G.R. No.

212193

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC y MARQUEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the verdict must be one of acquittal of
the accused. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation for rape.

Factual Antecedents

Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez (appellant) appeals the September 26, 2013 Decision of the Court of
1

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05452 which affirmed with modification the February 15, 2012
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453. The
2

RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against "AAA" under 3

paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The designation of the crime in the
Information against appellant is rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC.
However, the accusatory portion of the Information charges appellant with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph l(b), Article 266-A, to wit:

That on or about September 29, 2008 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and
by means of force and intimidation, commit sexual abuse upon the person of "AAA" by then and there
making her drink liquor which made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise
unconsciousness, bringing her to a room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her
will.

Contrary to law. 4

When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty." Elvis James Meneses (Meneses) was involved in the
commission of the crime but could not be prosecuted due to his minority. He was only 14 years old at the
time of the incident.

Version of the Prosecution

"AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was having a drinking session with
appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At
around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his
penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to
cut hotdog and now lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left
after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he
could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant
stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. "AAA" then left appellant's house and immediately
returned to the house she shared with her live-in partner.

The following day, "AAA" reported the incident to the police. She also underwent a medical examination
and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a drinking session
with his cousin, Gerry Tionloc. After a while, Meneses and "AAA" arrived and joined in their drinking
session. Meneses and

"AAA" then went inside his bedroom and continued drinking while he went out of the house to buy food.
When he returned and entered his bedroom, he saw Meneses and "AAA" having sex. They asked him to
leave, so he went to the kitchen. Meneses then came out of the bedroom followed by "AAA" who was
holding a bottle of "rugby," which she brought home with her. Appellant contended that nothing more
happened that night. Meneses corroborated his version of the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated February 15, 2012, the R TC clarified that appellant is charged with rape through
5

sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based on the allegations in the
Information and not with rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of the same provision of law, as the
designation in the Information suggests. The RTC stressed that this is consistent with the legal precept
that it is the allegations or recital in the Information that determine the nature of the crime committed.
Thus, the RTC ruled that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual
intercourse against "AAA." It held that the prosecution successfully established the crime through the
testimony of "AAA," which was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the private
complainant Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED. 6

Appellant appealed the RTC's Decision arguing that discrepancies in the sworn statement of "AAA" and
her testimony diminished her credibility. Appellant contended that "AAA" alleged in her sworn statement
that: (1) appellant held her hands while Meneses was on top of her; and (2) she slept after Meneses
raped her and awakened only when he was on top of her. However, "AAA" did not mention these
allegations during her direct examination. Appellant maintained that "AAA" failed to refute his assertions
that her aunt and uncle fabricated the charges against him for having previous affairs with two of her
cousins.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated September 26, 2013, the CA ruled that discrepancies between the affidavit and
7

testimony of "AAA" did not impair her credibility since the former is taken ex parte and is often incomplete
or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. The inconsistencies
even preclude the possibility that the testimony given was rehearsed. Moreover, the CA held that a rape
victim like "AAA" is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and
painful that she might even try to obliterate it from her memory. The CA gave scant consideration to the
appellant's claim of ill motive of the aunt and uncle of "AAA," as well as his denial of raping her which
cannot overcome her positive, candid and categorical testimony that he was the rapist. The CA therefore
affirmed the Decision of the R TC with modification that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed
on all damages awarded from the date of finality of the CA's Decision until fully paid. The dispositive
portion of the CA's Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 15 February 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, in Crim. Case No. 08-264453
finding accused-appellant Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
Php50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of private complainant AAA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 8

Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.

Assignment of Error

Appellant adopts the same assignment of error he raised before the CA, viz.:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 9

Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not able to establish the
required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of innocence.

Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
The Facts Recited In The Information
Determine the Crime Charged

It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the Information (rape by sexual
assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and the recital in the Information (rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of the same provision of law). However, this discrepancy does not
violate appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As ruled
correctly by the RTC, the allegations in the Information charged appellant with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital in the
Information determine the nature of the crime committed. "[T]he character of the crime is not determined
by the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information."10

The Use Of Force, Threat or

Intimidation Causes Fear on the Part of
the Rape Victim.

Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of appellant by
presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1,
Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to
have been committed by force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that
the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove
that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to
do so is fatal to its cause."
11

Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in
mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she
is threatened with death if she reports the incident. "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear
12

caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol." 13

It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had sexual
intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no
evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA."
She testified that appellant and Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of
appellant. At around 7:00 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of appellant and
chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up to about 11 p.m. when she took a
nap, there is no showing that appellant or Meneses forced, threatened or intimidated her.

As to how appellant and Meneses had sexual intercourse with her, "AAA" merely testified as follows:

Q - Madam Witness, you said that it was Elvis James who raped you first. And then after he left this Juan
Richard Tionloc [accused] approached you and asked if you can do it?

A - Yes, Ma' am; he asked me but I did not answer because I was still shivering.

Q - And then what else happened after that?

A - That is it; he was the one who did it. 14

No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant employed force, threat or
intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that appellant physically overpowered, or used or
threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her
life since a knife lying on the table nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere
product of her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely to
threaten or intimidate her. We cannot even ascertain whether said knife can be used as a weapon or an
effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented nor described in court. These
findings are clear from the following testimony of "AAA:"

Q- While Elvis James was inserting his penis to [sic] your vagina, what are [sic] you doing?

A- I was crying, Ma'am.

Q - You did not shout for help?

A - I did not because I was afraid, Ma'am.

Q - Why were you afraid, madam witness?

A - Because there was a knife inside the room which we used in cutting the hotdog and then [I] did not
shout anymore because I was afraid that they might stab me, Ma'am. 15

Even asswning in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in "AAA's" mind, it should
be noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA" for a sexual favor. In other words, the
source of the feigned force, threat or intimidation was no longer present when appellant casually asked
his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it" one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in the
negative.

Resistance Should be Made Before the

Rape is Consummated.

Later on, appellant went on top of "AAA" without saying anything or uttering threatening words. For her
part, "AAA" neither intimated any form of resistance nor expressed any word of rejection to appellant's
advances. It was only when she felt something painful minutes during their sexual intercourse that
"AAA" tried to move. Thus:

A - During the intercourse that was about few minutes and when I felt the pain that was the time when I
tried to move.

Q - When you tried to move, what else happened?

A - When I tried to move he released himself

Q - And then what happened?

A - He went out of the room. 16

Three things are thus clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, appellant never employed the slightest
force, threat or intimidation against her; second, "AAA" never gave the slightest hint of rejection when
appellant asked her to have sex with him; and, third, appellant did not act with force since he readily
desisted when "AAA" felt the slightest pain and tried to move during their sexual congress.

"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make
any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress
when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal
or rejection of appellant's sexual advances.

In People v. Amogis, this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt
17
1âwphi1

to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor and chastity.
And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil design
became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman
who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent and allowing
him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape.

The Age Gap Between the Victim and

Appellant Negates Force, Threat or
Intimidation.

"AAA's" state of"shivering" could not have been produced by force, threat or intimidation. She insinuates
that she fell into that condition after Meneses had sexual intercourse with her. However, their age gap
negates force, threat or intimidation; he was only 14 while "AAA" was already 24, not to mention that they
were friends. In addition, per "AAA's" own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter
threatening words or perform any act of intimidation against her.
Drunkeness Should Have Deprived the
Victim of Her Will Power to Give her
Consent.

The fact that "AAA" was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant. There is authority
to the effect that "where consent is induced by the administration of drugs or liquor, which incites her
passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the accused is not guilty of rape."18

Here, and as narrated by "AAA" on the witness stand, appellant and Meneses were her friends. Thus, as
usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and chatted with them while drinking liquor
for about four hours. And while "AAA" got dizzy and was "shivering," the prosecution failed to show that
she was completely deprived of her will power.

"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be. "AAA" is used to
consuming liquor. And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering" at that time rendered her immobile
19

such that she could not move her head to signal her rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to
whisper to him her refusal, then she would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home
immediately after the alleged rape.

It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests
on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles
appellant to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05452 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 08-264453 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez is ACQUITTED due to insufficiency of evidence. His
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
G.R. No. 193150

LOIDA M. JAVIER, Petitioner,

vs.
PEPITO GONZALES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Two Decisions were promulgated by the trial court in this case: the first one for conviction, and the
second for acquittal. We are called upon to resolve the procedural question of whether the
promulgation in absentia of the earlier judgment of conviction was valid.

This Petition for Review on Ce1iiorari under Rule 45 seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision 1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of Branch 40 of
the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (the RTC of Palayan City) in Criminal Case
No. 1066-P, penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren (Judge Soluren). Judge Soluren reversed a
previous Decision4 penned by Judge Erlinda P. Buted (Judge Buted). In the earlier Decision,
respondent was convicted of murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, and was
meted the death penalty.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

This case originated from a criminal case for murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder lodged in Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora (the RTC of Baler). The
Information charged respondent Pepito Gonzales as follows:

That on December 25, 1997 at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening in Barangay Diarabasin,
Municipality of Dipaculao, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused with intent to kill and with the use of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously throw a grenade inside the
house of one Leonardo Hermenigildo while the latter and his companions Rufino Concepcion, who
sustained mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause or his death thereafter; that as
further consequence of said explosion, Leonardo Hermenigildo was also hit and sustained physical
injuries fatal enough to cause his death without immediate and able medical attendance; that Julio
Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag were also hit and likewise sustained physical injuries, but
the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
multiple murder as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injuries sustained by said Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag
were not necessarily mortal.5

Gonzales filed a Motion for Bail6 with the RTC of Baler. Private complainant Carmen Macatiag
(Macatiag) - sister of the deceased victim, Rufino Concepcion - filed her Opposition7 to Gonzales's
Motion for Bail. Gonzales then filed a Comment8 to which Macatiag filed her Reply.9 The RTC Baler
issued an Order 10 granting Gonzales bail.

Thereafter, Macatiag filed with this Court an Urgent Petition for Transfer of Venue. 11 While her
petition was pending, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 of the Order of the RTC of Baler
granting bail to Gonzales, who filed his Opposition 13 to her motion. The RTC of Baler denied 14 the
Motion for Reconsideration and upheld its Order granting bail. Macatiag also filed with the RTC of
Baler a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings 15pending the resolution of her previous
petition for transfer of venue.

On 17 August 1999, the Court granted the transfer of venue and reassigned the case to the RTC of
Palayan City, which was then presided by Judge Erlinda Buted. 16 Trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC admitted the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. 17 Gonzales filed an Urgent Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. 18 To this motion he attached a Demurrer to Evidence, 19 which
the RTC denied.20 Following the denial, Gonzales presented his evidence and witnesses and filed his
Formal Offer of Evidence.21
Thereafter, on 30 November 2005, the RTC issued an Order22 setting the promulgation of the case
on 15 December 2005. The Return of Service23 indicated that the Order dated 30 November 2005
and the Notice of Promulgation dated 6 December 2005 were received on 7 and 12 December 2005
by the sister of private respondent, who refused to sign the Return.

