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G.R. No.

5246 September 16, 1910 On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the
Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of
vs. land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee. allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged
that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of
TRENT, J.:
land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of
land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of
Alba, are the only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case,
Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land
married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the
13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties,
petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-described rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former
property: decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case
Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason
and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52 that said decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the
hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's
highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; motion are not their property.
on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo
Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma
the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and part of the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of
on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder
Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo. of the land described in the said decree.

This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the
and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was same, including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is
filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly
technical description of the above-described parcel of land. executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of
February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a
of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the state grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question.
petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on
subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios the 6th of April of the same year.
Grey.

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It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said
case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was
is also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the
appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of
did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase
contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state
the estate grant by inheritance. grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant
was obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee
the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented
parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any
constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name
Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was
over the public document of purchase of 1864. not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names
of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit an
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered
prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years in February of the same year?
of age when their mother died. So these children were minors when the
father of the appellee obtained the estate grant. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to
by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full
petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all
deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known,
of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice
rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state
father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in writing. and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if
This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder,
and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together
1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land with their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the
to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in
on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons
his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that his appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the
father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the
cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after
parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the rental said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the
contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee clerk to every person named in the application whose address is known; to
the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a
the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in
small parcels of land in question are included, according to the description a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which

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the land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of the persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned
application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem in the application, notice, or citation.
proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directed
by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on
service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree
the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the description in the had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the
published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee
law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the
default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan
as stated in his application, a decree or registration shall be entered. was made.

Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure
including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud.
or included in the general description "to all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, statutes has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the
nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or
Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates
land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction
Registration a petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or
Act No. 496.)
"moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian
statutes relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 fraud is referred to, is there any express indication of the meaning of
referred to above. "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group.
(Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the
outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive
denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties effect of certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the
defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern." "fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely
constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In other cases,
under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate
was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has
the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of

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title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert
same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.
there absent the element of intention to deprive another of just
rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual — as The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.
distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes As we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of
Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.) an application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the
theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants,
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a
Privy Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the
Waihopi, decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered
Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The
meaning should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of
statutes (Act No. 496). private individuals.

The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are
the meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a coming to registration of title to land, because immovable property
question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing, and
kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
circumstances in each particular case. The only question we are called upon
to determine, and have determined, is whether or not, under the facts and The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he
circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February may evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold
12, 1908, by means of fraud. the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel
himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without 21.)
due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of
enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its
property without due process of law." use:

The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee
any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to
have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this shillings, and the time occupied from months to days.
section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of
law.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and
verbiage.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note
the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration

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Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during
mastered the "three R's" can transact his own conveyancing. the whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system
has been adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud. of the States of the American Union, and practical experience has
demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under
good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens
technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United
faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.) States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575;
People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of
title to land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land
layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title Registration Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of
by registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the system 1898.
under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by
a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts
certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, of those States.
constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under
the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance, It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say
depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the that we never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra;
correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)
of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay,
uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the
& Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.) necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with
a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name
registration of transactions with interest in land whose declared to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either
object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible,
to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens system, supra, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
pp. 1, 2.) between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and
those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will
always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The
registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs.
were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs.
only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 606, 611.
½ cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and

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If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or vs.
objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE
defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the LA ROSA, respondents.
right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the
object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and
if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
vs.
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds
everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given is by general
notice to all persons interested. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA,
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra),
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented
did not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the
by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
ground that the State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom
a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a
proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at
bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack on
the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of CRUZ, J.:
any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is
the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because
2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide. they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land
appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on
entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land,
court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
ordered. covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio
and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

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The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the
Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared
Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the
Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3 land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the
citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they
had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing
have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and
was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had
Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to
land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which
and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7 subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-
Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior
actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and
as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two
its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
payment of taxes on the land. 8 alienable and registerable.

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from correctly declared that:
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June
its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral
its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9 claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was
one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that: mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office
on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been

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acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249
had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of
annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced "The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the
geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
religiously paid the taxes. prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining
claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v.
Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.)
acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect
Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining of a grant by the United States of the right of present and
Company. exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of
all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of
mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as
of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
from the public domain and had become private properties of vested property right by virtue of his location made in
Benguet and Atok. compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when
Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a
Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all
from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws;
located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
power of the United States Government to deprive him of the good as though secured by patent.
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located
claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all
were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines
include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having
valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain

8
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except they did, to Benguet and Atok.
those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights.
Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that: It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was
subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not
forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing support their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land
right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
government established under this Constitution. Natural resources alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial judge, who
with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la
the limit of the grant.
Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession
was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
1935, declared: they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights
of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she
contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner
1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and of the said land.
subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby
declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of
respective locations. interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-
surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral
the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of
land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15As the land had become the title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical
application.

9
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are
farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.
and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How
deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
the sub-surface rights? reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even
private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral —
and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the
long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
unlawfully occupying the surface. time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
137, providing as follows: including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under
to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all
under the Constitution. lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is
SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land
patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents.

