Borthwick Papers

(formerly St Anthony's Hall Publications)

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10 Historians of York by James Biggins. 1956

16 Diocesan Administration in Fifteenth-Century England by R. L. Storey.
2nd ed. 1972.
18 Archbishop Geoffrey Plantagenet and the Chapter of York by Decirna
Oouie. 1960.
21 Norfolk Church Dedications by C. L. S. Linnell. 1962.
22 The Records of the Admiralty Court of York by J. S. Purvis. 1962.
23 A. F. Leach as a Historian of Yorkshire Education by W. E. Tate.
1963.
35 The Labourer in the Vineyard: The Visitations of Archbishop Melton
in the Archdeaconry of Richmond by Rosalind M. T. Hill. 1969.
37 Beneficed Clergy in Cleveland and the East Riding, 1305-40 by David
Robinson . 1970.
38 The Last Four Anglo-Saxon Archbishops of York, 1002-1069 by
Janet Cooper. 1970.
39 Christopher Wyvill and Refo rm, 1790-1820 by J. R . Dinwiddy. 1971 .
40 The Reformation in York, 1534-1553 by D. M. Palliser. 1971 (rep .
1979).
41 The Making and Limitations of the Yorkshire Domesday by R. Weldon
Finn. 1972.
45 The Jews of Medieval York and the Massacre of March 1190 by
R . B. Dobson. 1974.
46 The First Spasmodic Chole ra Epidemic in York, 1832 by M. Durey.
1974.
47 The Revival of the Convocation of York, 1837-1861 by D . A.
Jennings. 197 5.

[continued inside back cover

Richard III as Duke of
Gloucester:
A Study in Character
by

M.A. Hicks
Senior Lecturer in History , King Alfred's College, Winchester

BORTHWICK PAPERS No. 70

 First Published 1986
©M.A. Hicks
1986
ISSN:0524 <)913

The cover illustration is taken from an early 19th ce11tury view of

Middleham Castle.

The emblem on the front is a copy of the central boss in the roof of
St Anthony's Hall and represents the pig, traditionally associated with
St Anthony the Hermit.
 Richard III as Duke of Gloucester:
A Study in Character
Richard III's quincentenary celebrations in 1983-85 were marked by
an extraordinary upsurge of enthusiasm for him, which contrasts with
the general lack of interest shown in the SOOth anniversary of the
accession of the house of Tudor. 'Richard III has been the most
persistently vilified of all Engli.9h kings' . 1 Scholarly historical works
still repeat and indeed amplify the charges of contemporaries that he
was an usurper, a tyrant and a murderer of innocent children. For
William Shakespeare, writing almost four centuries ago, there was no
alternative interpretation available, but today Richard enjoys the
support of the vast majority of those knowledgeable about and
interested in his career. Founded in 1924, the Richard III Society now
has 4,400 members committed to clearing Richard's name.
In the belief that many features of the traditional accounts of the
character and career of Richard III are neither supported by sufficient
evidence nor reasonably tenable, the Society aims to promote in
every possible way research into the life and times ofRichard III, and
to secure a re-assessment of the material relating to this period, and of
the role in English history of this monarch. 2
For them, Richard was not just innocent of the crimes of which he was
charged, not just the victim ofTudor propaganda. He was a good man,
a good husband, a good duke, and a good king, who has been
grievously wronged by historians for over five hundred years. Between
these two absolutes there can be no common ground and the debate
often involves the exchange of assertions rather than the calm
assessment of the evidence.
It is not that the evidence is copious or easy to interpret. Quite the
reverse. Richard III ruled for only twenty-six months, the shortest
reign of any adult king since the Norman Conquest. His reign was
dominated by external military threats, which restricted his freedom of
manoeuvre and obliged him to react to events rather than imposing his
own stamp upon his reign. There was too little time for him to have
many initiatives in policy or successes to his credit and in any case
medieval government was largely a matter of routine rather than
innovation. There was little scope for originality. Those elements of
novelty once credited to Richard by his supporters, such as the
legislation of his parliament, now appear less obviously novel or less
2 BORTHWICK PAPERS

certainly the consequence of his personal initiative than they once did. 3
Not only is vital evidence often lacking, but the violence of historical
debate has sought to discredit hitherto accepted sources, not just the
Tudor historians but now also Mancini's accot1nt of the usurpation , and
has thus made a rounded view more difficult to achieve. Moreover it
should not be overlooked that some of our problems of interpretation
arise from enigmatic and secretive elements in Richard's personality.
Whatever befell the 'Two Little Princes in the Tower', it is certain that
Richard deliberately concealed tl1eir fate. If we do not know precisely
whe11 Richard decided to take the throne, this is because he masked his
real intentions so admirably in the weeks immediately preceding his
usurpation that even with hindsight certainty and unanimity cannot be
achieved. If we remain uncertai11 about his character, it is in part at least
because his public statements are not easy to accept at face value.
Richard did not wish everything to be known. In short, if Richard's
character is difficult to divine, it is at least in part his fault. As Professor
Ross suggested, our difficulties arise 'not from what we know about
him, but from what we do not know ... ' 4
All these problems serve only to stress the impossibility of accurately
assessing the character of Richard as man and king solely from the
evidence of his reign. But there is no need to do this. Whereas Richard
reigned for only two short years, he lived to be 32 and was adult for
twelve years before his accession. During these years he was of age, in
control of his own affairs, politically independent, and free of those
constraints on his freedom of action that emerged after his accession. It
was at this time that he formed habits, patterns of conduct, attitudes and
political policies that were unlikely to be changed by his promotion.
Surely the study of his career before 1483 will reveal those facets ofhis
character that endured beyond 1483? So, indeed, has been argued
repeatedly in the last thirty years. To be sure, Richard's career as Duke
of Gloucester has never been ignored, but it is only in recent years,
principally as a result of the work of Professors Myers and Kendall, 5
that this evidence has been integrated with that ofhis reig11 to produce a
fully rounded picture. The influence of this approach is most obvious in
Professor Ross' standard biography, a quarter of which treats Richard's
career before his accession. So far this technique has been used mainly
by Richard's supporters, anxious to stress the positive side of Richard
and to reveal an estimable individual surely incompatible with the
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 3
wickedness alleged of him as king, but the conclusion need not be so
favourable . The evidence is strictly neutral, waiting to be interpreted by
the historian, and may, when fully analysed, support either
interpretation. In spite of the value of this approach and the
considerable work done on different facets of Richard's ducal career,
nobody has attempted to examine it as a whole in isolation from his
reign, as this paper sets out to do. By placing Richard's career as Duke
of Gloucester on a sound footing, it is hoped ultimately to cast light on
Richard as king . One area specifically excluded from this paper is
Richard's religion, which I hope to discuss elsewhere.
This study makes certain assumptions about the material that is
studied. First of all, it assumes that Richard cannot have expected to
usurp the throne before 1483. King Edward was still relatively young
and had two sons and until 1478 the claims of a middle brother, George,
Duke ofClarence took priority over those of Richard. Richard's decisio11
to take the throne was therefore made very late, certainly after Edward
IV's death on 9 April 1483. The usurpation cannot have been expected
- could not have succeeded had it been anticipated and Richard may
well have left his options open even after the execution of Lord Hastings
on 13 June 1483. I should add here that I find particularly convincing
evidence that Richard was not seeking the throne earlier in his
carelessness about the validity of his marriage. Apparently 1narried in
1472, Richard still had no dispensation in 1475 and there is no evidence
that one was ever secured. 6 As this failure to secure a dispensation
bastardised his children and future kings, surely Richard would have
been careful over such technicalities had he expected to usurp the
throne? If one accepts that Richard did not expect to usurp, it follows
that he was not trying to clear away intervening barriers in 1471 and
1478 as was afterwards alleged. The evidence for Richard's complicity
in the deaths of Henry VI, Prince Edward and Clarence is anyway very
scanty, as Professor Myers showed long ago. 7 It is too far-fetched to
suppose that Richard was plotting over the longterm, from 1471 and
1478, to usurp the throne and that his career before 1483 was
conditioned by such aims. On the contrary, there is every reason to
suppose that his preoccupations became less national and more local in
their orientation as Edward IV's reign proceeded.
Nothing is inevitable until it happens and nothing is more
unhistorical than to interpret a period in the light of later events. If we
4 BORTHWICK PAPERS

accept that Richard was not aiming at the throne before 1483, then his
career before 1483 should have a consistency and a purpose about it. It
should be orientated towards a desired future and should make sense.
This, however, brings me to a central problem or paradox, which this
paper seeks to demonstrate. Richard's career before 1483 does not make
sense, at least not if one is thinking of material motivatio11, self-
advancement, and the establishment for himself and his heirs of an
enduring noble dynasty, which the great aristocracy (so we are told)
were always anxious to achieve. If, as Professor Stone reports, the
nobility were preoccupied by 'the preservation, increase and
transmission through inheritance and marriage of the property and
status of the lineage', 8 then Richard was quite untypical.

II

An important guide to Richard's intentions during the 1470s and

early 1480s is British Library Manuscript Cotton Julius BXII. This
book binds together three separate volumes drawn up at different
times, the third of which (ink foliation 111-31 Sv) is a collection of
grants, deeds and other me111oranda relating to Richard, Duke of
Gloucester. It is this third volume that concerns us here. Written
throughout in 15th-century hands, mainly by one scribe, it formed a
separate volume until at least the Elizabethan period, when blank spaces
were filled with genealogical data. In or after 1611 it was bound up with
the other volumes on behalf of Sir Robert Cotton, who repaginated the
whole and compiled the index. The oldest pagination from 2-227v
precedes this rebinding, comes after the loss of several leaves of text,
and demonstrates that by then the items in the volume were already in
their present order. Everything in the volume relates to Richard or his
interests and nothing in it is later than February 1483. The two marginal
annotators, the earlier one identifying the properties, the latter noting
down Richard's legal title, were concerned with matters that were of
interest only during Richard's lifetime. The volume is thus a register
compiled by Richard, Duke of Gloucester's staff for his use for
reference in the period before his accession to the throne.
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 5