On 15 December 2005, the scheduled date of promulgation, Gonzales failed to appear. His lawyer,
Atty. Mario Benitez (Atty. Benitez), personally filed a "Withdrawal of Counsel"24 with his client's
conformity.25 The promulgation was rescheduled to 22 December 2005. 26 On the same date, a
warrant of arrest27 was issued and the bond forfeited in view of the nonappearance of the accused,
who was deemed to have jumped bail.

A Notice of Hearing/Subpoena and Notice of Promulgation of Judgment28 was issued on 15

December 2005 commanding the parties to appear before the Court on 22 December 2015. Notices
were sent to Gonzales and Macatiag.29

On 22 December 2005, Gonzales still failed to appear without any justification. Judge Buted
appointed a counsel de oficio in lieu of Atty. Benitez.30 The Branch Clerk of Court thereafter read the
dispositive portion of Judge Buted's Decision in the presence of the public prosecutor, the
counsel de oficio, and the heirs of Macatiag. Macatiag had been killed on 14 December 2005, just a
day before the first promulgation date, and Gonzales was also an accused in her killing. Gonzales
was convicted of the murder charges:

WHEREFORE, the Accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER and MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED MURDER and is hereby
sentenced to a single indivisible penalty of DEATH.31

Thereafter, the Clerk of Court was directed to enter the judgment of conviction in the RTC's criminal
docket pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.32 Since the death penalty was still in force at the time the judgment was promulgated,
Judge Buted also ordered that the records of the case be immediately forwarded to the CA for
automatic review.33

In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, or on 6 January 2006, private
respondent Gonzales filed, through Atty. Benitez, an Omnibus Motion34 asking that the judgment
promulgated on 22 December 2005 be reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales argued that he had not
been properly notified of the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been represented by
counsel; and that the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting him.

The trial court, now presided by Judge Soluren, gave due course to the motion of Gonzales and
granted it through an Order dated 18 April 2006. The Order set aside the judgment of conviction
1awp++i 1

and reinstated his bail. 35

On 20 November 2006, petitioner Javier, Macatiag's daughter, discovered that the RTC had
rendered a Decision36dated 31 October 2006 acquitting Gonzales of all charges.37 On 16 January
2007, she filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA, citing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Soluren. The Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Comment38 dated 12 October 2007 praying that the Petition be denied due course
and dismissed for lack of merit. The OSG opined that Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the earlier Decision of Judge Buted.

THE CA RULING

In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It ruled out grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Soluren in granting private respondent's Omnibus Motion
and rendering a new judgment of acquittal. It agreed with the theory of the OSG that the
promulgation was void, because respondent Gonzales had not been validly notified of the
rescheduled promulgation of judgment on 22 December 2005; that since Gonzales's lawyer, Atty.
Benitez, had already withdrawn his representation on the first scheduled date of promulgation,
respondent had no knowledge that the promulgation had been rescheduled to 22 December 2005;
that since he was no longer Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez was relieved of the duty to inform his
client of court notices and processes; that since respondent was not personally notified of the
rescheduled promulgation, Judge Buted's promulgation in absentia was invalid.
The CA further adopted the OSG's stance that before resorting to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to
question respondent judge's act of acquitting private respondent, petitioner should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration. It ruled that a motion for reconsideration is not only a plain and adequate
remedy available under the law, but is an indispensible condition that must be satisfied before an
aggrieved party can resort to a special civil action for certiorari. The appellate court held that since
the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration was available to petitioner, and none of the
exceptions to the filing of that motion existed, the Petition must be dismissed.

THE ISSUES

The main issue in this case is whether the CA erred in affirming the Decision of acquittal issued by
Judge Soluren, who had ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on her part when she gave due course to the Omnibus Motion of private
respondent questioning his prior conviction.

In order to resolve the main issue, the following issues have to be addressed:

A. Whether there was a valid promulgation of judgment by Judge Buted in her prior Decision of
conviction;

B. Whether Judge Soluren's subsequent judgment of acquittal is valid;

C. Whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question a
decision of acquittal.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Petition is impressed with merit.

As a prologue to our ruling, We take cognizance of the unusual circumstances surrounding this
case. Petitioner is the daughter of the original private complainant, Carmen Macatiag, who was in
turn the sister of the first victim, Rufino Concepcion. When petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review with this Court, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion39 praying that the People of the
Philippines be removed as a co-petitioner because the OSG was not joining petitioner in this
Petition. The pertinent portion40 of the OSG's Manifestation and Motion reads:

[T]he records will show that the OSG already took on a position different from that of the petitioner
Loida M. Javier when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the OSG in its
Comment dated October 12, 2007 and Memorandum dated November 24, 2008 was of the position
that Honorable Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she ruled to acquit
Pepito Gonzales. In this regard, the arguments raised by the OSG in the aforementioned pleadings
were in fact, adopted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated May 22, 2010.

While the OSG ordinarily represents the People in proceedings before this Court, We have in the
past allowed private parties to file certiorari petitions assailing rulings and orders of the RTC in
criminal cases.41 As early as 1969, in Paredes v. Gopengco,42the Court already held that offended
parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved" to file a
special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections l and 2 of Rule 65. That ruling was in
line with the underlying spirit of adopting a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object. Recently, We reiterated this ruling in Almero v. People. 43 Similarly, in the case
at bar, We find that the ends of substantial justice would be better served and the issues determined
in a more just, speedy, and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the present Petition.

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

There are two divergent RTC Decisions: one for conviction, and another for acquittal. Our resolution
of this Petition for Review hinges on the validity of the second RTC Decision.

After review of the case and the records, We rule that the Court of Appeals, in affirming Judge
Soluren's Decision of acquittal, committed reversible error, which can be remedied by granting this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Judge Buted's Decision convicting
respondent was validly promulgated.

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a
judgment in absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of fifteen
(15) days from notice to the latter or the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.

Records show that respondent was properly informed of the promulgation scheduled on 15
December 2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 200544 documents the presence of his counsel
during the hearing. It is an established doctrine that notice to counsel is notice to client.45 In addition,
the Return of Service states that the Order and Notice of Promulgation were personally delivered to
respondent's address.

During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when respondent did not appear
despite notice, and without offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have
immediately promulgated its Dccision.46The promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory
pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.

xxxx

In case the, accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation
of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition of the situation in
the past when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment.47 The only essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the
judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused
or counsel.

In Almuete v. People,48petitioner's counsel informed the trial court that the accused were either ill or
not notified of the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment. The RTC, however, found their
absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled. The accused went up
to the CA, which acquitted them of the charge. This Court reversed the CA and upheld the validity of
the promulgation.

In Estrada v. People,49this Court also affirmed the validity of the promulgation of judgment in
absentia, given the presence of the essential elements.

Judge Buted's Order dated 22 December 200550 fulfilled the requirements set forth by the Rules and
prevailing jurisprudence. Pertinent portions of the Order read:

The judgment of conviction which carries the death penalty was pronounced in the presence of the
Public Prosecutor, the counsel de oficio of accused and the heirs of complainant Carmen Macatiag,
the dispositive portion of which, the OIC Clerk of Court is directed to enter into the Criminal Docket.

xxxx

Let copy of the Decision furnished each the Public Prosecutor, the counsel de oficio of the accused,
Atty. Bembol Castillo, and the accused at his last known address.

Respondent was not left without remedy. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states:

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure or the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) clays from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
However, instead of surrendering and filing a motion for leave to explain his unjustified absence,
respondent, through Atty. Benitez, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC praying that the
promulgation be set aside.51 We cannot countenance this blatant circumvention of the Rules.

Judge Soluren 's Decision acquitting

respondent is void and has no legal
effect.

Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
she gave due course to respondent's Omnibus Motion. Aside from being the wrong remedy, the
motion lacked merit.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be resorted to
if the accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of judgment.
Respondent did not appear during the scheduled promulgation and was deemed by the judge to
have jumped bail. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the judgment is for
conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest.

The Court underscores the fact that following Gonzales's waiver of the remedies under the Rules,
Judge Buted issued an Order dated 22 December 2005. According to the Order, the case records
shall be immediately forwarded to the CA for its automatic review of convictions meting out the death
penalty. 52 This automatic review was pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005
(dated 15 April 2005) as implemented by OCA Circular No. 57-2005 (dated 12 May 2005).

Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 mandates as follows:

[A]ll Regional Trial Courts concerned, through the Presiding Judges and Clerks of Court, arc hereby
DIRECTED to henceforth DIRECTLY forward to the COURT OF APPEALS (Manila for Luzon cases,
Cebu Station for Visayas cases, and Cagayan de Oro Station for Mindanao cases) the records of
criminal cases whose decisions are subject to (a) automatic review because the penalty imposed is
death or (b) ordinary appeals (by notices of appeal) because the penalty imposed is either reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, notwithstanding a statement in the notice of appeal that the appeal is
to the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, OCA Circular No. 57-2005 gives the following directive:

[A]ll Judges and Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts are hereby reminded that failure to
comply with the above-cited Administrative Circular shall warrant appropriate disciplinary action
pursuant to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by AM. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on 11
September 2001, as well as the pertinent rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission.

This Administrative Circular took effect on 19 April 2005, strict compliance herewith is hereby
enjoined.

In utter disregard of this Court's circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily
took cognizance of private respondent's Omnibus Motion, granted it, and rendered a totally opposite
Decision of acquittal. What she should have done was dismiss the Omnibus Motion outright, since
Judge Buted's Decision of conviction was already subject to automatic review by the CA. By acting
on the wrong remedy, which led to the reversal of the conviction, Judge Soluren contravened the
express orders of this Court. Her blatant abuse of authority was so grave and so severe that it
deprived the court of its very power to dispense justice.

We take this opportunity to correct a capricious, patent, and abusive judgment by reversing and
setting aside the Decision.

Judge Soluren retired compulsorily in 2012. Had she still been in the service, some members of this
Court would have been minded to refer this matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation into and evaluation of the question of whether the above acts call for the application of
administrative sanctions.

Double jeopardy is not triggered

when the order of acquittal is void.
Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.53

In People v. Hernandez,54this Court explained that "an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really 'acquit' and therefore does not terminate
the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment."

Considering that Judge Soluren's order of acquittal was void from the very beginning, it necessarily
follows that the CA ruling dismissing the Petition for Certiorari must likewise be reversed and set
aside.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629 dated 22 March 2010 and Resolution elated 30 July 2010
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija elated 31
October 2006 and Order elated 18 April 2006, rendered by public respondent Judge Corazon D.
Soluren acquitting respondent Pepito Gonzales, are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
Decision dated 22 December 2005 rendered by Judge Erlinda P. Buted is REINSTATED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to conduct the mandatory and automatic review of the
Decision dated 22 December 2005 pursuant to Sections 3 and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
Let the entire records of Criminal Case No. 1066-P entitled People of the Philippines v. Pepito
Gonzales be immediately TRANSMITTED to the Court of Appeals.

