IPTC 13434

Case History of Successful Underground Flow Control in Persian Gulf Field

Abbas Roohi, Haidar Bahmani, and Mehran Makvandi, National Iranian Drilling Company

Copyright 2009, International Petroleum Technology Conference

This paper was prepared for presentation at the International Petroleum Technology Conference held in Doha, Qatar, 7–9 December 2009.

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Abstract
`
An underground blowout occurs when formation fluids flow from one subsurface zone to another in an
uncontrolled manner. The results range from being indiscernible to catastrophic. An underground
blowout can result in minor transfers of fluids that may never be identified or in flow which reaches the
sea floor or ground surface. If the flow reaches the surface, a crater, loss of equipment, and sometimes
loss of life may result. A major complication in handling underground blowouts is the difficulty in
diagnosing what is actually happening in the subsurface. Once an underground blowout is identified, the
risk of surface cratering must be considered. Another major difficulty is the lack of a systematic
approach to analyzing and controlling the flow. These are aggravated by the relative lack of coverage of
underground blowouts in conventional industry well control training. This difficult and complex subject
usually accounts for less than 5% of the time or material covered. Overall, it is our opinion that
shortcomings exist in all areas relating to underground blowouts: training, prevention, identification,
diagnosis, control, and verification of control. An Iranian offshore oil field is located 75 km west of
kharg island containing three main production platform AA, AB and AC, with the total capacity of
220000 BPD,each about 80000 BPD. 67 wells out of 107 wells drilled in this oil field, are oil producer
now. There are 20 wells on A-11 which produce oil from Ghar and Damam formation. Costly
underground blowouts result in mud losses, wasted rig time, often ineffective remediation materials and
techniques, and sometimes lost holes, sidetracks, abandoned wells, relief wells, and lost petroleum
reserves. The underground blowout can be the most difficult, dangerous, and destructive situation in
well control. If the blowout is shallow, cratering can result and endanger the lives of all involved. The
underground blowout is often denied since the usual manifestations of a blowout are hidden from view.
It is imperative that the blowout be recognized and diagnosed as soon as possible in the early of recent
year, while drilling17 1/2" hole of well no. A-11-20, at depth 383m, huge flow of gas was observed and
after closing the well, as the formation below shoe was fractured, due to increase pressure to above
MASP, gas flowed from seabed, in addition, gas and water flowed from 30" conductor pipe of A-11-17
to lower deck up to 8 meters height. Underground blowout was controlled by engineering planning with
no fire after 60 days. It was designed base on three main concepts: Surface blowout control to allow
continues work safely on the platform Identify source of gas flow Underground blow out control. In this
paper underground blowout control in Abozar oil field will be discussed in detail procedure.
2 IPTC 13434

1. Introduction
Underground flow control with use of expertise and field study is possible. Underground flow may
cause by very small amount of fluids movement which never been recognize and they reach to the
surface or ocean floor.
Due to this flow up to surface and displacement will cause loss of drilling fluid, waste of time, loss of
hole, side tracing, abandon of the well, loss of reservoir & other lateral problems .
For this reason recognizing and controlling underground flow in short time is vital necessity, so at first it
must the cause of flow be recognized then start controlling it.
This operation can be very dangerous and disaster in case of shallow hole flow. . Flow control operation
on platform no 11 in Abozar field wells and recognizing cause of the flow and circumstance of
controlling the plat form is the issue of this paper.
2. Explanation circumstance of flow accident on Abozar 11 platform in Persian Gulf
Flow started while drilling well no 20 at depth of 306m casing point of 17 1/2" hole, which has been hit
unexpected gas packet in area of 50m in diameter and includes 20 wells in area. With flowing gas
through conductor pipe from seabed, increasing mud weight up to 75pcf while controlling gas flow,
running 13 3/8'' casing down to 302m and cementing the casing in two stages with no return. Observing
huge flow of gas from seabed while drilling directional 12 1/4'' hole to 383m, closing the well. Close the
well, annulus pressure increase to 800psi. Pumping mud to kill well, no result. Observing severely flow
from and around 20"–13 3/8" annulus well NO 17 and migrated in around the deck up to 8m with no
way to work. Due to running out of mud, pumping sea water through 4 1/2'' tubing and try to kill well
No 17 no results.
3. Summary of blow out control operation on Abozar 11 plat form
Due to huge gas flow from seabed, the plat form base was in danger and may cause platform to collapse
and disappear from surface, so taking decision to suspend production of all wells on Abozar plat form
and gas flow control program in three sections as follow has been write:
a) Surface flow control and safety procedure: making metal box
to guide gas flow to burning line.
b) Recognize source of gas flow: due to there are many wells on
this plate form, recognize source of gas flow in very complex and difficult. For this matter, at
first release annulus pressure of all wells and pump sea water until they are killed. Then check
the well history of no .14 and 17 which close to 20, the concern was pointed to well NO.17 and
checking the type and composition of gas from reservoirs (Ghar, Dammam, Asmari). Flowing
gas was from Ghar reservoir so all wells from this reservoir was closed for controlling the flow.
c) At mean time doing below operations:
i. Checking seabed with Remote Operation Vehicle (ROV) to
detect gas flow and to find out how big is the hole but ROV got stock between deck legs
and using divers to find out. No result.
ii. Studying Geophysics and 3D seismic log on the shallow area
for any gas pocket or gas channel with anomaly on the geophysics log was used for
helping the study but it was showing that because of instability they were not correct.
iii. By the study of the case they find out many sandy channels
from Mishan formation could be work as second reservoir and kept the gas flow from
wells.
d) Controlling under surface and sea bed flow: after studying the
boundary of problem wells and according on well history they chose two wells 14 and 17.
4. Well 17
Drilled 17 1/2" hole down to 308m, ran 13 3/8" casing to 305.5m and cemented. Directional drilled 12
1/4 '' hole to 385m hit hard stopper and put cement plug and continue directional drilled to 1396m and
ran 9 5/8'' casing 1289m and cemented and well completed. Because of severe gas flow from around
well no 17, well control program has been set for well no 17. Because of hard stopper at depth 385 m of
IPTC 13434 3