Gloucester's part of Cotton Julius BXII has long been known and
used by historians, but it has not been highly valued because few of the
docwnents that it contains are not known from other sources and none
of these are of major importance. It is however a unique survival from
Gloucester's secretarial archive and can be made to shed light on the
organisation of that archive, on the work of Gloucester's secretary, and
on the ducal policies to which the secretary contributed. It is important
to stress, however, what the volume is not. It is not a register of
Gloucester's correspondence, his finances, the work of his council, or
of his relations with his retainers, any of which historians would dearly
love to have. It is not a cartulary, in that it does not systematically list all
the title deeds to all his estates, neither is it a comprehensive collectiort
of royal grants. What it appears to be is a reference volume concerned
with his rights to land and office. It falls into two parts: firstly, a select
collection of grants, leases and indentures conferring title to land and
office before 1474 and, secondly, a collection of selected grants and
precedents relating to his estate compiled thereafter.
The opening 28 folios are written in a single hand and the documents
run on without a gap in no particular order or theme. All but the last
three items comprise royal grants, leases or indentures conferring land
or offices on Gloucester in the years 1462-72. The fmal item, the
unfinished 1474 indenture of partition of the Warwick inheritance,
could be a later addition, as indeed could the preceding two items,
which are included as precedents: these are the 1446 charter ofliberties
for Richmondshire and the 1461 indenture for the wardenship of the
West March. The other documents are set down in no particular order
of date or theme and may be merely copies of those title deeds still in
Gloucester's archive. This hypothesis gains some support from the
presence in the volume of copies of grants since superseded by others
and by the absence of the duke's 1464 exemption from payment of fees
on royal letters which was later admitted to be lost. 9 This explanation of
the contents, however, is unlikely to be correct. The documents
included are selected by subject matter: royal commissions, grants of
estate office, licences to enter lands, grants of presentations to
ecclesiastical livings and of custody of minors are deliberately omitted.
More striking yet is the inclusion in the list of at least two grants, those
of the Hungerford lands in 1462 and of the Great Chamberlainship of
England in 1471, that had already been cancelled and for which the
6 BORTHWICK PAPERS

surrendered originals survive in the chancery files for cancelled letters

patent. 10 These two entries are therefore based on copies, which were
probably taken deliberately from the enrolments on the patent roll.
This section of the volume, in short, contains Richard's title to
properties that he l1ad held or still held. The most likely date of this
portion is 1472, as it omits other documents ofJanuary 1473 of similar
character, but it could be as late as July 1474. It may be significant that
the latest item, the indenture of partition of that date, was left
unfmished.
A major omission from this part of the volume is Richard's charter of
creation as Duke of Gloucester in 1461, but otherwise all the main
grants are included. For the period of his minority there are patents of
Richmond honour, the forfeited lands of Lord Hungerford, the
Beaufort Dukes of Somerset, the De Vere Earls of Oxford, and of
various Duchy of Lancaster properties. These grants, however, were
impc1111anent: Edward IV transferred Richmond honour to l1is other
brother Clarence in 1462; the Beauforts and De Veres were all restored
in blood and recovered their possessions; and Margaret, Lady
Hungerford convinced the king that her grandson had never held the
family estates and so could not have forfeited the1n. As the first
monarch of a fragile new dynasty, Edward was anxious to come to
terms with as many of his erstwhile opponents as he could and tnost
attainders were ultimately reversed. That Gloucester, as recipient of
such grants, was a minor who had not taken seisin and who was unable
to object obviously made the king's decisions to restore these estates
very much easier to make. 11 The result was that Gloucester had few
lands to enter when declared of age sometime in 1468. Although still
only sixteen years of age, the duke or possibly his advisers took
immediate action to assert his rights. Following the second attainder of
Henry Beaufort, Duke of Somerset, Gloucester was again entitled both
to his possessions and to those of the dowager-duchess on her death in
1467. Further treasons in 1468 strengthened Richard's claim to the
Hungerford estates. New patents of October/November 1468, copied
into Cotton Julius BXII, identified more precisely the properties that
had been granted to the duke. Not so easily fobbed off by Lady
Hungerford as his royal brother, Gloucester concluded an agreement
with her on 14 May 1469 that gave him immediate possession of
Farleigh Hungerford Castle and the reversion of much else on her
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 7

death. 12 To this Edward IV added the lordship of Sudeley in

Gloucestershire and the duchy of Lancaster honours of Halton and
Clitheroe in Lancashire and Cheshire. Taken together, these would
have made Gloucester a major landowner in the north-west, on the
Welsh borders, and in the West Country, where his three principal seats
were the castles of Sudeley (Gloucs.), Corfe (Dorset) and Farleigh
Hungerford. This pattern of scattered possessions was not dissimilar
from the accrued inheritances of the greatest noble houses.
The political crises of 1470-1, however, gave Gloucester yet more
importance as a royal agent: he was despatched in late 1469 to Wales,
where he became Chief Justice of the northern and southern
principality, and then in 1470 was appointed warden of the West March
towards Scotland. These offices testified rather to Richard's potential
value than to any considered long-term planning by Edward. The
duke's exile with King Edward in 1470 and his return at the head of the
victorious ar111y in 1471 gave him new claims on his royal brother's
generosity and indeed he secured the bulk of the forfeitures then
available. Thereafter, as is well known, the duke concentrated his
attention on northern England and made himself, in Professor
Kendall's words, 'The Lord of the North' . 13 Any southern ambitions
were secondary. He gave way in Wales to the Wydevilles and in
north-west England to the Stanleys as part of the regional division of
power that characterised Edward IV's second reign. After 1471, in
short, the slate was wiped clean. Those earlier grants that remained
effective became of purely marginal significance.
This orthodox interpretation is contradicted by the inclusion ofearly
superseded grants in Cotton Julius BXII some time in or after 1472.
Why were these obsolete, if still formally uncancelled, patents
included? Why did Gloucester take the trouble to secure copies of
patents that had been surrendered and cancelled? Either he still held
these properties or had lost them to other people with better titles. It
seems most likely that Richard remembered his former rights and
hoped one day to make them effective. Richard recovered most of the
forfeited estates that he was granted in the 1460s, those of the
Hungerfords, De Veres and Beauforts, but not until long after the
event: he had to wait for the De Vere estates until 1471, nine years after
the original grant, and it was not for sixteen years, until 1478, that his
1462 grant of the Hungerford estates was made good. The two grants
8 BORTHWICK PAPERS

that were fo1111erly surrendered and cancelled, those of the Hungerford

lands in 1462 and the Great Chamberlainship of England in 1471, both
became his property eventually. Richmond honour and the Great
Chamberlainship were secured only in 1478 on the death ofhis brother
Clarence, at his own request and as the result of a bargain struck with
the king. 14 As regards Richmond, it is noteworthy that before
Clarence's death, probably before 1474, he had a copy of the charter of
libert'j of the honour issued by Richard, Earl of Salisbury copied into
Cotton Julius BXII. More striking evidence yet relates to his
appoint111ent as ChiefJustice of South and North Wales in 1469-70, the
former during the minority of the Earl of Pembroke, the latter for life.
On his return in 1471, when Pembroke was two years older and there
was a newborn Prince ofWales, the king had other plans in mind for the
government of Wales in which Richard played no part. Nevertheless,
claiming that both his original patents were lost, Richard secured
exemplifications of both of them on 26 August 1471, only three days
before the reappointment of the Earl of Pembroke and seventeen days
before the nomination of the Earl of Shrewsbury as Chief Justice of
North Wales. He must have known their grants were in the pipeline.
His new patent for South Wales was actually cancelled by the king, but
both appear in Cotton Julius BXII, whereas his appointment to the
council of the Prince of Wales does not. 15 It appears therefore that
Richard included all these items in the hope, perhaps the expectation, of
eventually making them good and did not give up hope just because
they were granted to someone else. Richard, of course, had never
actually held Richmond honour or the De Vere a11d Beaufort estates of
which he was nominal recipient in 1462. He was too young and his
nominal title was surely too brief for him to have become attached to
them or to feel resentme11t at losing them . That said, he nevertheless
seems to have remembered these grants or, at least, learnt of his
previous title and seen in these old grants residual claims that might one
day be made good. All magnates, of course, needed to have a long
memory for their rights, real and potential, and for possible rivals to
them, but Richard appears exceptional in retaining interest in royal
grants that had been superseded or cancelled. Clearcut royal decisions,
such as those transferring property to his brother and rearranging the
rule ofWales, did not deter him. He was also surprisingly singleminded
in pursuit of these claims, was prepared to wait for a long time to make
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 9

them good, and was highly successful in achieving his aims.

The rest of Cotton Julius BXII, post-1472 and perhaps post-1474 as
'
well, consists of miscellaneous items entered at different times in
different ink in the empty spaces left in between: an arrangement which
makes precise dating of most entries impossible. The contents seem to
have been selected because they offered the opportunity for defending
and extending the duke's rights or possessions. As lord of the Beaufort
lands, it was natural that the duke should keep a copy of the inquisitions
post mortem of the last Duke of Somerset, which recorded what he had
held, what he had forfeited, ar1d thus what Gloucester had acquired.
Similarly, as lord of Helmsley in Yorkshire from 1478, it is
understandable that he saw a use for an extent for 1353. As warden of
the West March and constable of England, it was appropriate that
Gloucester should have copies of the patent of the last constable, Earl
Rivers, and of the 1461 indenture as warden of the Earl of Warwick.
With such information, the duke could ensure that his rights were fully
exercised and did not lapse through oversight. But there is more to it
than that. By identifying rights due in 1353, the Helmsley inquisition
set a standard against which to measure the current situation, to identify
any that had lapsed, and thus constituted a basis for recovering them.
The duke could therefore make more of his rights than his predecessors
had done. Documents relating to Riclunond and Gloucester honours
reveal a particular interest in the appurtenant knights fees, militarily
obsolete and generally neglected, though whether the duke was
interested primarily in the potential income from feudal incidents or in
rights oflordship is unclear. Another group of documents ~bout forests
could have referred to Gloucester's office of Keeper ofForests North of
the River Trent, but that they are included in this volume and relate
solely to the Forests of Inglewood (Cumbs.), Nidderdale and Galtres
(Yorks.) suggests that his concern was personal rather than the result of
his official duties. The lnglewood documents, in particular, identified
the boundaries of the forest, which he did not hold, and the enclosures
within them, which he did, and may have justified the actions that
rendered the forest treeless and gameless by 1487. 16 As coheir of the
Warwick inheritance and its Beauchamp, Despenser, Neville,
Montagu and Holland components, it was logical for him to record
documents establishing his rights to an exchequer annuity, to the
Warwick chamberlainship of the exchequer, and to the office of
10 BORTHWICK PAPERS

weigher of Southampton. The identity, extent, title, and appurtenances

of the Neville estates were revealed by three sets of inquisitions and a
further document listed knights fees held of the lordship of Sheriff
Hutton (Yorks.). Together these provided information useful both in
defending Gloucester's tenure and for identifying and asserting rights
oflordship over his military tenants. It was logical that the duke should
record both the act of 1461 reversing the forfeiture ofJohn Montagu,
Earl of Salisbury (d.1400) and the original grant of 1337 endowing the
earldom. This latter patent included lands since lost, notably
Trowbridge and Sherborne. Did Gloucester, like his wife's
grandmother, contemplate recovering these properties under the
pretext that they were included in the earlier forfeiture? Why did he
include details of the process of 1397, whereby an Earl of Warwick lost
the marcher lordship of Gower, ifhe did not regard it as something that
might one day be recovered? The lordship of Gower, like that of
Ogmore which he did acqt1ire, 17 would have conveniently
complemented his own lordship of Glamorgan.
Examination of these later folios of Cotton Julius BXII thus
documents how Gloucester developed the long memory that was
identified above. Considerable administrative effort was directed from
the centre, almost certainly by the duke himself, to make the most ofhis
rights. Historical research was commissioned into the rights and titles
of his estates and offices. The results could have been useful in defence
against his rivals, but his objectives seem more positive than negative.
Most of the documents justified action, mainly to make the most of
particular properties or offices by recovering lapsed rights. There was
considerable attention to detail, even in minor estates, and a
consciousness of the potential of neglected rights, such as those over
knights fees. There was also a hint ofaggression against military tenants
and rival lords. What would the king, as lord of Trowbridge, or the
Earl of Pembroke, as lord of Gower, have thought if they had known
their titles were under review by potential rivals? But, so far as we
know, Gloucester did not actually pursue the latter two possibilities
before his accession, perhaps because the appropriate opportunities did
not arise. These later pages of Cotton Julius BXII offer the basis for
future action, some of which was taken before 1483, some not. All this
may appear speculative, since in most cases there is no evidence and
we cannot expect to find any to confi1111 my interpretation. But in
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 11