The bail granted to respondent Pepito Gonzales is CANCELLED. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director-General of the
Philippine National Police. The National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police
are hereby DIRECTED to cause the IMMEDIATE ARREST and DETENTION of respondent Pepito
Gonzales.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
G.R. No. 218466

MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221425

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a "JOHN," "KONYONG" SALONGA and
SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ "INONG" @ DIONISIO NACIONAL, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated cases 1 is the Decision2 dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05095, which affirmed the Decision3 dated December 8, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. B-243,
convicting accused-appellants Manny Ramos (Ramos), Roberto Salonga (Salonga), and Servillano
Nacional (Nacional; collectively, accused-appellants) of the crime of Murder Aggravated with the Use
of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 8294.4

The Facts

The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging accused-appellants
of the aforementioned crime, the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy. Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength and at night time,
armed with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
ROLANDO NECESITO y F ABRIGAS which caused his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs. 5

The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 2002,
eyewitness Reynaldo Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of Leonida Fabrigas when
he chanced upon accused-appellants having an altercation with the victim, Rolando Necesito
(Rolando). From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a
bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area
around seven (7) meters away from where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4)
successive gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of being hit. It was
on the sound of the fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To
ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-
appellants fled the scene.6

The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to conduct an
investigation from which were gathered the following evidence and information: (a) a piece of
bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando purportedly had a
previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the same was settled before the
barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the time of the incident.
An autopsy was likewise conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there were four (4) incised
wounds on his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and five (5) gunshot wounds on his body;
that based on the nature and sizes of his wounds, it was possible that the firearm used was of the
same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been inflicted by a single person. 7
For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly invoked the defenses of denial and
alibi. Essentially, they insisted that they were somewhere else when the incident occurred. In
1âwphi1

addition, Ramos maintained that the declarations of Reynaldo against him were motivated by a
personal grudge, while Nacional claimed that the corpus delicti was not proven with exact certainty
since the cadaver that was exhumed and examined was already in an advanced stage of
decomposition, having been interred for more than a month. 8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision9 dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without the benefit of parole, and ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando's heirs the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages. 10

In so ruling, the R TC gave credence to the direct, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness
testimony of Reynaldo positively identifying each of the accused-appellants as co-perpetrators of the
crime, further noting that Reynaldo had no ill-motive to falsely testify against them. On the other
hand, it found the defense testimonies to be untenable, as they were riddled with various
inconsistencies and contradictions. Further, the RTC found the presence of the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to Murder, considering that the accused-
appellants took advantage of their combined strength and their several weapons to overcome their
unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious design. In view of the foregoing, the RTC
concluded that accused-appellants "are equally guilty of the crime of Murder aggravated with the use
of unlincensed firearm, there having been proven the existence of implied conspiracy between
them." 11

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.12

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 13 dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction for the crime of
Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages to ₱75,000.00 each and imposing legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on all monetary awards from finality of the judgment until fully paid. 14 It held that
Reynaldo was able to positively identify accused-appellants as Rolando's killers, given that he was
only seven (7) meters away from the situs criminis. The CA likewise held that the accused-
appellants took advantage of their combined superior strength as they even used several weapons
to render the unarmed victim completely defenseless. 15

Hence, the instant consolidated cases.

Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal, 16 (G.R. No.221425) while Ramos and Salonga filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).

The IssuesBefore the Court

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-
appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

The Court's Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the matter before the Court thru a Notice of
Appeal17 (G.R. No. 221425) filed before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and Salonga filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466). 18As a general rule, appeals of
criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court; 19 except when the CA imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of
appeal filed before the CA.20 In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly availed of a wrong mode of
appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Court, despite having been sentenced by
the CA of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat
their petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the substantive issue at hand with finality.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21

As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple Murder,
and not Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a) that
a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is
not parricide or infanticide. 22

In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had established
beyond reasonable doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and eventually, killed
Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo
stick), which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks. Thus, such killing was attended
with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, 23 which perforce warrants accused-
appellants' conviction for Murder.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of

Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance."
There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the
corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing
these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.24

In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to his
demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the
firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered,
whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the courts a
quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an
unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this
allegation.25 Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby modifies accused-appellants' conviction to simple Murder.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659,26 Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for abuse
of superior strength which was used to qualify the killing to Murder), accused-appellants must be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, to conform with existing jurisprudence, accused-
appellants must be ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando's heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the
monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 27

WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05095 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
follows: accused-appellants Manny Ramos, Roberto Salonga, and Servillano Nacional are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando Necesito's heirs the amounts
of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on
all the monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225593

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
PALA TOUKYO y PADEP, Accused-Appellant

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Pala Toukyo y Padep (Toukyo)
assailing the Decision2 dated July 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
05510, which modified the Decision3 dated March 6, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 31270-R, and accordingly, found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

On November 23, 2010, an Information5 was filed before the RTC charging Toukyo of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Article 5 of RA 9165, viz.:

That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2010, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously deliver one (1) piece marijuana, a dangerous drug, in brick form wrapped
in brown packaging tape weighing 1,000 grams, to Agent Ryan Peralta, a member of the PDEA-CAR
who acted as poseur buyer, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that on November 22, 2010, Agent Ryan Peralta (Agent Peralta) of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency - Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) received
information from a civilian informant regarding the illegal drug selling activities of Toukyo. After
confirming via text message that Toukyo was indeed selling a brick of marijuana for ₱2,000.00, the
PDEA-CAR sent a buy-bust team comprised of

Agents Peralta, John Kay-an (Agent Kay-an), and Santino Awichen (Agent Awichen) to entrap
Toukyo. In the afternoon of even date near a restaurant located at Burnham Park, Agent Peralta and
the informant met with Toukyo. After Toukyo showed Agent Peralta the brick of marijuana, Agent
Peralta executed the pre-arranged signal, leading to Toukyo's arrest. Agents Kay-an and Awichen
immediately marked the seized marijuana at the place of arrest, and thereafter, Agent Peralta took
the marijuana as well as the backpack where it is placed. Upon reaching the PDEA-CAR field office,
Agent Peralta turned over the backpack containing the seized marijuana to Agent Dick Dayao (Agent
Dayao), who in tum, executed the proper documentation and delivered the seized item to the Crime
Laboratory.7 A qualitative examination reveals that the backpack indeed contains one (1)
kilogram/1,000 grams of marijuana.8

For his part, Toukyo invoked the defenses of denial and frame-up. He averred that on November 21,
2010, he was at the Igorot Garden when he overheard a certain Bonifacio and a companion
regarding a possible work opportunity. After inquiring if he could join them in the said opportunity,
Bonifacio replied in the affirmative and told him to wait for his text the next day. On the day he was
arrested, Toukyo met with Bonifacio and they rode a jeepney together towards Burnham Park. Upon
reaching Burnham Park, Bonifacio asked Toukyo to wait for him as he will just go to the restroom,
with the former leaving his backpack to the latter. While holding Bonifacio's backpack, Toukyo was
1âwphi1

suddenly grabbed by police agents and asked where his companion is. Toukyo then pointed at the
restroom but Bonifacio was no longer there, prompting the police to bring him to the PDEA-CAR
office. Thereat, Toukyo was mauled to force him to admit ownership of the contents of the bag but
he refused. After taking the cash from his wallet, Toukyo was fingerprinted, taken to the hospital for
a "check-up," and returned to the PDEA-CAR office. After he again denied ownership of the contents
of the backpack, he was brought to the detention cell and was told to wait for his transfer to the
Baguio City Jail.9
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision10 dated March 6, 2012, the RTC found Toukyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine in the amount of ₱5,000,000.00.11

The RTC found that the PDEA-CAR agents successfully executed a buy-bust operation which
resulted in Toukyo's arrest as the seller of the seized marijuana. In this regard, the RTC found
untenable Toukyo's defenses of denial and frame-up in view of the clear and convincing evidence
against him as well as the presumption of regularity in the official duties of the PDEA-CAR agents
who arrested him.12

Aggrieved, Toukyo appealed to the CA.13

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated July 3, 2015, the CA modified Toukyo's conviction, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11
of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine in the amount of ₱500,000.00.15

Contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that there was no valid buy-bust operation that took
place, especially in light of the fact that upon seeing the brick of marijuana, Agent Peralta
prematurely executed the prearranged signal which led to Toukyo's arrest. Since no actual
transaction took place before Toukyo's arrest, i.e., the exchange of the marijuana and the marked
money between the poseur-buyer and the seller, Toukyo cannot be convicted of the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs. This notwithstanding, the CA convicted Toukyo of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11 of RA 9165, as: (a) he
clearly had no authority to possess the one (1) kilogram/1,000 grams worth of marijuana seized from
him; and (b) case law has consistently ruled that the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
is necessarily included in the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the crime charged in the
Information.16

In this relation, the CA held that the PDEA-CAR agents complied with the chain of custody rule,
considering that: (a) the marking of the seized items were immediately made at the scene of the
arrest; (b) Agent Peralta took custody of the seized marijuana and handed it over to Agent
Dayao; (c) Agent Dayao conducted an actual inventory of the seized item in the presence of and
signed by the representatives of the DOJ, barangay, and the media; and (d) thereafter, Agent Dayao
delivered the seized item to the Crime Laboratory where it was received by the Forensic Chemical
Officer, Police Senior Inspector Alex Diwas Biadang, Jr.17

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Toukyo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11 of
RA 9165.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it appears from the records that in a letter18 dated January 26, 2017, Director General
Atty. Benjamin C. De Los Santos of the Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that Toukyo had
already died on October 15, 2014, attaching thereto a Certification19 issued by Mr. Jose Ramon C.
Padua, the Bureau's Officer-in-Charge for its Rehabilitation Operations Division, as well as the Death
Report20 issued on even date by Dr. Ursicio D. Cenas, Medical Officer III of the same Bureau.

Therefore, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is hereby dismissed.

Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the consequences of Toukyo's death are
as follows:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

In People v. Bayotas,21 the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused
pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) xxx

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.22

Thus, upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.23 Notably, there is no civil
liability that arose from this case, there being no private complainant to begin with.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to: (a) SET ASIDE the appealed Decision dated July 3, 2015
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CR HC No. 05510; (b) DISMISS Criminal Case No. 31270-
R before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 by reason of the death of accused-
appellant Pala Toukyo y Padep; and (c) DECLARE the instant
case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 213224

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC1, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

On appeal is the May 26, 2014 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Special Twenty-Third Division
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00887-MIN, which affirmed the Decision3 dated September 27, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Surallah, South Cotabato, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 4005-N.