10
G.R. No. 112905 February 3, 2000 On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi, representing the
Municipality of Silang, Cavite, filed a motion to lift the order of general
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, default and submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality. The
PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON, ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, opposition was later amended on September 16, 1966 alleging that a portion
FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, of the land applied for which the municipality had leased to private persons
ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier. The municipality
LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ further alleged that in a registration case entitled "Mariano Lopez de Leon
DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, v. Municipality of Silang" (CA-G.R. No. 8161-R), the Court of Appeals
FLOVIANA LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, found that the applicants had never been in possession of the land sought to
LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, be registered.
RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE
LEON,petitioners, In its answer to the amended opposition, the applicants claimed that a part
vs. of the whole tract of land they sought to register was their inheritance,
HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO which includes Lot No. 2 of plan PSU-51901 with an area of 119 hectares.
married to ANTONIO PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, However, it had to be excluded in the application for registration of the 69-
FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and hectare land in Cavite upon the recommendation of the Chief Surveyor of
their successors-in- interest,respondents. the General Land Registration Office because it is located in the province of
Laguna. Similarly, Lot No. 1 of PSU-51901 that lies within Tagaytay City
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: had been excluded from the registration proceedings under G.L.RO. Rec.
No. 53498 or Land Registration Case No. 2201 in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.1
In this case, the two applications for registration of the same parcel of land
were filed twelve years apart in different branches of the same Court of First
Instance, but a certificate of title was issued in one case while the other is Nevertheless, the municipality filed a motion to dismiss the application for
still pending appeal. original registration of Lot No. 1 on the ground of res judicata. The
applicants, on the other hand, contended that the principle of res jucidata is
not applicable because the subject matter of CA-G.R. No. 8161-R (Mariano
The applicants in the earlier case are now before this Court on a petition for
Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang) was Lot No. 2 or the portion of
review on certiorari. They assert that the decision ordering the issuance of a
the land in Laguna.
decree of registration in their favor, while promulgated subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title in the names of the second applicants,
should be "executed" and that the certificate of title issued to the latter On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to
should be nullified.1âwphi1.nêt dismiss for lack of merit on the ground that the oppositor municipality had
no personality to intervene considering that Lot No. 1 was outside of its
territorial limits. The lower court held:
The facts of the case are as follows:

. . . . Even if said land was communal property of the Municipality


On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez, et al. filed an application for the
of Silang, by virtue of its incorporation into (the) city of Tagaytay
registration of a 69-hectare parcel of land in Tagaytay City with the Court of
it became the property of the latter. Hence, the Municipality of
First Instance of Cavite, Branch III under Land Registration Case No. 299
Silang has no personality to appear in this (sic) proceedings. If any
and LRC Record No. 11617. On January 29, 1957, the court issued an order
of general default, excepting only the Director of Lands.

11
right of action exists, it accrues in favor of the City of Tagaytay The oppositor Municipality of Silang interposed an appeal from the said
and the same should be pursued by the said city.2 decision of the land registration court to the Court of Appeals. On May 2,
1979, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision7 dismissing the appeal "for
The oppositor municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the said lack of personality of the oppositor-appellant Municipality of Silang to
order. On July 23, 1970, the court issued an order stating that "in order not interfere in the registration proceedings below."8Undaunted, the oppositor
to impede whatever action the movant" might take against the order of municipality filed with this Court a petition for review
February 7, 1969, said motion should be denied. On January 12, 1971, the on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 51054 (Municipality of Silang v. Court
applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court be commissioned to of Appeals) which was denied on September 19, 1979. The municipality's
receive evidence for them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with finality for lack of
become final and executory "by virtue of which the Municipality of Silang merit on October 24, 1979.9 On November 9, 1979, judgment was entered
no longer ha(d) any personality to appear in these proceedings." 3 The court in the said case.10
granted said motion and directed the clerk of court to submit a report on the
matter. Meanwhile, in the course of examining the records for the purpose of
issuing the decree of registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land
In his report dated April 15, 1971, Clerk of Court Rolando D. Diaz stated Registration Commission discovered that Lot No. 1, plan Psu-51901 had
that since time immemorial, Micaela, Fernando, Ciriaco and Catalino, all been decreed in favor of private respondents Honesto de Castro, et al.11
surnamed De los Reyes, owned and possessed the parcel of land in question.
On November 3, 1870, they sold the land to Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad and Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967,12 Honesto de
Francisco Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the property passed in Castro, et al. filed before the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV in
ownership to Pedro Lopez de Leon, Sr. and Maxima Carrillo Trinidad, the Tagaytay City, an application for the registration of the same parcel of land
daughter and sole heir of Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad. Pedro and Maxima under Land Registration Case No. TG-95 and LRC Rec. No. N-33292. The
remained in possession of the property until their death when their children, case was called for hearing on March 18, 1968. Eight (8) days later or on
applicants Pedro Lopez, Mariano Lopez de Leon, Pastor Lopez de Leon, March 26, 1968, the court13 promulgated a decision adjudicating the land
Eulogio Lopez, Clara Lopez, Ricarda Lopez and Rosario Lopez took over located at Barrio Iruhin, Tagaytay City, more particularly described as Plan
ownership and possession thereof. Upon their death, their respective heirs Psu-51901-Amd., in favor of said applicants and directing that upon the
succeeded over the property and, on February 25, 1971, they partitioned it. finality of the decision, the corresponding decree of registration be
The agricultural property was under the supervision of Domingo Opeña issued.14 The ruling of the court was based on its finding that one
who planted portions thereof to rice and other agricultural products. Hermogenes Orte, who originally owned the land sought to be registered,
sold it in 1932 to Marciano de Castro. The deed evidencing said sale was
The clerk of court thus recommended that the court confirm its order of destroyed during the Japanese occupation. De Castro continued possession
general default, approve his report, and register the property in the names of of the land until his death on April 26, 1940. His wife Epifania and their
the applicants in accordance with the extrajudicial partition of the property. 4 children named Maria Socorro, Francisco, Honesto, Romualdo, Felicitacion,
Faustino and Felixberto continued possession of the property who declared
the land for assessment and taxation purposes in Cabuyao, Laguna.
On April 19, 1971, the court5 accordingly rendered a decision approving the
report of the clerk of court and ordering that once the decision becomes However, upon learning that the property lies in Tagaytay City, the
final, the corresponding decree of registration of title be issued in favor of applicants declared it in their names in said city.
the applicants.6
The cause of the conflicting claims over the same land was never explained
because the head of the geodetic engineers of the Land Registration
Commission did not appear in court in Land Registration Case No. 299.

