Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.

De Roy vs CA

157 SCRA 757 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of Laws – Publication of Laws – Publication of Supreme
Court Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by
the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal
had been warned prior hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by
the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because said ruling was never
published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice
to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals

eople of the Phils v Que Po Lay

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders
amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act
or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20
in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject
violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

Yes. It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central
Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based
on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its
penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

NPC vs Pinatubo Commercial

FACT:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow] only
partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely
or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being
violative of substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining
competitive free trade and commerce.

ISSUE(S):

Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -

(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

(b) restrained free trade and competition.

RULING:
The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection
clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification
intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote
the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors
especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.

Neri vs Committee in Accountability of Public Officers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M
in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S.
CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Manuel B. Villar (Senator
Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners
seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed
by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution
No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of ₱200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in
the 2008 General Appropriations Act.
The Antecedents
On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng
Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008
General Appropriations Act, particularly the ₱200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P.
Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way
(ROW), and another ₱200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated
that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the
same stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM
Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional
insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to
Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,3 the full text of which reads:
WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly "advocated" (sic) the construction of the C-5 Road/Pres.
C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in Parañaque City to the South Luzon Expressway;
WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of ₱200 million for the C-5 Road Extension project in
the 2008 General Appropriations Act;
WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double insertion for the C-5 Road
Extension Project was made by the Senate President;
WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he was member of the
House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension
project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno
Uno, Las Piñas would be financially benefited by the construction of the new road;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his corporations, negotiated the
sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the same properties affected by the projects he proposed;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President caused the sale of his landholdings to
government as a grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the area, the government, and the Filipino
people;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in the overpriced sale of another
property, used his power and influence to extort from the original landowner the profit made from the overprice by the
Villar owned corporations;
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;
WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his personal interests
thereby sacrificing the people’s welfare;
WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed the trust of the people, and by doing
so has shamed the Philippine Senate;
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the people’s trust and confidence and show
that the illegal conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not go unpunished;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS
AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.
FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5
ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE
THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED
BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE
DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL4
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee) which
at that time was composed of the following members:
Sen. Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson
Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal
Sen. Joker Arroyo - Member
Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member
Sen. Gregorio Honasan - Member
Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee
was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan,
Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether
the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the members of
the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics
Committee.6 On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives
to the Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their
members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s decision on the
matter is final.8 Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee
Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.9
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10 where he stated that he would answer the accusations
against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another
privilege speech11 where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation
that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion
was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.12
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and
on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of
the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would
constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May
2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009,
the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision
on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence
to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator
Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to
publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity
upon publication.13
In its Comment, respondent argues that:
1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the alternative, the
instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and
afforded the opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or primary
jurisdiction or prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively pertains to
Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the adoption of
supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14
The Issues
The issues for the Court’s resolution are the following:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of
the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a
violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2)
of the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
The Ruling of this Court
Indispensable Party
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 7 – Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot
be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there
cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further,
an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable
from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which
does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit
a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of
the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid
multiple litigation.15
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that
she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters
of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting
Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature of Senator Madrigal’s interest in this case is not of the nature that this case
could not be resolved without her participation.1awphi1
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of administrative
questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice."16 Citing
Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this
Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:
x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of
fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their
resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction
of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.19
As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of
separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people."20 Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on
this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind
the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."21 The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the
legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the
resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of the Whole violates
his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted
solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that
the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee
to the Senate as a body.
We do not agree with petitioners.
Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court notes that upon the
election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also reorganized.
Senator Lacson, who first called the Senate’s attention to the alleged irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was
elected as Chairperson. On 16 December 2008, when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name
their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from
the Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to
nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him that it is the stand of the
Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to convene a
caucus to determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final but the records did not show that a caucus was
convened.
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations
against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the accusation that the Ethics Committee
could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case that Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten
members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity,
integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee
on Ethics and Privileges."22 However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics
Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged
irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it
from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator
Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on
the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the
Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority
of the members of the Senate.
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
by the Senate Committee of the Whole
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is
violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process.
We do not agree.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s
right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by
this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress in
the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt
from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process.
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority
to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only
to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.23
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and
publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right
of Congress to amend its own rules.
Prior Publication
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that
publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only
one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,24 the Court declared void
unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court explained in the Resolution25 denying the motion for reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative
inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress,
it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted
pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered
valid and effective.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.,27 the Court further clarified:
x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution
where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that
with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s directive, without any
reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a
forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the
allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.28
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or
the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless
such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the
proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole provides:
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.29
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be
published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication
of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.
The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the
publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot
dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published
in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication
before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal
rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole30 is an exact reproduction
of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges31 which states that the Ethics
Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists
of all members of the Senate. In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole32 is
an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges33 which
states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondent’s allegation in
its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum.34
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a
quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35 Otherwise, there will be a
circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate
must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and
Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.

VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division, Central Police District
Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against
petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner,
checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police
Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco
and his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily
searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live
ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and
Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner
was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the
CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.

SC affirmed CAs decision.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission of the offense
was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The law
looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive,
effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive
effect.(Exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws).