The Facts

In an Information4 filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc (Roque) was
charged with the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:

"That on or about the 27th day of October 2005 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening thereof, at
Barangay Esperanza, Municipality of Norala, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun and a
knife, with intent to kill, attended by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot for several times and stab one BASILIO
GALLENERO, hitting and inflicting upon the latter several mortal gunshot wounds on the different
parts of his body, and stab wound at the epigastric area of the victim's abdomen, which caused his
death shortly thereafter."

CONTRARY TO LAW, attended by aggravating circumstance of Illegal Possession of Firearms.5

Upon arraignment, Roque pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented Alex Gallenero (Alex), the son of the victim, and Dr. Lanelita
Lanaria-Amido (Dr. Amido ), the Municipal Health Officer of Norala, South Cotabato, as witnesses
who testified to the following facts, to wit:

On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about 10 o'clock, Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero
(Basilio), were walking home along the road in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato6 after attending a
wedding celebration at the house of Rodolfo Dayaday,7 when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the
back four (4) times, successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place
was well lit and he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his
gun. 8 For fear of his life, Alex an away from the place of incident. 9 He reported the incident to his
uncle Petring Pinuela and to the police officers of Norala.10

The postmortem report of Dr. Amido showed that the victim suffered four (4) gunshot wounds and
one (1) stab wound11 and died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, probably secondary to multiple injuries
caused by the gunshot and stab wounds. 12

Roque, on the other hand, through the testimonies of Reynald Dayaday (Reynald) and Dennis
Blancada (Dennis), denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi.

Reynald, accused-appellant's brother, testified that on October 27, 2005, the night before the
wedding of his niece, he was at the house of his older Brother, Teodolfo Dayaday, at Barangay
Esperanza (Barrio 3), Norala, South Cotabato.13 He was with Roque and seven (7) other people, who
were tasked to prepare the food for the wedding celebration. They were all together in the kitchen
from 5 o'clock in the evening to 3 o'clock in the morning. 14

Dennis testified that he was at Barangay Esperanza, Norala, South Cotabato on October 27, 2005
because he was invited to cook in the house of Teodolfo Dayaday. 15 He arrived there at 12 o'clock
noon but his duty started at 5 o'clock in the evening and ended at 3 o'clock in the morning the
following day. 16 He recalled that during those times that he was cooking, Roque never left the
kitchen. 17

Ruling of the RTC

Finding the positive testimony of Alex credible as against Roque's defense of alibi, the RTC
convicted Roque of the crime of murder and sentenced him accordingly. The dispositive portion of
the Decision18 dated September 27, 2010 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the court finds the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to
sustain it in finding the accused criminally responsible of the crime charged.

Consequently, accused Roque Dayaday y Dago-oc is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder as he is charged in this case.

He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.

He is further ordered to pay the heirs of his deceased victim, Basilio Gallenero, the amount of
P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death; the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as reasonable actual expenses
for his wake and burial and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.19

Aggrieved, Roque appealed to the CA by a Notice of Appeal dated October 28, 2010.20 Both parties
accordingly filed their respective Briefs dated April 26, 201121 and November 22, 2011.22

Ruling of the CA

The CA concurred with the RTC's finding on Alex's credibility and dismissed the alleged
inconsistencies in his testimony. 23 Moreover, the CA found Roque's defense of alibi very flimsy.
According to the CA, while the defense witnesses claimed that Roque was cooking at the time of the
commission, it was not physically impossible for Roque to be at the scene of the crime because the
place where he was allegedly cooking was in the same vicinity where the crime was committed. 24

The CA further ruled that while the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, treachery was very patent in the instant case, which is sufficient to qualify the
crime to murder. Records showed that the victim was shot several times in the back while he was
walking, which means that he was defenseless at the time of the attack; and the fact that the stab
wound was located on the victim's abdomen would not preclude treachery because the victim was
already vulnerable due to the gunshot wounds.25

Thus, on May 26, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed Decision26 affirming Rogue's conviction, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, Surallah, South Cotabato finding accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4005-N is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.27

Hence, this appeal. 28

In the Resolution dated January 28, 2015,29 this Court required the parties to file their supplemental
briefs; but both parties manifested30 that they would no longer file the pleadings and opted to replead
and adopt the arguments submitted before the CA.

Issue

Consequently, the only issue for the Court's consideration is whether the CA erred in affirming
Roque's conviction for the crime of murder.

The Court's Ruling

In the instant appeal, Roque essentially questions the credibility of Alex and the veracity of his
accusations. Roque insists that Alex is a biased witness considering his relationship with the victim.
He further avers that Alex exhibited a propensity to lie when he stated in his affidavit that there were
other witnesses who saw the commission of the crime, and later admitted in open court that he was
the sole witness to the crime. Roque also claims that the testimony of Alex that his father had been
shot four (4) times runs counter to the postmortem report of Dr. Amido, which indicates that there
were seven (7) gunshot wounds.

The appeal fails.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses,
the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
truth. 31 Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial
court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. 32 The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA. 33

In the present case, both the RTC and CA found the testimony of Alex straightforward and worthy of
belief. Alex identified Roque as the one who shot his father at the back and his positive declaration
was never destroyed even after cross-examination in court. 34

For his part, Roque failed to identify any significant factor circumstance which would justify the
reversal of the RTC's and CA's findings on Alex's credibility.

The imputation of bias to Alex because of his relationship with the victim must necessarily fail.
In People v. Montemayor,35the Court ruled that relationship by itself does not give rise to any
presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their
testimonies. 36 The relationship of a witness to the victim would even make his testimony more
credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to charge
and prosecute another person other than the real culprit. 37 Relatives of victims of crimes have a
natural knack for remembering the faces of the attacker and they, more than anybody else, would be
concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by having the felon brought to justice and meted the
proper penalty.38Where there is no showing of an improper motive on the part of the prosecution's
witnesses for testifying against the appellant, their relationship to the victim does not render their
testimony less credible. 39 In this case, since there is no showing of any ill or improper motive on the
part of Alex to testify against the accused, his relationship with the victim even made his testimony
more credible and truthful.

Furthermore, the alleged discrepancy between Alex's testimony and the postmortem report of Dr.
Amido as to the number of gunshot wounds is more imagined than real. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, the postmortem report showing that there are four (4) entry gunshot wounds and three (3)
exit wounds, which means that there are three (3) perforating gunshots and one (1) penetrating
gunshot, coincides with Alex's declaration that his father was shot four (4) times.39-a

The Court also agrees with the CA that the inconsistency between Alex's affidavit and his testimony
in open court as to whether there are other witnesses to the crime is immaterial to affect his
credibility, because it does not detract from the fact that Alex saw and identified Roque as the
assailant of his father.40 In People v. Yanson, 41the Court held:

x x x [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony
of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal
defects to justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not
purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn
statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open
court.

xxxx

The discrepancies in [the witness]'s testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the
prosecution's evidence in its material whole. Instead, the discrepancies only erase suspicion that
the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest inconsistencies serve to
strengthen rather than destroy [the witness]'s credibility.42
Under Article 24843 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide.44

All elements of the crime of murder have been established in this case beyond reasonable doubt.

Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it was established that Basilio was killed
and it was Roque who had killed him. As to the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court
sustains the CA's finding that treachery attended the killing of Basilio. There is treachery when a
victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as when the accused attacks the victim from
behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim, or is, in any event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend
himself, thus insuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. 45

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind,
was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat to his life
as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill
Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and incapable of
retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.

Penalty, Civil Indemnity and Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder qualified by treachery is reclusion perpetua to
death. Considering that, apart from treachery, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and illegal possession of firearms, as alleged in the Information, were not duly proven,
the RTC correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

As to the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to modify the CA's award pursuant to the
Court's recent ruling in People v. Jugueta.46Therefore, in addition to the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
reasonable actual expenses for the wake and burial and the costs of suit, the victim's heirs are
entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 26, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00887-MIN, finding accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the
award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are each increased to Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) and all monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 206590

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance must be given
to "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." 1

This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
2

00744 that aft1rmed in toto the April 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan,
3

Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 and 2078, finding Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 (illegal sale of a dangerous drug) and
11 (illegal possession of a dangerous drug), Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, respectively, and
imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 for selling shabu, and the
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as maximum, for possessing 0.53gram of shabu.

Factual Antecedents

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the following accusatory allegations against
appellant:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy.
Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused who acted without the necessary pennit from proper authorities whatsoever,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and folonioμsly hi:i.ve in her possession, control and custody
eleven (11) x x x sachets (containing] Methamphdamme Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu"
weighing 0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 4

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in the following manner:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy.
Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, who acted without the necessary permit or authority whatsoever, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and dispense one (1) pc. small heat sealed sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.06 [gram], a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 5

During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in both cases. Joint trial then ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Based on the testimonies of SP03 Victorino de Dios (SP03 De Dios), SP03 Rolando G. Salamida (SP03
Sa1amida), P02 Rex Isip (P02 Isip), SP04 Josefina Bandoy (SP04 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar Barber, Jr.
(PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto ), and the documentary exhibits, the following facts
emerged:

PI Barber of the PNP Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a surveillance on
6

appellant after receiving several reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SP03
De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed for and was
issued a search warrant. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber decided to
conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him ₱200.00
marked money for the operation.

On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of appellant and asked
her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked money from
SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text
message about the successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of police officers who were
positioned 100 meters away n1shed towards the house of appellant. He also instructed SP03 De Dios
and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness the search of the house. When he
arrived together with a ko,gawad and a media representative, SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to
appellant.

During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SP03 De Dios took it
from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in addition to
the four sachets of shabu found inside the right pocket of the short pants of appellant. The search of the
house also revealed several drug paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and the
same was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and appellant. The sachets
of shabu were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified that the seized sachets
contained shabu.

Version of Appellant

Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004, somebody forcibly kicked
the front door of her house and tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI Barber pushed her
aside and told his companions to move quickly. They went directly to her room; when P02 Isip emerged
therefrom seconds later, he was holding a substance that looked like tawas. SP03 De Dios and SP03
Salamida went in and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant was shown to her only
after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She argued that the police officers fabricated
the charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police officer named Riza1ina Cuantero
regarding the fence separating their houses.

The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. It
declared that the prosecution ably established the elements of illegal sale and possession
of shabu through the testimonies of its witnesses who arrested appellant after selling a sachet of the
illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for possessing 11 sachets of the same drug in her house after
enforcing a search watrant immediately thereafter. Appellant had no evidence that she had license or
authority to possess the shabu.

The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of the sachets
of shabu from the time they were bought from appellant and/or seized from her house, to its turn over to
the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The RTC rejected appellant's
defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive identification by eyewitnesses as the criminal
offender.

The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for the
illegal sale of shabu. It also sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
and one (1) day, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum and
a fine of ₱300,000 for illegal possession of shabu.

