EN BANC [G.R. No. 168168. September 14, 2005.]
; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION; WHEN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDGARDO DIMAANO, appellant.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
Narzal B. Mallarres for appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TRIAL COURT'S
ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RAPE VICTIM GENERALLY
DESERVES THE APPELLATE COURT'S HIGHEST RESPECT. — This credibility
given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence
which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude
during direct and cross-examination by counsel. Absent any showing that the
trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, his
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENT PROOF OF ILL MOTIVE, THE REVELATION OF AN
INNOCENT CHILD WHOSE CHASTITY HAS BEEN ABUSED DESERVES FULL
CREDIT. — It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim
is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full
credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a
public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so
testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in
the absence of proof of ill motive. In the case at bar, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the complainant who
was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her
person. . . . We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and
found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELAY IN REPORTING THE RAPE INCIDENTS, DUE TO THREATS
OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, CANNOT BE TAKEN AGAINST THE VICTIM, MORE SO
WHEN THE LECHEROUS ATTACKER IS HER OWN FATHER. — Contrary to
appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her
failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite
opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the
face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more
so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions
brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to
doubt or even distrust what should otherwise be a positive attitude of
bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered justified the
filing of complaints for rape months, even years, after the commission of the
offense. In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an
indication that the charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions were
consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of
struggle and the studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought
about by genuine fear posed by her own father against her.
4. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; HAS NO PERSUASIVE VALUE
ESPECIALLY WHEN EXECUTED AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT. — Appellant's reliance
on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A
survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive
value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite
incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the
appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who
raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private
parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in
detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested
in pursuing the case.
5. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF AN
ACTION ONCE IT HAS BEEN INSTITUTED IN COURT. — Too, complainant
repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer
assisted her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve to
continue with the prosecution of the cases. Besides, the trial court is not
bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion whether or not to
proceed with the prosecution, considering that the compromise agreement
and the affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been
filed in court. Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign
State and to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. By
itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action,
once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or
absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed,
because the case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard
by the trial court.
1
6. ID.
SUFFICIENT; CASE AT BAR. — However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case
No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the
complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape. For a complaint
or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law
or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made
by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if
it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. Notably, the complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned
does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the
crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for
crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant "tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape" the complainant does
not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely
a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE; IN INCESTUOUS RAPE
OF A MINOR, ACTUAL FORCE OR INTIMIDATION NEED NOT EVEN BE
EMPLOYED WHERE THE OVERPOWERING MORAL INFLUENCE OF ACCUSED,
WHO IS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S FATHER, WOULD SUFFICE. — The
gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force
and without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force
and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element
of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction
will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is
12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must
be proven and also that it was done through force, violence, intimidation or
threat. We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or
intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering moral
influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice.
The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim
into submission to his beastly desires. The instant case is no exception.
Appellant took advantage of his moral and physical ascendancy to unleash
his lechery upon his daughter. Hence, under the above circumstances, we
affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for
the crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995.
8. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY WHERE CRIME WAS COMMITTED PRIOR TO
THE EFFECTIVITY OF R.A. NO. 7659. — The trial court correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the rape was
committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659,
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to
R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for the crime of rape, when committed against a woman
who is under 12 years old or is demented.
9. ID.; ID.; PENALTY OF DEATH PROPER WHERE THE SPECIAL QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF MINORITY AND RELATIONSHIP WERE PROPERLY
ALLEGED AND PROVED. — Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which
was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, thus applies. In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly
sentenced to death as the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during trial
by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself;
they were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and
birth certificate, respectively.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; PHOTOCOPY OF BIRTH
CERTIFICATE IS ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THE AGE OF THE VICTIM. — In the case
of People v. Cayabyab, this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a
photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim,
as the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The
admission of this secondary evidence is one of the exceptions to the "best
evidence rule" under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in
the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring its production. Indubitably, the marriage and birth
certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil registrar who is
a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is
admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to
note that appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence
to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and timely
objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same
became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is
bound thereby.
11. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; CIVIL LIABILITY; CIVIL INDEMNITY AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES; WHEN AWARDED. — Anent the awards of damages, the Court of
Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity and exemplary
damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed,
by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.00 and P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in line with the
prevailing jurisprudence. The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature
of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission of
the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying.
12. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED IN RAPE CASES
WITHOUT NEED OF FURTHER PROOF OTHER THAN THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME. — Finally, the awards of P50,000.00 and P75,000.00 as moral
damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court
of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The
award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need
of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her
to such award.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano
with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the
complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own
daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
2
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. 4 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. ADaSET
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she
was first sexually abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside
their house in Sucat, Parañaque, appellant entered her room and laid down
beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down then
inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but
she kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her. 5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he
asked her to lie on her side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While
in that position, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused
tremendous pain. 6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to
herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to
her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While
leaning on the kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her
breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his
penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant
immediately asked her to dress up. 7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996.
Appellant laid complainant down on the sofa then placed himself on top of
her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped
only when he heard the arrival of his wife. 8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta,
Rizal, who upon learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them
to go to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint. 9 The Medico-Legal
Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found her to
have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.
10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married
Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and begot three children
with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in
several companies abroad 11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in
September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped
complainant because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00
p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas. 12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29,
1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were other people in the house. He
argued that had he raped complainant, then she would not have
accompanied him to the Parañaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San
Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide
Shopping Center at Sucat, Parañaque, where they applied for membership at
the Video City Club. 13 He also maintained that the fact that his daughter was
in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it
because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with
another man her age. 14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and
credible. She narrated the obscene details of her harrowing experience which
no girl of tender age would have known unless she herself had experienced
it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the
quarrel between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife
to lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded the
Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since
complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. Besides,
she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted
rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is sentenced to a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is
imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is
sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional
medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor maximum. He is
ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused- A: September 1993.
appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: COURT:

In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as No specific date?
found guilty of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
A: I cannot remember, Ma'am.
sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim
MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as
found guilty of qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as A: 10 years old, Ma'am.
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death
penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00 xxx xxx xxx
as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened
exemplary damages. next, if anything happened?

