Abstractbook

the ethics of
poverty alleviation
salzburg, august 28 & 29, 2014
keynote speakers:
sabina alkire
darrel moellendorf
www.uni-salzburg.at/zea/poverty
2 salzburg, august 28 & 29, 2014
Welcome to the University of Salzburg!

The Paris Lodron University of Salzburg is the largest educational institution in
the Salzburg region. Presently, over 18,000 students are enrolled and it employs
approximately 2,700 staff members in research, teaching and administration. As
an integral part of both cultural and educational life, the University serves as a
meeting place for teaching staff, students and academics, as well as the general
public. Since our re-establishment in 1962, the University has developed into a
modern, vibrant institution whose four Faculties (Theology, Law, Cultural and
Social Sciences, and Natural Sciences) meet the highest standards of teaching
and research.
The conference will take place at the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Rese-
arch, which is located upon the Moenchsberg, a small mountain, directly in the
city center of Salzburg. Address: Moenchsberg 2a, 5020 Salzburg
The conference dinner will take place in the Restaurant Stieglkeller, just
beneath the Festung Hohensalzburg. Address: Festungsgasse 10, 5020 Salzburg
Salzburg
Salzburg is the fourth-largest city in Austria with about 150.000 inhabitants and
the capital city of the federal state of Salzburg. Its „Old Town“ (Altstadt) (listed as
a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997) has internationally renowned baroque
architecture and a beautiful alpine setting. The most famous son of Salzburg is
the 18th-century composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and many have seen
and heard the musical and film The Sound of Music. You can visit many different
museums, churches or the fortress Hohensalzburg, one of the largest medieval
castles in Europe. But Salzburg is not only about culture and music, it also has
three universities and a large population of students.
the ethics of poverty alleviation 3
Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research

The Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research (ZEA) at the University of Salzburg
is an interdisciplinary research organization with multiple integrations in natio-
nal and international institutions and networks. It is dedicated to the scientific
treatment of social-ethical issues with particular reference to the phenomena of
poverty and social exclusion. The aim of the ZEA is the promotion, recognition
and establishment of poverty research as a seperate scientific discipline.
The ZEA assumes social responsiblity. It holds that the university as well as
the scientific research and intelluctual work have a social responsiblity. This can
be justified with reference to the university‘s own history as well as the self-un-
derstandings of intellectuals This social responsibility comes to effect in colla-
borations with organisations and people outside the university. Having the pri-
vilege to work in science implies that we carry a responsiblity. Universities and
scientifc research have to contribute importantly to the urgent social problems
by the tools of analysis and by the quest for helpful solutions.
The ZEA‘s self-understanding that it is a coordination point of work in the
areas of poverty reserach and applied ethics. Through events, workshops, con-
ferences, projects, publications, consulting and networking, the Centre for Ethics
and Poverty Research tries to transfer scientific knowledge to the public, busi-
ness and politcal discussions.
Research focus: Culture and Poverty Alleviation

The issue of poverty includes not only financial resource allocation issues, but
also covers social issues. As part of the research for culture and poverty reduc-
tion, the relationship between culture and poverty is systematically reflected.
Culture, we understadn both in a narrow sense of creative artistic expression
(and its reception) and in a broader sense, thus as teh cultural practices of social
life and their effects on individuals. In the context of poverty and poverty alle-
viation, we ask for meaning, function and effect of culture in terms of cultural
(annd therefore social) inclusiona dn exclusion
• What knowledge about poverty is present in local cultures? How can
local knowlede inform poverty research and stimulate poverty allevia-
tion?
• What micro theories can we derive good practices for the further de-
velopment of poverty research and the alleviation of poverty?
• What is the relationship between cultural participation, cultural capital
and poverty
• What cultural activities can contribute to poverty reduction?
Research focus: Theory of Poverty and Normative Ethics

Issues of poverty are traditionally located at empirically-working social and eco-
nomic sciences rather than at philosophy and normative ethics. Nevertheless, a
theory of poverty as well as the basics of poverty research and alleviation must
be rooted in normative and evaluative concepts and assumptions. Decisions
about the concept of poverty and the "correct" operationalisation are often not
suficiently reflected in a relationship with normative theoretical assumptions.
the same holds true for the normative question, why we should alleviate poverty
at all. Such assumptions concern understandings of justice, the good life or the
common good.
A philosophical theorizing and reflection can help clarify key terms and
concepts of poverty and to establish a better understanding of the goals and
methods of poverty alleviation. The normative and evaluative research on such
issues as a core task of philosophy is therfore also granted wide space at the ZEA.
It is an essential part of self-understanding and teh work of the ZEA, that poverty
is not a solitary agenda of philosophy, but can only be tackled usefully if they are
treated in the inter and intra disciplinary conversation.
Research focus: Poverty Reduction and Tax Ethics

In the research area, Poverty Reduction and Tax Ethics, the ZEA studies the sys-
tematic relationship between the tax system, tax reform and poverty. The key
questions asked are: How do tax reforms affect the lives of the poor? What relati-
onship between tax policy and poverty alleviation programs can be observed in
selected European countries? What recommendations can be given for tax mea-
sures in the context of a clear social ethical position, and on the basis of data?
Between taxes on the one hand and welfare benefits on the other hand,
there is the entire welfare state structure. All the key issues raised are therefore
necessary embeded in the context of the welfare state adn must be analyzed
and evaluated within this reference system. The ZEA does so by applying me-
thods of empirical social research and within the discourse of normative ethics.
As a first step, we follow the ethical justification of welfare taxation in the context
of social justice and the alleviation of poverty by welfare programs. In the course
of this research, we idenify problem areas of ethical evaluation of principals of
taxation, as they are provided in the control sciences, and thus prepare the field
for further in-depth research questions and ideas.
We cooperate with the Universities‘ focal area „Law, Economics and La-
bour“, the Department of Economics at the university, Law Faculty and nume-
rous other researchers from the University of Salzburg in the context of book
projects and expert discussions.
The Ethics of Poverty Alleviation

The aim of this conference is to explore the ethical issues concerned with the
conceptualisation, design and implementation of poverty alleviation measures
from the local to the global level. It wants to bring together these topics with
the ongoing debates on global justice and to ask what an ethical or normative
philosophical perspective can add to the social scientific, economic and political
approaches that dominate poverty alleviation.
Key Themes and Questions

• Global and local justice and poverty
• Sufficiency and basic needs
• Capabilities, functionings and justice
• Responsibilities towrads the poor
• Concepts of relative and absolute poverty
• Poverty, health and well-being
• Poverty and modern capitalism
• Poverty and the welfare state
• Poverty measurement and domains of poverty
• Child poverty and disadvantage
• Ethics of development and policies
Program
Thursday, August 28
Time Room Room
12.00 Registration
14.00 – 14.15 Welcome
14.15 – 15.30 Sabina Alkire Kant Leibniz
15.30 – 16.00 Break
16.00 – 17.30 Session 1a Kant Session 1b Leibniz
17.30 – 18.00 Break
19.30 Reception
Friday, August 29
10.30 – 11.00 Break
12.15 – 13.15 Lunch
13.15 – 14.30 Tess Ridge Kant Leibniz
14.30 – 15.00 Break
16.45 – 18.30 City Tour
20.00 Conference Dinner
Schedule
Session 1a: International Development, Economic Democracy, and Moral
Motivation: What Is To Be Done About Global Poverty? By Whom? Why?
Timothy Weidel Ideology and the Harms of Self-Decep-

tion: Why We Should Act to End Pover-
ty
David Schweickart Global Poverty: What Then Must We
Do?
Ndidi Nwaneri Revealed Contradictions: The Positive
Relationship Between Global Poverty
and Global Consumption
Session 1b: Poverty and the Welfare State
Claudia Globisch & Context matters: being poor in a rich

Andreas Hirseland country
Serena Romano Ethics, poverty and moralisation in the

Hungarian welfare state: beyond aus-
terity?
Session 2a: Health and Poverty
Bas van der Vossen In Defense of Productive Human

Rights
Lily Frank Capabilities, a Just Global Distribution
of Health Care, and Reproductive Au-
tonomy
Schedule
Session 2b: Capabilities and Poverty
Ortrud Leßmann & Evolving Capabilities in Children? Im-