PNB vs. Office of the President G.R. No. 164815

FACTS:
Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lands
in favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was already executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private
respondents continued to comply with their obligation as buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage and became the owner of the lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled that PNB
may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortization payment and cannot compel them to pay again
for the lots they had already bought from the subdivision developer. The Office of the President affirmed this decision
by declaring Presidential Decree 957*.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment
HELD/DECISION:
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the contrary is provided. PD
957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take
effect to protect the innocent purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision
developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not reflect the intent and
purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the protection of human rights. It would also be illogical
if PD 957 which seeks to oust the fraudulent practices would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some
a technicality.
*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written
approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan
shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided
to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer
thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the
lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured
by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly
after full payment thereto;

CIR VS PHIL. HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS

FACTS:

On 1987, CIR issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth, as a provider of medical services, is exempt from
the VAT coverage. When RA 8424 or the new Tax Code was implemented it adopted the provisions of VAT and E-
VAT. On 1999, the BIR sent Philhealth an assessment notice for deficiency VAT and documentary stamp taxes for
taxable years 1996 and 1997. After CIR did not act on it, Philhealth filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA
withdrew the VAT assessment. The CIR then filed an appeal with the CA which was denied.
ISSUES:

1. Whether Philhealth is subject to VAT.

2. Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting Philhealth from payment of VAT has retroactive application.
RULING:

YES. Section 103 of the NIRC exempts taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital, and
veterinary services from VAT. But, in Philhealth's letter requesting of its VAT-exempt status, it was held that it showed
Philhealth provides medical service only between their members and their accredited hospitals, that it only provides for
the provision of pre-need health care services, it contracts the services of medical practitioners and establishments for
their members in the delivery of health services.
Thus, Philhealth does not fall under the exemptions provided in Section 103, but merely arranges for such, making
Philhealth not VAT-exempt. YES. Generally, the NIRC has no retroactive application except when:

1. where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of
him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts
on which the ruling is based, or
3. where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

The Court held that Philhealth acted in good faith. The term health maintenance organization was first recorded in the
Philippine statute books in 1995. It is apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in Philhealth's favor, the
term health maintenance organization was unknown and had no significance for taxation purposes. Philhealth,
therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT
Ruling No. 231-88. The rule is that the BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result
to the prejudice of the taxpayer.

DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS: A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors when the platform which he was on board fell from the
Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for DM Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened because the pin
inserted to the platform loosened and there was no safety lock. His widow filed with RTC of Pasig a complaint for
damages against DM Consunji Inc. The employer averred that the widow already availed benefits from the State
Insurance Fund and that she cannot recover civil damages from the company anymore.

ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil Code because she already availed
damages under the Labor Code

HELD: Although SC ruled that recovery of damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to recover under a
civil action, the CA ruled that in this case, the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she
was not aware and ignorant of her rights and courses of action. She was not aware of her rights and remedies. Thus, her
election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not waive her claim from the petitioner company. The argument that
ignorance of the law excuses no one is not applicable in this case because it is only applicable to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.

Emetrio Cui v Arellano University

CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first
year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the
said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at
Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano
University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which
Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private
schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students
in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano
University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not
mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant
if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1,
1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he
is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the
service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance
of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that
absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and
in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against
vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department
head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-
connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment
of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having considered the
statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of
Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety
the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary
Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
however, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of
1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission,
considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice
that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires”.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner’s
claim for benefits

NO

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent.
The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and
specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a
statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is
an express repeal; all others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the
new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to
be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
2. 2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate
to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter
of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits
under Section 699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those
aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in
an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature
being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

NOTES:
1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987
meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987
Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate
in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is
untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient
to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old
one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title
II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D.
1921, expressly provides that “the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system
(meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”

Case Digest on People vs. Licera

PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)] - Facts: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of
Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time
of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the
license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.

HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of
what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date
of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old
rule.

Chu Jan vs Bernas

FACTS:
Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant Lucio Bernas was
declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight. Justice of peace court decided that bout
was a draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and
comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights ,to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping
of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. Court of
First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial
treasurer and if possible, Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu
Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions
ISSUE:
Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for dismissal pronounced by lower
court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules
governing cockfights and duties of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law
that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.
Held:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision are not
reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the
issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law would be applicable, the
Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shal l be observed and in absence thereof, the
general principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and to record of the
proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special
finding is made with regard to cost.

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)

FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly
weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the
carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion
of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities
and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent
and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall
under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others
in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street when a
delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the street in the opposite
direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented
evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he
tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff
to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises
which frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and
was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has been a custom or
a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner which the cochero
left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has
acquiesced for years.

Yao Kee vs Gonzales

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal properties in the
Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration claiming among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina.
The petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China
and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of
Yao Kee’s petition but was modified and set aside by the court of appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom conclusive.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid,
but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom
must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence. In the case at bar,
petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of
the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural children, hence given equal rights)
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which
Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the
increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and
remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13,
1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown
complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April
14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for
tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant
to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap
year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary
period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months.
The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are
irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had
two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van
Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of the
parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

melda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a
child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that
while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial
court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.