certain cases documented in Cotton Julius BXII it can be demonstrated

that Gloucester aggressively asserted and extended his rights. These are
the three disputes over the Warwick inheritance, a11d the Oxford and
Hungerford lands.
The best known, without a doubt, relates to the estates of Richard
Neville, Earl of Warwick and Salisbury (Warwick the Kingmaker).
Following Warwick's death in 1471, his Neville lands l1eld in tail male
were considered forfeit, and those ir1 Yorkshire and Cumberland were
granted to the Duke of Gloucester. A fortnight after the first patent,
Gloucester had his grant amended to cover lands held by the earl in tail
male of royal grant. Although these were in the process of being given
to others, such a patent offered the prospect, if the cirsumstances were
right, of securing them in due course as well. More immediately
important, Gloucester coveted those lands held by the late earl in tail
general both in these counties and elsewhere, which were held by his
brother George, Duke of Clarence in right of his wife Isobel,
Warwick's eldest daughter, even though much rightly belonged to her
mother Anne, Warwick's widow and the Beauchamp and Despenser
heiress. To obtain a half-share of these lands as well, Gloucester
proposed marrying Warwick's other daughter Anne and sought the
division of the estates in her favour. Edward IV was induced to agree to
a division in February 1472, although one involving the whole of
Warwick's estates, not nlerely a partition of the tail general lands that
would have left the northern Neville lordships out of consideration and
in Gloucester's hands. With the king's support Gloucester exerted
pressure, including the cynical manipulation of the Countess of
Warwick, to force Clarence to compromise. An indenture of partition,
partly recorded in Cotton Julius BXII, was sealed in July 1474, the
principles underlying it were confirmed by parliament in 1474-5, and
the late Earl of Warwick was therefore on1itted from the 1475 act of
attainder. These measures enabled both dukes to enjoy the lands by
inheritance by a complex series of legal measures, which cut out the
legitimate rights of the politically impotent countess and of a minor,
George Neville, Duke of Bedford. Beneficial though the arrangement
was to Gloucester, it did not satisfy him, and he took advantage of
Clarence's execution in 1478 to secure the king's consent to some
revisions in his favour and at the expense ofhis infant nephew Edward,
Earl of Warwick. Certain lands in Rutland and Lincolnshire coveted by
12 BORTHWICK PAPERS

Gloucester, however, could not be secured by agreement, so he seized

them by force, clinging onto them in defiance of the royal exchequer
until, as king, he could silence it. Finally, he initiated litigation in
chancery to secure an eighth share of the lands of the Beauchamp trust,
which were probably excluded from the original partition in 1474-5. 18
There are considerable parallels in the case of the Oxford estates. Like
Warwick the Kingmaker, the Earl of Oxford was in the defeated
Lancastrian army at Barnet, but, unlike Warwick, survived to continue
resistance. His lands were also considered forfeit, although he was not
attainted until 1475, and they were granted to Gloucester on 4
December 1471 . In 1475 a second patent was issued, which added the
lands ofAnne Cobham, widow of the earl's elder brother. 19 Gloucester
apparently encountered no difficulty in making good his title to the
earl's paternal estates, but he also took the opportunity to build on what
he was given by the king by securing those lands held in her own right
by the earl's mother Elizabeth, Dowager-Countess of Oxford .
Gloucester had a reversionary interest in these only if they descended to
her son, but this was unlikely to happen, since they were enfeoffed to
her use and she could direct by will how they descended after her death.
Gloucester had no claim to them during her life, but he was granted
custody of her and her lands on account of her son's treason and
persuaded her and her feoffees to convey her lands to him by deeds
copied into Cotton Julius BXII. The written agreement between duke
and countess, if one existed, does not survive . At best, he secured her
estates from the admittedly aged and frail countess in return for
concessions which were extremely light and in no way a fair price,
especially in view of her almost immediate demise. At worst, he
terrorised her into giving up her birthright and disinheriting her heirs
by threatening and maltreating her. Richard himself asserted the
fo1111er, but there is considerable circumstantial evidence for the latter.
There can be no doubt that the chancellor, Bishop Stillington, and most
of the countess's feoffees strongly disapproved of these transactions and
indeed Richard had to sue the latter in chancery before they would
release their rights to him. Edward IV is reported to have disapproved
as well. Another observer, William Tunstall, felt that it was
incompatible with Gloucester's honour as a knight and king's brother
to take advantage of her, ironically drawing the wrong conclusion that
the countess would not be molested!
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 13

The same capacity to make the most of what he had emerges in

Richard's dealings with Margaret, Lady Hungerford. His original 1462
grant of the Hungerford lands of Lord Moleyns was oflittle immediate
value, because they had been enfeoffed by Moleyns' father Lord
Hungerford to their creditors and were controlled by the Dowager-
Lady Margaret. On his majority, however, Richard concentrated on
the ultimate devolution of the lands on the expiry of the mortgage and
death of Lady Hungerford and exploited her anxiety about the future to
secure concessions. On 14 May 1469 they agreed that she would hold
the bulk of the estates for life and dispose of some by will in return for
immediate possession of three properties and the reversion of more on
her death. This binding agreement, which converted his vestigial
claims into solid reality, was not the end of the matter, as in 1474 he was
granted immediate possession of further Hungerford estates. Some
were due to revert to him under the 1469 agreement, but others were
not. This grant took account of two inquisitions post mortem of 1470
and 1473. One found that Lord Hungerford could not have legitimately
enfeoffed certain estates that he held as life- or joint-tenant, the other
that certain properties never had been so enfeoffed. The former fmding
was correct, the latter fraudulent. In both cases, the lands concerned
were subject to Moleyns' attainder and hence to royal grant, the 1469
agreement being ignored . It is impossible to prove who was responsible
for supplying the juries with this information and thus for procuring
the inquisitions, but Gloucester as beneficiary is the most likely
candidate. The inquisitions feature in Cotton Julius BXII together with
copies ofMoleyns' quitclaims to his father's feoffees and to his mother,
which demonstrates that the duke was responsible for some research
into the title of the estates. It may be, moreover, that Richard never
intended to be bound by the 1469 agreement and merely saw it as a basis
for further gains. The absence from it of Edward IV's sign manual,
stated in the text to be appended as evidence of royal approval, is
suggestive. 20 Had Edward indeed signed it, would he have been willing
to overthrow its ter1ns five years later? Moreover Richard did not, as
agreed, secure mortmain licences within a year, perhaps because he did
not try. However that may be, the duke's gains proceeded by stages, in
1469, 1474 and in 1478, when further lands reverted to him. Lady
Hungerford's inquisitions post mortem are also included in Cotton
Julius BXII. Had Richard designs also on the remainder?
14 BORTHWICK PAPERS

That Richard was acquisitive needs no emphasis and no justification.

He had to be, if he was to achieve the level of resources, newly inflated
for his brother of Clarence from 2000 marks to £4500, considered
appropriate for a royal duke and to endow a ducal dynasty. In each of
these three cases his starting point was a petition, which resulted in a
royal patent. No doubt the contents of the petition itself resulted from
some research, but once in possession more investigation followed,
which identified other opportunities. Further patents were normally
obtained, correcting errors of names and locations in the origi11al,
omitting properties wrongly included, but also adding lands initially
overlooked like those of Anne Cobham and rephrasing the terms
to allow for other possibilities, such as Warwick's tail male lands of
royal grant. These display great foresight, a remarkable capacity to
predict future eventualities, which we have already seen in the later
entries in Cotton Julius BXII . In other instances, notably in
Cumberland, the duke steadily extended what the king granted him
and whittled down the rent due for it. 21 Gloucester's relations with his
rivals show a similar step by step, carefully researched approach . He
made the most of his strengths, whether they were merely his
reversionary rights and potential for nuisance in the instance of the two
dowagers, his access to royal favour, or his physical custody of the
Countess of Oxford, which he had surely requested. He was extremely
flexible in the means used. He was prepared to abandon rights under
royal grant in return for a compromise, exchanging immediate gains
for his reversionary rights and other concessions. Whether he ever
intended honouring his promises is doubtful and certainly in neither the
Hungerford nor the Warwick cases did the dispute end with the
agreement, which became the basis of further action. If this was always
his intention, he concealed it well and his opponents were not prepared
for his subsequent conduct. His tactics were highly flexible . Sometimes
he rigidly enforced a royal grant, sometimes struck a compromise, and
once even exploited his hand in marriage. If appropriate, he used the
courts of law and proper procedures, resorting to chancery on several
occasions and obtaining new inquisitions on others. He himself had a
good knowledge of the law and was able to argue his case most
ingeniously before the royal council in 1472. 22 He was capable of
pursuing alternative lines of argument, those about the Warwick
inheritance being mutually contradictory, and it was probably he who
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 15

was responsible for devising the legal fictions that enabled him to
inherit by excluding the real heirs. Where research failed to expose
weakness and legitirnate channels were not enough, he en1ployed fraud
and presumably maintenance to secure favourable inquisitions. Where
law and royal influence alike did not serve his ends, he used force,
certainly seizing some land and probably terrorising the Countess
Elizabeth. He exploited his opponents' weaknesses, whether they were
political eclipse, extreme age or youth, or personal frailty, and showed
no compunction in driving his advantage home . Yet he was prepared to
wait and prepare his ground u11til the opportunity arose, as we have
already seen with reference to Cotton Julius BXII, and did not confine
his attention to one avenue of adva.n tage. This combination of careful
preparation, opportunism, flexibility in tactics, and utter unscrupulous-
ness and ruthlessness in execution go a long way towards explaining
why the duke was so uniquely successful in achieving his ends.
Obviously Richard must have been well-served by researchers and
lawyers he could afford the services of the best but their activities
needed direction, which surely came from himself. It was he, surely,
who identified the objectives and selected the means. It was he in person
who is reported to have threatened the Countess of Oxford, 23 it was
certainly he who put his case in royal council, and it can only have been
he personally who exploited his access to and influence with his brother
the king.