Bernhard Babic portance and Requirements of such a
Concept in Child Poverty Alleviation
Helene Vannier Individual capabilities vs. social exch-
anges: Discussing levels of agency
and structure in opportunities and
choices
Mar Cabezas, Gunter Graf & Gottfried Capabilities, Health and Child Poverty
Schweiger
Session 3a: Conceptualisation of Poverty
Rudolf Schüssler Quantitative Measures of Energy Po-

verty – Justice Sidelined?
Sheldon Wein Measuring Poverty: From Theory to
Practice and Back
Philipp Kanschik The concept of energy poverty
Session 3b: Responsibilities towards the Poor

José Álvarez Who owes what to the very poor? To-
wards a conception of meta-responsi-
bility
Rachelle Bascara Cosmopolitanism and compatriot
partiality
Beth Kahn Structural Poverty and Precautionary
Duties
Session 4a: Relative Poverty
Christian Neuhäuser Relative poverty, absolute poverty

and the unjust background structure
Schedule
Tanja Munk Sorting out ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ po-
verty
Jan Deckers Fairness within and beyond Newcast-
le: a new theory of fair pay
Session 4b: Minmum Justice
Elizabeth Hupfer Distributing Welfare and Resources: A

Multi-threshold Sufficiency View
Elena Pribytkova A Decent Social Minimum as a Matter
of Justice
Juliane Petereit A minimal standard of justice: the alle-
viation of harm and the protection of
human dignity
Session 5a: Global Poverty and Justice
Charlotte Newey Fairness, Global Poverty and the

Self-Serving Bias
Monique Deveaux Beyond redistribution: social and po-
litical movements of the global poor
Christine Schliesser On a long neglected player: The religi-
ous factor in poverty alleviation
Session 5b: Global Poverty and Development
Joseph Burke The Ethics of Randomised Controlled

Trials in International Development
Johannes Schulz Discourse Ethics, Political Justice and
Global Poverty
Hubert Schnüringer In Defence of a Rights-Based Appro-
ach in Fighting World Poverty
Important Information
Conference Venue:
Centre for Ethics and
Poverty Research
Edith-Stein-Haus
Mönchsberg 2a
A-5020 Salzburg
How to get there:

You can either walk up the stairs from the Toscaninihof on the Mönchsberg or
use the elevator located 50 meters inside the mountain on the way from the
Toscaninihof to the garage. You can access the elevator using the door code:
1756#. The Centre is in the Edith-Stein-Haus, the smaller building opposite the
Edmundsburg.
Conference Dinner:
Restaurant Stieglkeller
Festungsgasse 10
A-5020 Salzburg
(located beneath the Festung Hohensalzburg)
Important Information
Meeting Point for the City Tour:
Toskaninihof
4.30 pm on Thursday
Wlan:
Network: Plus
Username:
Password:
Emergence Numbers:
Fire Department: 122
Police: 133
Ambulance: 144
Organization Team:
cepr@sbg.ac.at
+43 (0) 662 8044 2570
Opening Keynote
Darrel Moellendorf, darrel.moellendorf@normativeorders.net
Exzellenzcluster Normative Orders, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Energy Poverty and the Moral Challenge of Dangerous

Climate Change
The chief objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Ch-
ange is to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system”
(Article 2). Attempts by natural and social scientists to identify dangerous clima-
te change have failed to appreciate that danger in this context is a normative
concept. Climate change is risky, but that which is dangerous is that which we
have good reason to avoid. Because climate change and energy policy affect the
well-being of billions of people, our reasons for the pursuit of a climate change
policy involve moral values. Whether there is good reason in favor of a particular
mitigation policy depends on its effects on the global poor. Human develop-
ment depends upon inexpensive access to energy. Over one billion people live
in energy poverty without access to modern energy. Most burn bio mass for fuel,
which causes indoor pollution and is a public health problem rivaling that of HIV
and tuberculosis. Fossil fuels, especially coal, are for most of the world the che-
apest form of energy. But an international climate change mitigation regime is
very likely to discourage use of fossil fuels and encourage innovation in renewa-
ble energy by raising the price of fossil fuels. Any additional loss access to energy
for the global poor is also dangerous. A morally acceptable international climate
change regime must insure that the poor are not burdened by loss of access to
inexpensive energy. This places the responsibility on the most highly developed
states to shoulder the bulk of the costs of a global energy transition.
Closing Keynote
Sabina Alkire, ophi@qeh.ox.ac.uk
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford
Normative Issues in Poverty Measurement

The design of poverty measures - whether unidimensional or multidimensional
- entails a series of choices. The choices relate to the space of the measure, its
indicators, cut-offs, weights, and poverty line. This presentation describes tho-
se choices, and outlines alternative ways that they might be understood, made
and justified for poverty measures that are used to inform policy. While these
choices are general to measures of poverty and well-being, and also are used
with different multidimensional measurement techniques, this presentation ar-
ticulates the issues with reference to choices made in designing multidimensi-
onal poverty measures. As this presentation also pro-actively seeks to support
those making such design choices, and also includes one or more examples of
how these might be stated.
Abstracts
Session 1a: Children, Justice and Social Policy

Gunter Graf, ggraf@ifz-salzburg.at
international research center
Children, well-being and the currency of justice

When thinking about what is owed to children as a matter of justice, a first pre-
requisite is to specify a currency of justice determining the type of information
relevant, from the point of view of justice, to assessing how well the situation
of an individual compares to the situation of others. In my paper, I will exami-
ne three such currencies (utilities, primary goods and functionings/capabilities)
and investigate which of them provides the most plausible account for normati-
ve interpersonal comparisons in the case of children. I will show that all of them
have, in their standard interpretation as to be found in the literature, serious
shortcomings when it comes to children. However, I will defend the view that
functionings/capabilities, as introduced by Amartya Sen, can be modified and
extended in a way so that they overcome these difficulties.
In the first part of the paper, I will engage with some basic assumptions
of utilitarian and primary goods accounts of justice and criticise their respective
currencies of justice from the perspective of Sen’s capability approach. I will ar-
gue that Sen’s arguments are sound in showing the limitation of utilitarian and
primary goods accounts and show that these limitations are even more substan-
tive when paying attention to the special status of children. A focus on mental
characteristics alone, as suggested by utilitarians, is not able to accommodate
the problem of adaptive preferences and introduces many morally relevant
distortions in assessing the situation of children since they stress the value of
subjective experiences too much. Primary goods accounts, on the other hand,
do not pay sufficient attention to human diversity and changes of needs and
abilities within the life course. Furthermore, their localization within the social
contract tradition leads to further theoretical difficulties that I will address.
In the next part, I will examine the concepts of functionings and capabili-
ties and illuminate their potential to evaluate adequately the lives of children. I
will argue that the basic idea behind these notions provides a promising appro-
ach to comprehensively and mulitdimensionally conceptualise the well-being of
children and that this fact privileges them over the alternative accounts. Howe-
ver, in theorising about justice they are usually employed in way that does not
refer to the particularities of childhood.
Therefore I will, in the last part of the paper, elaborate on these concepts
and adapt them in a child-sensitive way. In doing so, particularly the facts that
children are (a) profoundly dependent on others for their well-being, which is,
at least in part, secured by other goods than in the case of adults (b) highly vul-
nerable to other people’s decisions and actions, (c) in a position to develop into
independent and autonomous adults and that (d) a child’s development is a dy-
namic process with different dimensions, stages and levels of competence will
be considered.
Gottfried Schweiger, gottfried.schweiger@sbg.ac.at