12
Hence, on August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite, Branch III15 issued an order 1971 by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico which became
declaring that the court had lost jurisdiction to hear the case, without, final on June 18, 1980;
however, dismissing the case.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds
Seven (7) years later, or on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez, et al. Registration Administration and the Register of Deeds of
filed a complaint "for execution of judgment and cancellation of land titles Tagaytay City to cancel the titles of the land in question
of the defendants and their successors-in-interest" before the Regional Trial under the names of the defendants and their successors in
Court of Cavite, Branch 18, at Tagaytay City. Docketed as Civil Case No. interest and that new title to the same parcel of land be
TG-1028, the complaint named as defendants Honesto C. de Castro, Maria issued to plaintiffs;
Socorro de Castro married to Antonio Perigrina, Francisco de Castro
"widow", Faustino de Castro, Felixberto de Castro, Epifania C. Vda. de 3. Ordering all the occupants of the questioned land to
Castro and their successors-in-interest. vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to the
plaintiffs;
The complaint alleged the facts pertinent to enforce the judgment of April
19, 1971. The plaintiffs, petitioners herein, alleged further that, upon the 4. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in
filing of their application for registration with the CFI of Cavite, Branch III interest to pay plaintiffs or its (sic) heirs and/or successors
at Cavite City, said court acquired jurisdiction over the res because land in interest actual damages (in) the amount of P200,000.00
registration proceedings are in rem and therefore, the CFI of Cavite, Branch or the amount that may be proven during the hearing and
IV at Tagaytay City could not have acquired jurisdiction over the trial of this case;
same res by virtue of De Castros' application for registration. They claimed
that no less than this Court had recognized the jurisdiction of Branch III in
5. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in
Cavite City when it passed upon the correctness of the lower court's ruling
interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 for and
in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al. Contending that the decision of Branch III on
as attorney's fees;
April 19, 1971 declaring that title to the land belonged to Pedro Lopez, et
al. had become final and executory on June 18, 1980, they asserted that they
were the lawful owners of the land. However, they had been unduly 6. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of
deprived ownership and possession thereof on account of its "wrongful P100,000.00 or the sum that may be proven during the
registration" in the name of the defendants "by means of fraud and trial;
misrepresentation." As a result of their undue deprivation of ownership,
possession and enjoyment of the property notwithstanding that the question 7. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
of ownership had been settled in their favor, plaintiffs claimed that they
suffered actual and moral damages. Claiming that the judgment sought to be Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs just and proper under
executed had not been barred by the statute of limitations, they prayed as the premises.16
follows:
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the defendants interposed
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the judgment to effect: the defenses of prescription, laches and/or estoppel and failure to state a
cause of action. They averred that they were no longer the owners of the
1. Execution of judgment of the decision of the then Court property as it had been sold "absolutely and unconditionally to innocent
of First Instance (CFI) Branch III, Cavite, dated April 19, third parties for valuable consideration and in good faith." They contended

