former
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism
(DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000,
petitioner submitted the original of an Employees
Clearance to her office in compliance with the
memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by
Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and
employees to clear themselves of property and money
accountabilities before their salaries for August and
September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the
Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature of
Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document was
not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-
law, and that the latter’s signature was very familiar to
her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the
original Employees Clearance with the intention of
sending the same to her daughter-in-law for the purpose
of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of
her name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There
being no messenger available, she instead called up
Laura to come to her office to verify the signature.
Laura, whose office was only a walking distance away,
came and inspected the clearance, and denied signing
the same. After she denied that she signed the
clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer
of the Employees Clearance took said document and
left.
51 | P a g e
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the
person who took the original of the Employee
Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and staff
member of the petitioner. She said that all the
signatures16 appearing in the Employees Clearance
were all genuine except for Laura’s signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y.
Pangilan, the person whose signature was allegedly
imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding
the position of Human Resource Management Officer II
of the Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said
position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT -
ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she
issued memorandum receipts (MR) to employees who
were issued government property, and received
surrendered office properties from officers and
employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the
accused, as she was their Regional Secretary of the
DOT - ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris17
Batuampar, an officemate and niece of petitioner
Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees
Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar requested her to
sign in order to clear petitioner of all property
accountabilities. She refused to sign the clearance
because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over
all the office properties issued to her. A few days later,
she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the latter’s
office and inspect the Employees Clearance submitted
by the representative of petitioner. She went to her
mother-in-law’s office and was shown the Employees
Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she
denied the signature18 appearing on top of her name.
Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the representative of
petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-
affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the instant
case. She issued a certification20 with a memorandum
receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by
petitioner. The certification attested she did not sign
petitioner’s Employees Clearance because all the office
properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over
or returned to the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM.
Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day
as Supply Officer, petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A.
Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon
City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator for
nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the
Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon
City. She received two telegrams23 for transmissions
both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to
petitioner and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon
receiving said documents, she transmitted the
documents through telegram. The telegram addressed to
petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto,
in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to
Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in,
Cotabato City on 1 June 2005.24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered25 its
documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1,
A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f,
A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and
A-9, to which the accused filed her objections.26 The
trial court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August
2005.27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena,
former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took the
stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was
appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari
(Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the
ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov.
Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to
liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31
August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of the
Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet
secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her
because she had no cash advances. Only those with
cash advances were required to get an Employees
Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She
then instructed her staff to work on her salary.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of
her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if
the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been
imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the
Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not cause
Laura’s signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary
for the month of August 2000 sometime in said month,
because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C.
Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance
before she could get her salary because she was re-
appointed.28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of
the subject Employees Clearance.29 When she first saw
the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the
signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see
the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after
this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan,
already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner
said it was not she who placed or caused Laura’s
purported signature to be affixed there.
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari
did not apply to her, because she had no cash advances
and she could receive her salary even without
clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier,
Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and
found that she had no cash advances.30 Because she was
elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her salary.
However, she was informed by her staff that her salary
could not be released because the Office of the
Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her
clearance, the purpose of which was for the release of
her salary for the months of August and September
2000. She was able to get all the needed signatures
except for Laura’s signature. With the refusal of Laura
to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio
and explained the situation.
52 | P a g e
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst.
Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering
her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the
original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-
ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August
2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her
receipt of her salary, she believed that an Employees
Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had
this document prepared by her staff. She said her
Employees Clearance was always in the possession of
Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris
who showed her the document twice.31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General,
testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum
dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because
the same was the product of consultation among him,
Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary
Parcasio. He explained that this memorandum pertained
only to outstanding cash advances. He added that an
Employees Clearance was not a requirement and was
not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in
the memorandum, because what was required for the
purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from
the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its
documentary exhibits32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5,
with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the
purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court
admitted all the defense exhibits.33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the
assailed decision convicting petitioner of the crime
charged in the information. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Normallah A. Pacasum GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the
Information and, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing her to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum with the
accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) with costs against
the accused.34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-
ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in
the Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been
falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on
petitioner’s defense denying she was the one who
actually falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating
the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea
about the alleged falsification, because it was her
assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked
for her clearance and the one who submitted the said
clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
ARMM. The trial court found said denial
unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no direct
evidence to show that petitioner herself "actually"
falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there
were circumstances that indicated she was the one who
committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked
somebody else to falsify/forge the subject signature in
her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added
that considering it was petitioner who took advantage of
and profited from the use of the falsified clearance, the
presumption was that she was the material author of the
falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not able
to rebut said presumption, failing to show that it was
another person who falsified/forged the signature of
Laura Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or
motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could
have benefited from the same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s
contention that she did not stand to benefit from the
falsification of her Employees Clearance and from the
submission thereof to the Office of the Regional
Governor, because she allegedly had no existing cash
advances. She claimed that an Employees Clearance
was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the
months of August and September 2000 under the 8
August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that
the presumption that he who benefits from the
falsification is presumed to be the author thereof does
not apply to her. The lower court explained that the
aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner, she
being an official of the ARMM. It said that the
applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was
even admitted by her when she, in compliance
therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to
work for her Employees Clearance to enable her to
collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said
that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash
advances did not exempt her from the coverage of the
memorandum, because she must show she had no cash
advances and the only way to do this was by obtaining
a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees
Clearance had no probative value in proving its
contents and was inadmissible because the original
thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the
presentation and admission of secondary evidence, like
a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified
to prove the contents thereof, because despite
reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution
to petitioner and her assistant secretary to produce the
original of her Employees Clearance, they ignored the
notice and refused to present the original of said
document.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Sandiganbayan35
to which the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition.36
Subsequent thereto, petitioner filed a Supplement to
Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for
New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.37
Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be
granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris
Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly
discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its
Opposition.38
53 | P a g e
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for
new trial, because the evidence sought to be presented
did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007,
respondent People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to
file its Comment on the petition.41 After two motions
for extension to file comment on the petition, which
were granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment
dated 18 February 2008.42 Petitioner was required43 to
file a Reply to the Comment, which she did on 5 June
2008.44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition for review on certiorari and
required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They
filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008
and on 5 November 2008.45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged
falsification, hence must be deemed the author
thereof, when the evidence on record does not
support, but even contradicts, such a conclusion.
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash
advances hence was required under the Misuari
Memorandum to submit her Employee’s Clearance
to clear herself of these, when there is no evidence
to that effect and the prosecution even admitted so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the
photocopy of the allegedly forged Employee’s
Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the
Accused.
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to
present additional evidence on her behalf, thus
denying her due process.46
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari
memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not
required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her
salary, since what was required under said
memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She
further contends that since she was not required to file
said Employees Clearance because she had no cash
advances, the signature in her Employees Clearance
was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was
required was a Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that
under the aforesaid memorandum, what was required
before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice
from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The
full text of the Memorandum47 form the Regional
Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the
extended term of the undersigned, it is hereby
directed that all outstanding cash advances be
liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and
other emoluments of all ARMM
officials/employees with unliquidated cash advance
shall be withheld until they have settled their
accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is
issued to them by the Commission on Audit.
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints
brought about by the drastic cut of our budget,
memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is hereby
reiterated. Therefore all releases for financial
assistance is hereby suspended effective
immediately.
4. For strict compliance.
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was
required from officers/employees who had unliquidated
cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice
issued by the COA after they had settled their accounts.
There was indeed no mention of any Employees
Clearance therein. Up to this point, we agree with
petitioner. However, on her contention that the
signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we
disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was
imitated or not is the main issue in this case for
falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit
Notice requirement was effective only starting 1
September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the
information charges petitioner not with failure to secure
a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her
Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-
ARMM. The Credit Notice requirement was therefore
irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of
salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature
of Laura Pangilan in petitioner’s Employees Clearance
imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused the
imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura
Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioner’s
Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an
imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed
to a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima
facie case for falsification is established which the
defendant must overcome.48
54 | P a g e
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an
Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She adds that Atty.
Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the ARMM,
told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did
not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-
appointed.49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for
petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not only for
compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more
importantly, because her term of office was about to
end, since her position was coterminous with the term
of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority.50 She even
admitted that before she received her salary for August,
2000,51 an Employees Clearance was necessary.52
Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her
secretary that she did not need an Employee Clearance
to get her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find
her alleged "re-appointment," when she was working
for her Employees Clearance at around August 2000,
improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by
Gov. Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-appointed her
sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still
the Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had her
Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August
2000? Clearly, her statement that she did not need an
Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed
does not inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the
presumption that if a person had in his position a
falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it),
taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is
presumed to be the material author of the falsification.
He argues that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact
that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made
use of or uttered the Employees Clearance, because
there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at
least caused it to be submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor. To support such claim, she said
there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees
Clearance to show that the Office of the Regional
Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified
document is separate and distinct from the
"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using"
falsified documents is not necessarily included in the
"falsification" of a public document. Using falsified
documents is punished under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the
Employees Clearance was consummated the moment
the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the
falsification of a public document, it is immaterial
whether or not the contents set forth therein were false.
What is important is the fact that the signature of
another was counterfeited.54 It is a settled rule that in
the falsification of public or official documents, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the
falsification of a public document, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the
falsification was made and whether the offender
profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are
no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or
uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that the
same was circulated to the different division heads for
their signatures is already considered use of falsified
documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of
the stamp mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance
does not mean that said document was not received by
the Office of the Regional Governor. We find the
certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio,
Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor
- ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to
be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the
Office of the Regional Governor. It must be stressed
that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the
Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees
Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan,
claiming that she had no knowledge about the falsification
because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar,
who worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated,
must certainly fail. Denial, when unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
serving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically
weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion.57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her
witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person whom she
instructed to work for her Employees Clearance. Her
failure to present this person in order to shed light on
the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that
the defense never intended to present Marie Cris
Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial
order, because the defense never listed her as a
witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help
her cause after she has been convicted is already too
late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar’s testimony, which
is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence as to merit the granting of her
motion for new trial and/or reception of newly
discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner
"actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan in
her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We
have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of
forgery, the prosecution would not always have the
means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts
contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on
circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts,
which if woven together would produce a single
network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.59 We totally agree with the
Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the
accused herself "actually" forged the signature of Laura
Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question, the
Court nevertheless finds the following circumstances,
obtaining in the records, to establish/indicate that she
was the one who committed the forgery or who asked
somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the
signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance, to wit –
55 | P a g e
 1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris
Batuampar to work for her Employees
Clearance in compliance with the
Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor
Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of
Laura Pangilan was affixed on her clearance
are strong evidence that the accused herself
either falsified the said signature or caused the
same to be falsified/imitated, and that
possession by Maricris of the falsified
clearance of the accused is possession by the
accused herself because the former was only
acting upon the instructions and in behalf of the
latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to
accomplish and to submit her Employees
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for
the months of August and September 2000 is
sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to
commit the falsification by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan or order someone
else to forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who
profited or benefited from the falsification as
she admitted that she was able to collect her
salary for the month of August 2000 after her
falsified Employees Clearance was submitted
and approved by the ORG-ARMM and
therefore, she alone could have the motive for
making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no
reasonable and fair-minded man would say that the
accused – a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had
no knowledge of the falsification. It is an established
rule, well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of
a satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his
possession or control a falsified document and who
makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is
justified that such person is the forger or the one who
caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification.
Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court
held that –
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it),
taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering
of the forged documents was so closely connected in
time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery,
or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v.
Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754;
People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60
Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it
was the accused who took advantage and profited in the
use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question,
the presumption is inevitable that she is the material
author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity,
she was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to
show that it was another person who forged or falsified
the signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another
person and not she alone, had the reason or motive to
commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could
have been benefited by such falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan,
as against the denials of petitioner, convince us to apply
the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a
forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of
falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the
burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created,
which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby
prevail.62 A prima facie case of falsification having
been established, petitioner should have presented clear
and convincing evidence to overcome such burden.
This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the
Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans
when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the
police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor of
said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting
her salaries.
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule
that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect.63 The determination of the
credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court,
as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses’
demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full
probative value to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart
from such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original
from which the photocopy of petitioner’s Employees
Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she
maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted
the authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of
the Employees Clearance.
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the
photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree when
it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. The purpose of the rule
requiring the production by the offeror of the best
evidence if the prevention of fraud, because if a party is
in possession of such evidence and withholds it and
presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from
the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or
devious purpose which its production would expose and
defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be
had, the Court should not receive in evidence that
which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies,
in the absence of any clear showing that the original has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court.
Such photocopies must be disregarded, being
inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.
56 | P a g e
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several
exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary
evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the
original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice." And
to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence
when the original of a writing is in the custody or
control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s
custody or control. – If the document is in the custody
or control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and
after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or
control of the adverse party against whom it is offered
does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence.
The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power
to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said
party to produce the document which may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or
made in open court in the presence of the adverse party
or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party
in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce
the same. When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or
refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees
Clearance was always in the possession of her assistant
secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the prosecution
in its effort to produce the original copy of the said
Employees Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant
Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano of the
Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the
COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram
subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum,
and [Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to submit to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before June
8, 2005, the original of the Employees’ Clearance in the
name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the
release of her August and September 2000 salary as
DOT Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding receipt of
the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto
in her residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not
appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor
Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of the said
Employees Clearance, much less offered to produce the
same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the
existence of the Employees Clearance as evidenced by
the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable
notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her
assistant secretary to produce the original of said
employees clearance they ignored the notice and
refused to produce the original document, the
presentation and admission of the photocopy of the
original copy of the questioned Employees Clearance as
secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was
justified.65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an
alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be
produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may
still prosper if the person wishing to establish the
contents of said document via secondary evidence or
substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the
best or primary evidence – the original of the document
– is not available for any of the causes mentioned in
Section 3,66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the
Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time to present
evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus
resulting in her failure to present another important
witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio.
Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given
every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The
Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case as
follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of
the parties, the initial hearing for the reception of
defense evidence was scheduled on September 19 and
20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon
motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its Order of
September 16, 2005, cancelled the setting as the
handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano,
had to attend a 5-day workshop at PHINMA in
Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled
anew the hearing on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at
8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the defense
counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the
November 23, 2005 hearing despite due notice, the
Court cancelled the November 23 and 24 hearings, and
moved the same to March 13 and 14, 2006 both at 8:30
in the morning, and at the same time directed the said
defense counsel to show cause in writing within five (5)
days from receipt of the Order why he should not be
held in contempt for his failure to appear despite due
notice. In compliance with this Order,1awphi1 Atty.
Rico B. Bolongaita, filed his Explanation and
Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which were
both Noted by the Court in its Resolution of January 19,
2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13,
2006 hearing and her continued failure to get a
substitute counsel considering that her counsel, Atty.
Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the
case since January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the
March 13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same
to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and
designated Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as
counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the
accused upon receipt of the order to immediately confer
with said counsel for purposes of preparing for her
defense in the case.
57 | P a g e
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following
Resolution, which reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17,
2006 (received by mail on March 16, 2006) requesting
extension of time to engage the services of counsel is
merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next
hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said
accused would have more than ample time to engage
the services of counsel of her choice. For this reason,
any excuse from the accused on said settings that she
failed to engage the services of counsel or that her
counsel needs more time to prepare will be
unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its Order of
March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio to represent
the accused, with specific orders to the latter to confer
with Atty. Rosario and assist him in preparing for her
defense.
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty.
Conrado Rosario, counsel for the accused, that since he
was appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not
communicated with him and therefore he was not ready
to present any evidence for the accused, the Court
cancelled the hearing in order to give the defense
another opportunity to present its evidence and reset it
to July 4, 2006, the following day as previously
scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order,
which reads –
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked
for the resetting of the case on the ground that she just
hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and entered
his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address
at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St.,
Diliman, Quezon City. With the appearance of her new
counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged
as counsel de oficio of the accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last
chance to present her evidence on October 9 and 10,
2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. For repeated
failure of the accused to acknowledge receipt of the
notices of the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby
cancelled and she is ordered to personally appear in the
scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty.
Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of Appearance,
Motion For Postponement of October 9 and 10
Hearings stating therein that since his service as new
counsel was just engaged by the accused, and that the
accused herself cannot also attend the said hearing
because she is undergoing fasting until October 24,
2006 in observance of Ramadan, he asked to postpone
the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing
on October 9, 2006, the Court issued the following,
which reads –
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for
Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006 Hearing filed
by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty.
Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to be without merit,
as this case has been set for hearing several times and
the accused has been given the last chance to present
evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for
postponement.
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused
Normallah L. Pacasum in today’s hearing despite the
Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her
waiver of appearance, and ordering her to personally
appear before this Court, as prayed for by the
prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued
against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her
provisional liberty is ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from
notice to explain in writing why final judgment shall
not be rendered against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that
the defense is not ready to present its evidence today
and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its
evidence, the Court is constraint to consider the
accused’s right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit
their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the case shall
be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the above Order dated October
25, 2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest dated
October 31, 2006.
At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration
on November 3, 2006, the Court issued the following
Order, which reads –
"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest’ was
called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas
M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared.
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.
In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not
inclined to give favorable action to the Motion for
Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial
reason for the issuance of the order sought to be
reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the
previous hearing in violation of the Court’s Order for
her to personally appear in the hearings of this case and
for her indifference to the directives of the Court. With
the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no
alternative but to deny the Motion.
Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion
that the counsel sought the assurance of the accused
(and she promised) to appear before this Court if the
motion will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused
the favor to appear before it. The accused is
reminded/advised that the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear
before the Court or be arrested and brought to the
Court.
58 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
denied.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Consideration of Prosecution’s Memorandum (And for
a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to
Present Defense Evidence) of the accused dated
November 21, 2006, and the prosecution’s Opposition
thereto, the Court issued the following Order, which
reads –
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold
in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s November
7, 2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the
Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense
Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiff’s
Opposition thereto dated November 28, 2006.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before
the Court and posted an additional bond of P10,000.00
despite the aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in
the interest of justice, the Court is inclined to
reconsider and give favorable action to the motion and
grant the accused another and last opportunity to
present here evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is
set for hearing for the accused’s last chance to present
and/or complete the presentation of her evidence on
February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in
the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon
City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to
present her defense, the Court gave her ample
opportunity to present her evidence.67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In
fact, we find that the trial court was lenient with the
petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty.
Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to
prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we
quote a portion of the hearing when petitioner was
testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this
Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov.
Misuari, we have not got together with the other
members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in
Davao, sir.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or
ask him to testify in this case?
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to
clear my name, sir.
CHAIRMAN
Not after this hearing, you should have already done
that. Because we already gave you enough opportunity
to present your side, right? You should not be telling
the Court that only after this hearing, you will start
looking (for) people who will, definitely, clear your
name. You should be doing that months ago, correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors.68
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees
Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of
falsification under said paragraph, the followings
elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public
officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2) that he
takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he
falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any
handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently
established. There is no dispute that petitioner was a
public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she
caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a
public document) for the release of her salary for the
months of August and September 2000. Such being a
requirement, and she being a public officer, she was
duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said
document. Were it not for her position and employment
in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said
Employees Clearance. In a falsification of public
document, the offender is considered to have taken
advantage of his official position when (1) he had the
duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document; or (2) he had official
custody of the document which he falsified.69 It being
her duty to prepare and submit said document, she
clearly took advantage of her position when she
falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees
Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura
Pangilan.lawphil.net
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we
find the same proper. The penalty for falsification under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00. There being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the felony, the imposable penalty is
prision mayor in its medium period, or within the range
of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from
the medium period of prision mayor, while the
minimum shall be taken from within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7
August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
59 | P a g e
ESTAFA IN RELATION TO ARTS. 171 AND 172
OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 185493 February 2, 2011
LtC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN (Ret.),
Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the conviction of an accused for an
offense other than that charged in the Information based
on a claim that the essential elements of the offense of
which he was convicted are also elements of the offense
charged in the Information.