In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision
xxx xxx xxx
correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as
RECORD: The witness is crying.
maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR
DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages,
A: He inserted in my anus — ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.
and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages. DACcIH
xxx xxx xxx
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?
of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this
case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review. A: No, Ma'am.

Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court. Q: Why not?

SO ORDERED. 16 A: Because I was afraid of my father.

In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues: Q: Why are you afraid of your father?

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS A: Because he might hurt me.
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that
occurred?
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE A: There is, Ma'am.
BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS
BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN Q: When was it?
ACCUSED. 17
A: After a few days after the first incident.
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she
could have reported them to the authorities when she accompanied him to xxx xxx xxx
Parañaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
relatives when she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the
trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes. HDaACI
ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only
pressured by her mother into filing the complaint. xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
We are not persuaded.
A: He removed his clothes.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side — pinatagilid niya
and attitude during direct and cross-examination by counsel. 18 Absent any ako.
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
his assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.
19 A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then
lying on his side.
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally
given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an xxx xxx xxx
innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened
willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an next, if any?
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could
A: He inserted his penis into my organ. 21
only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof
of ill motive. 20
For rape committed on December 29, 1995:
Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that
happened?

In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to A: There was, Ma'am.
the testimony of the complainant who was only 12 years old when she
narrated to the court the violations of her person as follows: Q: What is that incident?

For rape committed in September 1993: A: I was raped by my father on that day.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
3
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house. A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing
my breast.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time? Q: What were you wearing at that time?

A: I was then sitting at our dining set. A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.

Q: What about your father, what he doing? Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?

A: He was cooking. A: He raised them.

Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any? Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?

A: He told me to approach him. A: Shorts and T-shirt.

xxx xxx xxx Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?
Q: After you approached him, what happened next?
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him. went on top of me.

xxx xxx xxx Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
Q: What happened after you embraced him?
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
A: He held my breast.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After that, what happened next? A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived. 23

A: He kept kissing my breast. The trial court believed the complainant and held that:

Q: How many times did he kiss your breast? . . . The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the
indicia of truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete
A: Many times. with details. Her testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is
beyond question.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the
A: He put my shorts down. offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the
ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any? Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not
ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if
A: He also put down my panty. it is not true. 24

Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any? We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
A: He held my organ.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not
xxx xxx xxx diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and
ATTY. MALLARES: her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape
incidents, especially in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with
taken against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own
respect to organ.
father. Strong apprehensions brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can
easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what should
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court
When you say "organ", what do you mean? has thus considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even
years, after the commission of the offense. 25
A: Pekpek.
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that
COURT: the charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions were consistent with
reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the
Proceed. studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine
fear posed by her own father against her.
ANSWER:
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief. ITESAc consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches
no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?
afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact
that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina. 22
having the appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996: person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.? her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer
A: We were in our sala on the sofa. interested in pursuing the case. 26

Q: When you say "we", who are those you are referring to? Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by
stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature 27 and had
A: Me and my father. shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases. 28 Besides,
the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its
xxx xxx xxx discretion whether or not to proceed with the prosecution, 29 considering
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what that the compromise agreement and the affidavit of desistance were
happened? executed long after the cases have been filed in court. SIHCDA