12 1/4" hole which has been plugged then re-drilled. With evidence of drilling in Abozar field
possibility of casing damage on one of the adjacent wells raised, so well no 17 was chosen. First
pumping the sea water to try control the gas from this well. Also pumping sea water in the surrounding
wells of no 17 and checked for any result. Because of wells no 11, 15 and18 produce from Ghar was
close to well no 17 continuously injecting water in those wells for controlling the gas flow from inside
of the reservoir. Then with possibility of flowing gas is from outside of 9 5/8" casing because of bad
cement bond, perforating job by coil tubing was done in two stages at depths 1036-1030, and 936-930m,
beneath of cap rock of Ghar and upper Dammam, for cutting off to upper layers of cap rock in the well
no 17. Then cement slurry was injected to perforated zone by the coil tubing and try to control the flow,
but no result.
At the mean time make an outlet for 30" conductor pipe well no 17 for diverting and controlling the flow.
Then looking at well no 14 for any sign to be source of flow. According on results of gas sample of flow
well no 20, injecting water to well no 17, super PLT log in well no 17, possible damages to the well no
.14 casings due fishing job operation before abandon it.
5. Well 14
Drilled 17 1/2" to 375m and ran casing 13 3/8" to 370m and cemented. Directional drilled 12 1/4" hole
to 1620m while many times whole conditioning, because of tight hole at different depths and ran 9 5/8"
to 1329m, stuck casing string. Try to release casing no success.
Directional drilled 8 1/2" hole from 1319 to 1620m with many times hole conditioning due to tight hole,
continue drilling to 1677 m, ran 7" liner to 1650m, no success to run more. Try to release running tools,
no success. Release running tools by emergency release mechanism. Cemented liner, pull out of hole to
986m try to make circulation, no result, try to pull out of hole with 270kips, try to reverse circulation, no
result. Mechanical back off from 377m. Drilled out cement from 300 to 377m, and try drill out cement
around the fish to 385m, observe metal cuttings on shale shaker. Ran infectivity test rate as below
1. From inside of fish with 500 psi and rate 3.8 barrel per minute.
2. from annuals of fish and 9 5/8" casing with 500 phi and 7.3 barrel per minut. Yet plug at 350 m and
commit plug mp to 275 m and suspension of the well.
Considering to the inaction test and knowing the connection between annuals and formation also
cement on top of the fish represent cement circulation from calling rim to up and not having cement
around and out Sid of casing ( attached sham ties ) with cawing being through Ghar reservoir possibility
of gas immigration from reservoir
Throughout and rim then inside casing and fish had been happen.
Flow control operation through well no. A-11-14 forts by coil tubing then using drilling rig the flow of
this plat form has been under control which summer of this operation is as follow first step using coil
tubing. Running completion string in to well no. 14 for centralizing coil tubing 3.35 '' then drilling
cement and plug with sever los of circulation and running electrical log to find damage on casing at
depth 384 meter. Ran flatable packer 2 1/2'' to 461.3m and set that at this point with 2600 psi observing
gas bobble at water surface. Ran another 2 1/8" packer for more safety to the depth 944.8m then
observing gas bobble at sea surface.
a. Drilled out cement inside casing 9 5/8'' with Bit from 280m to
348m
b. Milled 20cm of bridge plug and fall in to the well.
c. Ran junk mill for milling the plug.
d. Ran RTTS and set packer at different Depths for checking
pressure.
e. Pumped cement and Drilled out cement and Milled fish.
f. Set cement plug at 389.8m (Length at plug 90cm).
g. Ran 7'' tie back for covering casing damage.
h. After controlling the flow, move drilling rig to well no .20 and
continue drilling this well.
4 IPTC 13434