The Facts and the Case
On June 20, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman
indicted petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan (Guillergan)
for estafa through falsification of public documents
before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 22904.1
The evidence shows that sometime in 1987, petitioner
Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), directed Master Sergeant
Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptroller’s
Office, to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their
civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with supporting time
record and book. The agents’ names were copied and,
based on their appointment papers, certified as correct
by Guillergan and then approved by Brigadier General
Domingo T. Rio (Rio).2
Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for
lack of signatures of the payees, Guillergan would
direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon),
the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to
affix his initial on the "Remarks/Sig" column of the
payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the
processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.3
Also on Guillergan’s instruction, the CIAs’ payrolls in
Region 6 for 1987, totaling ₱732,000.00, were covered
by cash advances payable to Captain Roland V.
Maclang, Jr. (Maclang, Jr.), which advances were
issued upon his request as disbursing officer for that
purpose. When ready, Guillergan received the
corresponding cash or checks then turned them over to
Rio.4
At the end of 1987, Rio further received ₱787,000.00 in
"administrative funds" to be paid out to contractors for
repairs in the men’s barracks, the firing range, the
guesthouse and others. But Rio requested that this
"administrative funds" be re-aligned to "intelligence
funds" in order to facilitate clearing.5
On April 14, 1989 the AFP Anti-Graft Board filed a
complaint6 against Rio, Butcon, Maclang, Jr., Seclon,
and Guillergan for violating Articles of War 94 in
relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution7 dated May
24, 1991, recommending the dismissal of the case for
lack of merit. On April 21, 1992, however, the
ombudsman investigator issued a memorandum,
recommending the filing of charges of illegal use of
public funds against Rio and the exoneration of the
other respondents. In a memorandum8 dated February
11, 1993, the review panel in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation.
On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended the filing of charges against
all the accused before the Sandiganbayan.
Consequently, an Information was filed against them
for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a),9 in relation to
Article 17110 of the RPC.
While the case was pending, Rio died, prompting the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case against him.11
On January 20, 2006, the parties submitted a stipulation
of facts with motion for judgment12 based on such
stipulations. On June 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan
Second Division rendered judgment,13 finding
Guillergan guilty of falsification penalized under
Article 17214 of the RPC and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months
as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days as
maximum. The court acquitted the other accused on the
ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can
convict Guillergan of violation of Article 172
of the RPC under an Information that charged
him with estafa in relation to Article 171 of the
code; and
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
The Court’s Rulings
The Information alleged that Guillergan committed
falsification by making it appear in several public
documents that ₱1,519,000.00 in AFP funds intended
for the CIAs’ payroll were paid for that purpose when
in truth these were just given to Rio, resulting in
damage and prejudice to the government. Although the
charge was estafa in relation to Article 171 of the RPC,
the facts alleged in the information sufficiently made
out a case for violation of Article 172 of which
Guillergan was convicted. What is important is that the
Information described the latter offense intelligibly and
with reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to
understand the charge against him and suitably prepare
his defense.15
60 | P a g e
What is punished in falsification of a public document
is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it.16 Generally, the
elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public
officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes
advantage of his official position; and 3) that he
falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is
done.17
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171; 18 and 3) the
falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document.19 All of the foregoing elements
of Article 172 are present in this case.
First. Guillergan was a public officer when he
committed the offense charged. He was the comptroller
to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the
Information said that he took advantage of his position
in committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found that
his work as comptroller did not include the preparation
of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he
have official custody of the pertinent documents.20 His
official function was limited to keeping the records of
the resources that the command received from Camp
Crame.21 Still, he took the liberty of intervening in the
preparation of the time record, book, and payrolls in
question.
Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan
committed the offense charged by "causing it to appear
that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate."22 In People v.
Yanson-Dumancas,23 the Court held that a person may
induce another to commit a crime in two ways: 1) by
giving a price or offering a reward or promise; and 2)
by using words of command. In this case, the
Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered Butcon to
sign the "receive" portion of the payrolls as payee to
make it appear that persons whose names appeared on
the same had signed the document when they in fact did
not.24
Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was
committed on the time record, book, and payrolls which
were public documents.
What is more, given that some of the essential elements
of Article 171 constitute the lesser offense of
falsification of public documents under Article 172,
then the allegations in the Information were sufficient
to hold Guillergan liable under Article 172.
As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan unless these fall
under certain established exceptions.25 Since none of
those exceptions can be identified in this case, the Court
must accord respect and weight to the Sandiganbayan's
findings. It had the better opportunity to examine and
evaluate the evidence presented before it.26 As aptly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the
payrolls did not receive their salaries. First, x x x
Guillergan declared that he personally turned over the
entire amount of [₱1,519,000.00] to Gen. Rio. Second,
Butcon’s narration that he was instructed by Guillergan,
to [affix his] initial at the receive portion of the
payrolls. Lastly, according to the records of the case,
the office of Guillergan had no business in processing
the payroll of these personnel. x x x
Additionally, the appointment papers from which these
payrolls were based do not reveal any information
about the acceptance of the appointments by the agents.
In a letter dated April 14, 1989 of the Anti-Graft Board
of the Armed forces of the Philippines x x x [to
Ombudsman Vasquez], it was stated that the
appointment papers of the agents "must" be
accompanied by the acceptance of the agents. These
papers "should ordinarily" be attached to the payrolls
for proper clearing purposes. Since there were no
acceptance papers presented, it only suggests that the
lists on the payrolls are names of ghost agents. Even
more, the board made a comment that x x x Guillergan
denies knowledge of the persons appointed even if he
certified to the correctness of the payrolls.
The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification
of the payrolls; causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate.271avvphi1
The Court finds no error in the decision of the
Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents
under Article 172 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the Sandiganbayan’s decision dated June 30,
2008 and Resolution dated January 7, 2004 which
found petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan guilty of
violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case 22904.
SO ORDERED.
61 | P a g e
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
G.R. Nos. 166086-92 February 13, 2009
ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR. and CAMILO B.
ZAPATOS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
the reversal of the Sandiganbayan Decision2 dated
September 24, 2004, convicting petitioners Eleno T.
Regidor, Jr. (Mayor Regidor), former City Mayor, and
Camilo B. Zapatos (Zapatos), former member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City
(petitioners), of the crime of falsification of public
documents.
The Facts
Petitioners, along with Aniceto T. Siete, former Vice-
Mayor, and one Marlene L. Mangao,3 then Acting
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub
City, were charged with the crime of falsification of
public documents in the following Informations:4
Criminal Case No. 13689 filed on May 10, 1989
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1988, in the City
of Tangub, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused Eleno T. Regidor,
Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene
Mangao, all public officers being then the City Mayor,
Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, Temporary Presiding Officer, and Acting
Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, of
said City, and as such are authorized to attest and
approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod,
and committing the crime herein charged in relation to
their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring
and confabulating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution
50-A, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City,
entitled: "A RESOLUTION GRANTING A SALARY
INCREASE OF ALL EMPLOYEES EXCEPT
CHIEFS, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF OFFICERS (sic)
AND CITY OFFICIALS OF TANGUB CITY AT ONE
HUNDRED PESOS (₱100) A MONTH EFFECTIVE
JULY 1, 1988," by then and there making it appear that
the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed
and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in
truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never
taken up by said body, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 13690 filed on May 10, 1989
That on or about the 30th day [of] June, 1988, in
Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.,
Aniceto T. Siete and Marlene L. Mangao, all public
officers being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and
Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, of the said City, and as such are
authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to their office, with grave
abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their
official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating
with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 56, of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled:
RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL
BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD OF TANGUB CITY FOR THE
CALENDAR YEAR 1988," by then and there making
it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated
upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well
knew it was never taken up by the said body, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 13691 filed on May 10, 1989
That on or about the 30th day of June, 1988, in Tangub
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.,
Aniceto T. Siete, and Marlene L. Mangao, all public
officers being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and
Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, of said City, and as such are authorized to
attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged
in relation to their office, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their official/public
positions, conspiring and confabulating with one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify Resolution No. 56-A of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub entitled:
"RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL
BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE INFRA FUND OF
TANGUB CITY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR
1988," by then and there making it appear that the
aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and
approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in
truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never
taken up by said body, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
Contrary to law.
62 | P a g e
 Criminal Case No. 13692 filed on May 11, 1989
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1988, in Tangub
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.,
Aniceto T. Siete, and Marlene L. Mangao, all public
officers, being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and
Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively of said City, and as such, are authorized to
attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged
in relation to their office, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their official/public
positions, conspiring and confabulating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify Resolution No. 63 of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "A
RESOLUTION EARNESTLY REQUESTING
HONORABLE ALFREDO BENGZON,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
MANILA, THRU THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
CANDIDO TAN, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
REGION X, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, TO
APPOINT DR. SINFORIANA DEL CASTILLO AS
CITY HEALTH OFFICER IN TANGUB CITY
HEALTH OFFICE," by then and there making it appear
that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon,
passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was
never taken up by said body, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 13693 filed on May 10, 1989
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1988, in Tangub
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.,
Aniceto T. Siete and Marlene L. Mangao, all public
officers being the City Mayor, Vice-Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and
Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, of said City, and as such, are authorized to
attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged
in relation to their office, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their official/public
positions, conspiring and confabulating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify Resolution No. 61 of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "A
RESOLUTION REVERTING THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000)
FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF SPORT CENTER
TO COVER UP DEFICIENCIES OF
APPROPRIATION IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE
FUND," by then and there making it appear that the
aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and
approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in
truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never
taken up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice
of the government.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 13694 filed on May 10, 1989
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1988, in the City
of Tangub, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.,
Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene Mangao, all public
officers being the City Mayor, Temporary Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting
Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, and
as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the
crime herein charged on relation to their office, with
grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their
official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating
with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 64, of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod entitled: "A
RESOLUTION ADOPTING A POSITION PAPER
REGARDING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND
OPERATION OF TANGUB CITY AND
REQUESTING HONORABLE LOURDES R.
QUISUMBING FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF
HER MEMORANDA," by then and there making it
appear that the aforesaid resolution was deliberated
upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well
knew it was never taken up by the said body, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 13695 filed on May 11, 1989
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1988, in Tangub
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.,
Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene L. Mangao, all being
public officers being City Mayor, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Member and concurrently Temporary
Presiding Officer and Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Secretary, respectively, of said City and as such, are
authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to their office, with grave
abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their
official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating
with one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 68, of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled:
"RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, MALACANANG, MANILA FOR
AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE TEN (10) UNITS OF
MOTORCAB, ONE (1) DOZEN MICROSCOPE
COMPOUND, ONE (1) SET ENCYCLOPEDIA
TEXTBOOKS, ONE (1) SET BRITANICA
DICTIONARY, SEVEN (7) UNITS ELECTRIC
TYPEWRITER (20" CARRIAGE), ONE (1) UNIT
ELECTRIC FAN AND ONE (1) UNIT LOMBARDINI
DIESEL ENGINE 4ID 820 FOR USE OF VARIOUS
OFFICES OF TANGUB CITY," by then and there
making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was
deliberated upon, passed and approved by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as
accused well knew it was never taken up by the said
body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Contrary to law.
63 | P a g e
Upon their arraignment on July 8, 1991, petitioners
entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. Marlene
L. Mangao was not arraigned as the Sandiganbayan did
not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Hence, an
order for her arrest was issued which remains unserved
up to the present. On the other hand, Aniceto T. Siete
passed away on March 12, 1991 before he could be
arraigned.5 Upon agreement of the parties, no pre-trial
conference was conducted. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued. In the course of trial, two varying
versions arose and, as found by the Sandiganbayan, are
culled as follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
The accused are all public officers in the City
Government of Tangub City. Accused Eleno T.
Regidor, Jr. was then the incumbent Mayor who
assumed office on May 5, 1988, while accused Aniceto
T. Siete as the incumbent Vice-Mayor and Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Accused
Camilo B. Zapatos was the Acting Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, while accused Marlene
L. Mangao, who was a clerk in the Office of the Mayor,
was designated as Acting Secretary of the City Council
during the period corresponding to the alleged
commission of the crimes charged against the accused.
When accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. assumed the
mayoral post on May 5, 1988, it has been the practice
that the proposals for resolutions and ordinances
originated from him or his office. Often, when a
proposal is put in the agenda of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, a prepared resolution is already available
so that it will be easier for the City Council to just
accept or adopt the resolutions.lawphil.net
During the session of the Sangguniang Panglungsod on
July 27, 1988, the Council was presented with the
Minutes for the sessions held on June 23, 30, July 14
and 21, respectively. The minutes of said sessions
reflected resolutions and ordinances allegedly taken up,
deliberated and passed upon by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod namely: Resolution 50-A on June 23,
1988, Resolution 56 and 56-A on June 30, Resolution
No. 63 and 61 on July 14, Resolution 64 and 68 on July
21. The actual copies of the Resolutions,
Appropriations and Ordinances all contained the
signatures of the four (4) accused and approving the
same.
However, some of the Council Members questioned the
validity of the said Resolutions and Ordinances. They
alleged that the Resolutions and Ordinances were
neither taken up, deliberated nor passed upon during the
above-mentioned dates. Roberto O. [Taclob],6 [private
complainant] a former council member, testified that
the questioned Resolutions were not taken up and thus
could not have been deliberated nor passed upon. His
testimony was corroborated by prosecution witnesses,
Estrelita M. Pastrano, Elizabeth L. Duroy Albarico and
Agustin L. Opay, all former members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City [private
complainants]. Although the questioned resolutions
were subsequently ratified by the Sanggunian through
Resolution 94 by a vote of five (5) to four (4), with the
four (4) complaining witnesses abstaining, dated
October 15, 1988, the Council Members still filed a
complaint with the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) an administrative case against the
four (4) accused for misconduct in office and neglect of
duty. The councilors claim that they were prevented
from [attending] the sessions of the Sanggunian for
seven (7) months because the schedule of sessions was
randomly changed without them being notified.
Accused Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., together with the
other co-accused were preventively suspended from
July to September of 1989 but were subsequently not
found guilty by the DILG. Despite signing an Affidavit
of Desistance, thinking that the Sandiganbayan is bound
by the findings of the DILG, the complainants pursued
the cases against the four (4) accused. Thus, the
criminal complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan were
continued and trial ensued on January 8, 1992.
Evidence for the Defense
In his defense, Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. testified
that before approving resolutions or ordinances, he
consults his legal counsel to check if there are any
irregularities in the resolutions and whether or not the
resolutions are beneficial to the City of Tangub. He also
stated that he did not attend or participate in the
sessions of the City Council, asserting that, as Mayor,
he did not, in any way, influence the deliberations of
the Sanggunian. He stressed that the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is totally independent of his office and as
the approving officer of the Municipal Government, he
relies on the certification of the Presiding Officer that
the resolutions and the ordinances are valid and lawful
before affixing his signature. The accused, Eleno T.
Regidor, Jr. contends that he signed the questioned
resolutions in good faith and with the belief that they
were deliberated and passed upon.
It is further contended by accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.
that the questioned Resolutions were taken up and
passed upon during the sessions. The same accused
further claimed that the minutes of the sessions of the
Sanggunian were inaccurate since the entire
proceedings were not completely and accurately taken
down by the stenographer or Council Secretary present
during the meetings, thus, the deliberations on the
questioned resolutions were not entirely recorded.
Lastly, the same accused claimed that the complainants
even admitted in their Affidavit of Desistance the
inaccuracy of the minutes "x x x although the matters
taken during the sessions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod wherein we were present, were discussed
and deliberated upon, we are not sure whether or not
said deliberations and discussions were recorded in the
minutes x x x." The defense of the accused Eleno T.
Regidor, Jr. is corroborated by the testimony of Rogelio
Taburada,7 [Taburada] who was then a Councilor of
Tangub City.
As for the other accused Sanggunian Member and
Acting Presiding Officer Camilo B. Zapatos, he opted
not to take the witness stand and instead adopted the
evidence of his co-accused Eleno T. Regidor Jr.
64 | P a g e
 The Sandiganbayan's Decision
On September 24, 2004, the Sandiganbayan held that
the petitioners' defenses of good faith and lack of intent
failed to cast doubt on the allegations of the
prosecution. The pieces of evidence and the testimonies
of the prosecution's witnesses revealed that Resolution
Nos. 50-A,8 56,9 56-A,10 6311 61,12 6413 and 6814
(assailed Resolutions) established the moral certainty or
degree of proof which would produce conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. Thus, it disposed of this case in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the
above cases as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 13689, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo
B. Zapatos, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. 13690, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document was defined
in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
3. In Criminal Case No. 13691, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
4. In Criminal Case No. 13692, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) years of
Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
5. In Criminal Case No. 13693, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
6. In Criminal Case No. 13694, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo
B. Zapatos, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
7. In Criminal Case No. 13695, the Court finds
the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo
B. Zapatos, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00).
In so far as Aniceto T. Siete is concerned, who died
before arraignment could be held, the case against him
is hereby considered dismissed by reason of his death.
Let a Warrant of Arrest issue against Marlene L.
Mangao for her immediate apprehension and in order to
answer the charges leveled against her.
SO ORDERED.
65 | P a g e
The Issues
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration15
which was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution16 dated November 26, 2004. Hence, this
Petition based on the following grounds:
I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK
OF JURISDICTION AS NO CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION WAS COMMITTED BY THEM;
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS WHEN THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WAS TOO
WEAK TO WARRANT CONVICTION [BECAUSE]
IT MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
GIVING WEIGHT/VALUE TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF
DESISTANCE OF THE COMPLAINANTS AND
THE EXONERATION BY THE DILG OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE AGAINST THEM;
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
OF REGIDOR THAT HE HAS NO PARTICIPATION
IN THE PREPARATION, BEING THE CITY
MAYOR HIS RULE WAS ONLY TO APPROVE
THE RESOLUTIONS; [AND]
V. THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS
INCREDIBLE THAT ACCUSED TOOK
ADVANTAGE OF THEIR POSITION[.]
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.17
Moreover, petitioners asseverate that there is no
falsification in this case under Article 171, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code because they did not cause it
to appear that other persons participated in an act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
Petitioners submit that they did not feign such
participation because the private complainants
physically and actually participated in passing the
assailed resolutions. The participation of Mayor
Regidor came only after the assailed resolutions were
submitted to him for approval. Likewise, there is no
falsification under paragraph 7 of Article 171 because
petitioners passed and approved authentic, genuine and
original documents. Petitioners submit that paragraph 7
involves falsification of a non-existent document and
the falsifier produces one purporting to be the original.
Petitioners also opine that the DILG's dismissal18 of the
administrative complaint and the private complainants'
act of executing affidavits of desistance19 should be
given weight. Intent to gain and/or bad faith were not
shown by petitioners as some of the assailed resolutions
do not involve money matters. Further, petitioners
argue that Taburada's testimony should have been
accorded more weight and credence than the testimony
of private complainant Taclob. Petitioners claim that
Taburada, as a former member of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, clearly testified that he was present at the
time all the assailed resolutions were deliberated upon
and approved,20 while Taclob's testimony was not
credible and trustworthy considering that he executed
two (2) affidavits of desistance. Taburada's testimony
was not at all discussed by the Sandiganbayan; hence,
its decision was not supported by evidence. Most
importantly, petitioners reiterate their contention that
the minutes21 were defective and inaccurate. Thus,
petitioners pray that they be acquitted in the name of
due process and based on the long-standing policy of
the State to acquit the accused if the quantum of
evidence is insufficient to convict, as in the case at
bench.22
On the other hand, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), claims that the issues raised by the
petitioners were purely questions of fact because the
same would entail the review of all pieces of evidence
and evaluation of the weight and probative value
thereof.1avvphi1 The OSP also claims that petitioners
questioned the sufficiency of evidence presented by the
prosecution which were relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, the OSP submits that the instant
Petition should be denied outright for it is not the
function of this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure to re-examine the pieces of evidence
duly submitted by the parties. On the merits, the OSP
argues that petitioners by virtue of their respective
offices and functions, held positions directly connected
with the proposal, deliberation, passage and approval of
the assailed resolutions as found by the Sandiganbayan
and as duly supported by evidence. Intent to gain and/or
bad faith is inconsequential, as the law punishes the act
of falsification as a violation of public faith. The OSP
alleges that the petitioners deliberately attempted to
and, in fact, did conceal the falsity of the documents by
making it appear that the assailed resolutions were valid
on their face, as the same were approved and signed by
the petitioners. Moreover, the DILG ruling dismissing
the administrative complaint filed against the
petitioners and the affidavits of desistance executed by
the private complainants were of no moment. Thus, the
OSP posits that the prosecution's evidence was
overwhelming and sufficient to prove the guilt of the
petitioners beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code.23
The ultimate issue in this case is whether petitioners are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
66 | P a g e
 Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
The law in point is Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, which clearly provides:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated
in any act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a
document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original
exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that
of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the
offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such
character that its falsification may affect the civil status
of persons.24
Thus, for falsification of a public document to be
established, the following elements must concur: 1) that
the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary
public; 2) that he takes advantage of his official
position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by
committing any of the aforementioned acts. Likewise,
in falsification of public or official documents, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.25
In this case, the petitioners are charged under Article
171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners Regidor and Zapatos, as Mayor, and
Member and Temporary Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, respectively, made it
appear that private complainants, among others,
participated in the Sangguniang Panglungsod sessions
when they did not in fact so participate,26 and issued, in
authenticated forms, the assailed resolutions purporting
to be copies of original documents when no such
originals exist.
We hold that all the elements of the offense punishable
under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised
Penal Code are present in this case.
First. Petitioners were public officers at the
time of the commission of the offenses charged.
Mayor Regidor was then Mayor of Tangub
City, while Zapatos was a member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod and was a
Temporary Presiding Officer thereof.
Second. The petitioners took advantage of their
respective official positions because they had
the duty to make or to prepare, or otherwise to
intervene in the preparation of the document, or
have the official custody of the document
which they falsified.27 Zapatos, as a member
and, at the time, Temporary Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, had the duty
to make or prepare or intervene in the
preparation of the assailed resolutions. In like
manner, Mayor Regidor cannot claim that as
mayor he had no participation in the making, or
preparation of, nor any intervention in the
assailed resolutions.
Under Section 18028 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, or the Local Government Code of 1983,
which was in effect at the time the crimes
imputed were committed, the city mayor had
the power to veto the ordinances and
resolutions enacted or adopted by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod. Contrary to Mayor
Regidor's submission, the veto power confers
authority beyond the simple mechanical act of
signing an ordinance or resolution as a requisite
to its enforceability. Thus, this Court held that
the concurrence of a local chief executive in the
enactment of an ordinance or resolution
requires not only a flourish of the pen, but the
application of judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence as well.29
67 | P a g e
 Third. While petitioners' witness, Taburada,
testified that he was present during the
Sangguniang’s deliberations of the assailed
resolutions,30 private complainant Taclob also
testified that the resolutions were not discussed
and approved during the respective sessions of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod.31 The minutes
of the sessions, as well, do not reflect any
deliberation and/or approval by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the assailed
resolutions. Initially, when Taburada was asked
if the minutes faithfully recorded all the matters
deliberated upon during the sessions of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod on June 23, June 30,
July 14, and July 21, 1988, he readily affirmed
it. But after the Sandiganbayan called for a
recess when the counsel for the parties had a
heated discussion, Taburada claimed that the
minutes of the sessions on said dates did not
contain all the matters taken up during those
sessions, particularly the deliberation and
approval of the assailed resolutions.32 Yet, the
resolutions were questioned by private
complainants precisely because the alleged
deliberation and voting thereon were not at all
conducted as reflected in the minutes33 of the
Sanggunian session of July 27, 1988. On said
date, after taking up other matters, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, upon motion of
Taclob, went into a closed-door session. Then a
nominal voting was conducted in order to
determine "whether said resolutions were
brought before the session for deliberation or
[if] the nature of said resolutions [was]
reflected in the minutes."34 Majority of the
members voted "no," while Taburada answered
"no comment"35 because he did not actually
read the minutes at the time, but he nonetheless
signed the same.36 To the same question,
Zapatos also answered "no comment." These
material inconsistencies in Taburada's
testimony, pitted against the testimonies of the
private complainants and the documentary
evidence, proved fatal to petitioners' cause.
It must be borne in mind that weighing heavily
against the petitioners' defense is the well-
settled doctrine that findings of fact of trial
courts — in this case, the Sandiganbayan —
particularly in the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent
any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.37
While the petitioners do not wish to impute much
significance to the minutes, they are important in the
resolution of this case.
In a similar case, De los Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, Third
Division,38 this Court, citing a number of cases,39
highlighted the importance of the minutes taken in the
pertinent proceeding, relying thereon to ascertain the
truth when confronted by conflicting claims of parties.
Hence, this Court held:
Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes
as the official repository of what actually transpires in
every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may
be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding,
thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great
weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are
made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records.
In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the
case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the minutes,
will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at
hand.40
We see no reason to deviate from this ruling.
Added to this is the Memorandum of Agreement41
entered into by the Office of the Mayor and the
Sangguniang Panglungsod on August 12, 1988,
"recalling all SP resolutions not duly passed and/or
approved by the majority of the members thereat."
Further, the Sangguniang Panglungsod, in its
Resolution No. 9442 dated October 15, 1988, opted to
re-approve the assailed resolutions "which were alleged
to [have been] implemented but not discussed," rather
than move for the amendment of the minutes. These
acts belie petitioners' claims that the minutes were
inaccurate for failing to include therein the
deliberations and approval of the assailed resolutions.
Indeed, if the minutes merely omitted any mention of
the discussion on, and approval of, the subject
resolutions, there would have been no need to resubmit
them for the approval of the Sanggunian. It would have
been more convenient to simply effect the correction of
the minutes.
Likewise, petitioners' reliance on the affidavits of
desistance executed by the private complainants fails to
impress this Court. Our ruling in Balderama v. People43
is instructive:
A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed
with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously
given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance
made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not
reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The
rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction
can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted
testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the
probability that it will later be repudiated. Only when
there exist special circumstances in the case which
when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the
truth of the testimony or statement given, can
retractions be considered and upheld.
The affidavits of desistance cannot prevail over the
categorical statements of the private complainants, the
very same affiants who executed the same. Moreover,
based on the testimonies of the private complainants,
they merely executed the affidavits of desistance after
the DILG dismissed the administrative complaint and
after Mayor Regidor asked them to execute the same,
because they had the impression that the DILG ruling
would, in one way or another, be binding on the
Sandiganbayan, and they simply wanted to avoid
having to spend for their fare in going to the
Sandiganbayan for the trial.
68 | P a g e
This impression was likewise noted by the
Sandiganbayan in its assailed Decision. The impression
was so prevalent that even the petitioners themselves
relied on the DILG dismissal of the administrative
charge, contending that it should have been given
greater weight by the Sandiganbayan, at least to create a
serious and reasonable doubt to warrant their acquittal.
The petitioners' contention lacks merit.
It is a fundamental principle in the law on public
officers that administrative liability is separate from and
independent of criminal liability. A simple act or
omission can give rise to criminal, civil or
administrative liability, each independently of the
others. This is known as the "threefold liability rule."
Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to
an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. In this
criminal prosecution, the dismissal of the administrative
cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result
in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against
them.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, the
Sandiganbayan's conviction of petitioners had ample
factual mooring, after the prosecution presented both
documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence. Time
and again, we held that we are not a trier of facts;
hence, we defer to the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan which had more opportunity and
facilities to examine and evaluate the evidence
presented.44
To repeat, settled is the rule that findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding
and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they
come under the established exceptions, among them: 1)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse
of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and 6) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of
evidence on record.45 We found none of these
exceptions in the present case. Thus, we accord respect
and weight to the Sandiganbayan's findings, a portion
of which aptly and judiciously states, to wit:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds the contentions
of the accused untenable. Their defense of good faith
and lack of intent has failed to cast doubt on the
allegations of the prosecution. In the falsification of
public or official documents, whether by public
officials or by private persons, it is not that there be
present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person. Verily, the pieces of evidence reveal the
specific acts of the four (4) accused in the commission
of the crime of falsification. Firstly, the accused caused
it to appear in a document that members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod participated in the sessions,
deliberations and passed the questioned resolutions.
The said resolutions reflect the attendance of all the
members of the Sanggunian on the dates thereon,
including their unanimous approval of the resolutions.
The pieces of evidence and the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, however, reveal otherwise. If, in
truth and in fact, Resolutions 50-A, 56, 56-A, 63, 61, 64
and 68 were indeed taken up and passed upon on their
respective dates, it would be contrary to human reason
why the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
who approved it unanimously, to suddenly file a case
against the accused and deny the existence of a
legislative act they authored. Secondly, the accused are
found to have committed the act of issuing in
authenticated form, a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such document exists.
In issuing the subject Resolutions, Mayor Eleno T.
Regidor, Jr., Vice-Mayor Aniceto T. Siete and SP
Camilo B. Zapatos, consummated the crime of
falsification by purporting them to be original copies of
valid, deliberated and approved resolutions when no
such documents exist and no proceedings regarding
them ever took place as established by the prosecution.
Their defense that the minutes of the sessions were
inaccurate and did not reflect the deliberations
concerning the questioned resolutions, does not
convince this Court. The testimonies of complainants
Roberto O. [Taclob], Estrelita M. Pastrano, Elizabeth L.
Duroy and Agustin L. Opay, all former members of the
City Council during the terms of the accused, must be
given great weight and credence. In falsification of a
public document, the falsification need not be made on
an official form. It is sufficient that the document is
given the appearance of, or made to appear similar to
the official form.
All told, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible
error in ruling that the petitioners are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
documents.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and
the Sandiganbayan Decision dated September 24, 2004
in Criminal Cases Nos. 13689, 13690, 13691, 13692,
13693, 13694 and 13695 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
69 | P a g e
FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC said accused did then and there release to
DOCUMENTS herself the same and received the loan of
P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and
G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006 convert to her own use and benefit the said
amount, and despite demands, refused and still
LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner, refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and
vs. prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.5