From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her Brief, she assailed the validity of the search
7

warrant claiming that it was not issued by the RTC upon determination of probable cause. She argued
that the "'confirmatory test-buy" conducted by the poseur buyer and the confidential asset was not valid
since they forced her to engage in a drug sale. She maintained that the shabu presented during trial was
inadmissible in evidence due to several gaps in its chain of custody.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the Appellee praying for the affirmance of the
8

appealed Decision. It argued that the evidence on which the RTC based its determination of probable
cause was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant. It asserted that the "test-buy operation" was
an entrapment and not an inducement. The OSG maintained that the shabu confiscated from appellant
was admissible in evidence since the prosecution established the proper chain of custody.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of unauthorized sale and possession
of shabu. The CA ruled that all the elements for the sale of shabu were established during the "test-buy
operation". It held that the illegal sale of shabu was proven by SP03 De Dios who participated in said
operation as the designated poseur buyer. His offer to buy shabu with marked money and appellant's
acceptance by delivering the illegal drug consummated the offense. The CA likewise declared that the
elements for possession of shabu were present in the case against appellant. After appellant's arrest for
illegal sale of shabu, a valid search resulted in the discovery of 11 sachets of shabu inside her house,
which were under her possession and control. She did not have legal authority to possess the same and
failed to overcome the presumption that she consciously knew she was in possession of the illegal drug
discovered in her home.

The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established probable cause in issuing the search
warrant, The deposition of P03 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug
activities, and the same served as basis for the finding of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a
search warrant.

The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-buy operation" amounted to instigation
since it is settled jurisprudence that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation.
The CA was also unconvinced by appellant's claim that the proof against her was inadmissible since the
prosecution failed to show strict compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules on the
custody and disposition of the evidence.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. On July 15, 2013, the Court notified the parties to file their
9 10

supplemental briefs. However, appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since she had extensively
argued her cause in her appellants' brief. For its part, the OSG manifested that it would not file a
11

supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the CA had already discussed and refuted the
arguments raised by appellant. 12

Our Ruling

The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After

Finding Probable Case

Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. She claims
that PI Barber had no personal knowledge of her alleged drug dealings.

There is no merit in this contention.

Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." The probable cause must
13

be "determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized." Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import
14

absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned only with the
question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe that the accused committed or is
committing the crime charged. 15

Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrar1t after deposing two witnesses,
namely PI Barber and SP03 Salamida. In particular, the disposition of SP03 Salamida shows that he had
personal knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for the finding of
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus, whether or not PI Barber had personal
knowledge of the illegal drug activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect the findings of
probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.

Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does

not constitute instigation.

Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she was
induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the confidential informant to sell the
seized shabu.

There is no merit in this argument.

In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically
induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal.
['This is distinguished from entrapment wherein] ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
capturing the lawbreaker inflagrante delicto. 16
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not amount to
instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant habitually
17

deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction
with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an acquittal as will be discussed
below.

The chain of custody of evidence was not established

Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and possession
of shabu against her due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the evidence in
view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

There is merit in this protestation.

The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor." On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of shabu has the following elements: "(l)
18

the accused is in possession of an item or an object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said
drug." In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be proof that these
19

offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 20

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that
the [shabu] illegally possessed and sold x xx is the same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must likewise
be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 21

"The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." 22

Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for
destruction." In People v. Havana, the Court expounded on the custodial chain procedure in this wise:
23 24

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.

While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item
of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing
or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in
case the evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.

Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be established:

first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 25
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the
items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized
items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as
reference. The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done "(l)
26

in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation." 27

In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their initials
in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that the seized
sachets of shabu were marked in the police station, no evidence was presented to show that the
28

marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said
items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the markings. There was therefore
a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.

While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of
warrantless searches and seizures. Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to their
29

operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However,
the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house
in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said house. The failure
of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes
the first gap in the chain of custody.

The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the police station
constitutes the second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes note that the
1âw phi 1

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the seized items were
turned over at the police station. While SP03 Salamida was identified as the property custodian of the
police station, this does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in
the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance considering
that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented during trial as
the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of custody is missing.

The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in the crime
laboratory is the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI Barber to
the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was handled therein. He also did
not identify the police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were placed at the PDEA. He
left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The request
for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer who delivered the seized shabu as a
certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory
was the same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is a third break in the chain of custody.

Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His testimony is not
clear and positive since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical substance presented for
laboratory examination and tested positive for shabu were the very same substance allegedly recovered
from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of the examination he conducted and not on the
source of the substance.

From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we have here are
individual links with breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together. The so-
called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not handled properly starting from the
actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime
laboratory for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that
the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and
then presented in court.

It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality however, this
rarely occurs. The legal standard that must therefore be observed "is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused." Here, the Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity
30

and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect
that a chain of custody could not be established at all. Failure of the prosecution to offer testimony to
establish a substantially complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate manner of handling
the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the government's chance of successfully prosecuting a
drug case. 31

Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another procedural
lapse casts farther uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This refers to the non-
compliance by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to the custody and
disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows:

Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizure of and custody over said items.

In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the place
where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice,
nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and control of said
drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same. Neither was an explanation offered for
such failure. While this directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in certain cases, "such liberality,
as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary value and
integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved." Such an exception does not obtain in this case.
32

"Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the [shabu] in view of the broken linkages in the chain
of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to the
[apprehending officers] by the courts below cannot arise."33

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles is
hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE the appellant from custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 225599

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

VELASCO. JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
06456, which affirmed accused-appellant's conviction for the offense of murder, punished under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili,
Camarines Sur, in its Decision in Criminal Case No. P-4100, promulgated on September 3, 2013.

The present case stems from an Information filed against accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa
(Roa) on June 5, 2007, charging him for the murder of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as
follows:

That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay San Miguel,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab Eliseo Delmiguez with the use of a bladed
weapon, locally known as "ginunting," hitting and injuring the body of the latter, inflicting multiple
mortal hack wound[s] thereon, which were the immediate and direct cause of his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be proven in
court.

That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying circumstance or which qualified
the killing to murder, and 2) [w]ith taking advantage of superior strength, as aggravating
circumstance.2

The Facts

The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are as follows:

A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is known to have suffered
mental disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ],
attributes said condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly struck in the
head by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from others and the
mother of the accused that the ailment is due to his use of illegal drugs when he was working in
Manila. When accused returned from Manila in 2001 , Issac recalled that, in marked contrast to the
silent and formal deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter became
talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself' and "complaining of a headache."

On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J.
Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005
certification issued by Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent treatment for
schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical Center] BMC in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. In
her Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. [Edessa Padre-]Laguidao also stated that accused was
prescribed antipsychotic medication which he was, however, not able to continue taking due to
financial constraints. Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew accused since childhood,
admitted hearing about the latter's mental health issues and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout
the wake of an unnamed aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac that
accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all the way to Bagumbayan,
Bula.

On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually silent, refused to take a bath and
even quarreled with his mother when prompted to do so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it
appears that Eliseo, then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in front of the store of
Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3, San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters,
the pair was spotted by Rico who, while waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused
sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby. When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was
approached from behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back with a bolo
locally known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches. Taken aback, Eliseo
exclaimed "Tara man, " before falling to the ground. Chased by both Edgar and Rico and spotted
running by Mrs. Sombrero who went out of the Barangay Hall upon hearing the resultant din,
accused immediately fled and took refuge inside the house of his uncle, Camilo Mejaro.

With the incident already attracting people's attention, Barangay Captain Herminion Ballebar called
for police assistance even as Isaac tried to appease Eliseo's relatives. Entering Camilo's house,
Issac saw accused who said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly thereafter, SPO 1
Hermilando Manzano arrived on board a motorcycle with SPO 1 Ballebar who called on accused to
surrender. Upon his voluntary surrender and tum over of the jungle knife he was holding to the police
officers, accused was brought to the Bula Municipal Police Station for investigation and detention. In
the meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Bula Municipal Health Center where he was pronounced
dead on arrival and, after the necropsy examination, later certified by Dr. Consolacion to have died
of Hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds.3 (citations omitted)

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty," but in the certificate of arraignment, he
signed his name as "Amado M. Tetangco." Trial on the merits ensued. There was no contest over
the fact that accused-appellant, indeed, stabbed the victim, but he interposed the defense of
insanity.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur found that
accused-appellant is guilty of the offense of Murder. The RTC ruled that the defense of insanity was
not sufficiently proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from the offense charged. The RIC noted
that as an exempting circumstance, insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived
of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, the
RTC said, the accused must be shown to be deprived of reason or that he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total
deprivation of the will. It is the accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity that has
the burden of proving the same with clear and convincing evidence. This entails, the RTC added,
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.4

In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he failed to discharge the burden of proving the
claim of insanity. First, while Isaac Mejaro's testimony was able to sufficiently prove that accused-
appellant started having mental health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court ruled that his past
medical history does not suffice to support a finding that he was likewise insane at the time that he
perpetrated the killing of Delmiguez in 2007. To the trial court, the lack of showing of any psychotic
incidents from the time of his discharge in 2002 until March 2007 suggests that his insanity is only
occasional or intermittent and, thus, precludes the presumption of continuity.5

Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant exhibited abnormal behavior after the
incident, particularly in writing the name of Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It
also noted that midway through the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, accused-appellant's
mental condition worsened, prompting his counsel to file another motion for psychiatric evaluation
and treatment, and that he was subsequently diagnosed again to be suffering from schizophrenia of
an undifferentiated type. The trial court, however, cited the rule that the evidence of insanity after the
fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. The trial court then
ruled that the witnesses' account of the incident provides no clue regarding the state of mind of the
accused, and all that was established was that he approached Delmiguez from behind and stabbed
him on his lower back. To the trial court, this actuation of the accused, together with his immediate
flight and subsequent surrender to the police authorities, is not indicative of insanity.

Finally, while the accused was reputed to be "crazy" in his community, the trial court ruled that such
is of little consequence to his cause. It said:

The popular conception of the word "crazy" is to describe a person or act that is unnatural or out of
the ordinary. A man may, therefore, behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily or
conclusively prove that he is legally so. The legal standard requires that the accused must be so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.6

Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced him as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Christopher Mejaro Roa
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez the following sums: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of said victim; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of conviction by the trial court. The CA
first noted that all the elements of the crime of murder had been sufficiently established by the
evidence on record. On the other hand, the defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven by clear
and convincing evidence. The CA said:

Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to prove that he was insane when he
fatally stabbed the victim on March 16, 2007. To prove his defense, accused-appellant's witnesses
including Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao testified that they knew him to be insane because he was
brought and confined to the Bicol Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry for treatment in the year
2001 . However, such fact does not necessarily follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during
the time he fatally attacked and stabbed the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez. No convincing evidence was
presented by the defense to show that he was not in his right mind, or that he had acted under the
influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally been regarded as insane around
the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him.