4

Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the
State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. 30 By itself, an
affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it
has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute
privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the
case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial
court. 31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that
complainant never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father.
Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the
rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the
complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to
consent to annul his marriage; allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal
properties; and entrust the custody of his children to his wife. Rather than
contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant
raped her on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of
force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an
element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual
intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force, violence,
intimidation or threat. 32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation
need not even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of
appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and
physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission
to his beastly desires. 33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took
advantage of his moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon
his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction
in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in
September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant
in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to
allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again
quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. 35 What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. 36 The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense. 37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned
does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the
crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for
5
crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant "tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape" the complainant does
not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely
a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in September 1993
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime
of rape, when committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is
demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was committed
on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus
applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation; cDECIA
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as
the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly alleged in the information and proved during trial by the testimonies
of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they were also
supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate,
respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab, 38 this Court, in affirming the death
penalty, held that a photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible to prove
the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public record in the custody
of a public officer. The admission of this secondary evidence is one of the
exceptions to the "best evidence rule" under Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Further, we held that production of the original
may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no
other useful purpose will be served by requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the
custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. The presentation,
therefore of their photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove
their contents. It is also well to note that appellant did not dispute their
contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority.
Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of
this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed
admitted and the other party is bound thereby. 39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the
awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court
lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the
sums of P50,000.00 40 and P75,000.00 41 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.00 42 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory
damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for rape. 43 On the other hand,
exemplary damages is awarded when the commission of the offense is
attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. 44
Finally, the awards of P50,000.00 45 and P75,000.00 46 as moral damages in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals
are also sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of
moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed
that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award. 47
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00263
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch
257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo
Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant
in Criminal Case No. 96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is
AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape
in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the specific
acts or omissions constituting the offense. IDTSEH
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005.]
MELBAROSE R. SASOT AND ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and REBECCA G.
SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal
prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
(Branch 1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147. 1
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties,
Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code on unfair competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI
stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the
laws of the United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA
trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as "USA BASKETBALL,"
"CHICAGO BULLS," "ORLANDO MAGIC," "LOS ANGELES LAKERS," "ROCKETS,"
"PHOENIX SUNS," "BULLETS," "PACERS," "CHARLOTTE HORNETS,"
"BLAZERS," "DENVER NUGGETS," "SACRAMENTO KINGS," "MIAMI HEAT,"
"UTAH JAZZ," "DETROIT PISTONS," "MILWAUKEE BUCKS," "SEATTLE SONICS,"
"TORONTO RAPTORS," "ATLANTA HAWKS," "CAVS," "DALLAS MAVERICKS,"
"MINNESOTA TIMBERWOLVES," and "LOS ANGELES CLIPPERS." These names
are used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport
shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly registered with the
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. The Report further
stated that during the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners are
engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit
"NBA" garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners' prosecution
for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 2
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as
President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del
Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the company's attorney-in-
fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil
and administrative complaints, among others. 3 The Special Power of
Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by
Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the
Philippines, New York, authenticated the certification. 4 Welts also executed
a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998, before Notary Public Nicole J.
Brown of the State of New York. 5
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen
Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against
petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 6 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
6
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of
Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the
appearance of "NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to
believe that the goods offered by them are those of "NBA" to the damage
and prejudice of the NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the "NBA".
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on
the following grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED 8
In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have
dismissed Welts's complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be
sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a
fax transmittal. 9 They also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine
patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they
have been using the business name "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC." since
1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to
complainant's, and they do not use complainant's logo or design. 10
The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his
Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original
copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to
represent it. Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to
prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended
party, as the crime charged is a public crime. 11
The trial court sustained the prosecution's arguments and denied petitioners'
motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999. 12
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision
dated January 26, 2000. 13 According to the CA, the petition is not the proper
remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised
therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the merits. 14 The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered to conduct further
proceedings with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147. DEHaTC
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the
CA. 16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, with issues raised as follows:
1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE (sic) TO
DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN BEHALF
OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND
WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS ENTITLED
TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE
ACCUSED.
5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION. 17
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of
the NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the
fiscal because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant
before the investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts
failed to show any board resolution showing his authority to institute any
action in behalf of the company, and that the NBA's trademarks are not being
actually used in the Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and
cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend
that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition. 18
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed
its Amended Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that
the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition
for reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000. 19
The petition must be denied. TCASIH
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.
20 The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go
to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
21 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and
reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are
no special or exceptional circumstances 22 in the present case such that
immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted.
Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition.
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the
Information filed against petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused, 23 their
arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the
fiscal, complainant's capacity to sue and petitioners' exculpatory defenses
against the crime of unfair competition.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then
in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates
the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue as
grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known
address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant's affidavit and
his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have
been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen
Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the
complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. 24 Want of oath is a mere
defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant
on the merits. 25
In this case, Welts's Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by
Notary Public Nicole Brown of the State of New York that the same has been
subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998, 26 duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the
7
complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution
Attorney Gutierrez stated that complainant's representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court, 27 and Prosecutor Guray
manifested that the original copy is already on hand. 28 It is apt to state at
this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in
the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report
the presumption of accuracy. 29
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from
which the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit: AcIaST
(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the
investigation conducted from April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997, and the
subsequent search and seizure of several items from petitioners'
establishment; 30
(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo,
Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping
the illegal manufacture, distribution and sale of "fake products bearing the
'NBA' trademark, and in prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid factory;" 31
and
(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of
the Pinkerton Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by
Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to their findings that petitioners
were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and distributing
counterfeit "NBA" garment products. 32
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing
of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of
public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination. 33
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code 34 is a public crime. It is essentially an act
against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured
party. The complainant's capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, 35 a case akin to the present
dispute, as it involved the crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against
manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of the
petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What
preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the
NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the
information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no
longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense
is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the
injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity
to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case.
We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape
prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim
of a crime has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before
our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign
corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign
states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to
which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and
enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied
in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into
because it is in our national interest to do so. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, with regard to petitioners' arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is
not entitled to protection under Philippine patent laws since it is not a
registered patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair
competition for the reason that their designs are original and do not appear
to be similar to complainant's, and they do not use complainant's logo or
design, the Court finds that these are matters of defense that are better
ventilated and resolved during trial on the merits of the case. acHETI
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this
case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24) where
Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings
with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005.]
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, petitioners, vs. HON. MONINA A.
ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned,
pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation,
may the information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the
ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-
Querijero dated 03 July 1996, 1 accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were
charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled
to Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, presided by
Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16
July 1996 in this wise: 2
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the
assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano entered a plea of
GUILTY to the crime charged against them in the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX
BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425 and they are
hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
and the period during which said accused are under detention is hereby
deducted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana
fruiting tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The
Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. 3
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions, first, to
admit amended Information, 4 and second, to set aside the arraignment of
the accused, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996. 5 In
plaintiff's motion to admit amended information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic)
Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for
transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45)
pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad
to Metro Manila.
2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it
conformable to the evidence on hand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the
herewith attached Amended Information against both accused be admitted
and subsequently set for arraignment and trial. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
8
Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996,
7 held:.
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court
has already decided this case on the basis that the accused was arrested in
possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to
amend the information.
Another Order 8 of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the
second motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the
Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor is hereby
GRANTED, it appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court
dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131 Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen
Bobares vs. Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by
this court on August 20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as
in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although
under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993 the
penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision
[correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under
the rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction over a criminal case
is dependent on the maximum penalty attached by the statute to the crime.
AHDaET
The amended Information reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there,
willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law. 9
This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City
presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa, 10 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
96-67572.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash 11 which was opposed 12 by the
People in its Comment/Opposition filed before the trial court. Subsequently,
while the motion to quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both
accused filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari 13 which
they later moved to withdraw "to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of
Quezon City to act judiciously on their motion to quash." 14 The Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 1996 15 noted the motion and
considered the petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997, 16 the trial court
denied accused's motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the
accused under the amended information. Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration, 17 duly opposed by the prosecution, 18 was denied by the
trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997. 19 Hence, the instant Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order 20
based on the following grounds: 21
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE
ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and
B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-66799. 22
In this Court's resolution dated 23 July 1997, 23 respondents were required
to comment on the Petition. They submitted their Comment on 18 November
1998. 24 Accused filed their Reply 25 on 02 March 2000. In compliance with
the Court's resolution dated 29 March 2000, 26 accused and respondents
submitted their memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 2000 27 and 26 July
2000. 28
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to
try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. 29
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and
whether or not the RTC, Branch 103, where the first information was filed
and under which Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to
try the case. SIEHcA
On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents
submitted opposing views — accused insisting on its validity, whereas
respondents asserted that the accused were arraigned under an invalid
information. Alleging that there being an alteration on the first information,
hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of
the accused, the prosecution insisted that the first information under which
accused were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the
accused's motion to quash, stating: 30
. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed
against the accused appeared to be sufficient in form. It was discovered,
however, that an alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana
fruiting tops which was placed at only 42.410 grams when the correct
amount should have been in kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily
vitiated the integrity of the proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt
made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the
correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the
prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective
a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy;
and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by
collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting himself from further
prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, either on the ground that the conviction is
void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a
party to it and therefore not bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-
245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful
maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight of the marijuana
fruiting tops as alleged in the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for
which they were charged before the information was tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when
they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased
weight in the now altered information which merited a much lighter penalty
was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in
jeopardy by the proceedings in court which was tainted with fraud.
The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle
with the courts by participating in a grand deception of pleading guilty to a
lesser offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering
and then tell the court that they would be placed in jeopardy for the second
time.
We do not agree with the trial court.
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest
proceedings dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were
apprehended "for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with each
other in facilitating and effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of forty-
five pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in bricks) and weighing
approximately forty-five kilos." 31
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and
arresting officer SPO1 Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were
caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops. 32 For
some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed against the accused
reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams. HDcaAI
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information
under which the accused were arraigned invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder
quoted:
9
Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the
court.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 33 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:
34
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as
nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court."
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. 35
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide
the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information
is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime
defined by law. 36
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which
the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied
with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110, 37 Section 6, shows on
its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court's point of view that
the accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they
"participated/acquiesced to the tampering," we hold that while this may not
be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. 38 Worse, we
cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of
guilty and convicted under the first information. Granting that
alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does
not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be
the subject of another inquiry.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, 39 the Court affirming the finality of
a decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or
set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where
the death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived
in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. aSAHCE
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the
information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained
finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment
is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
In Sanvicente v. People, 40 this Court held that given the far-reaching scope
of an accused's right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when
double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines argues, citing the case of
Galman v. Sandiganbayan 41 that the trial was a sham. We do not agree with
the respondent as the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock trial
owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who ordered the therein
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final outcome
of acquittal and total absolution of the respondents-accused therein of all
the charges. 42
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In
this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying
for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the
amendment of the information and seek to try again accused for the same
offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by
motion of the prosecution and at the time when the accused had already
been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of
the accused.
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v.
Escano, Jr., 43 upon which both trial courts justified their claim of jurisdiction,
was actually based on this Court's resolution dated 18 October 1995 where
this Court held:
The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as
amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the
imposable penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range of
prision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges against petitioners.
If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the
Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case under the first
Information. Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the
RTC Branch 103 was rendered without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not
invoke the right against double jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later
resolution superseding the resolution cited by the trial courts, specifically
Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with
jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572. The resolution provides:
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS,
CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and
efficient administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter
set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated
to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY
IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized under Rep.
Act No. 7659, committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions:
xxx xxx xxx
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR,
JR. DHcEAa
Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification
on the applicability of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 in
relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in
Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:
Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy
administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth,
the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to
exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING
10
OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
1972, AS AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.
This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco: 44
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the
penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted in
People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691
have neither amended nor modified this Section.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997, issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-
67572 is ordered Dismissed. Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are
forthwith ordered released from detention 45 unless there may be valid
reasons for their further detention.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 184537. April 23, 2010.]
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4TH DIVISION and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14,
2008 Resolution 1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM
0263, denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the
petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, and the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration done in open
court on August 13, 2008.
An Information 2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with
having violated Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue
injury to the government, reads:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the
Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public
officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern
Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with
the late Limpio * Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction
of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount
of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00), Philippine Currency,
without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the
government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price,
and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license
contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act
No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the
damage and prejudice of the government. DTcASE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319.
In a Resolution 3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted
petitioners' Motion to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of
the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused
the government, an essential element of the crime charged."
In a Memorandum 4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the
information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information 5 dated August 17, 2007, this time,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the
prejudice of the government.
The information, subject of the petition, now reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of
the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2
FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the
Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B.
SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares,
Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the
discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving
with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP)
and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and
non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by
then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the
Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and
Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the
benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government
and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. ITDHSE
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation 6 dated June 4, 2008
which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition 7 dated
June 18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new
preliminary investigation before the filing of the second Information
constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different
offense — that is, violation of Section 3 (e) by giving unwarranted benefit to
private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They
argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there
was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission
should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they
claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the
finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed
Resolution denying the petitioners' motion for preliminary investigation. The
graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial
amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary
investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged,
but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The
substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of
another preliminary investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of
the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary
investigation is not in order.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of
the information must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the
motion under consideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the arraignment of both accused shall proceed as scheduled. 8
11
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 9 dated August 6, 2008,
submitting that the two Informations substantially charged different
offenses, such that the present information constituted a substitution that
should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion 10 in open court.
Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court anchored on the following grounds: CTaSEI
I
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO ORDER THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE A QUO,
WHEN THE SECOND INFORMATION IN THE INSTANT CASE CONSTITUTED
SUBSTITUTED INFORMATION WHOSE SUBMISSION REQUIRED THE CONDUCT
OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO ORDER THE CONDUCT OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
THE CASE A QUO, SINCE THE SECOND INFORMATION THEREIN CONTAINED