III

Gloucester, it has been said, was the creation ofhis brother the king.
He owed his lands and income to the king's grants, exploited royal
favour on behalf of himself and his retainers. Mr Morgan, Professor
Ross, and Dr Horrox in turn have seen 'in the steady consolidation of
Gloucester's power in the north over more than a decade the working of
a conscious policy by Edward IV'. For them Richard's power was the
expression and his activities the extension of the king's will. 24 This was
true in the literal sense that his power derived from the king, but he was
never content with what Edward gave him, always sought to build on
16 BORTHWICK PAPERS

it, and was reluctant to accept the limits that the king tried to place upon
his freedom of action. He did not allow his obligations or sense of
loyalty to his brother to deprive him of his political independence.
Richard is believed to have opposed the treaty of Picquigny in 1475 and
in 1478 he co-operated in Clarence's fall only in return for the
satisfaction of a shopping list of desirable ends. 25 Nor did he necessarily
confo11n to the plans that the king had for him. When in 1471, as in
1469, Edward IV reassessed his patronage and distribution of
responsibility, he revised his plans for Gloucester. The duke could now
be provided for from forfeitures without dismembering the Duchy of
Lancaster, so Halton and Clitheroe were resumed and the Stanleys
recovered their former dominance of Lancashire and Cheshire. That
Gloucester did not willingly resign anything emerges both from his
inclusion of his grants of Halton, Clitheroe and the two Chief
Justiceships in Cotton Julius BXII and in his exemplification of the
latter patents in 1471 just before the offices were bestowed elsewhere.
Evidently he still hoped to recover them . He expanded his Welsh
holdings by securing the marcher lordships as part of his share of the
Warwick inheritance and sought to develop them, while in the north-
west he continued to back the Harringtons in their feud with the
Stanleys. However, he gratefully accepted the new opportunities
offered him. He enlarged his share of the Warwick inheritance at the
expense of his brother Clarence and he extended his power in the north
by recruiting the retainers of the other marcher warden, the Earl of
Northumberland, and challenged his sway in his own country in the
same way as he rivalled the Stanleys across the Pennines. His combative
approach threatened public peace in the north-west, where the Stanley-
Harrington feud dragged on; in the north-east, where the royal council
intervened on Northumberland's behalf in May 1473; and in the
midlands, where his quarrel with Clarence embroiled Lord Hastings
and the Wydevilles and almost came to blows. 26 Although he exploited
King Edward's influence, steadily extending what was granted him, he
was not unduly concerned about his good opinion. Not that Edward
was supine in his relations with his brother. In 1473 he sought to
restrain Gloucester in the north, in 1474 Gloucester secured less than he
wanted from the partition of the Warwick inheritance, and in 1475 the
king deleted five manors from an ampler petition for the Oxford
estates. Even such measures did not check Richard, who established his
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 17

dominance of northern England in spite of royal wishes, just as the

Wydevilles simultaneously exploited their control of Prince Edward to
establish their hegemony in Wales. Once Richard had built up his
regional authority, Edward found it useful and came to regard the duke
as his main representative in the north. Richard's power there had
developed, however, in spite of royal wishes rather than as their
•
expression.
While Gloucester was consolidating himself in the north, so the
queen's family, the Wydevilles, and the Stanleys were strengthening
their hold on Wales and the north-west. It was perhaps for this reason
that the duke became less assertive in those areas, but a more important
factor was the rationing of royal favour. After 1471 King Edward
evidently felt that he had given Gloucester enough. Thereafter the duke
secured new patents that enlarged the potential of what he held, but no
more unconditional grants of land. Those admittedly substantial estates
he obtained from King Edward were in exchange for other properties
elsewhere or on leases for rent. Henceforth the two brothers bargained
together to their mutual advantage. That Gloucester's interests
remained very wide is clear from the list of favours requested in 1478,
but he was obliged to decide what his priorities were, what he wanted
to develop, what he was prepared to give up and what, just as vital, the
king was prepared to accept in exchange. To obtain the castles and
lordships of Scarborough, Richmond, Skip ton and Helmsley, Richard
had to abandon his lordship of Chirk in the Welsh marches to the
Stanleys and his town of Chesterfield, his West Country castles of
Sudeley, Corfe and Farleigh Hnngerford, and two Hertfordshire
manors to the king. As Edward IV also deleted five Essex manors from
a new patent of the Oxford estates in 1475, he helped reduce
Gloucester's holdings in the West Country and Home Counties and
focus his attention on the north. 27 Probably Edward was motivated as
much by his search for endowments for St George's Chapel Windsor as
by any desire to make Gloucester primarily a northern magnate, but by
1475 that result had been achieved.
Edward's actions merely accelerated a process that Gloucester had
already begun. The duke's interests were wide and the possibilities that
he foresaw almost endless, but he was not universally acquisitive and
aggressive, rather he was selective about what to develop and what to
let go and initiated the rationalisation of his estates almost as soon as he
18 BORTHWICK PAPERS

was granted then1. This emerges n1ost obviously in the case of the
forfeitures he was granted in 1471 , which comprised 11ot just the De
Vere and Neville estates, but those of other traitors such as Sir Tho111as
Dymrr1ock, Sir Thomas l)elalaunde, Lewis Fitzjohn, Robert
Harleston, John Truthalc and John Darcy. Only Harleston, Dymmock
and Delalaunde were attainted in 1475, the others escaping this fate, and
only Delalaunde's la11ds were i11cluded in Ricl1ard's 1475 patent. A
factor here may have been the title by which the lands were held, since
Alice Harleston and Katherine Delalaunde recovered their jointures,
the former presurnably ir1 response to her survi~g petition to the
duke. Gloucester also permitted Darcy to recover his lands, helped save
Sir John Marny from forfeiture, and subsequently petitioned for and
secured the custody of Marny 's heir. Did a similar deal lie behind the
decision to allo\v Dym1nock 's son to irilierit i11 1472?28 It seen1s that
some ifnot all of these escaped attainder because Gloucester preferred co
compromise with the original owners, probably accepting cash instead,
a secure title to part of the estates, or the wardship of the heir in lieu.
Some even of the De Vere possessio11s were excluded fron1 Gloucester's
1475 petition, but were given by the king to Lords Howard and Ferrers
of Chartley, the king's feoffees, and Sir Thomas Grey in 1475-6,
probably by prior ag.r eement with the duke rather than resumption by
the king. Sucl1 alienations did not stop in 1475, as he sold southern
estates piecemeal thereafter. 29 His holdi11gs in the south were
i11creasingly peripheral to his main concerns, althot1gh he 11ever totally
abandor1ed his interest t11crc and continued to employ southerners -
notably the Suffolk knight Sir Ja111es Tyrell in key positio11s.
There was nothing involuntary about Gloucester's advancement of
himself in the north . Starting off with his Neville lordships, his
wardenship, his chief forestership, and his chief stewardship of the
north parts of the Duchy of Lancaster, he steadily accrued further lands
and offices by purchase, exchange and by lease. Nothing illustrates his
determination to consolidate his position n1ore than the way he outbid
others for leases, perhaps payi11g more tha11 the true value because his
concern was not financial but political. He displayed the same
aggression towards the other northern magnates, intruding himself
into their spheres of i11fluence and adding conflicts with the Stanleys
ar1d Percies to his hereditary feud with the Neville Earls of
Westmorla11d . Could he be co11te11t with nothi11g less than supremacy?
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 19

Donlli1ance was what he achieved, 11ot by force but by compromises

that made him pre-emjnent throughout the region wrule leaving his
rivals free of interference in their own countries. Details of Richard's
indenture with Northumberland are well-known and were apparently
observed; we know of his reconciliation with the Nevilles of Raby, but
not d1e ter111s; and a forrnal agreement with the Stanleys can only be
suspected. At the end the duke had a free hand in Cumberland, and
north and west Yorkshire, and his authority was felt indirectly through
the Percies, Nevilles a11d Sta11Jeys in Northumberland, Durhan1 and
Lancasrure. 30 What is nlost obviously missing here and what must have
played an essential part is the diplon1acy that persuaded ms rivals to
accept his assessn1ent of mutual advantage rather than resorting to
violent resistance and which, in the case of Northumberland at least,
brought war111th and willing co-operation to the relationsrup. Similarly
it was not Gloucester the aggressor who built up his retinue, but
Gloucester the reconciler. The duke let bygones be bygones,
welcoming former rebels to his brother into his service; he was a
generous patron an extravagant granter of fees and an arbiter
whose lordship was valued and could be trusted. His intra-personal
skills, rus capacity to get on with people, inspire them, manipulate
them, and win their enduring loyalty and nostalgic memory, can only
be deduced. Such techniques reinforced the existing ties of kinship,
neighbourhood and lordship and brought not only the gentry but the
lesser nobility into his service. 31 Thus, in only twelve years, he forged a
connection that dominated Yorkshire and the four northern counties.
Initially a disturbing influence, he became a source of peace and social
cohesion.
At the centre of this regional hegemony was the duke's status as heir
by nlarriagc of Warwick the King1naker and thus of three centuries of
Neville tradition. Hereditary right conferred greater security of tenure
than a royal grant. He represented continuity, not a break with the past,
and could draw on traditional ties of service and loyalty. He consciously
fostered this image, developing the unity ofhis connection by residing
on his estates, building up his retinue, reinforcing the ties ofkinship and
neighbourhood, building extensively at Middleham and Barnard
Castle, founding a fair at Middleham, patronising local religious
houses, and establishing two colleges. 32 It was prestigious to be the
patron of religious houses and such houses could advance their patron's
20 BORTHWICK JlAllERS

prestige if they identified with him. Their estates and their patronage
could become an extension of his own. To found one's own college
conferred these advantages with a personal tie and offered opportunities
to advance clerics in one's service. But there was more to Gloucester's
foundations than that. Gloucester's predecessors at Middleham and his
near rivals the Neville Earls of Westmorland had their spiritual centre in
Durham cathedral and at their college at Staindrop in the same county.
His immediate predecessor, Warwick the Kingmaker, inherited three
such mausolea, that of the Beauchamp Earls of Warwick at Warwick
College, that of the Despensers at Tewkesbury Abbey, and that of the
Montagu Earls of Salisbury at Bisham Abbey. Warwick had wanted to
rest at Warwick, but was buried instead at Bisham, like his father before
him. 33 For Gloucester; Bisham was not enough, perhaps because it was
too distant and also because it was Clarence, not himself, who was Earl
of Salisbury. To build on his wife's Neville tradition and create a
spiritual focus for his connection, to equal and indeed surpass his
near-neighbours the Nevilles, he needed a substantial foundation of his
own, at Middleham or Barnard Castle. To found one made him the
equal of the Earls of Westmorland; to found two and on such a scale
- made him one of the oustanding founders of the later middle ages,
ahead of those like the Nevilles, the Beauchamps, or the house ofYork,
each of whom had only one such college.
Behind the obvious material uses of religion, Gloucester was a
genuinely pious man, whose strange blend of practical materialism and
spirituality was shared by many of his contemporaries. The duke
differed, however, in the scale with which it was expressed. Rising
costs meant that in the later middle ages new foundations were few and
relatively small by the standard of earlier generations. Men with large
incomes and no heirs, like bishops, could found them from income
during their lives, but even the richest laymen, without near heirs to
provide for, did not bear all the costs in their lifetimes and left much to
their executors. Richard Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, perhaps the
second richest magnate of his age, left the Beauchamp chapels at
Warwick and Guyscliff, which cost £3634, to be built and endowed
after his death at the expense ofhis heirs by a trust with revenues of£328
that lasted almost fifty years . The second Hungerford chapel at
Salisbury, which cost £823 to build and equip, was financed by
borrowing secured by a similar long term trust. Gloucester's building
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 21