DECISION Criminal Case No. 3626

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: That on or about the 24th day of September,

1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221,
said accused being then the manager-cashier of
affirming with modification the April 15, 1993
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI),
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs
City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625,
of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa
collections of, the same, and paying out loans
through falsification of commercial documents, and the
to members taking advantage of her position
July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying the motion for
and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
reconsideration.
cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative commercial document, namely: Cash/Check
Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making
1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and an entry therein that the said Gonafreda
releasing loans to the member of the cooperative. Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and
by signals on the appropriate line thereon the
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing that
irregularities concerning the release of loans were she received the loan, thus making it appear
discovered.4 that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a
loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru truth and in fact said person was never granted
falsification of commercial documents were filed a loan, never received the same, and never
against Batulanon, to wit: signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her
name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent
Criminal Case No. 3625 and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and
Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province thereafter misappropriate and convert to her
of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the own use and benefit the said amount, and
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said despite demands, refused and still refuses to
accused being then the manager-cashier of restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of
entrusted with the duty of managing the P4,000, Philippine Currency.
aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments
to, and collections of, the same, and paying out CONTRARY TO LAW.6
loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
commercial document, namely: Cash/Check
Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of
Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an
entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency,
and by signing on the appropriate line thereon
the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that
she received the loan, thus making it appear
that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a
loan and received the amount of P4,160 when
in truth and in fact the said person was never
granted a loan, never received the same, and
never signed the cash/check voucher issued in
her name, and in furtherance of her criminal
intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI

70 | P a g e
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982
at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the manager-
cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing
the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of the same and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage
of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
commercial document, namely: an Individual
Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn
Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there
entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had
a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and
was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00,
thus making it appear that the said person made
a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and
was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth
and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a
deposit and was never granted loan and after
the document was so falsified in the manner set
forth, said accused did then and there again
falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in
the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein
the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it
appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the
loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in
truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never
received the loan, and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same, and received the amount of
P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal
use and benefit the said amount, and despite
demands, refused and still refuses to restitute
the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December,
1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the manager-
cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the
affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments
to, and collection of, the same and paying out
loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
commercial document, namely: an Individual
Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis
Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there
entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon
had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI
and was granted a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said
person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date
with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when
in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never
made such a deposit and was never granted
loan and offer the document was so falsified in
the manner set forth, said accused did then and
there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No.
374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis
Batulanon by signing therein the signature of
Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that
the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis
Batulanon never received the loan and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused
did then and there release to herself the same
and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the said amount,
and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses
to restitute the same to the damage and
prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned
amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich
a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo,
Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as
witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist
Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers9 testified
that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four
Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four
different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 30A10 for P4,160.00 was released to
Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 237A11 for P4,000.00 was released to
Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher
No. 276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October
16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was
released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No.
374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis
Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because
they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.15
Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the
cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for
a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew
her membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant
to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members
who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17
71 | P a g e
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon
sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their
respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the
records that they were payees and recipients of the
amount stated therein.18 As to the signature of Omadlao
in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same
was actually the handwriting of appellant.19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a
member of its board of directors since 1979. He
corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao,
Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is
Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that
membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of
Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in
1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to
Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did
not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee
and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes.
He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher
No. 237A is Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also
testified that among the four loans taken, only that in
Arroyo's name was settled.22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria
Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile
witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of
the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI
General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that
the said document reflected all the financial
transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was
asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect
to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to
identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of
Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other
vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and
she was not the one who prepared the entries.23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She
claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names
of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were
signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the
PCCI office after she personally released the money to
them;24 that the three were members of the cooperative
as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger;
that the board of directors passed a resolution in August
1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the
entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted
practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and
dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his
absence;25 that she signed the loan application and
voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a
minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add
his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of
irregularity;26 that contrary to the testimony of Gopio,
Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the
cooperative provided they are children of regular
members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's
name because she is no longer qualified for another
loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she
had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative
refused to accept her payments after the cases were
filed in court.27 She also declared that one automatically
becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI
from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-
laws yet.29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws
from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been
registered since 1967.30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision
convicting Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding
the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case,
she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4
months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2
months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to
indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of
P16,660.00 with legal interest from the
institution of the complaints until fully paid,
plus costs.
SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA
BATULANON is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private
Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor maximum, AS
MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, AS
MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the
Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of
thirteen thousand one hundred sixty
(P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the
filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best
witness is the person whose signature was allegedly
forged, thus the prosecution should have presented
Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn
Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an
unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.33 She
avers that the crime of falsification of private document
requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She
insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan
transactions because these loans are accounts receivable
by the cooperative.34
72 | P a g e
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is
estafa through falsification of commercial document,
appellant could be convicted of falsification of private
document under the well-settled rule that it is the
allegations in the information that determines the nature
of the offense and not the technical name given in the
preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we
held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real
sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is
the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. x x x That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he,
above all things else, should be most interested,
are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the information
in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real
and important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named
murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in
the manner stated, the law determines what the
name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts
alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to
be punished and punished adequately, whatever
may be the name of the crime which those acts
constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under
Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171;
(2) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage
to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453,
Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph 2
of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons
have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing
the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash
Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as
payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding
cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they
obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did
not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts
reflected in the cash vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the
preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of
Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI
members and not qualified for a loan from the
cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was
aware that while the former is a member, she did not
apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon
forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the
vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated
therein were actually received by these persons. As to
the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony
and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon
proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the
name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention,
the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons
whose signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness
account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is
without basis. There is no evidence showing that
Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative
asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt
is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that in criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has
not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are
reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been
established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide
members with no subsisting loan. These alleged
borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are
they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that
in Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her
mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal
prosecution with the understanding however, that she
will be reimbursed once the money is collected from
Batulanon.39
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject
vouchers are private documents and not commercial
documents because they are not documents used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade
or credit transactions41 nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other
commercial law.42 Rather, they are private documents,
which have been defined as deeds or instruments
executed by a private person without the intervention of
a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by
which some disposition or agreement is proved,
evidenced or set forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each
and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said
crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein.44 The prosecution in this case was able to
discharge its burden completely.
73 | P a g e
As there is no complex crime of estafa through
falsification of private document,45 it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with
falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the
falsification of a private document is committed as a
means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged
is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without
the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime
to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the
accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba
Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21
days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he
had worked only 11 days, and then charged the
offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of
the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated
the wages during which the laborer did not work for
which he was convicted of falsification of private
document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description
of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and
made it appear that the article is of greatly superior
value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in
another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of
the true value of the article pawned. He was found
guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v.
Chan Tiao,48 the accused presented a document of
guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for
the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of
sugar, and by means of said falsified documents,
succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held
guilty of falsification of a private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of
Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents
in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a
Private Document with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods with
a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into
consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which must be within the range of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in
Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
which is within the range of the allowed imposable
penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of
falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the
aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense
charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the
amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate
amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of
P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same
was settled with the understanding that PCCI will
reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The
amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994
until the finality of this judgment. From the time the
decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate
shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime
committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification.
Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts
that may constitute falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated
in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in
such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted
petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's
signature in the cash voucher based on the Information
charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son,
Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash
Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify
the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by:
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of
the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall
under any of the modes of falsification under Article
171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact
that she used the name of Dennis and that as
representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the
loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act
of making untruthful or false statements, which is not
attendant in this case. As to whether, such
representation involves fraud which caused damage to
PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable
for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an
error for the courts below to hold that petitioner
Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private
document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627
involving the cash voucher of Dennis.50
74 | P a g e
The elements of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or
on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended
party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is
not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the
defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted
the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a
treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the
sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and
used it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash
with his personal check of the same amount drawn on
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to
his cashier not to deposit the same in the current
account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end
of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check
of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the
accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with
the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his
account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he
deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to
cover the check. In handing down a judgment of
conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion
or diversion is very evidently not a necessary
element of the form of estafa here discussed;
the breach of confidence involved in the
conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the
place of fraudulent intent and is in itself
sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave
as the offense is, comparatively few men
misappropriate trust funds with the intention of
defrauding the owner; in most cases the
offender hopes to be able to restore the funds
before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the
facts of the case, we find all of the necessary
elements of estafa x x x. That the money for
which the appellant's checks were substituted
was received by him for safe-keeping or
administration, or both, can hardly be disputed.
He was the responsible financial officer of the
corporation and as such had immediate control
of the current funds for the purposes of safe-
keeping and was charged with the custody of
the same. That he, in the exercise of such
control and custody, was aided by subordinates
cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of
the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded
employee who, if he had acted on his own
responsibility, might also have misappropriated
the same funds and thus have become guilty of
estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking
money for his personal use, from the funds
entrusted to him for safekeeping and
substituting his personal checks therefor with
instructions that the checks were to be retained
by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant
misappropriated and diverted the funds for that
period. The checks did not constitute cash and
as long as they were retained by the appellant
or remained under his personal control they
were of no value to the corporation; he might as
well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver
them to his subordinate with instructions to
retain them.
xxxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was
not the intention of the accused to permanently
misappropriate the funds to himself. As we
have already stated, such intention rarely exists
in cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it
is not a necessary element of the crime. Though
authorities have been cited who, at first sight,
appear to hold that misappropriation of trust
funds for short periods does not always amount
to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this
interpretation of the law to cases where officers
of corporations convert corporate funds to their
own use, especially where, as in this case, the
corporation is of a quasi-public character. The
statute is clear and makes no distinction
between permanent misappropriations and
temporary ones. We can see no reason in the
present case why it should not be applied in its
literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the
appellant is charged is injury to another. The
appellant's counsel argues that the only injury
in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds
were withheld by the appellant. It is, however,
well settled by former adjudications of this
court that the disturbance in property rights
caused by the misappropriation, though only
temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute
injury within the meaning of paragraph 5,
supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S.
vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53
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In the instant case, there is no doubt that as
Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she
is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently
used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to
secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the
amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed
as she even admitted receiving the same for personal
use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is
reflected in the records as part of the receivables of
PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the
sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by
PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive
undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property
rights caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in
itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning
of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by
Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is
paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over
P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no
modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed
in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and
3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of
three counts of falsification of private
documents and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, for each
count, and to indemnify complainant
Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the
amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994
until finality of this judgment. The interest rate
of 12% per annum shall be imposed from
finality of this judgment until its satisfaction;
and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila
Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. She is likewise
ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
November 28, 1994 until finality of this
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum
shall be imposed from finality of this judgment
until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS
G.R. No. 168486 June 27, 2006
NOE S. ANDAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the
September 29, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556, affirming the January 29,
2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104
of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 92-36145,
convicting petitioner Noe S. Andaya of falsification of
private document, and the April 26, 2005 Resolution3
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and
non-profit association authorized to engage in savings
and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S.
Andaya was elected as president and general manager
of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to increase the
capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity
to its members. Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the
Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI passed and approved
Resolution No. RS-88-006-048 setting up a Finder’s
Fee Program whereby any officer, member or
employee, except investment counselors, of AFPSLAI
who could solicit an investment of not less than
P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finder’s fee
equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited.
In a letter4 dated September 1991, the Central Bank
wrote Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, then Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, regarding the precarious financial
position of AFPSLAI due to its alleged flawed
management. As a result, Gen. Abadia requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations
of AFPSLAI which led to the filing of several criminal
cases against petitioner, one of which is the instant case
based on the alleged fraudulent implementation of the
Finder’s Fee Program.
On October 5, 1992, an information for estafa through
falsification of commercial document was filed against
petitioner, to wit:
The undersigned accuses NOE S. ANDAYA of the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Document, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of April, 1991 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent
to gain, by means of deceit, false pretenses and
falsification of commercial document, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
ARMED FORCES AND POLICE SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Chairman of the Board of Director[s], Gen. Lisandro C.
Abadia, AFP, in the following manner, to wit:
76 | P a g e
on the date and in the place aforementioned the said
accused being then the President and General Manager
of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc., caused and approved the
disbursement of the sum of P21,000.00, Philippine
Currency, from the funds of the association, by then
and there making it appear in Disbursement Voucher
No. 58380 that said amount represented the 1% finder’s
fee of one DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas]; when in
truth and in fact accused knew fully well that there was
no such payment to be made by the association as
finder’s fee; that by virtue of said falsification, said
accused was able to encashed (sic) and received (sic)
MBTC Check No. 583768 in the sum of P21,000.00,
which amount once in his possession, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted to his own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party in the aforesaid sum of P21,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 (Emphasis supplied)
The case was raffled to Branch 104 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 92-36145. On May 30, 1994, petitioner was
arraigned6 and pleaded not guilty to the charge, after
which trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely,
Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue.
Guilas, a general clerk of AFPSLAI’s Time Deposit
Section, testified that on April 8, 1991, he was informed
by Tini Gabriel and Julie Alabansa of the Treasury
Department that there was a finder’s fee in the amount
of P21,000.00 in his name. Subsequently, Judy
Balangue, an investment clerk of the Time Deposit
Section, told him that the finder’s fee was for petitioner.
When Guilas went to petitioner’s office to inform him
about the finder’s fee in his (Guilas’) name, petitioner
instructed him to collect the P21,000.00 and turn over
the same to the latter. Guilas returned to the Treasury
Department and signed Disbursement Voucher No.
583807 afterwhich he was issued Metrobank Check No.
6837688 for P21,000.00. After encashing the check, he
turned over the proceeds to petitioner. On cross-
examination, Guilas admitted that there was no
prohibition in placing the finder’s fee under the name of
a person who did not actually solicit the investment.
Balangue also testified that on April 3, 1991, petitioner
instructed him to prepare Certificate of Capital
Contribution Monthly No. 521789 in the name of
Rosario Mercader for an investment in AFPSLAI in the
amount of P2,100,000.00 and to inform Guilas that the
finder’s fee for the aforesaid investment will be placed
in the latter’s name. On cross-examination, Balangue
confirmed that a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment
from Rosario Mercader was deposited in AFPSLAI. He
further acknowledged that the Finder’s Fee Program did
not prohibit the placing of another person’s name as
payee of the finder’s fee.
The defense presented three witnesses, namely, Emerita
Arevalo, Ernesto Hernandez and petitioner.
Arevalo, secretary of petitioner in AFPSLAI, explained
that the finder’s fee was for the P2,100,000.00
investment solicited by Ernesto Hernandez from
Rosario Mercader. The finder’s fee was placed in the
name of Guilas upon request of Hernandez so that the
same would not be reflected in his (Hernandez’s)
income tax return. She alleged that Guilas consented to
the arrangement of placing the finder’s fee in his
(Guilas’) name. She also claimed that there was no
prohibition in the Finder’s Fee Program regarding the
substitution of the name of the solicitor as long as there
was no double claim for the finder’s fee over the same
investment.
Hernandez, an associate member of AFPSLAI and vice
president of Philippine Educational Trust Plan, Inc.
(PETP Plans), testified that sometime in 1991, he was
able to solicit from Rosario Mercader an investment of
P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI. He also asked petitioner to
place the finder’s fee in the name of one of his
employees so that he (Hernandez) would not have to
report a higher tax base in his income tax return. On
April 8, 1991, petitioner handed to him the finder’s fee
in the amount of P21,000.00.
Petitioner denied all the charges against him. He
claimed that the P21,000.00 finder’s fee was in fact
payable by AFPSLAI because of the P2,100,000.00
investment of Rosario Mercader solicited by Ernesto
Hernandez. He denied misappropriating the P21,000.00
finder’s fee for his personal benefit as the same was
turned over to Ernesto Hernandez who was the true
solicitor of the aforementioned investment. Since the
finder’s fee was in fact owed by AFPSLAI, then no
damage was done to the association. The finder’s fee
was placed in the name of Guilas as requested by
Hernandez in order to reduce the tax obligation of the
latter. According to petitioner, Guilas consented to the
whole setup.
Petitioner also claimed that Hernandez was an associate
member of AFPSLAI because his application for
membership was approved by the membership
committee and the Board of Trustees and was in fact
issued an I.D. There was no prohibition under the rules
and regulation of the Finder’s Fee Program regarding
the substitution of the name of the solicitor with the
name of another person. On cross-examination,
petitioner claimed that he merely approved the
substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of
Guilas in the disbursement voucher upon the request of
Hernandez. He brushed aside the imputation of
condoning tax evasion by claiming that the issue in the
instant proceedings was whether he defrauded
AFPSLAI and not his alleged complicity in tax evasion.
After the defense rested its case, the prosecution
presented two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria
Maigue and Ma. Fe Moreno.
Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of
AFPSLAI, testified that Hernandez was ineligible to
become a member of AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2
of Article II of the association’s by-laws. However, she
admitted that the application of Hernandez as member
was approved by the membership committee.
77 | P a g e
Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI at the time of her
testimony on January 25, 2000, stated that there are
eight criminal cases pending against the petitioner in
various branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. In one case decided by Judge Bacalla of Branch
216, petitioner was convicted of estafa through
falsification involving similar facts as the instant case.
She further stated that Hernandez was not a member of
AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the by-
laws. On cross-examination, she admitted that the case
decided by Judge Bacalla convicting petitioner was on
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The defense dispensed with the presentation of
Mercader in view of the stipulation of the prosecution
on the fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI
and that she was convinced to invest in the association
by Ernesto Hernandez.10
On June 20, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision11
convicting petitioner of falsification of private
document. On July 5, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for
new trial.12 In an Order13 dated December 20, 2001, the
trial court ruled that the evidence submitted by
petitioner in support of his motion was inadequate to
conduct a new trial, however, in the interest of
substantial justice, the case should still be reopened
pursuant to Section 24,14 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioner proceeded to submit documentary evidence
consisting of the financial statements of AFPSLAI from
1996 to 1999 to show that AFPSLAI did not suffer any
damage from the payment of the P21,000.00 finder’s
fee. He likewise offered the testimony of Paterno
Madet, senior vice president of AFPSLAI, who testified
that he was personally aware that Rosario Mercader
invested P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI; that Hernandez
was a member of AFPSLAI and was the one who
convinced Mercader to invest; that the finder’s fee was
placed in the name of Guilas; that petitioner called him
to grant the request of Hernandez for the finder’s fee to
be placed in the name of one of the employees of
AFPSLAI; that there was no policy which prohibits the
placing of the name of the solicitor of the investment in
the name of another person; that the substitution of the
name of Hernandez with that of Guilas was approved
by petitioner but he (Madet) was the one who approved
the release of the disbursement voucher.
On January 29, 2002, the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision convicting petitioner of falsification
of private document based on the following findings of
fact: Hernandez solicited from Rosario Mercader an
investment of P2,100,000.00 for AFPSLAI; Hernandez
requested petitioner to place the finder’s fee in the
name of another person; petitioner caused it to appear
in the disbursement voucher that Guilas solicited the
aforesaid investment; the voucher served as the basis
for the issuance of the check for P21,000.00
representing the finder’s fee for the investment of
Mercader; and Guilas encashed the check and turned
over the money to petitioner who in turn gave it to
Hernandez.
The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification
of private document were present. First, petitioner
caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher, a
private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez,
was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee. Second, the
falsification of the voucher was done with criminal
intent to cause damage to the government because it
was meant to lower the tax base of Hernandez and,
thus, evade payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by
the trial court in an Order15 dated May 13, 2002. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court and denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration; hence, the instant petition
challenging the validity of his conviction for the crime
of falsification of private document.
Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals contradicted the ruling of the trial court. He
claims that the Court of Appeals stated in certain
portions of its decision that petitioner was guilty of
estafa through falsification of commercial document
whereas in the trial court’s decision petitioner was
convicted of falsification of private document.
A close reading of the Court of Appeals’ decision
shows that the alleged points of contradiction were the
result of inadvertence in the drafting of the same. Read
in its entirety, the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and,
necessarily, it affirmed the conviction of petitioner for
the crime of falsification of private document and not of
estafa through falsification of commercial document.
In the main, petitioner implores this Court to review the
pleadings he filed before the lower courts as well as the
evidence on record on the belief that a review of the
same will prove his innocence. However, he failed to
specify what aspects of the factual and legal bases of
his conviction should be reversed.
Time honored is the principle that an appeal in a
criminal case opens the whole action for review on any
question including those not raised by the parties.16
After a careful and thorough review of the records, we
are convinced that petitioner should be acquitted based
on reasonable doubt.
The elements of falsification of private document under
Article 172, paragraph 217 in relation to Article 17118 of
the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender committed
any of the acts of falsification under Article 171 which,
in the case at bar, falls under paragraph 2 of Article
171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate; (2) the falsification was
committed on a private document; and (3) the
falsification caused damage or was committed with
intent to cause damage to a third party.
Although the public prosecutor designated the offense
charged in the information as estafa through
falsification of commercial document, petitioner could
be convicted of falsification of private document, had it
been proper, under the well-settled rule that it is the
allegations in the information that determines the nature
of the offense and not the technical name given by the
public prosecutor in the preamble of the information.
78 | P a g e
We explained this principle in the case of U.S. v. Lim
San19 in this wise:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is
of no concern to the accused what is the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way
aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which
his attention should be directed, and in which he, above
all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but
did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The
real and important question to him is, "Did you perform
the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you
commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the
acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines
what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged
in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the
crime which those acts constitute.20
The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to
constitute the crime of falsification of private
document. Specifically, the allegations in the
information can be broken down into the three
aforestated essential elements of this offense as follows:
(1) petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled
to a finder’s fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of
P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finder’s fee was
due to him; (2) the falsification was committed on
Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the
falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount
of P21,000.00.
The first element of the offense charged in the
information was proven by the prosecution. The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely,
Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well as the
presentation of Disbursement Voucher No. 58380
established that petitioner caused the preparation of the
voucher in the name of Guilas despite knowledge that
Guilas was not entitled to the finder’s fee. Significantly,
petitioner admitted his participation in falsifying the
voucher when he testified that he authorized the release
of the voucher in the name of Guilas upon the request
of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not
personally prepare the voucher, he could be considered
a principal by induction, had his conviction been
proper, since he was the president and general manager
of AFPSLAI at the time so that his employees merely
followed his instructions in preparing the falsified
voucher.
The second element of the offense charged in the
information, i.e., the falsification was committed in
Disbursement Voucher No. 58380, a private document,
is likewise present. It appears that the public prosecutor
erroneously characterized the disbursement voucher as
a commercial document so that he designated the
offense as estafa through falsification of commercial
document in the preamble of the information. However,
as correctly ruled by the trial court,21 the subject
voucher is a private document only; it is not a
commercial document because it is not a document
used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions22 nor is it defined
and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other
commercial law.23 Rather, it is a private document,
which has been defined as a deed or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of
a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by
which some disposition or agreement is proved,
evidenced or set forth,24 because it acted as the
authorization for the release of the P21,000.00 finder’s
fee to Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment
of this finder’s fee.
While the first and second elements of the offense
charged in the information were satisfactorily
established by the prosecution, it is the third element
which is decisive in the instant case. In the information,
it was alleged that petitioner caused damage in the
amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he caused
it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Diosdado
Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in
truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such sum to him.
However, contrary to these allegations in the
information, petitioner was able to prove that AFPSLAI
owed a finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00
although not to Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez.
It was positively shown that Hernandez was able to
solicit a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment for
AFPSLAI from Rosario Mercader which entitled him to
a finder’s fee equivalent to one percent of the amount
solicited (i.e., P21,000.00) under the Finder’s Fee
Program. The documentary evidence consisting of the
Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No.
5217825 which was presented by the prosecution
categorically stated that Rosario Mercader deposited
P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in AFPSLAI. In
fact, Rosario Mercader was no longer presented as a
defense witness in view of the stipulation by the
prosecution on the fact that Mercader was a depositor
of AFPSLAI and that Hernandez was the one who
convinced her to make such deposit.26 Moreover, the
defense showed that the disbursement voucher was
merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the request of
Hernandez so that he would have a lower tax base.
Thus, after Guilas received the P21,000.00 from
AFPSLAI, he gave the money to petitioner who in turn
surrendered the amount to Hernandez.
It was further established that Hernandez was an
associate member of AFPSLAI and, thus, covered by
the Finder’s Fee Program. The prosecution tried to cast
doubt on the validity of Hernandez’s membership in the
association but it merely relied on the unsubstantiated
claims of its two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma.
Victoria Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor
of AFPSLAI and Ma. Fe Moreno, legal officer of
AFPSLAI, who claimed that Hernandez was
disqualified from being an associate member under
AFPSLAI’s by-laws. However, except for a recital of
certain provisions of the by-laws, they failed to support
their claims with documentary evidence clearly
showing that Hernandez was disqualified from being an
associate member. Significantly, Maigue admitted on
cross-examination that Hernandez’s membership was
approved by AFPSLAI’s membership committee and
was issued an AFPSLAI I.D. card.27
79 | P a g e
Documentary evidence consisting of Hernandez’s I.D. card
as well as the oral testimonies of petitioner, Arevalo and
Hernandez, and the admission of Maigue on cross-
examination, support the claim of the defense that Hernandez
was an associate member of AFPSLAI.
Considering that Hernandez was able to solicit a
P2,100,000.00 investment from Mercader, it follows
that he was entitled to receive the finder’s fee in the
amount of P21,000.00. AFPSLAI suffered no damage
because it really owed the P21,000.00 finder’s fee to
Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid to Guilas
and only later turned over to Hernandez. Clearly then,
the third essential element of the offense as alleged in
the information, i.e., the falsification caused damage to
AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00, was not proven
by the prosecution.
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.28 It has the duty to prove each
and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said
crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein. However, in the case at bar, the prosecution
failed to prove the third essential element of the crime
charged in the information. Thus, petitioner should be
acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court convicted petitioner of falsification of
private document, while conceding that AFPSLAI
suffered no damage, however, the court reasoned that
the third essential element of falsification of private
document was present because the falsification of the
voucher was done with criminal intent to cause damage
to the government considering that its purpose was to