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS WHOSE SUBMISSION REQUIRED THE
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
III
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO ORDER THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE A QUO,
ALTHOUGH THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MANDATES DUE RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE FINDING THAT PRIMA FACIE CAUSE EXISTED TO FILE
THE CASE A QUO. 11
From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not
the two (2) ways of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a)
by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or
another preliminary investigation.
In its Comment 12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters
that there is no substituted information in contemplation of law and
jurisprudence that would require the conduct of another preliminary
investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead to a
different determination should there be another preliminary investigation
conducted.
In their Reply, 13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses
charged in the first and second Information are not the same, and what
transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior conduct of
preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution,
substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and that its
submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
We find no merit in this petition.
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads: CAaSHI
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be ounlawful: *
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The essential elements of the offense are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. 14 ESDcIA
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its
elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago,
as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however
indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under both. 15
The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of
statutory construction that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word." 16
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information.
The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM
0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While
jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 17
provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense,
thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government;
or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct
offense. An accused may be charged under either mode 18 or under both
should both modes concur. 19
Petitioners' reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag, 20 ruling that, "in
substitution of information another preliminary investigation is entailed and
that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable
to the present case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of
information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor
v. Vivar, 21 that failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is
tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused
before trial, the denial of petitioners' claim for a new investigation, however,
did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the
records of the case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary
investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained
substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the
same must likewise fail.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the
first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second
Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue
injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a
substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded
on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a
Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for
barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the
evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
cCEAHT
To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited
the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan. 22 The same is inapplicable to
petitioners' case. In Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment
which entitled the accused to another preliminary investigation. The recital
of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely altered. In the
original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the
petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims
of the private complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is the
illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. In the case at
bar, there is no substantial amendment to speak of. As discussed previously,
12
the Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners' Motion to
Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be amended.
The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson, 23 where it was
written:
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling
of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense
or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new
preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some
of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no
longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled
or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required
if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new
criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is
upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must
be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no
modification in the nature of the charged offense. Consequently, a new
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
petitioners.
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates
due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case,
deserves scant consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new
investigation be conducted to consider newly discovered evidence, in
particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the audit
report. We are not convinced.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly
discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this
case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material,
not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. 24
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was
executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by
the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence
because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact,
such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the
preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners'
Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, 25 offered to dispute the charge
that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject
project. IECAaD
More important is the prosecution's statement in its Memorandum that,
"after a careful re-evaluation of the documentary evidence available to the
prosecution at the time of the filing of the initial Information, and at the time
of the re-filing of the Information, the prosecution insists on the finding of
probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the Office of the
Ombudsman." 26
Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo, 27 viz.:
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in
public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call.
Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the
exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory
powers. 28 The only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the
Office of the Ombudsman's action is grave abuse of discretion. 29
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim and despotism. 30
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent
to having acted without jurisdiction. 31
The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent
Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no
error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation.
As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation
is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the
offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary
investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an
exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary
investigation actively participated by both petitioners. EASIHa
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying
petitioners' motion for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08
CRM 0263.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 172476-99. September 15, 2010.]
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari 1 seeking to annul the 5 April 2006
Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Criminal Case Nos.
25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's motion to set aside his
arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as
President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998. 3
During petitioner's term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of
AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated
in General Santos City for development as housing projects. 4
On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors, 5 executed and
signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price
of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to
the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter
of the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the
same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only
P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented
the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale
became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of
Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS. 6 cIETHa
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman
representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General
Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit 7 against
petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and
(2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.
13
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999
Resolution, 8 found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 and falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the
following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names
appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
4.JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for
twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve
(12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
xxx xxx xxx
6.JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12)
counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the
government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-
RSBS; 9
On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12
informations 10 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations
11 for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other
co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,
12 with a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999, 13 of the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order, 14 the
Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioner's first motion for reconsideration,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to
evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof
dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court within
the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the
action thereon of the Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the
informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a
memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary,
stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers,
and checks for the purchase of the subject property. 15 HDTISa
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment
to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a
memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the
memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner's
name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio
approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner's first motion for
reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors 16 was tasked to review the records of the case. After
thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed
participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral
deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The
panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the
execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase
price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded
that probable cause existed for petitioner's continued prosecution. In its 19
December 2005 memorandum, 17 the panel of prosecutors recommended
the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend
the following:
1.The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military
be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner)
be DENIED;
2.Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against
Ramiscal and all the other accused for causing damage to the government
when it caused the payment of the amount of Php10,500.00 per square
meter for the subject lots when the actual amount should only be
Php3,000.00 per square meter. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of
the panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the
Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for
reconsideration 19 of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against
him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea,
the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006,
petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment 20 pending resolution
of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him
was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever
defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of
the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied
for lack of merit petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. 21 DTISaH
The Issue
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable
cause against him?
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from
the informations. He claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering
the prior findings of the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the
cases against him. Petitioner claims that heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should be grounds
other than the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to
sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner's
motion to set aside his arraignment. Respondent court argues that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and
pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment, violated
Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
as amended. Respondent court maintains that the memorandum of the
panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner was the final
decision of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, 22 sanction the immediate filing
of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even
during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the
Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7.Motion for Reconsideration. —
a)Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved
order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases
where the information has already been filed in court;
b)The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the
filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of
probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither
can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of
criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information. cIDHSC
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the
Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the
charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. 23
14
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, 24 otherwise known as the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused
within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused
has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is
later, thus:
Section 7.Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial. — The arraignment of an accused shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the
date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1 (g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of
RA 8493, provides:
Section 1.Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(g)Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court
circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 1 (g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7
of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted
from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
which is when the accused appears before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not
provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11.Suspension of arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a)The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b)There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c)A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. 25
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground
for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner's arraignment, as
mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed
Resolution, petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006
was already his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause against him. The Ombudsman, in its 19 December
2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioner's first motion for
reconsideration, 26 impugning for the first time the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion
for reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the
Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. SAcaDE
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner's defenses are evidentiary
in nature and are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits.
Petitioner's claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the
existence of probable cause against him is baseless. The memorandum of the
OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases against petitioner,
has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of
prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend
the following:
1.The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military