projects were larger than this, yet work certainly began at Middleham.
The scale of the proposed endowment, 200 marks for Middleham and
400 marks for Barnard Castle, was also exceptional. 34 The
endowments may have represented a tenth of Gloucester's income and
a capital value of £8000. Ma11y such schemes, like Lord Botreaux's
North Cadbury College, failed because the founder could not afford to
part with the land, but Gloucester, whose ambitions were even larger,
could and did. An act passed in the 1478 parliament allowed him to
alienate six of his wife's advowsons to the two colleges and in 1480 he
actually did alienate six manors late of the Countess of Oxford to
Middleham College. Other alienations can also be regarded as an
extension of his northern connection: Seaham rectory, bought for
£150, was appropriated in 1476 to Coverham Abbey and lands in
Sutton in Derwent were given to Wilberfoss priory. Other alienations
cannot be explained in these terms. Three of the Countess Elizabeth's
manors and the Warwick advowson ofOlney (Bucks.) were granted to
St George's Chapel, Windsor and another manor, Foul1ner, was given
to Queens' College, Cambridge. St George's Chapel was the
foundation most favoured by King Edward, who selected the chapel as
his burial place, rebuilt and re-endowed it, and his consort Elizabeth
Wydeville was recognized as second founder at Queens'. As a
benefactor of these colleges, Richard was self-consciously identifying
himself as a prince of the royal house.
The Y orkist period inflated the importance of the royal family and set
them apart from the non-royal nobility. In the 1460s even the husbands
of the queen's sisters were ennobled. The level of income thought
appropriate for a royal duke in 1467 was seven times the 1OOO marks
thought suitable for Edward III's sons and Henry Vl's half-brothers and
three times the minimum qualification for a dukedom. In 1483 a
sumptuary act set the royal family apart from the ordinary nobility:
no maner person, of what estate, degre or conditon he be, were any
clothe of golde, or silke of purpylle colour, but oonly the Kyng, the
Quene, my Lady the Kynges Moder, the Kynges Childer, his
Brother and Susters, upon payne to forfeite for every defaute twenty
poundes. 35
That Gloucester shared this heightened estimation of himself is
suggested by his accumulation of great offices, whose value was
primarily honourable and honorific. Already constable and admiral of
22 BOl~THWI C K l>Al>ERS

England, he added the great chamberlainship in l 478. 36 It was his status

as a royal pri11ce that e11abled l1im to create bannerets in t 481-2, when
earls and barons could only dub knights. Lavish display was
appropriate to his rank: we have treated his bt1ilding operations, his
large retinue, and his lavish religious foundations. The fi11ishing touch,
which recognized his distinction as a royal duke, was the grant of the
Cu1nberland palatinate in 1483. 37 This gave l1im regal powers within
the county of Cun1berland rivalled among late n1edieval laymen only
by the Dukes of Lancaster. In his own day he was u11ique .
The act of 1483 creating the Ct1mbcrland palatinate purports to
confirm the demands of the duke and reads like a petition. It was a
reward to the duke for his good service against the Scots and apparently
reflects his desires. As we have seen, the palatinate fits his high opinion
ofhimself. It is also consistent with his normal step by step approach. A
succession of grants had given Gloucester everythir1g that the king had
to give in Cumberland except the forest of lnglcwood: the wardensl1ip
of the West March, the shrievalty, the enclosures i11 lnglewood, and
two Duchy of Lancaster manors. These were not held in fee simple or
tail, but temporarily, for years, life or lease. Rents of £106 13s. 4d. w ere
due for the sheriffs farm and the Duchy leases. 38 The duke's logical
next step was to secure the freehold and cancel the rent, which the
creation of the palatinate achieved. Obviously there was more potential
for increasing revenue for a lord on the spot than for a distant king-
more people would attend a local court than one at Westminster and
the palatinate would reinforce his authority over the other local
magnates. The inducement for King Edward to give up his regalian
rights, his rents, and indeed a lump sum of 10,000 marks was the
prospect of permanent savings in the warden's salary, running at 1200
marks in peacetime and £1000 in war. Edward was certainly seeking to
reduce the cost, 39 which was difficult to achieve in wartime,
particularly as Gloucester's existing indenture still had seven years to
run. As the duke's salary had not been regularly paid, the loss of income
was initially more impressive in theory than in practice, especially as the
lump sum itself was certainly not paid imn1ediately. 111 the longer term,
the duke lost income that was highly unlikely to be fully made up by
more intensive administration. It might however be forthcoming from
any conquests in Scotland, which the act granted to Richard in fee
simple. Historians have tended to play down this provision and
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 23

certainly it was a high risk strategy. Yet, as we have seen, Gloucester

often saw potential in unpromising circumstances and frequently
sought to broaden the scope of royal grants in his favour at no extra cost
to the king. As warden of the West March since 1470, sheriffsince 1474,
he knew what resources were available in the county. His recent
campaign in Scotland had indicated what military resources were
necessary, he could count on assembling the same manpower from his
retinue for his own purposes as he had for the king, and he had raised
10000 marks towards the costs by capitalising his wardenship. The
ruthless exploiter of weakness in his English disputes, he may well have
seen a favourable opportunity in Scotland in its weak king and factional
divisions. It had been these that had prevented any effective opposition
to his 1482 campaign. The war was continuing and Gloucester could
count on the hostility of the Duke of Albany to the government and on
persistent fighting in the East March. In fact, as we know, factional
strife was to persist until James III's death in 1488 and into the minority
of his son. Perhaps therefore he was right to see a wonderful
opportunity for his aggression, which had been so successful in
England, to be applied towards constructing a semi-independent
principality for himself in Scotland. The obvious parallels are those
No1111an warlords, who carved out territory for themselves in Wales
and Ireland. It was a substitute for the throne that younger brothers of
kings in England, France and Scotland so hankered after at this time.
That he did not was because the throne of England proved a more
•
attracttve prospect.

IV

The Cumberland palatinate can thus be seen as the consummation of

Gloucester's policy throughout the 1470s and set the fmishing touches
to his creation of a northern dynasty more concentrated, more
powerful and more per111anent than that ofthe Nevilles which preceded
it. The stakes were very high, of course. Gloucester risked taking on
forces too powerful for him to cope with by himself with fmancial
resources that demanded quick and easy victory. Such a perilous course
24 BORTHWICK PAPERS

had to be pursued, however, if Gloucester was to retain the power that

he had already constructed, which was threatened with imminent
collapse in 1483.
The enhanced status of the Yorkist royal family implied higher
expenditure for royal dukes. Accordingly Edward IV treated his
brothers exceptionally generously. His grants were intended to endow
their new ducal houses in perpetuity. The recipients were expected to
retain the lands and live off the income. Clarence, indeed, did so, but
Gloucester was different. Evidently he regarded the retention of his
lands and their role as a source of income as subsidiary to his political
and religious priorities. His lordship of Middleham 40 and no doubt all
his northern lands were burdened with fees and can have yielded him
little disposable income. We are ill-informed about Gloucester's
ordinary expenditure the cost of his household and his style of dress
-but can recognize his building and land-purchases to be exceptional.
The wardenship of the marches probably cost him more than the salary,
particularly as he was irregularly paid. Rents were due from leasehold
estates to the king. In his bargains with Lady Hungerford, Lady
Latimer and the Countess of Oxford he agreed to pay annuities, debts
and other expenses on their behalf. 41 Taken together, there is reason to
suppose that the duke was spending above his income and may
therefore have been running into debt. There is no direct evidence of
this, however, and it should not perhaps be expected: in the absence of
Gloucester's accounts, any evidence must necessarily be random and
nothing can safely be deduced from its absence . The inadequacy of his
ordinary income to meet his expenses may be why Gloucester sought
other sources of revenue: mines, wardships, 42 and recovery of lost
rights. He may also have administered his estates more efficiently,
though this last remains to be demonstrated. He also sold lands. As we
have already seen, Gloucester actually secured less lands than he was
granted, sometimes because he compounded with the former owners,
in other cases because he sold out to third parties. By such transactions
he may have realised the capital value of these estates, occasionally
investing the proceeds in other properties, 43 more commonly meeting
immediate expenses. When account is taken of those properties
reswned by the king, others lost for unrecorded reasons, and the large
number alienated in mortmain, it is clear that the duke lost far more
than he bought and that both the number of his estates and his income
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOU C ESTER 25
from them must have been declining . Instead of retaining his lands as a
source of income, as an endowment as Edward IV had intended, he was
spending his capital on current expenses. Instead of accumulating more
lands than his brother Clarence, as Professor Ross suggested, he seems
more likely to have ended up with less.
In the longer ter111, therefore, Richard was faced with two
alternatives. To balance his books, he needed either to reduce his
expenditure or to increase his income. The grant of the Cumberland
palatinate in 1483 implied increased, rather than reduced, expenditure
and thus indicates that he had rejected retrenchment as an option. To
increase his income substantially was difficult : he had no hereditary
expectations and was ineligible to marry another heiress. The king, the
obvious source of bounty, was not prepared to give him anything more
at his own expense. Their exchange arrangements were bargains of
mutual advantage: it is not obvious that they were financially
advantageous to the duke, who was concerned primarily with political
considerations, and they involved the surrender of other lands for those
acquired. The duke's chosen solution to his dilemma in 1483, it appears,
was to carve out a new endowment for himself in Scotland. If he was
successful, he would thus reconcile his high expenditure and falling
income. The increased military expenditure required could be offset, at
least in the short-ter111, by the 10,000 marks provided by the king.
Failure, of course, would have exacerbated Gloucester's difficulties by
imposing extra obligations on a reduced income.
The Cumberland palatinate was thus the gamble of a desperate or,
more probably, a supremely confident man. Within four months,
however, one premise on which it was based had changed and
Gloucester's chances of success had dwindled disastrously, for reasons
that were foreseen nine years beforehand . The duke's power on the
borders, like that of Warwick and Salisbury before him, rested less on
his authority and salary as warden than on his retinue and revenue as a
great northern magnate. These, in turn, derived from his northern
estates: Penrith in Cumberland, Barnard Castle on the Tees,
Middleham and Sheriff Hutton in Yorkshire, all formerly held by
Warwick and Salisbury, plus those other lordships Helmsley,
Richmond, Skipton, and Scarborough acquired since. Gloucester,
again like Warwick and Salisbury, used Middleham44 and probably the
others to support many feed retainers and consequently depended for
26 BORTHWICK PAPERS