lower the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, allow him to
evade payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.
We find ourselves unable to agree with this
ratiocination of the trial court because it violates the
constitutional right29 of petitioner to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. As early
as the 1904 case of U.S. v. Karelsen,30 the rationale of
this fundamental right of the accused was already
explained in this wise:
The object of this written accusation was – First. To
furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction
or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should
be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
necessary to constitute the crime charged.31 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is fundamental that every element constituting the
offense must be alleged in the information. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to
be set out in the information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.32 The allegations of facts
constituting the offense charged are substantial matters
and an accused’s right to question his conviction based
on facts not alleged in the information cannot be
waived.33 No matter how conclusive and convincing the
evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the
information on which he is tried or is necessarily
included therein.34 To convict him of a ground not
alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded.35 The rule is that a variance between the
allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material
and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects
his substantial rights.36
Thus, in Alonto v. People,37 Dico v. Court of Appeals38
and Ongson v. People,39 we acquitted the accused for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 ("The Bouncing
Checks Law") because there was a variance between
the identity and date of issuance of the check alleged in
the information and the check proved by the
prosecution during trial:
This Court notes, however, that under the third count,
the information alleged that petitioner issued a check
dated May 14, 1992 whereas the documentary evidence
presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI
Check No. 831258 in the amount of P25,000 dated
April 5, 1992. Prosecution witness Fernando Sardes
confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks
(Exhibits "G," "H," and "I"), but categorically stated
that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated
May 14, 1992, which was contrary to that testified to by
private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check No.
831258 dated April 5, 1992. In view of this variance,
the conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal
Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this
ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is
tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I"
(BPI Check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992 in the
amount of P25,000) is excluded by the law and the
rules on evidence. Since the identity of the check enters
into the first essential element of the offense under
Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws
or issues a check on account or for value, and the date
thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the
time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he
or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same,
there is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
be informed of the nature of the offense charged in
view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the
conviction for the third count fatally defective.40
(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan,41 we
upheld the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the accusation against him in a case
involving a variance between the means of committing
the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 alleged in the
information and the means found by the
Sandiganbayan:
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Common and foremost among the issues raised by
petitioners is the argument that the Sandiganbayan
erred in convicting them on a finding of fact that was
not alleged in the information. They contend that the
information charged them with having allowed payment
of P83,850 to Ricardo Castañeda despite being aware
and knowing fully well that the surveying instruments
were not actually repaired and rendered
functional/operational. However, their conviction by
the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding that the
surveying instruments were not repaired in accordance
with the specifications contained in the job orders.
xxxx
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the
accused is at stake, due process requires that the
accused be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted
of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information
would be a violation of this constitutional right.
The important end to be accomplished is to describe the
act with sufficient certainty in order that the accused
may be appraised of the nature of the charge against
him and to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left in the
unenviable state of speculating why he is made the
object of a prosecution.
xxxx
There is no question that the manner of commission
alleged in the information and the act the
Sandiganbayan found to have been committed are both
violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Nonetheless,
they are and remain two different means of execution
and, even if reference to Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 has
been made in the information, appellants’ conviction
should only be based on that which was charged, or
included, in the information. Otherwise, there would be
a violation of their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against them.
In Evangelista v. People, a judgment of conviction by
the Sandiganbayan, for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, was reversed by
the Court on the ground that accused was made liable
for acts different from those described in the
information. The accused therein was convicted on the
finding that she failed to identify with certainty in her
certification the kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay
Distillery, Inc., although the information charged her
with falsifying said certificate. The Court said that,
constitutionally, the accused has a right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. To
convict her of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.
Contrary to the stand of the prosecution, the allegations
contained in the information and the findings stated in
the Sandiganbayan decision are not synonymous. This
is clearly apparent from the mere fact that the defenses
applicable for each one are different. To counter the
allegations contained in the information, petitioners
only had to prove that the instruments were repaired
and rendered functional/operational. Under the findings
stated in the Sandiganbayan decision, petitioners’
defense would have been to show not only that the
instruments were repaired, but were repaired in
accordance with the job order.
xxxx
This is not to say that petitioners cannot be convicted
under the information charged. The information in itself
is valid. It is only that the Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting them for an act that was not alleged therein.
x x x.42 (Underscoring supplied)
As in the Burgos case, the information in the case at bar
is valid, however, there is a variance between the
allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial with respect to the third essential element of
falsification of private document, i.e., the falsification
caused damage or was committed with intent to cause
damage to a third party. To reiterate, petitioner was
charged in the information with causing damage to
AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 because he
caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that
Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in
truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such amount to
Guilas. However, he was convicted by the trial court of
falsifying the voucher with criminal intent to cause
damage to the government because the trial court found
that petitioner’s acts were designed to lower the tax
base of Hernandez and aid the latter in evading
payment of taxes on the finder’s fee.
We find this variance material and prejudicial to
petitioner which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in
the instant case. By the clear and unequivocal terms of
the information, the prosecution endeavored to prove
that the falsification of the voucher by petitioner caused
damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 and
not that the falsification of the voucher was done with
intent to cause damage to the government. It is apparent
that this variance not merely goes to the identity of the
third party but, more importantly, to the nature and
extent of the damage done to the third party. Needless
to state, the defense applicable for each is different.
More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based
precisely on the allegations in the information. A
review of the records shows that petitioner concentrated
on disproving that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this
was the charge in the information which he had to
refute to prove his innocence. As previously discussed,
petitioner proved that AFPSLAI suffered no damage
inasmuch as it really owed the finder’s fee in the
amount of P21,000.00 to Hernandez but the same was
placed in the name of Guilas upon Hernandez’s request.
If we were to convict petitioner now based on his intent
to cause damage to the government, we would be riding
roughshod over his constitutional right to be informed
of the accusation because he was not forewarned that he
was being prosecuted for intent to cause damage to the
government. It would be simply unfair and
underhanded to convict petitioner on this ground not
alleged while he was concentrating his defense against
the ground alleged.
81 | P a g e
The surprise and injustice visited upon petitioner
becomes more evident if we take into consideration that
the prosecution never sought to establish that
petitioner’s acts were done with intent to cause damage
to the government in that it purportedly aided
Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the
finder’s fee. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was never
made a party to this case. The income tax return of
Hernandez was, likewise, never presented to show the
extent, if any, of the actual damage to the government
of the supposed under declaration of income by
Hernandez. Actually, the prosecution never tried to
establish actual damage, much less intent to cause
damage, to the government in the form of lost income
taxes. There was here no opportunity for petitioner to
object to the evidence presented by the prosecution on
the ground that the evidence did not conform to the
allegations in the information for the simple reason that
no such evidence was presented by the prosecution to
begin with.
Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to
cause damage to the government from the testimony of
petitioner and his three other witnesses, namely,
Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of
the names in the voucher was intended to lower the tax
base of Hernandez to avoid payment of taxes on the
finder’s fee. In other words, the trial court used part of
the defense of petitioner in establishing the third
essential element of the offense which was entirely
different from that alleged in the information. Under
these circumstances, petitioner obviously had no
opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge
that he committed the acts with intent to cause damage
to the government because this was part of his defense
when he explained the reason for the substitution of the
names in the voucher with the end goal of establishing
that no actual damage was done to AFPSLAI. If we
were to approve of the method employed by the trial
court in convicting petitioner, then we would be
sanctioning the surprise and injustice that the accused’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him precisely seeks to
prevent. It would be plain denial of due process.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to
convict petitioner for acts which purportedly constituted
the third essential element of the crime but which were
entirely different from the acts alleged in the
information because it violates in no uncertain terms
petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable act because it
deprives the government of much needed funds in
delivering basic services to the people. However, the
culpability of petitioner should have been established
under the proper information and with an opportunity
for him to adequately prepare his defense. It is worth
mentioning that the public prosecutor has been apprised
of petitioner’s defense in the counter-affidavit43 that he
filed before the NBI. He claimed there that AFPSLAI
really owed the P21,000.00 finder’s fee not to Guilas
but to Hernandez and that the finder’s fee was placed in
the name of Guilas under a purported financial
arrangement between petitioner and Guilas. Yet in his
Resolution44 dated September 14, 1992, the public
prosecutor disregarded petitioner’s defense and
proceeded to file the information based on the alleged
damage that petitioner caused to AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00 representing unwarranted
payment of finder’s fee.45 During the trial proper, the
prosecution was again alerted to the fact that AFPSLAI
suffered no actual damage and that the substitution of
the names in the voucher was designed to aid
Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the
finder’s fee. This was shown by no less than the
prosecution’s own documentary evidence – the
Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178
in the amount of P2,100,000.00 issued to Rosario
Mercader which was prepared and identified by the
prosecution witness, Judy Balangue. Later on, the
testimonies of the defense witnesses, Arevalo,
Hernandez, Madet and petitioner, clearly set forth the
reasons for the substitution of the names in the
disbursement voucher. However, the prosecution did
not take steps to seek the dismissal of the instant case
and charge petitioner and his cohorts with the proper
information before judgment by the trial court as
expressly allowed under Section 19,46 Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.47 Instead, the prosecution proceeded to
try petitioner under the original information even
though he had an adequate defense against the offense
charged in the information. Regrettably, these mistakes
of the prosecution can only benefit petitioner.
In closing, it is an opportune time to remind public
prosecutors of their important duty to carefully study
the evidence on record before filing the corresponding
information in our courts of law and to be vigilant in
identifying and rectifying errors made. Mistakes in
filing the proper information and in the ensuing
prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the
State’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws and
adversely affect the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
September 29, 2004 Decision and April 26, 2005
Resolution of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
26556 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The Bail
Bond is CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
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FALSIFICATION
G.R. Nos. 148682-85 November 30, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ANGEL A. ENFERMO, Appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This case was certified to this Court, pursuant to
Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, by the Court of Appeals
after reviewing the case on appeal1 and affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 158, which found appellant guilty of
two counts of Malversation through Falsification of
Public Documents and two counts of Malversation.2
On October 25, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Metro
Manila twelve informations against appellant, Angel A.
Enfermo, and Ferdinand C. Entienza, both former
employees of the National Research Council of the
Philippines (NRCP).3 Several of the cases filed were
dismissed for repeated failure of the prosecution to
present evidence.4 The motion for reconsideration of
the order of dismissal was denied.5 The NRCP through
the Government Corporate Counsel filed a petition for
certiorari6 with the Court of Appeals questioning the
dismissal and the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, which petition was denied by the Court
of Appeals in a resolution dated November 18, 1998.7
As a result of the dismissal of those cases, the only ones
that survived and were tried in the Regional Trial Court
were Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087 for
Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents and Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and
111091 for Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents, in which only appellant, Angel A.
Enfermo, was charged.
The prosecution, in support of its charges, presented
evidence, as follows:
Alejandro Rodanilla, Administrative Officer of the
NRCP, testified that appellant, Angel A. Enfermo, held
the position of Disbursing Officer II, Accounting
Section, Finance and Administrative Division of the
NRCP. His duties and responsibilities as a disbursing
officer are the following: "He assist[s] the cashier in the
preparation and the release of the checks covering the
financial transaction of the NRCP. He also assist[s] the
cashier in encashing the checks for salaries of the
employees of NRCP."8
As testified to by Luz Acosta Aramil, Accountant III of
NRCP, sometime in 1993, it was discovered that the
debit and credit records of the checks issued and paid
by its depositary bank, Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), did not balance. The bank reconciliation showed
overstatements of ₱80,000, ₱60,000 and ₱60,000 for
the months of June, July and November, respectively.
An investigation disclosed that there were double
issuances of checks, which were covered by only one
disbursement voucher each.
In Criminal Case No. 111086, the charge originated
from the double issuance of checks intended for Aurora
Dacanay, a researcher who was doing a study on pine
shoot moth and tip moth in the Benguet pine forest in
the Cordillera. On February 26, 1993, the NRCP issued
an LBP check with Check No. 0000163230-BB to
Dacanay in the amount of ₱38,446.13.9 This check was
duly supported by Disbursement Voucher No. 93-02-
95. The sum was the final release of an outright grant in
connection with an NRCP-assisted research project E-
181, entitled "Population Dynamics of Pine Shoot Moth
and Tip Moth in Benguet Pine Forest in the
Cordillera."10 The check was received and encashed by
Dacanay in Baguio City.11 However, on May 19, 1993,
a second check with Check No. 0000026186-CC was
issued to Aurora Dacanay for the same amount of
₱38,446.13 and supported by the same voucher as the
first check. This second check was encashed by
appellant in the Parañaque branch of the Land Bank of
the Philippines by supposedly forging the signature of
the payee and signing his own name as an
acknowledgement of receipt of payment.12 Appellant
received and misappropriated the proceeds of the check.
In Criminal Case No. 111087, again, the charge
stemmed from a double issuance of a check intended
for Jose M. Bernaldez, a Mathematics professor based
in Mindanao State University (MSU), Iligan City.
Check No. 0000096515-CC in the amount of ₱30,000
was issued by the NRCP to Bernaldez, on August 13,
1993.13 The check was supported by Disbursement
Voucher No. 93-5-591. The amount paid was for an
outright grant in connection with the NRCP-assisted
research project No. B-78, entitled "On Regular
Cyclically K-Complementary Graphs."14 The check was
received and encashed by Bernaldez in Iligan City.15
Again, as in the case of Aurora Dacanay, another check
was issued in the name of Jose M. Bernaldez with
Check No. 0000026624-CC, which was not supported
by a disbursement voucher.16 Like the case of Dacanay,
appellant encashed the check at the Parañaque branch
of the Land Bank of the Philippines, by supposedly
forging the signature of Bernaldez, and signing his own
name to acknowledge receipt of payment.17 Appellant
received and misappropriated the proceeds of the check.
The resident auditor of the Commission on Audit
assigned to the NRCP, Ma. Eugenia Rodil, testified to
an audit report which she prepared and submitted
pursuant to the detection of the anomalous transactions
at the NRCP. After her cash examination revealed that
there was a shortage, a fraud audit in the NRCP was
performed. Rodil testified on the documentary evidence
gathered relating to the double issuance of checks to
Dacanay and Bernaldez. In her investigation she
discovered that the bank statement did not tally with the
Journal of Checks Issued, which was prepared by
Accountant III Aramil and the Report of Checks Issued
(RCI), which was prepared by the cashier.18
83 | P a g e
With regard to Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and
111091, the prosecution presented Mary Christine
Avanzado and Lanie P. Manalo, employees of the
NRCP, who both executed affidavits.19 Avanzado
testified that when she was claiming her salary as Clerk
I for the period of January 1–15, 1994, she was
informed by appellant that he had spent the money and
would just pay her back.20 In the case of Manalo, she
did not receive her productivity incentive pay in the
amount of ₱2,000. She then confronted appellant
regarding the amount, and the latter replied that he had
used it to pay a debt.21 Both Avanzado and Manalo
signed the payroll upon the promise of appellant that he
would return the money.22
Appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court on
all four charges. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC decision with modification, as
follows:
Appellant contended that the prosecution failed to
prove that he falsified the signature of the payee in LBP
[Checks] Nos. 0000026186 (Dacanay) and 0000026624
(Bernaldez) in Criminal Case[s] Nos. 111086 and
111087 as it did not present the testimony of the NBI
officer or handwriting expert who prepared the
handwriting examination report. Moreover, argued the
appellant, if he really committed such forgery, then he
should have at least imitated the signature of the payee;
and since it was his signature which appeared on the
dorsal portion of the questioned checks, he could not
have forged his own signature. Appellant also pointed
out that the prosecution presented mere photocopies of
the questioned checks, the originals thereof were not
submitted in evidence. The trial court thus erred in
convicting the accused in the absence of evidence that
he misappropriated the proceeds of the subject checks.
Such contentions are untenable.
The crime charged in Criminal Case[s] Nos. 111086
and 111087 is malversation committed by means of
falsification of public documents, the checks considered
as public documents evidencing payment of obligation
by the government out of public funds
The crime of malversation of public funds is defined
and penalized as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.—
Presumption of malversation – Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property….. . .
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal uses.
The elements of malversation, essential for the
conviction of an accused, under the above penal
provision are that:
(a) the offender is a public officer;
(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office;
(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or
has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence permitted, the taking by another person of,
such funds or property. (Rueda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 129064, November 29, 2000.)
Anent the last element, our Supreme Court has ruled
that to justify conviction for malversation of public
funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the
accused received public funds or property and that he
could not account for them or did not have them in his
possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for
the disappearance of the same. (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 125160, June 20, 2000, citing
People v. Pepito, 267 SCRA 358,368, See also Felicilda
v. Grospe, 211 SCRA 285.) An accountable public
officer may be convicted of malversation even if there
is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only
evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts
which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
(Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 185;
Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan, 200 SCRA 722, 734.)
Such conversion of public funds must be affirmatively
proved, whether by direct evidence or by the production
of facts from which conversion necessarily follows.
(Bugayong v. People, 202 SCRA 762.)
In the case at bar, We find that the prosecution has
satisfactorily proved all the elements of the crime of
malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant did not give any explanation as to the
shortage in the funds which have been traced to the
double issuance of checks, the responsibility for which
fell on the cashier (Entienza) and the disbursing officer
(appellant). His defense consisted of a mere denial that
the signature appearing on the dorsal portion of the
questioned checks was not his. In his testimony,
however, appellant did not categorically deny that said
signature was his but that he could not remember
whether it was his signature because it was a long time
ago. As to the authenticity of his signature appearing on
said checks, upon the request of the NRCP, the NBI
conducted a handwriting examination of appellant’s
signature appearing on the questioned checks together
with specimen signatures of appellant taken from daily
time records, and submitted a report thereon confirming
that indeed, the same were written by (1) one and the
same person.
84 | P a g e
While it is true that the prosecution did not present the
testimony of the NBI officer or handwriting expert who
conducted said examination, the signature of appellant
appearing on the questioned checks was sufficiently
established by the testimony of Luz Aramil who has
sufficient familiarity with appellant’s signature, having
worked with appellant who was under her supervision
and had seen documents signed by him. Such opinion
of a non-expert on handwriting is authorized under Sec.
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to prove
genuineness of a handwriting. A person is deemed to be
acquainted with the handwriting of another where it is
shown that, in the ordinary course of business,
documents purporting to be written by that person have
frequently come into his possession or under his
scrutiny or have been habitually submitted to him.
(Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 ed., p.
279, citing 3 Jones, p. 311.) In Court Administrator v.
Villanueva (223 SCRA 41), our Supreme Court has
ruled that resort to handwriting experts, while probably
useful, is not mandatory nor indispensable in examining
or comparing handwriting. This is so since under Sec.
22, Rule 132, the handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the
testimony of the NBI handwriting expert who
conducted the examination and submitted the report
questioned by the appellant, is not indispensable in
proving the authenticity of appellant’s signature on the
questioned checks.
Appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to
indubitably establish that it was he who actually
falsified the signature of Aurora Dacanay and Jose M.
Bernaldez and referred to the testimony of Aramil on
cross-examination where the latter could not definitely
point to him as the one who signed the name of said
payees on the checks. Aramil’s testimony, however,
only emphasized the point that such act of falsification
committed by appellant can be conclusively presumed
from the undisputed fact that he was the one who
encashed the checks and received the proceeds thereof
as evidenced by his signature acknowledging receipt of
payment of said checks. It has been held that in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification. (Maliwat
v. CA, 256 SCRA 718.) Since it is obvious that the
purported signatures of the payees in the questioned
checks were not genuine signatures on the basis of
visual comparison alone, it goes without saying that
the person who encashed the same and received
payment thereof is presumed to be the forger of said
signatures. Taken together with the circumstances
that as disbursing officer, appellant was the one in
charge of preparation, encashment and delivery of
checks issued by the NRCP, the conclusion is
inevitable that no other person other than appellant
could have falsified the payees’ signature, encashed
the questioned checks and misappropriated the
proceeds thereof. Being a public officer who had
taken advantage of his official posisiton and falsified
the signature of the payees of the questioned checks,
appellant has committed falsification of public
document defined and penalized under Art. 171,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
The totality of evidence indeed points to the appellant
as the one responsible for the encashment of the
questioned checks found to be irregularly issued. His
objection as to the documentary exhibits being mere
photocopies is of no significance since during the
hearings below, appellant’s counsel, upon request by
the prosecution, had admitted that these are faithful
reproduction[s] of the originals thereof, which original
copies, however, have not been submitted to the trial
court as they were being kept in custody by the
Commission on Audit which had conducted its own
investigation on the matter. Besides, no such objection
was raised by appellant in his "Comments/Objections to
Prosecution[’]s Formal Offer of Evidence."
Coming now to the charges against the appellant in
Criminal Case[s] Nos. 111089 and 111091, the
respective information reads –
Criminal Case No. 111089
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of
the Ombudsman accuses Angel A. Enfermo of the
Crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document, defined and penalized under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Article 171 paragraph 1
and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
follows:
That on or about January 15, 1994, and for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused Angel A. Enfermo a public officer being then a
Disbursing Officer of National Research Council of the
Philippines (NRCP), Taguig, Metro Manila, taking
advantage of his official position, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify NRCP Salary Payroll for the period January 1 to
15, 1994 by forging the signature of Marie Christine T.
Avanzado, NRCP Accounting Clerk; and thereafter,
with grave abuse of confidence, embezzle,
misappropriate and convert to his personal use and
benefit the salary in the amount of ₱978.24 pertaining
to Ms. Avanzado, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest and Marie Christine T. Avanzado.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 111091
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of
the Ombudsman accuses Angel A. Enfermo of the
Crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document, defined and penalized under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Article 171 and Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
85 | P a g e
That on or about January 17, 1994, and for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused Angel A. Enfermo a public officer being then a
Disbursing Officer of National Research Council of the
Philippines (NRCP), Taguig, Metro Manila, taking
advantage of his official position, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
Productivity Incentive Payroll of NRCP for the year
1993 by forging the signature of Lanie P. Manalo, an
employee of the NRCP; and thereafter, with grave
abuse of confidence, misappropriate and convert to his
personal use and benefit the said Productivity Incentive
of Ms. Manalo in the amount of ₱2,000.00 to the
damage and prejudice of Lanie Manalo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As shown above, the prosecuting officer designated the
offense as Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document under Art. 315 paragraph 1(b) in relation to
Art. 171, paragraph 1 and Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. After evaluating the evidence adduced during the
trial however, the lower court convicted the appellant of
the crime of malversation defined and penalized under
Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, stating that there
was no falsification of public document involved as the
appellant did not falsify the signatures of Avanzado and
Manalo in the payroll since
the latter two (2) themselves signed the same after
appellant promised to return the money. The lower
court reasoned that said funds remain as public funds
prior to their release to and receipt by the personnel
entitled thereto, and hence by admitting that he had
used the money representing the salary and productivity
incentive bonus, respectively, of Avanzado and Manalo
for his own benefit, appellant clearly committed an act
of malversation in both cases.
Appellant, on the other hand, argued that he could not
be convicted of the crime charged in Criminal Case
Nos. 111089 and 111091 since both Avanzado and
Manalo testified that their signatures in the payroll were
not falsified by the appellant. Their signature on the
payroll thus constitutes undeniable proof that there was
transfer of ownership of said money from the
government to the said employees. Such money thereby
became subject to the control of the said employees and
it is perfectly within their rights to lend it and allow
somebody to use their money. In fact, appellant
averred, it is a recognized practice among government
employees and even in the private sector to just sign the
payroll without actually receiving their money because
others have borrowed it. No money or property was
taken from the government and hence no element of
damage to the government was present.
Appellant’s arguments are without merit.
First, We shall pass upon the matter of the crime
charged in the information and subsequent conviction
of the appellant for a crime other than that designated
by the prosecuting officer in said information.
Although the caption or preamble of the information(s)
charged the accused-appellant with estafa through
falsification of public document, the crime committed
was malversation. It is settled that what controls is not
the designation of the offense but the description
thereof as alleged in the information. (Santos v. People,
181 SCRA 487, 492, citing early cases People v.
Maravilla,165 SCRA 392; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,
253 SCRA 773; People v. Sandoval, 254 SCRA 436,
452; People v. Aczon, 225 SCRA 237.) The technical
name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the
information does not determine the character of the
crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
information. (People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168, 175,
citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773,
citing Reyes v. Camillon, et al., 192 SCRA 445.) The
real nature of the criminal charge cannot be determined
from the caption or preamble of the information or from
the mere reference to a particular provision of law
alleged to have been violated because they are
conclusions of law. On the contrary, it is determined by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. (Ibid.; See also Pecho v. People, 262
SCRA 518, 528, citing Matilde v. Jabson, 68 SCRA
456.) Thus, an incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake.
(Ibid., citing U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273.) For the rule
is settled that it is ultimately the court which determines
the nomenclature of the crime after the trial and
following its own ascertainment of the facts needed to
constitute the elements of the crime attributed to the
accused. (Cinco v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 726,
733, citing People v. Eleuterio, 173 SCRA 243, 251.)
As described in the information, the offense imputed to
appellant Enfermo contains all the essential elements of
malversation, to wit: (1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he has the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (3) the funds or
property involved are public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and (4) he has appropriated,
taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence permitted, the
taking by another person of such funds or property. So
that even if appellant is correct in saying, and which
was also the ruling of the trial court, that he had not
committed falsification of public document since he did
not falsify the signature of Avanzado and Manalo in the
payroll, still he cannot escape criminal liability for the
act of malversation committed by him in taking,
appropriating or misappropriating the payroll money
intended for Avanzado and Manalo, for his own
personal use and benefit. Contrary to appellant’s theory,
such funds remain as public funds prior to their release
to and receipt by said Avanzado and Manalo, the
persons entitled to receive the same. His asseveration
that it is a recognized practice among government
employees and even in the private sector for employees
to just sign the payroll without actually receiving the
money because others have borrowed it, has no basis
and does not justify his highly improper act. Besides, in
no way can it be considered that appellant had
"borrowed" the questioned funds intended for
Avanzado and Manalo when he had not first sought the
permission of the two (2) before taking the money and
using it for his personal benefit, as said employees even
had to confront him for their non-receipt of said payroll
money.
86 | P a g e
And even granting that he had priorly (sic) secured
permission from said employees, it will not change the
character of the payroll funds as public funds for as
long as these have not yet been received by or released
to the said employees.
Clearly then, upon the foregoing facts and
circumstances, the guilt of the accused-appellant for the
crime of malversation in Criminal Case Nos. 111089
and 111091 has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court, We
believe that the trial court erred in imposing the penalty
of eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum to reclusion perpetua
maximum in Criminal Case Nos. 111086 and 111087.
Art. 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In the light of
Article 48 which provides that the penalty for a
complex crime is the penalty for the most serious crime,
the same to be applied in its maximum period, the
proper penalty in this case is therefore reclusion
perpetua, which remains as an indivisible penalty
having no minimum, medium and maximum periods.
(People v. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360, 382, citing the
Supreme Court’s Resolution of January 9, 1995
clarifying its decision in People v. Lucas, 310 Phil 77.)
Consequently, the Indeterminate Sentence Law ( Act
No. 4103, as amended) does not apply in this case in
view of Section 2 thereof. On the other hand, the
penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 111089 and
111091 should also be modified from eight (8) years
and one (1) day to nine (9) years and four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each in accordance with
Article 217 paragraph 2, the amount involved (₱978.24
and ₱2,000.00) being more than ₱200.00 but does not
exceed ₱6,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal
is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision
in Criminal Case Nos. 111086, 111087, 111089, and
111091 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 111086, accused Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties
and to indemnify the National Research Council of the
Philippines (NRCP) the amount of ₱38,446.13;
2) In Criminal Case No. 111087, accused Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, together with the accessory
penalties and to indemnify the National Research
Council of the Philippines (NRCP) the amount of
₱30,000.00;
3) In Criminal Case No. 111089, accused Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, together with its accessory
penalties and to indemnify Christine Avanzado the
amount of P978.24; and
4) In Criminal Case No. 111091, accused Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum together with its accessory
penalties and to indemnify Lanie P. Manalo the amount
of ₱2,000.00.23
As mentioned above, the case was certified to this
Court pursuant to Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In a
Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, appellant raised the
following Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN CRIMINAL CASE[S] NOS. 111086 AND
111087 AND IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA.24
Appellant also adopted the arguments presented in
Appellant’s Brief25 and the Supplemental Appellant’s
Brief26 filed before the Court of Appeals. The errors
assigned in these briefs are as follows:
Appellant’s Brief
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION BUT
DISREGARDED BASIC FACTS THAT WOULD
HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIT THE
APPELLANT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE
MISAPPROPRIATED THE PROCEEDS OF THE
CHECKS.
Supplemental Appellant’s Brief
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 111086 AND 111087 HAS
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE No.
111089.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
111091.
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 IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
PENALTY OF RECLUSION [TEMPORAL
MINIMUM TO RECLUSION] PERPETUA
MAXIMUM IN CRIMINAL CASES NUMBERS
111086 AND 111087 ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
V People v. Manansala, cited in People v. Sandaydiego,
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
PENALTY OF EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1)
DAY TO NINE (9) YEARS AND FOUR (4)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR
IN CRIMINAL CASES NUMBERS 111089 AND
111091 ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
For clarity, the issues as culled from the arguments of
appellant in the briefs filed before this Court and the
Court of Appeals may be restated thus:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087, whether
the checks were actually in the possession of appellant.
2. In criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether it
was proven that the signatureS on the two checks Were
those OF APPELLANT.
3. In criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether
appellant falsified the signatures of dacanay and
bernaldez.
4. in criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether
photocopies of the checks are admissible as evidence.
5. In criminal cases nos. 111089 and 111091, whether
the funds taken by appellant were public funds.
6. In Criminal cases nos. 111086 and 111087, whether
the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion temporal minimum to reclusion perpetua
maximum.
7. in criminal cases nos. 111089 and 111091, whether
the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years and
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.
The first, second, and third issues will be discussed
together. Although it is true that the prosecution did not
present any direct evidence that appellant effected the
falsification, such is a disputable presumption arising
from the facts of the case. In Maliwat v. CA, cited by
the Court of Appeals, this Court said –
The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a
forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of
falsification. (Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116
citing Alarcon v. CA, 125 Phil. 1110 [1967], People v.
Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil 906 [1935]; People v. Lotegro, 50
O.G. No. 2632; People v. Dala, 50 O.G. 612675;
People v. Manansala, L-13142, 30 June 1959; People v.
Caragao, 30 SCRA 993; Caubong v. People, 210
SCRA 377).
If a person had in his possession a falsified document
and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is
the material author of the falsification. (U.S. v. Castillo,
6 Phil. 453; People v. de Lara, 45 Phil. 754 ; People v.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338;
81 SCRA 120 [1978].).27
By mere comparison with the signatures of Dacanay
and Bernaldez in the checks that they had actually
signed, Check No. 00000163230-BB28 and Check No.
0000096515-CC29, it was proven that the signatures in
the other two checks, Check No. 0000026186-CC30 and
Check No. 0000026624-CC31, were falsified.
Furthermore, it is indisputable that said checks were in
the possession of appellant, as proven by the fact that
he was the Disbursing Officer; and that possession of
such checks was within his functions. Also, the fact that
his signatures appeared at the back of the checks further
proves that he was in possession of them, that he was
the one who presented them for payment, and that he
received their proceeds and therefore used and profited
by such checks. Since he could not adequately explain
the foregoing facts, the presumption defined in Maliwat
v. CA applies. He is therefore presumed to be the forger
of the signatures of Dacanay and Bernaldez.
Appellant’s contention that the NBI report on the
signature of appellant is not admissible since the officer
who prepared the report was not presented to testify on
the report’s authenticity or contents need not be
resolved because the authenticity of appellant’s
signature on the two checks does not depend upon it
since such was proven by the testimony of Luz Aramil,
who was familiar with the signature of appellant.32
As to the fourth issue, regarding the admissibility of the
photocopies of the checks in Criminal Cases Nos.
111086 and 111087, this Court finds that they are
admissible because appellant did not raise this question
in his Comments/Objections to Prosecution’s Formal
Offer of Evidence.33 Appellant is therefore deemed to
have accepted the photocopies as admissible.
With regard to the fifth issue, the funds taken by
appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and 111091
are public in nature. He claims that Avanzado and
Manalo signed their names, which signified that they
had already received the money and therefore the
money had already become private in character. From
the testimony of Avanzado and Manalo, it is plain that
appellant took the money prior to their signing the
payrolls. In Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion, a case penned by Justice Malcolm, this
Court held:
88 | P a g e
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is
that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to the
creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and
to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit
indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason
is that money sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason
which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.
The United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of
Buchanan vs. Alexander ([1846], 4 How., 19), in
speaking of the right of creditors of seamen, by process
of attachment, to divert the public money from its
legitimate and appropriate object, said:
that prescribed by the Code.38 No error was committed
on this point. The court a quo placed the minimum and
maximum of the indeterminate sentence well within the
ranges prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 23001 is AFFIRMED in toto, as
follows:
1) In Criminal Case No 111086, appellant Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua together with the accessory
penalties, and to indemnify the National Research
Council of the Philippines (NRCP) in the amount of
₱38,446.13;
2) In Criminal Case No. 111087, appellant Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, together with the accessory
penalties, and to indemnify the National Research
Council of the Philippines (NRCP) in the amount of
₱30,000;