13
that in view of the indefeasibility of their title to the property, even the title Branch of this Court, in the same manner that they, or the plaintiffs
of their successors-in-interest can not be subject to collateral attack. They themselves, did not also know the existence of LRC Case No. TG
claimed that Branch III of the CFI in Cavite should have "remanded" the — 95 before this Court. This Court is assured that good faith
records of LRC Case No. 299 or LRC Record No. 11617 to the same CFI pervaded among the parties concerned, in the conduct of its
branch in Tagaytay City to which the "legal and proper jurisdiction to hear proceedings, all procedural requirements having been punctiliously
and decide that particular case belonged." They asserted that the complaint complied with and no irregularity or breach of law having been
should have been directed by the plaintiffs against the Assurance Fund committed. So that the decision rendered by this Court in that case
under the provisions of P.D. No. 1529. Alleging that the "very precipitate is valid and subsisting, for all intents and purposes and can be
and wrongful suit" caused them mental anguish, serious anxiety, social nullified only under circumstances and through procedures
humiliation and similar injury, they claimed moral damages of P500,000.00, mandated by law. Hence, the corresponding decree of registration
nominal damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of P300,000.00. issued in TG-95 and the original certificates of titles issued to
defendants in consequence thereof, are all valid and binding until
On May 21, 1990, the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18 in Tagaytay declared otherwise, in a case directly assailing their validity, and of
City17 rendered the decision in Civil Case No. TG-1028 dismissing the course, by a competent court. And by express provision of law, the
complaint for being "improper and premature". The court likewise same are insulated from any collateral attack.19
dismissed the defendants' counterclaims for "their dearth of sufficient legal,
factual and evidentiary support." 18 The court concluded that the complaint was in the nature of a collateral
attack on the validity of the certificate of title issued in favor of the
The lower court held that the decision of Branch III that became final on defendants and their successors-in-interest because, "(b)y its caption and
June 18, 1980, could not be enforced against defendants considering that averments, the validity of the title in question, is not directly assailed."
they were not parties in LRC Record No. 11617. Neither could it order the
cancellation of the titles issued to defendants because the LRC and/or the Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, which was
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City had not been impleaded as parties to the denied on May 29, 1991. It reiterated that the plaintiffs' failure to implead
case and therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. the Administrator of the NLRDRA, the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City
and the possessors of the property in question was a fatal procedural error
The lower court held further that because the case was covered by Act No. because they were indispensable parties over which the court should acquire
496 and/or P.D. No. 1529 which are special laws, Section 6, Rule 39 of the jurisdiction. Their inclusion as defendants in the case was necessary in order
Rules of Court on execution of judgment by independent action cannot be that their title to the property could be directly attacked. Petitioners should
invoked. The court also ruled that: have availed of the remedy provided by Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529 and
their failure to observe that law was a "colossal error" because once issued,
a certificate of title becomes indefeasible, "completely insulated from any
Treating the second issue raised by plaintiffs, the then Court of
form of collateral attack assailing its validity." 20
First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, or this Court, validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case filed by defendants Honesto de Castro, et
al., in LRC Case No. TG — 95. The records show that herein Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals, dismissed the
defendants as petitioner(s) in that case, complied with all the appeal on November 29, 1993.21 Stressing the indefeasibility of title under
jurisdictional requirements of law, conferring jurisdiction upon this the Torrens System of land registration, the Court of Appeals echoed the
Court to try that case and lent validly (sic) upon its proceedings. As lower court's ruling that the decree of registration in favor of respondents
admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, this Court was not aware of cannot be reopened or set aside in a "collateral proceeding such as the one
the existence of LRC Record No. 11617, pending before the other in the case at bar which has for its objective the execution of a judgment
which apparently has become dormant, thus appellants' insistence that it be

14
revived." Citing Article 1544 of the Civil Code on sale of property to AND ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN FAVOR OF THE
different vendees which it opined had a "persuasive influence" in the RESPONDENTS, WHICH RELIANCE ARE MISPLACED AND
resolution of the appeal, it held that "in case land has been registered in the UNAVAILING IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE
name of two different persons, the earlier in date (of registration) shall LOWER COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE LAND
prevail." Nonetheless, emphasizing that the land in question has been REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
transferred to a third person, the Court of Appeals ruled that the title issued AND TO ISSUE THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
in favor of respondents should be "maintained in their status quo, until the
proper court shall have determined their priorities, and the equities resulting 4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
therefrom."22 HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS CANNOT DIVEST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OF THE DISPUTED LOTS BY FILING THE INSTANT
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition for review ACTION FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND ASSAILING THE
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS' TITLES.
assignment of errors:
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY AND
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION.
THE VITAL AND PIVOTAL ISSUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT (CFI
TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH IV), HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the
THE SUBSEQUENT LAND REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly
APPLICANTS BELOW, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HEREIN, AND IN compiled with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. 23
DECREEING THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE SAID LOTS
WHICH WERE ALREADY PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF
When petitioners applied for the registration of Lot No. 1 before the CFI in
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS BY ANOTHER COURT (CFI
Cavite City in 1956, the governing law then as regards the matter of
CAVITE, BRANCH III) IN A PREVIOUS LAND REGISTRATION jurisdiction was the Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic Act No. 296. Section
CASE IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH WAS
52 of that law providing for the permanent stations of district judges or
SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EVEN BY THIS
judges of Courts of First Instance stated that for the Seventh Judicial
HONORABLE COURT.
District that included the province of Cavite, there would be two judges in
Cavite City.24 The law did not create other branches of the CFI in the
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE province of Cavite outside of the City of Cavite.
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT LIKEWISE FAILED TO RESOLVE
THE ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE INSTANT ACTION FILED
It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No. 3749 took effect that a CFI
BY THE PETITIONERS FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF CFI
branch in Tagaytay City was set up.25That amendment to Republic Act No.
BRANCH III, WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A REVIVAL OF THE
296 provided that four judges would preside "over the Courts of First
JUDGMENT. Instance of the Province of Cavite and the Cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and
Trece Martires" who would be "judges of the first, second, third and fourth
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE branches" of that court. Because the rule has always been that court having
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN MERELY RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE territorial jurisdiction over the property should take cognizance of its
OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE registration,26 upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch, petitioners'
RESPONDENTS' TITLES, AND PRIORITY IN THE REGISTRATION