his inco1ne primarily on estates situated elsewhere. Warwick's

possessions elsewhere were certainly more extensive than Gloucester's,
particularly as Gloucester's exchanges and alienations reduced his
southern holdings and hence his capacity to support his northern
expenditure. Gloucester's lands in the north were thus essential to his
role as warden. Among these lands, the vital ingredient was his Neville
lordships of Penrith, Middleham and Sheriff Hutton , but his tenure of
these was fatally weakened on 4 May 1483 by the death of George
Neville, formerly Duke of Bedford, the son ofJohn N eville, Marquis
Montagu (d.1471) and male heir ofWarwick himself. 45
These lands were settled in tail male jointly on Ralph Neville (d.1425)
and Joan Beaufort (d.1441), Earl and Countess of Westmorland (to the
disinheritance of subsequent earls of Westmorland) and descended on
Joan's death to their son Richard Neville, Earl ofSalisbury (d.1460) and
to the latter's son Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick and Salisbury
(d.1471). As Warwick had no so11, the line ofs u ccession led su ccessively
to his brotherJohn, Marquis Montagu and his male heirs, to Warwick's
third brother the celibate Archbishop Neville (d.1476), to the male line
of Salisbury's brother George, Lord Latimer, and thence to other
branches of the Neville family that need not concern us here. The
natural course of inheritance was interrupted by the death as traitors of
Warwick and Montagu in 1471. Initially Edward IV's declared
intention was to attai11t them and he granted their Neville inheritance in
the north in tail male to Gloucester. In 1475 this arrangement was
revised by act of parliament, which gave them to the duke by right of
inherita11ce of his duchess, Anne Neville. The act barred the rights of
Montagu's son George Neville, bestowing the lordships on the duke
and duchess
also long as there be any heire male begoten of the body of the seid
Marquys ... Savyng to all the Kings liege people and ther heires not
atteynted, other than the heires male of the body of the said late
Marquys begoten and Isabell late his wyf ... such right , title and
interesse as they had or shuld have had if this Acte had never been
made.
The right heirs, defined as the heirs of Richard, Earl of Salisbury, the
feoffees of Richard Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, their heirs and
assigns, could not be penalised as they had committed no offence to
justify forfeiture . Moreover ,
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 27

if the said issue male of the body of the said John Nevill knyght
begoten and comyng dye withoute issue mayl of their bodies
comyng, lyfyng the said Duke; that then the said Duke to have and
enjoie all the premisses for ter111 of his lyfe.
However, if Richard and Anne's marriage was declared null they
were related within the prohibited degrees a11d had no dispensation -
Richard would lose the lands if he remarried during Anne's lifetime. In
1475 George Neville, Duke of Bedford, aged 10, was the only male heir
of the Marquis Montagu. One life only stood between Gloucester's
tenure and the eventual succession of Richard Neville, Lord Latimer,
who was also a young child born only in 1469. One may wonder what
caused Gloucester to agree to such terms. Presumably, as Professor
Lander suggested, it was the only way he could secure a share of
Warwick's tail general estates. 46 He may also have felt that he could
reinforce his position later.
Gloucester was certainly well-aware of the weaknesses in his title. He
secured a quitclaim of the properties disputed with the Nevilles of Raby
from the heir apparent Ralph Lord Neville in 1478. 47 Regarding George
Neville, it was obviously importat1t to Gloucester both that he should
survive, marry and have sons and that he should not ally himself by
marriage to anyone powerful enough to secure the reversal of the 1475
act and his restoration to his rightful inheritance. Remote though that
possibility doubtless was during Gloucester's lifetime, it was a very real
threat should he die. Initially there was very little that Gloucester could
do about it, as George Neville was in the custody ofhis mother Isobel,
Marchioness Montagu and her second husband. She, however, had no
power to marry him. On her death in 1476, the opportunity arose for
Gloucester to secure his custody and marriage. The grant was made
for1nally in 1480, but an informal grant may have been made somewhat
earlier. 48 An important interim stage, which Catl have benefitted
nobody but Gloucester, was the act of parlian1ent of 1478 that degraded
George from the peerage. It was there argued that he lacked the means
to support his estate, which was true of his dukedom but not of his
father's barony. His demotion may have reduced his attractions on the
marriage market, but the main purpose was evidently to prevent him
from arguing his case for restoration in parliament when of age. Once
the duke had secured the boy's custody, he had to keep him alive and
marry him off. It was probably he who arranged the marriages of
28 BORTHWICK PAPERS

George's sisters to Sir William Stonor (1481), Thomas Lord Scope of

Masham, Sir Thomas FitzWilliam and William Huddleston (both by
1487), but George himself was still unmarried at his death.
Perhaps Gloucester did not try to marry George off, but trusted
instead on buying out the reversionary rights of Lord Latimer, who
could inherit only on the deaths of George Neville and the duke and
might have been willing to concede l1is rights for more solid benefits,
providing of course that they remained shadowy and reversionary.
Three obstacles stood in tl1c way . Richard, Lord Latimer was also a
minor, who was not scheduled to come of age until 1490, and could not
therefore release his rights until then. As Lord Latimer and Beauchamp
coheir, he was already an in1porta11t nobleman and could not be
removed from parliament like his cousin George. Thirdly, he was
outside the duke's control. Following the deaths of his father and
grandfather in 1469, the custody of Latimer and his lands and his
marriage were granted in 1471 to his great-uncle Thomas Bourchier,
Cardinal Archbishop of Canterbury (d.1486), who retained possession
in 1480.49 That Gloucester feared Latimer's rights emerges from the
quitclaims of Middleham, Sheriff Hutton and Penrith ,
that he obtained
both from Latimer's aunt Katherine Dudley (nee Neville) ,
in 1477 and
from his grandmother Elizabeth Lady Latimer (nee Beauchamp) in
1480, even though their rights to estates held in tail male were vestigial
in the extreme! Their goodwill, however, was worth having and that
Gloucester enjoyed it of Lady Latimer emerges from her involvment
with him in litigation over the Beauchamp trust, from her will of 1481
that named him as supervisor, from her quitclaim to him, and from
their indenture of 20 March 1480. This agreement revealed that the
cardinal's custody of Latimer estates included her dower and jointure
for which he paid an annuity in lieu. Should this annuity cease to be paid
by the cardinal, she would be reimbursed by the duke. Why the cardinal
should default is not specifically stated, but it was 'for accomplishing of
the desire and pleasure of the said duke'. This could relate to the
Beauchamp trust, but most probably concerns her quitclaim of the
Neville lands to the duke the previous month, which Gloucester valued
sufficiently to have registered on the close roll . Gloucester also
undertook to pay the 300 mark annuity to her if'he or eny other to his
use have any tyme hereafter as well the warde and custodie of the body
of the next heire of George Nevyll knight late lord latimer' or of the
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 29
lands. Evidently Gloucester wanted custody of Latimer's person and
lands and enjoyed Elizabeth's support in this project. Whether he was
successful in obtaining it is less certain. In 1482 he leased the manors of
Snape and Welle in Yorkshire, but these were part of the dowager's
dower and jointure which came to Edward's hands on her death in
1481. The lease does not mean that Bourchier lost the custody of
Richard, Lord Latimer, still less that Gloucester secured it.
What is clear from these transactions, therefore, is that Gloucester
realised the fragility of his title, appreciated the significance of both
Neville minors, wanted control of them both, but was unable to
achieve anything concrete in either case before George's death. Precisely
what the duke had in mind is obscure. George's death reduced Richard's
tenure at a stroke from a hereditary to a life estate: his heirs could not
inherit. Even his tenure, however, could not remain the same. When
Latimer grew up, a reversionary interest would develop. Richard's
grants would no longer be in perpetuity and his retainers would want
their patents confir111ed by his successor, Lord Latimer. His authority in
his principal northern estates would decline and without them his heirs
would be left only with Barnard Castle and his lesser properties, a more
scattered, less valuable and less impressive collection. His estate even in
these was uncertain, since certainly the Clifford and probably Roos
heirs were living peacefully in England as heirs of their mothers. 51 No
doubt Gloucester himself could keep what he had, but could his heirs?
The duke was thus threatened not just with the loss of the resources
necessary to make his Scottish principality a reality, but also with the
loss to his heirs of his principal northern estates and regional hegemony.
There were three obvious ways forward for Gloucester to recover.
Firstly, he could have had his marriage declared null, and remarried.
This would have bastardised his son, deprived the duke of the Neville
lands immediately, and would have required an heiress of equivalent
resources as bride in compensation. The obstacles were much greater
than in 1484, when his son was dead and the Neville inheritance ranked
less highly among his resources. Secondly, he could have the partition
of the Warwick inheritance revised to give him a larger share of the tail
general estates that had been allocated principally to his brother
Clarence. It would probably not have been difficult to persuade
Edward IV to undertake such a division during the minority of
Clarence's son Edward, Earl of Warwick. A revision would have
30 BORTHWICK PAPERS

reduced, rather than totally nullified, Richard 's loss. Such lands, of
course, would not have been in the north he had already received all
those and they would not therefore have enabled him to retrieve his
position in that region. Thirdly, the duke could have petitioned the
king to make up his losses by further grants, which Edward, as we have
already seen, was reluctant to do.
On 4 May 1483, however, these possibilities were remote.
Gloucester's brother King Edward had died one month before and had
been succeeded by his young son Edward V. No major alienations of
royal property to the disinheritance of the crown were likely during the
king's minority, even though the duke himself became Protector on 10
May. His Protectorate was anyway temporary and was due to expire on
Edward V's coronation on 22 June. 52 Thereafter the twelve-year-old
king would be guided by a council on which Gloucester would sit but
which he would be unlikely to dominate. The other principal faction,
the quecn~owager's family the Wydevilles, had good reason since the
arrest of Earl Rivers and Lord Richard Grey to regard Richard as their
enemy ar1d to oppose patronage to hin1 . One of them, the Marquis of
Dorset, had the custody and marriage of Clarence's son Warwick and
thus had every reason to oppose the repartition of the Warwick
inheritance to the young earl's loss. Political circumstances, in short,
were unpropitious for Gloucester to repair his prospects in the
immediate future. Apart from the unpalatable option of a sharp
reduction in commitments and expenditure, Gloucester's best hope for
the future now lay in the usurpation of the crown. Like the Scottish
venture, usurpation was a gamble involving great benefits and risks,
but was to be preferred because circumstances had made the former
objective impossible to achieve. That he should have left himself so
exposed to a single perfectly predictable misfortune is why his career to
1483 does not make sense.

v
By concentrating on Richard's political and territorial career a11d by
deliberately omitting his piety, this detailed examination of his career as
Duke of Gloucester has undoubtedly neglected those less material and
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 31

more gentle aspects of his personality which he defmitely possessed.