be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;
27 (Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors
finding probable cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. 28 The
Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal
complaints. 29 As this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda: 30
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory
and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this
Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence
are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
31 ICDSca
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman, 32 the Court explained the rationale behind
this policy, thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant. 33
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the
case. 34
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse
of discretion when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. 35
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere
with the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed
before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the
case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and
speedy termination of the case. 36 There being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings
with all deliberate dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Court's ruling in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 37 where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a
suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so
provides:
Section 7.Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the
petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which
denied petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is
immediately executory. caDTSE
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., * Peralta, Bersamin ** and Abad JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167571. November 25, 2008.]
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON
C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
15
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review 1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which
dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting
to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner
three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks
bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for
payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made
formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May
1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. 3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson
4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) 5 before the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. 6 Tongson claimed that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner,
he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not
Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks
had been falsified. IDAaCc
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents
showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those
appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse
claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, 9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara
found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice
(DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In
a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, 10 after finding that it was possible for
Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered
his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation,
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
AHCcET
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was
denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, 12 which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on
20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been
filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had
already prescribed. 13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the
Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the
investigating prosecutor. 14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had
no dealings with petitioner. 15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel
A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 16 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the DOJ, this time
through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. 18 Thus, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information 20 charging petitioner with
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 22 the DOJ, presumably acting
on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject
offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations
of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to
it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription
of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia
v. Reyes, Jr., 24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings
referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not
the one before the prosecutor's office. THEDcS
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the Court of Appeals
assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals
also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition
is a mere photocopy. 26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 27 Still, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with
the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently
without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. 28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that
the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. TCaAHI
The DOJ, in its comment, 29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four
(4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that
the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No.
3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner
and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the
Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being
intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that
a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure
an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct — the court
may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may
be served, 32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by
attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement. cAEDTa
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy
or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A
plain reading of the petition before the Court of Appeals shows that it seeks
the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a certified true
copy of which was attached as Annex "A". 34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals
committed a grievous mistake.
16
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, 35 a case involving
the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive
period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to
petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 36
wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a
special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. 37 He argues that sustaining the
DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave
injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his
control. 38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided
in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) . . .; (b) after
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) . . .
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. SACTIH
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense
under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326,
a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a
case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period. HAICTD
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment", 39 and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace
for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. 40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.
41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the
function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as
shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada 42 and People v. Joson, 43 is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice
of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the
complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the
accused. 44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao
and Parao 45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of
offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense. 46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte, 47 we held
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, 48 and
hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted. CAIaDT
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan 49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 50 which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)
and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused.
In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al., 51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose
of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
on violations of the Revised Securities Act, 52 another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case 53 is instructive,
thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act
No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with
the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive
or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase
and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to
toll prescription. 54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. 55 A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the
dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper
channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate
period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution
of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the
DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies. SHCaDA
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing
of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover,
since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is
also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. DCaEAS
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944. December 13, 2005.]
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ]
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO L.
AYCO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No.
1771 TB, "People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al.," for violation of
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence
consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State
Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence
during the proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27,
October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco,
he maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004
in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12,
2004 before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August
17
13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Ayco's act of allowing
the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly
irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be "coerced" to cross-examine
those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the
record. ASDCaI
By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the
Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State
Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for "Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct."
By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant
filed the complaint "to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and
lackadaisical handling of the prosecution" of the criminal case as in fact
complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Governor of South
Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary of Justice.
And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as
the prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting
it for hearing.
On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court
on November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same as "misleading" and
"highly questionable," complainant's having undergone medical treatment at
the Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed
to the trial court only on said date.
On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting
evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainant's failure to formally
offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time
granted for the purpose.
Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the
prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two
defense witnesses but he refused to do so.
By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with
"Contempt of Court" and "Grave Misconduct" and/or "Conduct Unbecoming
of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court."
On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds
respondent to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he
be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in
the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional
State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the
Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn. aTcSID
xxx xxx xxx (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case
there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in
writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the
court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute
the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a
whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the
complaining witness. 1 It is on this account that the presence of a public
prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state
interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people. 2
Respondent's act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in
the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor
designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which
could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondent's intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a
breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.
Respondent's lament about complainant's failure to inform the court of his
inability to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for
postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration
of his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates
may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of
the Rules.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a
fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor
Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent is advised that the same should be lodged
before the Secretary of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.]
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager
and authorized representative Norma Tan, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court Branch
3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and
"PETER DOES", respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be
reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered
reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator
duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City
pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13
of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. 1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San
Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are
the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General
Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato
B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the
respondents in I.S. No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John
Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin
Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and [left] unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell
which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00.
The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00
were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No. 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan,
Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that
on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed
the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933,
belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for
failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered
immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the
clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell[,]
its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of
P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the
respondents. 2
18
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against
each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery
under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three
(3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon
Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary investigation took place on
May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging
Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935. cCHETI
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of
his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was
parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the
wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of
the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp
not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his
family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp
with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4
In the Resolution 5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando
City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable
cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.
Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated
that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for
the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to
gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating
the existence of the crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing
the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their
failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations
of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the
law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged
into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No.
003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations
against them in Court. 6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of action and
concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted
design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took
[sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang
which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell
Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2600 to the
damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System
Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other
consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto
Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed
a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2,
2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the
two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal
action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts
that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with
more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides:
"Section 1.. . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed
[sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was
committed on May 7, 2003.
5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter
was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5)
months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal
liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by
prescription when the Information was filed. 9
In an Order 10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua,
Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3,
granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004
responding to the February 10, 2004 Order 11 to argue among other points
that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the
law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations
in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private
complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well
within the prescribed period. 12
Respondents filed their Opposition 13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner
filed a Reply 14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution 15 dated April 16, 2004
upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution
held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution
on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal
action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being
alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and
not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc). SCEDAI
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails
over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO
ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid.).
Petitioner then filed a Petition 16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on
the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge
ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses
charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
. . . "[c]riminal actions shall be instituted . . . [i]n . . . other chartered cities,
the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "[t]he
institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws." 17
Petitioner contended further that:
19
[the] filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal
action in these cases had prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered
by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on
Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations
of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the
petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these
criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These criminal
cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the
assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in
Zaldivia is [a] violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint
should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old
Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934
and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall
be commenced only by information." 18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month
prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment, 19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did
not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes 21 held that the proceedings
mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial
proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The
prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of
the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since
the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2,
2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the
two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the
respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled
in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judge's Order dated
February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription
period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents
Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No.
3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents
were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal
ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is
indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the
Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment, 22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did
not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise
that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash,
namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents
were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no
legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil
liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary
to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the private
complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not
the crime itself.
In the Reply, 24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed
the case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16,
2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely
stated but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed.
Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before
the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. AaCTcI
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a
Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved . . . may file a verified petition" 26
before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive
law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With
regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only
statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other
prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 27 this Court defined the parameters of
prescription:
[I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following
should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted. 28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is
two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91.Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the
attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively
commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases
falling within their jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
B.Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
20
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot
be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section
451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. — A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall
not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly
urbanized cities or component cities. An independent component city has a
charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as
early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, 29 this Court recognized the validity
of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as
the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved
in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule
in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the
offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on
May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1
of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that. STECAc
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred
to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission
of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As
a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the
effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan 31
categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special
laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this
principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations
of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to
file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of
the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only
had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it
prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial
Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge
Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice — National Prosecutors
Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I,
Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. — An information is the accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the
court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor
signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that —
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides
that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. — The complaint or information
is sufficient if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the
court, unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an
essential element of the crime[,] e.g., in a prosecution for violation of the
provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly
weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense
charged[,] e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. — For an
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial
Prosecutor; or wit[h] the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on
its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court.
xxx xxx xxx
21
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the
same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription
shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).
Presidential Decree No. 1275 32 reorganized the Department of Justice's
Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These
Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular
regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area
of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union
includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province,
Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was
designated to file the Information within the two-month period provided for
in Act No. 3326, as amended. AECacT
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is
unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private
respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances
and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the
Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say
concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected. 33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013.]
LEE PUE LIONG a.k.a. PAUL LEE, petitioner, vs. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE,
respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before this Court is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May
31, 2007 Decision 2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders 4 dated
August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion 5 for the exclusion of a
private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury pending before the
MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration 6 of the said order denying
the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion
Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies
(CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting
Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes
between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue
Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some
unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves inside the
premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees
were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of
Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-
99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City. 7
CTIEac
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary's
Certificate 8 issued by Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified
Petition 9 for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238 10 which covers a property owned by
CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court
an Affidavit of Loss 11 stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President
of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said
owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his
files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts
in locating the said title but it had not been found and is already beyond
recovery; and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as
collateral for the payment of any obligation with any person, credit or
banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing
averments during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order 12 dated September
17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of
the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion
praying, among others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside
claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in possession of
the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer
and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner
merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to
mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even
produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus,
on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999
Order. 13
In a Complaint-Affidavit 14 dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City
Prosecutor of Manila, respondent alleged the following: EcHTDI
1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer of Centillion
Holdings, Inc. (CHI), which corporation is duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws.
2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody and
safekeeping of all vital financial documents including bank accounts,
securities, and land titles.
3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owner's Duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 232238 registered in the name of CHI.
4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a VERIFIED PETITION
for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the aforementioned
certificate claiming under oath that said duplicate copy was in his custody
but was lost.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same fact of loss,
which affidavit he used and presented as exhibit "D".
xxx xxx xxx
6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost and misplaced from his files.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified
petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew that I was in
possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even
produced in open court the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238. acCTIS
Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated
November 12, 1999, . . . .
9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute, which dispute is
now pending with the SEC.
10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owner's duplicate of the aforementioned
TCT so that he could mortgage the property covered thereby with the
Planters Development Bank, even without my knowledge and consent as well
as the consent and knowledge of my brother Nixon Lee who is likewise a
shareholder, board member and officer of CHI.
11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with his
perjurious misrepresentation, a new owner's duplicate could have been
issued.
xxx xxx xxx 15 (Italics supplied.)
22
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit 16 to clarify
that she was accusing petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the
following occasions: (1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the
contents in his petition filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that
TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring under
oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying under
oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files. cHDAIS
The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case.
However, in the Review Resolution 17 dated December 1, 2000 issued by
First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to
dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the
Informations 18 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 352270-71 CR for perjury,
punishable under Article 183 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
against petitioner before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent
and as private prosecutor with the consent and under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. After the prosecution's presentation of
its first witness in the person of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca, Jr., 20 a lawyer from
the Land Registration Authority, petitioner's counsel moved in open court
that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from
participating in the case since perjury is a public offense. Said motion was
vehemently opposed by Atty. Macam. 21 In its Order 22 dated May 7, 2003,
the MeTC gave both the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to
submit their motion and comment respectively as regards the issue raised by
petitioner's counsel. IDAaCc
Complying with the MeTC's directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned
Omnibus Motion 23 asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of
any private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene
for the prosecution in this case. Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime
against public interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book
2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the offended party is the
State alone. Petitioner posited that there being no allegation of damage to
