State Marine Corporation vs.

Cebu Seamen’s Association expense necessary for the laborer’s and his family’s existence and
[G.R. No. L-12444 February 28, 1963]
subsistence so that by express provisions of law, they form part of the
wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom,
Facts: The petitioners were engaged in the business of marine
since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay
coastwise transportation. They had a CBA with the Cebu Seamen’s
them just the same. It is argued that the food or meal given to the
Association. On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed a
deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in
complaint against the petitioners alleging that the officers and men
question, were mere facilities which should be deducted from wages,
working on board the petitioners’ vessels have not been paid their
and not supplements which, according to Section 19 of the Minimum
sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners’
Wage Law, should not bededucted from such wages. It was found out
threatened then to accept the reduction of salaries, observed by other
that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to the
shipowners; that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the
effectivity of the Minimum Wage Law while they were on the high
petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the
seas not as part of their wages but as a necessary matter in the
sum of P0.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were
maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew members during
required to pay their meals and that because the captain had refused
the voyage. Thedeductions therein made for the meals given after
to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the petitioners dismissed
August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of the
the captain. The petitioner, on their defense, stated that they have
coastwise vessels should continue giving the benefits. Wherefore, the
suffered a financial losses in the operation of their vessels and there
petition is dismissed, finding out that the meals or food in question
is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or
are not facilities but supplements.
vacation leave to employees of private firms; that with regards to
their overtime pay, they have always observed the Eight-hour labor
Law and that overtime does not apply to those who provide means of
transportation. The decision ruled in favor of the respondent
union. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the required meals which the petitioner

company deducted from the salary of the employees is considered as
facilities, and not supplements.

Held: Supplements constitute extra remuneration or special privileges

or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their
ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of
 ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC., VS. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL RULING:
BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, G.R. NO. L-5276 MARCH 3, 1953
A person's needs increase as his means increase. This is true not only as to
FACTS: food but as to everything else — education, clothing, entertainment, etc.
The law guarantees the laborer a fair and just wage. The minimum must be
Demand was submitted to petitioner by respondent union through its fair and just. The "minimum wage" can by no means imply only the actual
officers for various concession, among which were (a) an increase of P0.50 minimum. Some margin or leeway must be provided, over and above the
in wages, (b) commutation of sick and vacation leave if not enjoyed during minimum, to take care of contingencies such as increase of prices of
the year, (c) various privileges, such as free medical care, medicine, and commodities and desirable improvement in his mode of living.
hospitalization, (d) right to a closed shop, check off, etc., (e) no dismissal
without prior just cause and with a prior investigation, etc. Some of the
demands, were granted by the petitioner, and the other were rejected, and
so hearings were held and evidence submitted on the latter. After the
hearing the respondent court rendered a decision, the most important
provisions of which were those fixing the minimum wage for the laborers at
P3.20, declaring that additional compensation representing efficiency bonus
should not be included as part of the wage, and making the award
effective from September 4, 1950. It is against these portion of the decision
that this appeal is taken.

On the issue of the wage, it is contended by petitioner that as the

respondent court found that the laborer and his family at least need the
amount of P2.58 for food, this should be the basis for the determination of
his wage, not what he actually spends; that it is not justifiable to fix a wage
higher than that provided by Republic Act No. 602; and that respondent
union made the demand in accordance with a pernicious practice of
claiming more after an original demand is granted. The respondent court
found that P2.58 is the minimum amount actually needed by the laborer
and his family

ISSUE:

What will be the basis to determine the minimum wage.