That he was knowledgeable about the liturgy, the common law and the
law of a1111s, able to discriminate between them in practice and to argue
an ingenious legal case, points to considerable intelligence and
eloquence that one could anyway deduce from other evidence. He was
more than conventionally pious and had his own distinct and reasoned
religious preferences. Affection as well as sensual lust may well have
coloured both his liasions and his marriage, although the immediate
motive for his wedding was territorial self-advancement. 53 His
relations with his brothers appear emotional, if not necessarily war111.
We know that he contracted abiding friendships and was loyal to the
memory of those who died in his service54 and that he was capable of
inspiring loyalty and trust in others. He was generous, even
extravagant, in his rewards, though sometimes at the expense ofothers.
While well-acquainted with the laws and practice of arms, he does not
seem to have placed a high value on keeping his word and was decidedly
unchivalrous, in the modern sense, in his treatment of women like the
Conntess of Oxford who barred his path. That so many gentler traits
can be qualified in this way indicates not only the complexity of his
character, 55 but also the prominence of material motivation in his
make-up.
On the evidence so far considered, Gloucester was proud, ambitious,
aggressive, acquisitive and courageous. Not surprisingly, he was
independent rather than subservient in politics. He examined his rights
and possessions objectively, coolly identified his essential interests in
the light of long-term aims and acted on them with singleminded
determination. He possessed great foresight, took infinite pains, was
prepared to wait for years for an appropriate opportunity and was then
ruthless in its pursuit. Presented thus, he was almost a caricature of the
''wicked baron'', sharing the characteristics of many different
individuals of his order, but these were mitigated by the flexibility,
pragmatism, diplomacy, and capacity for compromise that he also
displayed. No wonder he was so uniquely successful in gaining his
objectives and advancing himself. This survey has also revealed other
ways in which he was unconventional and unusual. He was surely
unique in his reorganisation and dispersal of his estates. His religious
fonndations were more numerous than any other later medieval
magnate, numbering more than those of any individual Hungerford,
32 BORTHWICK PAPERS

and his alienations in mortmain were also unusually extensive. He was

also distinctive in his sense of dynasty. It is the latter that contains the
key to his personality, to which all other facets relate, and it is to this
that I now wish to turn.
Everybody ''possessed his own kinship network, distinguished by a
unique set of relationships with himself, within which his interests were
paramount''. 56 As a member of the house of York, Richard was related
to most English noble houses as well as to the king and queen. He
identified himself with the house of York at the re-interment of his
father at Fotheringhay in 1476, in his benefactions to the family colleges
at Windsor and Cambridge, in his claim to be Protector as uncle of
Edward V in May 1483, and of course in his claim to the throne by
hereditary right six weeks later. He acknowledged other kin through
his wife. He also had his own nuclear family, of which he was head -
his wife and legitimate sons, only one of whom survived at his
accession and at least two illegitimate offspring whom he
acknowledged and advanced while king. According to Professor
Stone, great noblemen wished always to preserve the family
inheritance intact, to add to it as far as they were able, and to ensure the
succession by fathering as many sons as possible. 57 Richard had at least
two sons: it was not his fault that they died prematurely. He does not
confo11n to the rest of the pattern in that he did not seek to keep his
•
estates intact.
To approach the topic from another direction, Richard was a
younger son without hereditary expectations. Other than his wife's
inheritance, everything he held had been granted to him in person,
admittedly in tail male. Contemporaries generally acknowledged an
obligation to keep intact for their heirs what they themselves had
inherited, but felt free to alienate what they had acquired themselves.
Richard thus found himself exceptionally free from moral restraints and
indeed also from the entails that so often tied the hands of other
tenants-for-life. Unlike others sinularly placed, such as his brother
Clarence, Richard exploited his position to buy, sell, alienate, exchange
and generally reshape his estate to an extent quite without parallel in the
later middle ages. His deliberate alienations in the south and
concentration of lands in the north was unique for his time. Nor was
this confined to his own lands, for he also alienated lands of his wife's
inheritance, no doubt with her consent, both before and after his
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 33

accession. 58 All this involved the disinheritance of heirs and suggests

that he had an imperfect sense of dynasty. The 1474-5 settlement of the
Warwick inheritance distinguished between the rights ofhimselfon the
one hand and his wife and issue on the other. If his marriage was
declared null, he would retain the lands for life, but his children would
inherit nothing. That no dispensation was secured by 1475 is
surprising. That none was ever obtained denotes either an
extraordinary carelessness inconceivable in a man of such remarkable
foresight or indifference to the fate of his heirs when his life-estate
terminated on his death. Like his contemporaries, Richard was well-
aware ofhis rights as heir. Unlike them, he apparently lacked a sense of
obligation to his own heirs, whose interests were subordinated to an
unusual extent to his own.
Richard's selfishness denotes both exceptional egotism and
individualism. Whereas other magnates thought in the long-term,
seeking to maintain the family estates and to foster the interests of
future generations of their dynasty, Richard gave priority to his own
good, his immediate political needs and the eventual salvation of his
soul. He was concerned only secondarily with the long-term interests
of his heirs, whom he disinherited by. his alienations in mortmain and
otherwise. If Richard's career as Duke of Gloucester fails to make sense,
it is because his aims were different from those of other magnates. Both
as duke and king, Richard appreciated that heirs strengthened his own
position by giving permanence to his tenure, but he did not
acknowledge any obligation to give priority to their interests over his
own. One wonders whether his sentimental attachments to the houses
ofYork and Neville were sincere or were merely further expressions of
Richard's self-interest. Certainly his seizure of the crown sacrificed the
interests of his wider kindred to himself and led ultimately to the
destruction of the royal house to which they all belonged.
While it is probable that Richard's character remained unchanged as
king, it is not the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the point. It is an
open question whether the same qualities were required of kings and
magnates in late medieval England, but certainly much ofwhat Richard
did as king seems compatible with his conduct as Duke of Gloucester.
Whatever one's verdict on Richard as king, this paper has revealed him
beyond doubt as a remarkably successful and far from conventional
member of the late medieval nobility.
34 BORTHWICK PAPERS

Notes

Essential research for this paper was undertaken in 1984 as Visiting Research Fellow at the
Borthwick Institute, University of York. A11 earlier version of this paper er1titled
'Richard III as Duke of Gloucester: A Mari with a Future?' was delivered at Teesside
Polytechnic in 1984. Unless other,vise stated, all docun1ents at tl1e Public Record Office
are cited by their P.R.O. call-numbers only .

1 C . D. Ross, Richard Ill (Londor1 1981), p 226. For what follows, see A. J. Pollard,
'The Tyranny of Richard III ', Joun1al of Medie11a/ History , iii (1977) , pp 147-65; L.
Attreed, ' From Pearl Maiden to Tower Princes: towards a ne\v histo ry of medieval
childhood', ibid. ix (1983), pp 33-5.
2 Objectives of Richard III Society listed on inside front cover of The Ricardian 93 Oune
1985). For the men1bership, see Ricardian Bulletin (Dec. 1985). For the
historiography of Richard III, see Ross, Richard III, pp xix-liii; A. R. Myers,
'Richard III and the Historical Tradition', History , liii (1968), pp 181-202.
3 P. M . Kendall, Richard III (Londor1, 1955), pp 282-5. For a n1ore balanced
assessment, see C. D. Ross, Richard Ill (London, 1981 ), pp 184-9.
4 Ross, Richard Ill, p 229.
5 A . R. Myers, 'Character of Richard III ' History Today, iv (1954), pp 513-14; English
Historical Docu,n ents, iv 1327-1485, ed. A. R. Myers (London 1969), pp 314-17;
Myers, 'Richard arid Tradition', pp 181-202; Kendall, Richard Ill, pp 27-150. For the
next sentence, see Ross , Richard 111, chs. 1-3.
6 R[otuli] P[arlia,nentorun1], (Record Commission), vi, p 101. There is no evider1ce that
any dispensation was ever obtained: Mr C. A. J. Armstrong undertook a specific
search at the Vatican archives and failed to find it. The absence of a dispensation
would explain why it was thought that there were 'quite sufficient grounds' for a
divorce of Richard and Anne, ln,~ulph's C hrouicle of tire Abbey of C roy/and, ed. H. T.
Riley (London, 1893), p 499.
7 Myers, 'Richard and Tradition', pp 182-3.
8 L. Stone, Fan1ily, Sex and Marriage in Erigland 1500-1800 (London 1977), p 85. Unless
otherwise stated, the next twelve paras. arc based on B[ritish] L[ibrary] MS . C otton
Julius BXII.
9 C [aleudar oj] P(atenrJ R(olls] 1461-67, p387; 1476-85, p 166.
10 C PR 1461-7, p 197; 1467-77, p 262; C 266163124, 34.
11 CPR 1461-7 pp 197, 212-3, 228, 287, 292, 298; M. A. Hicks, ' Edward IV, the Duke
of Somerset and Lancastrian Loyalisn1 in the North', Northern History xx (1984), pp
26-7; idem, 'Piety and Lineage in the Wars of the Roses: The Hungerford
Experience', Kings and Nobles 1377-1529, ed. R. A. Griffiths and J . W. Sherborne
(Gloucester, 1986), p95;J . R. Lander, C ro1vn andNobility 1450-1509 (Londor1, 1976),
p 133. The judgement in the r1ext sentence corrects Ross, Richard Ill , p 10.
12 C PR 1467-77, pp 139, 179; Hicks, ' Piety and Lineage' , pp 99-100. For what follows ,
see C [a/endar oj] C [lose] R[olls) 1468-76, nos. 198, 409; R. Somerville, History of the
Duclry of Lancaster, i (London, 1953), p 257n .
13 Ross, Richard Ill, ch .3; Kendall , Richard Ill, title of ch.3.
 RICHARD Ill AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 35
14 CPR 1476-85, pp 67, 90; M . A. Hicks, False, Fleeting, Perjur'd Claret1ce: George, Duke
ofC larence 1449-78 (Gloucester, 1980) , pp 150-1 ; Idetn , 'The Middle Brother : "False,
Fleeting, Perjur'd Clarence",' The Ricardian , 72(1981), p 309.
15 CPR 1467-77, pp 179, 185, 275, 277, 366.
16 M. A. Hicks, 'Richard Ill as Duke of Gloucester and the North', Richard III and tire
North , ed. R. E. Horrox (Hull, 1986) , p 15.
17 History of the County of Glan1orgau, iii, The Middle Ages, ed. T. B . Pugh (Cardiff,
1965) .
18 M. A . Hicks, 'Descent, Partition and Extinction : The ''Warwick Inheritance",'
B[u/leti11 of the] l[nstitute oj] H[istorical] R[esearch] Iii( 1979), p 124; 'The Beauchamp
Trust 1439-87', ibid, liv(l 981), pp 141 , 145; C larence, pp 150-1 ; CPR 1467- 77, pp 260,
2(X).
19 CPR 1467-77, pp 197, 560. For what follows, see CCR 1468-76, nos . 1214-15;
C 263/2/1/6. My interpretation agrees with Ross, Richard III , p 31. I hope to
demonstrate the reliability of the depositions elsewhere. The next paragraph is based
on Hicks, 'Piety and Lineage'. pp 94-103, esp. 102-3.
20 The original is Huntington Libra.ry HAP 3466. I am indebted to Miss Mary
Robertson for supplying a photocopy of this document and for confirming that
Edward IV's sign manual is absent and to the Trustees of the Huntington Library for
allowing me to quote from it.
21 Hicks, 'Richard Ill and the N o rth', p 15; below, p .
22 l11gulph's Chronicle, p 470.
23 c 263/211/6.
24 D . A. L. Morgan, 'The King's Affinity in the Polity of Yorkist England',
Transactiotis of the Royal Historical Society, Sth series, xxiii(t 973), pp 17-18; Ross,
Richard Ill, pp 24, 26; R . E. Horrox, 'Introduction' to Richard Ill a11d the .\.ortl1,
p 12.
25 Kendall, Richard III, p 118; Ross, Richard III, pp 34-5; Hicks, Clare11ce, pp 150-1 .
26 Hicks, Clarence, p 121-2; ide1n , 'Dynastic Change and Northern Society: The Career
of the Fourth Earl of Northumberland 1470-1489', Northen1 History, xiv(l978),
pp 82-4; M . K. Jones, 'Richard III and the Stanleys' in Richard III a11d the ·'·orrlr,
pp 36-40.
27 Hicks, ' Dynastic Charge', p 83; Hicks, 'The Warwick Inheritance', pp 123-4;
C81/151 Vl . For what follows, see M. A . Hicks, 'The Changing Role of the
Wydevilles in Y orkist Politics to 1483', Patro11a~e , Pedigree a'1d Power;,, l..Jter .\lt•dit>1•11l
&igland, ed. C. D . Ross (Gloucester, 1979), pp 76-9.
28 CPR 1467-77, pp 297, 336-7, 560; RP v . pp 130-1; C 81/1504/13; British Librar,·
Additional Charter 67545.
29 CPR 1467-77, pp 538, 543, 545, 560, 563, 567, 569; CCR 1476-85, no . 735; F. De,·on.
Issues of tire Exchequer (London 1837), pp 499, 501.
30 Hicks, 'Dynastic Change', p 89; L. Attreed, ' An Indenture between Richard Duke of
Gloucester and the Scrope Family of Masham and Upsall', Spet11/11111 lviii(l983).
pp 1018-25.
32 Hicks, 'Richard III and the North', p 18.
33 Rous Roll (Gloucester, 1980), no. 57.
36 BORTHWIC K PAPERS