6. Well 20
Install BOPs and observing gas bubble from bell nipple, released gas and testing BOPs. Checking
pressure 400 psi released from chock, pumped sea water and got return from chock with 4.5bph losses.
Observed gas bubble at sea surface while pumping HiVis pill and seawater through annuals
(4.2bph) continu observing gas bubble at sea surface running 5'' DP open and pumped 3 stage cement
totaly 180bbl. for safety reason of previous hole from repeated leakage reservoir gas and suitable place
for start directional drilling this well at present time without of any problem is in drilling operation.
7. Environmental aspect
During this operation following standards and environments condition was priority for the rolles and it
was with high quality and within international law, without any accident and damages to the gas in area.
Is good to say with hi percentage of gas in area but it was control successfully without any harm.
Also taking satalight pictures (These pictures was taked by an European satalight terraSAR-x) for
observing any oil damage around abozar field with close up to 3 m not been found.
According to engineering calculation, about 1,000,000,000 cu.ft gas has been flowed from well no17
and 20, and 200,000 bbl of sea water has been injected to the abozar wells.
8. Lessons learning
a. Wrong procedure for abandon of well no 14
b. Did not consider a lot of indication of damage to 9 5/8" casing
through try to fishing operation in well no 14.

Table 1: Results of gas sampling –compeir gas compond from flowing well and other reservoir

Gas flow from Damam Uper Asmari

Ghar Reservoir Gas compund
well 20 Reservoir (mol percent)
0.5 0.16 1.07 0.64 Nitrogen
82.05 24.75 82.57 85.42 Methane
2.29 1.61 2.25 minimum Corbon Oxid
8.39 8.68 8.06 7.94 Ethane
1.65 2.17 1.4 0.19 Hydrogen Solfid
3.18 7.09 2.9 3.22 Propane
0.39 1.44 0.37 0.43 IsoButane
0.8 3.13 0.74 0.87 NormalButane
0.23 1.27 0.1 0.22 IsoPentane
0.22 1.32 0.17 0.20 NormalPentane
0.3 48.38 0.27 0.87 Hexane&Uper
100 100 100 100.00 Total
IPTC 13434 5

Fig 1: Well head platform A-11

Fig 2: Some of Abozar platform 11 wells

Aboozar Field-Wells Schematic

Formation TOP H.S A-11-13 A-11-14 A-11-15 A-11-16 A-11-17 A-11-18 A-11-19 A-11-20
Surface
U.Fars

26"

20" 108m 124m

645.63
275m
17 1/2 "

350m
L.Fars

13 3/8" 815m 370m 303m 303m 305.5m 302m 303m 302m

306m
383m
12 1/4 "

‫ﻩرفح يار‬
‫ب داوم و الاك دوبن ليل د‬
. ‫ دش اجباج‬20‫ﻩرا مش ﻩاچ تيعقوم‬

U.As (C .R.) 1124.34 9 5/8" 843 .5m 1316m 1 020 m 1 142 .4m 1289m 1179m
U.As 1159.34
8 1/2 "

‫ ﻩ‬12 1/4 "‫ب‬

1179-1650m

Ghar (C .R.) 1238.94 1296m

898-1369m

986-1640m

955-1524m
655-1360m

1252.26
Ghar

‫ب لكد‬

7"
T.D 1805m 1677m 200 1m 2003m 2123m
‫يرتس ﺁ ريگ ليل د‬
‫ قيلعت يرتم‬1650‫قمع رد‬
.‫ديدرگ‬
7"‫ب ﻩ اچ‬
6 IPTC 13434

Fig 3: Gas flow from well No. 17

Fig 4: well No.A-11-14H befor and aftter cementing the fish and abandon the well
IPTC 13434 7

Fig 5: condition of inside well no. 14

`Fig 6: Results of well no. 14 production and severe gas flow from 360 – 380 meter depth at top of fish because of casing
damage
8 IPTC 13434

Fig 7: Gas flow from well 14 through damaged casing, toward outside well and to wells No. 17, 20

Fig 8: Install stopper inside drilling pipe

IPTC 13434 9

Fig 9a: Checking formation layers of platform A-11 wells

Fig 9b: Checking formation layers platform A-11 wells