"To state such a principle is to refute it. No government
can sanction it. At all times it would be found
embarrassing, and under some circumstances it might
be fatal to the public service. . . . So long as money
remains in the hands of a disbursing officer, it is as
much the money of the United States, as if it had not
been drawn from the treasury. Until paid over by the
agent of the government to the person entitled to it, the
fund cannot, in any legal sense, be considered a part of
his effects." (See, further, 12 R. C. L., p. 841; Keene vs.
Smith [1904], 44 Ore., 525; Wild vs. Ferguson [1871],
23 La. Ann., 752; Bank of Tennessee vs. Dibrell
[1855], 3 Sneed [Tenn.], 379.)34
Hence, the money was public in nature since it had not
yet been received by Avanzado and Manalo when
appellant took it.
3) In Criminal Case No. 111089, appellant Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, together with its accessory
penalties and to indemnify Christine Avanzado in the
amount of ₱978.24; and
4) In Criminal Case No. 111091, accused Angel A.
Enfermo is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, together with its accessory
penalties, and to indemnify Lanie P. Manalo in the
amount of ₱2,000.

As to the sixth issue, the penalty imposed by the RTC is Costs de oficio.
wrong. Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its SO ORDERED.
maximum period to reclusion perpetua when the
amount malversed is greater than ₱22,000. Since
appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed in its
maximum period, pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. In this case the penalty imposed should be
reclusion perpetua. Since the Indeterminate Sentence
Law does not apply to indivisible penalties,35 and
reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty,36 the
Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be applied to the
penalty in Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087.

For the seventh and last issue, Article 217, paragraph 2

of the Revised Penal Code37 applies to the penalties in
Criminal Cases Nos. 111089 and 111091 since the
amounts malversed were ₱978.24 and ₱2,000. Since
there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
the medium range of the penalty prescribed in Article
217, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (the
penalty prescribed is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods) is where the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence can be placed. The minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower to