34 M . A. Hicks, 'Countir1g the Cost ofWar: Tt1e Moleyns Ranso rn and the Hungerford
Land Sales 1453-87' , Southern History viii(l 986); Hicks, 'The Beauchamp Trust',
pp 135-49, esp. 140, 144; CPR 1476-85, p 67. For North Cad bury, see W. Dugdale,
Mo11astico11 Anglica1114111, ed. J. Caley ar1d others (Record Commission, London,
1846), vi(3), p 1423; C PR 1422-29, pp 189-90; 1446-52, p 230. For what follows, see
RP vi p 172; C . Sharp, Rising;,, the l\Jorth : Tlie 1569 Rebellion, ed. C. Wood (Shotton,
1975), p 369; Durhan1, Dean and C hapter Muniments, Regi ster IV, ff.174v-5 , 185v;
North Yorkshire Record Office, Middleham College Documents, ZRC 17503; R.
E . Horrox , 'Richard Ill and the East Riding', Richard Ill a11d tire North, p 102 n.11;
C PR 1476-85, pp 34, 255, 266. The fate o f 10 o ther manors of the countess is
tmknown: we re these granted to Barnard Castle C ollege, whose records are lost?
35 RP vi pp 220-1. I am indebted to my colleague Dr T. B. James fo r this reference.
36 CPR 1461-67, p 214; 1467-7, p 178; 1476-85, p 67. For the next sentence, see Hicks,
'Dynastic Char1ge', pp 99-100, 103-1 07.
37 RP vi 204-5. This is the source of tl1e next paragraph.
38 CPR 1467- 77 p 556; DL 37/55129.
39 E 4<W77/1/28; Hicks, ' Dynastic Change', p 94.
40 G. Coles, 'The Lordship of Middleham , especially in Yorkist and Early Tudor
Tin1es' (unpublished Liverpool University M.A . thesis, 1961). appendix B.
41 Hicks, 'Piety and Lineage', p 99; Cale11dars of Proceedi11gs i11 Chancery in the Reign of
Queet1 Elizabeth, (Record Commission, London, 1827) , i, p.xc; see below.
42 C PR 1467-77, pp 329, 464; 1476-85, pp 48, 226; C [alendar oj] F[ine] R[olls] 1471-85,
nos . 422, 491 , 677; C 8 1/839/3468; C 8V1638'73; see above.
43 He sold Wivenhoe (Essex) for 1100 marks, Hutton Pagnell fo r £500, South Welles in
Romsey and other lands in Hampshire for £200, and the FitzLewis lar1ds in Essex
worth 1, 100 marks (£733 6s. 8d.) a year, and wanted to sell tt1e Countess of Oxford's
London house. He bought tl1e FitzLewis lands, Seaham advowson for £100, Carlton
•
in Craven (Yorks.) for £430 6s. 8d., South Wells and appurtenances in Hampshire,
the manor of Utley , the advowson of Bulmer, and lands in Burton in Dustysdale
(Yorks. )., RP vi p 127; CCR 1468-76, nos . 1428, 1432; 1476-85, nos . 602, 735, 995;
Devon, Issues, pp 499, 501; C P 4<Y853 m .350; CP 25(1Y281/165'4, 7, 9, 14; E 159/262
Rec.Hill.1 Hen. VII m .23.
44 A. J. Pollard, 'The Northern Retainers of Richard Nevill, Earl of Salisbury',
Northen1 History xi (1976), pp 52-69, esp. 57, 64-5; M . A. Hicks, 'The Neville
Earldom ofSalisbury 1429-71 ', Wiltshire Archaeological j\!fagaz i'1e 72fl3 (1980), p 144.
45 The next two paras . arc based on my article; 'What Might Have Been. George
Neville, Duke of Bedford-His Identity and Significance', Tire Ricardian , 95 (1986).
46 RP vi pp 100-1; Lander, Crown and Nobility , pp 138-9.
47 Hicks, 'The "Warwick Inheritance",' p 124.
48 The probability would be increased if Gloucester had indeed arranged the marriage
on Montagu's daughter Elizabeth Scrope , as suggested in Attreed, Specu/u,n
83(1983),.102n, but the marriage contract was made in 1468 by Montagu himselfand
Scrope's father , B.L.Add.Ch.73901. Scrope and Stonor were certainly married by
1483, when two (not three) daughters ren1ained ir1 wardship, Stonor Letters and Papers
ofthe Fifteenth Century , ed. C. L. Kingsford (Camden Society, 3rd series, xxix, xxx,
 RICHARD III AS DUKE OF GLOUCESTER 37
1919), i, p.xxxiii; ii. 158. FitzWillian1 n1ay have bee11 married by 1484, CPR 1476-85,
p487. For what follows, see CFR 1485- 1509, no. 131 .
49 CFR 1471-85, no. 65; CPR 1467-77, pp 295-6. For what follo\vs, see CCR 1476-85,
nos. 650, 754; Hicks, 'The Beauchamp Trust' , p 124; Burghley House, indenture of
Gloucester and Lady Latimer. I am indebted to Dr M . K. Jo nes for a transcript of this
document.
50 CFR 1471-85, no . 677; C 14lfl7/'2J6.
51 Lander, Cro1v11 a11d Nobility, p 141; Hicks, 'The Beauchamp Trust', p 141 .
52 Ross, Richard III, p 74. When did Richard learn of George Neville's death?
53 Hicks, 'Clarence and Richard', The Ricardian , 76(1982), p 20.
54 C. D. Ross, 'Some ''Servants arid Lovers" of Richard III in his youth ', The Ricardiat1 ,
4(1976), pp 2-4. I am indebted to Mrs Carolyn Hammond fo r a photocopy of this
article.
55 I do not agree that Richard 'does r1ot appear to have been a con1plex man', Ross,
Richard III , p 229.
56 Hicks, 'Piety and Lineage', p 92.
57 Stone, Fatnily, Sex a11d Marriage, pp 85-9.
58 Hicks, 'The "War\vick Inheritance",' p 125.
 continued from inside front cover]

48 The Oxford Movement and Parish Life: St Saviour's, Leeds, 1839-

1929 by W. N. Yates. 1975.
49 York Civic Ordinances, 1301 by Michael Prestwich. 1976.
50 Piety, Charity and Literacy Among the Yorkshire Gentry, 1370-1480
by M. G. A. Vale. 1976.
51 Jonathan Gray and Church Music in York, 1770-1830 by N. Temperley.
1977.
52 DearthandDistressin Yorkshire, 1793-1801 by R.A.E . Wells. 1977.
53 Marston Moor, 2 July 1644: The Sources and the Site by P. R.
Newman. 1978.
54 William Cumin: Border Politics and the Bishopric of Durham 1141-
1144 by Alan Young. 1978.
55 Education and Learning in the City of York 1300-1550 by JoAnn H.
Moran. 1979.
56 Yorkshire Nunneries in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries by Janet
E. Burton. 1979.
57 The General Strike in York by R. I. Hills. 1980.
58 Defamation and Sexual Slander in Early Modern England: The Church
Courts at York by J. A. Sharpe. 1980.
59 Confiscation and Restoration: The Archbishopric Estates and the
Civil War by I. J. Gentles and W. J. Sheils. 1981.
60 Inland Fisheries in Medieval Yorkshire 1066-1300 by John McDonnell.
1981.
61 Poverty and the Poor Law in the North Riding of Yorkshire c 1780-
183 7 by R. P. Hastings. 1982.
62 Pastoral Discipline and the Church Courts: the Hexham Court 1680-
1730 by M. G . Smith. 1982.
63 Building Craftsmen in Late Medieval York by H. Swanson. 1983.
64 The Victorian Church in York by E. Royle. 1983.
65 Charity Schools and the Defence of Anglicanism: James Talbot,
Rector ofSpofforth 1700-08 by Dr R . W. Unwin . 1984
66 The Medieval Courts of the York Minster Peculiar by Sandra Brown.
1984.
67 Urban Magistrates and Ministers: religion in Hull and Leeds from the
Reformation to the Civil War by Claire Cross. 1985.
68 Nonconformity in Nineteenth-century York by Edward Royle. 1985.
69 From York Lunatic Asylum to BoothamPark Hospital by Anne Digby.
1986.