An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at
the very moment the act under prosecution was committed. Mere prior confinement in a mental
institution does not prove that a person was deprived of reason at the time the crime was committed.
It must be noted that accused-appllant was discharged from the mental hospital in 2002, or long
before he committed the crime charged. He who relies on such plea of insanity (proved at another
time) must prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense. This, accused-
appellant failed to do.7 (citations ommitted)

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses that purport to support the
claim of insanity are based on assumptions, and are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to
be convincing. To the CA, their observation that accused-appellant exhibited unusual behavior is not
sufficient proof of his insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency
constitutes insanity.8 On the contrary, the CA found that the circumstances of the attack
bear indicia that the killing was done voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a long bolo locally known
as ginunting, (2) the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of accused-appellant to flee from
the scene of the crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being called by the police authorities.

Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the conviction of the RTC for the offense
charged. The CA merely modified the award of damages, and dispositively held, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the
amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) P50,000 .00 as
moral damages, and (c) P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line
with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at
the rate of six [percent] (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.9
Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, accused-appellant elevated the case before this Court by way of a
Notice of Appeal.10

The Issue

The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether there is sufficient evidence to
uphold the conviction of accused-appellant for the offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, there being no contest that accused-appellant perpetrated the
stabbing of the victim, which caused the latter's death, the resolution of the present issue hinges on
the pleaded defense of insanity.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA. Hence, the assailed
Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for murder must be upheld.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission
of the same court.

In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to discuss the nature of the
defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance. The Court there said:

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an
offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is
naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that
which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the
understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy
and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane
accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and
cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.

xxxx

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting
as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e.,
the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the
usual means of proof As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was
insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the
time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. (citations
omitted)

In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature
of confession and avoidance.12 Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found
to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the
accused had already admitted committing the crime.13 This Court had also consistently ruled that for
the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support
the claim.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful

defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity
as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.
The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.14

In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of accused-appellant Roa was supported by the testimony
of the following witnesses: (1) his uncle, Isaac Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs.
Lourdes Padregon Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao).

Dr. Laguidao testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted at the Bicol Medical Center, and
was discharged in 2002. She examined accused-appellant on March 15, 2012 and August 15, 2012.
She evaluated his mental condition and found out that his answers to her queries were
unresponsive, and yielding a meaningless conversation. She then diagnosed him as having
undifferentiated type of Schizophrenia, characterized by manifest illusions and auditory
hallucinations which are commanding in nature. She also recommended anti-psychotic drug
maintenance.15

Mejaro testified that accused-appellant's mental illness could be attributed to an incident way back in
May 8, 2000, when he was struck on the head by some teenager. After that incident, accused-
appellant, who used to be silent and very formal, became very talkative and always talked to himself
and complained of headaches. On September 27, 2001, accused-appellant had a psychotic episode,
prompting his mother to confine him at Don Suzano Rodriguez Mental Hospital (DSRMH). He was
observed to be well after his confinement. The illness recurred, however, when he failed to maintain
his medications. The symptoms became worse in March 2007, when his aunt died. He neither slept
nor ate, and kept walking by himself in the morning until evening. He did not want to take a bath, and
even quarreled with his mother when told to do so.16

The foregoing testimonies must be examined in light of the quantum of proof required, which is that
of clear and convincing evidence to prove that the insanity existed immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense.

Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to
pass muster. First, the testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering
from undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the accused in 2012, or
about five years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was
committed is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed
the offense. While it may be said that the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her
testimony that the accused was also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the
testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no
personal participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her testimony is
admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely provides basis for accused-
appellant's mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or simultaneous to the
commission of the offense in 2007.

Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was
insane during the commission of the offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the
possible underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but similar to Dr.
Laguidao's testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately
prior to, during, and immediately after accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any apparent
provocation.

Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case,
because of the rule that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the
insane is presumed to continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while
accused-appellant was confined in a mental institution in 2001, he was properly discharged
therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his confinement clearly indicates an improvement in
his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors would not have allowed his discharge from confinement.
Absent any contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.
In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's
mental condition when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of
his mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the
date of the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-
appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court cannot
sweepingly conclude that accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year period from
2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007. It was the defense's
duty to fill in the gap in accused-appellant's state of mind between the 2001 diagnosis and the 2012
diagnosis, and unfortunately, it failed to introduce evidence to paint a full picture of accused-
appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in 2007. With that, the Court has no other
option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity, and conclude that when accused-appellant
attacked the victim, he was conscious of what he was doing, and was not suffering from an insanity.

This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the
circumstances surrounding the incident. As the prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee's Brief,
1âw phi 1

there are circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence on
the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he surprised the victim when he
attacked from behind. This is supported by the companion of the victim, who testified that while they
were walking, they did not notice any danger when they saw accused-appellant standing near the
trimobile. Second, accused-appellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the
victim indicates that he knew that what he just committed was wrong. And third, when the police
officers called out to accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he
was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them.

The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he
committed the offense indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed
the act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such act of
stabbing is a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately preceding and
succeeding the act of stabbing are similar if not the same as that expected of a fully sane person.

Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, that accused-appellant's culpability had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the award of damages, however, the Court finds the need to modify the same, in line with the
rule enunciated in People v. Jugueta, where the Court laid down the rule that in cases where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded damages should be
₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages and ₱75,000 as exemplary damages,
regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 06456, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of the Decision must read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accusedappellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the
amount of: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages, and (c) ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line with
recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO. JR.

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 216063

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs
MARLON SORIANO y NARAG, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It must be stated at the outset that appellant Marlon Soriano y Narag does not deny that he stabbed
to death Perfecto Narag (Perfecto), his 71-year old maternal uncle who was a retired Philippine
Army officer, that fateful day of February 9, 2004 at Linao East, Tuguegarao City. Appellant insists
nonetheless that he killed Perfecto in legitimate self-defense and that treachery did not attend the
killing, hence he could not be convicted of murder.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was indicted for murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City under
an Information which states:

That on February 09, 2004, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MARLON SORIANO y NARA.G, armed with a bladed
weapon, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there Willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, stab to death victim PERFECTO NA.RAG, husband of complainant
EDERUNA A. NARAG, inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which caused his untimely death.

That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance[s] of dwelling, and in disregard of
the respect due to the offended party on account of ms age, being an old man.

Contrary to law. 1

The prosecution presented the following as witnesses:

Ederlina A. Narag (Ederlina), widow of Perfecto; Villamor Pagulayan (Villamor), a tricycle driver;
SP04 Avelino Guinucay (SP04 Guinucay) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tuguegarao
City; and Dr. Eugenio P. Dayag (Dr. Dayag), former City Health Officer of Tuguegarao City.

Ederlina testified that on the afternoon of February 9, 2004, appellant arrived at their house and
asked where her husband Perfecto was. Surprised at his arrival, Ederlina asked appellant why he
was looking for Perfecto. Instead of replying to her query, appellant barged into their house and
proceeded to Perfecto' s room. Seeing that appellant was carrying a bladed weapon, Ederlina
shouted to Perfecto to close the door to his room.

While Perfecto was attempting to close the door to his room, appellant grabbed his neck and
immediately stabbed him at the right chest while uttering the words "I will kill you." Ederlina tried to
stop the appellant from stabbing her husband but he pushed her away and stabbed her instead at
the right wrist and forehead. She pleaded with appellant to stop stabbing his uncle, Perfecto9 but
appellant did not heed her plea. Perfecto also pleaded with him to stop his stabbing frenzy, but he
paid no attention to his pleas.

Ederlina narrated that at this point, Villamor, the tricycle driver in their employ, came in and forced
appellant out of Perfecto's room. However, appellant was able to return inside the room and stabbed
Perfecto at the back again, Ederlina added that after appellant left their house, she saw him and his
brother Martin Soriano (Martin) at the street, with appellant himself yelling "Winner."

Corroborating Ederlina's testimony, Villamor testified that he was at the garage of the victim's house
when he heard Ederlina's screams. He ran inside the house and saw appellant, Perfecto, and
Ederlina inside Perfecto' s room. He saw appellant stab Perfecto several times. So he grabbed
appellant by the neck and brought him outside the room. But appellant freed himself from his
(Villamor's) hold and returned to Perfecto's room and again repeatedly stabbed the latter until he
died. Appellant also turned his ire against Villamor and tried to stab him, too, but Villamor succeeded
in avoiding serious injury by rushing out of the house. On his way out he ran into Martin, appellant's
brother, whom he entreated to help pacify appellant. But Martin instead grabbed Villamor's neck and
warned him not to report the incident to the police. However, Villamor broke off from Martin, and
went to the police station where he reported the incident.

SP04 Guinucay testified that he and a fellow police officer went to the scene of the crime to
investigate the reported incident. There they found the lifeless Perfecto in a pool of blood, with
multiple stab wounds.

Dr. Dayag, testified that he conducted an autopsy upon the 71-year old Perfecto. His autopsy
yielded the following results:

Findings:

• Multiple stab wounds, head, chest & back region

• Laceration on the left hand

• Lacerated wound on the left side of the face Cause of Death:

Severe internal injuries due to multiple stab wounds, head, chest and back region

Dr. Dayag described the injuries, as follows:

• two (2) stab wounds on the forehead:

1. stab wound measuring .8 inches by 2 inches caused by sharp pointed instrument but non-
penetrating;

2. stab wound measuring 1.02 inches by .2 inches deep hitting the skull but non-penetrating
caused by a sharp pointed instrument;

• one laceration on the cheek measuring 2 inches wide and 1.2 inches deep caused by sharp bladed
instrument;

• three (3) internal hematomas on the chest which were not fatal or more or less, superficial;

• one stab wound just below the nipple measuring 3.2 inches that hit the lungs which could cause
internal hemorrhage; inflicted with use of sharp pointed knife; a fatal wound

• a stab wound on the abdomen just at the left umbilicus measuring 1.2 by 3 inches hitting the large
and small intestines; non-fa1al wound;

• contusions on the abdomen just below the rib; superficial;

• a stab wound caused by a knife on the inguinal area measuring 1.2 inches by 3 inches in
thickness; possibly caused by sharp pointed instrument; inflicted injuries to the large intestines and
urinary bladder which, if not immediately attended to, would be fatal;

• another stab wound measuring 1.2 inches by 3 inches caused by sharp pointed instrument;
inflicted injuries to the large intestines and urinary bladder which, if not immediately attended to,
would be fatal

• four (4) stab wounds on the back region:

1. stab wound measuring 2 by 2.4 inches hitting the lungs; possibly caused by a sharp
pointed instrument; fatal wound;

2. Stab wound measuring 2 x 2.2 inches deep hitting the left kidney; caused by a sharp
pointed instrument; fatal wound;

3. Stab wound measuring 2 inches deep and 2 inches wide; on level with the lumbar area on
the left hitting the large intestines; possibly caused by a sharp bladed instrument;
 4. Stab wound measuring 2 inches by 3 inches deep on the right side of the lumbar area
hitting the large and small intestines; possibly caused by sharp bladed pointed instrument;
non-fatal;

On cross-examination x x x Dr. Dayag [declared] that when he conducted the autopsy, [Perfecto's]
cadaver was already [in] rigos mortis xxx [; that it] is possible that the wounds [inflicted] on the back
of the victim were caused by a chisel [; t]he Autopsy Report does not bear the depths and sizes of
the wounds but he had them in his notebook x x x. 2

On the other hand, the appellant claimed that there had been a longstanding bad blood between his
(appellant's) family and his now deceased uncle, Perfecto, who was an elder brother of his mother;
and that this family feud was caused by Perfecto's desire to deprive appellant's mother of her
legitimate share in the common residential compound at Linao East, Tuguegarao City. He claimed
that on that fateful day of February 9, 2004, Perfecto went near a store he was tending right inside
the common residential compound; that at a distance of about five meters, Perfecto yelled at him to
step outside; that when he stepped outside their store, Perfecto swung his knife at him and injured
his knee; that he ran inside the kitchen and armed himself with a chisel; that when Perfecto tried to
hurt him again, he was able to stab him first; that several persons witnessed the incident but nobody
tried to interfere; that after the stabbing incident, he surrendered to Barangay Councilman Benigno
Lucas who brought him to the police station in Annaturan, Tuguegarao City where he was
investigated; and that afterwards, he was brought to a hospital for treatment but said hospital did not
issue a medical certificate.