15
application for registration should have been transferred to that court Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296 provided that in land registration cases, the
inasmuch as the property involved is located in that city. Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked with the administration and
supervision of all courts, may transfer land registration courts "to any other
It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch remained the venue of place more convenient to the parties." This implied that Land Registration
petitioners' application for registration, apparently on account of the Case No. 299 could be retained in the Cavite City branch of the CFI if it
following provision of Rep. Act No. 3749: would be convenient to the applicants who had been used to transacting
business with that branch; the case did not have to be transferred to be
Sec. 6. Wherever an additional branch or branches of the Court of transferred to Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46 dated July 3,
First Instance is or are established in this Act in the same place 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R. Liwag addressed to all CFI
judges and clerks of court in line with the enforcement of Rep. Act No.
where there is an existing court or courts of first instance, all cases
3947, merely quotes Section 6 thereof. Said circular does not elucidate on
already filed in the latter court or courts shall be heard, tried and
whether cases should be transferred to the branches that had territorial
decided by such latter court or courts.
jurisdiction over them.
Notably, the law is not clear on whether or not the phrase "in the same
Petitioners' claim that this Court had "sustained" the jurisdiction of the
place" refers to the judicial district/province or the place where a branch of
Cavite City branch of the CFI over Land Registration Case No. 299 in G.R.
the court is stationed. Hence, considering the general rule that once a court
No. 51054 is incorrect. To be sure, the principal issue raised in the petition
acquires jurisdiction over a case it remains with that court until its full
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054 was the personality of the
termination,27 the phrase "in the same place" should be interpreted as
referring to the province of Cavite. The Cavite City branch of the CFI of Municipality of Silang to file an opposition to the application for land
Cavite thus correctly retained jurisdiction over the application for registration. While this Court upheld the lower court's ruling on that issue,
such affirmance in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was
registration because there was no jurisdictional question involved in the
likewise resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought to light for
proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 299. What was in question was
resolution.
whether the Cavite City branch of the Cavite CFI was the proper venue for
said case upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch. As this Court said:
As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City branch over the land
registration proceedings instituted by private respondents, the order of
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction
general default issued in Land Registration Case No. 299 is of relevance.
may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which
When the Cavite City branch of the CFI issued an order of default, it is
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an
action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be presumed to have regularly performed its task in accordance with law
changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the especially with regard to notice requirements. Act No. 496 provided that
after the court shall have set the application for initial hearing the following
plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the
procedure should be observed:
failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case,
the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can
never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or Sec. 31. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
not a prohibition exists against their alteration.28 initial hearing of the application from the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, the Chief of the General Land Registration Office shall
cause a notice thereof to be published twice, in successive issues of
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is
the Official Gazette, in the English language. The notice shall be
meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access
issued by order of the court, attested by the Chief of the General
to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.29 Thus, the last paragraph of

16
Land Registration Office, and shall be in form substantially as . . . it is true that appellants were not personally notified of the
follows: . . . .30 pendency of the present registration case even if they were actually
occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but such procedural
The general order of default of January 29, 1957 stated as follows: defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because
registration proceedings have the nature of actions in rem. . . . .33
It appearing from the certificate of the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office and the return of the Sheriff, attached to the A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires
record of this case, that the time notice relative to the application in constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
said case was duly published, posted, and served in accordance who have rights to or interests in the property. 34 Constructive seizure of the
with law; and that the time allowed for entering appearance and land for registration is effected through publication of the application for
filing answers expired at 9:30 A.M. on the 29th day of January, registration and service of notice to affected parties.35 Consequently, when
1957, for which date said case was duly set for hearing by the private respondents filed their own application for registration of the same
Court; parcel of land, strictly speaking, the Tagaytay City branch could no longer
entertain the application for registration as the res involved had been
constructively seized by the Cavite City branch of the same court. In
And it further appearing from said record that no person has
hindsight, this complication of two applications for registration having been
appeared as respondent in the case filed an answer within the time
filed for one and the same tract of land could have been avoided had Land
for that purpose allowed, with the exception of the Director of
Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to the Tagaytay City branch of
Lands represented by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi;
the same court where it rightfully belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep. Act
No. 3947.
All persons, except those herein above named, are hereby declared
to be in default in the above-entitled case, and it is ordered that a
Be that as it may, the Court is not persuaded that the registration
general default be recorded in said case, and that the application
proceedings instituted by private respondents should be nullified by reason
therein be taken as confessed by all the world, except the persons
hereinabove named. of the fact that the Cavite City branch of the same court was already
proceeding with another registration case for the same piece of land.
It is so ordered.31
In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take
care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration
On January 24, 1957, the Municipality of Silang filed a motion to lift said on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land
general order of default and to admit its opposition to the registration. 32 This shall prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of title is issued
fact supports the presumption that the officials concerned performed their over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as
duties regularly because it implies notice, whether actual or constructive, on against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.36 It should be
the part of said municipality that a land registration proceedings had been stressed that said rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to
filed with respect to Lot No. 1. the date of filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even
though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have
Compliance with the requirement of notice and publication had the effect of priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is being
notifying all persons interested in the proceedings including the herein processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take care
private respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar v. Caoagdan: that his right or interest is duly protected.