89 | P a g e
ART. 178 OF THE RPC
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner
by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation
of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No.
6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use
of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial
Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the
Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a
complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority
and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and
other officials of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a
resolution advising the Governor to report the
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal
cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut
logs in the area.2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for
petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in
Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the
complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked
his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office
of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger,
Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.
Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman
petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he
was reluctant to personally ask for the document since
he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman.
However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could
just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required
to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook.
Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the
name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed
to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty.
Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division,
Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the
complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by
writing the name "Oscar Perez."4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was
greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also
worked in the same office. They conversed for a while
then he left. When Loida learned that the person who
introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually
petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo
in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner
be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had
completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner
without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence
alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that
his supposed alias was different from his registered
name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause.
Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil
registry was presented to show the registered name of
accused which according to him was a condition sine
qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him
guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended
by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison
term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years
of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay
a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by
imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of
P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction
as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has
not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No.
6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar
Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term
which connotes the habitual use of another name by
which a person is also known. He claims that he has
never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only
used such name on one occasion and it was with the
express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his
position that an essential requirement for a conviction
under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has
not been complied with when the prosecution failed to
prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the Registry of Births. He further
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the defense theory that he was charged
under the wrong law.5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved
and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing
a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference
to the intended scope and purpose.6 The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.7
90 | P a g e
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No.
142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by
petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under
which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions
thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein
cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7
November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No.
6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.
It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary
purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was
christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as
may have been authorized by a competent
court. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or
aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to
obtain judicial authority for a change of name.
Separate proceedings shall be had for each
alias, and each new petition shall set forth the
original name and the alias or aliases for the
use of which judicial authority has been,
obtained, specifying the proceedings and the
date on which such authority was granted.
Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall
be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No.
6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A.
No. 142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for
literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil
registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of all alien, with which he
was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and
who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall
apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person
shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition
for an alias shall set forth the person's
baptismal and family name and the name
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his
original or real name, specifying the reason or
reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian
name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and
no person shall use any name or names other
than his original or real name unless the same is
or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their
origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate
the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than
True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its
Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on
14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent
provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to
use or sign, on any written or printed receipt
including receipt for tax or business or any
written or printed contract not verified by a
notary public or on any written or printed
evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with
his business other than his true name, or keep
conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at
the place where his business is conducted, if he
is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a
firm name or business name or style without
first registering such other name, or such firm
name, or business name or style in the Bureau
of Commerce together with his true name and
that of any other person having a joint or
common interest with him in such contract,
agreement, business transaction, or business . . .
.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as
amended was made primarily to curb the common
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of
different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which
for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or
wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an
alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by
proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil
register.9
91 | P a g e
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had
occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects
of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No.
142 when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's
use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition
to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add
to more confusion. That he is known in his
business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc.,
by the former name, is not sufficient reason to
allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted
that he is known to his associates by both
names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of
which he is a customer, knows him by his real
name. Neither would the fact that he had
encountered certain difficulties in his
transactions with government offices which
required him to explain why he bore two
names, justify the grant of his petition, for
petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by
simply using and sticking only to his real name
"Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside
permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his
having filed a petition for naturalization in
Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues
the more against the grant of his petition,
because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
there would then be no necessity for his further
using said alias, as it would be contrary to the
usual Filipino way and practice of using only
one name in ordinary as well as business
transactions. And, as the lower court correctly
observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized)
that it would be better for him to write his name
following the Occidental method, "he can
easily file a petition for change of name, so that
in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can,
abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt
the name Kheng Chiau Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion
and so hold, that petitioner has not shown
satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds
under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of
Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for
the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to
his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by
a competent authority. A man's name is simply the
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated
by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names
and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another
person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this
name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A.
No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in
the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which
was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who
should have brought the letter to that office in the first
place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely
serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the
complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There
is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias
name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that
he had used or was intending to use that name as his
second name in addition to his real name. The use of
the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an
isolated transaction where he was not even legally
required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had
identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy
of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of
the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the
complaint was part of public records hence open to
inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its
related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as
the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No.
142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid
all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A.
No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The
reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a
certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed,
our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not
clearly penalize the act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
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PERJURY
G.R. No. 162187 November 18, 2005
CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. THE
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and HORST-
KESSLER VON SPRENGEISEN, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Antecedents
On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the
Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Special
Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of
Finance against certain importations of Hamburg
Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of
magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany.2 The
case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I-98.
The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import
Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade and
Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-
Dumping Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS
submitted its report to the Tariff Commission, declaring
that a prima facie case existed and that continued
importation of refractory bricks from Germany would
harm the local industry. It adopted the amount of DM
1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the
imported goods.3
The HTC received a copy of the said report on February
14, 1997. However, before it could respond, the
chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parties
to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued
between RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant
General Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus
Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and
General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and
Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other. During
the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory
bricks were imported by the HTC at a price less than its
normal value of DM 1,200, and that such importation
was likely to injure the local industry. The parties also
agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses and
protracted litigation. HTC was required to reform its
price policy/structure of its importation and sale of
refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the
provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and
regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and
signed a compromise agreement containing the terms
agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia signed.4
Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered
the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of Ramon
Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard,
Manila by Von Sprengeisen’s approval.5
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement.
Borgonia revised the agreement by inserting the phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS" in paragraph 1
thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement
and had the same delivered to the office of HTC on
April 22, 1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez, a technical
assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement and
delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20
minutes, Gonzales returned, with the agreement already
signed by Von Sprengeisen.6 Gonzales, who had also
signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day,
Notary Public Zenaida P. De Zuñiga notarized the
agreement.7 Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized
Agreement to HTC.8
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff
Commission. During the May 9, 1997 hearing before
the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a
representative of HTC appeared. He offered no
objection to the Agreement. The Commission submitted
its report to the Special Committee which rendered a
decision declaring that, based on the findings of the
BIS, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks
was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC received a copy of
the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC
appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from
Germany anew and noted that the normal value of the
said importation under the decision of the Special
Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per
metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent
Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment with the
Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such
decision be declared null and void on the following
grounds:
1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE
PROTESTANT DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR
THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.
2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION
OF THE FACTS NOT AGREED UPON WAS
DELIBERATELY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE
BY THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.9
The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC
averred therein that Villanueva violated Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code when he surreptitiously
inserted the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in
the agreement without the knowledge and consent of
Von Sprengeisen and despite their agreement to put
behind them the findings of the BIS. Appended to the
motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von
Sprengeisen in which he alleged, inter alia, that
sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with its
Report declaring that the normal value of the
magnesite-based refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per
metric ton; before HTC could respond to the report,
Villanueva invited him to a conference for the purpose
of finding the best solution to the pending case before
the Commission; he and Gonzales attended the meeting
during which it was agreed, by way of a compromise,
that the parties will accept the amount of DM 1,050 per
metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based
refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the
draft of the compromise agreement prepared by
Villanueva, he approved the same; subsequently,
Villanueva transmitted a compromise agreement
93 | P a g e
already signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his
review, approval and signature; believing that the
compromise agreement reproduced the contents of the
first compromise agreement, he signed the second
agreement without reading it; when he received, on
March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of the Tariff
Commission based on the compromise agreement of the
parties wherein the committee adopted the findings and
recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value of
the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric ton), he was
shocked because he never agreed to the use of such
findings for the reformation of its price policies; there
was, in fact, an agreement between him and Villanueva
to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up
Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him despite
several attempts; suspecting that something amiss
happened, he had the draft of the first compromise
agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate the
same; it was only sometime later that his secretary
found the folder-file containing the draft and was
appalled to discover that Villanueva had substantially
altered the first draft of the compromise agreement; this
made him conclude and confirm his suspicion that
Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud, induced him to sign
the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the
HTC.10
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move,
Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and
Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal
complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended
thereto was a complaint-affidavit executed by
Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von
Sprengeisen made the following false statements in the
Urgent Motion, thus:
a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office,
inviting him to a meeting for the purpose of finding the
best and most equitable solution to the case (p. 3,
Urgent Motion);
b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind
them the findings and recommendations of the Bureau
of Import Services (BIS) with respect to the anti-
dumping protest filed by RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement
sent to him was merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
d. The phrase "based on the findings of the Bureau of
Import Services" was inserted in paragraph 1 of the
final Compromise Agreement without his knowledge
and consent (p. 3, Urgent Motion); and
e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously
inserted the aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion).11
Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the
following false statements in his Affidavit of Merit:
a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the
purpose of finding the best solution to the case;
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them]
the findings and recommendation of the BIS submitted
to the Secretary of Finance;
c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the
normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks
from Germany;
d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement
sent to him was merely a draft; and
e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced
[respondent] to sign the final Compromise
Agreement.12
In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that
whoever called the other for a conference was not a
material matter. Since the first draft of the Compromise
Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the
complainant to send to him the hard copy of the
Agreement for his signature. He further narrated that
when he received the hard copy of the compromise
agreement, he did not bother to review since he
assumed that it contained the same provisions in the
faxed copy. He did not suggest that the phrase "based
on the findings of the BIS" be inserted in the hard copy
of the agreement because he and Villanueva were at
odds on the BIS finding the normal price of the goods
was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it would
have been senseless of him to agree to such insertion; as
such, he did not make any willful and deliberate
assertion of any falsehood as to any material fact.13
Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no
probable cause for perjury against the private
respondent and recommended the dismissal of the
complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia
Dimagiba reviewed the resolution of Prosecutor Supnet
and found probable cause for perjury against the private
respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit
that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement
through fraud and deceit. According to the Second
Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the private
respondent "thru deceit and fraud to sign the final
Compromise Agreement" was a deliberate assertion of
a falsehood, designed as it was merely to give the BIS
the impression that private respondent was misled into
agreeing to the compromise agreement.
She further opined that the allegation was perjurious,
considering that the private respondent had sufficient
time to pass upon the Compromise Agreement and
could have availed the services of legal minds who
could review the terms and conditions thereof before
signing the same;14 hence, she recommended the
reversal of Prosecutor Supnet’s resolution and the filing
of the information. The City Prosecutor approved the
recommendation of the Second Assistant City
Prosecutor. Accordingly, an Information for perjury
was filed against the private respondent with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
The private respondent appealed the resolution to the
Secretary of Justice, who reversed the resolution of the
City Prosecutor on September 20, 2002. According to
the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish
the materiality of the alleged false assertions and that
the said assertions were willful and deliberate.
Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are
not altogether false since the intention of the parties in
executing the compromise agreement was precisely to
94 | P a g e
put behind the ruling of the BIS, despite which the
complainant inserted the condition that the parties
would be bound by such findings and
recommendations.15 The decretal portion of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Manila is hereby REVERSED. The City
Prosecutor is directed to withdraw the information for
perjury against respondent Horst-Kessler von
Sprengeisen and to report the action taken within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.16
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA assailing the resolution of the Justice Secretary,
alleging therein that grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, was
committed in issuing the said resolution.17 The private
respondent, for his part, sought the dismissal of the
petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary,
there was no probable cause against him for perjury.18
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition
and affirmed the resolution of the Justice Secretary.19
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the
Solicitor General in its comment on the petition, the
parties had agreed to put behind them the findings and
recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti-
dumping protest. The appellate court stated that its
finding is buttressed by the fact that the amount of DM
1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise
agreement and that, under such agreement, the HTC
obliged itself "to reform
its pricing policy and structure with respect to
refractory products being imported to and sold in the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 7843 and its implementing rules and requirements."
The CA emphasized that it was inclined to believe that
there was no meeting of the minds of the parties when
the petitioner inserted the phrase "based on the findings
of the BIS" in the revised compromise agreement;
hence, there could not have been perjury when the
private respondent executed the Affidavit of Merit and
the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
Judgment. The CA also agreed with the findings of the
Secretary of Justice that the insertion of the condition in
the compromise agreement that the parties would be
bound by the BIS findings and recommendation gave
the private respondent reason to believe that he was
deceived by the petitioner into signing the Agreement;
as such, the private respondent’s allegation in his
Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to signing the
Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, was
not altogether false. Consequently, the CA ruled, the
private respondent did not make any willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.20 The appellate
court conformed to the disquisitions of the Secretary of
Justice in the assailed resolution and concluded that the
private respondent did not, in the Affidavit of Merit,
make a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.21
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court against private respondent
Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary of Justice, insisting
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed
resolution.
The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary
investigation, he adduced substantial evidence to prove
probable cause for perjury against the private
respondent. He maintains that probable cause does not
mean actual and positive causes; nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. He avers that, contrary to the claim of the
private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the
meeting between him and Jesus Borgonio, on the one
hand, and the private respondent and HTC Sales
Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other, was arranged
by the latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft
and final copies of the compromise agreement, the
parties made express reference to the prima facie
findings of the BIS that the actual export price of HTC
was below the fair market value. By agreeing that such
findings of the BIS be included in the Compromise
Agreement, the said private respondent impliedly
agreed to such findings as basis of the price for which
HTC would sell the German-made magnesite-based
refractory bricks in the Philippines. The petitioner avers
that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton
was not specifically mentioned in the compromise
agreement was of no importance, considering the
parties’ acceptance of such findings is based on R.A.
No. 7843. He points out that the private respondent
could not have failed to notice the difference between
the first draft and the final copy of the agreement before
signing it because, as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his
reply affidavit, it took the private respondent twenty
minutes or so after receiving the agreement to review
the final draft before signing it. Moreover, the Urgent
Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment signed by
the private respondent was filed more than 15 months
from the execution of the compromise agreement and
after four months from the Tariff Commission’s
approval thereof.
The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the
interregnum of 19 months, the private respondent failed
to discover the revisions/insertions in the final draft of
the compromise agreement. Considering the premises,
the petitioner submits, the private respondent’s filing of
the Urgent Motion for and in behalf of HTC was merely
an afterthought, to enable the latter to escape
compliance with the terms and conditions of the
Agreement.
The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the
contested phrase in the final draft of the compromise
agreement was necessary although it may not be in the
best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods
made by the private respondent in his Urgent Motion
and Affidavit of Merit were material to the proceedings
in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission
because these were used to set aside the compromise
agreement executed by the parties.
95 | P a g e
In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent
avers that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual,
hence, improper in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The determination of the existence of a probable
cause is primarily an administrative sanction of the
Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the
Justice Secretary should be accorded great respect,
especially since the same were upheld by the CA. He
asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the CA
and in this Court that the Justice Secretary committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in her resolution.
The petition has no merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is factual – whether or not,
based on the records, there was probable cause for the
private respondent’s indictment for perjury.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only
questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial
agency, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive
on the Court, unless cogent facts and circumstances of
such a nature warranting the modification or reversal of
the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and
resolve factual issues in exceptional cases. The
petitioner has failed to establish that any such
circumstance is present in the case at bar.22
The Court finds that the public respondent did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolution, and that the CA did not commit any
reversible error in its assailed decision and resolution. If
at all the public respondent erred in issuing the assailed
resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, reversible by a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court especially so where, as in
this case, the issues before the CA were factual and not
legal. The absence or existence of probable cause in a
given case involves a calibration and a reexamination of
the evidence adduced by the parties before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative weight
thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed
the petition before it.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the private respondent is
probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term
does not mean "actual or positive cause;" nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge."23
The determination of its existence lies within the
discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a
preliminary investigation upon complaint of an
offended party.24 The Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice declaring the absence or existence of a probable
cause affirmed by the CA is accorded high respect.
However, such finding may be nullified where grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is established.25
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in
solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit
upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made
in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods
mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this
section shall suffer the respective penalties provided
therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may
affect the earnest concerns of the parties before a
tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false
statement is made.26
The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury
concludes that one consideration of policy overshadows
all others – the measures taken against the offense must
not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from
lodging complaints or testifying.27 As quoted by Dean
Wigmore, a leading 19th Century Commentator, noted
that English law, "throws every fence round a person
accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting
witnesses from oppression or annoyance, by charges, or
threats of charges, of having made false testimony is far
paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts."28
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a
falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by
authority of law on a material matter.29 The elements of
the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made
a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.30
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A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood,
is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and
willful.31 Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be
malice on the part of the accused.32 Willfully means
intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is
false with the intent that it should be received as a
statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to
"knowingly." "Deliberately" implies meditated as
distinguished from inadvertent acts.33 It must appear
that the accused knows his statement to be false or as
consciously ignorant of its truth.34
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to
belief or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a
belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a
statement is an adequate defense.35 A false statement
which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not
perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury:
(1) the statement made by the defendants must be
proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
defendant did not believe those statements to be true.36
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his
statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his
admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of
mind of the accused may be determined by the things
he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of
the objective falsity itself, and from other facts tending
to show that the accused really knew the things he
claimed not to know.37
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely
upon the contradictory sworn statements of the accused.
The prosecution must prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be
false by other evidence than the contradicting
statement.38 The rationale of this principle is thus:
… Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony
under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to
establish the falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for
this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as
against another, and it would not appear that the
testimony charged was false rather than the testimony
contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply
neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration
of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration,
however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending
to show perjury independently of the declarations of
testimony of the accused.39
The term "material matter" is the main fact subject of
the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove
that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the
subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the
credence of any witness who testified. In this case, a
matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency
to influence the Commission in resolving the motion of
HTC one way or the other. The effects of the statement
are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than
probability.40 The prosecution need not prove that the
false testimony actually influenced the Commission.41
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the
motion of the HTC and his affidavit, that it was the
petitioner who invited him to a
conference. The truth of the matter is that it was
Gonzales who did so. Nonetheless, the issue of who
called for a conference is of de minimis importance
because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after
having been prodded by the Chairman of the
Commission to settle the case instead of going through
the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation.
No adverse inference (related to the merits of their
respective contention in this case) can be ascribed as to
whoever called the conference. After all, parties are
even urged to settle cases amicably.
Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant
City Prosecutor in her resolution:
The allegation that it was complainant who invited
respondent to the meeting may not be a deliberate lie.
Respondent may not have known who arranged the
meeting, but as he was able to talk to complainant, he
presumed that it was complainant who extended the
invitation. Moreover, the identity of the one who
initiated the meeting is not material considering that
there was a meeting of the minds of the Parties.42
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private
respondent that the copy of the first agreement
transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft, and that,
contrary to the allegations of the private respondent,
such agreement was prepared by Borgonia and not by
the petitioner. As gleaned from page two of the
agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates
of the petitioner and the private respondent were not
typewritten, hence, cannot as yet be notarized. As
claimed by the private respondent, a copy was
transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he
found it to be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia
would prepare and sign the agreement and give it back
to him for review and signature, with the particulars of
his community tax certificate indicated in the final
copy.
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or
caused to prepare the compromise agreement
subsequently signed by the petitioner and the private
respondent was of prime importance because only such
person should be charged for perjury.
The private respondent erroneously stated in his
Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the
petitioner who prepared the agreement that was signed
by the parties. It turned out that it was Borgonia who
prepared the first and the second copies. However, the
private respondent cannot be held liable for perjury