G.R. NO. 111744 SEPTEMBER 8, 1995
LOURDES G. MARCOS, ALEJANDRO T. ANDRADA, BALTAZARA J. LOPEZ
AND VILMA L. CRUZ, PETITIONERS, VS
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND INSULAR LIFE
ASSURANCE CO., LTD., RESPONDENTS.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners were regular employees of private respondent Insular Life
Assurance Co:, Ltd., but they were dismissed when their positions were
declared redundant.
A special redundancy benefit was paid to them, which included payment of
accrued vacation leave and fifty percent (50%) of unused current sick leave,
special redundancy benefit, equivalent to three (3) months salary for every
year of service; and additional cash benefits, in lieu of other benefits
provided by the company or required by law.
Before the termination of their services, petitioner Marcos had been in the
employ of private respondent for more than twenty (20) years; petitioner
Andrada, more than twenty-five (25) years; petitioner Lopez, exactly thirty
(30)years; and petitioner Cruz, more than twenty (20) years.
Petitioners, particularly Baltazara J. Lopez, sent a letter dated October 23,
1990 to respondent company questioning the redundancy package, She
claimed that they should receive their respective service awards and other
prorated bonuses which they had earned at the time they were dismissed.
In addition, Lopez argued that "the cash service awards have already been
budgeted in a fund distinct and apart from redundancy fund.
Thereafter, private respondent required petitioners to execute a "Release
and Quitclaim," 6 and petitioners complied but with a written protest
reiterating their previous demand that they were nonetheless entitled to
receive their service awards.
Meanwhile, in the same year, private respondent celebrated its 80th
anniversary wherein the management approved the grant of an anniversary
bonus equivalent to one (1) month salary only to permanent and
probationary employees as of November 15, 1990.
On March 26, 1991, respondent company announced the grant of
performance bonus to both rank and file employees and supervisory
specialist grade and managerial staff equivalent to two (2) months salary
and 2.75 basic salary, respectively, as of December 30, 1990. The
performance bonus, however, would be given only to permanent
employees as of March 30, 1991.
In a decision dated October 8, 1992, the labor arbiter ordered respondent
company to pay petitioners their service awards, anniversary bonuses and
prorated performance bonuses, including ten percent (10%) thereof as
attorney's fees.
Issue:
WON respondent NLRC committed reversible error or grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the validity of the "Release and Quitclaim" and,
consequently, that petitioners are not entitled to payment of service awards
and other bonuses.
Held:
Under prevailing jurisprudence, the fact that an employee has signed a
satisfaction receipt for his claims does not necessarily result in the waiver
thereof. The law does not consider as valid any agreement whereby a
worker agrees to receive less compensation than what he is entitled to
recover. A deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar an employee from
demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled.
Furthermore, in the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that when
petitioners signed the instrument of release and quitclaim, they made a
written manifestation reserving their right to demand the payment of their
service awards. The element of total voluntariness in executing that
instrument is negated by the fact that they expressly stated therein their
claim for the service awards, a manifestation equivalent to a protest and a
disavowal of any waiver thereof.
The grant of service awards in favor of petitioners is more importantly
underscored in the precedent case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., et al. the year 1990. This observation should be taken into account in the
vs. NLRC, et al., 24 where this Court ruled that "as to the service award computation of the amounts to be awarded to petitioners.
differentials claimed by some respondent union members, the company
policy shall likewise prevail, the same being based on the employment WHEREFORE the decision of Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez is upheld.
contracts or collective bargaining agreements between the parties. As the
petitioners had explained,pursuant to their policies on the matter, the
service award differential is given at the end of the year to an employee
who has completed years of service divisible by 5.

A bonus is not a gift or gratuity, but is paid for some services or

consideration and is in addition to what would ordinarily be given. 25 The
term "bonus" as used in employment contracts, also conveys an idea of
something which is gratuitous, or which may be claimed to be gratuitous,
over and above the prescribed wage which the employer agrees to pay.

While there is a conflict of opinion as to the validity of an agreement to pay

additional sums for the performance of that which the promisee is already
under obligation to perform, so as to give the latter the right to enforce
such promise after performance, the authorities hold that if one enters into
a contract of employment under an agreement that he shall be paid a
certain salary by the week or some other stated period and, in addition, a
bonus, in case he serves for a specified length of time, there is no reason for
refusing to enforce the promise to pay the bonus, if the employee has
served during the stipulated time, on the ground that it was a promise of a
mere gratuity.This is true if the contract contemplates a continuance of the
employment for a definite term, and the promise of the bonus is made at
the time the contract is entered into. If no time is fixed for the duration of
the contract of employment, but the employee enters upon or continues in
service under an offer of a bonus if he remains therein for a certain time, his
service, in case he remains for the required time, constitutes an acceptance
of the offer of the employer to pay the bonus and, after that acceptance,
the offer cannot be withdrawn, but can be enforced by the employee.

The weight of authority in American jurisprudence, with which we are

persuaded to agree, is that after the acceptance of a promise by an
employer to pay the bonus, the same cannot be withdrawn, but may be
enforced by the employee. However, in the case at bar, equity demands
that the performance and anniversary bonuses should be prorated to the
number of months that petitioners actually served respondent company in
 MERALCO VS QUISUMBING
GRN 127598 JANUARY 27, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:.

FACTS:
The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the terms among
which are the following modifications among others: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-
1996; Retroactivity: December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some
members of the union filed a motion for intervention/reconsideration. Petitioner
warns that is the wage increase of Php2,000.00 per month as ordered is allowed,
it would pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an
increase rate of electricity. On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, the
parties reckon the period as when retroaction shall commence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such time as
granted by Secretary.

RULING:
In St. Luke’s Medical vs Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA negotiations
between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered
the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBS. The
Court ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting
retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary pursuant to
article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public respondent is deemed vested with the
plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing
CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed
thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other
hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that
granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of
the government. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the
date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall
control.
Wherefore, the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November
30, 1997; and the award of wage is increased from Php1,900 to Php2,000.