17
Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of policy which
applicants for land registration. In the same way that publication of their requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is
application for registration was supposed to have rendered private principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of claim to be enforced or asserted.39 Land registration proceedings entails a
notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents race against time and non-observance of time constraints imposed by law
had the same effect of notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus exposes an applicant to the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious
presumed to have been notified of the land registration proceedings filed by effects of the application of the doctrine of laches. An applicant for
private respondents in the Tagaytay City branch of the Cavite CFI thereby registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of
providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto. registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the
validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the
The fact that an interlocutory matter in Land Registration Case No. 299 had one-year period has lapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible. While
to be resolved by both the Court of Appeals and this Court did not in any the law grants the aggrieved applicant certain remedial measures, these are
way mean that petitioners should no longer exercise due diligence to protect designed to make up for his failure to register his title to the property and
their right or interest in the said proceedings. On the contrary, they were not necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that he had allowed by
bound to exercise such diligence with vigor especially because as early as inaction to be vested in another person. In Javier v. Court of Appeals,40 the
April 19, 1971, they already had a judgment in their favor. The record does Court set out these remedies as follows:
not show why petitioners did not have actual knowledge of the registration
proceedings instituted by private respondents. However, the lack of such . . . . The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree
knowledge in fact raises a doubt as to the veracity of their claim that they of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its
were in possession of the land. If indeed they possessed the property, even issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean however
if through an administrator, as diligent owners, the threat to their ownership that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property
could not have escaped them considering that the property is in a rural has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
community where news travels fast. reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes
incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year
Even granting that petitioners did not really have actual knowledge of from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the
private respondents' application for registration, yet after discovering that landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
the land was already registered in the name of private respondents, registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in court
petitioners should have immediately sought recourse in law to protect their for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always
rights. As it turned out, they let almost seven (7) years to pass from such available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third
discovery before they acted to revive what already was a dormant judgment. party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of an
Hence, they filed the separate action "for execution of judgment and innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages.
cancellation of titles" of private respondents because more than five (5) ....
years had elapsed since the promulgation of the decision directing the
issuance of a decree of registration.37 Under these circumstances, the In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court also said:
inevitable conclusion is that petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, . . . it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of
they could or should have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that they either the same is to bring an action for damages against those who
had abandoned or declined to assert it.38 In short, they were guilty of laches. caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an

18
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for The inevitable conclusion therefore is that petitioners were cognizant all the
recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. while of the futility of their attempt to cancel the title of private respondents
under the law. Hence, they indirectly and collaterally attacked the land title
In filing the action for execution of judgment and cancellation of titles, duly issued to private respondents on the theory that the revival of the
petitioners must have realized that only the remedy of filing an action for dormant judgment in their favor could result in the realization of their
damages was available to them. Otherwise, they could have filed an action objective of nullifying such title, However, aggrieved applicants for land
for reconveyance of the property. Of course, petitioners cleverly clothed registration cannot seek protection under the provisions of the Rules of
their complaint as one for execution of judgment under the provisions of the Court which are merely suppletory to special laws governing land
Rules of Court. Clearly, such procedural strategy was a bid to revive the registration proceedings.
decision of the lower court ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
in their names. In other words, petitioners availed of procedural remedies The resolution of the instant petition cannot be complete without a word on
provided for by the Rules of Court as it appeared that because of the lapse the manner by which officials of the then Land Registration Commission
of time, they would not benefit from remedies prescribed by land ignored the lower court's order to explain the conflicting claims of
registration laws. ownership over the same property. Particularly, there is a need for an
explanation why they caused the publication of the notice of hearing in
The wrong appellation of petitioners' complaint shall not mislead this Court private respondents' application for registration notwithstanding that the
as, in the determination of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather same office had already published the notice of hearing as regards
than its title, are the proper gauges.42 A reading of the allegations of the petitioners' application for registration of the same parcel of land. It is
complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028 betrays petitioners' true intention in within the power of these officials to determine whether or not the same
filing the case. In paragraph 15 of the complaint, petitioners alleged that parcel of land is the subject of two applications for registration. The
they were '"unduly deprived of their ownership and lawful possession of the indefeasibility of private respondents' title over the property should not get
land . . . due to the wrongful registration of the subject land in the name of in the way of an administrative investigation of possible omission or neglect
the defendants by means of fraud and misrepresentations." Except for this of official duty. This Court cannot let such malfeasance or misfeasance in
general statement, the issue of fraud or misrepresentation is not alleged with office pass unnoticed lest the integrity of the Torrens System of land
particularity in the complaint.43 This is unfortunate because, if filed within registration be undermined.
the time set by law, a complaint with the proper allegation of fraud coupled
with proof thereof could cause the loss of the indefeasibility of private WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED, and the
respondents' title to the property. It is established that if fraud attended the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-1028 is AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this
acquisition of title under the Torrens System, such title cannot be used as a Decision be furnished the Department of Justice so that an investigation
means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. 44 against officials who were responsible for the publication of two notices of
hearing of an application for registration of the same parcel of land may be
We take note of petitioners' allegation in their reply memorandum that in conducted and the guilty officials duly sanctioned.1âwphi1.nêt
the registration proceedings filed by private respondents, "what was
published in the Official Gazette was the description of a bigger tract of SO ORDERED.
land that includes the smaller lot actually applied for by
respondents."45 That factual allegation could have had its impact before the G.R. No. 101387 March 11, 1998
trial court in an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud in the
acquisition of title but not before this Court where factual issues may no
longer be raised. SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by
their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioner,