On cross-examination, appellant admitted that Ederlina was present during the stabbing incident in
question, and that when Ederlina intervened, she was in fact injured by him; that later, Ederlina filed
against him a criminal case for frustrated murder before Branch I of the RTC in Tuguegarao City, to
which criminal case he pleaded guilty,

Ruling of the Regiqnal Trial Court

The RTC of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, synthesized the evidence at bar in this wise:

The totality of the circumstances leads to the inevitable conclusion that the victim was caught
unaware and unable to defend himself and the accused deliberately chose a manner of attack that
insured the attainment of his violent intention with no risk tohimself.

The fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room does not rule out the
presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of possible
danger to his person, [there is treachery nonetheless when] the attack was executed in such a
manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate, The case at bar typifies this doctrine for
the victim had no opportunity to defend himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the
subject of an attack right inside his own abode and he was unarmed, with no opportunity to put up a
defense. It must also be noted that the victim was already old and that his reflexes could have been
worn down by age so he could not have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward off the
attack. It is worthy to note the injuries sustained by the victim. According to Dr. Dayag, the victim
sustained various injuries not only in front of [his] body but also [on] his forehead and at his back and
that the cause of his death is severe internal injuries due to multiple stab wounds, head, chest, and
back region.

The version of the accused that the stabbing incident happened outside their house cannot be given
credence. First, it is uncorroborated even if accused claimed that there were persons outside their
house during the incident. Second, the testimony of prosecution witnesses Villamor Pagulayan and
Ederlina Narag that the accused [stab] the victim inside the latter's room was corroborated by SP04
Avelino Guinucay who testified that he found the victim's body with multiple stabbed wounds lying
inside his room [in a] pool of blood. Defense conveniently did not present evidence on what
happened to the victim after the stabbing incident that should have explained why the victim's body
was found in his room even if the stabbing incident happened outside the house of the accused.

To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the
following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination [to commit the crime]; and (c) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Prosecution evidence [failed] to show when the accused planned to commit the offense and that he
reflected on the means to bring about its execution following an appreciable length of time. The
Court cannot rest easy in appreciating this aggravating circumstance.

Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if
the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Dwelling is
considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy [that] the law accords to [the]
human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere. The offense of Murder may be committed without the necessity of
trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house.

The victim was killed not merely in his house but in his own room. The accused could have killed him
elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at the victim's home; thus the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated against the accused.

The Court is also convinced that the offense was committed in disregard of the respect due to the
age of the victim. The accused knew fully well that the victim was already old because he is his
uncle. The accused perpetrated the act against his ageing uncle knowing that by himself, said
victim's physical condition due to old age would not allow him to sufficiently defend himself anymore.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is appreciated in favor of the accused. Police
officer Tangan testified that police officers x x x Remolacio, Batulan and Abadu, who brought
accused to PTU Don Domingo where he was on duty informed him that he accused surrendered to
Barangay Councilman Benigno Lucas, Linao East, Tuguegarao City. The reason why the accused
was no longer at the place of incident when police officer Guinucay investigated and that the
accused did not give himself up to any of the police officers was sufficiently explained by the
accused upon his testimony that he left the place of incident and proceeded to the barangay hall
where he surrendered to Barangay Councilman Benigno Lucas. It is significant to note that there is
no evidence to show that the police or any law enforcement agency exerted any effort to locate the
accused. By 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the accused was already turned over to PTU Don
Domingo.

The information alleges two (2) qualifying aggravating circumstances, to wit: treachery and evident
premeditation and two (2) generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disrespect to the victim
who is already old. Only one qualifying circumstance of treachery with the two generic aggravating
circumstances were proved. Applying the provision of paragraph 4, Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender offsets one generic aggravating
circumstance, thus leaving one more generic aggravating circumstance.Under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659

murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63
of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is
attended by one aggravating circumstance. Under this state of facts, the proper penalty to be
imposed upon the accused should be death.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua x x x

xxxx

Pursuant to the same law, the accused shall not be eligible for parole x xx. 3

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Judgment 4 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the accused MARLON SORIANO y Narag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility
of parole. Said accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Perfecto Narag the amounts of ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 5
Aggrieved, appellant sought recourse before the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court however threw out the appellant's appeal ratiocinating as follows:

Testimonies of Prosecution's Witnesses More Credible than Accused-Appellant's

It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these
factual findings are to be given the highest respect because it had the better opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.
On the other hand, the reviewing magistrate has none of the advantages peculiar to the trial judge's
position, and could rely only on the cold records of the case and on the judge's discretion. Thus, the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies would not be disturbed
absent any showing that it has overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied certain facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. We
assiduously examined the records and We find no reason to either depart from this established
doctrine or to review, much less, overturn the factual findings of the court a quo.

Marlon tried to destroy the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses by belaboring on their
relationship with the victim, Ederlina and Villamor being Perfecto's wife and nephew, respectively.
Such emphasis is misplaced. Blood relationship between a witness and the victim does not, by itself,
impair the credibility of the witness. In fact, the relationship with the victim would render the
testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating ti11e
crime to accuse somebody [else] other than the real culprit. There is absolutely nothing in our laws
to disqualify a person from testifying in a criminal case in which said person's relative was involved, if
the former was really at the scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal
act. Indisputably, Ederlina was with Perfecto in their home when Marlon attacked his uncle. She
clearly described the events that took place before, during, and after her husband was stabbed and
her testimony remained consistent and unwavering even on cross-examination. Thus, her positive
testimony is enough to convict Marlon of the crime charged.

Further, Marlon's claim that the stabbing occurred outside of their respective houses does not inspire
belief. We quote with approval the following disquisition of the RTC, viz.:

The version of the accused that the stabbing incident happened outside their house cannot be given
credence. First, it is uncorroborated even if accused claimed that there were persons outside their
house during the incident. Second, the testimony of prosecution witnesses Villamor Pagulayan and
Ederlina Narag that the accL1sed stabbed the victim inside the latter's room was corroborated by
SP04 Avelino Uuinucay who testified that he found the victim's body with multiple
stabbed (sic) wounds lying inside his room [in] a pool of blood. Defense conveniently did not present
evidence on what happened to the victim after the stabbing incident that should have explained why
the victim's body was found in his room even if the stabbing incident happened outside the house of
the accused.

There is also no merit in Marlon's contention that his testimony was corroborated by SPO 1 Tangan.
It bears stressing that SPO l Tangan did not witness the stabbing incident; his testimony surrounding
Perfecto's killing was purely based on Marlon's narration and not of his own personal knowledge. As
such, his testimony regarding the killing is inadmissible for being hearsay. It is a basic rule in
evidence that a witness can testify [to] the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge or
those which are derived from his own perception. He may not testify [to] what he merely learned,
read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. 6

With particular reference to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which according to the
appellant did not at all attend his stabbing-to-death of his uncle Perfecto, the appellate court
postulated thus:

Treachery: Duly Established; Qualified the Killing to Murder

xxxx
It may be said, as postulated herein, that the suddenness of the attack would not, by itself, suffice to
support a finding of treachery. However, where proof obtains that the victim was completely deprived
of a real chance to defend himself against the attack, as in the instant case, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery ought to and should be appreciated. Verily, what is
decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and
unable to retaliate.

As earlier discussed at length, the positive testimony of Ederlina established that Marlon purposely
sought the unsuspecting Perfecto with intent to inflict mortal wound on him. Perfecto was unarn1ed
at that time and there was no means of escape because he was trapped inside his room. In fact, 1âwphi 1

Perfecto was about to close the door to his room when Marlon suddenly and swiftly stabbed him.
Lastly, Marlon aimed at Perfecto's head, chest and back ensuring that he would not have a chance
to retaliate. Obviously, tl1e way it was executed made it impossible for the victim to respond or
defend himself. He just had no opportunity to repel the sudden attack, rendering him completely
helpless.

The following observation of the RTC is also apt:

The fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room does not rule out the
presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of possible
danger to his person, in treachery what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner
as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. The case at bar typifies this doctrine for the victim
had no opportunity to defend himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the subject
of an attack right inside his own abode and he was unanned, with no opportunity to put up a
defense. It must also be noted that the victim was already old and that his reflexes could have been
worn down by age so he could not have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward off the
attack. x x x

Accordingly, We sustain the findings of the RTC that Marlon is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder. 7

The appellate court nonetheless modified the sums awarded by the RTC in concept of actual
damages and exemplary damages, to wit:

Damages

However, We find it necessary to modify accused-appellant's civil liability. The RTC correctly
awarded ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity and. ₱50,000.00 moral damages but the actual damages should
be reduced to.₱25,000.00 which is the amount of expenses stipulated by Ederlina in her testimony.
The awarded exemplary damages should also be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with recent
jurisprudence. 1âw phi 1

All the foregoing monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this decision until fully paid. 8

The decretal portion of the appellate court's Decision 9 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the October 30, 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. 10121 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant MARLON SORIANO Y NARAG is hereby
ordered to pay the Heirs of Perfecto Narag. ₱25,000.00 actual damages and. ₱30,000.00 exemplary
damages, and all monetary awards are subject to 6% per annum from the time of finality of this
Decision until fully paid. All other aspects of the October 30, 2009 Judgment stand.