Paris Lodron University Salzburg
Justice and child poverty: the family and the state
A recent study of the United Nations shows that more than ten percent of chil-
dren in the OECD countries are living in poverty. Generally the rates of child po-
verty are higher than of the average population and there is convincing eviden-
ce that growing up in poverty has long reaching, often lifelong adverse effects.
Compared to the general population those who are born poor are more often
poor in their adulthood, are more often unemployed, have a lower income le-
vel, more often suffer from material deprivation and ill-health and die younger.
The multiple causes for this intergenerational transmission of poverty and other
forms of inequality are still not fully resolved but the family has certainly a major
impact. The family, one of the most highly valued institutions in nearly all so-
cieties, is the place where the future life course is decided, where child poverty
happens and where it can be alleviated.
This empirical knowledge opens a whole range of ethical questions that
are still unresolved. It appears to be obvious that child poverty is in itself and in
any case unjust and morally wrong as children – other than adults – can not be
made responsible for their living condition. Connected with this widely shared
belief is the conviction that child poverty should be alleviated and that the state
has some sort of responsibility to supply for them but the means to do so are
highly contested. The protection and value of the family seem to conflict with
the role of the state and its institutions.
In this paper I want to clarify some of these issues and reflect on child
poverty and its relation to the roles of the family and the state. In the first sec-
tion, I will present an outline to evaluate the moral status of child poverty. I will
examine the role of child poverty within the life course and the status of being
a child in general. I will then discuss the role of the state in relation to this role
of the family and their different levels of responsibility. Both are responsible to
provide for conditions in which children can grow-up without the experience of
poverty and deprivation but the responsibility of the state goes beyond that of
the family. It has long ranging rights to intervene if a family is not able to foster
such conditions. Finally, I will show that such an normative examination of child
poverty can be a valuable and important contribution to the development of
more inclusive poverty alleviation policies and social work.
Session 1b: Consumption Taxation

Xavier Landes, xavier.landes@gmail.com
University of Copenhagen
Why Taxing Consumption? Some Normative Considera-

tions
Fiscal questions have become central in most industrialized countries in the last
four years because of the gloomy economic situation, recurring public deficits
and increasing public debts. When closely scrutinized, these questions reveal
issues that revolve around two principles: efficiency (how to collect enough re-
sources for reducing public deficit?) and fairness (how to distribute the financial
charge across the different socioeconomic groups?). Fiscal instruments traditi-
onally include taxes on income, payroll or added value. However, an alternative
tool has rarely been considered: an incremental tax on consumption. According
to this proposition, consumers will be taxed on their consumption at a progres-
sive rate: the more they consume, the higher the rate will be. Highest spenders
might even been subject to confiscatory rates (i.e., almost one additional Euro
of tax paid for every marginal Euro of consumption).
Since the book Luxury Fever (1999), the economist Robert Frank has multi-
plied the writings that defend the principle of such a tax (which is different from
a luxury tax since it depends on the volume of taxation and not on the type of
the good). According to Frank, this tax will produce two positive effects: (a) to
curb the patterns of over-consumption at work in most industrialized countries
and (b) to collect resources for financing private/public investments and public
goods. Frank’s proposal departs from more classical approaches that rely on pro-
gressive income taxation.
My paper will discuss the idea of an incremental tax on consumption on
normative grounds through three steps. Firstly, a short introduction with brief re-
ferences will be offered to the history of the (progressive) taxation on consump-
tion (mostly Thomas Hobbes, Nicholas Kaldor and Robert Frank). By doing so, it
will show how economics and normative theory can be intertwined.
Secondly, the main justifications for the progressive tax on consumption

will be presented. These justifications can be sorted into four categories, which
reflect different normative concerns: efficiency (taxing consumption renders the
economy more productive), justice (it reduces socioeconomic inequalities), en-
vironment (it lessens the use of non-renewable resources) and paternalism (it
nudges individuals in taking better decisions in regard to their own interests).
Finally, these justifications will be critically reviewed, underscoring the
forces and weaknesses of each of them. Moreover, the idea will be defended that
if each of these justifications has merits of its own, there is a more profound and
encompassing reason for favouring an incremental tax on consumption: what
John Rawls coined as ‘the fair terms of cooperation’. In fine, it is argued that so-
cial cooperation might represent the strongest strategy for legitimating taxing
consumption at an incremental level.
Daniel Halliday, daniel.halliday@unimelb.edu.au

University of Melbourne
Egalitarianism and Consumption Tax

Consumption taxes are often used to encourage citizens to reduce or avoid un-
desirable sorts of consumption. Familiar examples include the sales taxes of-
ten attached to goods like alcohol and tobacco. The use of such taxes is often
motivated by a desire to help the worst-off members of society: Members of
low-income groups are often most vulnerable to the dangers associated with
purchases.
However, taxing consumption is often said to be anti-egalitarian, or re-
gressive: Members of low-income groups have less disposable income than bet-
ter-off citizens. But they pay the same amount of consumption tax per unit of
consumption. This means that the real burden that consumption taxes impose
on citizens tends to increase as citizens become poorer. In this way, consump-
tion tax apparently discriminates against the badly-off. So, from an egalitarian
perspective, consumption tax might be inferior to tax bases that can be made
progressive, such as income tax.
One response to this problem is to use less consumption tax. For some
goods (like childrens’ clothes) this is arguably the right thing to do, particularly
from an egalitarian perspective. However, most views about justice allow that
society should engage in some paternalistic policies when public health is at
stake, particularly the health of the badly-off. And it is hard to realise these go-
als without some use of taxation remains a more benign and accepted form of
coercion. So, it is worth trying to devise a way of making consumption tax more
egalitarian.
In this paper I argue that only the common sales tax model is obviously
regressive. Consumption taxes can also be implemented in other forms that are
compatible with egalitarian values. In particular, I focus on the case for licences,
which are a specific type of consumption tax. Licences require consumers to pay
for their consumption ‘up front’, rather than at the point of purchase, and could
be used to wholly replace sales taxes for certain sorts of products.
Licences are particularly defensible with respect to certain ways of using
to tax to promote better health outcomes. This is the paper’s main point. Further
to this, the paper identifies some more general but surprisingly unappreciated
advantages that licenses have. These emerge with respect to existing concerns
about contemporary over-criminalisation and over-corporatisation relating to
particular areas of contemporary markets. Discussing these themes will lead me
to make some claims about the role licences might play in legalising recreational
drugs, and in combating the increasing dominance of supermarkets and other
large-scale sellers of goods.
Limor Riza & Noam Sher, limor.riza@gmail.com

Carmel Academic Center School of Law
Consumption Tax Rate as a Partial Mechanism for

Increasing Consumer Wealth
We argue that in order for consumption tax reduction to be effective in increasing
consumer wealth rather than benefitting suppliers, the tax field is insufficient by
itself. The 2008 global economic crisis sent activists to the streets demanding,
among other things, a reduction in consumption tax rates. Demonstrators tend
to believe that a government policy which reduces consumption tax can bene-
fit the general population and promote distributional goals. We claim that due
to cognitive biases, or heuristics, when the government changes consumption
tax rates, officially to increase consumers‘ wellbeing, suppliers will be able to
fix market prices above the normal equilibrium prices. Thus, without additional
supervision, a reduction in consumption taxes such as value-added tax (herei-
nafter: VAT) or retail sales tax, would not be completely shifted to consumers.
We also claim that this effect is strongest in necessity and low-price products
bought in large amounts.
Let us start with a simple example. Assume a country levies VAT at 16%
rate. Due to severe criticism against the falling standard of living and growing
economic burden on the middle class, the government decides to cut it by one
percentage point. Thus, if a given before-tax product price is 5$ then it is re-
duced by only 0.05 cents, from 5.8$ to 5.75$ after tax (assuming the entire cut
is be shifted to the consumer). Could the consumer be aware of the price re-
duction if, for example, only the final price is displayed in stores? In their daily
shopping routine, consumers may not be able to sense the price changes, but
would be able to assess the tax cut only after a period of time by cumulative
purchases of daily products. Thus, price display of consumption tax cuts is critical
to consumer welfare.
Product price display varies between states and countries. In general, the-
re are two main systems: tax inclusive and tax exclusive pricing. In EU countries
the tax inclusive system is applied, so that prices displayed include VAT. In the
United States and Canada the tax exlusive system is applies. Including taxes in
price displays is usually justified in consumer protection law in that it provides
consumers full and unambiguous information of the final price. This conclusion
favoring legislation mandating tax inclusive display is only valid when prices are
fixed. However, the conclusion is overridden when consumption tax rates vary,
especially when they vary in favor of consumers.
We examine the application of behavioral economics to the specific ques-
tion of how changes in consumption tax rates shape individual behavior and
thus affect markets. The article also examines several regimes of product price
display, including the tax inclusive and the tax exclusive pricing rule, as a possib-
le solution to this problem.
To conclude, we claim that since consumers may not be aware of tax rate
cuts due to heuristics, in order for consumption tax reduction to be effective in
increasing consumer wealth and preventing this benefit from being shifted onto
suppliers, a purely tax-based analysis is insufficient.
Session 2a: Grounding Tax Ethics