private interests, a private prosecutor is not needed. On the other hand, the
Prosecution filed its Opposition 24 to petitioner's Omnibus Motion.
The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order 25 dated August 15,
2003, as follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor, however, an offended party may intervene
in the proceeding, personally or by attorney, especially in cases of offenses
which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party.
The only exception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right to
[file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the
termination of the case, in which case he loses his right to intervene upon
the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. And,
in any event, whenever an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a
criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197).
SaETCI
Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in
nature and those that can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended
party. In either case, the law gives to the offended party the right to
intervene, personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such right only
when he waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute one. Such is
not the situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public crime and the
private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings,
subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 26
The MeTC also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 27
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition 28 for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Petitioner prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin the
MeTC and respondent from enforcing the MeTC Orders dated August 15,
2003 and November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin the MeTC and
respondent from further allowing the private prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings below while the instant case is pending.
By Decision 29 dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent,
holding that the presence of the private prosecutor who was under the
control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal
proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA
ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the
private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party. 30 Reiterating the
MeTC's invocation of our ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco 31 as cited by former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his Remedial Law
Compendium, 32 the CA ruled that "the offended party, who has neither
reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil action may intervene, and such right
to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved." 33 DSacAE
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that
respondent's property rights and interests as the treasurer and a stockholder
of CHI were disturbed and/or threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner.
Further, the CA opined that petitioner's right to a fair trial is not violated
because the presence of the private prosecutor in these cases does not
exclude the presence of the public prosecutor who remains to have the
prosecuting authority, subjecting the private prosecutor to his control and
supervision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 34 but the CA denied it under
Resolution 35 dated January 31, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF
PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD
THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO
INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY. 36 SCHcaT
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest,
does not offend any private party but is a crime which only offends the public
interest in the fair and orderly administration of laws. He opines that perjury
is a felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because
there are no damages to be compensated and that there is no private person
injured by the crime.
Petitioner argues that the CA's invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek
Goan, cited by Justice Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private
offended party must have a civil interest in the criminal case in order to
intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner
points out that said case involved the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek
Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime of
grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims
that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene because he was
one of the offended parties.
Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to
represent respondent in this case despite the fact that the latter was not the
offended party and did not suffer any damage as she herself did not allege
nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or
CHI suffered any damage that may be satisfied through restitution, 37
reparation for the damage caused 38 and indemnification for consequential
damages. 39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper
offended party that may intervene in this case as she was not authorized by
CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any private
prosecutor for that matter be excluded from the prosecution of the criminal
cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened
be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor alone.
40 CScTDE
On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention
of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules,
stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an
officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she
submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to
intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case. 41
The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that "[e]very person criminally liable . . . is also civilly
liable." 42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when
a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right,
honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission. 43
23
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
IaEScC
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a
private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Where the
civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
defines an offended party as "the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 44 this
Court rejected petitioner's theory that it is only the State which is the
offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the
language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to
assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or
private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the
private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 45 we also held that aDACcH
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house,
liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable
act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or
injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has
a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will
entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence
is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will
be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not
be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the
party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. 46 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No.
232238 covering CHI's property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to
be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent's personal credibility
and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and
responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury
to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance
of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by
respondent's timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case
being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan
v. Yatco, 47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes
are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of
the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where
the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings,
that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability
born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control
of the public prosecutor. 48 ACcDEa
In Chua v. Court of Appeals, 49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by
private respondent who is also the corporation's Treasurer, four counts of
falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholder's Meeting)
was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After
private respondent's testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved
to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed
to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the
motion and ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari
to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the
private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition
and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing
the private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case.
Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the
nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense
charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense. IETCAS
Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising
from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is
also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the
State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether
done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced
to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising
from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right
to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising
from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can
intervene in the trial of the criminal action. DHESca
Petitioner avers, however, that respondent's testimony in the inferior court
did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a
result of petitioner's alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no
personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel
as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a
criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should
be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are
the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the
crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute
a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no
waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish
the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor
did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that
evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party
has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors. 50 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.) IEHTaA
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that
the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's
motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos.
352270-71 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision
dated May 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Brion, * Bersamin and Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
24
[G.R. No. 152662. June 13, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN,
respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for review on
certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision
2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C.
Malolos."
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00
and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks
totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31 on
7 June 2000. DaAISH
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00
and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks
totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC; Branch 31 on
7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in
an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The
criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads: ECaHSI
. . . Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000
with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June
2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22,
had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a
quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings
having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997
yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the
hearing of Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review 5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution 6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition
to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring
respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision
of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had
already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
. . . this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in
the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was
notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject
checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The
private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended,
four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court. CDESIA
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152 (sic)
against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly
prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes 7 the Supreme Court held that the
proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are 'judicial
proceedings', which means the filing of the complaint or information with the
proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall
be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this
Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the
computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws,
finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes 8 likewise
applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.
According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act
No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930,
governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the
institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office
of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. 10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by
private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases. EHSITc
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 11
that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not
the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of
prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the
subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, 13 the Supreme Court ruled
that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal's Office for preliminary
25
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City
on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within
which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with
Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the
petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with
the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of
the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural
lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint
before the City Prosecutor's Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by
petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 14 and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 15
Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation
of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by
Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be
made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as
in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense. DaHcAS
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent's claim that the OSG failed to attach to
the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002
decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record.
A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the
petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that
annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket
Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively
erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already
prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription
for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22
cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) . .
.; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) . . . .
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. Cdpr
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 16 this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This
ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. 17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal's
Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal
offense.
Respondent's contention that a different rule should be applied to cases
involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between
cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.
18 is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, 19 Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, 20 Brillante v. CA, 21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 22
cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al., 23 the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the
Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in

all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies. EHTSCD

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of
1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the
checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on

16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension
of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was
raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the
petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with
the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent's own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting,
that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte, 25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The
only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is
to file the requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12

March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

26