since it was Borgonia who prepared the agreement and
not the petitioner. The Court agrees with the following
contention of the private respondent in his counter-
affidavit:
4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr.
Borgonia who made the insertions, there is no doubt
that, indeed, the insertions were made into the
document. Since complainant is the signatory to the
Compromise Agreement, it is but natural for one to
presume that he had made the insertions.
97 | P a g e
At the same time, I can not be expected to know that it
was Mr. Borgonia, as claimed by complainant, who
made such insertions.43
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the
Management Information Group of RCP, whereas the
petitioner was no less than its Senior Vice President and
Assistant General Manager, Borgonia’s superior.
Unless and until approved by the petitioner, any
agreement prepared by Borgonia was merely a piece of
paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the
compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the
petitioner’s imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness
to the agreement. For all legal intents and purposes, the
petitioner had the compromise agreement prepared
under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be
concluded that the private respondent made a deliberate
falsehood when he alleged that the agreement was
prepared by the petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim
that, during the conference, he and the private
respondent agreed that, based on the BIS report, the
normal value of the imported refractory bricks per
metric ton was DM 1,200, and that such report would
be used as basis for the revision of the price policy and
structure of HTC.
It bears stressing that, during the conference, the
petitioner and the private respondent had agreed on
three aspects of the case: (1) based on the prima facie
findings of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per
meter ton was DM 1,200 and that the actual export
price of HTC was below the fair market value; (2) to
terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise
its price policy and structure for imported refractory
bricks to conform to R.A. No. 7843 and rules and
regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails
or refuses to comply with its undertaking, RCP will be
entitled to a writ of execution without need of demand.
However, the petitioner and the private respondent
could not have agreed on such base price; the petitioner
insisted on the amount recommended by the BIS (DM
1,200) while the private respondent insisted on DM
950. There was an impasse. By way of a compromise,
the parties agreed to do away with the BIS
recommended base value and agreed for HTC to base
the normal value of the importation per metric ton
under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued implementing
the law. This is gleaned from the affidavit of Borgonia:
13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested
that the value of DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price
at which Hamburg Trading would sell German-made
magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines.
Mr. Villanueva did not agree to the suggested value, as
we considered it low. In the end, both parties decided to
base the determination of the price on the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7843 and its implementing rules and
regulations. …44
Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and
incorporated therein the agreement of the petitioner and
the private respondent arrived at during the conference,
thus:
1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of
concession in order to end litigation, the SECOND
PARTY undertakes and commits to reform its pricing
policy and structure with respect to refractory products
being imported interest sold in the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 7843
and its implementing rules and regulations.45
If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-
Complaint, he and the private respondent had agreed
that HTC will use as basis for its price policy and
structural revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia
would have incorporated the said agreement in the first
compromise agreement. He did not, and Borgonia has
not offered any explanation for such failure. The
petitioner signed the draft of the agreement without any
plaint or revision. It was only in the second compromise
agreement that was later signed by the petitioner and
the private respondent that Borgonia incorporated the
phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS." Borgonia and the
petitioner made the insertion on their own, without the
a priori consent of the private respondent.
The Court is not convinced by the petitioner’s
contention (and that of Borgonia in his Affidavit) that
the petitioner and the private respondent had agreed to
leave the final determination of the base value or price
of importation per metric ton to a third party (BIS). The
private respondent could not have agreed to the use of
the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had
strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision
of its price policy and structure. For HTC to admit that
the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was the
normal value of the refractory bricks from Germany for
the purpose of resolving the anti-dumping case is one
thing; but for HTC to agree to be bound by the BIS
recommendation for the purpose of revising its price
policy and structure is completely a different matter.
With the petitioner and the private respondent’s
admission of the prima facie findings of the BIS, the
Commission can prepare its recommendation to the
Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the
HTC importation subject of the case. Thereafter:
D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15)
days after receipt of the report of the Commission,
decide whether the article in question is being imported
in violation of this section and shall give due notice of
such decision. In case the decision of dumping is in the
affirmative, the special committee shall direct the
Commissioner of Customs to cause the dumping duty,
to be levied, collected and paid, as prescribed in this
section, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on such article, and on the
articles of the same specific kind or class subsequently
imported under similar circumstances coming from the
specific country.
In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide
within the period prescribed herein, the
recommendation of the Commission shall be deemed
approved and shall be final and executory.46
98 | P a g e
On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price
policy and structure of HTC, the parties had agreed to
accomplish the same in due time. It goes without saying
that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to
the price policy and structure revision of HTC.
The agreement of the petitioner and the private
respondent not to be bound by the base value in the BIS
report for the revision of its price policy and structure is
not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are
only prima facie, meaning to say, not conclusive, and
HTC was accorded a chance to base its price policy and
structure on evidence and informations other than those
contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the
imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to
time, hence, the need for any importer to revise its price
policy and structure from time to time; and (3) the base
value to be used by HTC in revising its price policy
would be scrutinized and resolved initially by the
Commission, by the Special Committee and by the
Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the
private respondent was not only practical and fair, but
in accord with law as well.
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any
falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of
Merit when he declared that he and the
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to
use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations
implementing the same to determine the base price for
the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the
offending phrase before and after signing the agreement
and for a considerable stretch period until HTC filed its
motion. However, we do not agree with the contention
of the petitioner that such failure of the respondent to
object to the offending phrase for such period of time
amounted to an admission that, indeed, the private
respondent was aware of the offending phrase in the
Agreement, and to his agreement thereto; and estopped
the private respondent from alleging that he was
deceived by the petitioner into signing the Compromise
Agreement. In his appeal to the DOJ, the private
respondent declared that:
3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss
and lacking in circumspect in failing to review the hard
copy Compromise Agreement and notice the insertion.
Being in the trading business, respondent-appellant
personally handles hundreds of documents daily and is
on the telephone for most of the day communicating
with suppliers and customers. And he had no reason to
believe that either complainant-appellee or Mr.
Borgonia would make such an insertion, especially after
respondent-appellant had accepted the fax Compromise
Agreement wording and conveyed such acceptance to
complainant-appellee’s office. Respondent-appellant
also had to reason to even think that such a surreptitious
insertion would be made; after all, he had a very warm
and friendly meeting with complainant-appellee and
Mr. Borgonia and came out of it with a feeling that he
could trust complainant-appellee (p. 4, Annex "C").
3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he
was induced to sign the hard copy Compromise
Agreement through fraud and deceit, respondent-
appellant honestly believes that he was misled into
signing it. He was misled by the fact that he had been
sent the fax Compromise Agreement by complainant-
appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to
complainant-appellee and now requested for the hard
copy for execution, that he had been led to trust that the
findings and recommendation of the BIS were being put
behind them and that complainant-appellee had agreed
to such a compromise. The transmittal of the hard copy
Compromise Agreement, without any notice or mention
by complainant-appellee or complainant-appellee’s
office that it contained
insertions or wording different from the fax
Compromise Agreement, and on respondent-appellant’s
understanding that the wording of the hard copy
Compromise Agreement would be exactly the same as
the fax Compromise Agreement, constitutes the fraud
or deceit allegedly by respondent-appellant.47
In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent
explained that:
2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-
Affidavits, I was unable to review the Compromise
Agreement delivered by Mr. Gutierrez on 22 April
1997 as I was busy with numerous calls and business at
the time it was delivered. Also, I had been led to
believe in our meetings with Mr. Villanueva and Mr.
Borgonia that I could trust them. So, after having seen
the fax Compromise Agreement and being amenable to
it, I trusted that they would send a genuine hard copy.
As it turned out, I was mistaken.48
Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and
signing the Affidavit of Merit, the private respondent
tried for several times to contact the petitioner, but the
latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the
suspicion of the private respondent that the insertion of
the offending phrase was not, after all, inadvertent but
deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of
HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for
putting too much trust and confidence on the petitioner,
but he certainly cannot be indicted for perjury for lack
of probable cause.
The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of
the Commission that the private respondent appeared
for HTC, on May 9, 1997, before the Commission for
the hearing on the Compromise Agreement; and
showing that the private respondent did not object
thereto.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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FORGERY
G.R. No. 135297 June 8, 2000
GAVINO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. Spouses
GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights
are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention
of agrarian reform laws. However, in the present case,
the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in
favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such
action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in
favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver
of said land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian
Reform, which took control of the property, validly
awarded it to private respondents.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the May 14, 1998 Decision 1 and the August 19,
1998 Resolution 2 in CA-GR SP No. 47176, in which
the Court of Appeals (CA) 3 dismissed the petitioner's
appeal and denied reconsideration respectively.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads: 4
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Petition is denied due course and is hereby
dismissed. The Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. With costs against the Petitioner.
The Facts
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of
agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total
area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain
Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No.
126638.
To pay for his wife's hospitalization, petitioner
mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in
favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract period
expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria
Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four
years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to
guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a
contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram
Ng Lupang Sakahan," 5 which allowed the respondents
to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the
mortgage.
Before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City
(Region III), petitioner instituted against the
respondents an action for recovery of possession. 6 In
his Complaint, he alleged that they had entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10
and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had
planted on the land.
Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the
"Kasunduan" between them and petitioner allowed the
former to take over the possession and cultivation of the
property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying
his loan, petitioner allegedly executed on June 29,
1989, a "Waiver of Rights" 7 over the landholding in
favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over
the landholding and alleged that his and his children's
signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and
surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of
Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed
Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the
reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses,
who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries."
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), 9 in a Decision promulgated on
October 8, 1997 in DARAB Case No. 1251, affirmed
the provincial adjudicator's Decision. 10 Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the
Resolution dated February 26, 1998. 11 As earlier
stated, petitioner's appeal was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court ruled that petitioner had abandoned
the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary.
It rejected his contention that all deeds relinquishing
possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were
unenforceable. Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) 1199
and Section 28 of RA 6389 allow a tenant to voluntarily
sever his tenancy status by voluntary surrender. The
waiver by petitioner of his rights and his conformity to
the Samahang Nayon Resolutions reallocating the
landholding to the respondents are immutable evidence
of his abandonment and voluntary surrender of his
rights as beneficiary under the land reform laws.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the alleged forgery of his and his
sons' signatures.
Hence, this recourse. 12
Issues
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner alleges in his
Memorandum that the appellate court committed these
reversible errors: 1
I
. . . [I]n relying on the findings of fact of the
DARAB and PARAD as conclusive when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts and the inference taken is manifestly
mistaken.
100 | P a g e
 II
. . . [I]n disregarding and/or ignoring the claim
of petitioner that the alleged waiver documents
are all forgeries.
III
. . . [I]n ruling that petitioner had forfeited his
right to become a beneficiary under PD No. 27.
IV
. . . [I]n failing to rule on the legality and/or
validity of the waiver/transfer action.
In short, the focal issues are: (1) Was the appellate
court correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner
and his sons on the Waiver were not forged? (2)
Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the Waiver
were genuine, was it null and void for being contrary to
agrarian laws? (3) Did the petitioner abandon his rights
as a beneficiary under PD 27? (4) Did he, by voluntary
surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Factual Findings
Alleging that an information for estafa through
falsification was filed against the respondents,
petitioner insists that his signature on the Waiver was
forged.
We are not persuaded. The filing of an information for
estafa does not by itself prove that the respondents
forged his signature. It only means that the public
prosecutor found probable cause against the
respondents, but such finding does not constitute
binding evidence of forgery or fraud. 14 We agree with
the well-reasoned CA ruling on this point: 15
. . . We are not swayed by Petitioner's
incantations that his signature on the "Waiver
of Rights" is a forgery. In the first place,
forgery is never presumed. The Petitioner is
mandated to prove forgery with clear and
convincing evidence. The Petitioner failed to
do so. Indeed, the "Waiver of Rights" executed
by the Petitioner was even with the written
conformity of his four (4) sons (at page 11,
Rollo). The Petitioner himself signed the
Resolution of the Board of Samahang Nayon of
Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
surrendering his possession of the landholding
to the Samahang Nayon, (idem, supra). Under
Memorandum Circular No. 7, dated April 23,
1979 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
transactions involving transfer of rights of
possession and or cultivation of agricultural
lands are first investigated by a team leader of
the DAR District who then submits the results
of his investigation to the District Officer who,
in turn, submits his report to the Regional
Director who, then, acts on said report. In the
present recourse, the requisite investigation was
conducted and the report thereon was submitted
to and approved by the Regional Director.
Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Evidence, public officers are presumed to have
performed their duties regularly and in
accordance with law.
As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
coincide with those of the DARAB — an administrative
body which has acquired expertise on the matter —
such findings are accorded respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. 16 The presence or the absence of
forgery was an issue of fact that was convincingly
settled by the agrarian and the appellate tribunals.
Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that the appellate
court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary,
its findings were well-supported by the evidence.
Second Issue: Validity of the "Waiver of Rights"
Petitioner insists that agreements purportedly
relinquishing possession of landholdings are invalid for
being violative of the agrarian reform laws.
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no
longer entitled to recognition as a farmer-beneficiary
because of the series of mortgages he had taken out
over the land. They also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and
abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights
over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in
favor of the government or through hereditary
succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a
reversion to the old feudal system in which the
landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating
the government's program of freeing the tenant from the
bondage of the soil. 17 In Torres v. Ventura, 18 the
Court clearly held:
. . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the
rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the
government to him and to no other. To insure
his continued possession and enjoyment of the
property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government
or by hereditary succession, to his successors.
. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
issued the following Memorandum Circular
[No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:
Despite the above prohibition, however, there
are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of
PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights,
and/or possession of their farms/homelots to
other persons or have surrendered the same to
their former landowners. All these
transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27
and therefore, null and void.
101 | P a g e
 Third Issue: Abandonment
Based on the invalidity of the Waiver, petitioner
concludes that the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA
erroneously ruled on the basis of the said document that
he had abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his
landholding. Denying that he abandoned the land, he
contends that the transaction was a simple loan to
enable him to pay the expenses incurred for his wife's
hospitalization.
We agree. Abandonment 19 requires (a) a clear and
absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by
which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.
20 The intention to abandon implies a departure, with
the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or
claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned. 21
The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the
tenant's clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy
relationship; and (b) his failure to work on the
landholding for no valid reason. 22 The CA also
deemed the following as formidable evidence of his
intent to sever the tenancy relationship: (a) the
mortgage and (b) his express approval and conformity
to the Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the
private respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries of
the landholding. We disagree.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore,
the mortgage expired after four years.1awphil Thus, the
private respondents were obligated to return possession
of the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom, we see
on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or
irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of
possession did not amount to an abandonment because
there was an obligation on the part of private
respondents to return possession upon full payment of
the loan.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
Contrary to the finding of the appellate court, the
petitioner also denies that he voluntarily surrendered his
landholding.
His contention is untenable. The nullity of the Waiver
does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding
to the Samahang Nayon which, under the present
circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to
the government, of his rights under the agrarian laws.
PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to
the land reform program shall not be transferable except
through hereditary succession or to the government, in
accordance with the provisions of existing laws and
regulations. Section 8 of RA 3844 also provides that
"[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be
extinguished by: . . . (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee, . . . ."
In this case, petitioner's intention to surrender the
landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his
concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions
surrendering his possession of the landholding. The
Samahan then recommended to the team leader of the
DAR District that the private respondent be designated
farmer-beneficiary of said landholding.
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government,
not transferred to another private person. It was the
government, through the DAR, which awarded the
landholding to the private respondents who were
declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian
laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment
of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as
long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence. 2
Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon
qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government
because such action forms part of the mechanism for
the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of
tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of
PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall,
upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader,
recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be
substituted to all rights and obligations of the
abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. Besides,
these cooperatives are established to provide a strong
social and economic organization to ensure that the
tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits
of agrarian reform.
The cooperatives work in close coordination with DAR
officers (regional directors, district officers, team
leaders and field personnel) to attain the goals of
agrarian reform (DAR Memorandum Circular No. 10,
Series of 1977). The Department of Local Government
(now the Department of Interior and Local
Government) regulates them through the Bureau of
Cooperative Development (Section 8, PD 175). They
also have access to financial assistance through the
Cooperative Development Fund, which is administered
by a management committee composed of the
representatives from the DILG, the Central Bank, the
Philippine National Bank, the DAR and the DENR
(Section 6, PD 175).
Petitioner insists that his act of allowing another to
possess and cultivate his land did not amount to
abandonment or voluntary surrender, as the rights of an
OLT beneficiary are preserved even in case of transfer
of legal possession over the subject property, as held in
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association (Cocoma)
v. Court of Appeals. 24
We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the Cocoma
ruling because what was prohibited was the
perpetration of the tenancy or leasehold relationship
between the landlord and the farmer-beneficiary. The
case did not rule out abandonment or voluntary
surrender by the agricultural tenant or lessee in favor of
the government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED insofar
as it dismissed petitioner's appeal. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
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UNFAIR COMPETITION
G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT
TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA
DEMORAL-SAVAGE, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding
Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA,
MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEÑA,
respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K
ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed
by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the
search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano
B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu
City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of
wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners
located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to
quash the search warrant was denied by respondent
Judge as well as their motion to reconsider the denial.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by
private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and
general manager of Mendco Development Corporation
(MENDCO), 1 Supervising Agent Jose Ermie
Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed an application for search warrant with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. 2 The application
sought the authorization to search the premises of K
Angelin Export International located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron
furniture found therein which were allegedly the object
of unfair competition involving design patents,
punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-
1697-12 was issued by respondent Judge on 16 October
1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following day
by NBI agents. 3 Seized from the factory were several
pieces of furniture, indicated in the Inventory Sheet
attached to the Return of Search Warrant, and all items
seized have remained in NBI custody up to the present.
4 Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the
On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the
search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they were
accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant
was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to
ask the witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the
warrant did not particularly describe the things to be
seized. 5
On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental
Motion to Quash where they additionally alleged that
the assailed warrant was applied for without a
certification against forum shopping. 6 On 30 January
1998 respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash and
the Supplemental Motion to Quash. 7 On 2 March 1998
petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of their
motion to quash and alleged substantially the same
grounds found in their original Motion to Quash but
adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a)
respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter; and, (b) respondent court failed to "substantiate"
the order sought to be reconsidered. 8 The denial of
their last motion 9 prompted petitioners to come to this
Court.
The principal issues that must be addressed in this
petition are: (a) questions involving jurisdiction over
the offense; (b) the need for a certification of non-
forum shopping; and, (c) the existence of the crime.
Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense since it was not designated
as a special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR),
citing in support thereof Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for
IPR. The courts enumerated therein are mandated to try
and decide violations of IPR including Art. 189 of the
Revised Penal Code committed within their respective
territorial jurisdictions. The sala of Judge Benigno G.
Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated
Special Court for IPR for the 7th Judicial Region. 10
Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
104-96 was issued providing that jurisdiction over all
violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the
Regional Trial Courts. 11
The authority to issue search warrants was not among
those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the
Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which
it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 12
The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all
courts and may be effected outside their territorial
jurisdiction. 1 In the instant case, the premises searched
located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the
territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court. 14
designation of Special Courts for IPR. Administrative
Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could
"try and decide" cases involving violations of IPR. It
did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with
regard to all matters (including the issuance of search
warrants and other judicial processes) in any one court.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive
law; in this case, BP Blg.129, and not by a procedural
rule, much less by an administrative order. 15 The
power to issue search warrants for violations of IPR has
not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in
Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95.
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Petitioners next allege that the application for a search
warrant should have been dismissed outright since it
was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum
shopping, citing as authority therefor Washington
Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 16 In that case, we
sustained the quashal of the search warrant because the
applicant had been guilty of forum shopping as private
respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila
Regional Trial Court only after he was denied by the
courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs
significantly, for here there is no allegation of forum-
shopping, only failure to acquire a certification against
forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended
requires such certification only from initiatory
pleadings, omitting any mention of "applications." 17
In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule
on the matter, required such certification even from
"applications." Our ruling in Washington Distillers
required no such certification from applications for
search warrants. Hence, the absence of such
certification will not result in the dismissal of an
application for search warrant.
The last question to be resolved is whether unfair
competition involving design patents punishable under
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case.
Prosecutor Ivan Herrero seems to agree as he filed the
corresponding Information against petitioners on 17
March 1998. 18 However, since the IPR Code took
effect on 1 January 1998 any discussion contrary to the
view herein expressed would be pointless. The
repealing clause of the Code provides —
All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent
herewith, more particularly, Republic Act No.
165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as
amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the
Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No.
49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended, are hereby repealed (emphasis ours).
19
The issue involving the existence of "unfair
competition" as a felony involving design patents,
referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has
been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the
article.
The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a
possible violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts
specifically alleged were the manufacture and
fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that
patented by MENDCO, without securing any license or
patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or
defrauding Mendco and the buying public. 20 The Code
defines "unfair competition" thus —
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception
or any other means contrary to good faith by
which he shall pass off the goods manufactured
by him or in which he deals, or his business, or
services for those of the one having established
such goodwill, or shall commit any acts
calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty
of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an
action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way
limiting the scope of protection against unfair
competition, the following shall be deemed
guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person who is selling his goods and
gives them the general appearance of goods of
another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the
goods themselves or in the wrapping of the
packages in which they are contained, or the
devices or words thereon, or in any other
feature of their appearance which would be
likely to influence purchasers to believe that the
goods offered are those of a manufacturer or
dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or
dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with
such appearance as shall deceive the public and
defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any
subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent
of any vendor engaged in selling such goods
with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device,
or who employs any other means calculated to
induce the false belief that such person is
offering the services of another who has
identified such services in the mind of the
public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false
statement in the course of trade or who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit goods, businesses
or services of another. 21
There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair
competition" involving design patents in the controlling
provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore
unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the
enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment
of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code. In the face of
this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused,
22 for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication or any equitable consideration.
2
Respondents invoke jurisprudence to support their
contention that "unfair competition" exists in this case.
24 However, we are prevented from applying these
principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair
Competition found in the IPR Code, to the alleged acts
of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent
infringement as defined by the same Code —
Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. — 76.1.
The making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing a patented product or a product
obtained directly or indirectly from a patented
process, or the use of a patented process
without authorization of the patentee
constitutes patent infringement. 25
104 | P a g e
Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or
before the enactment of the IPR Code, we are
constrained to invoke the provisions of the Code.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such
application would be beneficial to the
accused. 26 Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates
the possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the
acts alleged, then that Code must be applied here.

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court

requires a finding of probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 27
Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search
warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent
requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The
nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the
other issues raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and
Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search
warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue
thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance
with established jurisprudence. 28

In petitioners' Reply with Additional Information they

allege that the trial court denied their motion to transfer
their case to a Special Court for IPR. We have gone
through the records and we fail to find any trace of such
motion or even a copy of the order denying it. All that
appears in the records is a copy of an order granting a
similar motion filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with
regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12. 29 This
attachment being immaterial we shall give it no further
attention.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court,

Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998, denying the
Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12
dated 30 October 1997 and the Supplemental Motion to
Quash dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as
well as the Order dated 8 April 1998 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 March
1998, is SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-
1697-12 issued on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to return
to petitioners the property seized by virtue of the illegal
search warrant.

SO ORDERED.

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