Helmut P Gaisbauer & Clemens Sedmak, helmut.gaisbauer@sbg.ac.at
Paris Lodron University Salzburg
Normative Foundations of Inheritance Taxation

How to justify inheritance taxation? We present standard arguments and reflect
on an understanding of social structures and on the concept of privileges. The
argument starts from the premises that a well-ordered society rests on a shared
basic appreciation of the idea of a common good. Privileges can be seen to un-
dermine the common good once they become “toxic”, i.e. unjustifiable. Undue
privileges harm standards of social justice (civic liberties, equality of opportunity
and economic balance) but also of economic efficiency. We explore the relati-
onship of the wider legal and political structure and the thick social structure
and look into the issues of the illusion of a “pre-tax world” (Murphy, Nagel). In-
heritance taxation is justified if it respects the interdependence between legal

and social structures and if it follows the principles of stability, public discourse,
rationality, orientation toward the common good, and grounded authority.
Teppo Eskelinen & Arto Laitinen, teppo.eskelinen@uef.fi

University of Eastern Finland
Justification of taxation and its global implications

The presentation focuses on justification of taxation, in other words the princip-
led rather than the technical aspect of taxation. What justifies taxation in the first
place? We argue, that the justificationary basis has to be clear especially when
designing taxation systems, as this has a considerable effect on the form the
tax takes; this is exemplified by the changing forms of the proposed Currency
Transactions Tax along with the changing rationale for suggesting its implemen-
tation.
In the presentation, we will sketch a typology of justification of taxation.
According to this typology, taxation can base its legitimacy on meeting ba-
sic needs (or rather, seeing to it that basic needs are met universally), creating
community (taxation can be shown to create the common market and the pu-
blic sphere of democractic fiscal policy), redistribution (especially applicable to
progressive taxation), and (dis)incentivising certain types of conduct (taxation
can be seen as an expression of normative ideas of the society, as it encoura-
ges some forms of economic/consumption conduct while discouraging others).
These four types of justification are all normatively relevant, but different to each
other. Practically, taxation systems always base their legitimacy on several of the-
se, political/normative choice being related to emphasis rather than choosing
only one justification.
We will further discuss the applicability of each type of justification on the
global level, and in regard to global issues. We will conclude by a discussion on
whether each type of justification calls for global institutions when brought to
the global sphere, or do they rather call for new functions to and new division of
labour between the national governments.
Session 2b: Citizenship and Taxation

Veronica Polin, veronica.polin@univr.it
University of Verona
Italian Citizens’ Beliefs on the fiscal exchange

In all countries, State affects income distribution by transferring resources among
individuals at a given point in time and transferring resources from a period to
another or from a given state of nature to another for a given agent. The impact
of the Tax State can be evaluated estimating for each family a household-sta-
te account (over a single year and over the lifecycle) which includes the values
of the various public programs that each individual member of the household
receives/pays. The fiscal exchange indicator (i.e. the net result of the “family-state
account”) is obtained by summing up all values of transfers paid and/or received
by each member.
The aim of this paper is to analyse, using an Italian survey, citizens’ beliefs
on the link between taxes and public expenditures in Italy and on the sign of
the fiscal exchange indicator over a single year. An agent’s opinion on the fiscal
exchange indicator may vary according to the presence of fiscal illusion, to her/
his own perception of tax burden’s fairness, satisfaction with government, tax
preferences and public expenditure preferences, attitude toward tax and tax
evasion, overall attitude towards the government, knowledge and awareness of
tax payment, perception of the purpose for which the taxes are raised, biases in
mental accounting regarding public spending (cash and in kind) and taxation.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between the perceived sign of the
fiscal exchange with the social representations of taxes.
Sandra Morgen, smorgen@uoregon.edu

University of Oregon
Producing and contesting taxpayer identity politics in the

U.S.
Tax policies that significantly “favor capital accumulation over income distribu-
tion” are a defining feature of neoliberalization (Prasad 2006). Despite the hege-
mony of neoliberalism, that hegemony is incomplete. Cultural and political work
is required to sustain it, including the work of “demobilizing alternative possi-
bilities” (Clarke 2004). I conceptualize this process as deKeynesianization, the
political project of challenging the assumptions and efficacy of the Keynesian
paradigm and marshalling public consent for welfare state retrenchment; a lea-
ner, “corporatized” public sector; privatization; deregulation; and regressive tax

policy.
An important discursive thread in the process of deKeynesianization in
the United States has been the construction and mobilization of a taxpayer
identity politics by the Right. The burdened, “hardworking” taxpayer has been
produced as a racially coded, class effacing, conservative majoritarian political
identity. Given that, at least in the U.S. since the 1970s, identity politics has been
somewhat successful in translating the demand for recognition into a politics
of (modest) redistribution, the taxpayer has been constructed as an alternative
political identity: a hard working, personally responsible, self sufficient bread-
winner/entrepreneur/small business owner forced to support “others” not of his
choosing. S/he is the avatar of deKeynesianization, a political subject who em-
bodies and stands at the intersection of the fiscal and cultural crises of the state.
This angry, resentful claims-making subject has been produced in local, state
and national battles over taxes, social welfare, and public sector worker com-
pensation and collective bargaining rights, among others. These struggles have
intensified in the wake of the rise of Tea party politics.
This paper examines the production of taxpayer anger and resentment in
tax-related ballot initiative campaigns. The paper develops this argument using
Oregon as a case study of a broader phenomenon across the U.S. Since 1990,
anti-tax and tax justice proponents have qualified and organized campaigns to
pass or defeat 50 tax-related ballot initiatives in Oregon, where state regulations
make qualifying a measure relatively easy. The research includes ethnographic
fieldwork during three ballot initiative campaigns (2006-2010); interviews with
more than two dozen anti-tax and tax justice activists; and archival research that
traces the development of political discourses about taxes (and related issues)
between 1990 and 2010.
This case study of the production of, and challenges to, taxpayer identi-
ty politics has both political and theoretical significance for understanding tax
politics in the neoliberal era. Of particular importance is the analysis of a 2010
victory of two progressive tax measures raising taxes on the wealthy and increa-
sing the corporate minimum tax. This campaign pitted a coalition comprised
of Democrats, organized labor and community groups versus anti-tax activists,
including the Tea Party and long-standing, corporate funded groups and sta-
te Republicans. Given the importance of mobilizing popular support for (more)
progressive tax policies and expanded State capacity to address burgeoning
economic insecurity and widening wealth and income inequalities, understan-
ding the resonance and efficacy of both anti-tax and tax justice discourses is
important.
Fatoş Gökşen & Ünal Zenginobuz, zenginob@boun.edu.tr

Bogazici University
Citizens’ Perception on Taxation, Representation and

Democracy in Turkey: Evidence From a Nationwide Survey
The more a state earns its income through tax collection, the more it needs to
enter into reciprocal arrangements with its citizens about provision of services
and representation in exchange for tax contributions. The focus on taxation as a
vehicle for democracy has only recently been brought into the debate about de-
mocracies in developing countries. Using a quantitative data set on Turkey (from
a survey administered to a nationwide sample of 2,400), this paper explores the
relationship between the perception of Turkish citizens on major themes that
form the cultural context with regard to taxation: democracy, justice, equality,
poverty and social exclusion, citizens’ rights and duties, and accountability of
government to citizens.
An overwhelming percent of participants thought that paying taxes gave
them the right for representation in the governing of the country. However,
perceptions on issues such as democratic representation, transparency of go-
vernment, and accountability of government are on the overall rather negative.
Average satisfaction from the way democracy functions in Turkey stood at a ra-
ting of 4.3 out of 10.
Thirty nine of participants found very high consumption taxes as the main
problem with the Turkish tax system, and then listed low taxes paid by high in-
come earners (23%) and the existence of a large unregistered economy (16%) as
important problems. As to why tax collection is not at an adequate level, 24%
marked the inequity of the tax system, followed by unregistered economy (22%)
and failure of the government to convert taxes collected into satisfactory public
services (16%).
As for what constitues an equitable (fair, just) tax system, 68% of the sub-
jects marked “according to ability to pay”. Subjects‘ evaluation of the fairness of
Turkish tax system stood at the low level of 3.15 (out of 10). Presented with a
choice between a flat rate income tax and progressive income tax, 85% of sub-
jects prefered progressive income tax.
An overwhelming majority of citizens (81%) believed that citizens ought
to pay their taxes fully. On the other hand, 75% of subjects believed that those
who pay their taxes fully in Turkey would have chosen to evade it had they had
a chance to evade, pointing at a low level of trust in tax compliance of others.
On tax compliance, about 30% of subjects had a very high tendency to
comply voluntarily with the tax system. This is a rather high figure, given that
most of the subjects find the Turkish tax system inequitable, non-transparent, in-
efficient, and the Turkish public system unaccountable to citizens. It also points
at the considerable amout of public support a tax reform would receive if it in-
volves an equitable system that will be implemented in a tranparent and effi-
cient manner with accountability.
Session 3a: Welfare and Social Policy