SO ORDERED. 10

Our Ruling

It is almost trite to say that the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these
factual findings are accorded the highest respect by the appellate court, whose revisory power and
authority is limited to the bare and cold records of the case. This explains why this Court, which is
not a trial court, is loathe to re-examine and re-evaluate the evidence that had been analyzed and
dissected by the trial court, and sustained and affirmed by the appellate court. In the case at bench,
we see no reason at all to overturn the findings of facts and the conclusions of law made by both the
trial court and the appellate court relative to the fact that treachery or alevosia in fact attended the
stabbing-to-death of Perfecto by the appellant at the time and place alleged in the Infom1ation.

The awards for damages can stand some modification, however. Notably, the appellate court
awarded ₱25,000.00 as actual damages which is the amount stipulated by the parties. 11 However, it
is settled that "only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually
expended in connection with the death of the [victim] may be allowed."12 Hence, the award of
₱25,000.00 as actual damages is deleted. In lieu thereof, "it is proper to award temperate damages
x x x since the heirs of the victim suffered a loss but could not produce documentary evidence to
support their claims." 13 In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages. As regards the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages, it was
held in People v. Jugueta14 that for a felony like murder where the penalty imposed is death, but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because of Republic Act No. 9346, the amount is fixed at ₱l00,000.00
each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 04241 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Marlon Soriano y Narag
is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Perfecto Narag the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱l00,000.00 as moral damages, ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Norma C. Gamaro and Josephine G. Umali Vs.
People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 211917;
February 27, 2017
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
the reversal of the Decision[2] dated November 25, 2013, and Resolution[3] dated February 21,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 15407 finding
petitioner Norma C. Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, while exonerating petitioner Josephine G. Umali from the crime charged. The RTC
also adjudged the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in favor of
private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of
the Revised Penal Code before Branch 32 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following
Information:

That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, defraud one JOAN FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following
manner, to wit: That Norma C. Gamaro, pretending that she is knowledgeable in the business of buy and
sell of jewelry, other merchandise and financing, assuring complainant of a sure market and big profit lure
and entice complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and the latter purchased and
delivered to her the jewelry amounting to P2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage the business for
private complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from complying, with her
obligation, managed the business as her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and pledging jewelries
to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused Josephine Umali work while the checks issued by respondent Rowena
Gamaro to guarantee their payment were all dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds,
to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while
accused Rowena C. Gamaro remained at-large.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence disclosed the following facts:

Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business
venture with petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters – petitioners Josephine G. Umali
(Umali) and accused Rowena GamaroFineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M.
Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who was then the manager of the said pawnshop
located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces of jewelry would then be sold for profit
by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the Social Security System (SSS) in San Pablo City.
The proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following manner: fifty percent
(50%) would go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be divided among Umali,
Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were placed in
the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several
checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of
the pieces of jewelry.[6]
The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma
Gamaro, together with her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar
business with other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. To wind
up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or
sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried to encash the
checks which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the
account of the Gamaros had been closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about
the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover
the amount of the checks. Fineza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several
pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma
Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to
redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was
the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who pledged the pieces of jewelry.[7]

To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her
possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for
the pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer.[8]

A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated
February 16, 2004, asking for the return of the amount of P2,292,519.00 as payment for all the
pieces of jewelry which were not returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the
rediscounting business. The demand letter was left unanswered.[9]

For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her
daughters. Umali likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro
and with Fineza. While admitting that there were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin,
Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where she was the manager, Umali denied that she knew
where those pieces of jewelry came from.[10]

On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment, as follows:

1. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
as defined and penalized under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate prison term of Four (4) Years and Two (2)
Months of PrisionCorreccional, as Minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum;

2. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal liability;

3. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine Umali to pay the private
complainant jointly and solidarity the following amounts:

1. P1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on February 16, 2004, until fully
paid;

2. P50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;

3. P25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;

4. P50,000.00, for and by way of attorney’s fees; and

5. To pay the costs.

Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau of Immigration is likewise directed to
issue a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal circumstances are as
follows:
Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO

Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority (NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San Pablo City

SO ORDERED.[11]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated November 25, 2013, the
CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the CA on
February 21, 2014.

Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:

A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION FINDING NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA UNDER SECTION 1(b), ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE
INFORMATION ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(A)
ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;

B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT (RTC) RELIED ON THE FINDINGS ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WITH SSS AGAINST NORMA GAMARO;

C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT (RTC) CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY.
BALDEO DESPITE CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA
GAMARO ADVISE REGARDING HER CASE; and

D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE RTC THAT
NORMA GAMARO RECEIVED THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE INCOMPETENT AND
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION ITSELF.[13]

The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different
paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible.

The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.[14]
The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be “informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him” is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The
prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its
formal name in the law. It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of
the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.[15]

The controlling words of the information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained
the doctrine in Flores v. Hon. Layosa[16] as follows:

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states,
among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the
offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not
controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts
alleged in the information. The Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is instructive:

x xx Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to
say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is
immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime
of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is
permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice x x x.[17]

In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Code, viz.:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.

2nd. The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is
over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

x xxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.[18]
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts
or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party
must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced
to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.[19]

However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa).

x xxx the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

x xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
x xx[20]
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods,
or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.[21]

The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which
petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) instead of paragraph 2(a)?

What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted
of a crime charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A
reading of the Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges
estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with
the pieces of jewelry amounting to P2,292,519.00 on the condition that the same will be sold for
profit. Petitioner Norma Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to
Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to
M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds
thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.

Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This,
at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information.[22]

There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently
inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the
elements of estafa by misappropriation. Petitioners are fully apprised of the charge against them
and for them to suitably prepare their defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not
deprived of any constitutional right. She was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the
charge and conviction for estafa, because the RTC has the discretion to read the Information in
the context of the facts alleged. In the case of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,[23] We explained the rationale
behind this discretion in this manner:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical
name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever
its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of
justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved
in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the
facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name
in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law
made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has
ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no
consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights… If he performed the acts alleged, in
the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore.
It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named x x x.[24]

Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1(b). As held by the
CA, Fineza positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her
and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner
Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in
trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to
petitioner’s own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has
the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. [25] As in fact,
in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own money.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and
misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s
own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver
the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.[26]

Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them, petitioner Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense, the same having
been proved.

Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of
prosecution witness Atty. Baldeo violated the rule on “privileged communication between attorney
and client” for the reason that Atty. Baldeo allegedly gave petitioner Norma Gamaro “advise”
regarding her case.

The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by

reason of this relationship that the client made the communication;

(2) The client made the communication in confidence;

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.[27]
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence
and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. The communication made by a client to
his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice
from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted
by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.[28]

Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
petitioner’s allegation. The testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that
petitioner Norma Gamaro was indeed engaged in the business of selling jewelry supplied by
private complainant Fineza. We note that the testimony is merely corroborative to the testimony
of private complainant Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma Gamaro. Atty.
Baldeo testified primarily on the fact that she personally saw petitioner Gamaro, on several
occasions, showing the jewelry for sale to their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered
to buy the pieces of jewelry on some instances, and she was told by petitioner Norma Gamaro
that the pieces of jewelry came from Fineza.[29]

The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC to dispute the defense of
petitioner Norma Gamaro that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:

Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the aforementioned administrative case,
accused Norma Gamaro’s defense of denial of her participation in the business transaction involving the
sale of jewelry supplied by private complainant, fall flat on its face.[30]

Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the
one who received the pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded
the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. Though
jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would
warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision.[31]

We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by the CA that petitioner Norma
Gamaro received some pieces of jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned
the jewelry entrusted to them by Fineza which is a clear act of misappropriation, thus:

x xxx. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and Josephine through the testimony of Frederick
San Diego is understandable. The argument, however, that it was Frederick San Diego, upon instructions
of Rowena Gamaro who pledged the jewelry, without the knowledge of Norma or Josephine is unavailing.
The records show that Frederick San Diego is not only a mere nephew of Norma, and cousin to Rowena
and Josephine, but also the messenger and collector of Rowena, who had knowledge of the fact that
Rowena’s partner was the private complainant, Frederick San Diego also knew that the private complainant
went to the house of Norma asking the missing jewelry.

As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the private complainant to Norma Gamaro, not
Rowena Gamaro. Yet the defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the same pieces of jewelry to
M. Lhuillier Pawnshop, CebuanaLhuillier, and the owner of Collette’s upon instructions of Rowena
Gamaro. Clearly then, Norma turned over the said jewelry to Rowena with knowledge that they will be
pledged to the pawnshops and to the owner of Collette’s. To hold otherwise would run counter to human
nature and experience.[32]

It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the eighteen (18) index cards given
by accused Rowena Gamaro to Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by
Fineza, with the corresponding appraised values. The due dates of the checks issued in favor of
Fineza (Exhibits “F” to “F-7” and “F-11” “F-27”) were also indicated on the index cards.[33] The
pieces of jewelry were pawned to various pawnshops and individuals, instead of offering them for
sale. Hence, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to return the jewelry to the damage and prejudice of
Fineza. She even offered her house and lot to Fineza as payment for the jewelry.

We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution’s evidence showed that
Fineza entrusted the possession of the jewelry to petitioner. The CA observed that the prosecution
duly proved petitioner’s misappropriation by showing that she failed to return the diamond ring
upon demand. That misappropriation took place was strengthened when petitioner Norma
Gamaro informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the terms of
their business agreement.

Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We note the declaration of the RTC
that Umali had knowledge as to who owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. The
RTC further pointed out that Umali was part of the business transaction between Norma Gamaro
and Rowena Gamaro with Fineza, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with
Banco Filipino to enable them to open a checking account. It was against this account that Norma
and Rowena Gamaro drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Fineza from the
proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry. These findings support the conclusion of the CA that
Umali’s acquittal was based on reasonable doubt. Hence, Umali’s civil liability was not
extinguished by her discharge.[34] We, therefore, concur with the findings of the CA:

On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to private complainant Fineza. As may
be recalled, appellant Umali was exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding, she is not entirely
free from any liability towards private complainant Fineza. It has been held that an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt her from civil
liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is required.[35]There is no question that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution is preponderant enough to sustain appellant Umali’s civil liability. Accordingly,
We agree with the court a quo’s ratiocination in this wise:

“What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by Frederick that it was Rowena Gamaro
who instructed him to pledge the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were true, then, with more reason
Josephine had knowledge as to who owns the jewelry. It may well be pointed out, as earlier stated, that
Josephine is part of the business transaction between Norma and Rowena with the private complainant, as
she too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino purposely to enable them to open
a checking account, and it was against this account that Norma and Rowena drew the checks that they
issued to guarantee the share of Joan from the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry. It follows then that
Josephine also knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged with her (sic) M. Lhuillier Pawnshop
Branch. x xx”

With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a quo’sruling that herein appellants be held
jointly and solidarily liable to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart
from the ruling of the court a quo.[36]

There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts
agree on the facts.[37] We, therefore, adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality,
bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
25, 2013, and its Resolution dated February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Bersamin,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on official leave.