19
vs. After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners,
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent. issued an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the
corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence,
PANGANIBAN, J.: petitioners filed this action for mandamus. 5

In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29,
adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of
(LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the Registration, which explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said
subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of decree: 6
title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to
issue such decree? In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners
through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted
The Case case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:

These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a
for mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of
registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2 San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano
[sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
The Facts
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of
registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR)
Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan
January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered
(LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex "A"
its decision disposing thus: 3
hereof;
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos.
appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda
699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on
Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described
August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905,
as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the
respectively;
registration of their title thereto.

On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding
of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "B" hereof,
decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda
requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of
Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal
Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de
address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.
Ultramar;

20
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995,
of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is which ordered: 8
Annex "C" hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "D" hereof; . . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case
dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been
April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondent's
copy is Annex "E" hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC
copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68),
subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City,
the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land
our letter has as yet been received by this Authority; Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.

After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with
the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision the above resolution, to which was attached a letter, dated November 27,
plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan 1997, of Feline M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree
S.W.O. — 7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Division, which states: 9
29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a
copy is attached as Annex "F" hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed
transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to
title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of
located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-
[sic] incomplete. 7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per
sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595
contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration is incomplete.
system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189,
Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . . . . It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated
petition be dismissed for being premature. March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the
motion, dated September 4, 1995, 7 for an early resolution of the case. To

21
integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. lack of opposition from the holders of said titles. 12 Fourth, the State
Eutropio Migriño, et. al.). "consented to its being sued" in this case[;] thus, the legislature must
recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case "as final and
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to make provision for its satisfaction." 13
avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends
Issue that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that "[the] Court
of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree
Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10
for the same land is null and void." 14On the question of whether the LRA
can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez 15 which held: 16
compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-
11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been
committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the
The Court's Ruling Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true
when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in
The petition is not meritorious. a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of
registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy? in the name of another.

Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and
"unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the laws only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious,
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office . . . ." They cite four without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No.
reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system,
have a "clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in
imperative duty to perform" because, as land registration is an in an early case, "(t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be
rem proceeding, the "jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a
should be complied with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA second action for registration." The application for registration of
filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear
corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to "take the to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed
cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Emphasis supplied.)
29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595." Rather, it is the "sole concern of said
private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the
action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of proper remedy for three reasons.
petitioners' application for registration." Third, petitioners contend that they
suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of "the failure First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the
certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595" notwithstanding the

22
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable.
this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its
Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance
does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the
entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
vs. Court of Appeals: 17
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and
become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not
said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the
reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."
provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the
court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally
read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act
of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, 496 which provides:
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision,
dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land,
the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches
entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
sound discretion of the court rendering it. land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible petition for review within one year after entry of the decree,
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or
certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be

23
incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this
registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part
issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent
annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right,
may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which
or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the
the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction
occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously
3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39). decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.

However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that
M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration
Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is
register — Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. so, because when once decreed by a court of competent
3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem.
No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's refusal to The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on
issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
render the judgment of the trial court void. favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the
property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable
registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title
void, 19 since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the
of land only once. 20 Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens
seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the
principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21 people in the efficacy of the registration law.