Sarah Berens, sb@mpifg.de
University of Cologne
Between Exclusion and Solidarity? Preferences for Private

versus Public Welfare Provision and the Size of the Informal
Sector
This article examines individual preferences for public versus private provisi-
on of social services in Latin America by testing two competing explanations,
subsequently referred to as the exclusion and solidarity hypotheses. This article
examines how the informal sector, as a group of potential free riders for public
welfare goods, relates to individual social policy preferences in low- and midd-
le-income economies. Informal workers do not contribute to public revenue or
to the welfare system in contrast to the formally employed workers, who carry
the tax burden.
The question is asked whether formal wage earners form welfare prefe-
rences based on a cost–benefit calculation and thus favor an exclusion of free
riders – represented by the informal sector – or whether the decisive cleavage
evolves instead around motives of solidarity for a group of individuals to which
formal workers can also easily belong. Both the logic of exclusion and solidarity
are further disaggregated into preferences by different income groups.
From a cost–benefit perspective I argue that the larger the share is of the
informally employed in the working population, the stronger the incentives will
be for formally employed middle- and high-income workers to favor a private
welfare provider – and thus to turn public welfare goods into club goods – which
excludes free riders much more efficiently than does the state. This assumption
will be referred to as the exclusion hypothesis. As a competing theoretical claim,
I contest this logic using the solidarity hypothesis, which argues that formal wor-
kers ally with the informal sector as the distance between informal and formal
employment is marginal and because, in the long run, formal workers may also
end up themselves in the informal sector due to the instability of formal work.
The study examines individual preferences for the provision of pensions,
education, and health care by either the state or private enterprises. The two
competing hypotheses are tested with a hierarchical model using survey data
from Latin America. The findings offer support for the exclusion hypothesis.
Anat Herbst, anat.herbst@gmail.com

Bar Ilan University
Welfare-to-Work Programs and Their Impact on Single

Mothers in Israel – Palestinians, Immigrants from the
Former Soviet Union and Veteran Israelis
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Israeli welfare state has carried
out significant reforms aimed at populations that rely on maintenance allowan-
ces and ones that did not integrate into the job market. This change in policy
was expressed by the amendment of existing laws and the legislation of new
ones, and served to encourage welfare-receivers to enter the job market. Most
of these welfare-receivers had not been on the job market for a long period of
time, never held jobs or held only temporary, part-time jobs.
This study will examine the changes in the mothers‘ socio-economic posi-
tion as a result of these changes in policy, and review their attitudes toward paid
work upon completion of welfare-to-work programs, while also considering the
impact of elements such as coercion and class.
The control group consisted of 40 mothers, who participated in the „Wo-
man of Valor“ program, and 10 coordinators who supported them on their path.
The program is based on a work model that combines group instruction and
personal training, and it is implemented in dozens of communities across the
country. The program‘s primary target group is women from the following sec-
tors: immigrants from the former Soviet Union – mostly from the Caucasus and
Bukhara (and a smaller group from the Ukraine), Ethiopian immigrants, Israe-
li Palestinians and veteran Israelis. Some of them received or are still receiving
income assurance or child support allowances from the National Insurance In-
stitute. These mothers often suffer from multi-dimensional distress, exclusion
and delegitimization. The principal junctures of exclusion are gender, poverty,
geographical periphery, ethno-national discrimination and single parenthood.
Israel can serve as an important case study in the research on single mo-
thers in welfare-to-work programs, as it constitutes a family-oriented society.
Israeli society‘s focus on family is manifest in the country‘s high birth rate, low
divorce rate and high marriage rate. The single-parent family rate is lower than
that encountered in other Western countries and employment level is higher
among single mothers than among married ones. Moreover, the poverty rate is
higher than that encountered in the West.
Session 3b: Tax Compliance

José Antonio Noguera, jose.noguera@uab.cat
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Tax compliance, normative commitments, and social

influence: an agent-based model
Tax evasion, usually defined as the voluntary reduction of the tax burden by ille-
gal means, is a problem of huge social relevance at present times. The first eco-
nomic model of tax evasion was presented four decades ago by Allingham and
Sandmo. This neoclassical economic model adapted Gary Becker’s ‘crime eco-
nomics’ to the study of tax behaviour. The aim was to explain deviant behaviour
(in this case, tax evasion) as rational choice: each taxpayer decides how much of
her income she declares as a function of the benefits of concealing it (given a
tax rate) and the costs of being caught (given a probability of being audited and
the amount of the fine). The most frequent criticism against the rational choice
approach is that it predicts a much more higher level of tax evasion than usually
observed or estimated: since audit probabilities and the amount of fines are low
in the real world, most taxpayers should rationally evade most of their income,
but they actually do not. This is the main reason why research on tax evasion in
the last two decades can be depicted as a series of consecutive attempts to bro-
aden the traditional neoclassical economic model in order to explain an action
(tax compliance) which in many cases appears to be ‘almost-voluntary’. Some
key questions in this research field are:
• To what extent is rational choice theory enough to explain estimated
levels of tax compliance?
• What is the effect of normative commitments on tax compliance?
• What is the effect of social influence on tax compliance?
In this article we will present the results of an agent-based series of virtual

experiments designed to answer these questions. The SIMULFIS project aims to
provide an agent-based computational tool able to shed some light on these
questions and other similar ones, by overcoming traditional economic appro-
aches and integrating two additional factors which may cause different levels
of tax evasion: tax morale (including fairness concerns and normative beliefs)
and social influence (including any kind of social contagion mechanism). The
model simulates a virtual social environment where a central tax authority im-
plements a fiscal regulation, collects taxes, execute audits and fines, and distri-
bute tax revenues through social benefits. All agents are members of a random
social network and have a random level of income and occupational status, the
distribution of which may be empirically calibrated to emulate real cases. The

model includes agents’ normative and factual beliefs on the fairness of the tax
system. SIMULFIS may also make agents’ decisions sensitive in different degrees
to the behaviour of their neighbours. The results of our simulations show that
normative commitments and social influence are required in order to generate
empirically estimated compliance levels, but the effect of social influence on tax
compliance is ambivalent. The normative implications of these results for tax po-
licy will be discussed.
Christoph Kogler, christoph.kogler.univie.ac.at

University of Vienna
The Influence of Trust in and Power of Authorities on Tax

Compliance
The slippery slope framework (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008) is an attempt to
integrate economic and psychological insights into tax compliance. Since purely
economic factors such as audit rates and fines have shown inconsistent effects
on tax compliance, the idea that taxpayers try to evade taxes, whenever there
is a chance, seems obsolete (e.g., Alm, Sanchez & de Juan, 1995; Kirchler, Mu-
ehlbacher, Kastlunger & Wahl, 2010). Therefore, the slippery slope framework
introduces two main dimensions which both are said to influence tax compli-
ance: (i) trust in authorities and (ii) power of authorities. In this context, trust is
defined as the general opinion that the tax authorities are benevolent and work
for the common good, whereas power of authorities refers to the perception of
authorities’ capacity to detect and punish evasion. According to the framework,
citizens’ tax compliance can be fostered either via boosting trust in authorities
or by increasing the perception of power of authorities. However, the quality of
compliance is different, depending on the basis of honest taxpaying. Increasing
tax honesty via enhancing trust in the authorities leads to voluntary compliance,
while raising power of authorities engenders enforced compliance.
The general aim of the present study was to confirm the general validity
of the main assumptions of the slippery slope framework within different cultu-
ral and economic settings in 30+ countries all over the world. Within an experi-
mental setting trust in authorities and power of authorities were manipulated
to determine their influence on different forms of intended tax compliance. The
results support the assumptions of the slippery slope framework and show that
both trust and power are important determinants of tax compliance in diffe-
rent economic conditions and tax climates. Moreover, they suggest that gover-
nments should try to gain their citizens’ trust by enhancing fair procedures and
service-oriented behavior. As a consequence, citizens could comply voluntarily

even in cases where detection by authorities is rather unlikely.
Session 4a: Wealth and Inheritance Tax

Rajiv Prabhankar, Rajiv.Prabhakar@open.ac.uk
The Open University
Taxing wealth: wealth taxes or a capital receipts tax?

Sir James Mirrlees chaired a recent review in the UK of taxation. This review
brought together an international group of tax experts to consider the appro-
priate tax system for the 21st century. This review backed a progressive and
neutral (where similar economic activities are taxed similarly) tax system. One
of its proposals is for a capital receipts tax that would tax the gifts and inhe-
ritances that a person receives over their lifetime. This builds on wider policy
interest in the capital receipts tax or accessions tax idea.
This paper considers some of the difficulties though of this propsal. It
suggests that a more realistic way of taxing wealth would be to impose a we-
alth tax such as property taxation rather than a wealth transfer tax such as
capital receipts tax. This is because a wealth tax is better placed than a capital
receipts tax in winning political support, averting problems of tax avoidance
and attracting less public disquiet.
Political support is needed for taxation as partisan divisions can block
reform. Politicians also need to be willing to overcome lobbying from vested
interests opposed to tax reforms. The paper suggests that the global financial
crisis creates a space for the development of a political argument in favour of a
wealth tax. In particular, a property price bubble in places such as the US was
one of the immediate causes of the crisis. Politicians can argue the case for pro-
perty price taxation as a way of dampening future bubbles in housing. Fairness
also suggests that all parts of society should contribute to the task of repairing
public finances. A wealth tax can also be justified as part of the role that the
wealthy can play in ‘fiscal consolidation’ packages across Europe.
Wealth taxes such as property taxes are also harder to avoid than a capi-
tal receipts tax. Property is less mobile and easily disguised than other forms
of capital wealth. This means that tax collection may be less of a problem for a
wealth tax than a capital receipts tax. Public disquiet with taxing wealth may
be driven in part by the belief that the wealthy can avoid paying these taxes.
Reducing tax avoidance might help tackle public unhappiness with taxing we-
alth.
Shifting from a wealth transfer tax to a wealth tax can also fit into the
underlying ‘optimal tax framework’ of the Mirrlees Review. Optimal tax theory
examines taxes as part of the tax system. What matters is the overall impact of
the system as opposed to the effect of specific taxes. This means that a wealth
tax could substitute for a wealth transfer tax.
Jennifer Stark, jennifer.stark@univie.ac.at

University of Vienna
Social Representations of Inheritance Tax

Inheritance and in particular inheritance taxes have become topics of steadily
increasing interest in public discourse. The present study investigates social
representations of the terms “wealth”, “inherit” and “bequeath”, with the aim to
shed light on contrasting images of inheriting and bequeathing.
The study was conducted on a sample of 75 Austrian taxpayers, all en-
rolled in a postgraduate study program at the Vienna University of Economics.
Participants were asked to write down their spontaneous associations with the
stimuli wealth, inherit and bequeath, and to evaluate their associations as posi-
tive, negative or neutral. Polarity- and neutrality indices were calculated to cap-
ture participants’ evaluation of the three stimuli, and nucleus analyses as well as
correspondence analyses were conducted to capture social representations of
the three stimuli.
The results show that the social representations of the three stimuli we-
alth, inherit and bequeath differ in evaluations as well as in semantic content.
Significant differences are found between the evaluations of all three stimuli
with wealth being evaluated most positively, followed by bequeath and inhe-
rit being evaluated least positive. Regarding the semantic content, the results
indicate money as the core element of the social representations of all three
stimuli. The social representation of the stimulus wealth mostly comprises ma-
terial possessions (e.g., real estate, cars, jewelry) and forms of investments (e.g.,
stocks, bonds, savings). In contrast, death, dispute, taxes, debt, and grief are pi-
votal elements of the social representation of the stimulus inherit, whereas the
elements death, real estate, will, children, and protection are central to the social
representation of the stimulus bequeath.
In sum, the results show that the terms inherit and bequeath, although
they are two sides of the same medal, are not only evaluated differently, but also
differ in the semantic content of their social representations. This profound dif-
ference needs to be considered in tax policy applications as well as in research
referring to inheritance tax.
Session 4b: Tax and Regulation

Irina Burlacu, irina.burlacu@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Maastricht University
The role of taxation in the existent and alternative

coordination mechanisms for mobility of labour
The mobility of labour plays an increasing role in welfare policies and calls for a
new approach in the national welfare states. Dissimilarities in welfare state ob-
jectives and taxation systems are one of the major obstacles in promoting free-
dom of movement for work. This paper focuses on the case of frontier workers in
Luxembourg in Belgium as an illustrative example of mobile earners commuting
in relatively similar settings. Using the example of individuals who commute re-
gularly to another EU country for work, while they and their families resides in
another EU country, such as frontier workers, this paper reveals a series of dispa-
rities and complexities that arise due to mobility of labour.
While countries follow analogous welfare regimes and pursue similar wel-
fare objectives, their ensuing outputs differ significantly. Current legislation pro-
duces uneven effects on the earnings of former mobile workers. Another main
findings is that mobility creates high vertical and horizontal inequity among re-
sidents and residents who commute to other countries for work. By questioning
to what extent mobile earners are covered by the objectives of the national soci-
al policies, the current study illustrates that their needs are only partially covered
by the welfare states in which they work and reside.
This paper empirically attempts to re-evaluate the importance and power
of the welfare states’ objectives, arguing that work mobility is an emerging field
that needs to be considered in policy designs.
Christian Timmermann, cristian.timmermann@wur.nl

Wageningen University
Hindering and facilitating access to innovations in

medicine and agriculture: a brief overview of the debate

Ideas are public goods. The use of an idea by one person does not hinder
others to benefit from the same idea. However in order to generate new life-sa-
ving ideas, i.e. inventions in the life sciences, a huge amount of human and
material resources are needed. Powerful, but highly criticized, tools to speed
up the rate of innovation are exclusive rights, prominent examples thereof are
patents and plant breeders’ rights. Exclusive rights leave by nature a number
of people empty-handed, with starvation, stuntedness, prevalence of disease
and death as preventable and quotidian consequences. To stimulate a human
rights compatible use of exclusive rights a wide range of moral frameworks
have been developed to condemn current praxes. Most prominent in the de-
bate are theories building on (1) utilitarian calculations of weighing benefits
with Peter Singer as a prominent advocate, (2) Pogge’s vindication of com-
pensation duties for institutional harms, (3) a throughout analysis on how the
current innovation incentive system fails to secure human rights and human
capabilities and lastly (4) showing how the status quo nurtures a relationship
of misrecognition.
Depending on how those theories are used, modest targets or even th-
roughout restructure of the innovation incentive system are demanded. Tho-
se theories have the mammoth task of restraining well-established ideas af-
firming the permissibility of a reckless use of property rights that are deeply
anchored in the property law discourse.
Life sciences raise a range of special problems when justifying pro-poor
innovation. Healthy people living in a society with a good sanitary infrastruc-
ture need far less resources to tackle health problems than people in places
with a poor infrastructure – the poor need to consume more. Patents that in-
volve gene sequences (or part thereof ) make inventing around impossible,
making the seeking of licenses mandatory for investigators wanting to make
follow-up research with the molecule. Speedy sharing of data concerning pu-
blic health hazards or threats to food security are vital to maintain living stan-
dards.
Douglas Bamford, D.Bamford@warwick.ac.uk