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the
Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of
proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto
express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, vs. Nable: 22

24
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or disregarded. 25 But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial
cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended
plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question
orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or
being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said against one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a judicial act is not
by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, compellable by mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according
234: to its own judgment and understanding of the law. 28

Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue
be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless
of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its
land. This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of
application are ordered registered and that the limits of such origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the
portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law,
In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional as herein discussed.
surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered.
That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is
charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration
with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a
report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT,
officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA
ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as
Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an herein discussed.
officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a
judicial function and not an administrative one(De los Reyes vs.
SO ORDERED.
De Villa, supra). . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable [G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988.]
by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, Petitioners, v.
the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF
sought to be compelled is clear and complete.24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, Respondents.
is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be

25
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the
64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that — (1) there is merit in the
these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised
designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406. passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the petition moot and academic pending the Court’s consideration of the
the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate
resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows: Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by this
Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827.
". . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is
with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as likewise ordered." (pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a
Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No.
No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R.
Baranda. The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte
Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they motion of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the
also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the
considering the private respondents’ opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated
fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the
motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was same subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited pursuant to our
issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29,
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
1982, the Court of Appeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the
petition for review on certioraridenominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
dated January 7, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is "Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda
final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant
case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession and "(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
only to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent
should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile "(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29,
effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R.
that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the No. 64432;
filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On
September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to "(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act

26
496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we
Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court. issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the
Court Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
"Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto,
the same is hereby GRANTED. In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated
"WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987 respectively, to wit:
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is
hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of "O R D E R
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
"This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants
"The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register
prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo - G.R. No. 64432). of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds,
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of
Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case "Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of
G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which the writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court,
remained unresolved. Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17, 1986, the present
motion is hereby GRANTED.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the "WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby
Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued: prayed for.

"1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under x x x
Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P.
Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
"O R D E R
"2. To cancel No. T-25772. Likewise to cancel No. T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda "This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
and Alfonso Hitalia; Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986 in compliance with
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises." (p. 473, 64432 the order of this Court dated November 25, 1986, a Motion for Extension of
Rollo) Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on
December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its Order
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17, 1986 a Resolution in dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable,

27
the same is hereby GRANTED. In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court’s orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito
"WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Saclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days 25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of
No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer
is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of Certificate of Title No. T-106098.
petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate
duplicate." (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432) case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was
carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier
private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
filed a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September
17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points: This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February
"a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned pendens in the new certificates of titles.
in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by
implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)? In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
"b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?" (p. 536, Rollo — 64432). Branch 23 denied the petitioners’ motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987
order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein: injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated
February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the
x x x notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the
name of the petitioners.

"Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice
and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the of lis pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte
matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary
sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these cases will be motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
entertained by this Court." (p. 615, Rollo - 64432) pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560;
T-111561 and T-111562.

28
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein: G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register
of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate
"That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order of title.
based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"‘At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and
in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta
memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the
the preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P.
upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action Teodosio, the Providos’ counsel, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on
or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.’ petitioners’ Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.
"That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098,
T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an
Case No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
entitled, ‘Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maxima Provido and
Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the
Respondents.’ reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
"That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon
the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or This petition is impressed with merit.
proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042.
"Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta
Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as
only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on
mere cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517,
Pendens." (pp. 68-69, Rollo) Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772
issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871,
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the among others. (Annex "E," G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in
the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds’ motion
for reconsideration. x x x

The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case
No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the "2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent

29
Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera
and her other co-owners." (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied) "We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has
been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it
G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court’s findings that they were not. under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal
for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)"
same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners
Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting. The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to
the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25, unsuccessfully the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed. 64432.

Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds’ stand that the notice of
full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571,
No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil
writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
"Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis
"Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing
causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should petition of the party who caused the registration thereof."
keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the
results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v. This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have
Duran, Et Al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter
citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486). when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in case are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely
the cases of Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the
Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched

30
on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the
over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of
Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a Presidential Decree No. 1529.
torrens certificate of title.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of implementation of this Court’s already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042
the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No.
the requests for registration . . . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as
in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree." respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under
their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987
of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All
or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12,
Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of
Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds . . ." SO ORDERED.

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union [IBAAEU] v. vs.
Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and
leaves no room for construction. According to Webster’s Third International MAKALINTAL, J.:
Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to,
must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in
laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the LRC Consulta No. 366.
function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of
respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title
a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge’s Order directing him (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos,"
to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of

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the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered
of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have owner, conveying an undivided portion of an area of
donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this
petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares. Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with
respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three
separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales
Entry No. 5658. Sales. contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate
certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana
undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of
Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January,
cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies
thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the
rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ... Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.

Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ... Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds
xxx xxx xxx in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in
controversy, the Commissioner observed:
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the
property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548,
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three
undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto different occasions in favor of three different buyers.
Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio
respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are
vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in
interest of the vendor ... addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title
No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be
Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ... surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance
of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion. point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to
the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully
issued.lawphi1.ñet

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Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for
would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may
their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein — subject of course to the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the
voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation
authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-
this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half
of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold
not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the portions of the same land to three other parties.
title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly,
because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
unauthorized. Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin
and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of
assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the
namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the
whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority proper notices of lis pendens.
from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum
of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of
existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed.
observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the No pronouncement as to costs.
issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its
legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is
easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance,
or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others.
The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of
the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the
title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
reliable.

One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in


upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that
since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is,
property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased
wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership
before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal

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