Warwick University
Hourly averaging as the preferred policy choice for

hypothetical insurers
This paper argues that if people were placed in a hypothetical position of equa-
lity, they would choose taxation and benefit policies that would utilise hour-
ly-averaging of taxation. The idea of hypothetical insurance as a means to de-
termine egalitarian redistributive policies is from Ronald Dworkin’s proposal for
Equality of Resources. Hypothetically equal insurers would consider policies that
assist those with poor market fortune while taking account of the costs to their
more fortunate potential self. Insurers would choose policies that effectively
transfer from the fortunate to the less fortunate, particularly if they do not have
an unduly large effect on the wider economy and consumer prices.
Hourly-averaging utilises hour-credits conferred by employers and go-
vernment agencies which indicate the time that someone has worked or been
excused from working. Hourly-averaging bases tax calculations on the average
hourly income of taxpayers over their entire lifetime. Calculating taxation on the
basis of a lifetime-hourly-average is attractive to insurers for several reasons. It
enables an earning subsidy for those who have had consistently low income
over their lifetime, without expending as many resources on those with previous
good fortune. It is an attractive means to tax the most fortunate more than those
with moderate fortune, and differentiate those from people with low fortune
overall but temporary good fortune. This enables very high marginal tax-rates
(up to 99.99%) without the usual disincentive effects.
Furthermore, hourly-averaging is attractive due to its likely economic ef-
fects. Unlike other forms of taxation and subsidy, it does not encourage people
to increase their leisure-time at the expense of economic activity. This lack of a
leisure-substitution effect is what provides hourly-averaging with its advanta-
ges over other forms of taxation and benefit policy. Hourly-averaging therefo-
re allows more targeted redistribution from fortunate people to less fortunate
people. In particular, fortunate leisure-lovers can often avoid taxation by wor-
king part-time, while less fortunate work-lovers usually do not qualify for bene-
fits due to their reasonable overall income or consumption. The advantages of
hourly-averaging listed would make it more attractive to hypothetical insurers,
despite the additional costs of administering such a system.
Session 5a: Issues in Social Justice

Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch, HCSaB@t-online.de
Technical University Braunschweig
On the Left-Libertarian Justification of Basic Income

The question of whether or not there are good reasons for introducing a basic
income has for some time now been a topic of controversy not only among phi-
losophers and social scientists, but also in the political arena. In general such
discussions understand basic income to be an income to which every adult ci-
tizen has a legal claim, independently of whether or not she is in need of it, and
independently of whether or not she is willing to take up gainful employment
should the opportunity arise. In view of recent economic developments con-
fronting many Western societies with large—and growing—gaps in income and
wealth, a sharp increase in unstable employments lacking benefits, as well as
mass unemployment especially among young people, many scientists, politi-
cians and citizens from these countries are posing the following question: is a
tax-funded basic income a social policy measure that should be supported on
the grounds of justice?
One of the most influential philosophical justifications of basic income co-
mes from the work of a left-libertarian thinker who situates himself in the traditi-
on of classical liberalism: Hillel Steiner. Steiner’s arguments in favor of the thesis
that basic income should be supported on the grounds of justice have been
adopted not only by libertarian and liberal political philosophers,1 but also by
important representatives of other philosophical schools of thought.
In my paper I examine whether or not the left-libertarian justification of
basic income is satisfactory. My aim is to show why this justification must be re-
garded as dissatisfactory even if one accepts its premises. To this end, I will first
consider the fundamental assumptions made by left-libertarianism and explain
why left-libertarians believe that these assumptions can serve as a justification
of basic income. I will then submit this argument to an internal critique and de-
monstrate that it raises a serious problem. My main point here will be that this
theory requires—but fails to provide—a convincing theory of economic value.
Throughout my discussion I will refer not only to Hillel Steiner, but also to other
left-libertarian thinkers, and I will explain why they too fail to provide solutions
to the problem I unfold.
I conclude by making clear that my critique of left-libertarianism does
not imply that basic income cannot be justified at all with philosophical means.
What I do show, however, is that one of the most influential justifications of ba-
sic income is problematic. As a result, there is a need for different arguments if
one wants to defend the thesis that basic income should be supported on the
grounds of justice.
Akira Inoue, inoue@si.gunma-u.ac.jp

Gunma University
Luck Egalitarianism and Disability

Egalitarian theories of justice have gained reputation as a convincing and ro-
bust strand of political philosophy. Among them is luck egalitarianism which is
essentially the idea that the influence of sheer luck that gives rise to inequalities
between people should be mitigated as much as possible This paper examines
whether luck egalitarianism as a plausible theory of justice can provide reason-
able help to the disabled.
We should first and foremost note that luck egalitarianism allows some
distribution to the disabled, such that it can characterize many disabilities as
sheer luck. However, there are two problems with the luck egalitarian way of ca-
ring for the disabled through public services. We can see them by distinguishing
two kinds of disabilities, congenital and acquired ones. First, the luck egalitarian
treatment of congenital disabilities may require the inefficient allocation of re-
sources to the disabled: some luck egalitarians may call for the direct eliminati-
on of natural causes that generate disabilities; the others may claim that large
amounts of cash should be compensated for the disabilities. Obviously, both
ways of treating the disabled are insensitive to social cost. Second, public as-
sistance may not sufficiently be given to those who have acquired disabilities in
the luck egalitarian scheme, on grounds that they are disabled responsibly, e.g.,
through their imprudent choices. This seems unduly harsh; their human dignity
would be offended if it were the case.
Recent defenses of luck egalitarianism can apparently cope with the two
problems by their common appeal to the idea of pluralist justice, or, more ge-
nerally, value pluralism: in the congenital disability case, the consideration of
efficiency put together with the alleviation of brute luck may favor cost-sensitive
and effective ways of appeasing inequalities that the disabled suffer; as for the
case of acquired disabilities, an appeal to the value of basic needs (within or out-
side luck egalitarian justice) can firmly provide care and support for the disabled.
The employment of pluralist strategy in defense of luck egalitarianism,
however, is a “two-edged” sword, since it easily falls into an unprincipled ethic:
luck egalitarianism would take into account other considerations of justice and/
or morality in ways that certainly help the disabled, responsibly or otherwise.
The recent arguments for luck egalitarianism seem to hold pluralism in such an
ad hoc manner. To be plausible, however, the pluralist version of luck egalitari-
anism must have a reasonably acceptable rule to adjudicate multiple principles
covering values in justice and/or morality. Moreover the rule in question must
be such that its way of regulating principles can reasonably be regarded as ega-
litarian. Setting up the regulation rule that can plausibly be seen as egalitarian is
a most difficult task to achieve.
Benjamin Alarie, ben.alarie@utoronto.ca

University of Toronto
The Challenge of Price Discrimination for Social Justice in Taxa-

tion
The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, which stems on most accounts from
the events surrounding the financial crisis and a widespread sense of irritation
at the increasing levels of income and wealth inequality in many countries, has
often been criticized for not having a clear agenda. Critics contend that it has
“no message,” “no goals,” and “no leaders.” Whether these criticisms of OWS are
well-founded or not generally, in this paper I explain why when it comes to tax
policy prescriptions it is understandable why the most intuitively obvious solu-
tions are not without serious complications. More specifically, I will explain why
most salient of such possible prescriptions—increasing tax rates—is not obvi-
ously a satisfactory solution (unless done carefully and strategically, with an eye
to jurisdictions which have successfully sustained high tax rates). For example,
the US has the highest corporate income tax rates of any jurisdiction—and yet
corporations such as GE and Google have been able to reduce their effective
corporate income tax rate liability dramatically below top line statutory rates.
The problem is that increasing tax rates often leaves those confronting
those higher tax rates with greater incentives to engage in various activities in
order avoid, one way or another, those taxes. The strategies include off-shoring
production, manipulating transfer pricing, devising clever corporate tax shel-
ters, transferring intangible IP to tax havens, lobbying for tax expenditures, and
pushing for tax amnesties, etc. All of these activities are clearly ongoing in the US
and in other developed countries. And so even though increasing tax rates is not
the clear-cut effective policy prescription one might reflexively have thought
it could be, the example of the Bush tax cuts illustrates that cutting tax rates
is also not obviously the right approach. In many countries claims that cutting
taxes will increase tax revenues (i.e., that we “are on the wrong side of the Laffer
curve”) are deeply suspect and almost certainly incorrect. Perversely, then, if tax
rates are increased it is not necessarily the wealthiest that will bear the greatest
burden, and if tax rates are cut, it is likely not the least well-off who will benefit.
Ultimately, I argue, that OWS ought not to be criticized for not articula-
ting a clear message with respect to tax policy. Responding intelligently to the
demands for a more progressive tax system that promotes the realization of so-
cial justice is apt to confront challenges that are deep and complicated. And yet
notwithstanding the general message of cautiousness with respect to the right
tax policy solutions, I will conclude by explaining that good tax policy starting
points are available if the political will can be found to sustain their introduction
and implementation.
Session 5b: Elites and Taxation

Bruno Verbeek, B.Verbeek@phil.leidenuniv.nl
Leiden University
‘You did not build that road’. Reciprocity, benefits, oppor-

tunities and taxing the extremely rich
Recently, many states in the Western world, confronted with a fall in revenues
and rising debts on the one hand and a growing economic inequality on the
other, have taken a critical look at the tax rates for the extremely rich. In various
places, policies have been proposed to the effect that the 1% of the highest
income earners should pay (much) more in taxes than they currently do. In par-
ticular, it is considered unjust that the highest marginal rate is the same for me-
dian incomes and for those in the 99th percentile of the income distribution, as
is the case in many Western democracies.
A typical argumentative strategy that is used to argue for increases in
the marginal tax burden for the extremely rich is to argue that the extreme rich
amassed their wealth by taking advantage of economic opportunities that they
did not create themselves. Other members of society created those opportuni-
ties and reciprocity therefore demands that the extremely rich ‘pay’ for these
opportunities they enjoyed.
A much discussed version of that argument comes from Elizabeth Warren,
who defended hefty increases in taxes for the extremely rich in a speech that
went ‘viral’ on internet as follows:
„You built a factory out there? Good for you. But I want to be clear: you mo-
ved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for; you hired workers
the rest of us paid to educate; you were safe in your factory because of police
forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn‘t have to worry that
marauding bands would come and seize everything at your factory, and hire
someone to protect against this, because of the work the rest of us did.
Now look, you built a factory and it turned into something terrific, or a
great idea? God bless. Keep a big hunk of it. But part of the underlying social
contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid who comes
along.“ Elizabeth Warren (Youtube, 11-9-2011) Similar arguments have been for-
mulated in France, the Netherlands and Great Brittain. However, it is not just
politicians who have argued like this. Political philosophers Liam Murphy and
Thomas Nagel in The Myth of Ownership have defended a view not dissimilar.
In this paper I will argue, first, that arguments like that of Elizabeth Warren
or those of Murphy and Nagel fail: they do not justify a marginally higher tax
burden on the extremely rich. These arguments commit what could be called a
‘fallacy of composition’. They assume that since an entrepreneur’s efforts would
be in vain had those public goods and services not been provided, that all eco-
nomic gain therefore is attributable to these goods and services – a conclusion
that does not follow.
Secondly, I argue that this type of ‘Warren argument’ appeals to a princi-
ple according to which taxation is the price a citizen pays for the enjoyment of
the benefits the state provides. Third, I will show that such a principle not only
undercuts the ‘Warren argument’, but also that it mandates a completely flat tax
rate with no marginal rates at all.
In the final part of the paper, I will discuss an argument for taxing the ext-
remely rich that does not appeal to a benefit principle. This argument proceeds
from the idea that justice demands that taxation is levied according to the abi-
lity to pay. I will defend this principle against objections formulated against it
by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel in The Myth of Ownership and show how
it justifies setting high marginal rates for the extremely rich. Social-democrats
and left liberals who are concerned about the extremely high incomes on the
top end of the income distribution are better advised to adopt such a strategy,
rather than sticking to Warren-like arguments.
Jorge Atria, jorge.atria@fu-berlin.de

Free University Berlin
Inequality and Taxes: an analysis from the Elites in Chile

The discussion about taxes and tax systems should not be conceived solely as a
legal or economic concern, but a matter that embodies the moral conceptions
and the divergences about social cooperation and solidarity. Taxes provide in-
comes for the acquisition of public goods, but they can also be useful to correct
and reduce big disparities. Therefore, the way in which a society discusses ques-
tions about how the taxes function and their proportionality has consequences
concerning the state and its capacity for redistribution and the degree of success
or failure in the aim of inequality decrease.
In this paper it is analysed the issue of inequality in Chile -‐characterised as a
historical and perdurable problem ‐ through the regressivity in the tax system. In
this sense, although inequality is defined as a unresolved subject in the country,
most of discussions and innovations are focused on the side of public spending,
leaving out considerations about tax system and some regressive taxes, whose
reform would help to a large extent to diminish the great distances within the
Chilean society.
This work emphasizes the study of the social position of the elites, in the
sense that they have the greatest incentives to pay lower taxes, as well as grea-
ter possibilities to take advantage of public information and state privileges. In
this case, elites -‐defined in terms of wealth and positions of political influence-‐
would achieve to control mass media resources to avoid the discussions in the
public sphere, keeping simultaneously the benefits associated with their posi-
tion, which is especially visible through the situations of tax elusion, tax avoi-
dance. Therefore, though many international organizations make sugge stions
to Chile in order to face the problem of economic and social inequality adding
the concern about regressive aspects of the tax system (for instance through the
creation of new mechanisms to improve problems of legal loopholes that bene-
fit especially the richest groups of the country), this items are far away from the
public sphere, being defined as too specific and not relevant for social inequali-
ty, prevailing a model of “neutral taxes”, which should be concentrated in helping
economic growth and foreign investments.
In the context of social protests against the problems of public educa-
tion and social inequality, the government proposed a tax reform, whose aim
would be exclusively to get new revenues in order to implement improvements
in education. This reform is analysed also as example of the mechanisms of the
Chilean elites to maintain the regressivity of the system, having influence in the
reproduction of the social inequality in the country.

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the ethics of

Welcome to the University of Salzburg!

Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research

Research focus: Culture and Poverty Alleviation

Research focus: Theory of Poverty and Normative Ethics

Research focus: Poverty Reduction and Tax Ethics

The Ethics of Poverty Alleviation

Key Themes and Questions

Timothy Weidel Ideology and the Harms of Self-Decep-

Session 1b: Poverty and the Welfare State

Claudia Globisch & Context matters: being poor in a rich

Serena Romano Ethics, poverty and moralisation in the

Session 2a: Health and Poverty

Bas van der Vossen In Defense of Productive Human

Ortrud Leßmann & Evolving Capabilities in Children? Im-

Session 3a: Conceptualisation of Poverty

Rudolf Schüssler Quantitative Measures of Energy Po-

Session 3b: Responsibilities towards the Poor

Session 4a: Relative Poverty

Christian Neuhäuser Relative poverty, absolute poverty

Session 4b: Minmum Justice

Elizabeth Hupfer Distributing Welfare and Resources: A

Session 5a: Global Poverty and Justice

Charlotte Newey Fairness, Global Poverty and the

Session 5b: Global Poverty and Development

Joseph Burke The Ethics of Randomised Controlled

How to get there:

Energy Poverty and the Moral Challenge of Dangerous

Normative Issues in Poverty Measurement

Session 1a: Children, Justice and Social Policy

Children, well-being and the currency of justice

Gottfried Schweiger, gottfried.schweiger@sbg.ac.at

Justice and child poverty: the family and the state

Session 1b: Consumption Taxation

Why Taxing Consumption? Some Normative Considera-

Secondly, the main justifications for the progressive tax on consumption

Daniel Halliday, daniel.halliday@unimelb.edu.au

Egalitarianism and Consumption Tax

Limor Riza & Noam Sher, limor.riza@gmail.com

Consumption Tax Rate as a Partial Mechanism for

Session 2a: Grounding Tax Ethics

Normative Foundations of Inheritance Taxation

heritance taxation is justified if it respects the interdependence between legal

Teppo Eskelinen & Arto Laitinen, teppo.eskelinen@uef.fi

Justification of taxation and its global implications

Session 2b: Citizenship and Taxation

Italian Citizens’ Beliefs on the fiscal exchange

Sandra Morgen, smorgen@uoregon.edu

Producing and contesting taxpayer identity politics in the

ner, “corporatized” public sector; privatization; deregulation; and regressive tax

Fatoş Gökşen & Ünal Zenginobuz, zenginob@boun.edu.tr

Citizens’ Perception on Taxation, Representation and

Session 3a: Welfare and Social Policy

Between Exclusion and Solidarity? Preferences for Private

Anat Herbst, anat.herbst@gmail.com

Welfare-to-Work Programs and Their Impact on Single

Session 3b: Tax Compliance

Tax compliance, normative commitments, and social

In this article we will present the results of an agent-based series of virtual

distribution of which may be empirically calibrated to emulate real cases. The

Christoph Kogler, christoph.kogler.univie.ac.at

The Influence of Trust in and Power of Authorities on Tax

service-oriented behavior. As a consequence, citizens could comply voluntarily